FSM-2 Flash Storage Cryptographic Module
Hardware Version Number: A8
Firmware Version: 4.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.1
Last Update: 2021-4-19
Prepared by:
Gossamer Security Solutions
9176 Red Branch Road, Suite L,
Columbia, MD 21045
www.gossamersec.com
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3
1.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 4
2 FSM-2 FLASH STORAGE CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ........................................... 5
2.1 OVERVIEW.......................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION .................................................................................................... 6
2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY............................................................................................. 6
2.4 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 6
2.5 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION ......................................................................... 7
2.6 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ........................................................................................... 9
2.7 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT............................................................................................ 9
2.8 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT........................................................................ 9
2.9 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 11
2.10 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 12
2.11 PHYSICAL SECURITY......................................................................................................... 13
3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 14
3.1 MULTIPLE APPROVED MODES .......................................................................................... 14
3.2 INITIAL SET-UP ................................................................................................................. 15
3.3 CO AND USER ACCOUNT SETUP....................................................................................... 15
3.4 SECURE MANAGEMENT .................................................................................................... 16
3.5 ZEROIZATION.................................................................................................................... 16
©2021 Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. This document can be reproduced and distributed only
whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 3
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary cryptographic module Security Policy for the FSM-2 Flash Storage
Cryptographic Module from Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. The firmware version running on
the module is v4.0. This Security Policy describes how the module meets the security
requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which
details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More
information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
(CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the modules.
The FSM-2 Flash Storage Cryptographic Module, which includes the hardware version, is
referred to in this document as FSM-2 or the module.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 2
Table 1. Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of
a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module
from the following sources:
• The Curtiss-Wright website (http://www.curtisswright.com) contains information on the
full line of products from Curtiss-Wright. The website
(https://www.curtisswrightds.com/products/) contains information on the full line of
products from Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions.
• The CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program) contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related
questions for the module.
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1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Curtiss-Wright FSM-2 Storage Cryptographic Module identified is referred
to as the Cryptographic Module, Module or FSM-2.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package provided to
the test laboratory. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence Document
• Finite State Model
• Validation Submission Summary
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and other validation submission documentation were produced by
Gossamer Security Solutions under contract to Curtiss-Wright. With the exception of this Non-
Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package is proprietary to Curtiss-Wright
and is releasable only under appropriate non- disclosure agreements. For access to these
documents, please contact Curtiss-Wright.
©2021 Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. This document can be reproduced and distributed only
whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 5
2 FSM-2 Flash Storage Cryptographic Module
This section describes the FSM-2 Flash Storage Cryptographic Module from Curtiss-Wright
Defense Solutions.
2.1 Overview
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions, a division of Curtiss-Wright Corporation, is the trusted,
proven leader for comprehensive, rugged, and secure mission-critical solutions for defense and
aerospace applications. The Defense Solutions business unit produces the FSM-2 Flash Storage
Cryptographic Module.
The FSM-2 (Figure 1) is a rugged, compact data storage device that can be plugged into any
chassis that accommodates conduction-cooled modules with a 3U form factor.
It uses a frame and covers to create the conduction cooled enclosure.
Figure 1. FSM-2 Flash Storage Cryptographic Module
The FSM contains 2 TB of solid-state memory utilizing SLC NAND flash components. The
design includes over-provisioning for faster write operations and improved reliability. It also
supports dynamic and static data wear-leveling for even distribution of erase/write cycles. This
prevents excessive writes to the same locations extending the life cycle of the flash.
The FSM-2 supports key generation, user authentication and authorization, and full disk
encryption using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Key management can be handled
internally on the FSM-2 controller PCB or externally by a host system.
The frame and covers are designed to dissipate component heat, provide rigidity, and move heat
to the outer enclosure. This closed conduction-cooled structure makes the FSM-2 less susceptible
to problems due to adverse environments and provides silent vibration-free operation. The
module complies with standards for a 3U (6.3-inch/160-mm) wide 1-inch pitch form factor.
©2021 Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. This document can be reproduced and distributed only
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2.2 Module Specification
The FSM-2 is a hardware module with a multi-chip embedded embodiment. The overall security
level of the module is 2. The module supports two types of FIPS-Approved modes of operation.
Instructions on how to invoke these two modes of operation are provided in Section 3.2.
2.3 Cryptographic Boundary
The module’s cryptographic boundary is the same as the physical boundary, which is defined by
the anodized aluminum covers that enclose the module and surround all the hardware and
software components. It includes the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces
of the case representing the module’s physical perimeter.
