Ctrl IQ, Inc.

Rocky Linux 8 and 9 NSS Cryptographic Module

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1 General

1.1 Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version rocky8.20240909 and rocky9.20240909 of the Rocky Linux 8 and 9 NSS Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1 module.

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1.2 Security Levels

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic module specification	1
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	1
4	Roles, services, and authentication	1
5	Software/Firmware security	1
6	Operational environment	1
7	Physical security	N/A
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	1
10	Self-tests	1
11	Life-cycle assurance	1
12	Mitigation of other attacks	1
	Overall Level	1

Table 1: Security Levels

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2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Description

Purpose and Use:

The Rocky Linux 8 and 9 NSS Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as "the module") is defined as a software module in a multi-chip standalone embodiment. It provides a C language application program interface (API) designed to support cross-platform development of security-enabled client and server applications. Applications built with NSS can support SSLv3, TLS, IKEv2, PKCS#5, PKCS#7, PKCS#11, PKCS#12, S/MIME, X.509 v3 certificates, and other security standards supporting FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic algorithms. It combines a vertical stack of Linux components intended to limit the external interface each separate component may provide.

Module Type: Software

Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone

Cryptographic Boundary:

The cryptographic boundary consists only of the libsoftokn3.so and libfreeblpriv3.so libraries along with their associated integrity check values as listed in Section 2.2. If any other NSS API outside of these two libraries is invoked, the user is not interacting with the module specified in this Security Policy.

Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):

The TOEPP of the module is defined as the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.

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

Figure 1: Block Diagram

2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

Tested Module Identification – Hardware:

N/A for this module.

Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):

Package or File Name	Software/ Firmware Version	Features	Integrity Test
libsoftokn3.so, libfreeblpriv3.so on Rocky Linux 8	rocky8.20240909	N/A	HMAC-SHA-256
libsoftokn3.so, libfreeblpriv3.so on Rocky Linux 9	rocky9.20240909	N/A	HMAC-SHA-256

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)

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Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:

N/A for this module.

Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
Rocky Linux 8	SuperMicro SuperServer 5039MS	Intel Kaby Lake Xeon E3-1270 v6	Yes	N/A	rocky8.20240909
Rocky Linux 9	SuperMicro SuperServer 5039MS	Intel Kaby Lake Xeon E3-1270 v6	Yes	N/A	rocky9.20240909
Rocky Linux 8	SuperMicro SuperServer 5039MS	Intel Kaby Lake Xeon E3-1270 v6	No	N/A	rocky8.20240909
Rocky Linux 9	SuperMicro SuperServer 5039MS	Intel Kaby Lake Xeon E3-1270 v6	No	N/A	rocky9.20240909

Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid

Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

N/A for this module.

2.3 Excluded Components

There are no components within the cryptographic boundary excluded from the FIPS 140-3 requirements.

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved	Automatically entered whenever an approved service is requested.	Approved	Equivalent to the indicator of the requested service ("CKR_OK" for approved DRBG service and NSC_NSSGetFIPSStatus returns CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1) for all other approved services).
Non-Approved	Automatically entered whenever a non-	Non-Approved	Equivalent to the indicator of the requested service (NSC_NSSGetFIPSStatus does not return CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)).

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Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
	approved service is requested.		

Table 4: Modes List and Description

After passing all pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests executed on start-up, the module automatically transitions to the approved mode. No operator intervention is required to reach this point.

Mode Change Instructions and Status:

The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on the services requested by the operator. The status indicator of the mode of operation is equivalent to the indicator of the service that was requested.

2.5 Algorithms

Approved Algorithms:

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A5915	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A5917	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A5921	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A5923	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC-CS1	A5915	Direction - decrypt, encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC-CS1	A5917	Direction - decrypt, encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC-CS1	A5921	Direction - decrypt, encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC-CS1	A5923	Direction - decrypt, encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC	A5915	Direction - Generation Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38B
AES-CMAC	A5917	Direction - Generation Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38B
AES-CMAC	A5921	Direction - Generation Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38B
AES-CMAC	A5923	Direction - Generation Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38B
AES-CTR	A5915	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CTR	A5917	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CTR	A5921	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CTR	A5923	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A5915	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A5917	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A5921	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A5923	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A5915	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External, Internal Key Length - 128, 192, 256 IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2	SP 800-38D

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-GCM	A5917	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External, Internal Key Length - 128, 192, 256 IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2	SP 800-38D
AES-GCM	A5918	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External, Internal Key Length - 128, 192, 256 IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2	SP 800-38D
AES-GCM	A5921	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External, Internal Key Length - 128, 192, 256 IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2	SP 800-38D
AES-GCM	A5923	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External, Internal Key Length - 128, 192, 256 IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2	SP 800-38D
AES-GCM	A5924	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External, Internal Key Length - 128, 192, 256 IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2	SP 800-38D
AES-KW	A5915	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-KW	A5917	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-KW	A5921	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-KW	A5923	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-KWP	A5915	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-KWP	A5917	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-KWP	A5921	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-KWP	A5923	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A5915	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A5921	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A5915	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Component - No	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A5921	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Component - No	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A5915	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A5921	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG	A5915	Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - SHA2-256	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
Hash DRBG	A5921	Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - SHA2-256	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A5915	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A5919	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A5921	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
HMAC-SHA2-224	A5925	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A5915	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A5919	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A5921	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A5925	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A5915	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A5919	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A5921	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A5925	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A5915	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A5919	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A5921	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A5925	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A5915	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A5921	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A5915	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192 Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A5921	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192 Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2	A5914	Derived Key Length - 2048 Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8 HMAC Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-56C Rev. 2
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2	A5920	Derived Key Length - 2048 Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8 HMAC Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-56C Rev. 2
KDF IKEv2 (CVL)	A5916	Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224, 2048, 8192 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 1056, 3072 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF IKEv2 (CVL)	A5922	Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224, 2048, 8192 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 1056, 3072 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
KDF SP800-108	A5915	KDF Mode - Counter, Double Pipeline Iteration, Feedback Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 112-4096 Increment 8	SP 800-108 Rev. 1
KDF SP800-108	A5921	KDF Mode - Counter, Double Pipeline Iteration, Feedback Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 112-4096 Increment 8	SP 800-108 Rev. 1
PBKDF	A5915	Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 1000-10000 Increment 1 Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 1	SP 800-132
PBKDF	A5921	Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 1000-10000 Increment 1 Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 1	SP 800-132
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A5915	Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 Primality Tests - 2pow100 Private Key Format - standard	FIPS 186-5
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A5921	Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 Primality Tests - 2pow100 Private Key Format - standard	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A5915	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A5921	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-2)	A5915	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 1536	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-2)	A5921	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 1536	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A5915	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 1024	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A5921	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 1024	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A5915	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A5921	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key Generation	A5915	Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
Safe Primes Key Generation	A5921	Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
SHA2-224	A5915	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A5919	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A5921	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A5925	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A5915	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A5919	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A5921	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A5925	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A5915	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A5919	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A5921	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
SHA2-384	A5925	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A5915	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A5919	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A5921	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A5925	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL)	A5915	Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL)	A5921	Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1

Table 5: Approved Algorithms

The table above lists all approved cryptographic algorithms of the module, including specific key lengths employed for approved services in Section 4.3, and implemented modes or methods of operation of the algorithms.

Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
Symmetric Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG)	Key type:Symmetric	N/A	SP 800-133r2, section 4, example 1, and section 6.1
Asymmetric Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG)	Key type:Asymmetric	N/A	SP 800-133r2, section 4, example 1

Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

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Name	Use and Function
MD2, MD5, SHA-1	Message digest
RC2, RC4, DES, Triple-DES, CDMF, Camellia, SEED, ChaCha20(-Poly1305)	Encryption, Decryption
AES GCM (external IV)	Encryption
CBC-MAC, AES XCBC-MAC, AES XCBC-MAC-96	Message authentication
HMAC (MD2, MD5, SHA-1; < 112-bit keys)	Message authentication
HMAC/SSLv3 MAC (constant-time implementation)	Message authentication
MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, DES, Triple-DES, AES, Camellia, SEED, ANS X9.63 KDF, SSL 3 PRF, IKEv1 PRF, TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS KDF without extended master secret	Key derivation
KBKDF, HKDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, IKEv2 PRF (< 112-bit keys)	Key derivation
KBKDF (MD2, MD5)	Key derivation
IKEv2 PRF (MD2, MD5)	Key derivation
PKCS#5 PBE, PKCS#12 PBE	Password-based key derivation
PBKDF2 (short password; short salt; insufficient iterations; < 112-bit keys)	Password-based key derivation
J-PAKE	Shared secret computation
KAS-FFC-SSC (FIPS 186-type groups)	Shared secret computation
X25519	Shared secret computation
RSA (primitive; PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS with MD2, MD5, SHA-1)	Signature generation, Signature verification
RSA (< 2048-bit keys)	Signature generation
RSA (< 1024-bit keys)	Signature verification
ECDSA (component)	Signature generation, Signature verification

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Name	Use and Function
RSA (data encryption / decryption)	Asymmetric encryption, Asymmetric decryption
DSA	Parameter generation, Parameter verification, Key pair generation, Signature generation, Signature verification
Diffie-Hellman (FIPS 186-type groups)	Key pair generation
RSA (< 2048 bits; > 4096 bits)	Key pair generation
Ed25519, X25519	Key pair generation
Symmetric key generation (< 112 bits)	Secret key generation

Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms

The table above lists all the non-approved cryptographic algorithms of the module employed by the non-approved services in Section 4.4.

2.6 Security Function Implementations

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
Encryption with AES	BC-UnAuth	Encryption using AES	Keys:128, 192, 256 bits with 128-256 bits of key strength	AES-CBC: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923) AES-CBC-CS1: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923) AES-CTR: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923) AES-ECB: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923)
Decryption with AES	BC-UnAuth	Decryption using AES	Keys:128, 192, 256 bits with 128-256 bits of key strength	AES-CBC: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923) AES-CBC-CS1: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923) AES-CTR: (A5915,

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				A5917, A5921, A5923) AES-ECB: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923)
Authenticated Encryption with AES	BC-Auth	Authenticated encryption using AES	Keys:128, 192, 256 bits with 128-256 bits of key strength	AES-GCM: (A5915, A5917, A5918, A5921, A5923, A5924)
Authenticated Decryption with AES	BC-Auth	Authenticated decryption using AES	Keys:128, 192, 256 bits with 128-256 bits of key strength	AES-GCM: (A5915, A5917, A5918, A5921, A5923, A5924)
Key Derivation with PBKDF2	PBKDF	Key derivation using PBKDF2	Derived keys:112-256 bits	PBKDF: (A5915, A5921)
Key Derivation with KBKDF	KBKDF	Key derivation using KBKDF	Derived keys:112-256 bits	KDF SP800-108: (A5915, A5921)
Key Derivation with HKDF	KAS-56CKDF	Key derivation using HKDF	Derived keys:112-256 bits	KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2: (A5914, A5920)
Key Derivation with TLS 1.2 KDF	KAS-135KDF	Key derivation using TLS 1.2 KDF	Derived keys:112-256 bits	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A5915, A5921)
Key Derivation with IKEv2 KDF	KAS-135KDF	Key derivation using IKEv2 KDF	Derived keys:112-256 bits	KDF IKEv2: (A5916, A5922)
Key Wrapping with AES	KTS-Wrap	Key wrapping using AES	Keys:128, 192, 256 bits with 128-256 bits of key strength; Compliant with IG D.G	AES-KW: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923) AES-KWP: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923)
Key Unwrapping with AES	KTS-Wrap	Key unwrapping using AES	Keys:128, 192, 256 bits with 128-256 bits of key strength;	AES-KW: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923) AES-KWP: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923)

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			Compliant with IG D.G	AES-GCM: (A5915, A5917, A5918, A5921, A5923, A5924)
Message Authentication with HMAC	MAC	Message authentication using HMAC	Keys:112-256 bits with 112-256 bits of key strength	HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5915, A5919, A5921, A5925) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5915, A5919, A5921, A5925) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5915, A5919, A5921, A5925) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5915, A5919, A5921, A5925)
Message Authentication with CMAC	MAC	Message authentication using CMAC	Keys:128, 192, 256 bits with 128-256 bits of key strength	AES-CMAC: (A5915, A5917, A5921, A5923)
Random Number Generation with Hash_DRBG	DRBG	Random number generation using Hash_DRBG	Hash:SHA2-256	Hash DRBG: (A5915, A5921)
Shared Secret Computation with KAS-ECC-SSC	KAS-SSC	Shared secret computation using KAS-ECC-SSC	Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 with 128, 192 and 256 bits of key strength; Compliant with IG D.F scenario 2(1)	KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5915, A5921)
Shared Secret Computation with KAS-FFC-SSC	KAS-SSC	Shared secret computation using KAS-FFC-SSC	Groups:MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192 with 112-200 bits of key	KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5915, A5921)

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			strength; Compliant with IG D.F scenario 2(1)	
Signature Generation with RSA	DigSig-SigGen	Signature generation using RSA	Keys:2048, 3072, 4096 bits with 112-150 bits of key strength	RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5915, A5921)
Signature Generation with ECDSA	DigSig-SigGen	Signature generation using ECDSA	Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 with 128, 192 and 256 bits of key strength	ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5915, A5921)
Signature Verification with RSA	DigSig-SigVer	Signature verification using RSA	Keys:1024, 1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits with 80-150 bits of key strength	RSA SigVer (FIPS186-2): (A5915, A5921) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5915, A5921) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5915, A5921)
Signature Verification with ECDSA	DigSig-SigVer	Signature verification using ECDSA	Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 with 128, 192, 256 bits of key strength	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5915, A5921)
Symmetric Key Generation with Hash_DRBG	CKG	Direct symmetric key generation using Hash_DRBG	Keys:112-256 bits with 112-256 bits of key strength; Compliant with SP800-133r2 section 6.1	Hash DRBG: (A5915, A5921)
Key Pair Generation with RSA	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen	Key pair generation using RSA	Keys:2048, 3072, 4096 bits with 112-150 bits of key strength	RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5915, A5921)
Key Pair Generation with ECDSA	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen	Key pair generation using ECDSA	Curves:P-256, P-384, P-521 with 128, 192 and 256 bits of key strength	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5915, A5921)

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
Key Pair Generation with Safe Primes	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen	Key pair generation using Safe Primes	Groups:MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192 with 112-200 bits of key strength	Safe Primes Key Generation: (A5915, A5921)
Message Digest with SHA	SHA	Message digest using SHA		SHA2-224: (A5915, A5919, A5921, A5925) SHA2-256: (A5915, A5919, A5921, A5925) SHA2-384: (A5915, A5919, A5921, A5925) SHA2-512: (A5915, A5919, A5921, A5925)

Table 8: Security Function Implementations

2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

2.7.1 AES-GCM IV

The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module.

