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Motorola Network Router (MNR)
S6000
FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module
Non‐Proprietary Security Policy
Version: 3.0
Date: 6/21/2016
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................4
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.........................................................................6
1.2 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................6
2 Cryptographic Functionality.............................................................................................7
2.1 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................... 10
2.2 Public Keys................................................................................................................................. 12
3 Roles, Authentication and Services................................................................................ 13
3.1 Assumption of Roles.................................................................................................................. 13
3.2 Authentication Methods ........................................................................................................... 14
3.3 Services...................................................................................................................................... 14
4 Self‐tests........................................................................................................................ 18
5 Physical Security Policy.................................................................................................. 19
6 Operational Environment .............................................................................................. 19
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy................................................................................. 19
8 Security Rules and Guidance.......................................................................................... 19
9 References and Definitions............................................................................................ 21
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations.......................................................................................... 4
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements....................................................................................... 4
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................................... 6
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions..............................................................8
Table 5 – Non‐Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions ..................................................................9
Table 6 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode.................................................................................................... 9
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ............................................................................................. 10
Table 8 – Public Keys...................................................................................................................................12
Table 9 – Roles Description......................................................................................................................... 13
Table 10 – Authenticated Services.............................................................................................................. 15
Table 11 – Unauthenticated Services ......................................................................................................... 16
Table 12 – CSP Access Rights within Services ............................................................................................. 16
Table 13 – Power Up Self‐tests................................................................................................................... 18
Table 14 – Conditional Self‐tests ................................................................................................................ 18
Table 15 – References.................................................................................................................................21
Table 16 – Acronyms and Definitions ......................................................................................................... 21
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Motorola Network Router (MNR) S6000 ..................................................................................... 6
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Motorola Network Router (MNR) S6000, hereafter
denoted the Module. The Module is a network router supporting secure integrated voice and data
applications as well as high‐speed site‐to‐site WAN connections. In addition to the normal routing
functions, the MNR S6000 supports data encryption and authentication over Ethernet and Frame Relay
links using the IPSec and FRF.17 protocols. The Module meets FIPS 140‐2 overall Level 1 requirements.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Module HW P/N and Version FW Version
1 MNR S6000 Base
Unit
CLN1780L Rev F GS‐16.8.1.06
2 S6000 Encryption
Unit
CLN8261D Rev NA N/A
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140‐2
validated network appliances. The Module is a multi‐chip standalone embodiment; the cryptographic
boundary is the module’s enclosure which includes all components.
The FIPS 140‐2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security 1
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 3
Self‐Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
The Module implementation is compliant with:
 FIPS 140‐2
 FIPS 197
 SP 800‐38A
 SP 800‐90A
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 FIPS 198‐1
 SP 800‐135
 FIPS 186‐4
 FIPS 180‐4
 SP 800‐20
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1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical cryptographic boundary of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. In the photo, blank plates
cover slots that can hold optional network interface cards that are external to the boundary of the
module.
Figure 1 – Motorola Network Router (MNR) S6000
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Qty Logical interface definition Interface Card Description
Ethernet 3 Data input, data output,
status output, control
input
Part of the S6000 Base
system
LAN port that provides connection
to Ethernet LANs using either
10BASE‐T or 100BASE‐TX Ethernet
Console 1 Status output, control
input
Part of the S6000 Base
system
RS‐232 interface
Power Plug 1 Power input N/A Power
LEDs 7 Status output N/A Provides LED status output on
network traffic, power, and errors
1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports both an Approved and non‐Approved mode of operation. To enter FIPS mode, the
Crypto‐Officer must follow the procedure outlined in Table 4 below. For details on individual gateway
commands, use the online help facility or review the Enterprise OS Software User Guide and the
Enterprise OS Software Reference Guide.
Step Description
1. Check if FIPS mode is enabled using the show –SYS FIPS command. If FIPS = ON, go to next step. If FIPS = OFF,
issue SETD ‐SYS FIPS=ON command.