2.4 Module Interfaces
The FSM-2 supports the four logical interfaces defined in FIPS 140-2: Data Input, Data Output,
Control Input, and Status Output. In addition, the module supports a Power Input interface.
Figure 2 shows the FSM-2 physical ports, controls, and indicators. Table 2 explains the mapping
of the module’s physical ports to the FIPS logical interfaces.
Figure 2. FSM-2 Connector, Control, and Indicators Locations
J3 Connector
Pin
Signal Name Logical Interface
Active /
Reserved
Description
1, 3 5V_IN Power Input Active +5V power supply
2 RS232_TX Data Output, Control
Input, Status Output
Reserved PIN NOT USED (reserved for RS-
232 - Host Management
[Transmit]).
4 RS232_RX Data Input, Control Input,
Status Output
Reserved PIN NOT USED (reserved for RS-
232 - Host Management [Receive]).
5 ERROR_ST Status Output Active FSM-2 ERROR Status - Asserted
HI to indicate an error.
J3 Connector
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6 ZEROIZE_BP Control Input Active Assert this pin HI to zeroize the
FSM-2
7 EXT_I2C_SCL Control Input Active I2C Clock
9 EXT_I2C_SDA Data Input & Output,
Control Input, Status Output
Active I2C Data
8 SYS_RST_IN Control Input Active System Reset - Assert pin low to
reset FSM-2 unit
10, 11, 16, 17,
22, 23, 28, 29
GROUND Power Return Active Digital Ground
12, 14 HOST_3TX+/- Data Input Active SATA Data Lane 3 - Host Transmit
18, 20 HOST_2TX+/- Data Input Active SATA Data Lane 2 - Host Transmit
24, 26 HOST_1TX+/- Data Input Active SATA Data Lane 1 - Host Transmit
30, 32 HOST_0TX+/- Data Input Active SATA Data Lane 0 - Host Transmit
13, 15 HOST_3RX+/- Data Output Active SATA Data Lane 3 - Host Receive
19, 21 HOST_2RX+/- Data Output Active SATA Data Lane 2 - Host Receive
25, 27 HOST_1RX+/- Data Output Active SATA Data Lane 1 - Host Receive
31, 33 HOST_0RX+/- Data Output Active SATA Data Lane 0 - Host Receive
Table 2. Hardware/Physical Boundary Interfaces
2.5 Roles, Services, and Authentication
In both FIPS-Approved modes, the module supports Identity-based authentication by using
UserID and Password. The module can be accessed via the serial console interface located on the
I2C data interface. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles that operators may assume:
Crypto Officer role and User role. The CO installs the module and can execute all of the
module’s services. The User can execute a subset of the module’s services. Both the CO and
User manage the device by authenticating to the module and issuing commands through the User
Control Interface (UCI). Descriptions of the services available in each Approved mode are
provided in Table 3 below. The approved mode that the service is available in is shown in the
“Security Mode” column. Please note that the CSPs listed in the table indicate the type of access
required using the following notation:
• R – Read: The plaintext CSP is read by the service.
• W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized by the service.
• X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or allowed security function or
authentication mechanism.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at a minimum eight
(8) characters long. Passwords are ONLY alphanumeric - numbers, lowercase, uppercase. NO
special characters (!@#$%^&*..etc). Passwords must be between 8-64 characters with 1 upper, 1
lower, and 1 number. See the Secure Operation section for more information. Given these
restrictions, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in
6,193,057,944,320 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard
American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 26 Upper and 26 Lower
alphabetic characters providing 62 characters to choose from in total). The calculation should be
62x62x62x62x62x26x26x10 = 6,193,057,944,320. Therefore, the associated probability of a
successful random attempt is approximately 1 in 6,193,057,944,320, which is less than the 1 in
1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
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In addition, for multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-minute
period, under the optimal modern network condition, if an attacker would only get 60,000
guesses per minute. Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt during
a one-minute period is 60,000/ 6,193,057,944,320= 1/ 103,217,632, which is less than 1 in
100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
Service Role Security Mode Description
CSP and Type of
Access
Push Button
Switch
CO
User
1, 2 Zeroize keys, configuration data, and
all user authentication data via front
panel
All Keys and
CSPs
Security Trigger CO
User
1, 2 Zeroize keys, configuration data, and
all user authentication data via
backplane signal
All Keys and
CSPs
System Reset CO
User
1, 2 Reboot the module via backplane signal All Keys and
CSPs stored in the
DRAM listed in
table 5
Sanitize (UCI) CO
User
1, 2 Zeroize keys, configuration data, and
all user authentication data
All Keys and
CSPs
Clear DEK (UCI) CO
User
1, 2 Zeroize DEK only DEK – W
Clear Key (UCI) CO
User
1, 2 Zeroize all keys and CSPs stored in the module. All Keys and
CSPs
Clear all (UCI) CO
User
1, 2 Zeroize all cryptographic keys including the
hardcoded PSK, configuration data, and all user
authentication data
All Keys and
CSPs
Setup user
accounts (UCI)
CO 1, 2 Display, create, modify, or delete user accounts Passwords – W
Set security
mode (UCI)
CO 1, 2 Specify if DEK is entered into module or
generated internally. A security mode change
causes zeroization.
