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Apple Inc.
Apple corecrypto Module v13.0
[Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1]
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 2.0
December 2024
Prepared by:
Lightship Security Inc.
1101-150 Isabella Street,
Ottawa, ON, K1S 1V7
www.lightshipsec.com
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Trademarks
Apple's trademarks applicable to this document are listed in https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-
property/trademark/appletmlist.html. Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or
service marks of others.
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Contents
1. General................................................................................................................................................................. 5
2. Cryptographic Module Specification.............................................................................................................. 6
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces................................................................................................................. 11
4. Roles, Services and Authentication.............................................................................................................. 12
4.1 Authentication........................................................................................................................................................................... 12
4.2 Services ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
5. Software/Firmware Security......................................................................................................................... 16
5.1 Integrity Techniques............................................................................................................................................................... 16
5.2 On Demand Integrity Test...................................................................................................................................................... 16
6. Operational Environment .............................................................................................................................. 17
6.1 Applicability............................................................................................................................................................................... 17
7. Physical Security.............................................................................................................................................. 18
8. Non-invasive Security ..................................................................................................................................... 19
9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management ............................................................................................... 20
9.1 Random Number Generation................................................................................................................................................ 21
9.2 Key / SSP Generation.............................................................................................................................................................. 22
9.3 Key / SSP Establishment........................................................................................................................................................ 22
9.4 Key / SSP Import/Export....................................................................................................................................................... 22
9.5 Key / SSP Storage..................................................................................................................................................................... 22
9.6 Key / SSP Zeroisation.............................................................................................................................................................. 23
10. Self-tests ............................................................................................................................................................ 24
10.1 Pre-operational Software Integrity Test ........................................................................................................................... 24
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................................. 24
10.3 Error Handling.......................................................................................................................................................................... 25
11. Life-cycle Assurance........................................................................................................................................ 26
11.1 Delivery and Operation .......................................................................................................................................................... 26
11.2 Crypto Officer Guidance ......................................................................................................................................................... 26
12. Mitigation of Attacks ....................................................................................................................................... 27
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Tables
Table 1 – Security levels...............................................................................................................................................................5
Table 2 – Tested operational environments...........................................................................................................................6
Table 3 – Affirmed operational environments.......................................................................................................................7
Table 4 – Approved algorithms..................................................................................................................................................9
Table 5 – Non-approved algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation.............................................9
Table 6 – Ports and interfaces ..................................................................................................................................................11
Table 7 – Roles, Services, Input and Output..........................................................................................................................12
Table 8 – Approved services.....................................................................................................................................................14
Table 9 – Non-approved services ............................................................................................................................................15
Table 10 – SSPs.............................................................................................................................................................................21
Table 11 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification..................................................................22
Table 12 – Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests.............................................................................................25
Table 13 – Error Indicators.......................................................................................................................................................25
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1. General
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel,
Kernel, Software, SL1] cryptographic module. It contains the security rules under which the module must
operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 module.
This document provides all tables and diagrams (when applicable) required by NIST SP 800-140B. The
column names of the tables follow the template tables provided in NIST SP 800-140B.
Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual
areas.
Section FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Table 1 – Security levels
The Module has an overall security level of 1.
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2. Cryptographic Module Specification
The Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] cryptographic module (hereafter referred
to as "the Module") is a software module running on a multi-chip standalone general-purpose computing
platform. The version of module is 13 written as v13.0. The module provides implementations of low-level
cryptographic primitives to the Host OS's (macOS Ventura v13) Security Framework and CommonCrypto. The
module has been tested by Lightship Security, Inc. CST lab on the following platforms with and without PAA:
# Operating System Hardware Platform Processor PAA/Acceleration
1 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Air (2022) Intel i5 (Amber Lake) PAA
2 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Air (2022) Intel i7 (Ice Lake) PAA
3 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro (2022) Intel i7 (Coffee Lake) PAA
4 macOS Ventura v13 iMac (2022) Intel i7 (Comet Lake) PAA
5 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro (2022) Intel i9 (Coffee Lake) PAA
6 macOS Ventura v13 iMac Pro (2022) Xeon W SkyLake PAA
7 macOS Ventura v13 Mac Pro (2022) Xeon W Cascade Lake PAA
8 macOS Ventura v13 Mac Pro (2022) Intel i5 (Coffee Lake) PAA
9 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Air (2022) Intel i5 (Amber Lake) No
10 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Air (2022) Intel i7 (Ice Lake) No
11 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro (2022) Intel i7 (Coffee Lake) No
12 macOS Ventura v13 iMac (2022) Intel i7 (Comet Lake) No
13 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro (2022) Intel i9 (Coffee Lake) No
14 macOS Ventura v13 iMac Pro (2022) Xeon W SkyLake No
15 macOS Ventura v13 Mac Pro (2022) Xeon W Cascade Lake No
16 macOS Ventura v13 Mac Pro (2022) Intel i5 (Coffee Lake) No
Table 2 – Tested operational environments.