2. Configure the parameters for the IKE negotiations using the IKEProfile command. For FIPS mode, only the
Optional Interface Card Slots
(not included in cryptographic module boundary)
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Step Description
following values are allowed: Diffie‐Hellman Group (Group 14 required for 112‐bit key strength), Encryption
Algorithm (AES or Triple‐DES), Hash Algorithm (SHA), and Authentication Method (PreSharedKey).
3. Electronically establish via the local console port the pre‐shared key (PSK) to be used for the IKE protocol using:
ADD –CRYPTO FipsPreSharedKey <peer_ID> <pre‐shared_key> <pre‐shared_key>
For FIPS mode, minimum key length is 14 bytes.
4. If IPsec is used, configure IPsec transform lists using the ADD –CRYPTO TransformLIst command. For FIPS
mode, only the following values are allowed: Encryption Transform (ESP‐TDES, or ESP‐AES) and Authentication
Transform (ESP‐SHA).
5. If FRF.17 is used, configure FRF.17 transform lists using the ADD –CRYPTO TransformLIst command. For FIPS
mode, only the following values are allowed: Encryption Transform (FRF‐TDES, or FRF‐AES) and Authentication
Transform (FRF‐SHA).
6. For each port for which encryption is required, bind a dynamic policy to the ports using:
ADD [!<portlist>] –CRYPTO DynamicPOLicy <policy_name> <priority>
<mode> <selctrlist_name> <xfrmlist_name> [<pfs>] [<lifetime>] [<preconnect>]
To be in FIPS mode, the selector list and transform list names must be defined as in previous steps.
7. If PIM authentication is enabled, configure Manual Key set using the ADD –CRYPTO ManKeySet command. For
FIPS mode, minimum authentication key length is 14 bytes.
8. If SNMPv3 is enabled, configure authentication and encryption passphrases for all SNMP users with AuthPriv
privileges. For FIPS mode, minimum authentication passphrase length is 14 bytes.
9. If SSHv2 is enabled, generate RSA 2048 bit keys using GenSshKey RSA 2048.
10. For each port for which encryption is required, enable encryption on that port using:
SETDefault [!<portlist>] –CRYPTO CONTrol = Enabled
11. DSA keys must not be used in FIPS mode.
12. Use the Show –SYS SwSignatureAlgorithm command to verify that firmware signing algorithm is set to
SHA2withRSA2048. If not use the SetD –SYS SwSignAlgorithm = SHA2withRSA2048 command to change
signing algorithm.
13. FIPS‐140‐2 mode achieved.
2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non‐Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in the table(s) below.
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Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES (Hardware
Implementation)
[FIPS 197, SP 800‐38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits (ECB, CBC only)
173
AES (Firmware
Implementation)
[FIPS 197, SP 800‐38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, CFB128
Key sizes: 128, 192 (CBC only), 256 bits (CBC only)
3547
DRBG [SP 800‐90A]
Functions: Hash DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
903
HMAC (Hardware
Implementation)
[FIPS 198‐1]
Functions: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA‐1
Key Size: 160 bits
39
HMAC (Firmware
Implementation)
[FIPS 198‐1]
Functions: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA‐1, SHA‐256
Key Size: minimum 112 bits
2265,
2266
KDF, Existing
Application‐
Specific (CVL)
[SP 800‐135]
Functions: SSH KDF, SNMP KDF, IKE v1 KDF, IKEv2 KDF
603, 604,
605
RSA [FIPS 186‐4, PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 1024 (RSA Verify only), 2048 bits
1827
SHA (Hardware
Implementation)
[FIPS 180‐4]
Functions: Message Digest
SHA size: SHA‐1
258
SHA (Firmware
Implementation)
[FIPS 180‐4]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification,
non‐Digital Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA‐1, SHA‐256
2926
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Algorithm Description Cert #
Triple‐DES (TDEA)
(Hardware
Implementation)
[SP 800‐20]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC
Key sizes: 3‐key
275
Triple‐DES (TDES)
(Firmware
Implementation)
[SP 800‐20]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC
Key sizes: 3‐key
1986
Table 5 – Non‐Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
Non‐SP 800‐56A
Compliant DH
[IG D.8]
Diffie‐Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength)
NDRNG [Annex C]
Hardware Non‐Deterministic RNG; minimum of 32 bits per access. The NDRNG
output is used to seed the FIPS Approved DRBG.
