Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
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SanDisk Technologies Inc
Ultrastar® DC SN655 BiCS5 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD, SED
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.1
Date: April 15, 2026
Protection of Data at Rest
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Table of Contents
1 – General................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 – Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................... 6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.........................................................................................................12
2.5 Algorithms .......................................................................................................................13
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................14
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................17
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................18
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................19
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................19
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................19
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................20
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................20
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................21
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................21
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................21
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................23
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................63
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................63
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................64
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................64
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................64
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................65
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................65
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ...........................................................................65
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................66
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................66
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................69
8.1 Mitigation Techniques......................................................................................................69
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................70
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9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................70
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................70
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................70
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................73
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................93
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................93
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................93
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................95
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................96
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................96
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................97
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................97
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................98
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................98
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................98
11.5 Maintenance Requirements.........................................................................................100
11.6 End of Life ...................................................................................................................100
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................................101
References and Definitions .....................................................................................................102
NIST Specifications .............................................................................................................102
Trusted Computing Group Specifications ............................................................................102
NVMe and PCIe Specifications............................................................................................103
Corporate References .........................................................................................................103
Other References................................................................................................................103
Definitions...............................................................................................................................104
Acronyms................................................................................................................................107
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7
Table 3 - Ultrastar DC SN655 Exclusions................................................................................... 8
Table 4: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................12
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Avago Technologies................................................................13
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Western Digital Corportation....................................................13
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Western Digital Corporation.....................................................13
Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................14
Table 9: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................17
Table 10: Entropy Certificates...................................................................................................18
Table 11: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................18
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................20
Table 13: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................21
Table 14: Roles.........................................................................................................................22
Table 15: Approved Services ....................................................................................................63
Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................66
Table 17: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................70
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................70
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................72
Table 20: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................83
Table 21: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................92
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................93
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................95
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................95
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................95
Table 26: Error States...............................................................................................................96
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Security Subsystem Components .............................................................................. 6
Figure 2 - Ultrastar DC SN655 ................................................................................................... 7
Figure 3 – Opacity Connector Side ...........................................................................................11
Figure 4 – Opacity Back Side....................................................................................................12
Figure 5 - Symmetric Key Tree .................................................................................................19
Figure 6 - Asymmetric Key Tree................................................................................................64
Figure 7 - Tamper-Evident Seals Ultrastar DC SN655, Top View..............................................67
Figure 8 - Tamper-Evident Seal Ultrastar DC SN655, Bottom View and UART Access Point....67
Figure 9 - Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seal............................................................................67
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1 – General
The Security Policy is non-proprietary.
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Ultrastar® DC SN655
BiCS5 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD self-encrypting drive. It contains the security rules under which
the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in
FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall
Security Level 2 module.SN655.
1.2 Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 – Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Module Type: Hardware
• Description - The Ultrastar®
SN655 BiCS5 NVMe®
TCG Opal SDD, hereafter referred to
as Ultrastar®
DC SN655, Cryptographic Module, cryptographic module, or CM is a self-
encrypting drive (SED) that complies in general with the specifications listed in 13.2
Trusted Computing Group Specifications and specifically with the TCG Storage
Architecture Core Specification [TCG Core] and Trusted Computing Group) Storage
Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification (TCG Storage SSC: Opal) [TCG Opal].
The TCG Storage SSC: Opal specification defines a management interface for a host
application to activate, provision, and manage encryption of user data. The specification
includes data structures, their required content, and mechanisms for managing and
configuring Authentication Credentials and access controls. The security architecture
provides a locking mechanism by which an Authentication Credential (i.e., a password)
can be set by an operator to enable control of access to user data. After an operator
authenticates to the appropriate role and locks access to user data access user data is
inaccessible. This implementation complies with the lock-based authentication model
specified in IG 4.1.A.
Figure 1 illustrates a logical view of the top-level firmware components that constitute the
security subsystem. The Security Core is the most secure portion of the security
subsystem. It forms a security boundary that provides assurances for firmware integrity,
SSP integrity, and data-at-rest security within the CM. The Security Protocol and Services
ring contains the TCG Storage SSC: Opal security protocol. Components in this ring
communicate to the security core using a Security Core API. The rest of the Cryptographic
Module’s firmware resides in the Security Application Client ring. The security application
client firmware, collectively known as the “Base FW”, interfaces with the Security Protocol
and Services Layer. The Host system communicates with the Cryptographic Module
through the Security Application Client layer.
Figure 1 - Security Subsystem Components
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Purpose - The Cryptographic Module’s intended use is by US Federal agencies or other
markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated hardware modules. The primary function of the
Cryptographic Module is to provide data encryption, access control, and cryptographic erase
of the data stored within solid-state memory devices within the CM. The operator of the
Cryptographic Module interfaces with the Cryptographic Module through applications that
reside within a host system.
Figure 2 illustrates the physical form of the CM within the scope of this security policy
document. The CM is a multi-chip embedded embodiment. The hard opaque surface of the
enclosure defines the cryptographic boundary. All components within this boundary satisfy
FIPS 140-3 requirements.
The cryptographic boundary consists of CM’s physical enclosure and all firmware
implementations within the immutable Security Core firmware that resides within the ROM of
the Western Digital FE2-PG4 ASIC and the mutable Security Protocol and Services and
Security Application Client firmware layers. The Cryptographic Module writes mutable
firmware from NAND solid-state media into DRAM memory on power up.
Photograph
Figure 2 - Ultrastar DC SN655
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Embedded
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
The Ultrastar®
DC SN655 cryptographic module was tested on the following operational
environment.
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
Ultrastar DC
SN655
WUS5EA1A1ESP7E8 RC104020
ARM Cortex M3, ARM
Cortex-R5
N/A
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
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The Cryptographic Module operates within a limited operational environment. When
operational, the Cryptographic Module prohibits operator or process-initiated additions,
deletions, or modification of the code working set. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic
Module uses an authenticated download service, which complies with ISO 19790 7.4.3.4, to
upgrade the mutable firmware in its entirety. The immutable security firmware stored in ROM,
which is essential and integral to the operation of the module is non-modifiable. If the download
operation is successful, authorized, and verified, the Cryptographic Module begins operating
with the new code working set after successfully executed all required pre-operational self-tests
that comply with ISO 19790 7.10.2.2. Firmware loaded into the Module that is not on the FIPS
140-3 certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3
validation.