DEK – W
KEK – W
Passwords – W
Table 3. Mapping of Services to Roles, Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Role Security Mode Description
CSP and Type of
Access
View temperature
status (UCI)
CO
User
1, 2 Display output from temperature sensors None
View DEK status
(UCI)
CO
User
1, 2 Display DEK load status and storage location None
View KEK status
(UCI)
CO
User
1, 2 Display KEK load status and storage locations None
View FSM ID
(UCI)
CO
User
1, 2 Display the FSM module ID None
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View Security
Mode (UCI)
CO
User
1, 2 View the current security mode of the FSM None
View error status
(UCI)
CO
User
1, 2 Display error conditions (including POSTs and
BISTs) and log history
None
Clear error status
(UCI)
CO 1, 2 Clear log history None
Logoff (UCI) CO
User
1, 2 Logoff None
Generate KEK
(UCI)
CO 1, 2 Generate a new KEK KEK - RWX
Store KEK (UCI) CO 1, 2 Stores the latest generated KEK KEK-R
Output KEK
(UCI)
CO 1, 2 Output KEK wrapped with PSK or an old KEK
(PSK is only used if there is no previous KEK
stored in the module)
KEK - RWX
PSK – RX
Generate DEK
(UCI)
CO 1 Generate DEK internally and storage DEK – RW
Enter DEK (UCI) CO 2 DEK (wrapped with KEK) entry and storage DEK – RW
KEK – RWX
Set password
(UCI)
CO
User
1, 2 Set passwords Password – RW
Table 4. Mapping of Services to Roles, Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access (Continued)
2.6 Unauthenticated Services
The services for someone without an authorized role are to view the status output from the
module’s LED pins, perform the zeroization service by pushing the KeyCLR button, and cycle
the power.
2.7 Operational Environment
The module is a hardware module. The module’s operating system is nonmodifiable operating
system. Thus, the requirements from FIPS 140-2 level 2, section 4.6.1, are not applicable to the
module.
2.8 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The Crypto Officer administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters
such as passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the Crypto
Officer login. Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory that stored the key or refreshing
the volatile memory. Keys are electronically entered and distributed. The entropy source
(NDRNG) within the module provides at least 256 bits of entropy to seed SP800-90a DRBG for
use in key generation. The cryptographic keys and other CSPs used by the module in both FIPS-
Approved modes are shown in Table 5 below.
©2021 Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. This document can be reproduced and distributed only
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation/Derivation Storage Zeroization
DRBG
entropy input
SP800-90A
HMAC_DRBG
(HMAC-SHA-
256)
440-bits This is the entropy for SP 800-90A
HMAC_DRBG (HMAC-SHA-256).
This key is established from the
module’s entropy source and used to
construct the seed. This key is never
output from the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document.
DRBG seed SP800-90A
HMAC_DRBG
(HMAC-SHA-
256)
440-bits Input to the DRBG that determines the
internal state of the DRBG. Generated
using DRBG derivation function that
includes the entropy input from the
entropy source. This key is never output
from the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
DRBG V SP800-90A
HMAC_DRBG
(HMAC-SHA-
256)
128-bits The DRBG V is one of the critical
values of the internal state upon which
the security of this DRBG mechanism
depends. Generated first during DRBG
instantiation and then subsequently
updated using the DRBG update
function. This key is never output from
the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
DRBG key SP800-90A
HMAC_DRBG
(HMAC-SHA-
256)
256-bits Internal critical value used as part of SP
800-90A HMAC_DRBG (HMAC-SHA-
256). Established per SP 800-90A
HMAC_DRBG. This key is never output
from the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
PSK (Pre-
shared key)
Secret 256-bits This key is hard coded in the module
during manufacturing. This key is never
output from the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
KEK (Key
encryption
key)
AES-KW 256-bits This key is generated by calling
approved SP800-90A DRBG. This key
can be output from the module wrapped
with PSK if there is no previously
generated KEK existing in the module.
or wrapped with the existing KEK in the
module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
DEK (Data
encryption
key)
AES 256-bits This key can be generated by calling
approved SP800-90A DRBG internally
in Security Mode 1, or injected from
outside wrapped with KEK in Security
Mode 2. This key is never output from
the module.
