Ruckus Wireless, Inc. SmartZone 104 (SZ-104),
SmartZone 124 (SZ-124) and SmartZone 300 (SZ-300)
WLAN Controllers
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version Number: 1.10
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Table of Contents
1. Module Overview..................................................................................................................................3
2. Modes of Operation..............................................................................................................................5
2.1 Approved Cryptographic Functions ....................................................................................................5
2.2 Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions................................................................9
2.3 All other algorithms .........................................................................................................................10
3. Ports and interfaces............................................................................................................................10
4. Roles, Services and Authentication.....................................................................................................11
5. Cryptographic Keys and CSPs..............................................................................................................14
6. Self-tests..............................................................................................................................................16
7. Physical Security..................................................................................................................................17
8. References ..........................................................................................................................................22
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1. Module Overview
SmartZone 104 (SZ-104) and SmartZone 124 (SZ-124) are scalable, resilient, and high performing
wireless LAN controllers within Ruckus Wireless, Inc. family of WLAN controllers. They manage up to
1,024 ZoneFlex Smart Wi-Fi access points, 2,000 WLANs, and 25,000 clients per device.
The SmartZone 300 (SZ300) Flagship Large Scale WLAN Controller is designed for Service Provider and
Large Enterprises, which prefer to use appliances. The Carrier Grade platform supports comprehensive
integrated management functionality, high performance operations and flexibility to address many
different implementation scenarios. The SZ300 supports up to 10,000 AP and 100,000 Clients per unit.
Figure 1: Encryption between AP and Controller
FIPS 140-2 conformance testing was performed at Security Level 2. The following configurations were
tested by the lab.
Table 1: Configurations tested by the lab.
Module Name and Version Firmware version
SmartZone 104
SmartZone 124
SmartZone 300
3.6.0.3
3.6.0.3
3.6.0.3
The Cryptographic Module meets FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements.
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Table 2: Module Security Level Statement.
FIPS Security Area Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
The cryptographic boundary of the module is the enclosure that contains components of the module.
The enclosure of the cryptographic module is opaque within the visible spectrum. The module uses
tamper evident labels to provide the evidence of tampering.
Figure 2: SmartZone 104
Figure 3: SmartZone 124
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Figure 4: SmartZone 300
2. Modes of Operation
The module is intended to always operate in the FIPS approved mode. However, a provision is made to
disable/enable FIPS mode via configuration. Refer to the Ruckus Wireless, Inc. FIPS Configuration Guide
for more information.
The Crypto Officer must invoke the user interface using default password. The following command must
be executed prior to operating the module in the FIPS mode:
fips enable
Crypto Officer must change the default password during the installation.
2.1 Approved Cryptographic Functions
The following approved cryptographic algorithms are used in FIPS approved mode of operation.
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Table 3: Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP Cert Library Algorithm Standard Model/Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli
Use
5471 Ruckus
Smartzone
Controller Java
Crypto Library
AES FIPS 197
SP 800-38F,
SP 800-38C,
SP 800-38D
CBC
Decrypt/Encrypt
128, 256 Data Encryption/
Decryption
KTS (AES Cert.
#5097 and
HMAC Cert.
#3399; key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits
of encryption
strength)
5097 Ruckus
Smartzone SSL
Crypto Library
ECB, CBC, CTR,
GCM1
Decrypt/Encrypt
128, 192, 256
2624 Ruckus
Smartzone SSL
Crypto Library
Triple-DES SP 800-67 TECB, TCBC 192 Data Encryption/
Decryption2
KTS (Triple-DES
Cert. #2624 and
HMAC Cert.