In addition to the platforms listed above, Apple Inc. has also tested the module on the following platforms and
claims vendor affirmation on them:
# Operating System Hardware Platform
1 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro - i5 (Ice Lake), 2021, 2020
2 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro - i5 (Coffee Lake), 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018
3 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro - i7 (Amber Lake), 2021, 2019, 2018
4 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro - i7 (Coffee Lake), 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018
5 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro - i7 (Ice Lake), 2021, 2020
6 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Pro - i9 (Coffee Lake), 2021, 2019, 2018
7 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Air - i5 (Ice Lake), 2021, 2020
8 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Air - i7 (Ice Lake), 2021, 2020
9 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Air - i5 (Amber Lake), 2021, 2019, 2018
10 macOS Ventura v13 MacBook Air - i7 (Amber Lake), 2021, 2018
11 macOS Ventura v13 Mac mini - i5 (Coffee Lake), 2021, 2018
12 macOS Ventura v13 Mac mini - i7 (Coffee Lake), 2021, 2018
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13 macOS Ventura v13 iMac - i5 (Comet Lake), 2021, 2020
14 macOS Ventura v13 iMac - i7 (Comet Lake), 2021, 2020
15 macOS Ventura v13 iMac - i9 (Comet Lake), 2021, 2020
16 macOS Ventura v13 iMac - i5 (Coffee Lake), 2021, 2019
17 macOS Ventura v13 iMac - i7 (Coffee Lake), 2021, 2019
18 macOS Ventura v13 iMac - i9 (Coffee Lake), 2021, 2019
19 macOS Ventura v13 iMac - i9 (Comet Lake), 2022
Table 3 – Affirmed operational environments.
The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the
generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation
certificate.
The table below lists all Approved or Vendor-affirmed security functions of the module, including specific key
size(s) employed for approved services, and implemented modes of operation. The module is in the Approved
mode of operation when the module utilizes the services that use the security functions listed in the table
below. The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned
into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 9 – Non-approved
services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the
Approved mode.
CAVP Cert Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key Size /
Key Strength
Use / Function
A3618 (asm_aesni)
A3619 (asm_x86)
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CBC 128, 192, 256 Symmetric encryption and
decryption
A3626 (vng_asm)
A3627 (vng_aesni)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38C]
CCM 128, 192, 256 Authenticated encryption
and decryption
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CFB128 128, 192, 256 Symmetric encryption and
decryption
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CFB8 128, 192, 256 Symmetric encryption and
decryption
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
A3626 (vng_asm)
A3627 (vng_aesni)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CTR 128, 192, 256 Symmetric encryption and
decryption
A3618 (asm_aesni)
A3619 (asm_x86)
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
A3626 (vng_asm)
A3627 (vng_aesni)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
ECB 128, 192, 256 Symmetric encryption and
decryption
A3626 (vng_asm)
A3627 (vng_aesni)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38D]
GCM 128, 192, 256 Authenticated encryption
and decryption
A3620 (c_aesni) AES KW 128, 192, 256 Key wrapping
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A3621 (c_asm) [FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38F]
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
OFB 128, 192, 256 Symmetric encryption and
decryption
A3618 (asm_aesni)
A3619 (asm_x86)
XTS-AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38E]
XTS 128, 256 Symmetric encryption and
decryption on storage
devices
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
A3626 (vng_asm)
A3627 (vng_aesni)
CTR_DRBG
[SP 800-90Ar1]
AES-CTR Key Length/ Key Strength:
128, 256
Derivation Function
Enabled: Yes
Random Number
Generation
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4]
KeyGen, KeyVer, SigGen,
SigVer
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521
Key Strength: from 112 to
256
Digital signatures and
asymmetric key generation
and verification
Vendor Affirmed CKG Key Pair Generation (CKG)
using method in Sections 4
and 5.1 in [SP 800-133r2]
- Cryptographic key
generation
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
A3628 (vng_intel)
HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-224
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
112 bits or greater Message authentication
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
HMAC-SHA2-512/256 112 bits or greater Message authentication
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
HMAC_DRBG
[SP 800-90Ar1]
SHA-1
SHA2-224
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
112 bits or greater Random Number
Generation
A3624 (c_sse3) KBKDF1
[SP 800-108r1]
Counter (CTR)
Feedback
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-224
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
Key-based key derivation
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
KeyGen (ANSI X9.31),
SigGen (PKCS#1 v1.5) and
(PKCS PSS)
SigVer (PKCS#1 v1.5) and
(PKCS PSS)
KeyGen: 2048, 3072, 4096
SigGen: 2048, 3072, 4096
SigVer: 1024 (legacy use),
2048, 3072, 4096
Digital signatures and
asymmetric key generation
and verification
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
A3628 (vng_intel)
SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA-1
SHA2-224
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
112 bits or greater Message digest
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA2-512/256 112 bits or greater Message digest
A3625 (c_ltc) Triple-DES ECB Keying Option: 1 Symmetric decryption
1
KBKDF: Supported Lengths: 8 to 4096 in increments of 8. Fixed Data Order: Before Fixed Data. When using HMAC as the PRF.