Table 6 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol Description
IKE v1 [IG D.8 and SP 800‐135]
Cipher Suites: Oakley Group 1,2, 5 and 14 DH key agreement with PreSharedKey
authentication, AES or Triple‐DES CBC encryption, SHA‐1 hashing, and HMAC PRF
IKE v2 [IG D.8 and SP 800‐135]
Cipher Suites: Oakley Group 1,2,5 and 14 DH key agreement with PreSharedKey
authentication, AES or Triple‐DES CBC encryption, HMAC‐SHA‐1 integrity and PRF
SNMPv3 [IG D.8 and SP 800‐135]
Allowed only with the SP 800‐135 SNMP KDF and AES encryption/decryption
SSH v2 [IG D.8 and SP 800‐135]
Cipher Suites: RSA 2048 DH group 14 SHA‐1 key transport, AES CBC encryption,
HMAC‐SHA‐1 MAC
Note: these protocols have not been reviewed or tested by CMVP or CAVP
Non‐Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non‐Approved mode only:
 DES
 Triple‐DES (2‐Key)
 FIPS 186‐4 RSA Signature Generation: 4096 bit keys with SHA‐2
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 MD5
 HMAC‐MD5
 HMAC‐SHA‐1‐96
 DSA 1024‐bit – for public/private key pair generation and digital signatures (non‐compliant)
 RSA 1024 – for key transport within SSH v2
 Non approved SW RNG: Provides random numbers for networking functions (non‐compliant)
 Diffie‐Hellman Group 1, 2 and 5
2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module
(including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 4.
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description / Usage
KEK This is the master key that encrypts persistent CSPs stored within the
module.
KEK‐protected keys include PSK and passwords.
Encryption of keys uses AES128ECB
IKE Preshared Keys Used to authenticate peer to peer during IKE session
SKEYID HMAC‐SHA‐1, used in IKE to provide for authentication of peer router.
Generated for IKE Phase 1 by hashing preshared keys with
responder/receiver nonce
SKEYID_d Phase 1 key used to derive keying material for IKE SAs
SKEYID_a Key used for integrity and authentication of the phase 1 exchange
SKEYID_e Key used for Triple‐DES or AES data encryption of phase 1 exchange
SKEYSEED Seed value is generated from initiator and responder nonce values and DH –
pre‐shared key. Used in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_d Key used to derive keying material for the CHILD_SAs established with IKEv2
IKE_SAs
SK_ai Key used by initiator as a key to the integrity protection algorithm for
authenticating the component messages in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_ar Key used by responder as a key to the integrity protection algorithm for
authenticating the component messages in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_ei Key used by initiator for encrypting and decrypting all subsequent exchanges
in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_er Key used by responder for encrypting and decrypting all subsequent
exchanges in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_pi Key used by initiator when generating an AUTH payload in IKEv2 IKE_SA
SK_pr Key used by responder when generating an AUTH payload in IKEv2 IKE_SA
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CSP Description / Usage
*Ephemeral DH Phase‐1
private key (a)
Generated for IKE Phase 1 key establishment
*Ephemeral DH Phase‐2
private key (a)
Phase 2 Diffie‐Hellman private keys used in PFS for key renewal
*IPsec Session Keys 128/192/256‐bit AES‐CBC and 168‐bit Triple‐DES keys are used to encrypt
and authenticate IPsec ESP packets
FRF.17 Session Keys 168‐bit Triple‐DES‐CBC and 128/192/256‐bit AES‐CBC keys are used to
encrypt and authenticate FRF.17 Mode 2
*SSH‐RSA Private Key Key used to authenticate oneself to peer
SSH Session Keys 128‐bit AES‐CBC keys are used to encrypt and authenticate SSH packets
*SSH DH Private Key Generated for SSH key establishment
SNMPv3 Passphrases Passphrases used in generation of SNMPv3 session keys
SNMPv3 Session Keys 128‐bit keys used to encrypt and authenticate SNMPv3 packets
RADIUS Secret Used for authentication of packets sent/received to RADIUS Server, up to 32
characters.
