Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 1 of 27
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FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc.
1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade
Hardware version: T600
Firmware version: t600-19.1_cd42 and t600-19.1_cd188
Date: 12/11/2020
Prepared by:
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Introduction
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified
environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140 program. The NVLAP
accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS
140 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS
140 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at:
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Fujitsu Network Communications Inc.
1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how
it meets the overall Level 2 security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
The Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade may also be referred to as the
“module” in this document.
Disclaimer
The contents of this document are subject to revision without notice due to continued progress in
methodology, design, and manufacturing. Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. shall have no liability for
any error or damages of any kind resulting from the use of this document.
Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
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Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................2
Disclaimer ...............................................................................................................................................2
Notices....................................................................................................................................................2
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Scope.......................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Overview..................................................................................................................................5
2. Security Levels.................................................................................................................................6
3. Cryptographic Module Specification ................................................................................................7
3.1 Cryptographic Boundary...........................................................................................................7
4. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces .....................................................................................9
5. Roles, Services and Authentication ................................................................................................10
5.1 Roles......................................................................................................................................10
5.2 Services..................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Authentication .......................................................................................................................12
6. Physical Security............................................................................................................................13
7. Operational Environment ..............................................................................................................13
8. Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management ...........................................................................14
8.1 Cryptographic Algorithms.......................................................................................................14
8.1.1 Allowed Algorithms.....................................................................................................16
8.1.2 Non-Approved Mode of Operation Non-Approved Algorithms and Protocols with No
Security Claimed........................................................................................................................16
8.1.3 Non-Approved Mode of Operation..............................................................................16
8.1.4 Non-Approved Algorithms...........................................................................................16
8.2 Cryptographic Key Management ............................................................................................16
8.3 Key Generation and Entropy ..................................................................................................22
8.4 Zeroization.............................................................................................................................23
9. Self-tests........................................................................................................................................23
9.1 Power-On Self-Tests...............................................................................................................23
9.2 Conditional Self-Tests.............................................................................................................24
9.3 Critical Function Tests ............................................................................................................24
10. Guidance and Secure Operation.....................................................................................................24
10.1 Initialization ...........................................................................................................................25
10.2 Usage of AES GCM in the module...........................................................................................25
11. Glossary.........................................................................................................................................27
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List of Tables
Table 1 - Security Level ............................................................................................................................6
Table 2 - Physical Port and Logical Interface Mapping..............................................................................9
Table 3 - Approved Services and Role allocation.....................................................................................11
Table 4 - Non-Approved Services............................................................................................................11
Table 5 - Non-Approved Services............................................................................................................11
Table 6 - Authentication Types...............................................................................................................12
Table 7 - Hardware Implementation Algorithms ....................................................................................14
Table 8 - Fujitsu Management Plane Cryptography Implementation ......................................................15
Table 9 - Fujitsu Control Plane Cryptography Implementation................................................................15
Table 10 - Fujitsu Management Plane SSH Implementation ...................................................................15
Table 11 - Allowed Algorithms ...............................................................................................................16
Table 12 - Non-Approved Algorithms .....................................................................................................16
Table 13 - Approved Keys and CSPs Table...............................................................................................19
Table 14 - Approved Service to Key/CSP Mapping ..................................................................................22
Table 15 - Power-up Self-tests................................................................................................................24
Table 16 - Conditional Self-tests.............................................................................................................24
Table 17 – Critical Function Tests...........................................................................................................24
Table 18 - Glossary of Terms..................................................................................................................27
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Front side of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade...........................................................................7
Figure 2 – Rear side of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade............................................................................7
Figure 3 - Right side of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade............................................................................7
Figure 4 - Left Side of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade .............................................................................7
Figure 5 - Top of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade.....................................................................................8
Figure 6 - Bottom of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade ...............................................................................8
Figure 7: 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade Ports........................................................................................9
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1. Introduction
1.1 Scope
This document describes the cryptographic module security policy for the Fujitsu Network
Communications Inc. 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade (Hardware version: T600) cryptographic module
(also referred to as the “module” hereafter) with Firmware versions, t600-19.1_cd42 or t600-19.1_cd188.
It contains specification of the security rules, under which the cryptographic module operates, including
the security rules derived from the requirements of the FIPS 140-2 standard.
1.2 Overview
The 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade is a 1RU blade form factor programmable optical transponder
supporting onboard software-provisioned data rates up to 600 Gbps over a single wavelength, using high-
performance components and electronics. Powered by 3rd-generation digital signal processor (DSP)
technology, the 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade delivers sophisticated and flexible modulation schemes
and variable forward error correction (FEC). The advanced modulation flexibility provides optimum reach,
capacity and power consumption, thereby enabling network operators to reduce cost per bit per
kilometer for long-haul, metro ROADM or metro point-to-point applications.
