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Trellix
Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensor NS7600
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Trellix
6000 Headquarters Drive, Suite 600
Plano, TX 75024
http://www.trellix.com
Prepared by:
www.acumensecurity.net
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
1.3 Additional Information....................................................................................................... 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 8
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 9
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 9
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 9
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................19
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................23
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................24
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................25
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................25
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................26
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................26
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................26
3.2 Additional Information......................................................................................................28
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................29
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................29
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................32
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................33
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................63
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................63
4.6 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ........................................................................63
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................63
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................63
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................64
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................64
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................64
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6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ...........................................................................64
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................64
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................64
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................64
8.1 Mitigation Techniques......................................................................................................64
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................65
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................65
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................65
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................68
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................69
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................90
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................90
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................90
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information......................................................................................100
10.4 Error States .................................................................................................................101
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests ...................................................................................102
10.6 Additional Information..................................................................................................102
11 Life-Cycle Assurance .........................................................................................................103
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures........................................................103
11.2 Administrator Guidance ...............................................................................................103
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance........................................................................................103
11.4 Design and Rules ........................................................................................................103
11.5 Maintenance Requirements.........................................................................................104
11.6 End of Life ...................................................................................................................104
11.7 Additional Information..................................................................................................104
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................................104
12.1 Attack List....................................................................................................................104
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 8
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 9
Table 4: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................10
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................11
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.....................................19
Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................23
Table 8: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................25
Table 9: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................25
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................28
Table 11: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................32
Table 12: Roles.........................................................................................................................33
Table 13: Approved Services ....................................................................................................62
Table 14: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................65
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................67
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................68
Table 17: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................79
Table 18: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................90
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................90
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests .............................................................................................100
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.......................................................................100
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information..............................................................................101
Table 23: Error States.............................................................................................................102
List of Figures
Figure 1: Front Panel of the Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensor NS7600 ...................... 7
Figure 2: Rear Panel of the Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensor NS7600 .................. 7
Figure 3: Block Diagram of the Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensor NS7600 ................. 8
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1 General
1.1 Overview
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 — Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a
Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) together form the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program (CMVP) and run the FIPS 140-3 program. The NVLAP (National Voluntary
Laboratory Accreditation Program) accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140-3
testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140-3 validation. Validated is the term given
to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-3 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at:
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the “Trellix Intrusion Prevention
System Sensor NS7600” provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how
it meets the overall Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-3.
The “Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensor NS7600” sensor may also be referred to as the
“sensor”, “NS7600” or “module” in this document.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
The module claims to meet the FIPS 140-3 requirements at an overall Security Level 1 with all
individual areas at Security Level 2 except sections 6 (Operational Environment) and 7
(Physical Security) where it meets requirements at Security Level 1. The module does not
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support non-invasive security and mitigation of other attacks and thus the requirements per
section 8 (Non-Invasive Security) and 12 (Mitigation of Other Attacks) respectively do not apply
to it.
Disclaimer
The contents of this document are subject to revision without notice due to continued progress in
methodology, design, and manufacturing. Trellix shall have no liability for any error or damages
of any kind resulting from the use of this document.
Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
Scope
This document describes the cryptographic module security policy for the Trellix Intrusion
Prevention System Sensor NS7600 (Hardware version: 1.00) cryptographic module with
firmware version 11.1.17.7. It contains specification of the security rules, under which the
cryptographic module operates, including the security rules derived from the requirements of the
FIPS 140-3 standard.
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The NS7600 is an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) and Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
designed for network protection against zero-day, DoS/DDoS, encrypted and SYN Flood
attacks, and real-time prevention of threats like spyware, malware, VoIP vulnerabilities,
phishing, botnets, network worms, Trojans, and peer-to-peer applications. The Trellix Intrusion
Prevention system Sensors (Trellix IPS sensor) connect with the Trellix Intrusion Prevention
System Manager Appliances (Trellix IPS Manager-may be referred to as Manager in this
document). The Trellix IPS Manager is used to manage and push configuration data and
policies to the Sensors. Communication between Manager and Sensors uses secure channels
that protect the traffic from disclosure and modification. Authorized administrators may access
the Trellix IPS Manager via a GUI (over HTTPS) or a CLI (via SSH or a serial console
connection). Sensors may be accessed via CLI (via SSH or a serial console connection) for
initial setup. Once initial setup is complete, all management occurs via the Manager.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary is the outer perimeter of the chassis enclosure. No components
have been excluded from the boundary. Optional network I/O modules have not been
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inserted in the module as part of this validation and thus are not included in the cryptographic
boundary.
Figure 1: Front Panel of the Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensor NS7600
Figure 2: Rear Panel of the Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensor NS7600
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Figure 3: Block Diagram of the Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensor NS7600
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
NS7600 1.00 11.1.17.7 Intel® Xeon® Scalable Processors (SILVER
4416+,Sapphire Rapids)
N/A
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
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2.3 Excluded Components
No components have been excluded from the module boundary.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
The module supports the Approved mode of
operation by default once it has been installed
and initialization per Section 11.1 of the
Security Policy; Only Approved and allowed
algorithms, modes, and key sizes are
supported by the module in the Approved mode
Approved "FIPS Mode:
Enabled" indicator
printed on CLI
using the "show"
command
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The module only supports an Approved mode of operation. The module does not support a non-
Approved mode or a degraded mode of operation. The module supports a non-compliant state
and must be initialized as specified in Section 11.1 to be operational in the Approved mode. The
following caveat thus applies to the module: When installed, initialized and configured as
specified in Section 11 of the Security Policy.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CFB128 A3350 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A3350 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A3350 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A3350 Prediction Resistance - Yes
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A3350 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A3350 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A3350 Curve - P-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A3350 Curve - P-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA2-256 A3350 Key Length - Key Length: 8-2048 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A3350 Key Length - Key Length: 8-2048 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A3350 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SSH (CVL) A3351 Cipher - AES-128, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-
512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A3350 Key Generation Mode -
probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A3350 Modulo - 2048
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A3350 Modulo - 2048
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A3353 Modulo - 2048
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
SHA-1 A3350 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
51200 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A3350 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
51200 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A3353 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
51200 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A3350 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A3350 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA3-256 A3303 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 202
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A3352 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
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Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key
Type:Symmetric
and Asymmetric
N/A NIST SP800-133r2 Section 4: Symmetric key
generation and Asymmetric seed generation
using an unmodified output from an Approved
DRBG (example 1); The module supports the
following per NIST SP 800-133r2: 1. Section
5.1: Key Pairs for Digital Signature Schemes
2. Section 5.2: Key Pairs for Key
Establishment 3. Section 6.2.1: Derivation of
symmetric keys
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode
of Operation.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
Name Caveat Use and Function
MD5 - file fingerprint No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
To calculate fingerprint of a file: The MD5 hash of
a file is sent to malware engines such as
Allow/Block list, GTI, TIE etc. Malware engines
use the md5sum of a file to determine if a file is
malicious or not
MD5 - Inspection
alerts
No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
MD5 hash is shared in the inspection alerts that
IPS generates
MD5 - Internal cache
lookup
No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
MD5 hash is used in Sensor’s internal cache
lookup
MD5 - Configuration
segments
No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
MD5 hash is used in configuration segments: IPS
Manager sends huge configuration data in
segments to Sensor; Prior to sending, for each
segment, IPS Manager populates MD5 hash &
appends it to the segment. When Sensor receives
it, it also populates MD5 hash of the received
segment data and compares it with the received
MD5 hash to check for integrity. After data integrity
check is passed, Sensor uses MD5 hash value to
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Name Caveat Use and Function
check if a particular configuration segment is
modified or not
MD5 - SSLv2 No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
MD5 used in SSLv2 to ensure data integrity; Note:
This algorithm is implemented independently from
all other cryptographic code in the module and is
used to analyze the network stream for malware
and malicious network attacks in accordance with
the functionality of the product. Due to this, the
corresponding functionality is deemed allowed in
the Approved mode of operation with no security
claimed, per Additional Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and
the following requirements per the Additional
Comment 2 are satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not
used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3
requirements; 2) the algorithm does not access or
share CSPs in a way that counters the
requirements of the IG; 3) i) the algorithm is not
intended to be used as a security function 4) the
algorithm's non-approved use and purpose (from
3)) is unambiguous to the operator and can't be
easily confused for a security function given as the
purpose is not providing any security functionality
recognized in FIPS 140-3.
MD5 - SSLv3/TLS No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
example a
MD5 used in SSLv3/TLS to ensure data integrity
SHA-1 - SNMPv3 No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
Used in SNMPv3 to ensure data integrity; Note:
This algorithm is implemented independently from
all other cryptographic code in the module and is
used to analyze the network stream for malware
and malicious network attacks in accordance with
the functionality of the product. Due to this, the
corresponding functionality is deemed allowed in
the Approved mode of operation with no security
claimed, per Additional Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and
the following requirements per the Additional
Comment 2 are satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not
used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3
requirements; 2) the algorithm does not access or
share CSPs in a way that counters the
requirements of the IG; 3) i) the algorithm is not
intended to be used as a security function 4) the
algorithm's non-approved use and purpose (from
3)) is unambiguous to the operator and can't be
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Name Caveat Use and Function
easily confused for a security function given as the
purpose is not providing any security functionality
recognized in FIPS 140-3.
SHA-1 - file fingerprint No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
The SHA-1 hash of a file is sent to malware
engines such as TIE etc. Malware engines use the
SHA-1 hash of a file to determine if a file is
malicious or not
SHA-1 - Inspection
Alerts
No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
SHA-1 hash is shared in the inspection alerts that
IPS generates
SHA-1 - proprietary
file transfer channel
No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
The Sensor & Manager share configuration data
via proprietary file transfer channel. The data is
encrypted using AES128_CFB symmetric cipher.
When Manager sends data to Sensor, it calculates
SHA1 hash of the data; It encrypts the SHA-1
hash and the data in AES128_CFB symmetric
cipher; When the Sensor receives it, it calculates
the SHA-1 hash of the received data and
compares it with the received SHA1 hash value.
Similarly, when Sensor sends data to Manager, it
calculates the SHA1 hash of the data; It encrypts
the SHA1 hash along with the data in
AES128_CFB symmetric cipher
SHA2 (SHA2-256 and
SHA2-384)
No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
SHA2 (SHA2-256 and SHA2-384) No Security
Claimed; Per IG 2.4.A Scenario 2 Additional
Comment 2 Used in TLS 1.2 to ensure data
integrity; Note: This algorithm is implemented
independently from all other cryptographic code in
the module and is used to analyze the network
stream for malware and malicious network attacks
in accordance with the functionality of the product.
Due to this, the corresponding functionality is
deemed allowed in the Approved mode of
operation with no security claimed, per Additional
Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and the following
requirements per the Additional Comment 2 are
satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not used whatsoever
to meet any FIPS 140-3 requirements; 2) the
algorithm does not access or share CSPs in a way
that counters the requirements of the IG; 3) i) the
algorithm is not intended to be used as a security
function 4) the algorithm's non-approved use and
purpose (from 3)) is unambiguous to the operator
and can't be easily confused for a security function
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Name Caveat Use and Function
given as the purpose is not providing any security
functionality recognized in FIPS 140-3.
HMAC No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
Used in the SSLv2, SSLv3/TLS and SNMPv3
protocols for the same purpose i.e. to provide
message/data authentication; Note: This algorithm
is implemented independently from all other
cryptographic code in the module and is used to
analyze the network stream for malware and
malicious network attacks in accordance with the
functionality of the product. Due to this, the
corresponding functionality is deemed allowed in
the Approved mode of operation with no security
claimed, per Additional Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and
the following requirements per the Additional
Comment 2 are satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not
used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3
requirements; 2) the algorithm does not access or
share CSPs in a way that counters the
requirements of the IG; 3) i) the algorithm is not
intended to be used as a security function 4) the
algorithm's non-approved use and purpose (from
3)) is unambiguous to the operator and can't be
easily confused for a security function given as the
purpose is not providing any security functionality
recognized in FIPS 140-3.