#3399; key
establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits
of encryption
strength)
4390 Ruckus
Smartzone
Controller Java
Crypto Library
SHA FIPS 180-4 SHA1
SHA224
SHA256
SHA384
SHA512
Message Digest
4351 Ruckus
SmartZone
Controller
DRBG SHA
Java Crypto
Library
4145 Ruckus
Smartzone SSL
Crypto Library
3627 Ruckus
Smartzone
Controller Java
Crypto Library
HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA256
HMAC-SHA384
Message
Authentication
KTS
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CAVP Cert Library Algorithm Standard Model/Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli
Use
3399 Ruckus
Smartzone SSL
Crypto Library
HMAC-SHA1
HMAC-SHA224
HMAC-SHA256
HMAC-SHA384
HMAC-SHA512
2150 Ruckus
Smartzone
Controller Java
Crypto Library
DRBG SP 800-90A Hash based Deterministic
Random Bit
Generation3
1903 Ruckus
Smartzone SSL
Crypto Library
Counter
Hash based
HMAC based
1322 Ruckus
Smartzone SSL
Crypto Library
ECDSA FIPS 186-4 SigGen: B-233,
B-283, B-409,
B-571, K-233,
K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224,
P-256, P-384,
P-521
Digital Signature
Generation and
Verification
SigVer: B-163,
B-233, B-283,
B-409, B-571,
K-163, K-233,
K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-192,
P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
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CAVP Cert Library Algorithm Standard Model/Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli
Use
2938 Ruckus
Smartzone
Controller Java
Crypto Library
RSA FIPS 186-2
FIPS 186-4
SHA224,
SHA256,
SHA384
SHA512
PKCS1 v1.5
RSA SigGen
(186-4) 2048,
3072
RSA SigVer
(186-2) 1024,
1536, 2048,
3072, 4096
RSA SigVer
(186-4) ) 1024,
2048, 3072
RSA SigGen
(186-4) 4096
Key Generation
Digital Signature
Generation and
Verification
2759 Ruckus
Smartzone SSL
Crypto Library
SHA-224
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
PKCS1 v1.5
ANSI X9.31
PKCSPSS
RSA KeyGen
(186-4) 2048,
3072
RSA SigGen
(186-2) 4096
RSA SigGen
(186-4) 2048,
3072
RSA SigVer
(186-2) 1024,
1536, 2048,
3072, 4096
1923 Ruckus
Smartzone
Controller Java
Crypto Library
CVL
RSASP1
FIPS 186-4 PKCS 1.5 2048 RSA Signature
Primitive
1922 Ruckus
Smartzone
Controller Java
Crypto Library
TLS 1.2 SP 800-135 Key Derivation4
1778 Ruckus
Smartzone
SNMP Crypto
Library
SNMP
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CAVP Cert Library Algorithm Standard Model/Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli
Use
1647 Ruckus
Smartzone SSL
Crypto Library
TLS 1.2
SSH
CKG
(vendor
affirmed)
Cryptographic
Key
Generation
SP 800-133 Key Generation5
Note 1: not all CAVS tested modes of the algorithms are used in this module.
Note 2: any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the
scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
1
The module’s AES-GCM implementation complies with IG A.5 scenario 1 and RFC 5288. AES-GCM is only
used in TLS version 1.2.
2
Operators are responsible for ensuring that the same Triple-DES key is not used to encrypt more than
2^16 64-bit data blocks.
3
The minimum number of bits of entropy generated by the module is 367 bits.
4
No parts of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
5
The module directly uses the output of the DRBG
2.2 Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions.
Table 4: Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
RSA Key Wrapping using 2048 bits key Provides 112 bits of encryption
strength.
Used during TLS handshake
EC DH using 224 / 256 / 384 / 521 bits key Provides between 112 and 256
bits of encryption strength
Used during SSH handshake and
TLS handshake
DH using 2048 bits key Provides 112 bits of encryption
strength.
Used during TLS handshake and
SSH session establishment.
MD5 RADIUS
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Algorithm Caveat Use
Note: RADIUS is available in the
FIPS approved mode. It is secured
using TLS.
NDRNG Used to seed SP 800-90A
DRBG.
2.3 All other algorithms
Table 5: All other algorithms
Algorithm Use
MD5 RADIUS in non-approved mode
Elliptic Curves secp256k1, sect239k1, secp224k1,
sect193r1, sect193r2, secp192k1, secp192r1, sect163k1,
sect163r1, sect163r2, secp160k1, secp160r1, and
secp160r2
Elliptic Curve Cryptography in non-approved mode.
3. Ports and interfaces
The following table describes physical ports and logical interfaces of the module.
Table 6.1: Ports and Interfaces of SmartZone 104 / 124
Port Name Count Interface(s)
Ethernet Ports:
4- 1GbE
2- 10GbE (SZ-124 only)
6 (SZ-124)
4 (SZ-104)
Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output
USB Port 2 Not used
Power Receptacle 1 Power Input
Reset Button 1 Control Input
F/D Button 1 Control Input
LEDs 15 (SZ-124)
11 (SZ-104)
Status Output
Console Port 1 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output
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Table 6.2: Ports and Interfaces of SmartZone 300
Port Name Count Interface(s)
Ethernet Ports:
6x 1GbE ports
4x 10GbE ports
10 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output
USB Port 4 Not used
Power Receptacle 2 Power Input
Reset Button 1 Control Input
LEDs 28 Status Output
VGA Port 1 Data Output, Status Output
Alarm Port 1 Not Used
Console Ports 2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input,
Status Output
4. Roles, Services and Authentication
The module supports role-based authentication. The module supports a Crypto Officer role, a User Role,
and AP Role. The Crypto Officer installs and administers the module. The Users and APs use the
cryptographic services provided by the module. The module supports concurrent operators. The module
provides the following services.