The Cryptographic Module’s security design utilizes common security protections, policies, and
processes. It utilizes a hardware security Access Control Module (ACM) that incorporates a
hardware Root of Trust (RoT). Security firmware leverages the RoT, hardware cryptographic
algorithms and accelerators to implement a secure environment that assures firmware integrity,
port access and the secure storage of plaintext secrets, user data, keys, and Sensitive Security
Parameters (SSP) within the Cryptographic Module. The CM only supports CMVP approved
security functions defined in NIST SP 800-140C and SP 800-140D.
The hardware Root of Trust assures,
1. The isolation of security firmware and sensitive security parameters from the Security
Application Client firmware (aka Base firmware) or firmware installed on embedded
components within the cryptographic boundary.
2. The verification of Cryptographic Module firmware and security objects before usage
3. A Key Management tree secured by a root key stored in HW RoT OTP bits.
4. Support for HW based Symmetric Key Generation
5. Cryptographic Algorithm Acceleration
6. End-to-End Protect between ACM & Key Server
2.3 Excluded Components
The Ultrastar DC SN655 components listed below are excluded from the cryptographic
boundary. The point of observation is noted in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
Table 3 - Ultrastar DC SN655 Exclusions
Exclusion * Rationale
C620 –C657 C620 –C657 are connected to the V1p20_SDRAM power rail. An open among them
would have no effect. A short among any of them would collapse the power rail,
cause DDR transactions to stop, and set the master reset signal. A short would
prevent the drive from starting and would force the drive to shut down if it occurred
during normal IO. In-flight data may be lost but stored data would not be
compromised.
D12 D12 is connected to the main 12V input power rail. An open will have no effect
under normal conditions. A short would blow the fuse and prevent the drive from
starting and would force the drive to shut down if it occurred during normal IO. In-
flight data may be lost but stored data would not be compromised.
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Exclusion * Rationale
C50, C156, and C371 C50, C156, and C371 are connected to the V1p80 power rail. An open among them
would have no effect. A short among any of them would collapse the power rail,
cause GPIO to stop, and set the master reset signal. A short would prevent the drive
from starting and would force the drive to shut down if it occurred during normal IO.
In-flight data may be lost but stored data would not be compromised.
C368 and C527 C368 and C527 are connected to the V2p50_Flash power rail. An open among them
would have little to no effect. A short among any of them would collapse the power
rail, cause flash writes to fail and set the master reset signal. A short would prevent
the drive from starting and would force the drive to shut down if it occurred during
normal IO. In-flight data may be lost but stored data would not be compromised.
C97, C123, C469, C576,
and C598
C97, C123, C469, C576, and C598 are connected to the VDD_I/O_NAND power rail.
An open among them would have little to no effect. A short among any of them
would collapse the power rail, cause flash read and writes to fail and set the master
reset signal. A short would prevent the drive from starting and would force the drive
to shut down if it occurred during normal IO. In-flight data may be lost but stored
data would not be compromised.
C27, C37, and C346 C27, C37, and C346 are connected to the VSWITCHED power rail. An open among
them would have little to no effect. A short among any of them would collapse the
power and cause the drive to stop. A short would prevent the drive from starting and
would force the drive to shut down if it occurred during normal IO. The power
backup capability would be defeated. In-flight data may be lost but stored data would
not be compromised.
C43, C328, C447 and
C613
C43, C328, C447 and C613 are connected the V2p50_SDRAM power rail. An open
among them would have no effect. A short among any of them would collapse the
power and cause the drive to stop. A short would prevent the drive from starting and
would force the drive to shut down if it occurred during normal IO. In-flight data may
be lost but stored data would not be compromised.
D9 and R277 D9 open or short affects SMBus operation which has no effect on data. R277 open
affects only SMBus during Vaux only operation R277 short affects Vaux in-rush.
Neither part manipulation would affect data operation.
R130 and C316 R130 open or short only affects the in-rush current on host powerup or hot swap.
C316 open or short only affects the in-rush current on host powerup or hot swap.
Only if both were shorted would the 12V fuse blow and the drive would be
inoperable.
D13, D8, Q14, Q9,
R145, R195, R241,
R278, R297, R30, and
U30
Status indicators are associated with D13, D8, Q14, Q9, R145, R195, R241, R278,
R297, R30, and U30. Open or short of any individual component would have no
effect on the drive. Multiple shorts could permanently damage components but
without additional effects on the operation of the drive.
D5 and D16 D5 and D16 are ESD protection diodes. Opens would have no operational effect on
a drive. Shorts would affect SMBus, manufacturing, or test signals which would
have no effect on data. Neither opens nor shorts would compromise data.
R11 and R41 These components affect dual-port operation. Shorts would prevent dual-port
operation. Opens would not prevent dual-port operation. Neither opens nor shorts
would compromise data.
C641, R322, R324,
Q18A and Q18B
These components affect external control of drive power. The external signal is
active high. No open or short of R322, R324, or C641 could cause false activation.
A short of Q18A or Q18B would cause the drive to power off with data saving or
prevent power-up.
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Exclusion * Rationale
R182, R183, R184 and
R185
These components affect the capacitor health check. ASSERT with short(s) due to
failure of the health check. No effect on data.
C450 and C451 These components affect signals used in U.3 mode where the PCIe signals come
through the SAS lanes. This mode is not used by the CM. No effect on operation or
data integrity.
R315 R315 is used only in a test mode within a manufacturing environment. Open would
defeat the test mode which is only used for debug purposes. No effect on data.
R191 and R192 R191 and R192 create a 3.3V ACTIVITY signal. Open R191 or short R192 could
damage U4 but will not affect data. Short R191 or open R192 affect only the
indicator on the host and will not affect data. No effect on operation or data integrity.
F2 Short F2 has no effect on circuit operation. Open F2 will disable Vaux-only operation
of SMBus and will put the drive in RESET. No effect on data.
Q16A and R230 Open or short Q16A or R230 will cause the capacitor health check to fail but no data
would be affected. Open R306 will have no effect. Short R306 will cause the
capacitor health check to fail but no data would be affected. No effect on data
integrity.
C347, R193, R2098,
R214 and R227
• OK: Effect will not be detectable and will have no effect on data IO or stored data
integrity
• ASSERT: Drive will detect the failure and not permit data transactions.
• SCRAM FAILURE: In-flight data may be compromised but security will not be
affected.