For TLS 1.2, the module offers the AES-GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario 1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. NSS is compliant with SP 800-52r2 Section 3.3.1 and the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288.

The module does not implement the TLS protocol. The module's implementation of AES-GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module's cryptographic boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key.

In the event the module's power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that a new key for use with the AES-GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be established.

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Alternatively, the Crypto Officer can use the module's API to perform AES-GCM encryption using internal IV generation that complies with Scenario 2 of the IG C.H. These IVs are always at least 96 bits and generated using the approved DRBG internal to the module's boundary.

Additionally, the module offers an internal deterministic IV generation mode compliant with Scenario 3 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The size of the fixed (name) field used by this IV generation mode is at least 32 bits. The module then internally generates a 32 bit or longer deterministic non-repetitive counter. The module explicitly ensures that this counter is monotonically increasing at each invocation of the AES-GCM for the same encryption key, and that this counter does not exhaust all its possible values. The generated GCM IV is at least 96 bits in length.

In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES-GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.

Finally, for TLS 1.3, the AES-GCM implementation uses the context of Scenario 5 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The protocol that provides this compliance is TLS 1.3, defined in RFC 8446 of August 2018, using the cipher-suites that explicitly select AES-GCM as the encryption/decryption cipher (Appendix B.4 of RFC 8446). The module supports acceptable AES-GCM cipher suites from Section 3.3.1 of SP800-52r2. TLS 1.3 employs separate 64-bit sequence numbers, one for protocol records that are received, and one for protocol records that are sent to a peer. These sequence numbers are set at zero at the beginning of a TLS 1.3 connection and each time when the AES-GCM key is changed. After reading or writing a record, the respective sequence number is incremented by one. The protocol specification determines that the sequence number should not wrap, and if this condition is observed, then the protocol implementation must either trigger a re-key of the session (i.e., a new key for AES-GCM), or terminate the connection.

In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES-GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.

2.7.2 Key Derivation using SP 800-132 PBKDF2

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF2), compliant with SP 800-132. The module supports option 1a from Section 5.4 of SP 800-132, in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). In accordance to SP 800-132 and FIPS 140-3 IG D.N, the following requirements shall be met:

- Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The MK shall not be used for other purposes. The module enforces the length of the MK or DPK to be of 112 bits or more for the service to be approved.
- Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF2, shall not be used as cryptographic keys.
- The minimum length of the password or passphrase accepted by the module is 8 characters. The probability of guessing the value is estimated to be at most $1/62^8 = 4 \times 10^{-15}$, when the password is a combination of lowercase, uppercase, and numeric characters. If the password solely consists of digits, the probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 10^{-8}. Combined with the minimum iteration count as described below, this provides an acceptable trade-off between user experience and security against brute-force attacks.
- A portion of the salt shall be generated randomly using the SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG provided by the module. The module restricts minimum length to 128 bits.

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- The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The module only allows minimum iteration count to be 1000.

2.7.3 SP 800-56Ar3 Assurances

To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56Ar3, the operator must use the module together with an application that implements the TLS protocol. Additionally, the module's approved Key Pair Generation service (see Section 4.3) must be used to generate ephemeral FFC or ECC key pairs, or the key pairs must be obtained from another FIPS-validated module. As part of this service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of the generated public key.

The module's shared secret computation service will internally perform the full public key validation of the peer public key, complying with Sections 5.6.2.2.1 and 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56Ar3.

2.7.4 RSA Approved Modulus Size

As allowed by FIPS 140-3 IG C.F, the module implements approved RSA signature verification with 1024, 1280, 1536 and 1792-bit moduli. The 1024-bit modulus has been CAVP tested for RSA signature verification in compliance with FIPS 186-4, while the 1536-bit modulus has been CAVP tested for RSA signature verification in compliance with FIPS 186-2. The 1280 and 1792-bit modulus are approved for FIPS 186-2 signature verification, but are untested as no CAVP testing is available for these moduli.

For all other approved moduli (namely 2048, 3072, and 4096 bit keys) supported by the module, RSA key pair generation, signature generation, and signature verification are approved and CAVP tested in compliance with FIPS 186-5.

2.7.5 Legacy Use

Digital signature using RSA with 1024, 1280, 1536, 1792-bit moduli is allowed for legacy use only.

These legacy algorithms can only be used on data that was generated prior to the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M.

2.8 RBG and Entropy

Cert Number	Vendor Name
E210	Ctrl IQ, Inc.

Table 9: Entropy Certificates

Name	Type	Operational Environment	Sample Size	Entropy per Sample	Conditioning Component
Rocky Linux Userspace CPU Time Jitter RNG Entropy Source	Non-Physical	Rocky Linux 8 on Intel Xeon E3-1270 v6; Rocky Linux 9 on Intel Xeon E3-1270 v6	256 bits	256 bits	SHA3-256

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Table 10: Entropy Sources

The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) implementation based on SP 800-90Ar1. This DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions). It can also be accessed using the specified API functions.

The DRBG implemented is a SHA-256 Hash_DRBG, seeded by the entropy source described in the table above. It does not employ prediction resistance.

The module complies with the Public Use Document for ESV certificate E210 by reading entropy data from the get_random() function with the GRND_RANDOM flag set, which corresponds to the GetEntropy() conceptual interface. This function outputs 256 bits of full entropy.

The DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bit entropy input and reseeded with a 256-bits long entropy input. Outputs of multiple GetEntropy() calls are concatenated to receive the entropy input length greater than 256 bits. The output is truncated to get the entropy input string which is not a multiple of 256.

The operational environment on the ESV certificate is identical to the operating system described in this document, which implements the entropy source (outside the module's cryptographic boundary). Thus, the module is compliant with scenario 1 (b) of IG 9.3.A. There are no maintenance requirements for the entropy source.

2.9 Key Generation

The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant with SP 800-133r2. When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP 800-90Ar1 approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2. The following methods are implemented:

- Direct generation of symmetric keys: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 6.1.
- Safe primes key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.2, which maps to SP 800-56Ar3. The method described in Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3 ("Testing Candidates") is used.
- RSA key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-5. The method described in Appendix A.1.3 of FIPS 186-5 ("Probable Primes") is used.
- ECC key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-5. The method described in Appendix A.2.2 of FIPS 186-5 ("Rejection Sampling") is used. Note that this generation method is used to generate ECDSA and KAS-ECC-SSC key pairs.

Additionally, the module implements the following key derivation methods:

- KBKDF: compliant with SP 800-108r1. This implementation can be used to generate secret keys from a pre-existing key-derivation-key.
- HKDF: compliant with SP 800-56Cr2. This implementation shall only be used to generate secret keys in the context of an SP 800-56Ar3 key agreement scheme.
- TLS 1.2 KDF, IKEv2 PRF: compliant with SP 800-135r1. These implementations shall only be used to generate secret keys in the context of the TLS 1.2 and IKEv2 protocols, respectively.
- PBKDF2: compliant with option 1a of SP 800-132. This implementation shall only be used to derive keys for use in storage applications.

Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized after processing the service.

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2.10 Key Establishment

The module provides FFC and ECC shared secret computation (KAS-FFC-SSC and KAS-ECC-SSC) compliant with SP800-56Ar3, in accordance with scenario 2 (1) of FIPS 140-3 IG D.F.

For KAS-FFC-SSC, the module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 3526 (IKE) and RFC 7919 (TLS). Note that the module only key pair generation and verification, and shared secret computation. No other part of the IKE or TLS protocols is implemented (with the exception of the TLS 1.2 KDF and IKEv2 PRF):

IKE (RFC 3526):

- MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
- MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
- MODP-4096 (ID = 16)
- MODP-6144 (ID = 17)
- MODP-8192 (ID = 18)

TLS (RFC 7919):

- ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)
- ffdhe3072 (ID = 257)
- ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)
- ffdhe6144 (ID = 259)
- ffdhe8192 (ID = 260)

The module also provides the following key transport mechanisms:

- Key wrapping using AES-KW and AES-KWP.
- Key wrapping using AES-GCM.

2.11 Industry Protocols

For KAS-FFC-SSC, the module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 3526 (IKE) and RFC 7919 (TLS) as listed in Section 2.10. Note that the module only implements key pair generation and verification, and shared secret computation. No other part of the IKE or TLS protocols is implemented (with the exception of the TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627) and IKEv2 KDF).

TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627) and IKEv2 implementations shall only be used to generate secret keys in the context of the TLS 1.2 and IKE protocols respectively.

AES-GCM with internal IV generation is offered in the approved mode compliant with TLS 1.2 (RFC 5288) and TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446). This functionality shall only be used in conjunction with the TLS protocol.

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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

3.1 Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
N/A	Data Input	API input parameters
N/A	Data Output	API output parameters
N/A	Control Input	API function calls, API input parameters for control input
N/A	Status Output	API return codes

Table 11: Ports and Interfaces

The logical interfaces are the APIs through which the applications request services. These logical interfaces are logically separated from each other by the API design. The module does not implement a control output interface.

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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Authentication Methods

N/A for this module.

The module does not support authentication for roles.

4.2 Roles

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer	Role	CO	None

Table 12: Roles

No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators or a maintenance role.

4.3 Approved Services

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Encryption	Encrypt a plaintext	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	AES key, IV, plaintext	Ciphertext	Encryption with AES	Crypto Officer - AES Key: W,E
Decryption	Decrypt a ciphertext	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	AES key, IV, ciphertext	Plaintext	Decryption with AES	Crypto Officer - AES Key: W,E
Authenticated Encryption	Encrypt a plaintext	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	AES key, IV, plaintext	Ciphertext, MAC tag	Authenticated Encryption with AES	Crypto Officer - AES Key: W,E
Authenticated Decryption	Decrypt a ciphertext	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	AES key, IV, MAC tag, ciphertext	Plaintext or fail	Authenticated Decryption with AES	Crypto Officer - AES Key: W,E
Key Derivation from a KDK	Derive a key from a key-	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	Key-derivation key,	Derived key	Key Derivation with KBKDF	Crypto Officer - Key-Derivation

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	derivation key		output length			Key: W,E - KBKDF Derived Key: G
Key Derivation from a shared secret	Derive a key from a shared secret	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	Shared secret, output length	Derived key	Key Derivation with HKDF Key Derivation with TLS 1.2 KDF Key Derivation with IKEv2 KDF	Crypto Officer - Shared Secret: W,E - HKDF Derived Key: G - TLS Derived Key: G - IKE Derived Key: G
Password-Based Key Derivation	Derive a key from a password	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	Password, salt, iteration count, output length	Derived key	Key Derivation with PBKDF2	Crypto Officer - Password: W,E - PBKDF2 Derived Key: G
Key Wrapping	Wrap a CSP	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	AES key, any CSP	Wrapped CSP	Key Wrapping with AES	Crypto Officer - AES Key: W,E
Key Unwrapping	Unwrap a CSP	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	AES key, Wrapped CSP	Any CSP	Key Unwrapping with AES	Crypto Officer - AES Key: W,E
Message Authentication with HMAC	Compute a MAC tag	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	HMAC key	MAC tag	Message Authentication with HMAC	Crypto Officer - HMAC Key: W,E

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Message Authentication with CMAC	Compute a MAC tag	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	AES key	MAC tag	Message Authentication with CMAC	Crypto Officer - AES Key: W,E
Message Digest	Compute a message digest	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	Message	Digest value	Message Digest with SHA	Crypto Officer
Random Number Generation	Generate random bytes	CKR_OK	Output length	Random bytes	Random Number Generation with Hash_DRBG	Crypto Officer - Entropy Input: W,E,Z - DRBG Seed: G,E,Z - Internal State (V, C): G,W,E
KAS-FFC-SSC Shared Secret Computation	Compute a shared secret	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	FFC private key (owner), FFC public key (peer)	Shared secret	Shared Secret Computation with KAS-FFC-SSC	Crypto Officer - FFC Private Key: W,E - FFC Public Key: W,E - Shared Secret: G
KAS-ECC-SSC Shared Secret Computation	Compute a shared secret	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	EC private key (owner), EC public key (peer)	Shared secret	Shared Secret Computation with KAS-ECC-SSC	Crypto Officer - EC Private Key: W,E - EC Public Key: W,E - Shared Secret: G
Signature Generation with RSA	Generate a signature	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	RSA private key, message	Signature	Signature Generation with RSA	Crypto Officer - RSA

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Private Key: W,E
Signature Generation with ECDSA	Generate a signature	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	EC private key, message	Signature	Signature Generation with ECDSA	Crypto Officer - EC Private Key: W,E
Signature Verification with RSA	Verify a signature	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	RSA public key, message, signature	Pass/fail	Signature Verification with RSA	Crypto Officer - RSA Public Key: W,E
Signature Verification with ECDSA	Verify a signature	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	EC public key, message, signature	Pass/fail	Signature Verification with ECDSA	Crypto Officer - EC Public Key: W,E
Key Pair Generation with Safe Primes	Generate a key pair	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	Group	FFC public key, FFC private key	Key Pair Generation with Safe Primes	Crypto Officer - FFC Private Key: G - FFC Public Key: G - Intermediate key generation value: G,E,Z
Key Pair Generation with RSA	Generate a key pair	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	Modulus size	RSA public key, RSA private key	Key Pair Generation with RSA	Crypto Officer - RSA Private Key: G - RSA Public Key: G - Intermediate key

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						generation value: G,E,Z
Key Pair Generation with ECDSA	Generate a key pair	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	Curve	EC public key, EC private key	Key Pair Generation with ECDSA	Crypto Officer - EC Private Key: G - EC Public Key: G - Intermediate key generation value: G,E,Z
Symmetric Key Generation	Generate a secret key	CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1)	Key size	AES key, HMAC key or key-derivation key	Symmetric Key Generation with Hash_DRBG	Crypto Officer - AES Key: G - HMAC Key: G - Key-Derivation Key: G
Show Version	Return the module name and version information	None	N/A	Module name and version information	None	Crypto Officer
Show Status	Return the module status	None	N/A	Module status	None	Crypto Officer
Self-Test	Perform the CASTs and integrity tests	None	N/A	Pass/fail	Message Digest with SHA Message Authentication with HMAC Encryption with AES	Crypto Officer