NVRAM
(encrypted by
Wrap key)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
HMAC key HMAC-SHA-
256
256-bits This key is generated by calling
approved SP800-90A DRBG. It is used
for message authentication. This key is
never output from the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation/Derivation Storage Zeroization
CO/User
password
Password 64 to 512-
bits
Used to authenticate the CO or User. In
addition, the password is also used to
derive Wrap key with SP800-132
PBKDF algorithm. This CSP is never
output from the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
PBKDF Salt Keying material 256-bits This key is generated by calling
approved SP800-90A DRBG. This
keying material is used for derive the
Wrap key in compliance with SP800-
132 PBKDF. This key is used to protect
the DEK in the NVRAM. It is never
output from the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
Wrap key SP800-132
PBKDF
320-bits The module generates this key in
compliance with SP800-132 PBKDF
with HMAC-SHA-256 and a number of
iterations and a 256-bits salt to transform
the operator's password. This key is used
to protect the DEK. It is never output
from the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Please see section
3.5 in this
document
Table 5. Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
2.9 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Algorithm Curtiss-Wright Crypto Firmware Enova HW
AES (256 bits; ECB) Cert. #5767
AES (256 bits; CBC) Cert. #250
DRBG (HMAC-SHA-256_DRBG) Cert. #2362
HMAC (SHA-256) Cert. #3815
KTS (AES-KW) AES Cert. #5767
SHS (SHA-256) Cert. #4590
CKG (vendor affirmed) N/A
PBKDF (vendor affirmed) N/A
Table 6. Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
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Note:
• There are key sizes that have been CAVP tested but not used by the module. Only the key
lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are used by the module.
• In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as per scenario 1 of section 6 in SP800-133. The resulting
generated symmetric key is the unmodified output from SP800-90A HMAC_DRBG.
• The module deploys a SP800-132 Password Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF).
o The module complies with Option 1a within SP800-132.
o The minimum password length is set between 8-64 characters with 1 upper, 1 lower,
and 1 number.
o The module generates ephemeral Wrap Key (referred to Master Key in SP800-132)
by passing a Password and associated KDF salt though an underlying pseudorandom
function (HMAC-SHA-256).
o The function has an iteration count of 10,000.
o The module uses the SP800-90A HMAC_DRBG to generate unique 256-bit salts.
o The module generates and assigns a unique MEK and KEK to each LBA Band.
o The sole use of a Wrap Key is to protect the Data Encryption Key (DEK), which was
stored in the NVRAM. Please note that both Wrap Key and DEK cannot be output
and shall not leave the module.
Non-FIPS Approved, but Allowed Algorithms in FIPS Mode
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved, but allowed in the FIPS approved mode.
• NDRNG (entropy source)
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module does not support non-approved/allowed cryptographic algorithm.
2.10 Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are
functioning correctly.
Self-tests performed
• Curtiss-Wright Crypto Firmware POSTs
o AES-ECB Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o AES-KW Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o DRBG KATs (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3 are
performed)
o Firmware Integrity Test (EDC)
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-256 KAT
• Enova HW POST
o AES-CBC Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
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• Curtiss-Wright Crypto Firmware Conditional tests
o CRNGT for SP800-90A DRBG
o CRNGT for NDRNG
The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied. If an error
occurs during a power-up self-test, the module will enter a critical error state. Data output from
the module will be inhibited. The module will log the error into an error log and the Fault LED
will illuminate. To correct the error, the CO must restart the module.
2.11 Physical Security
Four tamper-evident labels are applied by the vendor during manufacturing. Upon initialization
of the module, the Crypto Officer shall visually inspect the labels to ensure that they are in the
proper locations and that they do not show any signs of tampering. Labels will be placed on the
two center screws located on the top and bottom of the module. Figures 3-8 below show the
proper seal placement for the module. Actions to be taken when any evidence of tampering
should be addressed within the site security program. Any deviation of the TELs placement by
unauthorized operators such as tearing, misconfiguration, removal, change, replacement or any
other change in the TELs from its original configuration as depicted below shall mean the
module is no longer in FIPS mode of operation. The device must be returned to Curtiss-Wright
for service before it can operate in the Approved mode of operation again. Below are the photos
for the module with TELs while in the FIPS mode of operation.