Hash‐DRBG Seed Initial seed for FIPS‐Approved DRBG
Hash‐DRBG Internal State Internal state/context for FIPS‐Approved DRBG. The critical security
parameters are the values V and C.
Passwords
 Crypto‐Officer
(Super User)
 Network Manager
 Admin
 User
7 (to 15) character password used to authenticate to the module
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2.2 Public Keys
Table 8 – Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
RSA Firmware Load Key RSA 2048 bit key used for firmware authentication
SSH‐RSA Key (RSA 2048‐bit) Distributed to peer, used for SSH authentication
SSH Known Host Keys (RSA 1024 and 2048‐bit) Distributed to module, used to authenticate peer
IKE DH public key (g^a) (2048‐bit) Generated for IKE Phase 1 key establishment
IKE DH phase‐2 public
(g^a) key
(2048‐bit) Phase 2 Diffie‐Hellman public keys used in PFS for key renewal (if
configured)
SSH DH Key (2048‐bit) Generated for SSH key establishment
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports eight distinct operator roles, Cryptographic Officer (Super User), Admin, Network
Manager, User, Maintenance, MotoAdmin, MotoMaster, and MotoInformA/B. The cryptographic
module enforces the separation of roles using Role‐based authentication.
Table 10 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Module supports concurrent operators.
Each operator has an independent session with the gateway, either though SSH or via the console. Once
authenticated to a role, each operator can access only those services for that role. In this way,
separation is maintained between the role and services allowed for each operator.
The role‐based authentication capabilities will be described here, although the role based‐
authentication is not required to comply with Level 1 requirements.
Table 9 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
Crypto‐Officer
(Super User)
The owner of the
cryptographic module with
full access to services of
the module.
Role‐based operator
authentication.
Username and Password
Network
Manager (NM)
An operator of the module
with almost full access to
services of the module.
Role‐based operator
authentication.
Username and Password
Admin An assistant to the Crypto‐
Officer that has read only
access to a subset of
module configuration and
status indications.
Role‐based operator
authentication.
Username and Password
User A user of the module that
has read only access to a
subset of module
configuration and status
indications.
Role‐based operator
authentication.
Username and Password
Maintenance Maintenance role can be
entered via the external
console port
(unauthenticated) or via EOS
software command (requires
Network Manager
authentication)
Unauthenticated
maintenance role is
entered only via the router
console port
None
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Role ID Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
MotoAdmin
(MO)
A SNMPv3 user who can
issue any command from
the SNMP V3 User
Manager menu.
Role‐based operator
authentication.
Passphrase
MotoMaster
(MM)
A SNMPv3 user who can
change its own
passphrases from the
SNMP V3 User Manager
menu.
Role‐based operator
authentication.
Passphrase
MotoInformA/B
(MI)
A SNMPv3 user who
receives and transmits
reliable messages over
SNMPv3.
Role‐based operator
authentication.
Passphrase
3.2 Authentication Methods
Username and Password
Passwords are alphanumeric strings consisting of 7 to 15 characters chosen from the 94 standard
keyboard characters. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur
is 1/94^7 which is less than 1/1,000,000. After three consecutive unsuccessful login attempts, an
operator is locked out for two minutes, ensuring that that the probability is less than one in 100,000 per
minute, that random multiple attempts will succeed or a false acceptance will occur.