Open Short
C347 OK ASSERT
R193 ASSERT OK
R209 OK ASSERT
R214 SCRAM FAIL ASSERT
R227 ASSERT SCRAM FAIL
D10 D10 provides Vaux during PFAIL. Open: SMBus and PERST will be affected during
PFAIL. Stored data will not be compromised.
Q10, R162 and R194 • OK: Effect will not be detectable and will have no effect on data IO or stored data
integrity
• ASSERT: Drive will detect the failure and not permit data transactions.
• Possible ASSERT: Drive may ASSERT due to health check timing beyond
specification.
Open Short
Q10 ASSERT ASSERT
R162 ASSERT ASSERT/Q10
damage
R194 OK ASSERT
Q16B Q16B: Open or short will affect knowledge of the holdup capacitor state. Short will
cause failure of the health check. Open will cause ASSERT on powerup. Data will
not be compromised.
C546 and C547 C546 and C547 couple PCIe signals from the host. Open will prevent 1x4 lane
operation.
Short may disrupt PCIe bus operation. Data will not be compromised.
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Exclusion * Rationale
U8, R12, R13, R38, R51
and R52
• OK: Condition will not affect drive operation.
• NEEDS TESTING: Drive operation is uncertain. May prevent proper link training.
• Stored data will not be compromised.
Open Short
U8 OK OK
R12 OK OK
R13 OK OK
R38 OK OK
R51 OK OK
R52 OK OK
U7 and U15 U7 and U15 are temperature sensors. The malfunction or failure of either
component will cause the module to throttle performance or shut down. Stored data
will not be compromised.
R43, R44 and R45 R43, R44 and R45 set the output voltage during PFAIL. High output won’t damage
downstream regulators. Low output will prevent saving of in-flight data. Stored data
will not be compromised.
Open Short
R43 Low Output High Output (16V)
R44 High Output Low Output
R45 High Output OK
C319, C332, C362, R46
and R314
C319, C332, and C362 shorts could damage the MP5514. C319, C332, and C362
opens could cause MP5514 malfunctions. R46 open/short undetectable. R314
open/short will affect the health check. Stored data will not be compromised.
Open Short
C319 MP5514 Failure MP5514 Failure
C362 MP5514 Failure MP5514 Failure
C332 MP5514 Failure MP5514 Failure
R314 ASSERT ASSERT
R46 OK OK
Figure 3 – Opacity Connector Side
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Figure 4 – Opacity Back Side
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
isFIPS
The cryptographic
module is operating
as a FIPS 140-3
compliant module
Approved
1. The Level 0 Discovery service returns a value
of 1 from the in FIPS global indicator data field
and 2. The Firmware Download Control
LockOnReset field is set to PowerCycle and 3.
For each configured Locking SP User, the state of
each attribute listed here is set such that, a.
LockOnReset = PowerCycle . b.
ReadLockEnabled = True c. WriteLockEnabled =
True
Table 4: Modes List and Description
Section 11. this document specifies the recommended and mandatory steps necessary for the
secure installation, initialization, and start-up of the cryptographic module as a FIPS 140-3 SL2
compliant module. The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the mandatory
configuration requirements remain unchanged. When correctly configured, the Cryptographic
Module always powers up isFIPS mode.
The Cryptographic Module does not support non-approved or non-allowed security functions.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The above table specifies the conditions that must be true for the Cryptographic Module to
operate in isFIPS mode. Any action by the operator that results in the negation of the Firmware
Download Control's lock on PowerCycle setting transitions the CM to a noncompliant state. Any
action by the operator that negates the Locking SP User attribute settings, specified the "Modes
List and Description" Table above for LockOnReset, ReadLockEnabled, or WriteLockEnabled
transitions the CM to a noncompliant state.
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2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The Module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic algorithms listed the table below.
Avago Technologies
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC AES 3580
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB AES 3580
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
HMAC-SHA2-
256
HMAC
2280
- FIPS 198-1
SHA2-256 SHS 2942
Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Avago Technologies
Western Digital Corportation
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB A3410
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Western Digital Corportation
Western Digital Corporation
Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-KWP A3374
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38F
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
A3410
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38E
Counter DRBG A3374
Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
PBKDF A3374
Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 2-
1024 Increment 1
Password Length - Password
Length: 32
SP 800-132
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
4)
A3374
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
4)
A3375
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048
FIPS 186-4
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Western Digital Corporation
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Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The Cryptographic Module implements the listed FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic
algorithms.
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG-Direct
Symmetric Key
Generation:AES 256
N/A
SP 800-133rev2 Section 4
example #1, Section 6.1 and IG
D.H
CKG-
Combined
Symmetric Key
Generation:AES 256
N/A
SP 800-133rev2 Section 6.3
example #2 and IG C.I
Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Authority_Digest_Generation MAC
Generates an
HMAC
message
digest of an
Authentication
Credential
PIN
Publication:[FIPS
198-1] [IG10.3.A]
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
Authority_Digest_Verification MAC
Verifies the
HMAC digest
of an
Authentication
Credential
PIN.
Publication:[FIPS
198-1] [IG 10.3.A]
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
Decryption
BC-
UnAuth
Block Cipher
Publication:[FIPS
197] [SP 800-38A]
[IG 10.3.A]
AES-CBC:
(AES 3580)
Key Size: :
256
Key
Strength::
256 bits
Derived_Key_Generation PBKDF
Password-
Based Key
Derivation
Publication:[SP
800-132] [IG
10.3.A] [IG D.N]
[FIPS 198-1] [IG
10.3.A]
PBKDF:
(A3374)
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
Digest_Generation SHA
Secure Hash
Standard
Publication:FIPS
[180-4] [IG 10.3.A]
[IG C.B]
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
Encryption
BC-
UnAuth
Block Cipher
Publication:[FIPS
197] [SP 800-38A]
[IG 10.3.A]
AES-CBC:
(AES 3580)
Key Size:
256
Key
Strength:
256 bits
Entropy ENT-ESV
Entropy
Source
Publication:[IG
9.3.A] [IG D.J] [IG
D.O]
FW_Authenticity
DigSig-
SigVer
Digital
Signature
Verification.
Verifies the
authenticity of
a firmware
image.
Publication:[IG
10.3.A] [IG C.B] [IG
C.F]
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4): (A3374)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
FW_Integrity
DigSig-
SigVer
Digital
Signature
Verification.