Triple-DES No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
Triple-DES No Security Claimed; Per IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2 Additional Comment 2 Used for
symmetric decryption over SSLv2 and SSLv3/TLS;
Note: This algorithm is implemented independently
from all other cryptographic code in the module
and is used to analyze the network stream for
malware and malicious network attacks in
accordance with the functionality of the product.
Due to this, the corresponding functionality is
deemed allowed in the Approved mode of
operation with no security claimed, per Additional
Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and the following
requirements per the Additional Comment 2 are
satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not used whatsoever
to meet any FIPS 140-3 requirements; 2) the
algorithm does not access or share CSPs in a way
that counters the requirements of the IG; 3) i) the
algorithm is not intended to be used as a security
function 4) the algorithm's non-approved use and
purpose (from 3)) is unambiguous to the operator
and can't be easily confused for a security function
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Name Caveat Use and Function
given as the purpose is not providing any security
functionality recognized in FIPS 140-3.
DES No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
Used for symmetric decryption over SSLv2 and
SSLv3/TLS; Note: This algorithm is implemented
independently from all other cryptographic code in
the module and is used to analyze the network
stream for malware and malicious network attacks
in accordance with the functionality of the product.
Due to this, the corresponding functionality is
deemed allowed in the Approved mode of
operation with no security claimed, per Additional
Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and the following
requirements per the Additional Comment 2 are
satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not used whatsoever
to meet any FIPS 140-3 requirements; 2) the
algorithm does not access or share CSPs in a way
that counters the requirements of the IG; 3) i) the
algorithm is not intended to be used as a security
function 4) the algorithm's non-approved use and
purpose (from 3)) is unambiguous to the operator
and can't be easily confused for a security function
given as the purpose is not providing any security
functionality recognized in FIPS 140-3.
AES - SSLv3/TLS No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
AES - SSLv3/TLS No Security Claimed; Per IG
2.4.A Scenario 2 Additional Comment 2 Used for
symmetric decryption over SSLv3/TLS; Note: This
algorithm is implemented independently from all
other cryptographic code in the module and is
used to analyze the network stream for malware
and malicious network attacks in accordance with
the functionality of the product. Due to this, the
corresponding functionality is deemed allowed in
the Approved mode of operation with no security
claimed, per Additional Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and
the following requirements per the Additional
Comment 2 are satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not
used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3
requirements; 2) the algorithm does not access or
share CSPs in a way that counters the
requirements of the IG; 3) i) the algorithm is not
intended to be used as a security function 4) the
algorithm's non-approved use and purpose (from
3)) is unambiguous to the operator and can't be
easily confused for a security function given as the
purpose is not providing any security functionality
recognized in FIPS 140-3.
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Name Caveat Use and Function
AES - SNMPv3 No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
AES - SNMPv3 No Security Claimed; Per IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2 Additional Comment 2 AES-CFB128
for symmetric encryption/decryption over SNMPv3;
Note: This algorithm is implemented independently
from all other cryptographic code in the module
and is used to analyze the network stream for
malware and malicious network attacks in
accordance with the functionality of the product.
Due to this, the corresponding functionality is
deemed allowed in the Approved mode of
operation with no security claimed, per Additional
Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and the following
requirements per the Additional Comment 2 are
satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not used whatsoever
to meet any FIPS 140-3 requirements; 2) the
algorithm does not access or share CSPs in a way
that counters the requirements of the IG; 3) i) the
algorithm is not intended to be used as a security
function 4) the algorithm's non-approved use and
purpose (from 3)) is unambiguous to the operator
and can't be easily confused for a security function
given as the purpose is not providing any security
functionality recognized in FIPS 140-3.
AES - TLS 1.2 No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
AES-GCM (128/256 bits) for symmetric
encryption/decryption over TLS 1.2; Note: This
algorithm is implemented independently from all
other cryptographic code in the module and is
used to analyze the network stream for malware
and malicious network attacks in accordance with
the functionality of the product. Due to this, the
corresponding functionality is deemed allowed in
the Approved mode of operation with no security
claimed, per Additional Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and
the following requirements per the Additional
Comment 2 are satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not
used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3
requirements; 2) the algorithm does not access or
share CSPs in a way that counters the
requirements of the IG; 3) i) the algorithm is not
intended to be used as a security function 4) the
algorithm's non-approved use and purpose (from
3)) is unambiguous to the operator and can't be
easily confused for a security function given as the
purpose is not providing any security functionality
recognized in FIPS 140-3.
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Name Caveat Use and Function
RC4 No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
RC4 No Security Claimed; Per IG 2.4.A Scenario 2
Additional Comment 2 Used for symmetric
decryption over SSLv2 and SSLv3/TLS; Note: This
algorithm is implemented independently from all
other cryptographic code in the module and is
used to analyze the network stream for malware
and malicious network attacks in accordance with
the functionality of the product. Due to this, the
corresponding functionality is deemed allowed in
the Approved mode of operation with no security
claimed, per Additional Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and
the following requirements per the Additional
Comment 2 are satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not
used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3
requirements; 2) the algorithm does not access or
share CSPs in a way that counters the
requirements of the IG; 3) i) the algorithm is not
intended to be used as a security function 4) the
algorithm's non-approved use and purpose (from
3)) is unambiguous to the operator and can't be
easily confused for a security function given as the
purpose is not providing any security functionality
recognized in FIPS 140-3.
SNMPv3 KDF No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
Used for key derivation in the context of SNMPv3
(SNMPv3 is used as a transport mechanism
between the Manager and the sensor with no
security claimed (when using self-signed
certificates); SNMPv3 is used as a Read Only
connection and responses to non-CSP objects for
3rd Party Clients with no security claimed); Note:
This algorithm is implemented independently from
all other cryptographic code in the module and is
used to analyze the network stream for malware
and malicious network attacks in accordance with
the functionality of the product. Due to this, the
corresponding functionality is deemed allowed in
the Approved mode of operation with no security
claimed, per Additional Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and
the following requirements per the Additional
Comment 2 are satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not
used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3
requirements; 2) the algorithm does not access or
share CSPs in a way that counters the
requirements of the IG; 3) i) the algorithm is not
intended to be used as a security function 4) the
algorithm's non-approved use and purpose (from
3)) is unambiguous to the operator and can't be
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Name Caveat Use and Function
easily confused for a security function given as the
purpose is not providing any security functionality
recognized in FIPS 140-3.
KAS-ECC No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
Used in TLS 1.2 for key exchange; Note: This
algorithm is implemented independently from all
other cryptographic code in the module and is
used to analyze the network stream for malware
and malicious network attacks in accordance with
the functionality of the product. Due to this, the
corresponding functionality is deemed allowed in
the Approved mode of operation with no security
claimed, per Additional Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and
the following requirements per the Additional
Comment 2 are satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not
used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3
requirements; 2) the algorithm does not access or
share CSPs in a way that counters the
requirements of the IG; 3) i) the algorithm is not
intended to be used as a security function 4) the
algorithm's non-approved use and purpose (from
3)) is unambiguous to the operator and can't be
easily confused for a security function given as the
purpose is not providing any security functionality
recognized in FIPS 140-3.
RSA PKCS1.5
(encrypt/decrypt/key
wrapping)
No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
RSA PKCS1.5 (encrypt/decrypt/key wrapping) No
Security Claimed; Per IG 2.4.A Scenario 2
Additional Comment 2 * Used for key wrapping in
the context of SNMPv3 (when using self-signed
certificates). * Used for encryption of the secret
and IV values by Manager using the RSA
PKCS1.5 mod 2048-bit sensor public key * Used
in the context of SSLv2, SSLv3/TLS, TLS 1.2 and
SNMPv3; Note: This algorithm is implemented
independently from all other cryptographic code in
the module and is used to analyze the network
stream for malware and malicious network attacks
in accordance with the functionality of the product.
Due to this, the corresponding functionality is
deemed allowed in the Approved mode of
operation with no security claimed, per Additional
Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and the following
requirements per the Additional Comment 2 are
satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not used whatsoever
to meet any FIPS 140-3 requirements; 2) the
algorithm does not access or share CSPs in a way
that counters the requirements of the IG; 3) i) the
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Name Caveat Use and Function
algorithm is not intended to be used as a security
function 4) the algorithm's non-approved use and
purpose (from 3)) is unambiguous to the operator
and can't be easily confused for a security function
given as the purpose is not providing any security
functionality recognized in FIPS 140-3.
ECDSA No Security
Claimed; Per
IG 2.4.A
Scenario 2
Additional
Comment 2
Used in TLS 1.2 for authentication; Note: This
algorithm is implemented independently from all
other cryptographic code in the module and is
used to analyze the network stream for malware
and malicious network attacks in accordance with
the functionality of the product. Due to this, the
corresponding functionality is deemed allowed in
the Approved mode of operation with no security
claimed, per Additional Comment 2 in IG 2.4.A and
the following requirements per the Additional
Comment 2 are satisfied: 1) the algorithm is not
used whatsoever to meet any FIPS 140-3
requirements; 2) the algorithm does not access or
share CSPs in a way that counters the
requirements of the IG; 3) i) the algorithm is not
intended to be used as a security function 4) the
algorithm's non-approved use and purpose (from
3)) is unambiguous to the operator and can't be
easily confused for a security function given as the
purpose is not providing any security functionality
recognized in FIPS 140-3.
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
The above listed algorithms are implemented independently from all other cryptographic code in
the module and are used to analyze the network stream for malware and malicious network
attacks in accordance with the functionality of the product. Due to this, the corresponding
functionality is deemed allowed in the Approved mode of operation with no security claimed, per
example scenario 2 in IG 2.4.A.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not support non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved mode.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KTS-1 KTS-Wrap Key Transport
for TLS 1.2
(note: ECB is
Standard :SP
800-38D
IG
AES-GCM:
(A3350)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
used as the pre-
requisite for
GCM)
D.G:approved
method from IG
D.G
Key
confirmation:no
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 256
bits of security
strength
AES-ECB:
(A3350)
KTS-2 KTS-Wrap Key Transport
for SSHv2
(note: ECB is
used as the pre-
requisite for
GCM)
Standard :SP
800-38D
IG
D.G:approved
method from IG
D.G
Key confirmation
:no
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
AES-GCM:
(A3350)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A3350)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A3350)
SHA2-256:
(A3350)
SHA2-512:
(A3350)
AES-ECB:
(A3350)
KAS-1 CKG
KAS-135KDF
KAS-Full
KAS-SSC
Key Agreement
for TLS 1.2
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(2), split
Key
confirmation:no
Key
derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A3350)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A3352)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
KAS-2 CKG
KAS-135KDF
KAS-Full
KAS-SSC
Key Agreement
for SSHv2
IG :IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(2), split
Key
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A3350)
KDF SSH:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
confirmation:no
Key
derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat : Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128
bits of security
strength
(A3351)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
RSA SigVer1 DigSig-SigVer RSA Signature
Verification used
for firmware
integrity
FIPS 186-5,
size:2048 bits,
SHA2-256
encryption
strength:112 bits
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A3353)
SHA2-256:
(A3353)
Password Hash SHA SHA2-512 used
for storing
passwords in a
hashed form
SHA2-512:
(A3350)
Entropy Source ENT-ESV Non-Physical
Entropy Source
SHA3-256:
(A3303)
SSH all
algorithms
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
BC-Auth
CKG
DigSig-SigGen
DigSig-SigVer
DRBG
KTS-Wrap
MAC
Includes list of
all functions
used in SSH
protocol
N/A:N/A AES-GCM:
(A3350)
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A3350)
SHA2-256:
(A3350)
SHA2-512:
(A3350)
Counter DRBG:
(A3350)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
TLS all
algorithms
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
BC-Auth
CKG
DigSig-SigGen
DigSig-SigVer
DRBG
KTS-Wrap
MAC
Includes list of
all functions
used in TLS
protocol
AES-GCM:
(A3350)
Counter DRBG:
(A3350)
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
SHA2-384:
(A3350)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
SNMPv3 BC-UnAuth
SHA
SNMPv3
authentication
and privacy
(AES 128-bit key
and SHA2-384)
AES-CFB128:
(A3350)
SHA2-384:
(A3350)
Self-Tests AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
DigSig-SigGen
DigSig-SigVer
DRBG
KAS-135KDF
KAS-KeyGen
KAS-SSC
MAC
SHA
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-
Tests (CASTs)
AES-ECB:
(A3350)
AES-GCM:
(A3350)
Counter DRBG:
(A3350)
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A3350)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A3350)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A3350)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A3350)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A3350, A3353)
SHA-1: (A3350)
SHA2-256:
(A3350, A3353)
SHA2-512:
(A3350)
KDF SSH:
(A3351)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A3352)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
IG C.F
The module only supports the testable RSA moduli/key size (2048 bits) and thus the
requirements per FIPS 140-3 IG C.F do not apply.