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Table 4 – Approved algorithms
The module does not have non-Approved algorithms used in the Approved mode of operation (with or
without security claimed).
The table below lists non-Approved security functions that are not Allowed in the Approved Mode of
Operation:
Algorithm Use / Function
RSA ANSI X9.31 Key Pair Generation Key Size < 2048
PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Generation Key Size < 2048
PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Verification
Key Size< 1024
RSA Key Encapsulation: OAEP, PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS schemes
X25519 Key Agreement
Key Generation
Ed25519 Key Generation
Signature Generation
Signature Verification
ANSI X9.63 KDF Hash based Key Derivation Function
RFC6637 Key Derivation Function
HKDF [SP 800-56C] Key Derivation Function
DES Encryption / Decryption, Key Size: 56-bits
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption, Key Sizes: 40 to 128-bits in 8-bit increments
RC4 Encryption / Decryption, Key Sizes: 8 to 4096-bits
RC2 Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 8 to 1024-bits
MD2 Message Digest, Digest size 128-bit
MD4 Message Digest, Digest size 128-bit
MD5 Message Digest, Digest size 128-bit
RIPEMD Message Digest, Digest size 160-bits
ECDSA Key-pair generation: Curve P-192
Public key validation: Curve P-192
Signature Generation: Curve P-192
Signature Verification: Curve P-192
Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points
Integrated Encryption Scheme
on elliptic curves (ECIES)
Encryption / Decryption
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption
OMAC (One-Key CBC MAC) MAC generation
Triple-DES [SP 800-67r2]2 CBC, ECB: Encryption/Decryption
Note: The module does not enforce the limit of 216 encryptions with the same Triple-DES key, as
required by FIPS 140-3 IG C.G.
Table 5 – Non-approved algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
2
Triple-DES encryption/decryption was tested as part of CAVP algorithm testing, but is not utilized for any services implemented/supported by the
module in Approved mode of operation.
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The Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] executes within the kernel space of the
computing platforms and operating systems listed in Table 2 – Tested operational environments. Figure 1
below shows the logical block diagram3 representing the following information:
• The location of the logical object of the module with respect to the operating system, other supporting
applications and the cryptographic boundary so that all the logical and physical layers between the logical
object and the cryptographic boundary are clearly defined; and
• The interactions of the logical object of the module with the operating system and other supporting
applications resident within the cryptographic boundary.
Figure 1 – Logical block diagram
3
Kernel extension (KEXT) is a bundle that performs low-level tasks. KEXTs run in kernel space, which gives them elevated privileges and the ability to
perform tasks that user-space apps cannot.
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3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces
As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-3
validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which it
runs.
The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C language Kernel Interfaces (KPIs). In detail these
interfaces are described in the table below.
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port / interface
N/A Data Input Data inputs are provided in the variables passed in the KPI and callable service
invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
N/A Data Output Data outputs are provided in the variables passed in the KPI and callable service
invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
N/A Control Input Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated
parameters, namely the kernel module plist whose information is supplied to the
module by the kernel module loader.
N/A Control Output Not Applicable4
N/A Status Output Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each
KPI lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C
language KPIs within the module is provided in the header files and the KPI
documentation. Messages are also documented in the KPI documentation.
Table 6 – Ports and interfaces
The module is optimized for library use within the macOS kernel space and does not contain any terminating
assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as a macOS dynamically loadable library. The dynamically
loadable library is loaded into the macOS kernel and its cryptographic functions are made available to macOS
kernel services only. Any internal error detected by the module is reflected back to the caller with an
appropriate return code. The calling macOS kernel service must examine the return code and act accordingly.
The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return codes,
thus indicating the module’s status. It is the responsibility of the caller to handle exceptional conditions in a
FIPS 140-3 appropriate manner.
Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers. Cryptographic bypass
capability is not supported by the module.
4
The Module does not output control information, and thus has no specified control output interface.
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4. Roles, Services and Authentication
The Module supports a single instance of one authorized role, designated as the Crypto-Officer. No support is
provided for multiple concurrent operators or a Maintenance Operator.