For campus, regional, metro and long-haul data center interconnect (DCI) applications, the 1FINITY™ T600
Transport Blade enables data center and cloud operators to deploy flexible, cost-effective optical
connections. The 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade helps operators meet the growing demands of the digital
economy:
• Industry-leading capacity with 600 Gbps single-wavelength transmission
• Maximized optical performance and reach with programmable modes from 200 to 600 Gbps
• Highest spectral efficiency in the industry, achieving up to 76.8 Tbps per single fiber using C- and
L-bands
• Cost-effective, energy-efficient power consumption of just 0.29 W per Gbps (fully-loaded)
In addition to its capacity and spectral efficiency, the 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade’s superior rack-space
density and low power consumption helps cut total cost of ownership in a variety of multihaul DCI
applications. The 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade supports two transponder plug-in units and an
integrated CPU complex, as well as redundant, replaceable fan modules and AC/DC power supply units.
The plug-in units can each support a 1.2 TBps transponder with 12 QSFP28-based client ports mapped to
two fixed network ports, achieving a total system density of 2.4 TBps per 1RU.
The following management protocols are supported by the 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade1
:
• Access Control List (ACL) for user or system processes that granted access to objects and specify
what operations are allowed on given objects.
• Command Line Interface (CLI) over a management interface or Telnet/Secure Shell (SSH)
connection
• Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Client used for obtaining configuration parameters
1
Plaintext protocols shall not be used. Please see Section 10 in this document for instructions on the secure
configuration and operation of the module.
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• Domain Name System (DNS) Client used to help resolve DNS requests using external DNS server
• File Transfer Protocol/ Secure Transfer Protocol (FTP/SFTP) Server used for file transfer of
system software, Log files, and Configuration files
• gRPC Network Management Interface (gNMI) used to install, manipulate, and delete the
configuration of network devices, and to view operational data
• Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) used to advertise devices identity, capabilities and
neighbors on a local area network
• Network Time Protocol (NTP) for network calendar timing
• Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) used to install, manipulate, and delete the
configuration of network devices
• Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)
• Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) protocol for centralized remote user
authentication
• Remote Monitoring (RMON) for monitoring network operational activities
• Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) protocol with support for SNMPv1, SNMPv2c
and SNMPv3 versions
• Streaming Telemetry enables access to real-time, model-driven, and analytics-ready data that
can help with network automation, traffic optimization, and preventive troubleshooting on the
module.
• Syslog protocol for monitoring device events by a remote server
• Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) protocol for centralized
remote user authentication
• Zero Touch Provisioning (ZTP) used for provisioning the network infrastructure
2. Security Levels
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1 - Security Level
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3. Cryptographic Module Specification
3.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary is classified as a multi-chip standalone device and is the entire boundary of
the chassis as pictured below.
Figure 1 – Front side of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade
Figure 2 – Rear side of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade
Figure 3 - Right side of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade
Figure 4 - Left Side of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade
1 2 3 4
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Figure 5 - Top of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade Figure 6 - Bottom of 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade
5
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4. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The module provides the following number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the
physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data
input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces and their mapping are
described in the following table:
Figure 7: 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade Ports
Physical Port Qty. FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping
RS232 RJ-45 Console Port 1 Control Input, Status Output
100 Gbe (QSFP28) client
ports
24 (12 per PIU) Data Input
10BASE-T/100BASE-
T/1000BASE-
T/1000BASESX/1000BASE-
LX10 Management ports
2 Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output
200/300/400/500/600G
(fixed DCO) line ports
4 (2 per PIU) Data Output
Dual replaceable AC or DC
power supplies
2 Power
Replaceable Fans 5 N/A
Status LEDs Total= 39
Data= 28
LX10 Mgmt(s)= 2
System= 1
ALARM= 1
F/S= 1
Power= 1
Fan= 5
Status Output
Table 2 - Physical Port and Logical Interface Mapping
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5. Roles, Services and Authentication
5.1 Roles
The module supports eight different roles:
Read-only user, Performance Monitor Operator, Equipment Operator, Super User, System Operator,
Security Operator, Crypto User and Crypto Officer (CO).
• Read-only user (Level-1): Read-only access privileges, can request alarm and PM information.
*Level-1 cannot request security or encryption related information.
• Performance Monitor Operator (Level-2): Level-1 privileges plus can reset PM counters.
• Equipment Operator (Level-3): Level-2 privileges plus access to provision equipment and
interfaces.
• Super User (Level-4): Full access to system, provisioning, security, and crypto encryption
functions.
• System Operator (Level-5): Level-3 access privileges, plus access to system functions
o Note: Level-5 cannot access security and crypto-encryption functions.
o Note: Level-5 cannot add, change, or delete users.
• Security Operator (Level-6): Security access privileges only, can add, change, or delete users
o Note: Level-6 cannot access system, provisioning, and crypto encryption functions.