IG C.H
The module conforms to IG C.H for the AES GCM IV generation as follows:
o AES GCM is used to support TLS and SSH secure communications and adheres to the
[FIPS140-3_IG] C.H Resolution 1a TLS 1.2 and 1d SSH protocol IV generation
requirements.
o AES-GCM IVs are only used in compliance with [FIPS140-3_IG] C.H scenario 1a (TLS
1.2, per [RFC5288]) and 1d (SSHv2, per [RFC5647]).
o The Module is compatible with TLS 1.2 protocol and provides the primitives to support
the AES GCM ciphersuites from [SP800-52r1] Section 3.3.1.
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o The Module’s implementation of AES-GCM is used together with one or more
applications outside the Module’s cryptographic boundary that implement the specified
protocols. This application negotiates the protocol session’s keys and the 32-bit nonce
value of the IV.
o Per [FIPS140-3_IG] D.C, no parts of these protocols, other than the approved
cryptographic algorithms and KDF, have been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and
CMVP.
o In each of the protocols, if the Module’s power is lost and then restored/the session is
terminated, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption is re-established/re-
distributed and a new IV is derived.
o When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key
(2^64-1), the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a
handshake to establish a new encryption key.
IG C.C
The SHA3-512 function has been tested and validated on the processor used within the module
per CAVP Cert. #A3303 in accordance with the IG C.C Resolution 2. a.
IG D.F and IG D.G
Per IG D.F Scenario 2 (path (2)):
-KAS-ECC (Key Agreement Scheme Elliptic Curve Cryptography): Key Agreement Scheme –
Key Agreement Scheme Shared Secret Computation (KAS-ECC-SSC) (CAVP Cert. #A3350)
per SP 800-56Arev3, Key Derivation per SP 800-135r1 (KDF TLS 1.2 CVL Cert. #A3352) used
in the context of the IETF TLS 1.2 protocol:
KAS1: KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC Cert.#A3350 and CVL Cert. #A3352; SSP establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
-KAS-ECC (Key Agreement Scheme Elliptic Curve Cryptographic): Key Agreement Scheme
Shared Secret Computation (KAS-ECC-SSC) per SP 800-56Arev3, Key Derivation per SP 800-
135r1 (SSH KDF CVL Cert. #A3351) used in the context of the IETF SSH protocol:
KAS2: KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A3350 and CVL Cert. #A3351; SSP establishment
methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength)
Per IG D.G approved methods respectively are as follows:
-KTS (Key Transport Scheme):
KTS1 (in the context of the IETF TLS 1.2 protocol): KTS (AES Cert. #A3350; SSP establishment
methodology provides 256 bits of encryption strength)
-KTS (Key Transport Scheme):
KTS2 (in the context of the IETF SSH protocol): KTS (AES Cert. #A3350 and HMAC Cert.
#A3350; SSP establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength)
2.8 RBG and Entropy
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Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E157 Trellix
Table 8: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Trellix Intrusion
Prevention
System Sensors
Jitter Entropy
3.4.0
Non-
Physical
Ubuntu 20.04 on
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Scalable Processors
(SILVER 4416+,
Sapphire Rapids)
256 bits Full
entropy;
256 bits
per
sample
SHA3-256
(CAVP Cert.
#A3303)
Table 9: Entropy Sources
The DRBG is seeded with 384 bits of which 256 bits of entropy input and 128 bits of a nonce
both provided by the Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensors Jitter Entropy 3.4.0 source.
2.9 Key Generation
The entropy source provides 256 bits of entropy which is sufficient for the generation of the
SSPs (using the approved DRBGs of the module) with the maximum target security strength
(256 bits) needed. The module implements one NIST SP 800-90Ar1 CTR_DRBG and supports
the following sections per NIST SP 800-133r2 (CKG): Sections 4, 5.1, 5.2 and 6.2.1.
2.10 Key Establishment
Per IG D.F:
The module implements full KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC per NIST SP 800-56Ar3 and KDF SSH/TLS
KDF per NIST SP 800-135r1 in the context of the SSH and TLS protocols respectively; IG D.F
Scenario 2 (path 2 option 2, separate testing of the SSC and SP800-135r1 KDF). The KAS-1
and KAS-2 in the SFI Table have been documented in accordance with this requirement:
KAS-1 (for TLS): KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A3350 and CVL Cert. #A3352; SSP
establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
KAS-2 (for SSH): KAS (KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A3350 and CVL Cert. #A3351; SSP
establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength)
The Approved Algorithm list includes the tested components (KAS-ECC-SSC, KDF SSH and
TLS KDF) as individual entries.
Per IG D.G:
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The module supports the IETF SSH and TLS protocols and thus implements key transport in the
context of the protocols (per the KTS-1 and KTS-2 entries in the SFI table of the Security
Policy).
The module implements the following approved KTS using approved AES modes and HMAC:
KTS-1 (for TLS): KTS (AES Cert. #A3350; SSP establishment methodology provides 256 bits of
encryption strength)
KTS-2 (for SSH): KTS (AES Cert. #A3350 and HMAC Cert. #A3350; SSP establishment
methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength)
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module supports IEFT SSH and TLS protocols. Per IG D.C, please note that no parts of
these protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been
tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Serial Console port (1) Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
Data and control input
to/data/status output from the
module directly from the serial
console
4 SFP/SFP+ 1/10 Gigabit Ethernet ports in
built-in G0 module
Data Input
Data Output
Ethernet data input/output
Network I/O slots Data Input
Data Output
Additional Monitoring ports (3
slots) - 6-port RJ45 10/1
Gigabit Ethernet interface
module with built-in fail open -
8-port 10/1 Gigabit fiber (SM
and MM) interface module
with built-in fail open
RJ-45 1000/10000 Management port
(Mgmt)(1)
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
Management traffic
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
RJ-45 1000/1000 Response port (R1) (1) Data Output Output data/response traffic
USB Ports (2) Data Input Image Configuration
LEDs [status LED(s) (Green - Sensor is
operating in good health, Amber - Sensor is
booting up. It also indicates system bad
health if the LED is on for longer duration)];
[FAN LED(s) (Green - All five fans are
operating, Amber - One or more fans are not
working)]; [Temp LED(s) (Green - Inlet air
temperature measured inside the chassis is
normal.(Chassis temperature OK), Amber -
Inlet air temperature measured inside the
chassis is too high. (Chassis temperature too
hot))]; [4-port SFP/SFP+ module in built-in G0
module Link LED, Green - The link is up, Off -
The link is down]; [4-port SFP/SFP+ module
in built-in G0 module Activity LED, Blinking
Amber - With traffic, Off - Without traffic]; [6-
port RJ45 10/1 Gigabit Ethernet inter-face
module with built-in fail open Link LED, Green
- The link is up, Off - The link is down]; [6-port
RJ45 10/1 Gigabit Ethernet inter-face module
with built-in fail open Speed LED, Green - link
is up with 10000 Mbps port speed, Amber -
link is up with 1000 Mbps port speed]; [6-port
RJ45 10/1 Gigabit Ethernet inter-face module
with built-in fail open Normal / Bypass LED,
Green - The port pair is in Inline Fail-
Open/Inline Fail-Close/SPAN/Tap Mode, off -
The port pair is in the bypass mode]; [8-port
10/1 Gigabit fiber interface module with built-
in fail open Link LED, Green - The link is up,
Off - The link is down]; [8-port 10/1 Gigabit
fiber interface module with built-in fail open
Activity LED Blinking Amber - With traffic, Off
- Without traffic]; [8-port 10/1 Gigabit fiber
interface module with built-in fail open Normal
/ Bypass LED, Green - The port pair is in
Inline Fail-Open/Inline Fail-Close/SPAN/Tap
Mode, off - The port pair is in the bypass
mode]; [Power LED(s) (Solid Green - Power
Supply is functioning, Blinking Green - Power
Supply is stand-by, Yellow - Power Supply is
not functioning or the unit has no power
feed.)]; [Management Port Link LED (Solid
Status
Output
Status Indicator
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Yellow - Link is up and the port speed is
1000/10000 Mbps, Off - The link is down];
[Management Port Speed LED (Solid Green -
The port speed is 1000 Mbps, no activity,
Solid Yellow - The port speed is 10000 Mbps,
no activity, Blinking Green - Data is
transmitted with 1000 Mbps port speed,
Blinking Yellow - Data is transmitted with
10000 Mbps port speed]; [Management Port
Activity LED (Solid Green - The port speed is
1000 Mbps, no activity, Solid Yellow - The
port speed is 10000 Mbps, no activity,
Blinking Green - Data is transmitted with 1000
Mbps port speed, Blinking Yellow - Data is
transmitted with 10000 Mbps port speed];
[Response Port Link LED (Solid Yellow - Link
is up and the port speed is 1000/10000 Mbps,
Off - The link is down]; [Response Port
Speed LED (Solid Green - The port speed is
1000 Mbps, no activity, Solid Yellow - The
port speed is 10000 Mbps, no activity,
Blinking Green - Data is transmitted with 1000
Mbps port speed, Blinking Yellow - Data is
transmitted with 10000 Mbps port speed];
[Response Port Activity LED (Solid Green -
The port speed is 1000 Mbps, no activity,
Solid Yellow - The port speed is 10000 Mbps,
no activity, Blinking Green - Data is
transmitted with 1000 Mbps port speed,
Blinking Yellow - Data is transmitted with
10000 Mbps port speed]
Power Ports (2) Power Power input
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
Notes:
1. The module does not support control output and thus does not comprise a control output
interface.
2. The Network IO Slots each accept interface modules which provide additional monitoring
ports. The interface modules have not been inserted in the cryptographic boundary for this
validation.
3.2 Additional Information
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Please note that the module claims to meet the requirements of this section at Security Level 2
and thus does not claim to support a trusted channel per ISO/IEC 19790:2012. The trusted
channel terminology used below is specific to Trellix to denote secure communications channels
used between the module and its Manager, and not intended to denote the trusted channel as
specified in the ISO/IEC 19790:2012 and FIPS 140-3.
The module supports the following communication channels with the Manager:
• Install channel: Only used to associate a Sensor with the Manager. They use a “shared
secret”. Manager listening on port 8501 (Self-signed certificates) or port 8506 (CA
signed certificates).
• Trusted Alert/Control channel (TLS): Manager listening on port 8502 (Self-signed
certificates) or port 8507 (CA signed certificates).
• Trusted Packet log channel (TLS): Manager listening on port 8503 (Self-signed
certificates) or port 8508 (CA signed certificates).
• Command channel (SNMP, plaintext): Sensor listening to Manager and 3rd Party SNMP
Clients on port 8500.
• Command channel (TLS): Sensor listening to Manager SNMPv3 client encapsulated in
TLS on port 18500 (CA signed certificates).
• Proprietary File Transfer Channel. Data transferred is encrypted using AES128_CFB.
Manager listens on port 8504.
• Malware file upload channel from Sensor to Manager. Manager listens on port 8510
(self-signed certs) or 8509 (CA certificates).
• Trusted Authentication Gateway channel (TLS): uses same crypto context as
Alert/Control channel. Manager listening on port 8502 (Self-signed certificates) or port
8507 (CA signed certificates).