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					Decryption with AES Authenticated Encryption with AES Authenticated Decryption with AES Message Authentication with CMAC Key Derivation with KBKDF Key Derivation with HKDF Key Derivation with TLS 1.2 KDF Key Derivation with IKEv2 KDF Key Derivation with PBKDF2 Shared Secret Computation with KAS-FFC-SSC Shared Secret Computation with KAS-ECC-SSC Signature Generation with RSA Signature Verification with RSA Signature Generation	

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					with ECDSA Signature Verification with ECDSA	
Zeroization	Zeroize all SSPs	N/A	Any SSP	None	None	Crypto Officer - AES Key: Z - HMAC Key: Z - Key-Derivation Key: Z - Shared Secret: Z - Password: Z - KBKDF Derived Key: Z - PBKDF2 Derived Key: Z - HKDF Derived Key: Z - TLS Derived Key: Z - IKE Derived Key: Z - Entropy Input: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - Internal State (V, C): Z - FFC Private Key: Z - FFC

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Public Key: Z - EC Private Key: Z - EC Public Key: Z - RSA Private Key: Z - RSA Public Key: Z - Intermediate key generation value: Z

Table 13: Approved Services

The module provides services to operators that assume the available role. All services are described in detail in the API documentation (manual pages). For the above table, the convention below applies when specifying the access permissions (types) that the service has for each SSP.

- **Generate (G):** The module generates or derives the SSP.
- **Read (R):** The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
- **Write (W):** The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
- **Execute (E):** The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
- **Zeroize (Z):** The module zeroizes the SSP.
- **N/A:** The module does not access any SSP or key during its operation.

To interact with the module, a calling application must use the FIPS token APIs provided by libsoftokn3.so. The FIPS token API layer can be used to retrieve the approved service indicator for the module. This indicator consists of three independent service indicators:

1. The session indicator, which must be used for all cryptographic services except the key (pair) generation and key derivation services. It can be accessed by invoking the NSC_NSSGetFIPSStatus function with the CKT_NSS_SESSION_LAST_CHECK parameter. If the output parameter is set to CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1), the service was approved.
2. The object indicator, which must be used for the key (pair) generation and key derivation services. It can be accessed by invoking the NSC_NSSGetFIPSStatus function with the CKT_NSS_OBJECT_CHECK parameter and the output derived key. If the output parameter is set to CKS_NSS_FIPS_OK (1), the service was approved.
3. The DRBG service indicator, which must be used for the DRBG service. It can be accessed by invoking the C_SeedRandom or C_GenerateRandom functions. If any of these functions returns CKR_OK, the service was approved.

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The above-described behavior maps to example scenario 3 of FIPS 140-3 IG 2.4.C.

4.4 Non-Approved Services

Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
Message Digest	Compute a message digest	MD2, MD5, SHA-1	CO
Encryption	Encrypt a plaintext	RC2, RC4, DES, Triple-DES, CDMF, Camellia, SEED, ChaCha20(-Poly1305) AES GCM (external IV)	CO
Decryption	Decrypt a ciphertext	RC2, RC4, DES, Triple-DES, CDMF, Camellia, SEED, ChaCha20(-Poly1305)	CO
Message Authentication	Compute a MAC tag	CBC-MAC, AES XCBC-MAC, AES XCBC-MAC-96 HMAC (MD2, MD5, SHA-1; < 112-bit keys) HMAC/SSLv3 MAC (constant-time implementation)	CO
Key Derivation	Derive a key from a key-derivation key or a shared secret	MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, DES, Triple-DES, AES, Camellia, SEED, ANS X9.63 KDF, SSL 3 PRF, IKEv1 PRF, TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS KDF without extended master secret KBKDF, HKDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, IKEv2 PRF (< 112-bit keys) KBKDF (MD2, MD5) IKEv2 PRF (MD2, MD5)	CO
Password-Based Key Derivation	Derive a key from a password	PKCS#5 PBE, PKCS#12 PBE PBKDF2 (short password; short salt; insufficient iterations; < 112-bit keys)	CO
Shared Secret Computation	Compute a shared secret	J-PAKE KAS-FFC-SSC (FIPS 186-type groups) X25519	CO
Signature Generation	Generate a signature	DSA RSA (primitive; PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS with MD2, MD5, SHA-1) RSA (< 2048-bit keys) ECDSA (component)	CO
Signature Verification	Verify a signature	DSA RSA (< 1024-bit keys) ECDSA (component)	CO

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Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
Asymmetric Encryption	Encrypt a plaintext	RSA (data encryption / decryption)	CO
Asymmetric Decryption	Decrypt a plaintext	RSA (data encryption / decryption)	CO
Parameter Generation	Generate domain parameters	DSA	CO
Parameter Verification	Verify domain parameters	DSA	CO
Key Pair Generation	Generate a key pair	DSA Diffie-Hellman (FIPS 186-type groups) RSA (< 2048 bits; > 4096 bits) Ed25519, X25519	CO
Secret Key Generation	Generate a secret key	Symmetric key generation (< 112 bits)	CO

Table 14: Non-Approved Services

The table above lists the non-approved services in this module, the algorithms involved, the roles that can request the service, and the respective service indicator. In this table, CO specifies the Crypto Officer role.

4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

The module does not load external software or firmware.

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5 Software/Firmware Security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

Each software component of the module has an associated HMAC-SHA2-256 integrity check value. The module makes use of an HMAC key hard-coded within the module to perform the integrity test. The integrity of the module is verified by comparing the HMAC-SHA2-256 values calculated at run time with the integrity values embedded in the check (.chk) files that were computed at build time. If the integrity test fails, the module enters the Power-On Error state.

5.2 Initiate on Demand

Integrity tests are performed as part of the pre-operational self-tests, which are executed when the module is initialized. The integrity tests may be invoked on-demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module, which will perform (among others) the software integrity tests.

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6 Operational Environment

6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable

How Requirements are Satisfied:

If properly installed, the operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented.

6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions

The module shall be installed as stated in Section 11.1.

Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace, userspace live patching, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-validated operational environment.

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7 Physical Security

The module is comprised of software only and therefore this Section is not applicable.

7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required

N/A for this module.

7.2 EFP/EFT Information

Temp/Voltage Type	Temperature or Voltage	EFP or EFT	Result
LowTemperature			
HighTemperature			
LowVoltage			
HighVoltage			

Table 15: EFP/EFT Information

7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges

Temperature Type	Temperature
LowTemperature	
HighTemperature	

Table 16: Hardness Testing Temperatures

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8 Non-Invasive Security

This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism and therefore this Section is not applicable.

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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
RAM	Temporary storage for SSPs used by the module as part of service execution. The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs	Dynamic

Table 17: Storage Areas

SSPs imported, generated, derived, or otherwise established by the module are stored in RAM while the module is operational. The operator application can use these SSPs to perform cryptographic operations, or export them as described in Section 9.2.