• Crypto User (Level-7): Provision data-encryption interfaces and read the encryption status on the
encryption-enabled interfaces.
• Crypto Officer (Level-8): Level-7 access privileges, plus can create crypto-user, crypto-officer, and
can set global encryption policy.
o Note: A Level-4 user must create the first Level 8 Crypto Officer account. Additional Level-
8 user accounts can be created by a Level-4 or Level-8 user.
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5.2 Services
The module provides the following Approved services which utilize algorithms listed in Table 8 and 9:
Service
Super
User
(Level-4)
System
Operator
(Level-5)
Equipment
Operator
(Level-3)
Performance
Monitor
Operator
(Level-2)
Read-only
user
(Level-1)
Security
Operator
(Level-
6)
Crypto
User
Role
(Level-7)
Crypto
Officer
Role
(Level-8)
Initialization X
Manage Other User
Accounts
X X X
Change Own Password X X X X X X X X
Provision Layer 1
Encryption
X X X
Add/Change Pre-Shared
Secret (DEK)
X X X
Transfer Logs X X
System Provisioning X X
Equipment Provisioning X X X
Interface Provisioning X X X
View Equipment PM
counters
X X X X X
View Interface PM
counters
X X X X X X X
Clearing PM Counters X X X X
View Faults or Alarms X X X X X X X X
Request Status Information X X X X X
Export Backup of
Configuration file over SFTP
X X
View Network Element
Configuration
X X X X X
On-Demand Self-test X X X X X X X X
Zeroization/Factory Reset X X
Firmware Update X X
Set Configuration data X X
Table 3 - Approved Services and Role allocation
The below table provides a full description of the unauthenticated services provided by the module:
Unauthenticated Services
Request Authentication
On-Demand Self-test
Table 4 - Non-Approved Services
The module provides the following non-Approved services which utilize algorithms listed in Table 12:
Service
Non-Conformant Key Agreement
Table 5 - Non-Approved Services
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Services listed in Table 5 make use of non-compliant cryptographic algorithms. Use of these algorithms
are prohibited in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.
5.3 Authentication
The module supports identity-based authentication. Operators must authenticate using a user ID and
password or SSH client key (SSH only). The password entry feedback mechanism does not provide
information that could be used to guess or determine the authentication data. Each User SSH session
remains active (logged in) and secured until the operator logs out or inactivity for a configurable amount
of time has elapsed. Each User Management Console session remains active until the operator logs out
or inactivity for a configurable amount of time has elapsed.
Type of
Authentication
Authentication Strength
Operator
Passwords
Passwords are required to be at least 8 characters in length and maximum of 128 characters
(number of characters is dependent on the character set used by system). An 8-character password
allowing all printable American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) characters (95)
with repetition and a character restriction of: two uppercase characters, two lowercase characters,
two numeric characters, two special characters equates to a 1: (26x26x26x26x10x10x33x33), or
1:49,764,686,400 chance of false acceptance.
The probability of a successful random attempt is 1: 49,764,686,400, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
The maximum number of possible attempts per minute is 3 (after 3 attempts operator is locked out
for 1 minute). Therefore, the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-
minute period is 3:49,764,686,400 which is less than the 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
Public keys The module supports RSA based authentication of roles during SSH. Using conservative estimates
and equating a 2048-bit RSA key to a 112-bit symmetric key, the probability for a random attempt to
succeed is 1:2112
or 1: 5.19 x 1033
.
The probability of a successful random attempt is 1:2^112, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Assuming the module can support 60 authentication attempts in one minute, the probability of a
success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 60/2^112, which is less than
the 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
SNMPv3
Authentication/
Privacy Password
Passwords are required to be at least 8 characters in length and maximum of 32 characters. An 8-
character password allowing all printable American Standard Code for Information Interchange
(ASCII) characters (95) with repetition equates to a 1: (95x95x95x95x95x95x95x95), or 1:
6,634,204,312,890,625 chance of false acceptance.
The probability of a successful random attempt is 1: 6,634,204,312,890,625, which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Assuming 10 attempts per second via a scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with
multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 600/6,634,204,312,890,625, which is less
than the 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
Table 6 - Authentication Types
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6. Physical Security
The module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module made with production grade components
and standard passivation. The cover of the module is sealed with one circular tamper-evident seal2
that
covers a screw that needs to be removed to remove the cover of the module. The PIU’s are sealed with
four tamper-evident seals (2 per PIU), which are part of a FIPS kit and must be applied by the Crypto
Officer on each PIU ear. The Crypto Officer must develop an inspection schedule to verify that the external
enclosure of the modules and the tamper seals have not been damaged or tampered with in any way.