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Username and
Password
Assuming a
password of
exactly 15
characters for
simplicity, the
minimum required
characters would
take up 8
positions (2 of
each type),
leaving 7
positions to fill
with any
characters;
SHA2-512
(A3350)
The probability that
a random attempt
will succeed or a
false acceptance
will occur is
1/[(105) x (78) x
(55) x (36) x (93^7)]
= ~ 9.54×10^16,
given 5 consecutive
attempts are
possible, it is =
5*(9.54×10^16)=
4.77×10^ 15 which
After three (3)
consecutive failed
authentication
attempts, the
session goes
inactive and the
operator must
retry, this is
enforced by the
module;
Additionally, the
module only
supports 5
concurrent SSH
Page 30 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Choosing
positions for 2
uppercase, 2
lowercase, 2
numeric, and 2
special
characters: Total
ways to choose
positions for 2
uppercase from
15: binomial(15
2)=105; Total
ways to choose
positions for 2
lowercase from
the remaining 13:
binomial(13
2)=78; Total ways
to choose
positions for 2
numeric from the
remaining 11:
binomial(11
2)=55; Total ways
to choose
positions for 2
special characters
from the
remaining 9:
binomial(9 2)=36;
The remaining 7
positions can be
filled with any of
the 93 characters
(93^7)
is less than
1/1,000,000
sessions; Thus,
the probability of
success in a one-
minute period is:
60*4.77x10^-15 =
2.862 x 10^-13,
which is less than
1/100,000
Digital
Signature
RSA 2048-bit
keys using SHA2-
256 are used for
the signing (in
isolated Trellix
laboratory) and
verification (by
sensor) of digital
signatures
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A3353)
The probability that
a random attempt
will succeed or a
false acceptance
will occur is
1/2^112, which is
less than
1/1,000,000
The module can
only perform one
(1) digital
signature
verification per
second; The
probability of
successfully
authenticating to
the module within
one minute
Page 31 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
through random
attempts is
60/2^112 which is
less than
1/100,000
Username,
Privacy and
Authentication
Key
The privacy key
and
authentication key
together make an
alphanumeric
string of a
minimum of eight
(8) characters and
maximum of 15
(for 3rd party
SNMP key) and
16 (for Manager
SNMP key)
chosen from the
set of sixty-two
(62) numbers,
lower case letters,
and upper case
letters
SNMPv3 The probability that
a random attempt
will succeed or a
false acceptance
will occur is 1/62^8,
which is less than
1/1,000,000
The module will
allow
approximately one
(1) attempt per
millisecond,
meaning that
60,000 attempts
can be made per
minute; The
probability of
successfully
authenticating to
the module within
one minute
through random
attempts is
60,000/62^8 which
is less than
1/100,000
Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret")
Shared secret
used to
authenticate a
Manager to the
module
Shared
secret
The module
enforces 8-
characters(at
minimum) chosen
from the 96 human
readable ASCII
characters. The
maximum length is
25-characters.
Thus, the
probability of a
successful random
attempt is 1/(96^8),
which is less than
1/1 million
The module will
allow
approximately one
(1) attempt per
millisecond,
meaning that
60,000 attempts
can be made per
minute. Thus, the
probability of a
successful
random attempt
within one minute
is 60,000/(96^8),
which is less than
1/1 million
Public key
authentication
- RSA
RSA public key
used to
authenticate a
host to the
module
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A3350)
The module
supports RSA
(2048 bits), which
has a minimum
equivalent
The module can
only perform one
(1) digital
signature
verification per
Page 32 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
computational
resistance to attack
of 2^112 (2048
bits); Thus, the
probability of a
successful random
attempt is 1/
(2^112), which is
less than
1/1,000,000
(million)
second with a
maximum of 5
consecutive SSH
sessions
supported by the
module; The
probability of
successfully
authenticating to
the module within
one minute
through random
attempts is
60*5/2^112 which
is less than
1/100,000
Public key
authentication
- ECDSA
ECDSA public
key used to
authenticate a
host to the
module
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A3350)
The module
supports ECDSA
(P-256), which has
a minimum
equivalent
computational
resistance to attack
of either 2^128 (P-
256); Thus, the
probability of a
successful random
attempt is
1/(2^128), which is
less than
1/1,000,000
(million)
The module can
only perform one
(1) digital
signature
verification per
second with a
maximum of 5
consecutive SSH
sessions
supported by the
module; The
probability of
successfully
authenticating to
the module within
one minute
through random
attempts is
60*5/2^128 which
is less than
1/100,000
Table 11: Authentication Methods
The module employs (and enforces i.e. the method is required) role-based authentication
mechanisms.
4.2 Roles
Page 33 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Admin (Cryptographic
Officer)
Role CO Username and Password
Public key authentication -
RSA
Public key authentication -
ECDSA
Sensor Operator(s) Role User Username and Password
Public key authentication -
RSA
Public key authentication -
ECDSA
3rd Party SNMP Client(s) Role User Username, Privacy and
Authentication Key
Trellix IPS Manager
(Cryptographic Officer)
Role CO Digital Signature
Username, Privacy and
Authentication Key
Manager Initialization
Secret (i.e., Manager
"Shared Secret")
Unauthenticated Role User None
Table 12: Roles
The cryptographic module supports two distinct “User” roles (Sensor Operator(s) and 3rd Party
SNMP Client(s)) and two “Cryptographic Officer” roles (Trellix IPS Manager and Admin
(Cryptographic Officer)).
The following types of Sensor Operators can be configured on the module with differing levels of
access by the Admin (Cryptographic Officer) role: admin, maintainer, readonly, readwrite and
updater.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Show
Status/Show
version
Provides the
status of the
module,
usage
statistics, log
data, and
alerts,
Hardware
and
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
Sensor
and
Sensor
network
show; status;
show
mgmtport;
show
mgmtcfg;
show intfport
<port>; show
ssh config
Status
outputs
or
status of
invoked
service,
hardwar
e,
firmwar
KTS-1
KTS-2
KAS-1
KAS-2
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Administrator
Passwords: E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
Page 34 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Firmware
versions and
Module
Identifier
(show
command)
configura
tion
informati
on
printed
on CLI
e
versions
and
module
identifier
(show
comma
nd),
network
configur
ation
informat
ion
(show
comma
nd),
Approve
d mode
status
(status
comma
nd)
algorit
hms
TLS
all
algorit
hms
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Sensor
Operator(s)
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Page 35 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Trellix IPS
Manager
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
E
- TLS Session
Public Key : E
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): E
- TLS Manager
Public Key: E
- Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): E
Page 36 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Sensor
Operator
Management
Allows
Admin to
add/delete
Sensor
Operators,
set their
service
authorization
level, set
their session
timeout limit,
and unlock
them if
needed
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
'User
<userna
me> is
created
successf
ully' gets
printed
after
successf
ul
creation
of the
user post
which the
operator
is
prompted
to assign
a
passwor
d to the
created
user
The 'userlist'
command
displays the
existing
users and
their access
rights,
'adduser
<user-
name>'
command is
used to
create new
user,
'userrole
<user-
name>
<role>'
command is
used to
update an
exisiting
user; The
'deleteuser
<user-
name>'
command is
used to
delete a user
and
userpasswd
<username>
command is
to assign
password for
created user
same as
indicator
KTS-1
KTS-2
KAS-1
KAS-2
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
algorit
hms
TLS
all
algorit
hms
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Administrator
Passwords: E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Trellix IPS
Manager
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): E
- TLS Sensor
Page 37 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): E
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): E
- TLS Manager
Public Key: E
- TLS Session
Public Key : E
Network
Configuratio
n
Establish
network
settings for
the module
or set them
back to
default
values
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
status of
all ports
and
manage
ment
configura
tion
displayed
on CLI
show
mgmtport;
show
mgmtcfg; set
sensor ip
x.x.x.x(modu
le ip) y.y.y.y
(module
subnet
mask); set
sensor
gateway
x.x.x.x; set
scpserver ip
x.x.x.x
Same
as
indicator
KTS-1
KTS-2
KAS-1
KAS-2
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
algorit
hms
TLS
all
algorit
hms
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Administrator
Passwords: E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Page 38 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Sensor
Operator(s)
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Trellix IPS
Manager
(Cryptographic
Officer)
Page 39 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
E
- TLS Session
Public Key : E
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): E
- TLS Manager
Public Key: E
- Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): E
Administrativ
e
Configuratio
n
Other
various
services
provided for
admin,
private, and
support
levels
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
status of
all ports
and
manage
ment
configura
tion
displayed
on CLI
show
mgmtport;
show
mgmtcfg; set
sensor ip
x.x.x.x(modu
le ip) y.y.y.y
(module
subnet
mask); set
sensor
gateway
x.x.x.x; set
scpserver ip
x.x.x.x, set
manager ip
x.x.x.x
same as
indicator
KTS-1
KTS-2
KAS-1
KAS-2
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
algorit
hms
TLS
all
algorit
hms
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): W
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
Page 40 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- Administrator
Passwords: E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Sensor
Operator(s)
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
Page 41 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Trellix IPS
Manager
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
E
- TLS Session
Public Key : E
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): E
- TLS Manager
Public Key: E
- Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): E
Firmware
Update
Install an
external
firmware
image
through SCP
or USB
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
CLI
displayin
g the
string
loadimage
scp
"complete
firmware
path"
same as
indicator
KTS-1
KTS-2
KAS-1
KAS-2
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Proprietary
File Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
Page 42 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
'Applying
the
image...