The table below lists the services available to the Crypto-Officer:
Role Service Input Output
Crypto-Officer (CO) Symmetric encryption AES Key
Plain text data
Cipher text
Crypto-Officer (CO) Symmetric decryption AES Key
Cipher text data
Plain text
Crypto-Officer (CO) Key wrapping Key-encryption-key
Key to be wrapped
Wrapped key
Crypto-Officer (CO) Key unwrapping Key-encryption-key
Wrapped key
Unwrapped key
Crypto-Officer (CO) Secure Hashing Message Message digest
Crypto-Officer (CO) Message Authentication Code
(MAC) Generation
message, MAC key, MAC
algorithm
Message Authentication Code
Crypto-Officer (CO) Message Authentication Code
(MAC) Verification
MAC, message, HMAC key,
MAC algorithm
pass/fail result
Crypto-Officer (CO) Generate asymmetric key pair Random numbers, domain
parameters
Public/private key pair
Crypto-Officer (CO) Generate digital signature private key, message, hash
function
Digital signature
Crypto-Officer (CO) Verify digital signature public key True or False
Crypto-Officer (CO) Generate random number entropy, seed, V and key
values
random bit-string
Crypto-Officer (CO) Derive key via KBKDF KBKDF Key Derivation Key Derived key
Crypto-Officer (CO) Zeroise symmetric keys Handler of symmetric crypto
function context
Released memory space
Crypto-Officer (CO) Zeroise asymmetric keys Handler of asymmetric crypto
function context
Released memory space
Crypto-Officer (CO) Zeroise hash Handler of hash context Released memory space
Crypto-Officer (CO) Self-test Instantiation Status
Crypto-Officer (CO) Show status KPI invocation Operational / error status
Crypto-Officer (CO) Show module info KPI invocation Module base name
Module version
Table 7 – Roles, Services, Input and Output
4.1 Authentication
FIPS 140-3 does not require an authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does
not implement an authentication mechanism for Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer role is authorized to
access all services provided by the module (see Table 8 – Approved services and Table 9 – Non-approved
services below).
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4.2 Services
The module implements a dedicated KPI function to indicate if a requested service utilizes an approved
security function. For services listed in Table 8 – Approved services, the indicator function returns 1. For
services listed in Table 9 – Non-approved services, the indicator function returns 0.
The table below lists all approved services that can be used in the approved mode of operation. The
abbreviations of the access rights to keys and SSPs have the following interpretation:
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
N/A= The service does not access any SSP during its operation
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs
Indicator
ECDSA key pair
generation
Generate a
public/private key
pair
ECDSA5
CKG
ECDSA key pair CO GR 1
ECDSA signature
generation
Generate a digital
signature
ECDSA ECDSA private key CO RE 1
ECDSA signature
verification
Verify a digital
signature
ECDSA ECDSA public key CO RWE 1
Derive key via
KBKDF
Derive keys KBKDF KBKDF Key
derivation key
KBKDF Derived key
CO WE
GRE
1
Key wrapping Perform key wrapping AES-KW AES Key-encrypting
key
CO WE 1
Key unwrapping Perform key
unwrapping
AES-KW AES Key-encrypting
key
CO WE 1
Hashing Compute a message
digest
SHA-1
SHA2-224
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
SHA2-512/256
N/A CO N/A 1
MAC Generation Compute a message
authentication code
HMAC HMAC key CO WE 1
MAC Verification Verify a message
authentication code
HMAC HMAC key CO WE 1
RSA key pair
generation
Generate a
public/private key
pair
RSA6
CKG
RSA key pair CO GR 1
RSA signature
generation
Generate a digital
signature
RSA RSA private key CO RE 1
5
In accordance with Section 4 and 5.1 of NIST [SP 800-133r2] (CKG), the module uses its approved DRBG to generate random bits
and seeds used to generate asymmetric keys. Each generated seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG.
6
In accordance with Section 4 and 5.1 of NIST [SP 800-133r2] (CKG), the module uses its approved DRBG to generate random bits
and seeds used to generate asymmetric keys. Each generated seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG.
