Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module
NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Used as a Standalone Device as ‘Thales Luna PCIe HSM’ OR as an
Embedded Device in ‘Thales Luna Network HSM’
FIPS 140-2, Level 3
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Document Information
Document Part Number 002-010935-002
Release Date March 8, 2023
Revision History
Revision Date Reason
A June 18, 2020 Updated SP for FW release 7.7.0.
The document has been updated to be consistent in style other
Thales SP including updates to both branding and product name.
The document builds on 002-010935-001.
B July 21, 2020 Updated Vendor Affirmation claims to be consistent with FIPS IG
G.13.
C July 29, 2020 Simplified services table listings.
D November 2, 2020 Updated for FW 7.7.1 as well as minor fixes.
E December 16, 2020 Updated to address Coordination comments and to add algorithm
certs for KAS-FFC-SSC SP 800-56Ar3, KAS-ECC-SSC SP 800-
56Ar3 and KAS-KDF OneStep SP 800-56Cr1.
F January 8, 2021 Corrected typographic error in KDA cert number in Table 8.
Corrected incorrectly mapped certificate number to KAS-SSC in
Table 8.
G March 5, 2021 Updated Table 8 to comply with requirements in IG A.11 for use of
SHA-3 with higher-order algorithms without available CAVP testing.
Updated Table 8 and Table 9 to comply with requirements from IG
D.4, G.13, D.8 and D.9 in relation to KTS, KAS, SP 800-56B and
allowances for RSA key transport.
Updated references to SP 800-56Br2 to SP 800-56B throughout.
H May 5, 2021 Updated Table 8 to add algorithm certificates, replacing vendor
affirmations.
J June 17, 2021 Updated references to SP 800-56B to SP 800-56Br2 throughout.
Added missing CKG Vendor Affirmation to Table 8.
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Corrected entry from SP 800-56Br2 KAS1-Basic in Table 8 to be
consistent with IG G.13.
Expanded footnote 7 to make is clear duplicated KAS listings under
Cert #A480 are required and intended.
Added footnote 10 against PBKDF entry in Table 8 to provide
further details on the limitations on use of algorithm by the module.
Added further guidance and information on use of PBKDF to section
2.4.1.
K October 25, 2021 Minor updates to key strength claims
X9.42 CVL text modification
L March 18, 2022 Added two part hardware versions to reflect minor parts supply
issue.
M April 18, 2022 Corrected hardware part number typos
N December 9, 2022 Added bootloader 1.1.5 and firmware 7.7.1-20 to address bug fixes
P March 8, 2023 Corrected typo
Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software
© 2023 Thales. All rights reserved. Thales and the Thales logo are trademarks and service marks of Thales
and/or its subsidiaries and are registered in certain countries. All other trademarks and service marks,
whether registered or not in specific countries, are the property of their respective owners.
Disclaimer
All information herein is either public information or is the property of and owned solely by Thales and/or its
subsidiaries who shall have and keep the sole right to file patent applications or any other kind of intellectual
property protection in connection with such information.
Nothing herein shall be construed as implying or granting to you any rights, by license, grant or otherwise,
under any intellectual and/or industrial property rights of or concerning any of Thales’s information.
This document can be used for informational, non-commercial, internal and personal use only provided that:
 The copyright notice below, the confidentiality and proprietary legend and this full warning notice appear
in all copies.
 This document shall not be posted on any network computer or broadcast in any media other than on
the NIST CMVP validation list and no modification of any part of this document shall be made.
Use for any other purpose is expressly prohibited and may result in severe civil and criminal liabilities.
The information contained in this document is provided “AS IS” without any warranty of any kind. Unless
otherwise expressly agreed in writing, Thales makes no warranty as to the value or accuracy of information
contained herein.
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Thales hereby disclaims all warranties and conditions with regard to the information contained herein,
including all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement.
In no event shall Thales be liable, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, for any indirect, special or
consequential damages or any damages whatsoever including but not limited to damages resulting from loss
of use, data, profits, revenues, or customers, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of
information contained in this document.
Thales does not and shall not warrant that this product will be resistant to all possible attacks and shall not
incur, and disclaims, any liability in this respect. Even if each product is compliant with current security
standards in force on the date of their design, security mechanisms' resistance necessarily evolves according
to the state of the art in security and notably under the emergence of new attacks. Under no circumstances,
shall Thales be held liable for any third party actions and in particular in case of any successful attack against
systems or equipment incorporating Thales products. Thales disclaims any liability with respect to security
for direct, indirect, incidental or consequential damages that result from any use of its products. It is further
stressed that independent testing and verification by the person using the product is particularly encouraged,
especially in any application in which defective, incorrect or insecure functioning could result in damage to
persons or property, denial of service or loss of privacy.
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CONTENTS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................... 7
PREFACE............................................................................................................................ 11
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 12
1.1 Purpose ...........................................................................................................................................12
1.2 Scope ..............................................................................................................................................12
1.3 Validation Overview.........................................................................................................................12
1.4 Functional Overview........................................................................................................................13
2 Module Overview ........................................................................................................... 14
2.1 Module Specification .......................................................................................................................14
2.2 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................................15
Ports and Interface Overview..........................................................................................................15
Luna PED (local connection)...........................................................................................................16
Luna PED (remote connection).......................................................................................................17
Secure Messaging...........................................................................................................................18
2.3 Roles and Services..........................................................................................................................18
Roles ...............................................................................................................................................18
Services...........................................................................................................................................20
2.4 Authentication..................................................................................................................................38
User Authentication .........................................................................................................................38
Activation .........................................................................................................................................39
M of N ..............................................................................................................................................40
2.5 Physical Security .............................................................................................................................40
External Event .................................................................................................................................40
PCI-E Card Removal.......................................................................................................................40
Environmental Failure Protection ....................................................................................................40
Decommission.................................................................................................................................41
Secure Transport Mode...................................................................................................................41
Fault Tolerance................................................................................................................................41
2.6 Operational Environment.................................................................................................................41
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management.....................................................................................................42
FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations ....................................................................................42
Non-Approved Algorithm Implementations .....................................................................................48
2.8 Critical Security Parameters............................................................................................................50
Key Generation................................................................................................................................58
Key Import and Export.....................................................................................................................58
Limits on the use of TDES keys ......................................................................................................60
2.9 Self-Tests ........................................................................................................................................60
Power-On Self-tests ........................................................................................................................60
Conditional Self-Tests .....................................................................................................................61
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks ..............................................................................................................62
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3 Guidance........................................................................................................................ 63
3.1 Identifying the Module Version........................................................................................................63
Checking the Bootloader and Firmware Version.............................................................................63
Checking Firmware Build Version ...................................................................................................65
3.2 Approved Mode of Operation ..........................................................................................................67
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
AU AUdit
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CID Client IDentity
CITS Chrysalis ITS
CFB Cipher FeedBack
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authenticate Code
CO Crypto Officer
CPV1 Cloning Protocol Version 1
CPV3 Cloning Protocol Version 3
CSK CSP Wrapping Key
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR CounTeR
CU Crypto User
CVL Component Validation List
DAK Device Authentication Key
DAC Device Authentication Certificate
DEK Data Encryption Key
DH Diffie Hellman
DMK Data MAC Key
DPK Data Protection Key
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Term Definition
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
EFP Environmental Failure Protection
EKA Ephemeral Key Agreement
EMC ElectroMagnetic Compliance
EMI ElectroMagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FM Functional Module
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
GSK Global Storage Key
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HA High Availability
HOC Hardware Origin Certificate
HOK Hardware Origin Key
HSE-BBRAM High-speed erase battery backed RAM
HSM Hardware Security Module / Host Security Module
ICD Interface Control Design/Document
IG Implementation Guidance
I/O Input/Output
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key-Based Key Derivation Function
KCV Key Cloning Vector
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Term Definition
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEK Key Encryption Key
KEV Key Encryption Vector
KTS Key Transport Scheme
KW Key Wrap mode
KWP Key Wrap with Padding mode
LCO Limited Crypto Officer
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
Masking A Thales term to describe the encryption of a key for use only within a Thales
cryptographic module.
MGF Mask Generation Function
MIC Manufacturer’s Integrity Certificate
MIK Manufacturer’s Integrity Key
MK Master Key
N/A Not Applicable
OFB Output FeedBack
PBKDF Password-based Key Derivation Function
PSK Partition Storage Key
PCI-E Peripheral Component Interconnect
PEC Password Encryption Certificate
PED PIN Entry Device
PEK Password Encryption Key
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
POST Power-on Self-Test
RDK Role Domain Key
RNG Random Number Generator
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Term Definition
RPK Remote PED Key
RPV Remote PED Vector
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
RTC Real Time Clock
SALK Secure Audit Logging Key
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SKA Static Key Agreement
SMK SKS Master Key
SKS Scalable Key Storage
SMK Security Officer’s Master Key
SO Security Officer
SP Special Publication
STC Secure Trusted Channel
STM Secure Transport Mode
TDES Triple – Data Encryption Standard
TUK Token or Module Unwrapping Key
TVK Token or Module Variable Key
TWC Token or Module Wrapping Certificate
USB Universal Serial Bus
USK User’s Storage Key
VPD Vital Product Data
XEX XOR-encrypt-XOR
XOR eXclusive OR
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext Stealing
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PREFACE
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module in
the technical terms of FIPS PUB 140-2, 'Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules', 12-03-2002.
General information on Thales HSM alongside other Thales products is available from the following
sources:
 the Thales internet site contains information on the full line of available products at
https://cpl.thalesgroup.com
 product manuals and technical support literature is available from the Thales Customer Support Portal
at https://supportportal.thalesgroup.com/csm
 technical or sales representatives of Thales can be contacted through one of the channels listed on
https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/contact-us
NOTE: You require an account to access the Customer Support Portal. To create a new
account, go to the portal and click on the REGISTER link.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document describes the security policies enforced by the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module.
1.2 Scope
This document applies to hardware part numbers 808-000048-002, 808-000048-003, 808-000066-001, 808-
000073-001 and 808-000073-002 with firmware version 7.7.0, 7.7.1, or 7.7.1-20, with bootloader version 1.1.1,
1.1.2, 1.1.4, and 1.1.5 and where:
 808-000048-002 and 808-000048-003 correspond to a module with fans on the outside of the metal
enclosure factory installed;
 808-000073-001 and 808-000073-002 correspond to a module with extra heatsinks installed (instead of
fans as pictured);
 808-000048-002 and 808-000048-003 are functionally equivalent with the difference being limited to the
supply choice for one of the non-security enforcing internal components;
 808-000073-001 and 808-000073-002 are functionally equivalent with the difference being limited to the
supply choice for one of the non-security enforcing internal components; and
 808-000066-001 and 808-000073-001 are alternate part numbers for the same hardware with no functional
changes.
The security features described in this document apply to the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module only and
do not include any feature that may be enforced by the host appliance, client or Thales Luna PED.
The Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module can be used as follows:
 as a standalone device called the Thales Luna PCIe HSM; or
 as an embedded device in the Thales Luna Network HSM.
This document covers both the PED and Password Authentication (FIPS Level 3) configurations of the Thales
Luna K7 Cryptographic Module.
1.3 Validation Overview
The cryptographic module meets all level 3 requirements security requirements for FIPS 140-2, alongside the
optional Environment Failure Protection (EFP) augmentation as summarized in the table below:
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
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Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles and Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Machine Model 3
Physical Security 3 + EFP
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks 3
Cryptographic Module Security Policy 3
1.4 Functional Overview
The Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic module in the
form of a PCI-Express card that typically resides within a custom computing or secure communications
appliance. The cryptographic module is contained in its own secure enclosure that provides physical resistance
to tampering.
The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure enclosure
on the PCI-E card.
A module may be explicitly configured to operate in either FIPS 140-2 Approved mode, or in a non-FIPS mode
of operation using steps outlines in section 3 and where these are performed during initialization of the module.
The module only supports a single approved mode of operation as set out in FIPS IG 1.7 ‘Multiple Approved
Modes of Operation’ and any configuration changes to settings defining the ‘Approved Mode of Operation’ will
trigger a zeroization of all partition CSP and require the full reset and re-initialization of the module.
A module is accessed directly (i.e., electrically) over the PCI-Express communications interface. If configured
the Thales Luna PIN Entry Device (PED) can be connected to the module’s USB port for authentication.