Image
applied
successf
ully,
please
reboot
the
sensor'
algorit
hms
TLS
all
algorit
hms
by Manager
using the
Sensor public
key): W,E
- Trellix FW
Verification
key: W,E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Client): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Client): E
- SSH Client
Private Keys
(id_ecdsa)
(Sensor as
SSH Client) : E
- SSH Client
Public Key
(Sensor as
Client): E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Page 43 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- Administrator
Passwords: E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Sensor
Operator(s)
- Proprietary
File Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
by Manager
using the
Sensor public
key): W,E
- Trellix FW
Verification
key: W,E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Client): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Client): E
- SSH Client
Private Keys
(id_ecdsa)
Page 44 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
(Sensor as
SSH Client) : E
- SSH Client
Public Key
(Sensor as
Client): E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Trellix IPS
Manager
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Proprietary
File Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
by Manager
using the
Page 45 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Sensor public
key): W,E
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
E
- Trellix FW
Verification
key: W,E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): E
- TLS Manager
Public Key:
W,E
- TLS Session
Public Key : E
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): E
- Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): E
Install with
Manager
Configures
module for
use; This
step includes
establishing
trust
between the
module and
the
associated
management
station
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with,
the trust
establish
ed
between
sensor
and
manager
indicated
via the
following
status
Set sensor
sharedsecret
key
same as
indicator
KTS-1
KAS-1
Passw
ord
Hash
Entrop
y
Sourc
e
TLS
all
algorit
hms
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Proprietary
File Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
by Manager
using the
Sensor public
key): W,E
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
Page 46 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
'Trust
Establish
ed : yes
(Self
Signed
cert
support)'
after
entering
the
Manager
Initializati
on secret
and
checking
status via
'status'
comman
d
channel for
Manager): G,E
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
G,E
- TLS Session
Public Key :
G,E
- Entropy Input
String: G,E
- Seed for
RNG: G,E
- DRBG
Internal State -
V: G,E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): G,E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- Administrator
Passwords: E
- Manager
Page 47 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): W,E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- DRBG
Internal State -
Key : G,E
Sensor
Operator(s)
- Proprietary
File Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
by Manager
using the
Sensor public
key): W,E
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): G,E
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
G,E
- Entropy Input
String: G,E
- Seed for
RNG: G,E
- DRBG
Internal State -
V: G,E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Page 48 of 104
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Manager): G,E
- TLS Session
Public Key :
G,E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
E
- Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Page 49 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
- DRBG
Internal State -
Key : G,E
Install with
3rd Party
SNMP Client
Configures
module for
3rd Party
SNMPv3
use; This
step includes
establishing
trust
between the
module and
the
associated
3rd Party
SNMP
Client; Trust
is provided
by Manager
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
the user
list
indicated
on the
CLI
'NMS
User 1 =
<user
created>'
after
running
the
comman
d 'show
mgmtcfg'
The 3rd
party SNMP
users are
created
using the
IPS Manager
web
application
interface by
entering the
username,
entering
(and
confirming)
the
initialization
key and the
private key
same as
indicator
KTS-1
KAS-1
Passw
ord
Hash
TLS
all
algorit
hms
SNMP
v3
Trellix IPS
Manager
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Proprietary
File Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
by Manager
using the
Sensor public
key): W
- TLS Session
Public Key : E
- 3rd Party
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys: W,E
- Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): E
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): E
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): E
- TLS Manager
Public Key: E
Page 50 of 104
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Change
Passwords
Allows
Admin and
Sensor
Operators to
change their
associated
passwords;
Admin can
also
change/reset
Sensor
Operators
passwords
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
operator
asked to
enter the
new
passwor
d twice,
and
successf
ul
executio
n of
which
would
print
'Passwor
d
successf
ully
changed'
on
console
userpasswd
if Admin is
updating the
password for
a particular
operator,
passwd if a
Sensor User
(maintainer)
is doing it
same as
indicator
KTS-2
KAS-2
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
algorit
hms
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Administrator
Passwords: W
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
W
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Sensor
Operator(s)
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
Page 51 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
W
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Perform
zeroisation
Performs
zeroisation;
destroys all
plaintext
secrets
contained
within the
module; The
"resetconfig"
command is
used,
followed by a
reboot
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with,
Manager
communi
cation
channels
: Alert
channel,
log
channel
resetconfig same as
indicator
KTS-2
KAS-2
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
algorit
hms
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Administrator
Passwords: Z
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
Z
- Manager
Initialization
Page 52 of 104
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
and
authentic
ation
channel
go down
after
running
the
resetconf
ig
(zeroizati
on)
comman
d; Also,
the trust
establish
ment
between
sensor
and IPS
Manager
breaks
after
resetconf
ig
comman
d
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): Z
- Proprietary
File Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
by Manager
using the
Sensor public
key): Z
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): Z
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): Z
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Client): Z
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): Z
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
Z
- Seed for
RNG: Z
- DRBG
Internal State -
V: Z
- Entropy Input
String: Z
Page 53 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): Z
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): Z
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Client): Z
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): Z
- TLS Manager
Public Key: Z
- TLS Session
Public Key : Z
- 3rd Party
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys: Z
- Manager
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys: Z
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E,Z
- DRBG
Internal State -
Key : Z
Sensor
Operator(s)
- Administrator
Passwords: Z
- Sensor User
Passwords
Page 54 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
Z
- Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret"): Z
- Proprietary
File Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
by Manager
using the
Sensor public
key): Z
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): Z
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): Z
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Client): Z
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): Z
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
Z
- Seed for
Page 55 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
RNG: Z
- DRBG
Internal State -
Key : Z
- Entropy Input
String: Z
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): Z
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): Z
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Client): Z
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): Z
- TLS Manager
Public Key: Z
- TLS Session
Public Key : Z
- 3rd Party
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys: Z
- Manager
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys: Z
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E,Z
- DRBG
Internal State -
V: Z
Page 56 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Intrusion
Detection/Pr
evention
Management
Management
of intrusion
detection/pre
vention
policies and
configuration
s through
SNMPv3 and
TLS
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
display of
operation
al status
of the
port
including
any
packet
errors;
displays
the log
output
Can be
managed/mo
nitored via
the
Manager's
dashboard
same as
indicator
KTS-1
KAS-1
TLS
all
algorit
hms
SNMP
v3
Trellix IPS
Manager
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Proprietary
File Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
by Manager
using the
Sensor public
key): E
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): E
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): E
- TLS Session
Public Key : E
- TLS Manager
Public Key: E
- Manager
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys: E
3rd Party
SNMP
Client(s)
- 3rd Party
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys: E
Page 57 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Intrusion
Detection/Pr
evention
Monitoring
Limited
monitoring of
Intrusion
Detection/Pr
evention
configuration
, status, and
statistics
through
SNMPv3,
TLS 1.2 and
via show
commands
using the
console/SSH
connections
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
display of
operation
al status
of the
port
including
any
packet
errors;
displays
the log
output
show intfport
<port
range>;
show
malware
statistics,
etc.
same as
indicator
KTS-1
KTS-2
KAS-1
KAS-2
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
algorit
hms
TLS
all
algorit
hms
SNMP
v3
Trellix IPS
Manager
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): E
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): E
- TLS Manager
Public Key: E
- TLS Session
Public Key : E
- Manager
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys: E
3rd Party
SNMP
Client(s)
- 3rd Party
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys: E
Sensor
Operator(s)
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
Page 58 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Administrator
Passwords: E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
Page 59 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Enable/disab
le
SSH/Consol
e Access
Enables/disa
bles
SSH/Consol
e Access via
the CLI
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
combine
d with
the
display of
'sshd
disabled'
after
running
the sshd
disable
comman
d
sshd(enable|
disable)
same as
indicator
KTS-2
KAS-2
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
algorit
hms
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Administrator
Passwords: E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Page 60 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Sensor
Operator(s)
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Perform Self-
tests
On demand
execution of
self-tests via
rebooting the
module
Approve
d Mode
Indicator
Power-cycle The
module
reboots
and
prints
KTS-2
KAS-2
RSA
SigVer
1
Admin
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- Administrator
Passwords: E
Page 61 of 104
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
the
success
ful
completi
on of
each
self-test
in the
boot
logs
else
returns
the error
indicator
s as
follows:
Console
displays
'!!!
CRITIC
AL
FAILUR
E !!!
FIPS
140-3
POST
and
KAT...F
ailed
REBOO
TING IN
15
SECON
DS' in
case of
a self-
test
failure
(pre-
operatio
nal
firmwar
e
integrity
Passw
ord
Hash
SSH
all
algorit
hms
Self-
Tests
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Sensor
Operator(s)
- Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI):
E
- SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_EC
DSA_key)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Session
private Keys
Page 62 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Description Indicator Inputs Output
s
Secur
ity
Functi
ons
SSP Access
test
and/or
CAST)
(Sensor as
SSH Server): E
- SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server): E
- SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server): E
Trellix IPS
Manager
(Cryptographic
Officer)
- TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager): E
- TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager):
E
- TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager): E
- TLS Manager
Public Key:
W,E
- TLS Session
Public Key : E
Unauthenticate
d
Table 13: Approved Services
Page 63 of 104
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E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroizes the SSP.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not support any Non-Approved Services.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module supports loading of firmware (complete image replacement) from an external
source. The executable form of the module firmware is a pre-compiled binary image (in .tgz
form). The Crypto Officer role must be assumed to load an image and process of firmware
loading does not provide any unauthorised access to/permit unauthorised use of the module.
Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the
scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
4.6 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
The module supports self-initiated cryptographic output in the context of the TLS 1.2 protocol.
The internal actions performed by the module prior to allowing such output are:
1. Manager IP must be configured for TLS connection.
2. Shared Secret between Sensor and Manager must be set.
3. A check performed by the module to ensure the Shared Secret matches that of the Manager.
The activation status can be requested by running the "status" command on the module to verify
if the connection to the Manager (i.e. TLS peer) is active/up, if so, it serves as the indication of
the capability being active. The output on the CLI when trust between Manager and Sensor is
established is:
[Manager Communications]
Trust Established: yes (Self Signed cert support)
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module performs the firmware integrity check using an RSA 2048 signature verification with
the underlying SHA2-256 hash on the entire firmware image. The executable form of the
module firmware is a pre-compiled binary image (a .tgz file). The RSA 2048 bits key (a non-
SSP) used to perform the firmware integrity test is generated in Trellix’s secure lab and
embedded inside the firmware image and stored in plaintext on boot media upon installation of
Page 64 of 104
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the image. The key can be changed only by installing a new firmware image onto the module.
The key is not zeroised.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by rebooting the module.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module supports firmware loading from an external source and thus supports a limited
operational environment.
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
No restrictions apply to the configuration of the operational environment other than those
specified in Section 11.4.
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The cryptographic module has a multi-chip standalone embodiment, and the enclosure is of
production grade and has standard passivation applied to it. There are no ventilation holes,
gaps, slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any
component contained within the cryptographic boundary. The module is designed to meet
Physical Security requirements at Level 1.
8 Non-Invasive Security
8.1 Mitigation Techniques
The module does not support any non-invasive security mitigations.