The physical security of the module is intact if there is no evidence of tampering with the seals. If the
Cryptographic Officer observes tamper evidence, it shall be assumed that the device has been
compromised. The Cryptographic Officer shall retain control of the module and perform Zeroization of
the module’s CSPs by following the steps in Section 8.4 of the Security Policy and then follow the steps in
Section 10 to place the module back into a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The tamper-evident seals
shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals, and the
direct control and observation of any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the tamper
evident seals or security appliances are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module is
maintained during such changes and the module is returned to a FIPS approved state. The locations of
the tamper-evident seals are indicated by the red rectangles in Figures 1 & 53
.
Instructions for applying the tamper evident seals shall be followed and are as follows; the surfaces should
be cleaned with 99% Isopropyl alcohol to remove dirt and oil before applying the seals. Handle the seals
with care, do not touch the adhesive side of the seal and ensure the seal placement surface is completely
clean and dry before applying the seals. If a seal needs to be re-applied, completely remove the old seal
and follow the instructions for applying a new seal.
Additional seals can be requested through your Fujitsu sales contact. Reference the ‘246700000108A’ SKU
for Blade FIPS seals and ‘246700000115A’ when ordering PIU FIPS seals.
7. Operational Environment
The module’s operational environment is considered a limited operational environment under FIPS 140-
2.
2
This seal is applied by the manufacturer before shipment. During initial inspection of the module, if the end
customer observes tamper evidence to this seal the module is DOA (Dead on Arrival) and the hardware is shipped
back to FNC.
3
Depicted on Page 7 & 8 of this document.
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8. Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management
8.1 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements the following approved algorithms in the firmware and hardware:
Hardware Implementation Algorithms
CAVP Cert # Algorithm Sizes Standard Mode/Method Use
C1004 AES 256-bits SP 800-38A
FIPS 197
SP 800-38D
ECB, GCM, CTR, GMAC Encryption, Decryption
KTS 256-bits IG D.9 KTS (AES GCM) Key Transport
Table 7 - Hardware Implementation Algorithms
Fujitsu Management Plane Cryptography Implementation
CAVP Cert # Algorithm Sizes Standard Mode/Method Use
C1319
AES 128, 192, 256-
bits
SP 800-38A
SP 800-38B
SP 800-38C
SP 800-38D
SP 800-38E
FIPS 197
CBC, ECB, CFB1, CFB8,
CFB128, OFB, CCM, XTS4
,
GCM, CTR, CMAC
generation & verification
Encryption, Decryption,
Authentication
C1319
TDES 168-bit SP 800-67 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB1, CFB8,
CFB64, CMAC generation &
verification
Encryption, Decryption,
Authentication
C1319 KTS 128, 192, 256-
bits
IG D.9 KTS (AES GCM) Key Transport key
establishment methodology
provides between 128 and
256 bits of encryption
strength
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG N/A SP 800-133 N/A Key Generation
C1319
CVL P-224, P-256
P-384, P-521
SP 800-56A ECC CDH Component
Testing
Key Agreement
C1319
Hash_DRBG &
HMAC_DRBG:
(SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-
512)
SP 800-
90Arev1
Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG,
CTR_DRBG
Random Bit Generation
4
AES-XTS was CAVP tested (128-bit and 256-bit only) but is not used in any of the services implemented by the
module in the Approved mode of operation.
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DRBG
CTR_DRBG:
(AES-128, AES-
192, AES-256)
C1319
HMAC 160, 224, 256,
384, 512-bits
FIPS PUB 198 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Message Authentication
C1319
SHS SHA-1, SHA-2 FIPS PUB
180-4
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Message Digest Generation
C1319
RSA 2048,
3072
FIPS PUB
186-25
& 186-
4
Key Generation9.31,
Signature Generation9.31,
Signature Verification9.31,
Signature Generation
PKCS1.5, Signature
Verification PKCS1.5,
Signature Generation PSS,
Signature Verification PSS
Key Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature
Verification
C1319
ECDSA P-1926
, P-224,
P-256 P-384, P-
521
FIPS PUB
186-4
KeyGen, PKV, SigGen,
SigVer
Key Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature
Verification
C1319
DSA 10247
, 2048,
3072
FIPS PUB
186-4
KeyGen, PQGGen, PQGVer,
SigGen, SigVer
Key Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature
Verification
C1319
CVL SHA-256, SHA-
384
SP 800-135 TLS KDF (v1.0/1.1 and
v1.2), SNMP KDF
Key Derivation
Table 8 - Fujitsu Management Plane Cryptography Implementation
Fujitsu Control Plane Cryptography Implementation
CAVP Cert # Algorithm Sizes Standard Mode/Method Use
C1317
AES 256-bits FIPS 197 ECB, CTR Encryption, Decryption,
Authentication
C1317
SHS SHA-2 FIPS PUB
180-4
SHA-384 Message Digest Generation
C1317
DRBG AES-256 SP 800-
90Arev1
CTR_DRBG Random Bit Generation
Table 9 - Fujitsu Control Plane Cryptography Implementation
Fujitsu Management Plane SSH Implementation
CAVP Cert # Algorithm Sizes Standard Mode/Method Use
C1320
CVL SHA-1, SHA-
256, SHA-512
SP 800-135 SSH KDF Key Derivation
Table 10 - Fujitsu Management Plane SSH Implementation
Note: Not all algorithms/modes tested on the CAVP validation certificates are implemented in the module.