A module provides secure key generation and storage for symmetric keys and asymmetric key pairs along with
support for a broad range of cryptographic services. Access to key material and cryptographic services for
users and user application software is provided through the PKCS #11 programming API, which is implemented
over the module’s proprietary command interface (ICD).
A module may host multiple ‘user partitions’ that are cryptographically separated and are presented as “virtual
tokens” to user applications. A single ‘admin partition’ exists that is dedication to the HSM Security Officer and
Administrator roles. Each partition must be separately authenticated in order to make it available for use.
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2 Module Overview
2.1 Module Specification
The cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded hardware module which is available by itself as the Thales
Luna PCIe HSM or embedded within the Thales Luna Network HSM.
The cryptographic boundary1
of the module is shown below. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the metal
enclosure on the top and bottom sides of the PCI-E card as outlined. The fans depicted alongside the
removable backup battery are not included in the cryptographic boundary.
Figure 1: Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module cryptographic boundary
Figure 2: Thales Luna Network HSM
1 The fans depicted are not included in the physical boundary of the module. The 808-000066-001, 808-000073-001
and 808-000073-002 variants of the module do not include fans.
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2.2 Ports and Interfaces
Ports and Interface Overview
The module supports the following physical ports and interfaces:
 PCI-E interface
 USB port
 Serial port
 Power supply
 Battery
 LED
 External event input
 Decommission input
Table 2: Mapping of FIPS 140-2 Interfaces to Physical and Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Interface Physical Interface Logical Interface
Data Input PCI-E interface Data I/O
Luna ICD
Logical Trusted Path (Luna PED - remote
connection)
Bootloader command protocol
USB Physical Trusted Path (Luna PED - local
connection)
Serial interface Bootloader command protocol
Data Output PCI-E interface Data I/O
Luna ICD
Logical Trusted Path (Luna PED –
remote connection)
Bootloader command protocol
USB Physical Trusted Path (Luna PED – local
connection)
Serial Port Bootloader command protocol
Control Input PCI-E interface Data I/O
Luna ICD
External event jumper N/A
Decommission jumper N/A
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FIPS 140-2 Interface Physical Interface Logical Interface
Serial Port Luna Communication Path
Status Output PCI-E interface Data I/O
Luna ICD
Logical Trusted Path (Luna PED - remote
connection)
Bootloader command protocol
USB Physical Trusted Path (Luna PED - local
connection)
LED N/A
Serial Port Bootloader command protocol
Power 5V and 1.8V (generated
from 12V power supply
via PCI-E interface)
N/A
3.6V battery N/A
Luna PED (local connection)
If configured, the module can use a Luna PED as an external data input/output device. The Luna PED
connects to the module’s USB port and is used to pass authentication data and CSPs to and from the module
via a physical trusted path. CSP’s and authentication data that are output to the Luna PED are stored in a PED
Key (also known as an iKey) USB device connected to the Luna PED.
Any PED Key, once data has been written to it, is an Identification and Authentication device and must be
safeguarded accordingly by the administrative or operations staff responsible for the operation of the module
within the customer’s environment.
The following types of PED Keys2
are used with the Luna PED:
 Orange (RPV) PED Key – for the storage of the Remote PED Vector (RPV);
 Blue (Security Officer) PED Key – for the storage of HSM Security Officer, Partition Security Officer and
Administrator authentication data3
;
 Black (Crypto Officer) PED Key – for the storage of Crypto Officer (or Limited Crypto Officer (LCO))
authentication data;
 Grey (Crypto User) PED Key – for the storage of Crypto User authentication data;
 Red (Cloning Domain) PED Key – for the storage of the cloning domain data, used to control the ability to
clone to another cryptographic module or to a backup module; and
2Separate PED Keys are used when M of N token splitting is used to share responsibilities for this role between
different operators.
3 Separate PED Keys can be used when these roles are assigned to different operators
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 White (Audit) PED Key – for the storage of Audit user authentication data.
Figure 3: Thales Luna PIN Entry Device (PED) and iKey
Luna PED (remote connection)
If configured, the user has the option of operating the Luna PED remotely, connected to a USB port on a
management workstation. Remote PED operation extends the physical trusted path connection by the use of a
secure protocol over the PCI-E interface that authenticates both the remote PED and the module and
establishes an encrypted and authenticated communications channel between the module and the Remote
PED. Once secure communications have been established, all interactions between the cryptographic module,
PED, and PED Keys are performed in exactly the same way as they would be when locally connected.
The logical path between the cryptographic module and the Remote PED is secured in the manner described
below:
 Luna PED and cryptographic module will use the C(2e, 2s, ECC CDH) scheme from NIST SP 800-56Ar3 to
establish a CSP Wrapping Key (CWK) and MAC key (DMK) for encrypting the session and authenticating
each other.
 Encryption of messages between the Luna PED and cryptographic module uses AES-256 in CTR Mode and
with each encrypted message additionally protected using a HMAC-256 MAC.
Sensitive data in transition between a Luna PED and an HSM is end-to-end encrypted: plaintext PED data is
never exposed beyond the HSM and the Luna PED boundaries at any time. Inherent security of the PED/HSM
connection and associated protocols allows the usage of otherwise unprotected communications all the way
through the data path between the devices.
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Secure Messaging
Each partition can optionally be configured to use a secure messaging feature called Secure Trusted Channel
(STC). An STC channel is a cryptographic tunnel established between a partition and the Thales Luna Client
running on a host which may either be:
 local to the Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module; or
 running on a remote host.
The STC channel is designed to provide confidentiality, authenticity and integrity on all ICD commands that are
sent to the partition.
Clients are pre-registered with a target partition requiring STC using a supplied public key used to authenticate
them and where the Cryptographic Module is separately pre-registered at the client based on a supplied
certificate registered at the client.
The STC protocol uses C(2e, 2s, ECC CDH) scheme from NIST SP 800-56Ar3 to establish shared encryption
and optionally message authentication keys. Following the key exchange the transport protocol can be
configure to use one of two cipher suites for message transmission:
 AES-256 using GCM as an authenticated encryption mode; or
 AES-256 using CTR mode alongside HMAC-SHA512,
for its encryption and authentication.
2.3 Roles and Services
Roles
The Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module supports the following roles:
Table 3: Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module Roles
Roles Principal Duties
HSM Security Officer
(HSM SO)
[Admin Partition Role]
The HSM SO is responsible for managing the HSM. As such, he/she is
authorized to install and configure the HSM, set and maintain global
HSM security policies. He/she is also able to request the load of new
HSM firmware update files (FUF) and new Configuration Update Files
(CUF).
The HSM SO is able to create and delete partitions, but is not
authorized to generate, load or use keys stored on the user partitions
that have been created.
The HSM SO is able to create, manage and use keys created in the
Admin Partition alongside is responsible for initializing the
‘Administrator role’. The HSM SO can reset the Administrator
password (configuration dependent).
The HSM can have only one HSM SO.
Administrator
[Admin Partition Role]
The Administrator is authorized to create, use, transfer and destroy key
objects contained in the Admin partition. This role has privileges that
are a subset of the HSM SO role.
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Roles Principal Duties
Partition Security Officer
(Partition SO)
[User Partition Role]
The Partition SO creates the partition level Partition CO role, sets and
changes partition-level policies. This role also has an option to reset
the Partition CO password (configuration dependent) following lockout.
Partition Crypto Officer
(Partition CO)
[User Partition Role]
The Partition CO role is authorized to create, use, destroy and transfer
key objects for a given partition. The Partition CO can optionally create
the Partition LCO and Partition CU, and perform initial assignment of
key authorization data.
Partition Limited Crypto
Officer (Partition LCO)
[User Partition Role]
The Partition LCO is an optional partition role authorized to create and
use key objects, and perform initial assignment of key authorization
data. The role is only permitted to delete key objects where per-key
authorization is used and the correct authorization data for a given key
object can be presented to the cryptographic module.
Partition Crypto User
(Partition CU)
[User Partition Role]
The Partition CU is the partition role authorized to use the key objects
within the partition (e.g. sign, encrypt/decrypt).
Audit
[Admin Partition Role]
The Audit user initializes the secret key used to generate Message
Authentication Code (MAC) for secure audit messages alongside
configuring logging levels for the HSM.
The mapping of the cryptographic module’s roles to the roles defined in FIPS 140-2 can be found in the table
below:
Table 4: Mapping of FIPS 140-2 Roles to Module Roles
FIPS 140-2 Role Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module Role Role Scope
Crypto Officer HSM Security Officer (HSM SO) Module
Audit Module
Partition Security Officer (Partition SO) User Partition
User Administrator Admin Partition
Crypto Officer User Partition
Partition Crypto Officer (Partition CO) User Partition
Partition Limited Crypto Officer (Partition LCO) User Partition
Partition Crypto User (Partition CU) User Partition
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FIPS 140-2 Role Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module Role Role Scope
Unauthenticated User Public User Module/Partition
Services
All services listed in the table below can be accessed in FIPS 140-2 Approved mode and when in this mode
exclusively use the security functions listed in Table 8 and Table 9.
When the module is operating in this mode, Security Functions in section 2.7.2 are disabled and blocked from
being used.
For a complete description of CSP referenced from the table please see Table 10.
Table 5: Roles and Access Rights by Service
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
HSM Management
HSM Factory Reset. Erased (for ALL
partition):
PSK, USK, DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
KCV, SMK, STC-
PIDPUB, STC-PIDPRIV,
STC-CIDPUB, STC-
PIDPUB, STC-PKAPUB,
STC-PKAPRIV, STC-
CKAPUB, STC-PEN,
STC-PMA, STC-PIV,
STC-CEN, STC-CMA,
STC-CIV. HAPUB, HAPK,
RND, Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition
or session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys).
In addition, the
following HSM level
keys are erased:
DRBG Key, SALK,
CWKHSM, CWKPED,
DEKHSM, DMKHSM,
DEKPED, DMKPED.
x x x x x x x x Does not require user login.
Factory reset deletes all roles
(including HSM SO), all users
and objects and sets all HSM
settings and policies to default
values.
Can be performed by any role
as equivalent to destroying the
HSM through other means if
physical access to the HSM is
possible.
Only possible over the serial
connection to LUSH when
Luna PCI-E K7 is embedded in
Thales Luna Network HSM.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
21
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Initialize the HSM
(operation resets the
admin partition,
deletes all user
partitions (if present),
initializes the HSM
SO role and creates /
selects cloning
domain secret
(KCV)).
Erased:
For ALL partition if
present – USK, PSK,
SMK, Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition
or session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys).
For User Partitions:
HAPUB, HAPK (for all
roles).
For Admin Partition -
HAPUB, HAPK for Admin
role only.
Write: PEK, PEC,
USK, PSK, DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
KCV.
Used: PSK, USK,
GSK.
x x x x x x x x Operation must be performed
by the HSM SO unless the
HSM has been factory reset
first.
If performed without the factory
reset, the HSM SO, AU and
KCV for the Admin Partition are
maintained through
initialisation.
If factory reset has been
performed prior to initialising
the HSM SO, any role with the
ability to access the LunaCM
(Thales Luna PCIe HSM) or
LunaSH (Thales Luna Network
HSM) Command Line
Interface (CLI) can perform
initialization. Where Luna PED
is used in its remote
configuration, additional CSP
are used and written and are
recorded following this table.
Create a user
partition.
Write: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
KCV.
x - - - - - - - None.
Delete a user
partition.
Erased (for partition
instance of key
object):
PSK, USK, DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
KCV, SMK, STC-
PIDPUB, STC-PIDPRIV,
STC-CIDPUB,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys).
x - - - - - - - Deleting a partition erases all
partition object and roles.
Query HSM status. None. x x x x x x x x This service is permitted from
an un-authenticated client even
if STC is enabled.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
22
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Query partition
status.
None. x x x x x x x x This service is permitted from
an un-authenticated client even
if STC is enabled.
Query HSM
configuration.
None. x x x x x x x x None.
Query partition
configuration.
None. x x x x x x x x None.
Set HSM Level Policy
(General).
Erased (if destructive
policy change
requested):
For all partitions:
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), USK,
PSK, KCV, SMK, STC-
PIDPRIV, STC-PIDPUB.
The following are
erased in addition if
HSM Policy (50) ‘Allow
Functional Modules’ is
enabled:
HOK, HOC, ECC HOK,
ECC
HOC,TUK4,TWC4,
CITS-DAK, CITS-DAC,
ECC DAK, ECC DAC,
HSM-SKA-CREMOTE, HSM-
SKA-KLOCAL, PAC, RPV-C,
PEK, PEC.
x - - - - - - - None.