Page 65 of 104
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence
Type
via SHA2-512 hash in Linux shadow
file
"Admin" and "user" password stored
in hashed form using SHA2-512 in
the Linux shadow file
Static
via SHA2-512 hash in shell.conf file "support" and "private" passwords
stored in hashed form using SHA2-
512 in the shell.conf file
Static
Encrypted on Storage Media (Internal
SSD)
Stored in encrypted form on the
Internal SSD
Static
Encrypted using a set of RSA
private/public key pair and stored in
Storage Media (internal SSD)
Stored in encrypted form on the
Internal SSD using an RSA
private/public key pair
Static
Stored temporarily in RAM in plaintext Stored temporarily in RAM in plaintext Dynamic
Plaintext in EEPROM Stored in EEPROM in plaintext Static
Plaintext on internal Storage Media
(SSD)
Stored on internal Storage Media
(SSD) in plaintext
Static
Plaintext on boot media Used to store the Trellix FW
Verification key
Static
Table 14: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Received
from
Manager as
a plaintext
key through
TLS 1.2
channel
Manager Stored
temporarily
in RAM in
plaintext
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS-1
Entered by
the operator
through CLI
over SSH
External
endpoint
via SHA2-
512 hash in
shell.conf
file
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS-2
Entered by
the operator
through CLI
over SSH-2
External
endpoint
via SHA2-
512 hash in
Linux
shadow file
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS-2
Page 66 of 104
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Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Entered by
the operator
through CLI
over SSH -3
External
endpoint
Stored
temporarily
in RAM in
plaintext
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS-2
Entered by
the operator
through CLI
via direct
connection to
serial
console port
External
endpoint
via SHA2-
512 hash in
shell.conf
file
Plaintext Manual Direct
Entered by
the operator
through CLI
via direct
connection to
serial
console port-
2
External
endpoint
via SHA2-
512 hash in
Linux
shadow file
Plaintext Manual Direct
Entered by
the operator
through CLI
via direct
connection to
serial
console port-
3
External
endpoint
Stored
temporarily
in RAM in
plaintext
Plaintext Manual Direct
Never output N/A N/A Plaintext N/A N/A
Never
entered
N/A N/A Plaintext N/A N/A
Entered at
manufacture
By Trellix Plaintext
on internal
Storage
Media
(SSD)
Plaintext N/A N/A
Entered over
SCP
Host Plaintext
on internal
Storage
Media
(SSD)
Plaintext Automated Electronic KTS-2
Output
During SSH
handshake
Stored
temporarily
in RAM in
plaintext
External
endpoint
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Page 67 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Output
During SSH
handshake -2
Plaintext
on internal
Storage
Media
(SSD)
External
endpoint
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Output during
SSH
handshake -3
Plaintext in
EEPROM
External
endpoint
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Output during
initial TLS
handshake
Stored
temporarily
in RAM in
plaintext
External
endpoint
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Entered
during SSH
handshake
External
endpoint
Stored
temporarily
in RAM in
plaintext
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Entered
during SSH
handshake -
2
External
endpoint
Plaintext
on internal
Storage
Media
(SSD)
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Entered
during initial
TLS
handshake
External
endpoint
Stored
temporarily
in RAM in
plaintext
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Entered
during initial
TLS
handshake -2
External
endpoint
Plaintext
on internal
Storage
Media
(SSD)
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Entered over
TLS 1.2
Manager Encrypted
on Storage
Media
(Internal
SSD)
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS-1
Entered RSA
(PKCS1.5
key wrapped,
no security
claimed
hence
considered
plaintext)
Manager Stored
temporarily
in RAM in
plaintext
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods
Page 68 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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The module supports MD/DE for SSPs input via a direct connection to the CLI of the module
and AD/EE for SSPs established by/entered into/output from the module over TLS 1.2/SSH
protocols.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Zeroised from
Storage Media
(internal SSD) on
resetconfig
Zeroised from Storage Media (internal
SSD) on resetconfig
Method used to
zeroize
persistently
stored SSPs
Operator
initiated
Zeroised from
Storage Media
(internal SSD) on
rescue
Zeroised from Storage Media (internal
SSD) on rescue
Method used to
zeroize
persistently
stored SSPs
Operator
initiated
Zeroised from
RAM on each
reboot
Zeroised from RAM on each reboot Method used to
zeroize
temporarily
stored SSPs
Operator
initiated
Zeroised by
OpenSSH library
upon every
SCP/SSH session
closure
Zeroization of temporary SSPs on
session termination
Method used to
zeroize
temporarily
stored SSPs
Module
initiated
Zeroised from
EEPROM on
resetconfig or
rescue
Zeroised from EEPROM on resetconfig
or rescue
Method used to
zeroize
persistently
stored SSPs
Operator
initiated
Zeroised as part of
OpenSSL
scrubbing
Zeroised in the context of internal
function calls
Method used to
zeroize
temporarily
stored SSPs
Module
initiated
Zeroised on de-
install
Manager is de-installed from the module Method used to
zeroize
persistently
stored SSPs
Operator
initiated
Zeroisation of
passwords
Zeroisation of individual user passwords
(SHA2-512 hash) from the Linux shadow
file when the cli command "deleteuser" is
run for that user, also, all the newly
created users and their passwords are
zeroised (removed) during the
resetconfig
Method used to
zeroize
persistently
stored SSPs
Operator
initiated
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods
Page 69 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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9.4 SSPs
Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
Administrator
Passwords
Authentic
ation of
the
"admin"
role
through
console
and SSH
login;
Extended
services
are given
to the
"admin"
role by
using the
"support"
and
"private"
password
; This
extended
service of
"support"
and
"private"
are
configura
ble via
CLI
(privatem
ode
enable|di
sable)
and are
enabled
by default
15 char - The fifteen
(15) character
minimum is enforced
by the module. The
probability that a
random attempt will
succeed or a false
acceptance will
occur is
1/{(10^2)*(26^4)*(31
^2)*(93^7)} which is
less than
1/1,000,000
Password
- CSP
SHA2-
512
(A335
0)
Sensor User
Passwords
(Users created
Authentic
ation of
"user"
accounts
15 char - The fifteen
(15) character
minimum is enforced
by the module. The
Password
- CSP
SHA2-
512
(A335
0)
Page 70 of 104
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
by Admin using
"adduser" CLI)
through
console
and SSH
login
probability that a
random attempt will
succeed or a false
acceptance will
occur is
1/{(10^2)*(26^4)*(31
^2)*(93^7)} which is
less than
1/1,000,000
3rd Party
SNMP Client
Privacy and
Authentication
Keys
Authentic
ation of
the 3rd
Party
SNMP
role
User Name: Min of 8
chars and Max of 31
chars;
Authentication Key:
Min of 8 chars and
Max of 15 chars;
Private Key: Min of 8
chars and Max of 15
chars - The privacy
key and
authentication key
each make an
alphanumeric string
of a minimum of
eight(8) to maximum
fifteen (15)
characters chosen
from the set of sixty-
two (62) numbers,
lower case letters,
and upper case
letters. The
probability that a
random attempt will
succeed or a false
acceptance will
occur is 1/62^8,
which is less than
1/1,000,000
Privacy
and
Authentic
ation keys
- CSP
KTS-1
Manager SNMP
Client Privacy
and
Authentication
Keys
Authentic
ation of
the
Manager
SNMP
role
User Name: Fixed
as "EMS" for
primary manager
and "EMS1" for
secondary manager;
Authentication Key:
Privacy
and
Authentic
ation keys
- CSP
KTS-1
Page 71 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
Min of 8 chars and
Max of 16 chars;
Private Key: Min of 8
chars and Max of 16
chars - The privacy
key and
authentication key
each make an
alphanumeric string
of a minimum of
eight(8) to maximum
sixteen (16)
characters chosen
from the set of sixty-
two (62) numbers,
lower case letters,
and upper case
letters. The
probability that a
random attempt will
succeed or a false
acceptance will
occur is 1/62^8,
which is less than
1/1,000,000
Manager
Initialization
Secret (i.e.,
Manager
"Shared
Secret")
Mutual
authentic
ation
paramete
r for the
sensor
and IPS
Manager
during
initializati
on. Note:
The
Manual
Key Entry
Test is
required.
This is
already
being
done by
Min:8 and Max:25
char password - The
module enforces 8-
characters(at
minimum) chosen
from the 96 human
readable ASCII
characters. The
maximum length is
25-characters. Thus,
the probability of a
successful random
attempt is 1/(96^8),
which is less than
1/1 million
Shared
Secret -
CSP
Page 72 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
forcing
the user
to enter
the key
twice
Proprietary File
Transfer
Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV
are encrypted
by Manager
using the
Sensor public
key)
Used to
encrypt
data
packets
across
the
Proprietar
y File
transfer
channel
Uses AES-128 CFB
encryption - 128 bits
Session
key - CSP
AES-
CFB1
28
(A335
0)
SSH Host
Private Keys
(ssh_host_ECD
SA_key)
(Sensor as SSH
Server)
Authentic
ation of
sensor to
remote
terminal
for CLI
access
ECDSA P-256 -
ECDSA P-256 with
key strength of 128
bits
Host
Private
key - CSP
ECDS
A
SigGe
n
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as SSH
Server)
Set of
ephemera
l EC
Diffie-
Hellman
P-256,
AES
128/256
bit, and
HMAC
(SHA2-
256/512)
keys
created
for each
SSH
session
KAS-ECC-SSC P-
256, AES 128, 256
bits and HMAC
(SHA2-256/512 bit) -
KAS-ECC-SSC P-
256 with key
strength of 128, bits,
AES 128, 256 bits
with key strength
128, 256 bist and
HMAC (SHA2-
256/512 bit) with key
strengths 128, 256
bits
Session
Private
key - CSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
KAS-2 AES-
ECB
(A335
0)
AES-
GCM
(A335
0)
HMAC
-
SHA2-
256
(A335
0)
HMAC
-
SHA2-
512
(A335
0)
KAS-
Page 73 of 104
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
ECC-
SSC
Sp800
-56Ar3
(A335
0)
KDF
SSH
(A335
1)
SSH Client
Private Keys
(id_ecdsa)
(Sensor as SSH
Client)
Authentic
ation of
sensor to
remote
server for
SCP
communi
cation
ECDSA P-256 -
ECDSA P-256 with
key strength of 128,
bits,
Client
Private
key - CSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
SigGe
n
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as SSH
Client)
Set of
ephemera
l EC
Diffie-
Hellman
P-256,
AES
128/256
bit, and
HMAC
(SHA-
256/512)
keys
created
for each
SCP
session
KAS-ECC-SSC P-
256, AES 128, 256
bits and HMAC
(SHA2-256/512 bit) -
KAS-ECC-SSC P-
256 with key
strength of 128, bits,
AES 128, 256 bits
with key strength
128, 256 bist and
HMAC (SHA2-
256/512 bit) with key
strengths 128, 256
bits
Session
Private
Keys and
Authentic
ation -
CSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
KAS-2 AES-
ECB
(A335
0)
AES-
GCM
(A335
0)
HMAC
-
SHA2-
256
(A335
0)
HMAC
-
SHA2-
512
(A335
0)
KAS-
Page 74 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
ECC-
SSC
Sp800
-56Ar3
(A335
0)
KDF
SSH
(A335
1)
TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager)
RSA
2048-bit
key used
for
authentic
ation of
the
sensor to
Manager
2048 - RSA 2048 bit
key with 112 bits of
key strength
Authentic
ation -
CSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
RSA
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
RSA
SigGe
n
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
TLS Session
private Keys
(for Manager)
Set of
ephemera
l EC Diffie
Hellman
P-256, P-
384 or P-
521, AES
128 bit
and
HMAC
(SHA2-
256/512
bit) keys
created
for each
TLS
session
with the
Manager
KAS-ECC-SSC P-
256, P-384 or P-
521, AES 128 bit
with and HMAC
(SHA2-256/512 bit) -
KAS-ECC-SSC P-
256, P-384 or P-521
with key strength of
128, 192, 256 bits,
AES 128 bit with key
strength 128 bit and
HMAC (SHA2-
256/512 bit) with key
strengths 128, 256
bits
Private
Keys and
Aunthenti
cation -
CSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
KAS-1 AES-
ECB
(A335
0)
AES-
GCM
(A335
0)
HMAC
-
SHA2-
256
(A335
0)
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800
-56Ar3
(A335
0)
TLS
Page 75 of 104
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
v1.2
KDF
RFC7
627
(A335
2)
Seed for RNG Seed
created
by
ENT(NP)
and used
to seed
the Block
Cipher
(CTR)
DRBG;
The
Nonce is
128 bits
and the
Entropy
Input is
256 bits
for a total
seed size
of 384
bits
384 bits - 384 bits DRBG
seed -
CSP
Entrop
y
Source
Count
er
DRBG
(A335
0)
DRBG Internal
State - V
V used by
the
DRBG to
generate
pseudo-
random
numbers
128 bits - 128 bits DRBG
internal
state -
CSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
Count
er
DRBG
(A335
0)
DRBG Internal
State - Key
Key used
by the
DRBG to
generate
pseudo-
random
numbers
256 bits - 256 bits DRBG
internal
state
value -
CSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
Count
er
DRBG
(A335
0)
Entropy Input
String
256-bit
output
string
256 bits - 256 bits Entropy
Input -
CSP
Entrop
y
Source
Count
er
DRBG
Page 76 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
from the
Jitter
Entropy
library
(A335
0)
SSH Host
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server)
ECDSA
P-256-bit
key used
to
authentic
ate the
sensor to
the
remote
client
during
SSH
P-256 - P-256 with
key strength 128 bits
Authentic
ation by
ECDSA -
PSP
ECDS
A
SigVer
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
SSH Remote
Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Server)
ECDSA
P-256-bit
or RSA
mod
2048-bit
key used
to
authentic
ate the
remote
client to
the
sensor
during
SSH
ECDSA P-256; RSA
mod 2048 - 256 bits
- ECDSA P-256 with
key strength 128
bits; RSA mod 2048
with key strength
112 bits
Authentic
ation
using
ECDSA,
RSA -
PSP -
PSP
ECDS
A
SigVer
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Server)
EC Diffie-
Hellman
P-256-bit
session
key
created
for each
SSH
session
P-256 - P-256 with
key strength 128 bits
Public
Key -
PSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800
-56Ar3
(A335
0)
KDF
SSH
(A335
1)
Page 77 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
SSH Client
Public Key
(Sensor as
Client)
ECDSA
P-256-bit
key used
to
authentic
ate the
sensor to
the
remote
server
during
SCP
P-256 - P-256 with
key strength 128 bits
Authentic
ation by
ECDSA -
PSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
SigVer
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
SSH Session
Public Key
(Sensor as
Client)
EC Diffie-
Hellman
P-256-bit
session
key
created
for each
SCP
session
P-256 - P-256 with
key strength 128 bits
Public
Key for
SCP
session -
PSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800
-56Ar3
(A335
0)
KDF
SSH
(A335
1)
TLS Sensor
Public Key (for
Manager)
RSA
2048-bit
key used
to
authentic
ate the
sensor to
Manager
during
TLS
connectio
ns
2048 - RSA 2048 bit
key with 112 bits of
key strength
Authentic
ation by
RSA -
PSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
RSA
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
TLS Manager
Public Key
RSA
2048-bit
key used
to
authentic
ate
2048 - RSA 2048 bit
key with 112 bits of
key strength
Authentic
ation by
RSA -
PSP
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
Page 78 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
Manager
to sensor
during
TLS
connectio
ns
TLS Session
Public Key
EC Diffie-
Hellman
P-256, P-
384 or P-
521-bit
session
key
created
for each
TLS
session
KAS-ECC-SSC P-
256, P-384 or P-521
- KAS-ECC-SSC P-
256, P-384 or P-521
with key strength of
128, 192, 256 bits
Public
Key for
TLS
session -
PSP
Counte
r
DRBG
(A3350
)
ECDS
A
KeyGe
n
(FIPS1
86-5)
(A3350
)
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800
-56Ar3
(A335
0)
TLS
v1.2
KDF
RFC7
627
(A335
2)
Trellix FW
Verification key
RSA
2048 bits
SHA2-
256
public key
used to
authentic
ate
firmware
images
loaded
into the
module.