Verifies the
integrity of a
firmware
image
Publication:[IG
10.3.A] [IG C.B] [IG
C.F]
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4): (A3375)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
Key Wrap BC-Auth
Key Wrapping
Key
Unwrapping
Publication:[SP
800-38F] [IG D.G]
[FIPS 197] [IG
10.3.A]
AES-KWP:
(A3374)
AES-ECB:
(AES 3580)
Key Size::
256
Key
Strength::
256 bits
Keyed_Digest_Generation MAC
Generates an
HMAC
message
digest to sign
encrypted
SSPs
Publication:[FIPS
198-1] [IG 10.3.A]
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
Keyed_Digest_Verification MAC
Verifies the
HMAC
message
digest
Publications:[FIPS
198-1] [IG 10.3.A]
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
signature of
an encrypted
SSPs
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
MEK Generation CKG
Cryptographic
Key
Generation,
XOR of LRK
and NSK
Publication:[SP800-
133] [IG D.H]
CKG-
Combined:
()
Symmetric
Key
Generation:
AES 256
RBG DRBG
Random
number
generator
Publication:[SP
800-90A] [IG
10.3.A] [IG D.L] [IG
D.R]
Counter
DRBG:
(A3374)
RBG Seeding ENT-ESV
Seeds DRBG
with entropy
data
Publication:[SP
800-90B] [IG 9.3.A]
[IG 10.3.A] [IG D.J]
[IG D.K]
Counter
DRBG:
(A3374)
SecureLoader_Integrity
DigSig-
SigVer
Digital
Signature
Verification.
Verifies the
integrity of the
Secure
Loader
firmware
image
Publication:[IG C.F]
[IG 10.3.A] [IG C.B]
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4): (A3374)
User_Data_Decryption
BC-
UnAuth
Block Cipher
Publication:[FIPS
197] [SP 800-38E]
[IG 10.3.A] [IG C.I]
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision
2.0:
(A3410)
Payload
Length::
4096 -
32768
Increment::
128
Tweak
Mode::
Number
Key Size:
256
Key
Strength::
256 bits
AES-ECB:
(A3410)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Key Size:
256
Key
Strength:
256 bits
User_Data_Encryption
BC-
UnAuth
Block Cipher
Publication:[FIPS
197] [SP 800-38E]
[IG 10.3.A] [IG C.I]
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision
2.0:
(A3410)
Payload
Length:
4096 -
32768
Increment::
128
Tweak
Mode::
Number
Key Size::
256
Key
Strength::
256 bits
AES-ECB:
(A3410)
Key Size:
256
Key
Strength:
256 bits
Symmetric_Key_Generation CKG
Generates
AES 256
symmetric
cryptographic
keys
Publication:[SP800-
133r2] [I.G D.H]
CKG-
Direct: ()
Symmetric
Key
Generation:
AES 256
Table 9: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES-XTS Key Pair Generation
The Cryptographic Module performs a key comparison test on each LRK.AESKey/LRK.XTS and
NSK.AESKey/NSK.XTS keyset to assure compliance with FIPS 140-3 [IG C.I] XTS-AES Key
Generation Requirements every time the CM generates an LRK.AESKey/LRK.XTS and
NSK.AESKey/NSK.XTS keyset, to assure compliance for all derived MEKs. The only use of
any AES-XTS key pair is the encryption and decryption of data-at-rest within the cryptographic
module in a storage application.
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PBKDF2
The password consists of a minimum of twelve (12) hexadecimal bytes values and a maximum
of thirty-two (32) hexadecimal bytes values that range from 0x00 to 0xFF. The probability that a
random attempt correctly guesses a twelve (12) byte password, or a false acceptance occurs is
equal to 1 in 7.92E+28. The probability that a random attempt correctly guesses a thirty-two
(32) byte password, or a false acceptance occurs is equal to 1 in 1.16E+7728.
The default 1024 iteration count, 256-bit Salt and HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert #HMAC 2280)
algorithm conforms to SP 800-132, Option 2a. The Master key (MK) encrypts and decrypts data
protection keys using AES-KWP (Cert. #A3374).
The PBKDF2 password derived keys, Ku, and Ka, encrypt data protection keys used in a data
storage application.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The SP 800-90A rev1-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG), implemented as
a CTR_DRBG mechanism, uses an AES-256 block cipher derivation function to generate
encryption keys for use within the cryptographic boundary of the Cryptographic Module. The
paragraphs titled Entropy Information and RBG Information summarize the characteristics of the
entropy noise source that resides within the cryptographic boundary and seeds the
CTR_DRBG.
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E5 Western Digital Corporation
Table 10: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
ESV,
E5
Physical
20-82-10047-A1, FE2-PG4 ASIC,
Rev A1 ARM Cortex M3
32 bits 2.6 None
Table 11: Entropy Sources
Entropy Information
The hardware-based ring oscillator noise source referenced in the "Entropy Sources" Table
consists of eight (8) identical groups of four (4) independent ring oscillator circuits. Within each
group, there are four (4) distinct logic inverter gate designs that consist of 19, 23, 31, and 39
gates. The oscillators are physically isolated from other active traces within the FE2-PG4 ASIC.
No configuration steps are necessary to operate the entropy source in a compliant manner. As
stated in the Public Use Document for E5, on power up the Cryptographic Module executes an
entropy source initialization sequence that collects sufficient samples of raw noise to verify the
health of the entropy noise source prior to seeding the RBG. If the initialization sequence
returns false, the Cryptographic Module transitions to an error state that blocks the execution of
all security services.
RBG Information
The output of the entropy source referenced in the "Entropy Sources" Table consists of the raw
data generate from thirty-two (32) free running ring oscillators. Eight (8) identical groups of four
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(4) variable length inverter chains define the implementation. Each 32-bit sample produces at
least 2.69 bits of entropy. Each time the CTR_DRBG is instantiated or reseeded, one hundred
sixty (160) 32-bit samples are concatenated to seed the CTR_DRBG. This equates to 5120 bits
of entropy data and translates to at least 430 bits of min-entropy. This seeds the CTR_DRBG
with approximately 287 bits of security strength (~287 bits of entropy input and ~143 bits of
nonce). Seeding the DRBG with at least 287 bits of security strength exceeds the requirement
to seed the CTR_DRBG with 256 bits of security strength.
2.9 Key Generation
The Cryptographic Module utilizes an SP 800-90A rev1-compliant CTR_DRBG to generate
symmetric cryptographic keys, which comply with sections 6.1, 6.2.3 and 6.3 of SP 800 133r2.