5
RSA SignGen (FIPS 186-2) is only approved for modulus 4096
6
P-192 is only approved for ECDSA PKV and SigVer
7
1024 is only approved for DSA PQGVer and SigVer
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8.1.1 Allowed Algorithms
The module implements the following allowed cryptographic algorithms:
Algorithm Use
NDRNG To seed the Approved DRBG
Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #C1319 and #C1320, key agreement; key
establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
EC Diffie-Hellman EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #C1319 and #C1320, key agreement; key
establishment methodology provides between 128 bits and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
Table 11 - Allowed Algorithms
No parts of the TLS, SNMP or SSH protocol, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and
CMVP per FIPS 140-2 IG D.11.
Each of TLSv1.2 and SSHv2 protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES keys. Refer to
RFC 5246 (TLS) and RFC 4253 (SSH) for details relevant to the generation of the individual Triple-DES
encryption keys. The user is responsible for ensuring the module limits the number of encryptions with
the same key to 2^20.
8.1.2 Non-Approved Mode of Operation Non-Approved Algorithms and Protocols with No Security
Claimed
The module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithms with no security claimed:
• AES encryption/decryption used to obfuscate files stored on the module.
The operator shall consult FIPS 140-2 IG 1.23 for further understanding of the use of functions
where no security is claimed.
8.1.3 Non-Approved Mode of Operation
The Crypto Officer is responsible for configuration of the module. When configured according to the
Section 10 in this Security Policy, the module only supports the non-Approved service listed in Table 5.
The non-Approved algorithms or plaintext protocols in Section 10 are disabled.
8.1.4 Non-Approved Algorithms
The module implements the following algorithms which are considered non-Approved:
Algorithm
Diffie-Hellman Less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
RSA Less than 112 bits of encryption strength.
Table 12 - Non-Approved Algorithms
8.2 Cryptographic Key Management
The module supports the following CSPs listed below in Table 10:
Keys and
CSPs
Description Key/CSP
Type
Generation
/Input
Output
Method
Storage Zeroization
Operator
Passwords
Authentication
for Read-only
User,
Performance
Monitor
Minimum of 8
(64 bits) and
maximum of
128 bytes (1024
bits) string
Externally
generated. Enters
the module in
encrypted form via
Exits
encapsulated
(SSH/SFTP) in
configuration
backup
Hashed in
non-
volatile
Flash
Invoke
Factory Reset
or Zeroization
command
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Keys and
CSPs
Description Key/CSP
Type
Generation
/Input
Output
Method
Storage Zeroization
Operator,
Equipment
Operator, Super
User, System
Operator,
Security
Operator, Crypto
User, Crypto
Officer
(level-1 to level-8
users)
value a secure TLS or
SSH/SFTP session.
Enters the module
in plaintext via a
directly attached
cable to the serial
port
memory
EC DH Key Pair
for DEK
Key pair used in
NIST SP 800-56A
(Section 5.7.1.2)
ECC CDH
Primitive
computation
EC DH private
component
384-bits
EC DH public
key (P-384)
Generated
internally using the
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Public key of a
peer enters the
module in
plaintext
Private never
exits the
module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Session
termination
or power
cycle or key
rotation
ECC CDH
primitive for
DEK
Shared Secret (Z)
value that will be
used to derive the
DEK
384-bit string Computed per SP
800-56Arev1
(Section 5.7.1.2)
Never exits
the module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Session
termination
or power
cycle or key
rotation
Data
Encryption Key
(DEK)
Used for
encrypting or
decrypting
payload data
AES-GCM 256
bit
Derived per NIST
SP 800-56A
(Section 5.8.1)
Never exits
the module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power Cycle
or key
rotation
Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret
Entered by Super
User, Crypto
User, Crypto
Officer (level-4, 7
or 8). Parameter
used for Peer-
Authentication
during key
exchange
384-bit string Externally
generated. Enters
the module in
encrypted form via
SSH, TLS or
Console (users
enter in plain-text
but encrypted
through transport
protocol)
Exits
encapsulated
(SSH or TLS)
in
configuration
backup
Encrypted
in non-
volatile
Flash
memory
Invoke
Factory Reset
or Zeroization
command
Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair
Negotiating TLS
or SSH/SFTP
sessions
Diffie-Hellman
private
component
160 – 512 bits
Public
component
2048 bits
Generated
internally using the
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Public key of a
peer enters the
module in
plaintext
Private never
exits the