Generate
d in
Trellix
secure
lab and
embedde
d inside
the
firmware
image
and
2048 bits - RSA
2048 bit key with
112 bits of key
strength
FW
verificatio
n key -
Neither
SHA2-
256
(A335
3)
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
3)
Page 79 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
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Name Descripti
on
Size - Strength Type -
Category
Gener
ated
By
Establi
shed
By
Used
By
stored in
plaintext
on boot
media
upon
installatio
n of the
image.
The key
can be
changed
only by
installing
a new
firmware
image
onto the
module
SSH Remote
Client Public
Key
Authentication
Key (Sensor as
Server)
ECDSA/R
SA public
key used
in the
context of
public key
authentic
ation
P-256 for ECDSA,
2048 bits for RSA -
128 bits for ECDSA,
112 bits for RSA
Public key
- PSP
ECDS
A
SigVer
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS
186-5)
(A335
0)
Table 17: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Administrator
Passwords
Entered
by the
operator
through
CLI over
SSH
Entered
by the
via SHA2-512
hash in Linux
shadow
file:Encrypted
via SHA2-512
hash in
shell.conf
file:Encrypted
N/A N/A
Page 80 of 104
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
operator
through
CLI over
SSH-2
Entered
by the
operator
through
CLI via
direct
connectio
n to serial
console
port
Entered
by the
operator
through
CLI via
direct
connectio
n to serial
console
port-2
Never
output
Sensor User
Passwords (Users
created by Admin
using "adduser"
CLI)
Entered
by the
operator
through
CLI over
SSH
Entered
by the
operator
through
CLI over
SSH-2
Entered
by the
operator
through
CLI via
direct
connectio
via SHA2-512
hash in Linux
shadow
file:Obfuscated
via SHA2-512
hash in
shell.conf
file:Obfuscated
N/A Zeroisati
on of
passwor
ds
Page 81 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
n to serial
console
port
Entered
by the
operator
through
CLI via
direct
connectio
n to serial
console
port-2
Never
output
3rd Party SNMP
Client Privacy and
Authentication
Keys
Never
output
Entered
over TLS
1.2
Entered
RSA
(PKCS1.
5 key
wrapped,
no
security
claimed
hence
considere
d
plaintext)
Encrypted on
Storage Media
(Internal
SSD):Encrypte
d
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM till
reboot;
Stored
in
internal
SSD
only
until
before
resetcon
fig and
rescue
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
rescue
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Manager SNMP
Client Privacy and
Authentication
Keys
Received
from
Manager
as a
plaintext
key
through
TLS 1.2
channel
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM till
reboot
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Page 82 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
Never
output
Manager
Initialization Secret
(i.e., Manager
"Shared Secret")
Entered
by the
operator
through
CLI over
SSH -3
Entered
by the
operator
through
CLI via
direct
connectio
n to serial
console
port-3
Never
output
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM till
reboot
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Proprietary File
Transfer Channel
Session Key
(Secret and IV are
encrypted by
Manager using the
Sensor public key)
Never
output
Entered
RSA
(PKCS1.
5 key
wrapped,
no
security
claimed
hence
considere
d
plaintext)
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM till
reboot
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
SSH Host Private
Keys
(ssh_host_ECDSA
_key) (Sensor as
SSH Server)
Never
output
Entered
at
manufact
ure
Plaintext on
internal
Storage Media
(SSD):Plaintex
t
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM till
reboot.
Stored
in
internal
SSD
only
until
before
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
from
SSH Host Public
Key (Sensor as
Server):Paired
With
Page 83 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
resetcon
fig and
rescue.
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
rescue
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as SSH
Server)
Never
output
Never
entered
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM till
reboot
and till
the
SCP/SS
H
session
closure.
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
by
OpenSS
H library
upon
every
SCP/SS
H
session
closure
SSH Client Private
Keys (id_ecdsa)
(Sensor as SSH
Client)
Never
output
Never
entered
Encrypted
using a set of
RSA
private/public
key pair and
stored in
Storage Media
(internal
SSD):Encrypte
d
Stored
in
internal
SSD
only
until
before
resetcon
fig and
rescue.
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
rescue
SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as SSH
Client)
Never
output
Never
entered
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
stored in
RAM till
reboot
and till
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
SSH Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Client):Paired With
Page 84 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
plaintext:Plaint
ext
the
SCP/SS
H
session
closure.
reboot
Zeroised
by
OpenSS
H library
upon
every
SCP/SS
H
session
closure
TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager)
Never
output
Never
entered
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
Plaintext on
internal
Storage Media
(SSD):Plaintex
t
Stored
in
internal
SSD till
resetcon
fig or
rescue;
and
stored in
RAM till
reboot
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
rescue
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
TLS Sensor Public
Key (for
Manager):Paired
With
TLS Session
private Keys (for
Manager)
Never
output
Never
entered
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM
until
before
de-
install or
reboot;
also
zeroised
as part
of
OpenSS
L
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
as part of
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g
Zeroised
TLS Session
Public Key :Paired
With
Page 85 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
scrubbin
g
on de-
install
Seed for RNG Never
output
Never
entered
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored
until
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g and
reboot
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
as part of
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g
Entropy Input
String:Derived
From
DRBG Internal
State - V
Never
output
Never
entered
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored
until
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g and
reboot
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
as part of
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g
Seed for
RNG:Derived From
DRBG Internal
State - Key :Used
With
DRBG Internal
State - Key
Never
output
Never
entered
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored
until
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g and
reboot
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
as part of
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g
Seed for
RNG:Derived From
DRBG Internal
State - V:Used
With
Entropy Input
String
Never
output
Never
entered
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored
until
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g and
reboot
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
as part of
OpenSS
L
Seed for
RNG:Used to
derive RNG seed
Page 86 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
scrubbin
g
SSH Host Public
Key (Sensor as
Server)
Entered
at
manufact
ure
Output
During
SSH
handshak
e
Output
During
SSH
handshak
e -2
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
Plaintext on
internal
Storage Media
(SSD):Plaintex
t
stored in
RAM till
reboot.
Stored
in
internal
SSD
only
until
before
resetcon
fig and
rescue.
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
rescue
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
SSH Host Private
Keys
(ssh_host_ECDSA
_key) (Sensor as
SSH
Server):Paired
With
SSH Remote
Client Public Key
(Sensor as Server)
Never
output
Entered
during
SSH
handshak
e
Entered
during
SSH
handshak
e - 2
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
Plaintext on
internal
Storage Media
(SSD):Plaintex
t
stored in
RAM till
reboot.
Stored
in
internal
SSD
only
until
before
resetcon
fig and
rescue.
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
rescue
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Page 87 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
SSH Session
Public Key (Sensor
as Server)
Never
entered
Output
During
SSH
handshak
e
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM till
reboot
and until
SCP/SS
H
session
closure
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
by
OpenSS
H library
upon
every
SCP/SS
H
session
closure
SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as SSH
Server):Paired
With
SSH Client Public
Key (Sensor as
Client)
Output
During
SSH
handshak
e
Output
during
SSH
handshak
e -3
Plaintext in
EEPROM:Plai
ntext
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
Stored
in
EEPRO
M till
resetcon
fig or
rescue;
and
stored in
RAM till
reboot
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
from
EEPRO
M on
resetconf
ig or
rescue
SSH Client Private
Keys (id_ecdsa)
(Sensor as SSH
Client) :Paired With
SSH Session
Public Key (Sensor
as Client)
Never
entered
Output
During
SSH
handshak
e
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM till
reboot
and until
SCP/SS
H
session
closure
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
by
OpenSS
H library
upon
every
SCP/SS
H
SSH Session
private Keys
(Sensor as SSH
Client):Paired With
Page 88 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
session
closure
TLS Sensor Public
Key (for Manager)
Never
entered
Output
during
initial TLS
handshak
e
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
Plaintext on
internal
Storage Media
(SSD):Plaintex
t
stored in
RAM
until de-
install or
reboot.
Stored
in
internal
SSD
only
until
before
resetcon
fig and
rescue
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
rescue
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
on de-
install
TLS Sensor
Private Key
(alert/sysEvent
channel for
Manager):Paired
With
TLS Manager
Public Key
Never
output
Entered
during
initial TLS
handshak
e
Entered
during
initial TLS
handshak
e -2
Plaintext on
internal
Storage Media
(SSD):Plaintex
t
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM
until de-
install or
reboot.
Stored
in
internal
SSD
only
until
before
resetcon
fig and
rescue
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
rescue
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
Page 89 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
reboot
Zeroised
on de-
install
TLS Session
Public Key
Never
entered
Output
during
initial TLS
handshak
e
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM
until
before
de-
install or
reboot;
also
zeroised
as part
of
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
reboot
Zeroised
as part of
OpenSS
L
scrubbin
g
Zeroised
on de-
install
TLS Session
private Keys (for
Manager):Paired
With
Trellix FW
Verification key
Never
output
Entered
at
manufact
ure
Plaintext on
boot
media:Plaintex
t
N/A N/A
SSH Remote
Client Public Key
Authentication Key
(Sensor as Server)
Never
output
Entered
over SCP
Plaintext on
internal
Storage Media
(SSD):Plaintex
t
Stored
temporarily in
RAM in
plaintext:Plaint
ext
stored in
RAM
until de-
install or
reboot.
Stored
in
internal
SSD
only
until
before
resetcon
fig and
rescue
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
resetconf
ig
Zeroised
from
Storage
Media
(internal
SSD) on
rescue
Zeroised
from
RAM on
each
Page 90 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizati
on
Related SSPs
reboot
Zeroised
on de-
install
Table 18: SSP Table 2
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A3353)
RSA mod 2048
bits (Cert.
A3353)
signature
verification
using SHA2-256
(Cert. A3353)
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Console displays 'The
signature verification passed
for <image file name>' if
firmware integrity check
passes; If integrity test fails
then the CLI displays the
following error message:
'Software integrity test failed -
use netboot to recover.
System will reboot in 5
seconds ...'