Each symmetric keyset consists of an encryption key and a signing key. Specifically,
• the Root Keyset consists of a 256-bit Root Encryption Key and 256-bit Root Signing Key
• the Global Active Keyset (AEK) consists of a 256-bit Global Active Encryption Key and a
256-bit Global Active Signing Key
• the SED Active Keyset consists of a 256-bit SED Active Encryption Key and a 256-bit
SED Active Signing Key
• the SED AdminSP Active Keyset consists of a 256-bit SED AdminSP Active Encryption
Key and a 256-bit SED AdminSP Active Signing Key
• SED LockingSP Active Keyset consists of a 256-bit SED LockingSP Active Encryption
Key and a 256-bit SED Locking SP Active Signing Key
Figure 5 - Symmetric Key Tree
2.10 Key Establishment
Key Agreement Information
The cryptographic module does not support a key establishment scheme.
Key Transport Information
The cryptographic module does not support a key transport scheme.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The Cryptographic Module supports the TCG Storage SSC: Opal [TCG Opal] security protocol.
Root Keyset
Global Active Keyset
SED Active Keyset
SED Admin SP Active Keyset
SED Locking SP Active Keyset
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
As a hardware module, the Cryptographic Module conforms to the SFF-TA-1001 U.3 form
factor. The connector is designed to blind mate, has staggered contacts to facilitate hot-
plugging, and conforms to SFF-8639 [SFF-8639]. The following table identifies the
Cryptographic Module’s ports and interfaces. The Cryptographic Module does not provide a
maintenance access interface.
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
U.3
Connector
Control Input
U.3 connector: Used to transmit NVMe commands from the
host system to the CM.
U.3
Connector
Data Input
U.3 connector: Used to transmit data and firmware update
images from the host system to the CM.
U.3
Connector
Data Output
U.3 connector: Used to transmit data from the Cryptographic
Module to the host system.
U.3
Connector
Status
Output
Used to transmit status data from the CM to the host system.
U.3
Connector
Power U.3 connector power pins
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces
The NVMe protocol provides the primary communication channel between the Cryptographic
Module and a host system. The NVM Express®
NVM Command Set Specification defines the
format of input data and control information sent from the Host to the CM Services provided by
the Cryptographic Module that require the processing of operator issued commands include
TCG Storage SSC: Opal configuration settings, the reading and writing of user data, and
retrieval of status data.
The Cryptographic Module does not support a trusted channel communication link between the
CM and a host system.
Note: The module does not support Control Output.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Credential
PIN
Authentication
Authenticates a
12 to 32 bytes
Authentication
Credential PIN.
Byte value
range (ea.):
0x00 to 0xFF.
Authority_Digest_Verification
Lowest:
12-byte
PIN: 96
bits
For 12-byte
PIN:
Permutations:
7.92E+28
Authentication
Time: 2.094965
msec Guess
Probability (1
min): 3.61E-25
Table 13: Authentication Methods
Note: E = log2(RL), where E = authentication strength, R = pool of unique characters and L =
password length defines the security strength of an Authentication Credential PIN. See
Calculating Password Entropy [PW].
4.2 Roles
The Cryptographic Module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and
authentication credential in the form of a Personal Identification Number (PIN). The
Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators. The Cryptographic Module
enforces role dependent service access rules. Section 4.3 maps services to Crypto Officer and
User roles. Access Control is implemented in layers. The top layer of the implementation
consists of Access Control Lists (ACLs). ACLs are lists of Access Control Elements (ACEs).
The boolean state of an ACE associated with an authority within a role determines access to a
service. When an authority is authenticated, its associated ACE boolean expression is set to be
True. If the authority has not been authenticated, its associated ACE boolean expression is set
to False. Closing a TCG session or powering off the Cryptographic Module disables all
previously authenticated authorities by setting the ACE Boolean expression associated with all
authenticated authorities to False. After powering up the CM and opening a new TCG session,
the operator must execute the Authenticate service to enable an authority within the Crypto
Officer and User roles.
The Cryptographic Module encrypts and signs all authentication data, associated with a role,
stored outside the ACM. The ACM imports the encrypted and signed authentication, verifies the
signature, and decrypts the authentication data. Before validating the operator supplied
authentication data, the ACM checks for try limit violations.
The lock-based authentication method implemented by the Cryptographic Module remains
secure because the purpose of the implementation is to protect data-at-rest and the host
operating system in communication with the CM acts as the operator and is considered a
trusted machine.
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Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Admin SP Admin1 Role CO
Credential PIN
Authentication
Anybody Role User None
Locking SP Admin Role CO
Credential PIN
Authentication
Locking SP User Role CO
Credential PIN
Authentication
SID Role CO
Credential PIN
Authentication
NVMe User Role User None
Table 14: Roles
The CM supports both Crypto Officer (CO) and User roles. Except for the Anybody Authority,
operators must authenticate to the corresponding TCG Authority to assume a Crypto Officer,
User or Maintenance role.
• Crypto Officer Roles
o Secure ID (SID)
▪ This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the TPer owner within the Admin SP
Authority as defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal
Specification [TCG Opal].
o Admin SP Admin1
▪ This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Admin SP Admin1 authority defined
in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification [TCG Opal].
o Locking SP Admin
▪ This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Locking SP Admin Authority as
defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification
[TCG Opal]. The Cryptographic Mode supports up to four (4) Locking SP
Admin authorities.
o Locking SP User
▪ This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Locking SP User Authority as
defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification [TCG
Opal]. The Cryptographic Mode supports up to ten (10) Locking SP User
authorities.
• User Roles
o NVMe User
▪ This Crypto Officer role utilizes the NVM Express™
(NVMe™
) interface protocols,
which are designed to provide an efficient peer-to-peer communication link, for a
Host to send commands to the Cryptographic Module and receive responses.
Authentication to the SID authenticates the Drive Owner to the Crypto Officer
role. The NVMe User may execute services that were previously enabled by
another authenticated role.
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o Anybody
▪ This user role corresponds to the Locking SP Anybody Authority as defined in
the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification [TCG Opal]. As
specified in the TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification [TCG Core], the
Anybody authority is always considered "authenticated" within a session, even if
the Anybody authority was not specifically called out during session startup.
The Anybody authority executes services that do not require authentication or
were previously enabled by an authenticated role.
4.3 Approved Services
The following table lists the approved services implemented by the Cryptographic Module.