Table 7.1: Roles and Services
Service Corresponding
Roles
Types of Access to Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
R – Read
E - Execute
W – Write or Create
Z – Zeroize
Self-test Crypto Officer
User
N/A
Reboot Crypto Officer
User
N/A
Zeroization Crypto Officer All: Z
Firmware update Crypto Officer Firmware update key: R, E
Show status Crypto Officer
User
AP
N/A
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Service Corresponding
Roles
Types of Access to Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
R – Read
E - Execute
W – Write or Create
Z – Zeroize
Login Crypto Officer
User
Password: R, W
SSH Keys: R, W, E
TLS Keys: R,W, E
DRBG seed: R, W
SSH Tunnel Crypto Officer
User
AP
Password: R, W
SSH Keys: R,W, E
DRBG seed: R, W
Configuration Crypto Officer Password: R, W
SSH Keys: R,W, E
TLS Keys: R,W, E
DRBG seed: R, W
RadSec AP TLS Keys: R,W, E
DRBG seed: R, W
GRE Tunnel AP RGRE packets AES key: R,W, E
HTTPS/TLS Crypto Officer
User
AP
TLS Keys: R,W,E
DRBG seed: R, W
EAP authenticator AP SSH Keys: R,W,E
DRBG seed: R, W
SNMPv3 Crypto Officer
User
Password: R, W
SNMP Keys: R,W,E
FIPS mode enable/disable Crypto Officer All: Z
The module supports the following authentication mechanisms.
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Table 7.2: Authentication Mechanisms
Role Authentication Mechanisms
User Role (Monitoring user) Passwords (Minimum 8 characters)
The module uses passwords of at least 8 printable characters. Total
number of password permutations with eight characters is
95^8 = 6,634,204,312,890,625. Therefore the probability is less than
one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur.
For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a
one-minute period, the probability is less than one in 100,000 that a
random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur due to
the authentication process performance limitation. The number of
attempts that are required to reach 1/100,000 far exceeds the
capabilities of the equipment since billions of attempts per second
would be required.
CO Role (Configuration user) Passwords (Minimum 8 characters)
The module uses passwords of at least 8 printable characters. Total
number of password permutations with eight characters is
95^8 = 6,634,204,312,890,625. Therefore the probability is less than
one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur.
For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a
one-minute period, the probability is less than one in 100,000 that a
random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur due to
the authentication process performance limitation. The number of
attempts that are required to reach 1/100,000 far exceeds the
capabilities of the equipment since billions of attempts per second
would be required.
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AP Role RSA key (2048 bits)
The module uses 2048 bits RSA key, which corresponds to 112 bits of
security. 2^-112 is significantly less than 1/1,000,000. Therefore the
probability is less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will
succeed or a false acceptance will occur.
For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a
one-minute period, the probability is less than one in 100,000 that a
random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur due to
the authentication process performance limitation. The number of
attempts that are required to reach 1/100,000 far exceeds the
capabilities of the equipment since more than billions of attempts per
second would be required.
5. Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
The table below describes cryptographic keys and CSPs used by the module.