Figure 3. FSM-2 Front view
Figure 4: FSM-2 Back view
J3 Connector
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whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 14
Figure 5: FSM-2 Left view
Figure 6: FSM-2 Right view
Figure 7: FSM-2 Top view
Figure 8: FSM-2 Bottom view
3 Secure Operation
The sections below describe how the module operates in the FIPS mode.
3.1 Multiple Approved Modes
The module supports two FIPS-Approved modes of operation, which are defined as Security
Mode 1 and Security Mode 2. Section 3.2 provides instructions on how to configure the module
in one of the two Approved modes. The description of the two Approved modes is provided in
Section 3.2 (step #5) and Section 3.4.
1
2
3
4
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whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 15
3.2 Initial Set-up
The module meets Overall Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The firmware version running
in the module is 4.0, which is the only allowed firmware in FIPS mode. The firmware was
programmed into the module while in manufacturing. Follow the setting instructions provided
below to operate the module in each FIPS-approved mode of operation. Operating this module
without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved
mode of operation. The steps are summarized below.
1. After unpacking the module, a physical inspection should be conducted to:
• Identify any damage to the assemblage or tamper-evident seals
• Verify the correct seating of all screws and front panel switches.
2. The FSM-2 is not a freestanding device. Therefore, mount the module into a chassis frame that
can accommodate a 1-inch pitch bay with slots for conduction-cooled module. Align the FSM-2
module rails with the chassis slides and push the FSM-2 module in until the connector makes
contact. Apply pressure on the FSM-2 module handles to seat the connector into the backplane
connector.
3. Establish serial communication to the device using I2C bus.
4. Ensure that the firmware version 4.0 is running in the module (This is the only allowed
firmware version in FIPS mode)
5. Configure the module by:
• There is no default login username and password
• Creating CO and User accounts (See Section 3.3)
• Setting the Security Mode (see Section 3.3 below)
• In Internal Key Generation Mode (Security Mode 1), request the module to generate an
AES encryption key
• In External Key Generation Mode (Security Mode 2), enter an externally generated AES
encryption key into the module.
3.3 CO and User Account Setup
The Crypto Officer is responsible for initialization and security-relevant configuration and
management of the module. The CO shall configure the module security mode, the storage
device for the DEK, and a CO username and password. Passwords shall be between 8 and 64
characters and must consist of at least 1 upper- and lower-case letters and 1 number. The first
account created is always the CO and during account creation, the user specifies which key
generation mode they desire. The CO will then log on using the newly set credentials. The
current firmware does not support RS-232 therefore the FSM> prompt does not exist. If any
future customer desires this, then we would need to activate the RS-232 lines to interface with
the FSM-2. The CO may then add additional User accounts.
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whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 16
3.4 Secure Management
The module operates in FIPS-Approved mode when used as specified within this Security
Policy. Each mode defines how the Data Encryption Key (DEK) used for SATA device
protection is generated. Following each power cycle, the FSM-2 software will determine the
appropriate key generation mode to determine the method of injecting the DEKs. The key
generation method for each security mode is described below:
• Internal Key Generation Mode (Security Mode 1) - Data Encryption Key (DEK) for
SATA flash storage is to be generated internally. The CO commands the module to
generate DEK directly from the output of HMAC_DRBG (Cert. #2362), and then injects
it into the hardware encryptor.
• External Key Generation Mode (Security Mode 2) - Data Encryption Key (DEK) for
SATA flash storage is to be generated externally and entered into the module wrapped
with KEK. The CO enters the encrypted DEK with its associated HMAC into the module,
and then injects it into the hardware encryptor.
Please note that switching between security modes requires the user to zeroize all stored
cryptographic Keys/CSPs listed in Table 5, and create a new CO account (See Section 3.3.2).
Upon entering the new security mode, the module will perform the power-up self-tests to all
supported algorithms listed in Section 2.10.
3.5 Zeroization
Cryptographic keys are zeroized in DRAM memory upon power-up after the module is power-
cycled or rebooted. Keys and all other CSPs stored NVRAM can be zeroized by the following
methods:
• Pressing the Push Button Switch on the front panel (labeled KEY CLR)
• Sending a Security Trigger signal from the host device via the backplane connector.
• Using the “Sanitize” services as listed in Table 3.
• Using the “Clear DEK” service as listed in Table 3. This only zeroizes the DEK used to
protect the data stored on flash.
• Automatic zeroization of keys and CSPs occurs when changing the security mode, which
designates if the DEK is internally generated or externally entered into the module.
• The FSM-2 module is able to be zeroized via the KEY CLR button after main power is
off for up to 30 minutes. The CO or User must wait until the module has been
successfully returned a success or error in order to verify that zeroization has completed.