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RSA signature
verification
Verify a digital
signature
RSA RSA public key CO RWE 1
Random number
generation
Generate a random
number
CTR_DRBG DRBG entropy input
DRBG seed
DRBG 'V' value
DRBG 'Key' value
CO Input: WE
Seed: GE
V: GE
Key: GE
1
Self-test Perform pre-
operational and
algorithm self-test
N/A N/A CO N/A 1
Show status Return module status N/A N/A CO N/A N/A
Show module
info
Return module name
and versioning
information
N/A N/A CO N/A N/A
Symmetric
encryption
Encrypt plaintext data AES-CBC
AES-CCM
AES-CFB128
AES-CFB8
AES-CTR
AES-ECB
AES-OFB
AES-GCM
XTS-AES
AES Key
AES GCM key
AES XTS key
CO WE 1
Symmetric
decryption
Decrypt ciphertext
data
AES-CBC
AES-CCM
AES-CFB128
AES-CFB8
AES-CTR
AES-ECB
AES-OFB
AES-GCM
XTS-AES
AES Key
AES GCM key
AES XTS key
CO WE 1
Zeroise
symmetric keys
Release all resources
of symmetric crypto
function context
N/A AES Key
AES GCM key
AES XTS key
AES Key-encrypting
key
KBKDF Key
derivation key
KBKDF Derived key
CO Z 1
Zeroise
asymmetric keys
Release of all
resources of
asymmetric crypto
function context
N/A RSA key pair
ECDSA key pair
CO Z 1
Zeroise hash Release all resources
of hash context
N/A HMAC key CO Z 1
Table 8 – Approved services
The table below lists all non-Approved services that can only be used in the non-Approved mode of operation.
Service Description Algorithms Accessed Role Indicator
Key Encapsulation Perform key wrapping RSA encrypt CO 0
Key Decapsulation Perform key unwrapping RSA decrypt CO 0
EdDSA/X25519 key pair
generation
Generate a public/private key pair
Curve: Ed25519 and Curve25519
EdDSA KeyGen
X25519 KeyGen
CO 0
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EdDSA signature
generation
Generate a digital signature
Curve: Ed25519
EdDSA SigGen CO 0
EdDSA signature
verification
Verify a digital signature
Curve: Ed25519
EdDSA SigVer CO 0
X25519 key agreement Perform key agreement X25519 Key agreement CO 0
ECDSA key pair
generation
Generate a public/private key pair
Curve: P-192
ECDSA CO 0
ECDSA signature
generation
Generate a digital signature
Curve: P-192
ECDSA CO 0
ECDSA Signature
verification
Verify a digital signature
Curve: P-192
ECDSA CO 0
RSA key pair generation Generate a public/private key pair
Key size < 2048
ANSI X9.31 CO 0
RSA signature
generation
Generate a digital signature
Key size < 2048
PKCS#1 v1.5
PSS
CO 0
RSA Signature
verification
Verify a digital signature
Key size < 1024
PKCS#1 v1.5
PSS
CO 0
Key Derivation Hash-based key derivation
Per: ANSI X9.63
SHA-1 CO 0
Key Derivation Hash-based key derivation
Per: SP 800-56C HKDF
SHA-256 CO 0
Key Derivation Hash-based key derivation
Per: RFC6637
SHA-256, SHA-512, AES-128, AES-256 CO 0
Generate MAC Compute a message authentication
code
OMAC CO 0
Hashing Compute a message digest MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD CO 0
Symmetric encryption Perform symmetric data encryption Triple-DES, Blowfish, CAST5, DES, ECIES,
RC2, RC4
CO 0
Symmetric decryption Perform symmetric data decryption Triple-DES, Blowfish, CAST5, DES, ECIES,
RC2, RC4
CO 0
Table 9 – Non-approved services
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5. Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1], which is made up of a single component, is
provided in the form of binary executable code. A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image
of the module. The HMAC-SHA2-256 implemented in the module is used as an approved algorithm for the
integrity test. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided
and data output is prohibited. In this state the module is not operational.
5.2 On Demand Integrity Test
Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. The software integrity test is
automatically executed at power-on. It can also be invoked by self-test service or powering-off and reloading
the module.
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6. Operational Environment
6.1 Applicability
The Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] operates in a modifiable operational
environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The module is supplied as part of macOS, a commercially
available general-purpose operating system executing on the computing platforms specified in section 2.
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7. Physical Security
The FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel,
Kernel, Software, SL1] since it is a software module.
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8. Non-invasive Security
Currently, the ISO/IEC 19790:2012 non-invasive security area is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP
800-140F). The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module.
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9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management
The following table summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the
cryptographic services implemented in the module:
Key/SSP
Name/
Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Genera-
tion
Import
/Export
Establishm
e-nt
Storage Zeroisation Use &
related
keys
AES key 128 to
256 bits
AES (CBC, CCM,
CFB, CTR, ECB, KW,
OFB modes)
A3618 (asm_aesni)
A3619 (asm_x86)
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
A3626 (vng_asm)
A3627 (vng_aesni)
N/A Imported
from kernel
No export
N/A N/A. The
module
does not
provide
persistent
keys/SSPs
storage.