The module maintains internal separation of the SSPs (including CSPs) in approved and non-approved modes of operation using an internal isFIPS flag for each SSP. This flag indicates whether the SSP can be used in approved or non-approved services.

The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs.

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
API input parameters (plaintext)	Calling application within TOEPP	Cryptographic module	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	
API input parameters (encrypted)	Calling application within TOEPP	Cryptographic module	Encrypted	Manual	Electronic	Key Unwrapping with AES
API output parameters (plaintext)	Cryptographic module	Calling application within TOEPP	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	
API output parameters (encrypted)	Cryptographic module	Calling application within TOEPP	Encrypted	Manual	Electronic	Key Wrapping with AES

Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods

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CSPs (with the exception of passwords) can only be imported to and exported from the module when they are wrapped using an approved security function (e.g. AES KW or KWP). PSPs can be imported and exported in plaintext. Import and export is performed using API input and output parameters.

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Destroy Object	Destroys the SSP represented by the object	Memory occupied by SSPs is overwritten with zeroes, which renders the SSP values irretrievable. The completion of the zeroization routine indicates that the zeroization procedure succeeded.	By calling the C_DestroyObject function.
Automatic	Automatically zeroized by the module when no longer needed	Memory occupied by SSPs is overwritten with zeroes, which renders the SSP values irretrievable.	N/A
Remove power from the module	De-allocates the volatile memory used to store SSPs	Volatile memory used by the module is overwritten within nanoseconds when power is removed. Module power off indicates that the zeroization procedure succeeded.	By removing power

Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods

All data output is inhibited during zeroization.

9.4 SSPs

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
AES Key	AES key used for encryption, decryption, and for message authentication	128, 192, 256 bits - 128, 192, 256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Symmetric Key Generation with Hash_DRBG		Encryption with AES Decryption with AES Authenticated Encryption with AES Authenticated Decryption with AES Key Wrapping with AES

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Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
						Key Unwrapping with AES Message Authentication with CMAC
HMAC Key	HMAC key used for message authentication	112-256 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Symmetric Key Generation with Hash_DRBG		Message Authentication with HMAC
Key-Derivation Key	Symmetric key used to derive symmetric keys	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Symmetric Key Generation with Hash_DRBG		Key Derivation with KBKDF
Shared Secret	Shared secret generated by KAS-ECC-SSC or KAS-FFC-SSC	256-8192 bits - 112-256 bits	Shared secret - CSP		Shared Secret Computation with KAS-ECC-SSC Shared Secret Computation with KAS-FFC-SSC	Key Derivation with HKDF Key Derivation with TLS 1.2 KDF Key Derivation with IKEv2 KDF
Password	Password used to derive symmetric keys	8-128 characters - N/A	Password - CSP			Key Derivation with PBKDF2
KBKDF Derived Key	Symmetric key derived from a key-derivation key	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Key Derivation with KBKDF		
PBKDF2 Derived Key	Symmetric key derived from a password	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Key Derivation with PBKDF2		

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Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
HKDF Derived Key	Symmetric key derived from a shared secret using HKDF	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Key Derivation with HKDF		
TLS Derived Key	Symmetric key derived from a shared secret using TLS 1.2 KDF	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Key Derivation with TLS 1.2 KDF		
IKE Derived Key	Symmetric key derived from a shared secret using IKEv2 KDF	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Key Derivation with IKEv2 KDF		
Entropy Input	Entropy input used to seed the DRBG	128-384 bits - 128-384 bits	Entropy input - CSP	Random Number Generation with Hash_DRBG		Random Number Generation with Hash_DRBG
DRBG Seed	DRBG seed derived from entropy input	440 bits - 256 bits	Seed - CSP	Random Number Generation with Hash_DRBG		Random Number Generation with Hash_DRBG
Internal State (V, C)	Internal state of the Hash_DRBG	880 bits - 256 bits	Internal state - CSP	Random Number Generation with Hash_DRBG		Random Number Generation with Hash_DRBG
FFC Private Key	Private key used for KAS-FFC-SSC	2048-8192 bits - 112-200 bits	Private key - CSP	Key Pair Generation with Safe Primes		Shared Secret Computation with KAS-FFC-SSC
FFC Public Key	Public key used for KAS-FFC-SSC	2048-8192 bits - 112-200 bits	Public key - PSP	Key Pair Generation		Shared Secret Computation

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Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
				with Safe Primes		with KAS-FFC-SSC
EC Private Key	Private key used for KAS-ECC-SSC and ECDSA	P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128, 192, 256 bits	Private key - CSP	Key Pair Generation with ECDSA		Shared Secret Computation with KAS-ECC-SSC Signature Generation with ECDSA
EC Public Key	Public key used for KAS-ECC-SSC and ECDSA	P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128, 192, 256 bits	Public key - PSP	Key Pair Generation with ECDSA		Shared Secret Computation with KAS-ECC-SSC Signature Verification with ECDSA
RSA Private Key	Private key used for RSA signature generation	2048, 3072, 4096 bits - 112-150 bits	Private key - CSP	Key Pair Generation with RSA		Signature Generation with RSA
RSA Public Key	Public key used for RSA signature verification	KeyGen: 2048, 3072, 4096 bits; SigVer: 1024, 1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 3072, 4096 bits - KeyGen: 112-150 bits; SigVer: 80-150 bits	Public key - PSP	Key Pair Generation with RSA		Signature Verification with RSA

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Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
Intermediate key generation value	Temporary value generated during key generation services	256-8192 bits - 112-256 bits	Intermediate value - CSP	Key Pair Generation with RSA Key Pair Generation with ECDSA Key Pair Generation with Safe Primes		Key Pair Generation with RSA Key Pair Generation with ECDSA Key Pair Generation with Safe Primes

Table 20: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
AES Key	API input parameters (encrypted) API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	
HMAC Key	API input parameters (encrypted) API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	
Key-Derivation Key	API input parameters (encrypted) API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	KBKDF Derived Key:Derivation Of
Shared Secret	API input parameters (encrypted) API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	FFC Private Key:Derived From FFC Public Key:Derived From EC Private Key:Derived From EC Public

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Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
					Key:Derived From HKDF Derived Key:Derivation Of TLS Derived Key:Derivation Of IKE Derived Key:Derivation Of
Password	API input parameters (plaintext)	RAM:Plaintext	For the duration of the service	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	PBKDF2 Derived Key:Derivation Of
KBKDF Derived Key	API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	Key-Derivation Key:Derived From
PBKDF2 Derived Key	API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	Password:Derived From
HKDF Derived Key	API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	Shared Secret:Derived From
TLS Derived Key	API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	Shared Secret:Derived From
IKE Derived Key	API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	Shared Secret:Derived From

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Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
Entropy Input		RAM:Plaintext	From generation until DRBG Seed is created	Automatic Remove power from the module	DRBG Seed:Derivation Of
DRBG Seed		RAM:Plaintext	While the DRBG is instantiated	Automatic Remove power from the module	Entropy Input:Derived From Internal State (V, C):Generation Of
Internal State (V, C)		RAM:Plaintext	While the module is operational	Remove power from the module	DRBG Seed:Generated From
FFC Private Key	API input parameters (encrypted) API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	FFC Public Key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
FFC Public Key	API input parameters (plaintext) API output parameters (plaintext)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	FFC Private Key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
EC Private Key	API input parameters (encrypted) API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	EC Public Key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
EC Public Key	API input parameters (plaintext) API output parameters (plaintext)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	EC Private Key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From

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Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
RSA Private Key	API input parameters (encrypted) API output parameters (encrypted)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	RSA Public Key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
RSA Public Key	API input parameters (plaintext) API output parameters (plaintext)	RAM:Plaintext	Until explicitly zeroized by operator	Destroy Object Remove power from the module	RSA Private Key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
Intermediate key generation value		RAM:Plaintext	For the duration of the service	Automatic	FFC Private Key:Generation Of FFC Public Key:Generation Of EC Private Key:Generation Of EC Public Key:Generation Of RSA Private Key:Generation Of RSA Public Key:Generation Of

Table 21: SSP Table 2

9.5 Transitions

The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2031.