Table 8: Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
Key Description/Usage Storage
TLS master secret Used to derive TLS encryption
key and TLS HMAC Key
RAM in plaintext
TLS pre-master secret Used to derive TLS master
secret
RAM in plaintext
TLS AES or Triple-DES
key
Used during encryption and
decryption of data within the
TLS protocol
RAM in plaintext
TLS HMAC key Used to protect integrity of
data within the TLS protocol
RAM in plaintext
TLS RSA keys public
and private keys
Used during the TLS
handshake
RAM in plaintext
Hard drive in plaintext
TLS ECDSA keys public
keys
Used during the TLS
handshake
RAM in plaintext
TLS Diffie-Hellman
public and private
keys
Used during the TLS
handshake to establish the
shared secret
RAM in plaintext
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Key Description/Usage Storage
TLS EC Diffie-Hellman
public and private
keys
Used during the TLS
handshake to establish the
shared secret
RAM in plaintext
CTR_DRBG CSPs:
entropy input, V and
Key
Hash_DRBG CSPs:
entropy input, V and C
HMAC_DRBG CSPs:
entropy input, V and
Key
Used during generation of
random numbers
RAM in plaintext
Passwords Used for operator
authentication
RAM in plaintext
Hard drive in plaintext
Firmware update RSA
key
Used to protect integrity
during firmware update
RAM in plaintext
Hard drive in plaintext
RGRE packets AES key Used for establishing RGRE
tunnel
RAM in plaintext
SNMP Secret Used to establish SNMP
sessions
RAM in plaintext
Hard drive in plaintext
SSH AES key Used during encryption and
decryption of data within the
SSH protocol
RAM in plaintext
SSH HMAC key Used to protect integrity of
data within the SSH protocol
RAM in plaintext
SSH RSA public and
private keys
Used to authenticate the SSH
handshake and AP
RAM in plaintext
Hard drive in plaintext
SSH ECDSA public keys Used to authenticate the SSH
handshake
RAM in plaintext
Hard drive in plaintext
SSH Diffie-Hellman
public and private
keys
Used during the SSH
handshake to establish the
shared secret
RAM in plaintext
SSH EC Diffie-Hellman
public and private
keys
Used during the SSH
handshake to establish the
shared secret
RAM in plaintext
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Note: Zeroization is achieved by changing the FIPS mode from Enable to Disable OR from Disable to
Enable using the fips enable or the fips disable command.
6. Self-tests
The module performs the following power-up and conditional self-tests. Upon failure or a power-up or
conditional self-test the module halts its operation.
The following table describes self-tests implemented by the module.
Table 9: Self-Tests
Algorithm Test
AES KAT using ECB and CBC modes
(encryption/decryption)
Triple-DES KAT using ECB mode (encryption/decryption)
SHS KAT using SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384,
and SHA512
HMAC KAT using SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384
and SHA512
SP800-90A DRBG KAT:
CTR_DRBG
HASH_DRBG
HMAC_DRBG
Continuous Random Number Generator test
NDRNG Continuous Random Number Generator test
RSA KAT using 2048 bit key, SHA-256
Pairwise Consistency Test
Firmware integrity MD5 checksum during bootup
Firmware load RSA using 4096 bit key
ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test (sign/verify)
using P-224, K-233 and SHA512
ECC CDH Shared secret computation
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7. Physical Security
The cryptographic module consists of production-grade components. The enclosure of the cryptographic
module is opaque within the visible spectrum. The removable covers are protected with tamper-evident
seals. The tamper-evident seals must be checked periodically by the Crypto Officer. If the tamper-evident
seals are broken or missing, the Crypto Officer must halt the operation of the module.
The tamper evident seals shall be installed by either the manufacturer or the Crypto Officer for the
module to operate in the approved mode of operation.
FIPS security seal application instructions
For all seal applications, Crypto Officer ensures that the following instructions are observed:
• All surfaces to which the seals will be applied must be clean and dry. Use alcohol to clean the
surfaces. Do not use other solvents.
• Do not cut, trim, punch, or otherwise alter the TEL.
• Do not use bare fingers to handle the labels. Slowly peel the backing from each seal, taking care not
to touch the adhesive.
• Use very firm pressure across the entire seal surface to ensure maximum adhesion.
• Allow a minimum of 24 hours for the adhesive to cure. Tamper evidence might not be apparent until
the adhesive cures.
Order for seals is placed to Ruckus Wireless, Inc. through a partner/distributor and Ruckus Wireless, Inc.
processes the order. The part number for the seals is XBR-000195.
Number of seals per model: SZ-104/SZ-124 has four tamper evident seals and SZ-300 has eight tamper
evident seals.
During the installation the Crypto Officer must check that the product was not damaged.
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Figure 5: Tamper-evident seals on SmartZone 104 /124
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Figure 6: Tamper-evident seals on SmartZone 300
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8. References
Table 8: References
Reference Specification
[ANS X9.31] Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry (rDSA)
[FIPS 140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
[FIPS 180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
[FIPS 186-2/4] Digital Signature Standard
[FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard
[FIPS 198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
[FIPS 202] SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
[PKCS#1 v2.1] RSA Cryptography Standard
[PKCS#5] Password-Based Cryptography Standard
[PKCS#12] Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
[SP 800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of
Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode
[SP 800-38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
[SP 800-38C] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
[SP 800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
[SP 800-38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
[SP 800-56A] Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
[SP 800-56B] Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
[SP 800-56C] Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion
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Reference Specification
[SP 800-67R1] Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
[SP 800-89] Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
[SP 800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators
[SP 800-108] Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
[SP 800-132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
[SP 800-135] Recommendation for Existing Application –Specific Key Derivation Functions