The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input).
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Activate
Activate,
is an
Opal
SSC
[TCG
Opal]
specific
method
that
allows
the TPer
owner to
"turn on"
a
Security
Provider
created
in
manufact
uring.
isFIPS
mode is
true
See 5.1.1
Activate -
Admin
Template SP
Object
Method [TCG
Opal]
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
Authority_Diges
t_Generation
Derived_Key_G
eneration
Encryption
Key Wrap
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK
Generation
RBG
RBG Seeding
User_Data_Dec
ryption
SID
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,E
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
G,E
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AE
S Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- User
Manage
ment
Key
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
(UMK:
G,E
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: G,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: E
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key: E
-
DRBG.S
eed: E
-
Anybody
User
Access
Key
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
(UAKa):
G
Activate, Single
User Mode
Activate,
is an
Opal
SSC
[TCG
Opal]
specific
method
that
allows
the TPer
owner to
"turn on"
a
Security
Provider
created
in
manufact
uring.
isFIPS
mode is
true
See 3.1.2.1
Activate [TCG
Opal Single
User]
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
None
SID
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: E
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
-
DRBG.S
eed: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest: G
Authenticate
PSID
PSID
character
string
authentic
ation
isFIPS
mode is
true
PSID
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
Decryption
Keyed_Digest_
Verification
SID
- PSID:
W
- PSID
Digest: E
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
Anybody
- PSID:
W
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- PSID
Digest: E
Authenticate
TCG Authority
Authentic
ation
Credenti
al
authentic
ation
isFIPS
mode is
true
Authentication
Credential
PIN
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
Authority_Diges
t_Verification
SID
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: W,E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Admin
SP
Admin1
- SID
PIN: W,E
- SID
PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4]
PIN: W,E
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Locking
SP
Admin
- SID
PIN: W,E
- SID
PIN
Digest: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: W,E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Locking
SP User
- SID
PIN: W,E
- SID
PIN
Digest: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: W,E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: E
Anybody
- SID
PIN: W,E
- SID
PIN
Digest: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: W,E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
BootFlashInteg
rity
An RSA
digital
signature
verifies
the
authentic
ity of a
binary
indicato
risFIPS
mode is
true
RSA 2048
PKCS1 v1.5
signed
firmware
image
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
SecureLoader_I
ntegrity
Unauthe
nticated
- Storage
Device
Certificati
on
Authority
Key
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
firmware
image.
(SD_CA
Key): E
FIPS 140
Compliance
Descriptor
(Show Version)
This
service
reports
the FIPS
140
revision
as well
as the
Cryptogr
aphic
Module's
overall
security
level,
hardware
revision,
firmware
revision
and
module
name.
N/A
Security
Protocol IN
(0x0, 0x2,
0x2)
FIPS
140
Compl
iance
Descri
ptor
table
data
or
UEC
failure
code
None
NVMe
User
Firmware
Download
Digital
signature
verificati
on of a
binary
firmware
image.
isFIPS
mode is
true
RSA 2048
PKCS1 v1.5
signed
firmware
image
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
FW_Authenticit
y
SID
- OEM
Firmware
Key
(OEM
FW Key):
E
Firmware
Download
Control
Enable
or
disable
access
to the
Firmware
Downloa
d service
N/A
FW_DOWNL
OAD_PORT
bit within the
AdminSP
Logical Port
Table
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
None SID
Firmware
Integrity
An RSA
digital
signature
verifies
the
authentic
ity of a
binary
isFIPS
mode is
true
RSA 2048
PKCS1 v1.5
signed
firmware
image
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
FW_Integrity
Unauthe
nticated
- OEM
Firmware
Key
(OEM
FW Key):
E
-
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 32 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
firmware
image.
Security
Core
Firmware
Key
(SC_FW
Key): E
-
Security
Protocol
Firmware
Key
(SP_FW
Key): E
- OEM
Original
Factory
State
Key
(OEM_O
FS Key):
E
- Storage
Device
Boot FW
Key
(SD_BF
W Key):
E
- Storage
Device
Certificati
on
Authority
Key
(SD_CA
Key): E
- Product
Group
Key
(PROD_
GROUP
Key): E
Format_NVM_
SecureErase
Cryptogr
aphic
erasure
(Zeroise)
of user
data.
isFIPS
mode is
true
See §5.23,
§5.24 [NVMe
Base], §4.1.2
[NVMe
Command]
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK
Generation
RBG
RBG Seeding
NVMe
User
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 33 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
User_Data_Enc
ryption
DRBG.V:
G,E
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AE
S Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 34 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
Generate
Random
TCG
Random
method
that
generate
s a
random
number
from the
SP 800-
90A
CTR_DR
BG
isFIPS
mode is
true
Byte count
Byte
string
RBG
Anybody
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
Get
Reads
data
structure;
access
control
enforcem
ent
occurs
per data
structure
field
isFIPS
mode is
true
See §5.3.3.6
Basic Table
Method
Group - Get
(Table and
Object
Method [TCG
Core]
Reque
sted
table
data.
[TCG
Core]
Decryption
Keyed_Digest_
Verification
Anybody
- MSID:
R
Get Range
Attributes
Returns
the data
stored in
the
Locking
SP table
for an
LBA
Range
N/A
Band_UID
[TCG Opal]
LBA
range
attribu
te
data
[TCG
Opal]
None
Anybody
Locking
SP User
Get Data Store
Read a
stream of
bytes
from
unstructu
red
storage
N/A
See §3.2.13.9
Read data
from the
DataStore
table [TCG
SIIS]
DataS
tore
plainte
xt
data
or
UEC
failure
code
None Anybody
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 35 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Level 0
Discovery
TCG
'Level 0
Discover
y'
discloses
basic
configura
tion data
about the
Cryptogr
aphic
Module,
both
current
and
potential
[TCG
Core]
[Product
Manual]
N/A
See §3.3.6
Level 0
Discovery,
§3.3.6.2 IF-
RECV
Command
[TCG Core]
Level
0
Disco
very
Respo
nse
data
[TCG
Core]
None Anybody
Locking SP
User Password
Update
Allows
Locking
SP
Admins
to update
the PIN
of a user
that in
not in
Single
User
Mode
isFIPS
mode is
true
Locking SP
UserPIN
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
Authority_Diges
t_Generation
Decryption
Derived_Key_G
eneration
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
RBG
Locking
SP
Admin
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Manage
ment
Key
(UMK: E
- Non-
Admin
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 36 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- KDF
Salt
(Unique
to Admin
SP
Admin1,
each
Locking
SP
Admin
and each
Locking
SP
User):
G,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: G
Reactivate
In Single
User
Mode,
the
reactivat
e service
allows
the
hostoper
ator to
define
which
ranges
are
under
the
control of
a Single
User
authority.