Set Partition Level
Policy (Admin
Partition).
Erased (if destructive
policy change
requested):
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), SMK.
x - - - - - - - None.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
23
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Set Partition Level
Policy (User
Partition).
Erased (if destructive
policy change
requested):
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), SMK.
- - - x - - - - None.
Update Firmware. Used: Root Certificate,
Firmware Signing
Certificate.
x - - - - - - - None.
Trigger HSM
zeroization /
decommission.
Erase: As per Factory
Reset above but with
the following
omissions: CSP
associated with the
Audit partition and AU
role are not zeroized
and persist. RPV
persists.
x x x x x x x x Can be performed by any role.
Equivalent to destroying the
HSM through other means if
physical access to the HSM is
possible.
Only possible over the serial
connection to LUSH when
Thales Luna K7(+)
Cryptographic Module is
embedded in Thales Luna
Network(+) HSM.
Trigger user partition
zeroize.
Erased: USK,
PSK,KCV, SMK,
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys).
x x x x x x x x This command is currently
supported by the Luna ICD
command library but isn’t
currently made available using
any of the customer facing API
(such as the Cryptoki API).
Load Configuration
Update File (CUF).
Used: Root Certificate
and License Signing
Certificate.
x - - - - - - - None.
Query the audit log
status.
None. x x x x x x x x None.
Submit external
messages for entry
into secure audit log.
Used: SALK. x x x x x x x x None.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
24
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Configure the audit
logging level and
destination for
offload.
None. - - x - - - - - None.
Export/import audit
log secret key.
Used: RDK
Read: SALK
- - x - - - - - None.
Set time on HSM
Real Time Clock
(RTC).
None. - - x - - - - - The RTC is used for time-
stamps on logs and separately
for enforcing
CKA_START_DATE and
CKA_END_DATE object
attributes when Partition
Policy (39) Allow Start/End
Date Attributes is enabled.
Validate the audit log. Used: SALK. - - x - - - - - None.
Request Partition
STC Identity.
Use: STC-PIDPUB
Write: STC-PIDPRIV,
STC-PIDPUB
x x x x x x x x STC-PIDPRIV, STC-PIDPUB are
created on first attempted read
of the public certificate.
Register/De-register
client for STC (admin
partition).
Write: STC-CIDPUB x - - - - - - - None.
Register/De-register
client for STC (user
partition).
Write: STC-CIDPUB x - - x - - - - None.
Query registered
STC client status
information (admin
partition).
None. x - - - - - - - None.
Query registered
STC client status
information (user
partition).
None. - - - x - - - - None.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
25
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Initiate STC Tunnel
once configured.
Use: STC-PIDPRIV,
STC-CIDPUB, ECC
HOC, GSK.
Create: STC-PKAPUB,
STC-PKAPRIV, STC-
PEN, STC-PMA, STC-
PIV, STC-CEN, STC-
CMA, STC-CIV.
x x x x x x x x None.
Send commands to
partition with STC
tunnel initiated.
Use: STC-PEN, STC-
PMA, STC-PIV, STC-
CEN, STC-CMA, STC-
CIV.
x x x x x x x x This service includes the
dispatch and receipt of
commands and responses to a
target partition with an active
STC tunnel.
Privileges involve the ability to
dispatch messages only and
authentication of any active
session as another role is
required over-STC ahead of
performing any privileged
operation.
Clone SMK between
Partitions.
Use: Root Certificate,
MIC, HOC (or FM
equivalent) and TUK4,
TWK4, KEVs (CPV1
only), KEVt, KCV and
Cloning Transfer Key.
Read/Write: SMK.
x - - - x - - - HSM SO is able to clone (or
receive) the SMK from/to the
Admin Partition.
Partition CO is able to clone (or
receive) the SMK from/to the
user partition.
Clone partition
objects between
Partitions.
Use: Root Certificate,
MIC, HOC (or FM
equivalent) and TUK4,
TWK4, KEVs (CPV1
only), KEVt, KCV and
Cloning Transfer Key.
x x - - x x x - Partition CU is able to clone
public key objects only.
Rollover SMK for a
given partition.
Use: USK, DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
Write: SMK, DRBG
Key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V.
x - - - x - - - HSM SO can trigger roll-over of
the SMK on the admin partition.
Partition CO can trigger roll-
over of the SMK on the user
partition.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
26
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Enable/disable STM. Create: STM Nonce.
Use: STM Nonce,
DRBG Key, DRBG
Seed, DRBG V (DRBG
only used to create
STM None on enabling
STM).
x x x x x x x x Command can be executed un-
authenticated if HSM is in
zeroized state otherwise
requires HSM SO role.
Clear tamper event. None. x x x x x x x x Only required when HSM
Policy (48): Do Controlled
Tamper Recovery is enabled.
Command can be executed un-
authenticated if HSM is in
zeroized state otherwise
requires ‘HSM SO’.
Request HSM self-
test operation.
None. x x x x x x x x None.
Role Management
Query Role Status. None. x x x x x x x x None.
Initialize the
Administrator.
Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
USK, PSK, KEK, PEK.
Write: PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
x - - - - - - - PEK is only used if the
authentication date is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
27
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Initialize the AU. Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
USK, PSK, KEK, PEK.
Write: PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
x x x x x x x x AU can be initialized from a
public session to the Admin
partition of the HSM, hence is
accessible to all roles.
In Thales Luna Network HSM,
the role is initialized by the
Audit user appliance role.
PEK is only used if the
authentication date is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Initialize the Partition
SO.
Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
KEK, PEK.
Write: USK, PSK,
PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
x x x x x x x x PEK is only used if the
authentication data is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Initialize the Partition
CO.
Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
USK, PSK, KEK, PEK.
Write: PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
- - - x - - - - PEK is only used if the
authentication date is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
28
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Initialize the Partition
LCO.
Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
USK, PSK, KEK, PEK.
Write: PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
- - - - x - - - PEK is only used if the
authentication date is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Initialize the Partition
CU.
Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V,
USK, PSK, KEK, PEK.
Write: PEK, PEC, PED
Authentication Data,
User Password (if
challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
- - - - x - - - PEK is only used if the
authentication date is
submitted over Luna ICD
command.
PEK and PEC are only created
if not already present on the
cryptographic module.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Change HSM SO
authentication data.
Read: USK
Use: KEK, PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
Write: USK.
x - - - - - - - Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
29
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Change AU
authentication data.
Read: USK
Use: USK, KEK, PEK
(if password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
Write: USK.
- - x - - - - - Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Change
authentication data
for Administrator /
unlock role.
Read: USK
Use: KEK, PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
Write: USK.
x x - - - - - - Only possible for HSM SO if
HSM Policy (15) Enable SO
reset of partition PIN is
enabled.
If the service is performed by
the HSM SO, this is considered
as unlock operation after
Administrator role is locked out.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Change Partition SO
authentication data.
Read: USK
Use: KEK, PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
Write: USK.
- - - x - - - - Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Change
authentication data
for Partition CO /
unlock role.
Read: USK
Use: KEK, PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
Write: USK.
- - - x - - - - Only possible if HSM Policy
(15) Enable SO reset of
partition PIN is enabled.
Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
30
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Change
authentication data
for Partition LCO /
unlock role.
Read: USK
Use: KEK, PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
Write: USK.
- - - - x x - - If the service is performed by
the Partition CO, this is
considered as an unlock
operation after the Partition
LCO role is locked out.
Change
authentication data
for Partition CU /
unlock role.
Read: USK
Use: KEK, PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
Write: USK.
- - - - x - x - If the service is performed by
the Partition CO, this is
considered as an unlock
operation after the Partition
CU role is locked out.
Configure partition
for High-Available
(HA) Recovery /
Login
Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG
V.
Write: HAPUB, HAPK,
DRBG Key, DRBG
Seed, DRBG V.
Create: RND, Ksess.
x x x x x x x - This service allows partitions to
be registered in a way with a
primary partition in order to
allow login to the secondary
partition following activation of
the primary partition.
The service can only be used if
Partition Policy (21) Enable
high availability recovery is
enabled.
Required role depends on the
role desired to be configured
for HA Recovery.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
31
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Login to
Access/Session as
role.
Use: KEK, PEK (if
password
authentication used),
PED Authentication
Data, User Password
(if challenge-secret
enabled), Password.
Write: recovered
USK, PSK, KCV,
GSK, SMK (if
configured) (on
successful
presentation of
correct login
credentials).
x x x x x x x - Where Luna PED is used in its
remote configuration, additional
CSP are used and written and
are recorded following this
table.
Close authenticated
sessions.
Erase: USK, PSK,
KCV, GSK, SMK (if
configured),
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(session keys).
x x x x x x x x CA_CloseApplicationID
or
CA_CloseApplicationIDF
orContainer can be
executed un-authenticated and
can be used to close all
sessions and/or access.
USK, PSK, KCV, GSK, SMK
only erased if no open sessions
remain for a given Access.
Luna PED Configuration
Initialize Remote
PED Vector (RPV).
Use: GSK.
Write: RPV.
x - - - - - - - None.
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
32
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Key Management Activities
Generate local
symmetric or
asymmetric key-pair.
Use: USK, DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
Write: Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition
or session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), DRBG
Key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V.
x x - - x x - - HSM SO and Administrator can
only create keys in the Admin
Partition (or session owned by
admin partition for session
based keys).
Partition CO and LCO can only
create keys in their
corresponding user partition (or
session owned by user partition
for session based keys).
Generate domain
parameters.
Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
Write: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
x x x x x x x x Domain parameter objects can
be created by any role if
CKA_PRIVATE key attribute is
set to false.
If CKA_PRIVATE is set to true
– only HSM SO and
Administrator can create in
admin partition and Partition
CO or LCO.
As an output of the service a
domain parameter object will
be stored on the target partition
which can be used as an input
to subsequent key-pair
generation operations.
Derive key from
existing partition
secret or private key
object.
Use: Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition
or session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), USK,
DRBG Key, DRBG
Seed, DRBG V.
Write: Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), DRBG
Key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V.
x x - - x x - - CKA_DERIVE must be set to
true.
HSM SO and Administrator can
only derive keys in the admin
partition.
Partition CO and Partition LCO
in the user partition.
Where PKA data is configured,
both source and new PKA data
must be provided during the
operation.
DRBG is only used where
derive operations requires
entropy (e.g. generation of
random IV or randomised
padding).
Module Overview
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
33
Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Import public key,
certificate, domain
object or data
objects.
Write: Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition
or session keys).
x x x x x x x x Listed objects can be created
by any role if CKA_PRIVATE is
set to false.
If CKA_PRIVATE is set to
true – only HSM SO and
Administrator can create
objects in the admin partition
and Partition CO or LCO in the
user partition.
Import secret or
private key using key
wrapping.
Use: Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition
or session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), USK.
Write: Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition
or session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys).
x x - - x x - - HSM SO and Administrator are
only able to import to an admin
partition.
Partition CO and LCO are only
able to import keys into the
user partition they are a
member of.
Export secret or
private key using key
wrapping.
Read: Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition
or session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys).
Use: Asymmetric Key
Pairs (general partition
or session keys),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), DRBG
Key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V, USK.
Write: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
x x - - x x - - HSM SO and Administrator are
only able to export keys from
an admin partition.
Partition CO and LCO are only
able to export keys into the
user partition they are a
member of.
DRBG is only used where
encrypt operations require
entropy (e.g. generation of
random IV or randomised
padding).
Read non-sensitive
key attribute where
CKA_PRIVATE =
false for a given
key object.
None. x x x x x x x x None.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Read non-sensitive
key attribute where
CKA_PRIVATE =
true for a given key
object.
None. x x - - x x x x None.
Insert key from
external storage
using SKS.
Use: SMK, USK.
Write: Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys) or
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys)
x x - - x x x - HSM SO and Administrator are
only able to insert keys for the
admin partition.
Partition CO, LCO and CU are
only able to insert keys into the
user partition they are a
member of.
Extract key to
external storage
using SKS.
Use: SMK, USK.
Read: Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys) or
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys)
x x - - x x x - HSM SO and Administrator are
only able to extract keys from
the admin partition.
Partition CO, LCO and CU are
only able to extract keys from
the user partition they are a
member of.
Explicitly revoke
activation for key on
a target session
access.
None. x x - x x x x x Explicit rescinding of
activations can be performed
using the CA_AuthorizeKey
command with ‘0’ length
authentication data supplied.
Cryptographic Services
Re-seed partition
random number
generator (RNG).
Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
Write: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
x x x x x x x x HSM SO, Administrator and AU
are only able to seed the admin
partition DRBG instance.
Partition SO, CO, LCO and CU
are only able to seed the user
partition DRBG instance for the
partition they are a member of.
Key owner must separately be
authenticated as another role
listed.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Extract entropy from
Partition DRBG.
Use: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V
Write DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
x x x x x x x x HSM SO, Administrator and AU
are only able to extract entropy
from the admin partition DRBG
instance.
Partition SO, CO, LCO are only
able to extract entropy from the
user partition DRBG instance
they are a member of.
Key owner must separately be
authenticated as another role
listed.
Perform digest
operation on user
supplied data.
None. x x x x x x x x None.
Perform encrypt
operation on user
supplied data object.
Use: USK (if request
requires access to key
in non-volatile storage),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys),
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys) – public
key, DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
Write: DRBG Key,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V.
x x x x x x x x Key owner must separately be
authenticated as another role
listed.
DRBG is only used where
encrypt operations requires
entropy (e.g. generation of
random IV or randomised
padding).
AU and PSO is only able to
encrypt supplied data using
public keys where
CKA_PRIVATE for a given
public key is false.
Perform decrypt
operation on user
supplied data object.
Use: USK (if request
requires access to key
in non-volatile storage),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys).
x x - - x x x x HSM SO and Administrator are
only able to use keys stored in
the admin partition.
Partition CO, LCO and CU are
only able to use keys in the
user partition they are a
member off.
Key owner must separately be
authenticated as another role
listed.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Derive key Use: USK (if request
requires access to key
in non-volatile storage),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys) or
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys), DRBG
Key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V.
Write: Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), DRBG
Key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V.
x x - - x x - x HSM SO and Administrator are
only able to use keys stored in
the admin partition.
Partition CO, LCO are only
able to use keys in the user
partition they are a member off.
Key owner must separately be
authenticated as another role
listed.
DRBG is only used where
derive operations require
entropy.
Generate signature
over user supplied
data.
Use: USK (if request
requires access to key
in non-volatile storage),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys) or
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys), DRBG
Key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V.
Write: Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys), DRBG
Key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V.
x x - - x x x - HSM SO and Administrator are
only able to use keys stored in
the admin partition.
Partition CO, LCO, CU are only
able to use keys in the user
partition they are a member off.
Key owner must separately be
authenticated as another role
listed.
DRBG is only used where
signature operations require
entropy.
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Service
Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs (Used,
Create, Read, Write
or Erased)
HSM
SO
Administrator
AU
Partition
SO
Partition
CO
Partition
LCO
Partition
CU
Public
User
Notes
Validate signature
over user supplied
data.
Use: USK (if request
requires access to key
in non-volatile storage),
Symmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys) or
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys).
x x x x x x x x HSM SO and Administrator are
only able to use keys stored in
the admin partition.
AU and PSO is only able to
validate signatures with public
keys where CKA_PRIVATE for
a given public key is false.
Partition CO, LCO, CU are only
able to validate signatures in
the user partition they are a
member off.
Key owner must separately be
authenticated as another role
listed.
Bootloader Services
Set/Read scratchpad
flag to signal to
firmware
None. x x x x x x x x Used exclusively to request un-
authenticated deletion of the
FM and/or SMFS to the
firmware.
Request complete
erase of the HSM
firmware image and
key stores (excludes
erase of bootloader).
None. x x x x x x x x Only used to recover from
corrupt firmware as performed
as a factory operation.
Erases all CSP with the
exception of the Root
Certificate.
Following erase, card needs to
repeat manufacturing process
including loading factory signed
keys before it can be
operational again.
Read Vital Product
Data (VPD)
programmed at
Manufacture.
None. x x x x x x x x Includes the hardware part
number alongside whether
PCIe card was built with fans or
not installed.
Request
authentication and
execution of main
firmware.
Use: Root Certificate
and Firmware Signing
Certificate.
x x x x x x x x None.
Where a service in Table 5 above involves the optional use of the Luna PED in its remote configuration, the
following additional CSP are used or created by the target role using the Luna PED:
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 Used: RPV, RPV-C, PAC, HSM-SKA-KLOCAL, HSM-SKA-KREMOTE, PED-SKA-C.
 Created: CWKHSM, CWKPED, DEKHSM, DMKHSM, IVHSM, DEKPED, DMKPED, IVPED.
2.4 Authentication
User Authentication
All roles except for the Public User must authenticate to the module by providing their authentication data.
Table 6 and Table 7, explain the type and strength of the authentication data supported for each role.
If configured with PED, all roles must authenticate using a PED Key. When a role is initialized, a module
generates the authentication data as a 48-byte random value and writes it to a PED Key. Optionally, the Crypto-
Officer, Limited Crypto Officer and Crypto-User roles can be configured to use two-factor authentication by also
assigning a password to the role.
If configured with Password, all roles must authenticate using a password. When a role is initialized under this
configuration, the operator enters the initial password for the role.
Regardless of configuration (PED or Password), the password is delivered to the module encrypted with the
module’s Password Encryption Key (PEC) using KTS-OAEP: Key-Transport using RSA-OAEP from NIST SP
800-56Br2.
Table 6: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role
Type of
Authentication
Authentication Data
Password Configuration PED Configuration
HSM Security
Officer
Identity-based Password Authentication token (PED Key)
Audit Identity-based Password Authentication token (PED Key)
Partition
Security
Officer
Identity-based Password Authentication token (PED Key)
Crypto Officer Identity-based Password Authentication token (PED Key),
plus optional password
Limited Crypto
Officer
Identity-based Password Authentication token (PED Key),
plus optional password
Crypto User Identity-based Password Authentication token (PED Key),
plus optional password
Administrator Identity-based Password Authentication token (PED Key)
Public User Not Required N/A N/A
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Table 7: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
PED Key (if configured) 48 byte random authentication data generated when a role is
initialized and stored on PED key. The probability of guessing the
authentication data in a single attempt is 1 in 2384 (far less than 1 in
1,000,000). With a maximum of 6000 failed login attempts per
minute allowed by the module (1.52 e-112, far less than 1 in
100,000), the thresholds required by FIPS 140-2 can never be
reached.
Password User provided byte array (minimum 7 bytes). The probability of
guessing the challenge secret in a single attempt is 1 in 256 (far less
than 1 in 1,000,000). With a maximum of 6000 failed login attempts
per minute allowed by the module (1.44 e-81,far less than 1 in
100,000), the thresholds required by FIPS 140-2 can never be
reached.
When using the password authentication mechanism, the module encrypts a known check-word under a key
derived using PBKDF from SP 800-132 and option 1a from section 5.4, ‘Using the Derived Master Key to
Protect Data’. During a login attempt, the module generates a key from the supplied password, and attempts to
decrypt a known checkword. Successful login is achieved if the decrypted checkword matches the expected
value. If successful, the PBKDF derived key is used to remove a layer of encryption from the module stored
User Storage Key (USK)4
.
The length of the password used as input to the PBKDF function is consistent with the password length
selected by the authenticating user which is required to be between 7 and 255 characters long. Where
passwords are randomly generated, the probability of successfully guessing the password and deriving the
storage key for a minimum password length of 7 characters is 1 in 256
. This probability is significantly reduced if
random passwords are not used.
Guidance in Appendix A, ‘Security Considerations’ of NIST SP 800-132 should be consulted when picking an
appropriate password length in situations where encryption layers derived from the user password are required
to protect the confidentiality of module protected user keys.
Activation
If PED authentication is configured, the Crypto-Officer, Limited Crypto Officer and Crypto-User roles can be
configured to use a two-step authentication process. The first stage is termed “Activation” and is performed
using a PED key. Once activated, access to key material and cryptographic services is not allowed until the
second stage of authentication, ‘User Login’, has been performed using the role’s password.
Once activated, a role stays activated until the role is explicitly deactivated, deleted or the module is reset5
.
4 When ‘decommission’ is enabled as a module capability, the USK is independently encrypted in storage under a
256-bit module generated AES key.
5 A module is reset in response to a trigger signal being received on the External Event input, Decommission signal
and EFP violations, loss of power or a request from a host application.
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M of N
If the PED based authentication is configured, the cryptographic module supports the use of an M of N (up to
N=16) secret sharing authentication scheme for each of the modules roles. M of N authentication provides the
capability to enforce multi-person control over the functions associated with each role.
The M of N capability uses Shamir’s threshold scheme. The cryptographic module splits the randomly-
generated authentication data into “N” pieces, known as splits, and stores each split on an iKey. Any “M” of
these “N” splits must be transmitted to the cryptographic module by inserting the corresponding iKeys into the
Luna PED in order to reconstruct the original secret.
2.5 Physical Security
The Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module as defined by FIPS
PUB 140-2, section 4.5. The module is enclosed in a strong metal enclosure that provides tamper-evidence.
Any tampering that might compromise a module’s security is detectable by visual inspection of the physical
integrity of a module. The HSM SO should perform a visual inspection of the module at regular intervals.
Within the metal enclosure, a hard opaque epoxy covers the circuitry of the cryptographic module. Attempts to
remove this epoxy will cause sufficient damage to the cryptographic module so that it is rendered inoperable.
The module’s enclosure is opaque to resist visual inspection of the device design, physical probing of the
device and attempts to access sensitive data on individual components of the device.
External Event
The module supports a physical interface for the input of an external event signal. The external event signal
jumper is monitored in both the powered-on state and the powered-off state.
In the event of an external event signal, the module will erase the Token Module Variable Key, reset itself, clear
all working memory and log the event. The module can be reset and placed back into operation when the
external event signal is removed.
PCI-E Card Removal
The module detects removal from the PCI-E slot in both the powered-on state and the powered-off state. If the
card is removed from the PCI-E slot, the Token Module Variable Key (TVK) is erased and the event is logged.
Environmental Failure Protection
The module is designed to sense and respond to out-of-range temperature conditions as well as out-of-range
voltage conditions. The temperature and voltage conditions are monitored in both the powered-on state and the
powered-off state.
In the event that the module senses an out-of-range temperature or over voltage, the module will erase the
TVK, reset itself, clear all working memory and log the event. The module can be reset and placed back into
operation when in-bound operating conditions have been restored.
Note, under-voltage conditions are treated as a power cycle. In the event that the module senses an under
voltage, the module will clear all working memory and halt operations. The TVK will not be erased. The module
can be reset and placed back into operation when proper operating conditions have been restored.
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Decommission
The module supports a physical interface for the input of a decommission signal. The decommission signal
jumper is monitored in both the powered-on state and the powered-off state.
In the event of a decommission signal, the module will erase the Key Encryption Key (KEK), reset itself, clear all
working memory and log the event.
This provides the capability to prevent access to sensitive objects in the event that the module has become
unresponsive or has lost access to primary power.
The module can be reset, re-initialized and placed back into operation when the decommission signal is
removed.
The module can optionally be configured to erase the KEK in response to the External Event signal and EFP
violations described above.
Secure Transport Mode
Secure Transport Mode (STM) is a feature that allows the integrity of the module to be verified when the module
is shipped from one location to another or placed in storage.
When a module is placed in to STM, a random string and a fingerprint of the internal state of the module is
output from the module. The fingerprint is a SHA-256 digest of the random string, a randomly generated nonce,
module CSPs, firmware, module configuration information and non-volatile memory. The nonce is stored in the
HSE-BBRAM that is erased in response to an External Event, Decommission signal and EFP violations.
While in STM, the module is in a reduced mode of operation which only allows the module to be taken out of
STM. If the module has been initialized, only the HSM SO can put the modules into STM and take it out of
STM. If the HSM is in a zeroized state, only the public user can put the module into STM and take it out of
STM.
The module can be taken out of STM by entering the random user string. The module will recalculate and
output the fingerprint. It is the operator’s responsibility to verify that the fingerprint output matches the
fingerprint initially output when the module was put in to STM.
Fault Tolerance
If power is lost to a module for whatever reason, the module shall, at a minimum, maintain itself in a state that it
can be placed back into operation when power is restored without compromise of its functionality or
permanently stored data.
A module shall maintain its secure state6
in the event of data input / output failures. When data input / output
capability is restored the module will resume operation in the state it was prior to the input / output failure.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module uses a non-modifiable operational environment. The requirements for a modifiable operating
environment do not apply.