Automatic
zeroisation
when structure
is deallocated or
when the
system is
powered down
Symmetric
Encryption
and
Decryption
AES Key-
encrypting key
128 to
256 bits
AES-KW
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
N/A Imported
from kernel
No export
N/A Key
Wrapping
and
Unwrapping
(KTS)
AES GCM key 128 to
256 bits
AES (GCM mode)
A3626 (vng_asm)
A3627 (vng_aesni)
N/A Imported
from kernel
No export
N/A Symmetric
Encryption
and
Decryption
AES XTS key 128 and
256 bits
XTS-AES
A3618 (asm_aesni)
A3619 (asm_x86)
N/A Imported
from kernel
No export
N/A Symmetric
Encryption
and
Decryption
HMAC key >=112 bits HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-2
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
A3628 (vng_intel)
N/A Imported
from kernel
No export
N/A Generate and
Verify MAC
ECDSA public
key
112 to 256
bits
ECDSA
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
The key
pairs are
generated
conformant
to [SP 800-
133r2]
Section 4
(CKG) using
FIPS186-4
Key
Generation
method, and
the random
value used
in the key
generation
is generated
using [SP
800-90Ar1]
DRBG
Imported
from or
exported to
kernel
N/A Signature
verification
ECDSA private
key
Exported to
kernel
Intermediate
keygen
values are
not output
N/A Signature
generation
RSA public key 112 to 256
bits
RSA
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
The key
pairs are
generated
conformant
to [SP 800-
133r2]
Section 4
(CKG) using
FIPS186-4
Key
Generation
Imported
from or
exported to
kernel
N/A Signature
verification
RSA private
key
Exported to
kernel.
Intermediate
keygen
values are
not output
N/A Signature
generation
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method, and
the random
value used
in the key
generation
is generated
using [SP
800-90Ar1]
DRBG
Entropy Input
String
256 bits Random Number
Generation
N/A Imported
from entropy
source
N/A Random
Number
Generation
DRBG Seed,
internal state:
V value and
Key
256 bits CTR_DRBG
A3620 (c_aesni)
A3621 (c_asm)
A3627 (vng_aesni)
HMAC_DRBG
A3622 (c_avx)
A3623 (c_avx2)
A3624 (c_sse3)
Internally
generated
as defined
by [SP 800-
90Ar1]
N/A N/A Random
Number
Generation
KBKDF Key
derivation key
Min: 112
bits
KBKDF
A3624 (c_sse3)
N/A Imported
from calling
application
No export
N/A Key
Derivation
KBKDF
Derived key
Min: 112
bits
KBKDF
A3624 (c_sse3)
Generated
via KBKDF
No import
Exported to
calling
application
N/A Key
Derivation
Table 10 – SSPs
9.1 Random Number Generation
A NIST approved deterministic random bit generator based on a block cipher as specified in NIST [SP 800-
90Ar1] is used. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation is a CTR_DRBG using AES-
256 with derivation function and without prediction resistance. The random numbers used for key
generation are all generated by CTR_DRBG in this module. Per section 10.2.1.1 of [SP 800-90Ar1], the internal
state of CTR_DRBG is the value V and Key.
The module also employs a HMAC_DRBG for random number generation. The HMAC_DRBG is only used at the
early boot time of macOS kernel for memory randomization. The output of HMAC_DRBG is not used for key
generation. Per section 10.1.2.1 of [SP 800-90Ar1], the internal state of HMAC_DRBG is the value V, Key. The
deterministic random bit generators are seeded by “read_random”. The read_random is the Kernel Space
interface. Two entropy sources (one non-physical entropy source and one physical entropy source) residing
within the TOEPP provide the random bits. The output of entropy pool provides 256-bits of entropy to seed
and reseed [SP 800-90Ar1] DRBG during initialization (seed) and reseeding (reseed).
For both Apple Entropy sources tested in the OEs listed in Table 2, the customer does not have the ability to
modify the ES configuration settings (see details in Public Use Document referenced in 3 and 4).
The module also performs DRBG health tests according to section 11.3 of [SP 800-90Ar1].
Entropy source Minimum number of
bits of entropy
Details
ESV Cert #E14 (physical source)
ESV Cert #E110 (non-physical source)
256 The seed is provided by post-processed entropy data from
two entropy sources. The entropy sources are located within
the physical perimeter of the module but outside the
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cryptographic boundary of the module.
Table 11 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
9.2 Key / SSP Generation
The module generates Keys and SSPs in accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. The cryptographic module
performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per [SP 800-133r2] Section 4 (vendor
affirmed), compliant with [FIPS186-4], and using DRBG compliant with [SP 800-90Ar1]. A seed (the random
value) used in asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP 800-90Ar1] DRBG. The key generation service
for RSA, ECDSA, as well as the [SP 800-90Ar1] DRBG have been ACVTS tested with algorithm certificates
found in Table 4 – Approved algorithms.
The module also implements KBKDF key derivation according to [SP 800-108r1] to derive symmetric keys.
The module supports both Counter and Feedback modes with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-
256, HMAC-SHA2-384, or HMAC-SHA2-512 as the pseudo-random function (PRF).