module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Session
termination
or power
cycle
Elliptic Curve Negotiating TLS EC DH private Generated Private never Plaintext in Session
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 18 of 27
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Keys and
CSPs
Description Key/CSP
Type
Generation
/Input
Output
Method
Storage Zeroization
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair
or SSH/SFTP
sessions
component
384-bits
EC DH public
key (P-256, P-
384 and P-521)
internally using the
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Public key of a
peer enters the
module in
plaintext
exits the
module
volatile
memory
termination
or power
cycle
SNMP Privacy
Key
Encryption /
decryption of
SNMP session
traffic
AES CFB 128 bit Derived using SP
800-135 Key
derivation (SNMP)
Exits
encapsulated
(SSH/SFTP) in
configuration
backup
Plaintext in
non-
volatile
Flash
memory
Invoke
Factory Reset
or Zeroization
command
SNMP
Authentication
Key
Message
authentication
and verification in
SNMP
HMAC-SHA-1 Derived using SP
800-135 Key
derivation (SNMP)
Exits
encapsulated
(SSH/SFTP) in
configuration
backup
Plaintext in
non-
volatile
Flash
memory
Invoke
Factory Reset
or Zeroization
command
SNMPv3
Authentication
/ Privacy
Password
Password Minimum of 8
(64 bits) and
maximum of 32
bytes (160 bits)
string value
Externally
generated. Enters
the module in
encrypted form via
a secure TLS or
SSH session.
Exits
encapsulated
(SSH/SFTP) in
configuration
backup
Plaintext in
non-
volatile
Flash
memory
Invoke
Factory Reset
or Zeroization
command
SSH/SFTP Host
Key Pair
Key Pair used for
SSH/SFTP
authentication
RSA 2048-bit Internally
generated via FIPS-
Approved DRBG
upon first system
power-up
Private never
exits the
module
Plaintext in
non-
volatile
Flash
memory
Zeroization
command
TLS Premaster
Secret
Establish the TLS
Master Secret
384-bit string Generated
internally with the
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Input during TLS
negotiation
Exits in
encrypted
form during
protocol
handshake
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Session
termination
or power
cycle
TLS Master
Secret
Establish the TLS
Session Key
384-bit string Derived 8
from the
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
Never exits
the module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Session
termination
or power
cycle
TLS Session Key Used for
encrypting/
decrypting TLS
messages
AES CBC or
GCM 128 or
256-bit key,
168-bit Triple-
DES ECBC
Generated
internally during
session
negotiation
Exits in
encrypted
form during
protocol
handshake
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Session
termination
or power
cycle
8
Derived via NIST SP 800-135 TLS 1.2 KDF
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 19 of 27
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Keys and
CSPs
Description Key/CSP
Type
Generation
/Input
Output
Method
Storage Zeroization
TLS
Authentication
Key
Used for
authenticating
TLS messages
HMAC SHA-1-,
256-, 384-bit
key
Generated
internally during
session
negotiation
Never exits
the module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Session
termination
or power
cycle
SSH/SFTP
Session
Encryption Key
Used for
Encrypting
SSH/SFTP
messages
AES CBC or CTR
128-, 192, or
256-bit key/
GCM 128-or
256-bit/ 168-bit
Triple-DES ECBC
Internally
generated via FIPS-
Approved DRBG
Exits in
encrypted
form during
protocol
handshake
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Session
termination
or power
cycle
SSH/SFTP
Session
Authentication
Key
Data
authentication for
SSH/SFTP
sessions
HMAC SHA-1-,
96, 256-, or
512-bit key
Derived via
in SP800-135 KDF
(SSH)
Never exits
the module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Session
termination
or power
cycle
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Seed
Seeding material
for the SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bit value Internally
generated by the
NDRNG
Never exits
the module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Nonce
Entropy material
for the SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
128-bit value Internally
generated by the
NDRNG
Never exits
the module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value
Used for the SP
800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Internal state
value
Internally
generated
Never exits
the module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value
Used for the SP
800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Internal state
value
Internally
generated
Never exits
the module
Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power cycle
Table 13 - Approved Keys and CSPs Table
The module implements the following access control policy on keys and CSPs in the module shown in
the following table. The Access Policy is noted by R=Read, W=Write and X=Execute.