6 A secure state is one in which either the cryptographic module is operational and its security policy
enforcement is functioning correctly, or it is not operational and all sensitive material is stored in a
cryptographically protected form.
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2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
The FIPS-Approved algorithms implemented by the module are listed in the table below:
Table 8: FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementation
Approved Security Functions Certificate No.
Symmetric Encryption/Decryption
AES:
CBC, CFB128, CFB8, CTR, ECB, GCM7, KW, KWP, OFB (128, 192, 256-bits)
XTS (128 and 256-bits)
C1707.
AES:
GCM7 , KW, KWP (128, 192, 256-bits)
C1718.
Triple DES (3-key):
CBC, CFB64, CFB8, CTR, ECB, OFB.
C1707.
Hashing
SHA:
SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-
384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256 (Byte Only).
C1707.
SHA:
SHA2-256, SHA2-512 (Byte Only).
C1718.
SHA:
SHA-1, SHA2-384 (Byte Only).
C1701.
Message Authentication Code
HMAC:
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512,
HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512.
C1707.
HMAC:
HMAC-SHA-256.
C1718.
Triple-DES:
CMAC.
C1707.
AES:
CMAC (128, 192, 256-bits).
C1707.
7
The module generates IVs internally using the Approved DRBG which all IV used are 128-bits in length.
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Approved Security Functions Certificate No.
AES:
GMAC (128, 192, 256-bits).
C1707, C1718.
Asymmetric
RSA:
Key Generation (2048 and 3072 modulus), Signature Generation (2048 and 3072
modulus), Signature Verification (1024, 2048 and 3072 modulus).
Signature Type: ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS.
Hash options:
Signature Generation (PKCS 1.5 and PKCSPSS): SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
Signature Generation (ANSI X9.31): SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512.
Signature Verification (PKCS 1.5 and PKCSPSS): SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
Signature Verification (ANSI X9.31): SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512.
C1707, C1717,
C1718 (when
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2 hash
options).
Vendor Affirmed
using FIPS IG
A.11 when using
SHA-3 hash.
RSA:
Key Generation (2048 and 3072 modulus).
Key Generation Mode: B.3.3 and B.3.6.
C1718, C1719.
RSA:
Signature Generation (4096 modulus), Signature Verification (4096 modulus).
Signature Type: ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS.
Signature Generation (PKCS 1.5 and PKCSPSS): SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
Signature Generation (ANSI X9.31): SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512.
Signature Verification (PKCS 1.5 and PKCSPSS): SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
Signature Verification (ANSI X9.31): SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512.
A480, A481
(when using
SHA-1 and SHA-
2).
Vendor Affirmed
using FIPS IG
A.11 when using
SHA-3.
RSA:
Key Generation (4096 modulus).
A478, A479,
A480, A481.
RSA:
Signature Verification (4096 modulus).
Hash options: SHA-1, SHA2-384.
C1701.
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Approved Security Functions Certificate No.
DSA:
Parameter Generation (2048 and 3072 modulus), Key Generation (2048 and 3072
modulus), Signature Generation (2048 and 3072 modulus), Signature Verification
(1024, 2048 and 3072 modulus).
Hash options:
Parameter Generation: SHA2-224, SHA2-256.
Signature Generation: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
Signature Verification: SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
C1707 (when
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2).
Vendor Affirmed
using FIPS IG
A.11 when using
SHA-3.
DSA:
Parameter Generation (2048 and 3072 modulus), Key Generation (2048 and 3072
modulus).
Hash Options:
Parameter Generation: SHA2-224, SHA2-256.
C1718.
ECDSA:
Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Generation Component (CVL),
Signature Verification.
Curves: B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-
192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521.
Hash options:
Signature Generation: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
Signature Verification: SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
C1707 (when
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2).
Vendor Affirmed
using FIPS IG
A.11 when using
SHA-3.
ECDSA:
Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Generation Component (CVL),
Signature Verification.
Curves: B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571.
Hash options:
Signature Generation: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
Signature Verification: SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
C1718 (when
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2).
Vendor Affirmed
using FIPS IG
A.11 when using
SHA-3.
RSA (CVL):
Decryption Primitive.
C1707, C1717,
C1718, C1719.
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Approved Security Functions Certificate No.
Key Agreement Scheme
KAS (Cert. #A480; key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of encryption
strength)8
ECC:
Full Validation, Key Pair Generation
Full Unified, OnePassDH.
Supported curves: P-521, KDF methods: One-Step, Supported hash: SHA2-512, Key
confirmation: HMAC-SHA2-512, Key length: 256, 512.
A480.
KAS-SSC9
ECC:
Ephemeral Unified, Full Unified, OnePassDH.
Supported curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-163, B-
233, B-283, B-409, B-571.
Supported hash: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
FFC:
dhHybrid1, dhEphem, dhHybridOneFlow, dhOneFlow.
Modulus length: 2048, 3072 and 4096.
Supported hash: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
A478, A480.
KAS-RSA (Certs #A478, #A479, #A480, #A481; key establishment methodology
provides 150 bits of encryption strength)10
KAS1-Basic:
Modulus length: 4096 bits, key generation method: rsakpg1-crt, KDF method: One-
Step Key Derivation from SP 800-56Cr1 using SHA2-512.
A478, A479,
A480, A481.
Key Transport
KTS (AES Certs. #C1707 and #C1718; key establishment methodology provides
between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
AES KW and KWP(128, 192, 256-bits)
C1707, C1718.
8 Full key agreement used by STC and with the Thales Luna PED. STC uses Full Unified Model C(2e, 2s,ECC CDH)
with Bilateral Key Confirmation on P-521 with 512 bit HMAC key. Thales Luna PED (local connection) uses
OnePassDH C(1e, 1s, ECC CDH) with Unilateral Key Confirmation on P-521. Thales Luna PED (remote connection)
uses Full Unified Model C(2e, 2s, ECC CDH) with Bilateral Key Confirmation on P-521 with 256 bit HMAC key.
9 Shared secret computation when requesting a Diffie-Hellman or Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman key derivation using
the C_DeriveKey Cryptoki API call.
10 Full key agreement with the CPV3 protocol.
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Approved Security Functions Certificate No.
KTS-RSA (Certs. # A478, #A479, #A480 and #A481; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
KTS-OAEP-Basic:
Modulus length – 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192, Hash –SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, Mask Generation
Function (MGF) –SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-
256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
A478, A479,
A480, A481.
Key Derivation Function
Key-Based Key Derivation Function (KBKDF)
KDF Mode: Counter.
MAC Mode: CMAC-AES128, CMAC-AES192, CMAC-AES256, CMAC TDES, HMAC-
SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512,
HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512.
C1707 (when
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2).
Vendor Affirmed
using IG A.11
when using SHA-
3.
KDA (Cert. #A480)
One-Step Key Derivation using SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-
224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
A480.
ANSI X9.42 CVL
KDF Type: Concatenation
Supported Hash: SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
A480.
PBKDF11
MAC Mode: HMAC-SHA2-512
A480.
Random Number Generation
Counter DRBG
Mode: AES 256
C1707.
Key Generation
CKG12 Vendor Affirmed
using IG D.12.
11 Used internal to the cryptographic module to derive the storage encryption key used to encrypt the checkword used
during password based authentication. The derived key is separately used to encrypt for storage the USK which is
independently also encrypted under the module generated KEK. The module uses method 1a from SP 800-132
where the derived Master Key (MK) is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK).
12 Symmetric keys and seeds used for asymmetric key generation are an unmodified output from approved DRBG
(Cert #C1707).
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Table 9: Allowed Security Function for the Firmware Implementation
Allowed Security Functions
Key Transport
AES (key unwrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength)
(based on AES Cert. #C1707 and using allowances in FIPS IG D.9).
Triple-DES (key unwrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
(based on Triple-DES Cert. #C1707 and using allowances in FIPS IG D.9).
RSA (CVL Certs. #C1707, C1717, C1718 and C1719, key wrapping; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)13
Modulus length – 2048, 3072, 4096.
Hash – SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512.
Mask Generation Function (MGF) – SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
Random Number Generation
NDRNG14
13 Only permitted for use under FIPS IG D.9 and is not permitted for use after December 31, 2023. This entry covers
the use of RSA encryption/decryption using PKCS#1-v1.5 padding which is used with CPV1 (modulus length - 2048)
for transport of exchanged nonce as well as available for optional use with C_WrapKey and C_UnwrapKey user
functions for import and export of secret key.
14 the entropy source falls within a scenario of FIPS IG 7.14 that requires an entropy assessment and meets
requirements of FIPS IG 7.15.
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Non-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Non-FIPS Approved security functions are not available for use when the module has been configured to
operate in FIPS-approved mode (see section 3 for further details on configuring the approved mode of
operation).
 Symmetric Encryption/Decryption
 DES
 Triple-DES (non-compliant for encryption using 112 bit keys)
 RC2
 RC4
 RC5
 CAST3
 CAST5
 SEED
 ARIA
 SM4
 Hashing
 MD2
 HAS-160
 SM3
 KECCAK
 Message Authentication Code
 AES MAC
 DES-MAC
 RC2-MAC
 RC5-MAC
 CAST3-MAC
 CAST5-MAC
 SEED-MAC
 ARIA-MAC
 SSL3-MD5-MAC
 SSL3-SHA1-MAC
 HMAC (non-compliant for any configuration providing less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 TUAK
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 MILENAGE
 COMP128
 Asymmetric
 KCDSA
 RSA X-509
 RSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 DSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 ECDSA (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 EdDSA
 SM2
 EdDSA PH
 Key Generation
 DES
 RC2
 RC4
 RC5
 CAST3
 CAST5
 SEED
 ARIA
 GENERIC-SECRET
 SSL PRE-MASTER
 BIP32
 Key Agreement
 ECC (non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology; non-compliant with less than 112 bits
of encryption strength)
 Key Transport
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology; non-compliant with less than 112 bits of encryption
strength)
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2.8 Critical Security Parameters
The following table lists Critical Security Parameters (CSP) used to perform approved security function
supported by the cryptographic module:
Table 10: Summary of CSPs
Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
Key Encryption Key (KEK) AES-256
AES-CTR
DRBG
Not Input or Output.
When administrators enable Decommission,
the KEK encrypts all sensitive values and is
zeroized in response to a decommission
signal.
Root Certificate
RSA-4096
public key
certificate
Loaded at
manufacturing
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the Root Key. It is self-
signed with its private key controlled by
Thales. Used in verifying Manufacturing
Integrity Certificate (MIC) and firmware and
capability updates.
Root Private
RSA-4096
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
The root key used in the Thales controlled
certificate hierarchy used by HSM to
authenticate firmware/capability updates and
peer HSMs in secure protocols.
Firmware Signing Key
RSA-4096
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output
The subordinate root signing key used to
certify HSM firmware updates.
Firmware Signing
Certificate
RSA-4096
public key
certificate
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Input with Firmware
Update Image
which is considered
plaintext.
The X.509 public subordinate certificate
signed by “Root Private” signing key used to
certify HSM firmware updates.
Capability Signing Key
RSA-4096
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
The subordinate root signing key used to
certify HSM capability updates.
Capability Signing
Certificate
RSA-4096
public key
certificate
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Input with
Capability Update
File.
The X.509 public subordinate certificate
signed by “Root Private” signing key used to
certify HSM capability updates.
Manufacturer’s Integrity
Certificate (MIC)
RSA-4096
public key
certificate
Loaded at
manufacturing
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the Manufacturing Integrity
Key (MIK) controlled by Thales. It is signed
by the Root Key. Used in verifying all key
material certified by Hardware Origin
Certificates (HOCs).
Manufacturer’s Integrity
Key
RSA-4096
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
The subordinate root signing key used to
certify HSM Hardware Origin Keys.
ECC Manufacturing
Integrity Certificate
(ECC MIC)
ECC public
certificate for
public key on
curve P-384.
Loaded at
manufacturing
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the ECC Manufacturing
Integrity Key (ECC MIK). It is self-signed.
ECC Manufacturer’s
Integrity Key
ECC private
key on curve
P-384
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
The subordinate root signing key used to
certify HSM ECC Hardware Origin Keys.
Hardware Origin Key
(HOK)
RSA 4096 bit
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 4096 bit RSA private key used to sign
certificates for other device key pairs, such
as the TWC4 used with CPV3. It is
generated at the time the device is
manufactured.
Hardware Origin
Certificate (HOC)
RSA-4096
public key
certificate
Loaded at
manufacturing
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the HOK. It is signed by the
Manufacturer’s Integrity Key (MIK) at the time
the device is manufactured. Used in verifying
all key material signed by the HOK.