9.3 Key / SSP Establishment
The module provides the following key/SSP establishment related services in the Approved mode:
• AES Key Wrapping
The module implements a Key Transport Scheme (KTS) using AES-KW compliant to [SP 800-38F], IG D.G. The
SSP establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
9.4 Key / SSP Import/Export
All keys and SSPs that are entered from, or output to module, are entered from or output to the invoking
application running on the same device. Keys/SSPs entered into the module are electronically entered in
plain text form. Keys/SSPs are output from the module in plain text form if required by the calling application.
The module allows the output of plaintext CSPs (for example: ECDSA or RSA Key Pairs). To prevent
inadvertent output of sensitive information, the module performs the following two independent internal
actions:
1. The module will internally request the random number generation service to obtain the random numbers
and verify that the service completed without errors.
2. Once the keys are generated the module will perform the pairwise consistency test and verify that the
test is completed without errors.
Only after successful completion of both actions, are the generated CSPs output via the KPI output parameter
in plaintext.
9.5 Key / SSP Storage
The Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] stores ephemeral keys/SSPs in memory
only. They are received for use or generated by the module only at the command of the calling application.
The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.
The module protects all keys/SSPs through the memory separation and protection mechanisms provided by
the operating system. No process other than the module itself can access the keys/SSPs in its process’
memory.
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9.6 Key / SSP Zeroisation
Keys and SSPs are zeroised when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the system is powered
down. Input and output interfaces are inhibited while zeroisation is performed.
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10. Self-tests
This section specifies the pre-operational and conditional self-tests performed by the module. The pre-
operational and conditional self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic
algorithms work as expected.
The module does not implement a bypass mode nor security functions critical to the secure operation of the
cryptographic module and thus, does not implement either a pre-operational bypass test or pre-operational
critical functions test.
While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available and input and output are inhibited. If
the module fails pre-operational or conditional self-tests fail, it will report an error message indicating the
cause of the failure and enters the Error State (See section 10.3). The module permits operators to initiate the
pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting the
system (i.e., power-cycling).
10.1 Pre-operational Software Integrity Test
The module performs a pre-operational software integrity test automatically when the module is loaded into
memory (i.e., at power on) before the module transitions to the operational state. A software integrity test is
performed on the runtime image of the Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] with
HMAC-SHA2-256 used to perform the approved integrity technique. Prior to using HMAC-SHA-256,
Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test (CAST) is performed. If the CAST on the HMAC-SHA-256 is
successful, the HMAC value of the runtime image is recalculated and compared with the stored HMAC value
pre-computed at compilation time.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are to be performed by a cryptographic module when the conditions specified for the
following tests occur: Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test, Pair-Wise Consistency Test.
The module does not implement any functions requiring a Software/Firmware Load Test, Manual Entry Test,
Conditional Bypass Test nor Conditional Critical Functions Test; therefore, these tests are not performed by
the module.
The following sub-sections describe the conditional tests supported by the Apple corecrypto Module v13.0
[Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1].
10.2.1. Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
In addition to the pre-operational software integrity test described in Section 10.1, the Apple corecrypto
Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] also runs the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
(CAST) for all cryptographic functions of each approved cryptographic algorithm implemented by the module
during power-up as well. All CASTs are performed prior to the first operational use of the cryptographic
algorithm. These tests are detailed in Table 12 – Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests below.
Algorithm(s) Notes
HMAC-SHA256 CAST (KAT) performed prior to module’s integrity test during
POSTs
AES implementations selected by the module for the Separate encryption / decryption operations are performed
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corresponding environment
AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-XTS, AES-CBC, AES-ECB, AES-KW using
128-bit key
CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG Each DRBG mode tested separately
KAT and Health test per NIST [SP 800-90Ar1] Section 11.3
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-512 Covered by high level HMAC self-test
RSA, 2048-bit modulus with SHA-256 Separate Signature generation/ verification KAT are performed
ECDSA, P-256 curve with SHA-256 Signature generation/verification are performed
KBKDF (counter and feedback modes) KAT
Table 12 – Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests
10.2.2. Conditional Pairwise Consistency Test
The Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] does generate RSA and ECDSA asymmetric
keys and performs the required RSA and ECDSA pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs.
10.3 Error Handling
If any of the self-tests described in Sections 10.1, 10.2.1 or 10.2.2 fail, the module reports the cause of the
error and enters an error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is
prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to power cycle the device which results in the
module being reloaded into memory and reperforming the pre-operational software integrity test and the
Conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-
operational software integrity test and the CASTs. The table below shows the different causes that lead to the
Error State and the status indicators reported.
Cause of Error Error indicator
Failed Pre-operational Software
Integrity Test
print statement “FAILED: fipspost_post_integrity” to stdout
Failed Conditional CAST print statement “FAILED: <event>” to stdout
(<event> refers to any of the cryptographic functions listed in Table 12 – Conditional
Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests.)