Service CSP Access Right (R/W/X)
Initialization Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key, SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication Key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
Manage Other User Accounts Operator Passwords , Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS
Master Secret, TLS Session Key, TLS Authentication Key;
SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair, SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key,
SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
R/W/X
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 20 of 27
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Seed, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key
value, SP 800-90A V value
Change Own Password Operator Password, Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS
Master Secret, TLS Session Key, TLS Authentication Key;
SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair, SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key,
SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
Seed, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key
value, SP 800-90A V value
R/W/X
Provision Layer 1 Encryption Operator Password R
EC DH Key Pair for DEK, ECC CDH primitive for DEK, DEK, Peer-
Authentication Pre-Shared Secret, Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair,
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster
Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS Session Key, TLS Authentication
Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair, SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key,
SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
Seed, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key
value, SP 800-90A V value
R/W/X
Add/Change Pre-Shared
Secret (DEK)
Operator Password R
EC DH Key Pair for DEK, ECC CDH primitive for DEK, DEK, Peer-
Authentication Pre-Shared Secret, Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair,
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster
Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS Session Key, TLS Authentication
Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair, SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key,
SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
Seed, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key
value, SP 800-90A V value
R/W/X
Transfer Encryption Logs Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key, SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication Key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
System Provisioning Operator Password R
SNMP Privacy Key, SNMP Authentication Key, SNMPv3
Authentication/ Privacy Password; DH Key Pair, ECDH Key Pair,
TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS Session Key, TLS
Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair, SSH/SFTP Session
Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session Authentication key, SP 800-
90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A V value
R/W/X
Equipment Provisioning Operator Password R
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 21 of 27
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
Interface Provisioning Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
View Equipment PM counters Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
View Interface PM counters Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
Clear PM Counters Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
View Faults or Alarms Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
Request Status Information Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
R/W/X
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 22 of 27
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
Export Backup of
Configuration file over SFTP
Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
View Network Element
Configuration
Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
On-Demand Self-test N/A N/A
Zeroization/Factory Reset All CSP’s R/W/X
Firmware Update Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
Set Configuration data Operator Password R
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Pair, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Session Key, TLS Authentication Key; SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair,
SSH/SFTP Session Encryption Key, SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Seed, SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG Nonce, SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG key value, SP 800-90A
V value
R/W/X
Table 14 - Approved Service to Key/CSP Mapping
8.3 Key Generation and Entropy
The module’s primary entropy source is an entropy-generating NDRNG inside the module’s cryptographic
boundary consistent with Scenario 1 (a) described in FIPS 140-2 IG 7.14. The module performs a CRNGT
on the entropy input it receives. The Approved CTR_DRBGs in the Fujitsu Management Plane
Cryptography Implementation library and Fujitsu Control Plane Cryptography Implementation library will
each request 384-bits from the Linux output pools when needed.
Seed created by NDRNG and used to seed the CTR_DRBG. The Nonce is 128 bits and the Entropy input is
256 bits for a total seed size of 384 bits.
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 23 of 27
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In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation
(CKG) as per SP 800-133 (vendor affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric keys are the unmodified
output from the SP 800-90A DRBG.
8.4 Zeroization
Ephemeral secret keys are zeroized either at session termination or by power-cycling the module.
Persistently stored CSPs can also be zeroized by issuing a factory reset command, “request zeroize-
system”. This changes all values back to zero or the default values. Targeted Zeroization of CSPs used
for L1 data encryption can also completed by issuing the “request zeroize-data-encryption” command.
If the module transitions from the non-Approved to the Approved mode or vice versa, the module shall
be zeroized prior to switching modes.
The output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected from processes
performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the data output
interface when the module zeroizes keys.
9. Self-tests
FIPS 140-2 requires the module to perform self-tests to ensure the module integrity and the correctness
of the cryptographic functionality at start-up. Some functions require conditional tests during normal
operation of the module.
9.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are run upon the initialization of the module and do not require operator intervention
to run. If any of the tests fail, the module will return an error code and transition to an error state where
no functions can be executed. An operator can attempt to reset the state by cycling the power. However,
the failure of a self-test may require the module to be replaced.
The module implements the following power-on self-tests in the Module:
Type Test Description
Integrity Test • File Integrity (CRC-32)
• Blade FPGA FW Integrity (CRC-32)
• DCO FW Integrity (CRC-16)
• DSP FW Integrity (CRC-16)
Known Answer
Tests
• Hardware AES ECB KAT (Encryption and Decryption. Size 256)
• Hardware AES GCM KAT (Encryption and Decryption. Size 256)
• Fujitsu Management Plane Cryptography
o Firmware AES CBC KAT (Encryption and Decryption. Size
128,192,256)
o Firmware AES GCM KAT (Encryption and Decryption. Size 128, 256)
o Firmware TDES CBC KAT (Encryption and Decryption)
o Firmware SHS KAT (SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512)
o Firmware HMAC KAT (HMAC-SHA-1, -SHA-256, -SHA-384, -SHA-512)
o Firmware SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT
o Firmware RSA KAT (Sign and Verify. Size 2048)
o Firmware DSA KAT (Sign and Verify Size 2048)
o Firmware ECDSA KAT (Sign and Verify. Size P-256)
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 24 of 27
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
o Firmware EC Diffie-Hellman Primitive “Z” Computation KAT
• Fujitsu Control Plane Cryptography
o Firmware AES ECB KAT (Encryption and Decryption. Size 256)
o Firmware ECDHE KAT
o Firmware SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT
o Firmware SHS KAT (SHA-384)
Table 15 - Power-up Self-tests
The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when it is initialized. All power-on self-tests
must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The Power-on self-tests can be run on
demand by rebooting the module in FIPS approved Mode of Operation. Should any of the above tests
fails, the device enters an error state. In an error state no traffic is allowed in or out of the device on the
ethernet ports.