FM Hardware Origin Key
(FM HOK)
RSA 4096 bit
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 4096 bit RSA private key used to sign
certificates for other device key pairs, such
as the TWC4. It is generated at the time the
device is manufactured.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
FM Hardware Origin
Certificate (FM HOC)
RSA-4096
public key
certificate
Loaded at
manufacturing
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the FM HOK. It is signed
by the Manufacturer’s Integrity Key (MIK) at
the time the device is manufactured. Used in
verifying all key material signed by the FM
HOK.
ECC Hardware Origin Key
(ECC HOK)
ECC private
key on curve
P-384
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output.
ECC P-384 private key used to sign other
device keys and used for a specific PKI
implementation requiring assurance that a
key or a specific action originated within the
hardware crypto module.
ECC Hardware Origin
Certificate
(ECC HOC)
ECC public
certificate for
public key on
curve P-384.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the ECC HOK. It is signed
by the ECC Manufacturing Integrity Key
(ECC MIK). It is used for a specific PKI
implementation requiring assurance that a
key or a specific action originated within the
hardware crypto module.
FM ECC Hardware Origin
Key
(FM ECC HOK)
ECC private
key on curve
P-384
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output.
ECC P-384 private key used to sign other
device keys and used for a specific PKI
implementation requiring assurance that a
key or a specific action originated within the
hardware crypto module.
FM ECC Hardware Origin
Certificate
(FM ECC HOC)
ECC public
certificate for
public key on
curve P-384.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the FM ECC HOK. It is
signed by the ECC Manufacturing Integrity
Key (ECC MIK). It is used for a specific PKI
implementation requiring assurance that a
key or a specific action originated within the
hardware crypto module.
Token or Module
Unwrapping Key (TUK3)
RSA-2048 bit
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 2048-bit RSA private key used with the
Cloning Protocol Version 1 supported for key
import only. It is following initial request for
the key.
Token or Module
Wrapping Certificate
(TWC3)
RSA-2048
public key
certificate
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the TUK4. It is signed by
the HOK. Used in exchange of nonce (KEVs
and KEVt) as part of the handshake during
the cloning protocol version 1 supported for
key import only.
Token or Module
Unwrapping Key (TUK4)
RSA-4096 bit
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 4096 bit RSA private key used in the key
cloning protocol. It is generated each time
the module initializes from power up or reset.
Token or Module
Wrapping Certificate
(TWC4)
RSA-4096
public key
certificate
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the TUK4. It is signed by
the HOK. Used in exchange of nonce (KEVs
and KEVt) as part of the handshake during
the cloning protocol.
Cloning Key Encryption
Vector – source (KEVs
)
384 bit nonce.
AES-CTR
DRBG
Exchanged during
CPV1 and CPV3
protocol (see
section 2.8.2 for
further details).
384 bit nonce used with the cloning protocol
and generated on the source HSM.
Cloning Key Encryption
Vector – target (KEVt)
384 bit nonce.
AES-CTR
DRBG
Exchanged during
CPV1 protocol (see
section 2.8.2 for
further details).
384 bit nonce used with the cloning protocol
and generated on the target HSM.
Cloning Transfer Key AES-256
Single Step
Concatenation
KDF from
NIST SP 800-
56Cr1 and
SHA2-512 as
hash.
Not Input or Output.
256 bit AES key derived during the cloning
protocol and used to transfer key objects
between source and target partitions using
the cloning protocol.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
Device Authentication Key
(CITS-DAK)
RSA 4096
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
4096-bit RSA private key used for a specific
PKI implementation requiring assurance that
a key or a specific action originated within the
hardware crypto module.
Device Authentication Key
(CITS-DAC)
RSA-4096
public key
certificate
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the CITS-DAK. Signed by
the HOK. Used for a specific PKI
implementation requiring assurance that a
key or a specific action originated within the
hardware crypto module.
ECC Device
Authentication Key
(ECC DAK)
ECC private
key on curve
P-384
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output. ECC P-384 private key.
ECC Device
Authentication Certificate
(ECC DAC)
ECC public
certificate for
public key on
curve P-384.
Loaded at
manufacturing
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the ECC DAK. It is signed
by the ECC HOK.
Token or Module Variable
Key (TVK)
AES-256
AES-CTR
DRBG
Not Input or Output.
It is used to encrypt authentication data
stored for auto-activation purposes.
Secure Transport Mode
(STM) Nonce
992-bits
AES-CTR
DRBG
Not Input or Output.
Random value used to create module
fingerprint that is used to verify the module’s
integrity as part of the Secure Transport
Mode feature.
DRBG Key AES-256
Hardware
Noise Source
Not Input or Output.
32 bytes AES key stored in the RAM. Used
in an implementation of the NIST SP 800-
90Ar1 CTR (AES) DRBG.
DRBG Seed 384 bits
Hardware
Noise Source
Not Input or Output.
Random seed data drawn from the Hardware
RBG and used to seed an implementation of
the NIST SP 800-90Ar1 CTR (AES) DRBG.
DRBG V 128 bits
Hardware
Noise Source
Not Input or Output.
Part of the secret state of the approved
DRBG. The value is generated using the
methods described in NIST SP 800-90Ar1.
DRBG Entropy Input 384 bits
Hardware
Noise Source
Not Input or Output.
The 384-bit entropy value used to initialize
the approved DRBG.
Global Storage Key
(GSK)
AES-256
AES-CTR
DRBG
Not Input or Output.
32-byte AES key that is the same for all
users on a specific Luna cryptographic
module. It is used to encrypt permanent
parameters within the non-volatile memory
area reserved for use by the module.
Role Domain Key (RDK)
48-byte
random value
(PED
configuration)
Or
7 - 255
character data
string
(Password
configuration).
AES-CTR
DRBG for
PED
configuration.
N/A for
Password
configuration.
Input / Output via
direct connection to
PED.
For PED configurations, this is a 48-byte
value, the first 32-bytes of which are used as
an AES KW 256-bit key that is used to
wrap/unwrap the SALK when it is exported /
imported from / to the module.
It is either generated by the module or
imprinted onto the module at the time Audit
role is initialized. The value is output from the
original module onto a PED key to enable
initializing the Audit role on additional
modules into the same domain.
For password configurations, this value is
supplied by the user during configuration of
the secure audit capability.
Secure Audit Logging Key
(SALK)
256 bit HMAC
key
AES-CTR
DRBG
Input / Output
encrypted under
the RDK and using
AES-256 in KWP
mode.
A 256-bit key used to verify data integrity and
authentication of the log messages. Saved in
the parameter area of Flash memory.
Secure Audit AppID-
HMAC Key
256 bit HMAC
key
AES-CTR
DRBG
Not Input or Output.
A 256-bit key used to create an HMAC of the
AppID to be used in the Secure Audit logs, to
prevent against the theft of the actual AppID.
A new key will be generated at every module
power-on or firmware reset.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
User Password (if PED
configuration and
optionally selected)
7 - 64
character data
string
N/A
Input from host
using ICD
communication
path and encrypted
under the PEC and
using KTS-OAEP-
basic from SP 800-
56Br2.
User provided password input by the
operator as a second factor of authentication
data.
PED Authentication Data
(if PED configuration)
48-byte
random value
AES-CTR
DRBG
Input / Output via
direct connection to
PED.
All messages sent
to the local PED
are encrypted using
A 48-byte random value that is generated by
the module when a role is created and is
written out to the PED key via the Trusted
Path.
Password (Authentication
Data if Password
configuration)
7 - 255
character data
string
N/A
Input from host
using ICD
communication
path and encrypted
under the PEC and
using KTS-OAEP-
basic from SP 800-
56Br2.
User provided password input by the
operator as authentication data.
The password is input to the PBKDF in order
to derive a key used to decrypt a known
checkword alongside the USK as part the
authentication process (the USK is
separately also encrypted under the KEK
when decommission is enabled).
User Storage Key (USK) AES-256
AES-CTR
DRBG
Not Input or Output.
This key is used to encrypt all sensitive
attributes of all private objects owned by the
User.
Partition Storage Key
(PSK)
AES-256
AES-CTR
DRBG
Not Input or Output.
This key is unique per-partition and used to
encrypt all CSP that are shared by all roles of
a given partition.
SKS Master Key (SMK) AES-256
AES-CTR
DRBG
Input/Output using
CPV3.
Input for key
migration purposes
using CPV1.
A randomly generated 256-bit secret used as
the master key for deriving all SKS key blob
encryption keys.
HA Login Public Key
(HAPUB)
4096-bit public
key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
A 4096-bit RSA public key used for the HA
Login protocol.
HA Login Private Key
(HAPK)
4096-bit
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 4096-bit RSA private key used for the HA
Login protocol.
HA Login Authentication
Data Encryption Key PIN
(RND)
AES-256
AES-CTR
DRBG
Output encrypted
using AES-256 in
KWP mode and
using a shared
secret from output
of SP 800-56Br2,
KAS1-Basic
exchange.
An AES 256-bit encryption key used to
encrypt authentication data for export to the
primary HA Login instance.
HA Login Ephemeral
Wrapping Key
(KSESS)
AES-256
AES-CTR
DRBG
Output encrypted
with peer TWC.
An AES 256-bit encryption key used to
encrypt authentication data for re-import from
the primary HA Login instance.
Key Cloning Domain
Vector (KCV)
48-byte
random value
(PED
configuration)
Or
7 - 255
character data
string
(Password
configuration).
AES-CTR
DRBG for
PED
configuration.
N/A for
Password
configuration.
Input / Output via
direct connection to
Thales PED.
Value that controls a partition’s ability to
participate in the cloning protocol.
In the case of PED configurations, it is
generated by the module or imprinted onto
the module at partition initialization time.
For password configurations, this value is
supplied by the user during partition
initialization.
For PED configurations, the value is output
from the original partition in the domain to a
PED key to enable initializing additional
modules into the domain.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
Remote PED Vector
(RPV) (if PED
configuration)
256-bit secret
value
AES-CTR
DRBG
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
A randomly generated 256-bit secret, which
must be shared between a remote PED and
a cryptographic module in order to establish
a secure communication channel between
them.
PED Authentication
Certificate (PAC)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
An ECC public key certificate used to verify
certificates for local or remote connection
with a Luna PED.
PED Authentication Key
(PAK)
ECC private
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output.
An ECC private key used to sign certificates
used for local or remote connection with the
Luna PED.
HSM Static Key-
Agreement Certificate for
Local Connections (HSM-
SKA-CLOCAL)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
Used by the Luna PED to authenticate the
local HSM to connect to and to extract the
HSM’s static ECC public key for C(1e,1s,
ECC CDH) key-agreement for local
connection with a Luna PED.
HSM Static Key-
Agreement Private Key
for Local Connections
(HSM-SKA-KLOCAL)
ECC private
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output.
Used by the HSM as the static private key for
C(1e,1s, ECC CDH) key-agreement
agreement for local connection with a Thales
Luna PED.
HSM Static Key-
Agreement Certificate for
Remote Connections
(HSM-SKA-CREMOTE)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
Used by the PED to authenticate the remote
HSM to connect to and to extract the HSM’s
static ECC public key for:
 C(2e,2s, ECC CDH) key-agreement for
remote connection with PED.
 C(1e,1s, ECC CDH) DLC Key Transport
for CSP migration
HSM Static Key-
Agreement Private Key
for Remote Connections
(HSM-SKA-KREMOTE)
ECC private
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output.
Used by the remote HSM as the static private
key for:
 C(2e,2s, ECC CDH) key-agreement
agreement for remote connection
with PED.
 C(1e,1s, ECC CDH) DLC Key
Transport for CSP migration
HSM Ephemeral Key-
Agreement Certificate
(HSM-EKA-C)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
Used by the Luna PED to authenticate the
remote HSM to connect to and to extract the
HSM’s ephemeral public key for C(2e,2s,
ECC CDH) key-agreement agreement for
remote connection with a Luna PED.
HSM Ephemeral Key-
Agreement Private Key
(HSM-EKA-K)
ECC private
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output
Used by the Luna PED to authenticate the
remote HSM and to extract the HSM’s
ephemeral public key for C(2e,2s, ECC CDH)
key-agreement agreement for remote
connection with a Luna PED.
Remote PED Vector
Certificate (RPV-C)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
An ECC public key certificate used by the
HSM device to verify PED-SKA-C, PED-EKA-
C.