In
addition,
isFIPS
mode is
true
See §3.1.1.1
Reactivate
[TCG Opal
Single User]
and §3.1.2
Reactivate
[TCG Opal
Datastore]
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
None
Locking
SP
Admin
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
G,E
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: G
- SED
Active
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 37 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
it allows
the host
to define
range
ownershi
p within
non-
Global
Range
Locking
objects.
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Manage
ment
Key
(UMK: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4]
PIN: W
Read User
Data
Reads
ciphertex
t from a
isFIPS
mode is
true
NVMe READ,
Starting LBA,
Transfer
Plaint
ext
user
User_Data_Dec
ryption
NVMe
User
- MEK -
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 38 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
specified
LBA
range
and
outputs
the user
data as
plaintext.
Length, Data
Buffer [NVMe
Command]
data
or
UEC
failure
code
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range): E
Reset Module
Power
on Reset
isFIPS
mode is
true
None
Drive
Ready
Indicat
or or
UEC
failure
code
Derived_Key_G
eneration
Encryption
Key Wrap
RBG
Unauthe
nticated
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
- ESV:
G,E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: G,E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G
- User
Manage
ment
Key
(UMK: G
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 39 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Revert
The TCG
Revert
method
cryptogra
phically
erases
CSPs
and
returns
the
Cryptogr
aphic
Module
to its
original
manufact
ured
state.
isFIPS
mode is
true
PSID
Drive
Ready
Indicat
or or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Key Wrap
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK
Generation
RBG
Symmetric_Key
_Generation
SID
- SID
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: G,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key: G,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
LockingS
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 40 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
P
Signing
Key: G,Z
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: G,Z
- PSID:
W
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK):
G,E,Z
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest:
G,E,Z
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 41 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
G,E,Z
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
G,E,Z
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AE
S Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Manage
ment
Key
(UMK:
G,E,Z
-
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 42 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Root
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- Root
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- MSID:
E
- MSID
Digest: E
Anybody
- SID
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
-
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 43 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,Z
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
G,E,Z
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AE
S Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Range
Access
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 44 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Manage
ment
Key
(UMK:
G,E,Z
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Root
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- Root
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK):
G,E,Z
- Global
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 45 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- PSID:
W
- MSID:
E
- MSID
Digest: E
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 46 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
RevertSP
The
RevertS
P
method
cryptogra
phically
erases
CSPs
and
returns
the
Cryptogr
aphic
Module
to its
original
manufact
ured
state.
IsFIPS
mode is
true
See §5.1.3
RevertSP -
Base
Template SP
Method [TCG
Opal]
Drive
Ready
Indicat
or or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Key Wrap
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK
Generation
RBG
Symmetric_Key
_Generation
Anybody
- SID
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.S
eed: G,E
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,E,Z
- Non-
Admin
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 47 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AE
S Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Manage
ment
Key
(UMK:
G,E,Z
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 48 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Root
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- Root
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK):
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 49 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SID
PIN: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4]
PIN: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: E
- MSID:
E
- MSID
Digest: E
SID
- SID
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 50 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: G
-
DRBG.S
eed: G
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,Z
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
G,E,Z
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 51 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AE
S Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Manage
ment
Key
(UMK:
G,E,Z
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Root
Encryptio
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 52 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
n Key:
G,E,Z
- Root
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK):
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key:
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 53 of 108
Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- MSID:
E
Self-Test
The
Cryptogr
aphic
Module
performs
self-tests
when it
powers
up
N/A None
Drive
Ready
or
UEC
failure
code
Decryption
Derived_Key_G
eneration
Digest_Generat
ion
Encryption
FW_Integrity
Key Wrap
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
Keyed_Digest_
Verification
RBG
Entropy
Unauthe
nticated
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
Set
Write
data
structure
s; access
control
enforcem
ent
occurs
per data
structure
field.
This
service
can
change
Authentic
ation
Credenti
al PINs
isFIPS
mode is
true
Set method
table data.
See [TCG
Core]
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
SID
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
n Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- SID
PIN: W
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Anybody
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- MSID:
E
Admin
SP
Admin1
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Locking
SP
Admin
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4]
PIN: W
Locking
SP User
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W
Set Range
Attributes
Set the
starting
location,
size, and
attributes
of an
LBA
range.
isFIPS
mode is
true
LBA range
configuration
data See
[TCG Opal]
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
Locking
SP User
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
Set DataStore
Write a
stream of
bytes to
unstructu
red
storage.
isFIPS
mode is
true
DataStore
byte table
data See
[TCG Opal]
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
None
Anybody
Locking
SP User
Show Status
The
status
inquiry
comman
d
requests
NVMe
device
(e.g.,
Cryptogr
N/A
[NVMe
Command]
defines the
input
parameters.
Retur
n
reque
sted
modul
e data
or
UEC
failure
code
None
NVMe
User
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
aphic
Module)
status
informati
on
TCG Erase,
Single User
Mode
TCG
Erase
cryptogra
phically
erases
user data
within a
defined
data
range.
isFIPS
mode is
true
[NVMe
Command]
defines the
input
parameters.
Retur
n
reque
sted
modul
e data
or
UEC
failure
code.
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK
Generation
RBG
Locking
SP
Admin
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,E,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: E
-
DRBG.V:
E
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- Locking
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AE
S Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,Z
- User
Manage
ment
Key
(UMK: E
-
Anybody
User
Access
Key
(UAKa):
E
Locking
SP User
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AE
S Key
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: E
-
DRBG.V:
E
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Manage
ment
Key
(UMK: E
-
Anybody
User
Access
Key
(UAKa):
E
TCG GenKey
TCG
GenKey
cryptogra
phically
erases
user data
within a
defined
isFIPS
mode is
true
See §5.3.3.16
Key Related
Method
Group -
GenKey [TCG
Opal]
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK
Generation
RBG
Locking
SP User
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
data
range.