Passphrase
Each SNMPv3 user has its own pair of encryption and authentication passphrases. The SNMPv3 user
authentication or encryption passphrase must be 8‐64 characters long and may contain uppercase and
lowercase alphabetic characters (A‐Z) and (a‐z); numeric characters (0‐9); and any of the following
special characters (! “ % & ” ( ) * + , ‐ . /: ; < = > ?).
The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/81^8 which is
less than 1/1,000,000. The timing of the SNMPv3 authentication protocol as implemented limits the
probability of randomly guessing a SNMPv3 passphrase in 60 seconds to less than 1 in 100,000. Based on
processing speeds, roughly 12 authentication attempts via passphrase are possible in a one (1) minute
period. Therefore the probability that a false acceptance will occur in a one minute period is 12/81^8.
3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. Each service description also
describes all usage of CSPs by the service.
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Table 10 – Authenticated Services
Service Description CO NM Admin User Main. MO MM MI
Firmware
Update
Load firmware images
digitally signed by RSA (2048
bit) algorithm
X X
Key Entry Enter Pre‐Shared Keys (PSK) X X
User
Management
Add/Delete and manage
operator passwords
X X
Reboot Force the module to power
cycle via a command
X X
Zeroization Actively destroy all plaintext
CSPs and keys
X X
Crypto
Configuration
Configure IPsec and FRF.17
services
X X
IKE Key establishment utilizing
the IKE protocol
X X
IPSec IPsec protocol X X
FRF.17 Tunnel
Establishment
Frame Relay Privacy
Protocol
X X
Alternating
Bypass
Provide some services with
cryptographic processing
and some services without
cryptographic processing
X X
SSHv2 For remote access to the
gateway
X X
Network
Configuration
Configure networking
capabilities
X X
SNMPv3 Network management,
including traps and
configuration
X X X X X
Enable Ports Apply a security policy to a
port
X X
File System Access file system X X
Authenticated
Show Status
Provide status to an
authenticated operator
X X X X
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Service Description CO NM Admin User Main. MO MM MI
Access Control Provide access control for
Crypto‐Officer, Network
Manager, Admin, and User
X X X X
Table 11 – Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Unauthenticated Show
Status
Provide the status of the cryptographic module – the status is shown using
the LEDs on the front panel
Power‐up Self‐tests Execute the suite of self‐tests required by FIPS 140‐2 during power‐up
Monitor Perform various HW support services
All Services available in FIPS Approved mode are also available in FIPS Non‐Approved mode. The
Approved mode is defined by the correct configuration.
Table 122 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The
modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
 G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
 R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module
uses the CSP.
 E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
 W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites
an existing CSP.
 Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 12 – CSP Access Rights within Services
CSP
Firmware
Update
Key
entry
User
Management
IKE
IPsec
tunnel
establishment
FRF.17
tunnel
establishment
SSHv2
Reboot
Zeroization
Crypto
Configuration
Network
Configuration
SNMPv3
Alternating
Bypass
Enable
Ports
File
System
Authenticated
Show
Status
Access
Control
KEK ‐ ‐ E ‐ ‐ ‐
‐
E Z GE ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
IKE Pre‐shared Keys ‐ W ‐ E ‐ ‐
‐
‐ Z RW ‐
‐
‐ ‐ EW E ‐
SKEYID ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SKEYID_d ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐
‐
‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
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SKEYID_a ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SKEYID_e ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SKEYSEED ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SK_d ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SK_ai ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SK_ar ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SK_ei ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SK_er ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SK_pi ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SK_pr ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Ephemeral DH Phase‐
1 private key (a)
‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Ephemeral DH Phase‐
2 private key (a)
‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
IPsec Session Keys ‐ ‐ ‐ EG E ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
FRF.17 Session Keys ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ E ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SSH‐RSA Private Key ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ Z EG ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SSH Session Keys ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SSH DH Private Key ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ Z ‐ ‐
‐
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Passwords ‐ ‐ EW ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E
RADIUS Secret ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ EW
SNMPv3 Passphrases ‐ ‐ EW ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ E ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
SNMPv3 Session Keys ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ EGZ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
DRBG Seed ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
DRBG Internal State ‐ ‐ ‐ EG ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Page 18 of 22
4 Self‐tests
Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power up self–tests are available on demand by power
cycling the module.