Verify
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
A Known Answer Test (KAT) for the RSA SigVer mod 2048 SHA2-256 algorithm used in the
integrity test is performed during boot prior to the execution of the firmware integrity test in
accordance with the FIPS 140-3 IG 10.2.A.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
AES-ECB
(A3350) -
Encrypt
Key
size:12
8 bits
with
key
strengt
h: 128
bits
KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'AES
encryption/decryption...
successful when the
self-test passes
Encrypt All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
Page 91 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
AES-ECB
(A3350) -
Decrypt
Key
size:12
8 bits
with
key
strengt
h: 128
bits
KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'AES
encryption/decryption...
successful when the
self-test passes
Decrypt All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
AES-GCM
(A3350) -
Encrypt
Key
size:12
8 bits
with
key
strengt
h: 128
bits
KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'AES-
GCM
encryption/decryption...
successful' when the
self-test passes
Encrypt All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
Page 92 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
AES-GCM
(A3350) -
Decrypt
Key
size:12
8 bits
with
key
strengt
h: 128
bits
KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'AES-
GCM
encryption/decryption...
successful' when the
self-test passes
Decrypt All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A3350)
Modulu
s: 2048
bits
PCT PCT Console displays 'RSA
key generation and
encryption/decryption...
successful' when the
self-test passes
Key
Generatio
n
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A3350)
Type:
PKCS
1.5;
Modulu
s:
2048;
Hash
Algorith
m:
KAT CAS
T
Console displays
'Signature RSA test
started Signature RSA
test OK' when the self-
test passes
Sign
Generatio
n
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
Page 93 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
SHA2-
256
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A3350)
Type:
PKCS
1.5;
Modulu
s:
2048;
Hash
Algorith
m:
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Console displays
'Signature RSA test
started Signature RSA
test OK' when the self-
test passes
SIgn
Verificatio
n
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
SHA-1 (A3350) SHA-1 KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'SHA-
1 hash...successful'
when the self-test
passes
Message
Digest
Generatio
n
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
SHA2-256
(A3350)
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'SHA-
256 hash...successful'
Message
Digest
All
module
CASTs
Page 94 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
when the self-test
passes
Generatio
n
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
SHA2-512
(A3350)
SHA2-
512
KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'SHA-
512 hash...successful'
when the self-test
passes
Message
Digest
Generatio
n
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
Counter DRBG
(A3350)
AES-
256
with
key
strengt
h: 256
bits
KAT CAS
T
Console displays
'DRBG`AES-256-CTR
DF test started; DRBG
AES-256-CTR DF test
OK; DRBG AES-256-
CTR test started;
DRBG AES-256-CTR
test OK' when self-tests
pass
Generate,
Reseed,
Instantiat
e
functions
per NIST
SP 800-
90Ar1
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
Page 95 of 104
Copyright Musarubra US LLC, 2024 Version 1.0
Musarubra US LLC Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
by an
operator
on
demand
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A3350)
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Console displays
'HMAC-SHA-256
hash...successful' when
self-test passes
Message
Authentic
ation
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A3350)
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
KAT CAS
T
Console displays
'HMAC-SHA-512
hash...successful' when
self-test passes
Message
Authentic
ation
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627
(A3352)
TLS
1.2
KDF
(SHA2-
384)
KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'SP
800-135 Application-
Specific KDF-TLS 1.2
with EMS SHA-384
test...succeeded.' when
self-test passes
Key
Derivatio
n
Function
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
Page 96 of 104
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
KDF SSH
(A3351)
SSH
KDF
(SHA2-
256)
KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'SP
800-135 Application-
Specific KDF-SSH
SHA-256
test...succeeded.' when
self-test passes
Key
Derivatio
n
Function
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A3350)
KAS-
SSC
(SP800
-
56Arev
3) IG
D.F
Scenari
o 2
path (2)
; P-
256
with
key
strengt
KAT CAS
T
Console displays
'ECDH ID=713 test
started ECDH ID=713
test OK' when self-test
passes
Key
Agreeme
nt
(Shared
Secret
Computat
ion)
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
Page 97 of 104
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
h: 128
bits
on
demand
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A3350) PCT -
Signature
generation/verif
ication
Curve:
P-256
PCT PCT Console displays
'ECDSA KAT sign &
verify passed' if self-test
passes
Signature
Generatio
n and
KAS-
ECC-
SSC Key
Agreeme
nt
All self
tests
(includin
g PCTs)
can be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
by
rebootin
g the
module
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A3350)
Curve:
P-256
KAT CAS
T
Console displays
'ECDSA Test OK' if the
test passes
Signature
Generatio
n
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A3350)
Curve:
P-256
KAT CAS
T
Console displays
'ECDSA Test OK' if the
test passes
Signature
Verificatio
n
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
Page 98 of 104
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
NIST SP 800-
90B Entropy
Source
Adaptive
Proportion Test
(APT)
N/A Adaptiv
e
Proport
ion
Test
(APT)
CAS
T
1 N/A Run at
startup
and
continuo
usly
under
the
normal
operatin
g
condition
s, can be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
NIST SP 800-
90B Entropy
Source
Repetition
Count Test
(RCT)
N/A Repetiti
on
Count
Test
(RCT)
CAS
T
1 N/A Run at
startup
and
continuo
usly
under
the
normal
operatin
g
condition
s, can be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A3353)
Type:
PKCS
1.5;
Modulu
KAT CAS
T
Console displays
'PKCS#1 sig. verify:
RSA-SHA2 hash verify.
RSA SHA2 key verify
Signature
Verificatio
n
All
module
CASTs
are run
Page 99 of 104
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
s:
2048;
Hash
Algorith
m:
SHA2-
256
passed' if the self-test
passes
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
SHA2-256
(A3353)
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Console displays 'SHA-
256 self test #1:`self
test passed SHA-256
self test #2: self test
passed SHA-256 self
test #3: self test passed'
if self-tests pass
Message
Digest
Generatio
n
All
module
CASTs
are run
automati
cally
during
boot by
the
module
and can
be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
Firmware Load
Test
Modulu
s:
2048;
Hash
Algorith
m:
SHA2-
256
Signatu
re
Verifica
tion
SW/
FW
Load
Successful completion
indicated by return of
the command prompt to
the operator
Signature
Verificatio
n
Can be
initiated
by an
operator
on
demand
by
loading
firmware
onto the
module
Manual entry
test
Duplica
te entry
test
Duplica
te entry
test
Man
ual
Entry
Successful completion
indicated by return of
N/A Can be
initiated
by an
Page 100 of 104
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Proper
ties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditio
ns
the command prompt to
the operator
operator
on
demand
by
configuri
ng
passwor
ds or the
Manager
Initializati
on
Secret
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A3353)
KAT SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually, via
reboot
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-ECB (A3350) -
Encrypt
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-ECB (A3350) -
Decrypt
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-GCM (A3350) -
Encrypt
KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-GCM (A3350) -
Decrypt
KAT CAST On demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5) (A3350)
PCT PCT On demand Manually
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5) (A3350)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5) (A3350)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA-1 (A3350) KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A3350) KAT CAST On demand Manually
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
SHA2-512 (A3350) KAT CAST On demand Manually
Counter DRBG
(A3350)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A3350)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512
(A3350)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (A3352)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
KDF SSH (A3351) KAT CAST On demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3 (A3350)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5) (A3350)
PCT - Signature
generation/verification
PCT PCT On demand Manually
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5) (A3350)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5) (A3350)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
NIST SP 800-90B
Entropy Source
Adaptive Proportion
Test (APT)
Adaptive
Proportion Test
(APT)
CAST On demand Manually
NIST SP 800-90B
Entropy Source
Repetition Count Test
(RCT)
Repetition
Count Test
(RCT)
CAST On demand Manually
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5) (A3353)
KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A3353) KAT CAST On demand Manually
Firmware Load Test Signature
Verification
SW/FW Load On demand Manually
Manual entry test Duplicate entry
test
Manual Entry On demand Manually
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Page 102 of 104
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Hard
Error
State
In the case of
one or more
failed
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self
Tests, a pre-
operational
firmware integrity
test failure, or a
pairwise-
consistency test
failure, the
module enters
the hard error
state, and
reboots
continually
Cryptographic
Algorithm Self
Test failure
Pre-
operational
Firmware
Integrity Test
failure
Pairwise
Consistency
Test failure
Reinitialize
the module
via
reinstallation
of the
firmware
image
Console displays '!!! CRITICAL
FAILURE !!! FIPS 140-
3 POST and KAT...Failed
REBOOTING IN 15 SECONDS'
in case of a self-test failure (pre-
operational firmware integrity
test and/or CAST) ; The console
displays "cannot
generateSensorCertAndKey in
install" in case of a pairwise
consistency test failure
Soft
Error
State
In case of a
firmware load
test or manual
entry test failure,
the module
enters a soft
error state
Firmware load
test failure
Manual entry
test failure
The module
rejects the
load/entered
values and
continues
normal
operation
The following message is
printed on the CLI: "Load Image
with SCP Failed." for a firmware
load test and "the two entries do
not match" for a manual entry
test
Table 23: Error States
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The pre-operational firmware integrity test and all conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests
can be initiated by an operator on demand by rebooting the module. Pairwise consistency tests
can be initiated by performing SSP generation. The manual entry test can be initiated by
performing manual entry of the Manager Initialization Secret, whereas the firmware load test
can be initiated on demand by loading firmware from an external source.
10.6 Additional Information
The pre-operational firmware integrity test and all Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CAST) are
performed by the module during its boot process prior to operation in the Approved mode. Data
output is inhibited during self-tests and error states. All self-tests performed at boot are run
before data output ports are initialized.
Page 103 of 104
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The operator, i.e. Crypto Officer, shall load the validated firmware to enable the Approved mode
of operation. The operator does a firmware load/update as follows:
1) The operator first zeroises the module.
2) The operator authenticates to the module as administrator (Admin (Cryptographic
Officer)) using the default credentials (admin username and password as admin123).
3) The default admin password must be changed to a password with characteristics as
listed in Table 14 (enforced by the module). Once the default password has been
changed the module must be rebooted.
4) The firmware image can be loaded onto the module via the CLI from an scp server using
the command loadimage scp <filepath> or via the Manager using a .jar file. The
underlying image is in .tgz format in both cases.
5) The module prompts the operator to authenticate to the server to proceed with the image
installation.
6) Once operator has been authenticated, the image installation succeeds and the module
prompts for a reboot to be performed.
7) Post reboot, the operator can run the ‘show’ command to see the updated firmware
version and that the module is operating in the Approved mode. The string “FIPS Mode:
Enabled” returned by the ‘show’ command is intended to signify that the Approved mode
of operation has been enabled. Any references to “FIPS Mode” correspond to code
embedded within the module. The Approved mode of operation is referred to as such,
i.e., as the Approved mode elsewhere in this document.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Administrative guidance has been provided in Section 2 and throughout this section. For
additional information of operation of the module, please see the Trellix IPS documentation at
https://docs.trellix.com/.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The non-administrator guidance has been provided in Section 2 and throughout this section. For
additional information of operation of the module, please see the Trellix IPS documentation at
https://docs.trellix.com/.
11.4 Design and Rules
The cryptographic module’s design corresponds to the module’s security rules as follows:
• The cryptographic module provides four distinct operator roles: Admin (Cryptographic Officer),
Sensor Operator(s), Trellix IPS Manager and 3rd Party SNMP Client(s). The cryptographic
module provides role-based authentication and previous authentication results are cleared when
the module transitions to a power-off state. The module does not allow change of /switching
Page 104 of 104
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between operators without logging out and logging into the module (and undergoing re-
authentication).
• When the module is not accessed via a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services that could cause modification of the module’s SSPs.
• Data output is logically disconnected/inhibited during SSP generation, while performing self-
tests and during zeroisation.
• For the Perform zeroisation service (authenticated and unauthenticated), the operator must
remain in control of the module or be physically present with the module to ensure that the
entire zeroisation process completes successfully. This may take up to one minute.
• Status information provided by the module does not contain SSPs or sensitive data that if
misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
• If a non-FIPS validated firmware version is loaded onto the module, then the module is no
longer a FIPS validated module.
• The RSA mod 4096-bit keys are not supported by default for Sensor to Manager trust
establishment. The Manager (peer) shall not be configured to use RSA 4096-bit keys so as to
maintain the FIPS validation configuration of the sensor.
• The module only supports five concurrent SSH operators when SSH is enabled.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
No specific maintenance requirements apply to the module.
11.6 End of Life
The module must be zeroised (using the Perform zeroisation service per Section 4 of this
document) in order to perform secure sanitization of the module.
11.7 Additional Information
The entropy source provides 256 bits of entropy (see the Entropy Input String size in the SSPs
table) which is sufficient for the generation of the SSPs (using the approved DRBGs of the
module) with the maximum target security strength (256 bits) needed.
Security during delivery of the hardware can be ensured by examining the module chassis for
any signs of damage. Security during distribution of the firmware can be confirmed by verifying
the checksum of the firmware image against that provided by Trellix when delivering the
firmware.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
The module does not mitigate against any additional attacks and thus the requirements per this
section do not apply.