Remote PED Vector
Private Key (RPV-K)
ECC private
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
An ECC private key used by the HSM to sign
PED-SKA-C, and by the Luna PED to sign
PED-EKA-C.
PED Static Key-
Agreement Certificate for
Remote Connections
(PED-SKA-C)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
Used by the HSM to authenticate and extract
the Luna PED’s ECC ephemeral public key
for C(2e,2s, ECC CDH) or C(1e,1s ECC
CDH) key-agreement.
Uniquely generated for each use.
PED Static Key-
Agreement Private Key
(PED-SKA-K)
ECC private
key on curve
P-521.
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Output via direct
connection to a
Luna PED.
Used by the Luna PED for Remote
connections. Act as An ECC static private
key for C(2e,2s, ECC CDH) key-agreement.
Key isn’t used by the HSM as a CSP but is
generated by it for use by the Luna PED.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
HSM CSP Wrapping Key
(CWKHSM)
AES-256
Single Step
Concatenation
KDF from
NIST SP 800-
56Cr1 and
using SHA2-
512 as hash.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Local and Remote PED
Channel for wrapping exchanged CSPs.
PED CSP Wrapping Key
CWKPED
AES-256
Single Step
Concatenation
KDF from
NIST SP 800-
56Cr1 and
using SHA2-
512 as hash.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Local and Remote PED
Channel for wrapping exchanged CSPs.
HSM Data Encryption Key
(DEKHSM)
AES-256
Single Step
Concatenation
KDF from
NIST SP 800-
56Cr1 and
using SHA2-
512 as hash.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
encrypting communication messages (from
HSM-to-PED).
HSM MAC Key (DMKHSM) 256 bits
Single Step
Concatenation
KDF from
NIST SP 800-
56Cr1 and
using SHA2-
512 as hash.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
message authentication of communication
messages (from HSM-to-PED).
HSM Initialization Vector
(IVHSM)
256 bits
Single Step
Concatenation
KDF from
NIST SP 800-
56Cr1 and
using SHA2-
512 as hash.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel as the
initialization vector for encrypting
communication messages (from HSM-to-
PED).
PED Data Encryption Key
(DEKPED)
AES-256
Single Step
Concatenation
KDF from
NIST SP 800-
56Cr1 and
using SHA2-
512 as hash.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
encrypting communication messages (from
PED-to-HSM).
PED MAC Key (DMKPED) 256 bits
Single Step
Concatenation
KDF from
NIST SP 800-
56Cr1 and
using SHA2-
512 as hash.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel for
message authentication of communication
messages (from PED-to-HSM).
PED Initialization Vector
(IVPED)
256 bits
Single Step
Concatenation
KDF from
NIST SP 800-
56Cr1 and
using SHA2-
512 as hash.
Not Input or Output.
Derived during Remote PED Channel as the
initialization vector for encrypting
communication messages (from PED-to-
HSM).
Password Encryption Key
(PEK)
RSA 4096 bit
private key
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Not Input or Output.
A 4096 bit RSA private key used to decrypt
user passwords that are provided to the
module. It is generated the first time it is
required.
Password Encryption
Certificate (PEC)
RSA-4096
public key
certificate
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.3.6.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
The X.509 public key certificate
corresponding to the PEK. It is created and
signed by the HOK the first it is required.
Partition STC Static
Public ID Key
(STC-PIDPUB)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
A 521-bit ECC public key used as the
partition’s static ID in the STC protocol.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
Partition STC Static
Private ID Key
(STC-PIDPRIV)
ECC private
key on curve
P-521
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output.
A 521-bit ECC private key used as the
partition’s static ID in the STC protocol.
Partition STC Ephemeral
Public Key
(STC-PKAPUB)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Certificate Output in
Plaintext.
A 521-bit ECC public key used as the
partition’s ephemeral key in the STC
protocol.
Partition STC Ephemeral
Private Key
(STC-PKAPRIV)
ECC private
key on curve
P-521
FIPS 186-4,
Appendix
B.4.1.
Not Input or Output.
A 521-bit ECC private key used as the
partition’s ephemeral key in the STC
protocol.
Client STC Static Public
ID Key
(STC-CIDPUB)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521
External Input in Plaintext.
A 521-bit ECC public key used as the client’s
static ID in the STC protocol.
Client STC Ephemeral
Public Key
(STC-CKAPUB)
ECC public
key on curve
P-521
External Input in Plaintext.
A 521-bit ECC public key used as the client’s
ephemeral key in the STC protocol.
Partition STC Session
Encryption and
Authentication Keys
(STC-PEN, STC-PMA,
STC-PIV, STC-CEN,
STC-CMA, STC-CIV)
AES-128
HMAC-
SHA512
NIST SP 800-
56Ar3 key
agreement.
Not Input or Output.
These keys are agreed upon with a client
application for the purpose of encrypting and
generate MAC for message exchanges
during an STC session.
Asymmetric Key Pairs
(general partition or
session keys)
RSA, DSA,
ECC, DH
N/A (user
imported) or
either FIPS
186-4,
Appendix
B.3.3 or B.4.1.
Input or output
encrypted
using Symmetric
Keys (general
partition or session
keys)
using key
wrap/unwrap ICD
commands using
key wrap/unwrap
ICD commands and
SP 800-38F
encryption options.
Input using
Symmetric
Keys (general
partition or session
keys) using key
unwrap ICD
commands and
approved
symmetric
algorithms as
permitted by FIPS
IG D.9.
When transferred
between partitions
using SKS,
encrypted under
the SMK.
Input using CPV1
as covered in
section 2.8.2.
General use asymmetric key
pairs that can be
exported/imported from/to the
module or generated by the
module.
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Keys and CSPS CSP Type Generation Input / Output Description
Symmetric Keys (general
partition or session keys)
AES or TDES
(including
AES-XTS),
MAC, KDF.
N/A (user
imported) or
AES-CTR
DRBG
(module
generated).
Input or output
encrypted
using Symmetric
Keys (general
partition or session
keys) using key
wrap/unwrap ICD
commands and SP
800-38F encryption
options.
Input or output
encrypted
using
Asymmetric Keys
(general partition or
session keys)
using key
wrap/unwrap ICD
commands and
KTS-OAEP-basic
from SP 800-56Br2.
Input using
Symmetric
Keys (general
partition or session
keys) using key
unwrap ICD
commands and
approved
symmetric
algorithms as
permitted by FIPS
IG D.9.
When transferred
between partitions
using SKS,
encrypted under
the SMK.
Input using CPV1
as covered in
section 2.8.2.
General use asymmetric key
pairs that can be
exported/imported from/to the
module or generated by the
module.
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Key Generation
Symmetric cryptographic keys are generated by the direct unmodified output of the module’s NIST SP 800-
90Ar1 DRBG. The DRBG output is also used to provide seeds for asymmetric key generation.
Keys which are generated outside the module and input during the manufacturing process include: Root
Certificate, MIC and ECC MIC.
The HOC, ECC HOC, FM HOC and FM ECC HOC are created outside the module during manufacture based
on public keys generated by the module and exported as part of the manufacturing process. Once signed by
corresponding externally managed keys, these are re-loaded onto the module for subsequent validation and
storage.
User passwords for authentication of roles are generated by the operator.
The NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG (CTR-DRBG using AES-256) is seeded using 2048 bits or raw entropy taken
from the module NDRNG which is conditioned using SHA-512 ahead of creating the 384 bit seed. Based on
calculated min-entropy values for the platform raw noise source and factors outlined in NIST SP 800-90B, the
384-bit input used to seed to the DRBG has a full 384 bits of entropy.
Key Import and Export
Import and Export of CSP is supported over the following interface:
 Physical Trusted Path (local PED); or
 Luna ICD, logical interface.
For details of specific mapping of CSP to interfaces and associated methods of encryption of specific CSP refer
to the Input / Output column of Table 10.
Depending on the configuration of the module, the following methods of key import and export for ‘Asymmetric
Key Pairs (general partition keys)’ and ‘Symmetric Keys (general partition keys)’ are available as a service:
 Key Wrap / Unwrap using Cloning Protocol Version 3 (CPV3)
Cloning is a product feature where KAS1-Basic from SP 800-56Br2 is used to negotiate a shared secret
used to transfer partition objects between a source and destination partition and where these can be on the
same or different cryptographic module. The protocol uses the following options with KAS1-Basic:
 RSASVE for transfer of shared secrets uses the public key from the TWC4 certificate which has a
modulus length of 4096 bits;
 Shared keys are derived using One-Step KDF from SP 800-56Cr1 using SHA2-512. Inputs to the
KDF include the exchanged shared secret from the RSASVE transfer, alongside the pre-shared
256 bit secret key (KCV or RDK) and additional HSM related shared information; and
 Encryption of the SMK during the transfer uses AES-256 in KWP mode and a single-use key and IV
derived from the output of the KDF.
 Scalable Key Storage (SKS)
SKS allows the transfer of partition objects (symmetric and asymmetric keys, alongside other objects)
between partition encrypted under the SMK which must have been pre-shared between source and
destination partition using CPV3.
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SKS uses AES-256 in GCM mode with a 128bit random IV generated by the cryptographic module using
output from its NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG and where a unique key per extraction is used. This key is
deriver using the shared partition SMK and a 256-bit random salt value (unique per SKS export operation)
and the SMK.
Encryption keys are derived using SP 800-108 PRF KDF and using AES-CMAC-256.
 Key Wrap / Unwrap
The key wrap operation is available for use to import or export raw Symmetric Keys (general partition or
session keys) or an Asymmetric Key Pair (general partition or session keys) – private key, using one of the
following options:
 KTS-OAEP-basic from SP 800-56Br2 and where the following options are supported:
 Modulus lengths of 2048, 3072 or 4096 (for export) or 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 for import;
 Hash and MGF options must match and be consistent with one of the following algorithms: SHA-1,
SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
 SP 800-38F compliant KTS using one of the following options for both key unwrapping and wrapping:
 AES (128, 192 or 256) in KW, KWP;
 FIPS IG D.9 compliant KTS for unwrap of key objects using one of the following options:
 AES (128, 192 or 256) in CBC, CTR or ECB modes; or
 TDES (112 and 168 bit) in CBC, ECB and CTR.
The unwrap operation takes as input an encrypted symmetric key or asymmetric private key and a handle to
the key required to successfully unwrap the object. It decrypts the key and returns the handle to the
imported key.
 Key Unwrap using Cloning Protocol Version 1 (CPV1)
CPV1 is supported to enable the import of keys from existing Thales HSM with firmware prior to 7.7.0 to the
cryptographic module.
CPV1 operates in the following way:
 256 bit nonce (KEVt and KEVs) are transferred using RSA with PKCSv1.5 encryption and the public key
from the TWC3 certificate (of source and destination partitions) with modulus length of 2048 bits.
 Shared keys are derived using One-Step KDF from SP 800-56Cr1 using SHA2-512 and with the source
and destination nonce (KEVt and KEVs) alongside KCV (or RDK) as inputs. KCV (or RDK) are
transferred out of band of the protocol to source and destination partitions either as a pre-shared
password or on the red PED key presented using the Luna PED.
 Encryption of the partitions object during transfer uses AES-256 in CBC mode alongside having an
independent SHA2-256 hash for integrity protection.
 Key Unwrap using historic versions of SKS
The module supports key import for keys previously exported from other FIPS certified Thales HSM using
versions of SKS supported by legacy firmware versions and where related certificates are now on NIST’s
historical list.
Import is supported for key migration only and where ahead of import, the SMK used to originally encrypt
the object must be transferred to the target partition using CPV1.
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Objects imported using this method are either:
 Encrypted using AES-256 in GCM mode with SHA256 for integrity protection; or
 Encrypted using AES-256 in OFB mode and with SHA1 for integrity protection;
Limits on the use of TDES keys
In conformance with limitations on the maximum number of blocks encrypted for a given 168-bit TDES key
outlined in SP 800-67r1 and further tightened in FIPS IG A.13 ‘SP 800-67rev1 Transition’ – the cryptographic
module technically enforces that any given TDES key stored in the cryptographic module cannot be used for
more than 216
64-bit data block encryption operations.
TDES keys created on the HSM (imported or generated) include a ‘remaining blocks’ attribute that is managed
by the HSM and decremented following each encrypt operation requested. Once the ‘remaining blocks’ count
reaches zero, the key is permitted for use with decrypt and MAC verify operations exclusively and is prohibited
from being copied, exported and/or for the counter being reset to a non-zero value.