9.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are test that run during operation of the module. Each module performs the
following conditional self-tests:
Type Test Description
CRNGT on NDRNG Continuous RNG test (CRNGT) performed on entropy input from the
TRNG
CRNGT on the DRBG Continuous RNG test (CRNGT) for the SP800-90A DRBG
Pairwise Consistency Test RSA/ ECDSA Key Generation
Firmware Load Test RSA based integrity test to verify firmware to be loaded into the
module
Table 16 - Conditional Self-tests
9.3 Critical Function Tests
The module implements the following critical function tests which execute at start-up or during
operation of the module.
Type Test Description
DRBG Health Tests Performed on DRBG, per SP 800‐90A Section 11.3. Required per IG
W.3.
Table 17 – Critical Function Tests
10. Guidance and Secure Operation
This section describes the configuration, maintenance, and administration of the cryptographic module.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for ensuring none of the plaintext protocols are used and non-
Approved ciphers in Section 10 are disabled. When configured according to the Section 10 in this
Security Policy, the module only runs in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation with the exception of the
Services in Table 5. Services listed in Table 5 make use of non-compliant cryptographic algorithms. Use
of these algorithms are prohibited in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.
When the module is powered on, its power-up self-tests are executed without any operator
intervention.
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 25 of 27
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
10.1 Initialization
The operator shall set up the device as defined in the Fujitsu 1FINITY™ T600 Transport Blade Security
Guide. The Crypto-Officer shall also:
• Verify that the firmware version of the module is t600-19.1_cd42 or t600-19.1_cd188.
• Ensure the default password of the Super User and Crypto Officer is changed upon first use.
• All operator passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters in length meeting the following
character restrictions;
• two uppercase characters
• two lowercase characters
• two numeric characters
• two special characters
• The following should be disabled prior to enabling FIPS and shall not be used in the FIPS Approved
mode of operation;
• RADIUS
• TACACS+
• ZTP
• USB
• Root Access
• Telnet
• FTP
• HTTP
• Bypass encryption
• SNMP-v1/v2c
• Console shall be enabled.
• SNMPv3 to allow only secure auth/priv methods
• Password mode should be fips-compatible.
• ciphers should be fips-compatible.
• ssh-algorithm should be fips-compatible
• For SSH/SFTP, ensure modulus sizes of 2048-bits of strength or use group 14 selected for Diffie-
Hellman.
• Ensure that SSH is configured to use RSA for authentication.
• Ensure RSA keys are at least 2048-bit keys. No 512-bit or 1024-bit keys shall be used in FIPS mode
of operation.
The system shall be considered to be in the non-approved mode of operation if any of the non-
compliant algorithms listed in Section 8.1.3 are used.
10.2 Usage of AES GCM in the module
The module's software AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for
TLS. The module is compatible with TLS v1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites
from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its
cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given
session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 26 of 27
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use
with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
For SSH, the IV conforms to the SSHv2 specification and is compliant with RFCs 4252, 4253 and RFC 5647
and FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 scenario #1.
The module's hardware AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5, scenario #3. The module uses
deterministic construction where the 96-bit IV is the concatenation of two fields, the fixed field and the
invocation field. The fixed field is the 32-bit Device Field (Engine #ID) and the invocation field is the 64-
bit counter. The block counter in the IV is incremented every OTN frame. The module forces a counter
reset/new IV every 48 hours for the core. If a new key is not derived before the maximum limit, the
module raises a flag/alarm.
Per the requirements specified in Section 8 in NIST SP 800-38D, the probability that the authenticated
encryption function ever will be invoked with the same IV and the same key on two (or more) distinct
sets of input data is no greater than 2-32
.
The module enforces FIPS 140-2 IG A.5, which states that in case the module’s power is lost and then
restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
Fujitsu Network Communications Inc. 2020 Version 1.0 Page 27 of 27
Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
11. Glossary
Term Description
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CFB Cipher Feedback
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
DCO Digital Controlled Oscillator
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSP Digital Signal Processor
ECB Electronic Codebook
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
IG Implementation Guidance
IV Initialization vector
KAT Known answer test
KDF Key-Derivation Function
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OTN Optical Transport Network
QSFP Quad Small Form-factor Pluggable
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
TBps Terabytes per second
TRNG True Random Number Generator
Table 18 - Glossary of Terms
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