On power up or reset, the Module performs the self‐tests described in Table 13 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails,
the Module enters the error state. KAT failure is indicated by the device not being able to power up.
Table 13 – Power Up Self‐tests
Test Target Description
Firmware
Integrity
16 bit CRC performed over all code in flash
AES (Hardware
implementation)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC
Key sizes: 128 bits
AES (Firmware
implementation)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
DRBG KATs: HASH DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
HMAC
(Hardware
implementation)
KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA‐1
Includes hardware SHA‐1 KAT
HMAC
(Firmware
implementation)
KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA‐1
RSA KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHA KATs: SHA‐1, SHA‐256
TDES (Hardware
implementation)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC,
Key sizes: 3‐key
TDES (Firmware
implementation)
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC,
Key sizes: 3‐key
Table 14 – Conditional Self‐tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the
NDRNG.
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Test Target Description
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
Firmware Load RSA 2048 signature verification performed when firmware is loaded.
RSA Pairwise
Consistency
Pair‐wise consistency test for public and private key generation (RSA)
DRBG Health
Checks
Performed conditionally per SP 800‐90 Section 11.3. Required per IG C.1.
Bypass Test Bypass Test performed when the service Alternating Bypass is called.
5 Physical Security Policy
The MNR S6000 router is composed of industry standard production‐grade components.
6 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140‐2 definitions. The
Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within
the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140‐2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded
into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140‐2 validation.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Motorola MNR S6000 Gateway has not been designed to mitigate against other attacks outside the
scope of FIPS 140‐2.
8 Security Rules and Guidance
The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140‐2 Level 2
module.
1. The Motorola MNR S6000 Gateway provides eight distinct operator roles: Crypto‐Officer (Super
User), Admin, Network Manager, User, Maintenance, MotoAdmin, MotoMaster, and
MotoInformA/B. The Crypto‐Officer role uses the Super User account.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power up self‐tests by
cycling power or resetting the module.
4. Power up self‐tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self‐tests, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
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7. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
9. The module does not support manual key entry.
10. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
11. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
12. The module does not output intermediate key values.
The module is distributed to authorized operators wrapped in plastic with instructions on how to
securely install the module. On initial installation, perform the following steps:
1. Power on the module and verify successful completion of power up self‐tests from console port
or inspection of log file. The following message will appear on the console interface: “power‐on
self‐tests passed”.
2. Authenticate to the module using the default operator acting as the Crypto‐Officer with the
default password and username.
3. Verify that the Hardware and Firmware P/Ns and version numbers of the module are the FIPS
Approved versions.
4. Change the Crypto‐Officer and User passwords using the SysPassWord command.
5. Initialize the Key Encryption Key (KEK) with the KEKGenerate command. Account passwords and
certain keys are persistent across reboots and are encrypted with the Key Encryption Key (KEK).
This key can be reinitialized at any time.
6. Configure the module as described in Section 3, Table 4.
The module supports a minimum password length of 7 characters and a maximum length of 15
characters. The Crypto‐Officer controls the minimum password length through the PwMinLength
parameter: SETDefault ‐SYS PwMinLength = <length>, where <length> specifies the minimum length.
The Zeroization Service should also be invoked to zeroize all CSPs prior to removing a gateway from
service for repair.
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9 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 15 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140‐2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800‐131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
Table 16 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLI Command Line Interface
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DH Diffie‐Hellman
FRF Frame Relay Forum
FRF.17 Frame Relay Privacy Implementation Agreement
FRPP Frame Relay Privacy Protocol
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEK Key Encrypting Key
MNR Motorola Network Router
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy
PIM Protocol Independent Multicast
RNG Random Number Generator
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
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Acronym Definition
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
Tanapa The part number that is built and stocked for customer orders