Failed Conditional PCT Error code “CCEC_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY” returned for ECDSA
Error code “CCRSA_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY” returned for RSA
Table 13 – Error Indicators
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11. Life-cycle Assurance
11.1 Delivery and Operation
The module is built into macOS Ventura v13 and delivered with device. There is no standalone delivery of the
module as a software library.
The vendor's internal development process guarantees that the correct version of module goes with its
intended macOS version. For additional assurance, the module is digitally signed by vendor and it is verified
during the integration into macOS.
This digital signature-based integrity protection during the delivery/integration process is not to be confused
with the HMAC-SHA2-256 based integrity check performed by the module itself as part of its pre-operational
self-tests.
11.2 Crypto Officer Guidance
The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the
non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 9 – Non-approved services. If
the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved
mode.
The ESV Public Use Document (PUD) reference for physical entropy source is:
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/documents/entropy/E14_PublicUse.pdf
The ESV Public Use Document (PUD) reference for non-physical entropy source is:
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/documents/entropy/E110_PublicUse.pdf
Apple Platform Certifications guide [platform certifications] and Apple Platform Security guide [SEC] are
provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the necessary technical information to ensure
FIPS 140-3 Compliance of the deployed systems. This guide walks the reader through the system’s assertion
of cryptographic module integrity and the steps necessary if module integrity requires remediation.
The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module:
o AES-GCM IV is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1. The GCM IV generation follows
RFC 4106 and shall only be used for the IPsec protocol version 3. When the IV in RFC 4106
exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given security association, either party to
the security association that encounters this condition triggers a rekeying with IKEv2 to establish
a new encryption key for the security association. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to
establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES-GCM encryption keys are derived. In
case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM
encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed. This condition is not enforced by the module.
This protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
o AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTS
data unit does not exceed 220 blocks. The module checks explicitly that Key_1 ≠ Key_2 before
using the keys in the XTS-Algorithm to process data with them compliant with IG C.I.
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12. Mitigation of Attacks
The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks.
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Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAST5 A symmetric-key 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit key
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESVP Entropy Source Validation Program
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation Function
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEXT Kernel Extension
KW AES Key Wrap
MAC Message Authentication Code
KPI Kernel Programming Interface
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
OFB Output Feedback
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PCT Pairwise Consistency Test
PKG Key-Pair Generation
PKV Public Key Validation
PRF Pseudo-Random Function
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
PUD Public Use Document (ESVP)
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
TOEPP Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter
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XTS XEX Tweakable Block Ciphertext Stealing
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Appendix B. References
FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
March 2019
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3
SP 800-140x CMVP FIPS 140-3 Related Reference
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-
standards
FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-ig-
announcements
FIPS140-3_MM CMVP FIPS 140-3 Draft Management Manual
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/documents/fips%20140-3/Draft%20FIPS-140-3-
CMVP%20Management%20Manual%2009-18-2020.pdf
SP 800-140 FIPS 140-3 Derived Test Requirements (DTR)
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140/final
SP 800-140A CMVP Documentation Requirements
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140a/final
SP 800-140B CMVP Security Policy Requirements
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140b/final
SP 800-140C CMVP Approved Security Functions
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140c/final
SP 800-140D CMVP Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and Establishment
Methods
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140d/final
SP 800-140E CMVP Approved Authentication Mechanisms
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140e/final
SP 800-140F CMVP Approved Non-Invasive Attack Mitigation Test Metrics
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140f/final
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
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FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1
February 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm
September 2002
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm
September 2009
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt
SP 800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP 800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality
May 2004
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
SP 800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP 800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices
January 2010
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
SP 800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2024 Apple Inc., All rights reserved.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision.
Page 32 of 33
SP 800-56Cr2 Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes
August 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf
SP 800-57r5 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 - Recommendation for Key
Management Part 1: General
May 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf
SP 800-67r1 NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 - Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
January 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf
SP 800-90Ar1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
June 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
SP 800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used
for Random Bit Generation
January 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
SP 800-108 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised)
October 2009
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf
SP 800-131Ar2 NIST Special Publication 800-131A - Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic
Algorithms and Key Lengths
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
SP 800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for Password-Based Key
Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications
December 2010
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf
SP 800-133r2 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
June 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
SP 800-135r1 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions
December 2011
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf
Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Intel, Kernel, Software, SL1] FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2024 Apple Inc., All rights reserved.
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision.
Page 33 of 33
MACOS macOS Technical Overview
https://developer.apple.com/macos/
SEC Apple Platform Security Guide
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/welcome/web
macOS Product security certifications for macOS
https://support.apple.com/HT201159