2.9 Self-Tests
Power-On Self-tests
The module performs Power-On Self-Tests (POST) upon power-up to confirm the firmware integrity, and to
check the continued correct operation of the random number generator and each of the implemented
cryptographic algorithms. While the module is running POST, all interfaces are disabled until the successful
completion of the self tests. If any POST fails an error message is output, the module halts, and data output is
inhibited.
These self-tests can also be initiated as an operator service but do not require operator input to initiate at power
on.
Table 11: Power On Self-Tests (Bootloader) – Module Integrity
Test When Performed Indicator
Boot loader performs an RSA 4096-bit SHA2-384 signature
verification of itself
Power-on Error output and module
halt
Boot loader performs an RSA 4096-bit SHA2-384 signature
verification of the firmware prior to firmware start
Power-
on/Request15
Error output and module
halt
SHA (SHA-1 and SHA2-384) and RSA (4096 modulus) KAT. Power-
on/Request16
Error output and module
halt
15 Request indicates triggering a POST via a command
16 Request indicates triggering a POST via a command
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Table 12: Power On Self-Tests (Firmware) – Cryptographic Implementations
Test When Performed Indicator
DRBG Self-Test (Instantiate Function Known Answer Test,
Generate Function KAT, Reseed Function KAT, conditional
tests)
Power-on/once
every 24 hours.
Error output and module
halt
SHA KAT (SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-
128, SHAKE-256)
Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
HMAC KAT (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA224, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-
SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512)
Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
RSA KAT (Signature Generation, Signature Verification,
Encrypt, Decrypt)
Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
DSA KAT (Signature Generation, Signature Verification) Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
Diffie-Hellman KAT (X9.42 DH Derive) Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
AES KAT (ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, CFB128, CFB8, KW, KWP,
GCM, XTS modes covering 128, 192 and 256 bit keys, CMAC
and GMAC).
Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
Triple-DES KAT (ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB64 (162 bit keys),
CTR, CMAC).
Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
ECDH KAT (Derive) Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt
ECDSA KAT (Signature Generation, Signature Verification) Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
KBKDF KAT (SP 800-108 KBKDF using AES-CMAC, HMAC-
SHA224, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384, HMAC-SHA512 as
PRF).
Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
KDF KAT (SP 800-56Cr2 One-Step KDF using SHA1, SHA2-
224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512).
Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
KAS1-basic KAT (SP 800-56Br2 using 4096-bit RSA modulus) Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
PBKDF KAT (SP 800-132) Power-on/Request Error output and module
halt.
Conditional Self-Tests
The module automatically performs conditional self-tests based on the module operation. These self-tests do
not require operator input to initiate.
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Table 13: Conditional Self-Tests
Test When
Performed
Where
Performed
Indicator
NDRNG conditional tests17 Continuous Firmware /
Hardware
Error output and module halt
HRNG conditional tests Continuous Firmware /
Hardware
Error output and module halt
RSA – Pair-wise consistency test
(asymmetric key pairs)
On
generation
Firmware Error output
DSA – Pair-wise consistency test
(asymmetric key pairs)
On
generation
Firmware Error output
ECDSA – Pair-wise consistency
test (asymmetric key pairs)
On
generation
Firmware Error output
Firmware load test (4096-bit RSA
Signature Verification)
On firmware
update load
Firmware Error output – module will
continue with existing firmware
2.10Mitigation of Other Attacks
Timing attacks are mitigated directly by a module through the use of hardware accelerator chips for modular
exponentiation operations. The use of constant timing hardware acceleration ensures that all RSA signature
operations complete in the same time, therefore making the analysis of timing differences irrelevant. RSA
blinding may also be enabled as an additional defense in depth optional mitigation.
17 CRNGT, as described in Section 4.9.2 of FIPS 140-2, is only performed for the NDRNG and is not performed for
the DRBG as permitted by FIPS IG 9.8 for modules implementing an approved DRBG from NIST SP 800-90Ar1.
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3 Guidance
3.1 Identifying the Module Version
Ahead of putting the module into its approved mode of operation, it is important to identify the hardware,
firmware and bootloader versions of the target module and to check these correspond to those listed in section
1.2. The following sections provide guidance on checking each element.
Any module returning hardware, firmware and bootloader versions not listed in this security policy is
out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 certificate.
Checking the Bootloader and Firmware Version
Two paths are supported to checking the hardware, bootloader and firmware versions depending on whether
the LunaCM or LUSH management interfaces are being used18
:
> hsm showinfo when using LunaCM; or
> hsm show when using LunaSH.
See section 3.1.2 for steps to verify the firmware build.
All commands return status information on the target cryptographic module including the version numbers for
both bootloader and firmware and separately the hardware identity.
Example output for each command for a valid module is shown in the Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7, and
Figure 8 below with relevant versions highlighted in red:
lunacm:>hsm showinfo
Partition Label -> myPCIeHSM
Partition Manufacturer -> SafeNet
Partition Model -> Luna K7
Partition Serial Number -> 67842
Partition Status -> L3 Device
HSM Part Number -> 808-000048-002
Token Flags ->
CKF_RNG
CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED
CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED
RPV Initialized -> Not Supported
Slot Id -> 4
Session State -> CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION
Role Status -> none logged in
Token Flags ->
TOKEN_KCV_CREATED
Partition OUID: 000000000000000002090100
Partition Storage:
Total Storage Space: 393216
Used Storage Space: 0
Free Storage Space: 393216
Object Count: 0
18 Both LunaCM and LunaSH map to the Luna ICD logical interface at the cryptographic module boundary.
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Overhead: 9848
*** The HSM is in FIPS 140-2 approved operation mode. ***
FM HW Status -> FM
Bootloader Version -> 1.1.5
Firmware Version -> 7.7.1
Rollback Firmware Version -> 7.0.3
Environmental:
Fan 1 Status : active
Fan 2 Status : active
Battery Voltage : 3.093 V
Battery Warning Threshold Voltage : 2.750 V
System Temp : 38 deg. C
System Temperature Warning Threshold : 75 deg. C
HSM Storage:
Total Storage Space: 33554432
Used Storage Space: 33554432
Free Storage Space: 0
Allowed Partitions: 1
Number of Partitions: 1
License Count -> 8
1. 621000068-000 K7 Base Configuration
2. 621010185-003 Key backup via cloning protocol
3. 621000135-002 Enable allow decommissioning
4. 621000134-002 Enable 32 megabytes of object storage
5. 621000154-001 Enable decommission on tamper with policy off
6. 621000021-002 Maximum performance
7. 621000138-001 Controlled tamper recovery
8. 621000074-001 Enable Functionality Modules
Command Result: No Error
Figure 4: Example output of hsm showinfo command from LunaCM
lunash:>hsm show
Appliance Details:
==================
Software Version: 7.7.0-1
HSM Details:
============
HSM Label: myLunaHSM
Serial #: 66331
Bootloader: 1.1.5
Firmware: 7.7.1
HSM Model: Luna K7
HSM Part Number: 808-000073-003
Authentication Method: Password
HSM Admin login status: Not Logged In
HSM Admin login attempts left: 3 before HSM zeroization!
RPV Initialized: No
Audit Role Initialized: No
Remote Login Initialized: No
Manually Zeroized: No
Secure Transport Mode: No
HSM Tamper State: No tamper(s)
Partitions created on HSM:
Guidance
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
65
==============================
Partition: 154438865296, Name: mypar0
Number of partitions allowed: 100
Number of partitions created: 1
FIPS 140-2 Operation:
=====================
The HSM is in FIPS 140-2 approved operation mode.
HSM Storage Information:
========================
Maximum HSM Storage Space (Bytes): 33554432
Space In Use (Bytes): 335544
Free Space Left (Bytes): 33218888
Environmental Information on HSM:
=================================
Battery Voltage: 3.072 V
Battery Warning Threshold Voltage: 2.750 V
System Temp: 53 deg. C
System Temp Warning Threshold: 75 deg. C
Functionality Module HW: FM
=======================
Command Result : 0 (Success)
Figure 5: Example output of hsm show command from LunaSH
Checking Firmware Build Version
To check the firmware release version to differentiate between FW 7.7.1 and FW build 7.7.1-20, use:
1. hsm supportinfo when using LunaSH on Thales Luna Network HSM.
2. ./lunadiag for Thales Luna PCIe running Linux; or
3. lunadiag.exe from a Windows command line.
The hsm supportinfo command will generate a .txt file that must be opened to view the information.
lunash:>hsm supportInfo
'hsm supportInfo' successful.
Use 'scp' from a client machine to get file named:
supportInfo.txt
From the text file:
=====================================================================
HOST INFORMATION and DATE/TIME
=====================================================================
Wed Nov 2 15:02:37 EDT 2022
local_host
Guidance
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
66
=====================================================================
BACKUP TOKEN INFO AND POLICIES
=====================================================================
No backup token present.
=====================================================================
HSM INFO
=====================================================================
HSM Details:
============
HSM Label: Pri_SA1
Serial #: 593658
Bootloader: 1.1.5
Firmware: 7.7.1
HSM Model: Luna K7
HSM Part Number: 808-000073-001
Authentication Method: Password
HSM Admin login status: Not Logged In
HSM Admin login attempts left: 3 before HSM zeroization!
RPV Initialized: No
Audit Role Initialized: No
Remote Login Initialized: No
Manually Zeroized: No
Secure Transport Mode: No
HSM Tamper State: No tamper(s)
Figure 6: Example output of hsm supportinfo showing the base bootloader and firmware versions
To find the firmware build number, search the text file for the text FW Rev In the below example, 7.7.1 is the
firmware version and -20 is the build number.
Entry 25, 0x3d bytes read, timestamp = 21292, reset count = 12:
LOG(INFO): HSM core init complete: online
Entry 26, 0x2e bytes read, timestamp = 380, reset count = 13:
LOG(INFO): FW Rev 7.7.1-20
Entry 27, 0x43 bytes read, timestamp = 380, reset count = 13:
LOG(INFO): File: ./SOURCE/LUNA2/MAIN_MOD/main.c
Figure 7: Example output of hsm supportinfo showing in addition the specific build
Use of the lunadiag tool also requires searching for FW Rev. To display the firmware, follow the following steps:
1. Execute the ./lunadiag command (in Linux) or lunadiag.exe (in a command line in Windows).
2. Enter the slot number where the K7 card resides
3. Select option 18 Read Diagnostic Log
4. Select option 7 Software Info
5. To find the firmware build number, search output file for the text FW Rev. In the below example, 7.7.1
is the firmware version and -20 is the build number.
Entry 9, 0x49 bytes read, timestamp = 70022, reset count = 6:
LOG(INFO): Deactivating (erasing the TVK in NVRAM)...
Entry 10, 0x2e bytes read, timestamp = 371, reset count = 7:
LOG(INFO): FW Rev 7.7.1-20
Entry 11, 0x43 bytes read, timestamp = 372, reset count = 7:
LOG(INFO): File: ./SOURCE/LUNA2/MAIN_MOD/main.c
Guidance
Thales Luna K7 Cryptographic Module - LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
002-010935-002 Rev. P, March 8, 2023, Copyright © 2023 Thales.
67
Figure 8: Example excerpt of output from lunadiag option 7 showing the firmware revision and build
3.2 Approved Mode of Operation
To place the module in FIPS 140-2 Approved mode, the HSM Security Officer must check and, if necessary, set
the following HSM level policies:
 HSM Policy (12), “Allow Non-FIPS Algorithms” – this is enabled by default and shall be disabled;
 HSM Policy (50), “Allow Functionality Modules” – this is disabled by default and shall either remain disabled
or shall be disabled to enter FIPS mode;
If the HSM Security Officer attempts to enable or disable these policies, a warning is displayed and the HSM
Security Officer is prompted to confirm the selection. If either of these policies are left (or put) in the “enabled”
state, the module will be operating in the non-Approved mode.
As a confirmation and secondary step - The HSM Security Officer can independently confirm that the
cryptographic module is in FIPS 140-2 Approved mode by executing the status commands covered in the prior
section. Confirmation of FIPS mode status is provided on the lines highlighted in green on Figure 4 and Figure
5.
Where the modules configuration has not met the above requirements the following alternative statement will be
found in the output of these comments:
The HSM is not in FIPS 140-2 approved operation mode.
Following entry into an approved mode of operation – any changes to HSM Policy (12) or HSM Policy (50) will
trigger an automatic zeroization of the HSM erasing all roles and partition stored key objects.