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10 Self-Tests

Upon initialization, the module immediately performs all libfreeblpriv3.so cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs) as specified in the Conditional Self-Tests table. When all those self-tests pass successfully, the module automatically performs the pre-operational integrity test on the libfreeblpriv3.so file using its associated check value. Consequently, the HMAC-SHA2-256 algorithm goes through a CAST before the software integrity tests are performed.

Then, the module performs the RSA CAST in the libsoftokn3.so library, followed by the pre-operational integrity test on the libsoftokn3.so file using its associated check value. The CAST for the algorithm used in the pre-operational self-test (i.e., HMAC-SHA2-256) was already performed by the libfreeblpriv3.so library, before the libsoftokn3.so library integrity test. Finally, all remaining CASTs for the algorithms implemented in libsoftokn3.so are executed (see the Conditional Self-Tests table).

Only if all CASTs and pre-operational integrity tests passed successfully, the module transitions to the operational state. No operator intervention is required to reach this point.

While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited until the tests are successfully completed. If any of the self-tests fails, an error message is returned, and the module transitions to an error state.

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5915)	256-bit key	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Integrity test for libsoftokn3.so and libfreeblpriv3.so
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5919)	256-bit key	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Integrity test for libsoftokn3.so and libfreeblpriv3.so
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5921)	256-bit key	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Integrity test for libsoftokn3.so and libfreeblpriv3.so
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5925)	256-bit key	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Integrity test for libsoftokn3.so and libfreeblpriv3.so

Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

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10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
SHA2-224 (A5915)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-256 (A5915)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-384 (A5915)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-512 (A5915)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-224 (A5919)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-256 (A5919)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
SHA2-384 (A5919)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-512 (A5919)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-224 (A5921)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-256 (A5921)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-384 (A5921)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-512 (A5921)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-224 (A5925)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes	Message Digest	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				operational and services are available for use		
SHA2-256 (A5925)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-384 (A5925)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
SHA2-512 (A5925)	512-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Digest	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5915)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5915)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5915)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services	Message Authentication	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				are available for use		
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5915)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5919)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5919)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5919)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5919)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5921)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5921)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5921)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5921)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5925)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5925)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5925)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5925)	288-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes	Message Authentication	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				operational and services are available for use		
AES-ECB (A5915)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-ECB (A5917)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-ECB (A5921)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-ECB (A5923)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-CBC (A5915)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-CBC (A5917)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				are available for use		
AES-CBC (A5921)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-CBC (A5923)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-GCM (A5915)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-GCM (A5917)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-GCM (A5918)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-GCM (A5921)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-GCM (A5923)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-GCM (A5924)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Encryption and decryption	Module initialization
AES-CMAC (A5915)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
AES-CMAC (A5917)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
AES-CMAC (A5921)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization
AES-CMAC (A5923)	128, 192, 256-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Message Authentication	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
KDF SP800-108 (A5915)	HMAC-SHA2-256 in counter mode	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initialization
KDF SP800-108 (A5921)	HMAC-SHA2-256 in counter mode	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initialization
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2 (A5914)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initialization
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2 (A5920)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initialization
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A5915)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initialization
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A5921)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initalization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
KDF IKEv2 (A5916)	SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initialization
KDF IKEv2 (A5922)	SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initialization
PBKDF (A5915)	SHA2-256 with 5 iterations, 128-bit salt and 14 characters password	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initialization
PBKDF (A5921)	SHA2-256 with 5 iterations, 128-bit salt and 14 characters password	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Key Derivation	Module initialization
Hash DRBG (A5915)	SHA-256 without prediction resistance	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Instantiate Generate; Reseed Generate (compliant to SP 800- 90Ar1 Section 11.3)	Module initialization
Hash DRBG (A5921)	SHA-256 without prediction resistance	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Instantiate Generate; Reseed Generate (compliant to SP 800- 90Ar1 Section 11.3)	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5915)	ffdhe2048	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Shared Secret Computation	Module initialization
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5921)	ffdhe2048	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Shared Secret Computation	Module initialization
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5915)	P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Shared Secret Computation	Module initialization
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5921)	P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Shared Secret Computation	Module initialization
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, and 2048-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Signature Generation	Module initialization
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, and 2048-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Signature Generation	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, and 2048-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Signature Verification	Module initialization
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, and 2048-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Signature Verification	Module initialization
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	SHA2-256 and P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Signature Generation	Module initialization
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	SHA2-256 and P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Signature Generation	Module initialization
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	SHA2-256 and P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Signature Verification	Module initialization
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	SHA2-256 and P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Signature Verification	Module initialization

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	Signature Generation and Signature Verification	Key Pair Generation
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	Signature Generation and Signature Verification	Key Pair Generation
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915) Public Key Recalculation	N/A	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	PCT according to section 5.6.2.1.4 of [SP800-56Ar3]	Key Pair Generation
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921) Public Key Recalculation	N/A	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	PCT according to section 5.6.2.1.4 of [SP800-56Ar3]	Key Pair Generation
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915) SigGen SigVer	SHA-256	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	Signature Generation and Signature Verification	Key Pair Generation
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921) SigGen SigVer	SHA-256	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	Signature Generation and Signature Verification	Key Pair Generation
Safe Primes Key Generation (A5915)	N/A	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	PCT according to section 5.6.2.1.4 of [SP800-56Ar3]	Key Pair Generation
Safe Primes Key Generation (A5921)	N/A	PCT	PCT	Successful key pair generation	PCT according to section 5.6.2.1.4 of [SP800-56Ar3]	Key Pair Generation

Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests

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10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5915)	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5919)	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5921)	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5925)	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	On demand	Manually

Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
SHA2-224 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-384 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-224 (A5919)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256 (A5919)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-384 (A5919)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512 (A5919)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-224 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-384 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-224 (A5925)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256 (A5925)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
SHA2-384 (A5925)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512 (A5925)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5919)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5919)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5919)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5919)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5925)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5925)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5925)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5925)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB (A5917)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB (A5923)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CBC (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CBC (A5917)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CBC (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CBC (A5923)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM (A5917)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM (A5918)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM (A5923)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM (A5924)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CMAC (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CMAC (A5917)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CMAC (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CMAC (A5923)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
KDF SP800-108 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2 (A5914)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2 (A5920)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF IKEv2 (A5916)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF IKEv2 (A5922)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
PBKDF (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
PBKDF (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
Hash DRBG (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
Hash DRBG (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915) Public Key Recalculation	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921) Public Key Recalculation	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5915) SigGen SigVer	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5921) SigGen SigVer	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
Safe Primes Key Generation (A5915)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
Safe Primes Key Generation (A5921)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually

Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information

10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Power-On Error	An error occurred during the self-tests executed on power-on	Software integrity test failure or CAST failure	Restart of the module	Module will not load
PCT Error	An error occurred during a PCT	PCT failure	Restart of the module	Module stops functioning (sftk_fatalError is set to TRUE)

Table 26: Error States

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In any error state, the output interface is inhibited, and the module accepts no more inputs or requests.

10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests

The software integrity tests and CASTs can be invoked on demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module. The PCTs can be invoked on demand by requesting the Key Pair Generation service.

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11 Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

The module is delivered as part of the following RPM packages:

- Rocky Linux 8 system:
  - nss-softokn-3.90.0-7.el8_6.ciqfips.0.3.x86_64
  - nss-softokn-freebl-3.90.0-7.el8_6.ciqfips.0.3.x86_64
- Rocky Linux 9 system:
  - nss-softokn-3.90.0-7.el9_2.ciqfips.0.2.x86_64
  - nss-softokn-freebl-3.90.0-7.el9_2.ciqfips.0.2.x86_64

Before these packages are installed, the Rocky Linux 8 or Rocky Linux 9 system respectively must operate in the FIPS validated configuration. This can be achieved by:

- Adding the fips=1 option to the kernel command line during the system installation. During the software selection stage, do not install any third-party software.
- Switching the system into the FIPS validated configuration after the installation. Execute the fips-mode-setup --enable command. Restart the system.

In both cases, once the system has rebooted, the Crypto Officer must verify the system operates in the FIPS validated configuration by executing the fips-mode-setup --check command, which should output "FIPS mode is enabled."

After the completion of the above-mentioned installation steps, the respective RPM packages can be installed on the Rocky Linux 8 or Rocky Linux 9 system using "dnf install" command.

After the RPM packages are installed, the Crypto Officer must execute the "Show module name and version" service by accessing the CKA_NSS_VALIDATION_MODULE_ID attribute of the CKO_NSS_VALIDATION object in the default slot. The object attribute must contain the value:

Rocky Linux 8 NSS Cryptographic Module rocky8.20240909 3.90.0-a7491da2812208d5 (for Rocky Linux 8)

Rocky Linux 9 NSS Cryptographic Module %rocky9.20240909 3.90.0-1631d89a69603589 (for Rocky Linux 9)

Alternatively, the /usr/lib64/nss/unsupported-tools/validation tool is provided as a convenience by either the nss-tools-3.90.0-7.el8_6.ciqfips.0.3.x86_64 package or the nss-tools-3.90.0-7.el9_2.ciqfips.0.2.x86_64 package. This tool performs the same steps, and also outputs the FIPS module identifier as above.

11.2 Administrator Guidance

The version of the RPMs containing the FIPS validated Module is stated in Section 11.1. The RPM packages forming the Module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the installation of RPM packages on a Rocky Linux system (for example, dnf and rpm). All RPM packages are signed with the CIQ build key, which is an RSA 4096-bit key using SHA-256 signatures. The signature is automatically verified upon installation of the RPM package. If the signature cannot be validated, the RPM tool rejects the installation of the package. In such a case, the Crypto Officer is requested to obtain a new copy of the module's RPMs from CIQ.

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

There is no non-administrator guidance.

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11.4 End of Life

As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of unloading the module. This will zeroize all SSPs in volatile memory. Then, if desired, either both the nss-softokn-3.90.0-7.el8_6.ciqfips.0.3.x86_64 and nss-softokn-freebl-3.90.0-7.el8_6.ciqfips.0.3.x86_64 RPM packages can be uninstalled from the Rocky Linux 8 systems or both the nss-softokn-3.90.0-7.el9_2.ciqfips.0.2.x86_64 and nss-softokn-freebl-3.90.0-7.el9_2.ciqfips.0.2.x86_64 RPM packages can be uninstalled from the Rocky Linux 9 systems.

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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

12.1 Attack List

Timing attacks on RSA

- RSA blinding: timing attack on RSA was first demonstrated by Paul Kocher in 1996, who contributed the mitigation code to our module. Most recently Boneh and Brumley showed that RSA blinding is an effective defense against timing attacks on RSA.
  - Specific Limit: None.

Cache-timing attacks on the modular exponentiation operation used in RSA

- Cache invariant module exponentiation: this is a variant of a modular exponentiation implementation that Colin Percival showed to defend against cache-timing attacks
  - Specific Limit: this mechanism requires intimate knowledge of the cache line sizes of the processor. The mechanism may be ineffective when the module is running on a processor whose cache line sizes are unknown.

Arithmetic errors in RSA signatures

- Double-checking RSA signatures: arithmetic errors in RSA signatures might leak the private key. Ferguson and Schneier recommend that every RSA signature generation should verify the signature just generated.
  - Specific Limit: None.

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Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
CAST	Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CKG	Cryptographic Key Generation
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter
CTS	Ciphertext Stealing
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FFC	Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
HKDF	HMAC-based Key Derivation Function
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE	Internet Key Exchange
KAS	Key Agreement Scheme
KAT	Known Answer Test
KBKDF	Key-based Key Derivation Function

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KTS	Key Transport Scheme
KW	Key Wrap
KWP	Key Wrap with Padding
MAC	Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology
PAA	Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PAI	Processor Algorithm Implementation
PCT	Pair-wise Consistency Test
PBKDF2	Password-based Key Derivation Function v2
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSC	Shared Secret Computation
SSP	Sensitive Security Parameter
TLS	Transport Layer Security
XOF	Extendable Output Function

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Appendix B References

FIPS 140-3 **FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules**

March 2019

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf

FIPS 140-3 IG **Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program**

23 October 2024

https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-ig-announcements

FIPS 180-4 **Secure Hash Standard (SHS)**
August 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf

FIPS 186-2 **Digital Signature Standard (DSS)**
July 2013
https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/186-2/final/docs/fips186-2.pdf

FIPS 186-4 **Digital Signature Standard (DSS)**
July 2013
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FIPS 186-5 **Digital Signature Standard (DSS)**
February 2023
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf

FIPS 197 **Advanced Encryption Standard**
May 2023
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf

FIPS 198-1 **The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)**
July 2008
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf

FIPS 202 **SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions**
August 2015
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RFC 3526	**More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)** May 2003 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3526.txt
RFC 5288	**AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS** August 2008 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt
RFC 7919	**Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)** August 2016 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7919.txt
RFC 8446	**The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3** August 2018 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8446.txt
SP 800-38A	**Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques** December 2001 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
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SP 800-38B	**Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication** May 2005 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
SP 800-38D	**Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC** November 2007 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf

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SP 800-52r2	**Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations** August 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf
SP 800-56Ar3	**Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography** April 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
SP 800-56Cr2	**Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes** August 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf
SP 800-90Ar1	**Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators** June 2015 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
SP 800-90B	**Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation** January 2018 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
SP 800-108r1	**NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions** August 2022 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1.pdf
SP 800-131Ar2	**Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths** March 2019 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
SP 800-132	**Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications** December 2010 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf
SP 800-133r2	**Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation** June 2020 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf

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SP 800-135r1 **Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions**
December 2011
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf

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