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AE
S Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: E
-
DRBG.V:
E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
-
Anybody
User
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Name
Descript
ion
Indicat
or
Inputs
Outpu
ts
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Access
Key
(UAKa):
E
Write User
Data
Transfor
ms
plaintext
user data
into
ciphertex
t and
writes
the data
to a
specified
LBA
band.
isFIPS
mode is
true
Operation
Code, LBA,
Transfer
Length, Data-
Out Buffer
[NVMe
Command]
Succe
ss or
UEC
failure
code
User_Data_Enc
ryption
NVMe
User
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range): E
Table 15: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The Cryptographic does not support non-approved services.
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The Cryptographic Module utilizes RSA public key cryptography to verify that the firmware
downloaded to the module is authentic. The Cryptographic Module uses RSA 2048 PKCS1
v1.5 with SHA2-256 to verify the digital signature of all downloaded firmware binary image.
RSA Public/Private key pairs used in the firmware signing process are generated and stored
within a Hardware Security Module (HSM), which resides in a secure Western Digital facility.
The Cryptographic Module rejects a downloaded firmware binary image if the FW_Authenticity
security function fails.
The FW Update replaces the FW image partially; it does not replace the ROM code. From that
perspective, a full image replacement is not supported.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Cryptographic Module utilizes RSA public key cryptography to verify the integrity of all
firmware binary images within the CM prior to execution.
The firmware integrity tests ensure that prior to executing any firmware image the storage
device verifies the firmware is from an authenticated Western Digital source. Current storage
devices typically implement a multi-stage loader system to boot the drive. Each loader stage is
responsible for loading and verifying the next image before transferring control to the next
image. This process establishes a chain of trust during the boot process.
The Cryptographic Module’s Boot ROM code loads the secure loader image. The secure
loader, which is signed by the SD_CA Key, enables the boot process to use other keys besides
the SD_CA Key for boot time RSA digital signature check (i.e., SD_BFW Key). For example,
the secure loader loads the SD_BFW public key certificate and verifies the SD_CA Key RSA
digital signature of the certificate. The secure loader then loads the next image(s) from boot
flash, verifies the signature of the next image(s) using the SD_BFW public key, and transfers
control to the next image.
Figure 6 - Asymmetric Key Tree
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator initiates the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Cryptographic Module.
SD_CA Key
SD_BFW Key
SD_SM Key
SD_FW Key
Prod_Group Key
OEM_FW Key
OEM_OFS Key
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Operating Environment Type - Limited
While operational, the Cryptographic Module prohibits additions, deletions, or modification of the
code working set. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic Module uses an authenticated
download service to upgrade its firmware in its entirety. The immutable security firmware stored
in ROM, which is essential and integral to the operation of the module is non-modifiable. If the
download operation is successful, authorized, and verified, the Cryptographic Module will begin
operating with the new code working set after successfully executing all pre-operational self-
tests.
Firmware loaded into the Cryptographic Module that is not on the FIPS 140-3 certificate is out of
the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
The Cryptographic Module blocks the installation of firmware images that contain a Code ID that
is inconsistent with the Cryptographic Module’s SoC ASIC, hardware interface type (e.g., SAS,
SATA, PCIe, etc.) and security type (e.g., TCG Enabled, FIPS Enabled, etc.).
The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the LockOnReset parameter of the logical
firmware download port is set to PowerCycle. The Cryptographic Module is in noncompliant
state when the LockOnReset parameter is not set to PowerCycle. The Crypto Officer is
responsible for assuring the logical firmware download port remains locked unless the CO
intends to execute the Firmware Download service. The CO shall lock the firmware download
port after the Firmware Download service completes. Consult the Ports section of the Ultrastar®
DC SN655 Specification [Product Manual] for guidance.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the Locking SP User Authentication PIN
Credential for all configured Locking SP Users does not equal the MSID value. LBA ranges
associated with a Locking SP User with a default authentication PIN values are considered
plaintext.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the LockOnReset attribute for any configured
Locking SP User is set to PowerCycle. The Cryptographic Module is in noncompliant state
when the state of the LockOnReset attribute of any configured Locking SP User is not set to
PowerCycle.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled
attribute for any configured Locking SP User is set to True. The Cryptographic Module is in a
noncompliant state when the state of the ReadLockEnabled or WriteLockEnabled attribute of
any configured Locking SP User is set to False.
Consult the TCG Storage SSC: Opal Specification [TCG Opal] for guidance.
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7 Physical Security
The Cryptographic Module is a multiple-chip embedded module that complies with FIPS 140-3
Level 1 security. An ambient temperature from 0° to 70°C defines the Cryptographic Module’s
environmental operating range [Datasheet]
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS
140-3 Level 1 security. Therefore, the CM does not employ any fault induction mitigation
techniques or an EFP feature that immediately zeroise all unprotected SSPs if the temperature
or voltage falls outside of the Cryptographic Module's normal operating range. The CM will
institute a thermal safety shutdown to preserve data integrity if the operating temperature
reaches 83°C. The thermal safety shutdown process does not zeroize SSPs.
• All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation.
• The enclosure is opaque.
• Engineering design supports opacity requirements.
• An attacker cannot penetrate or remove and reapply a tamper-evident security seal
without evidence of tampering. In addition, it is difficult to replicate the tamper-evident
security seal.
Mechanism
Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
During the manufacturing
process, specialized equipment
applies three tamper-evident
security seal to the CM's PCBA.
See below.
Annually
The Cryptographic Module's owner shall
inspect the Cryptographic Module for
evidence of tampering. If tamper evidence
is apparent, the owner should return the
module to Western Digital. See below.
Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required
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Figure 7 - Tamper-Evident Seals Ultrastar DC SN655, Top View
Figure 8 - Tamper-Evident Seal Ultrastar DC SN655, Bottom View and UART Access Point
Figure 9 - Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seal
2
1
3
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8 Non-Invasive Security
8.1 Mitigation Techniques
The Cryptographic Module lacks features to mitigate any non-invasive security attacks beyond
the scope of the requirements within FIPS 140-3 Security Level 2.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
The Cryptographic Module manages the SSPs listed in Section 9.4 of this document. The
Cryptographic Module does not support the output of SSPs beyond the cryptographic boundary.
The Cryptographic Module does not support non-approved algorithms or key lengths.
9.1 Storage Areas
Calling processes implemented in firmware control Cryptographic Module access to SSPs.
Zeroization services cryptographically erase SSPs.
Storage Area Name Description
Persistence
Type
DRAM General purpose system memory Dynamic
IRAM Memory internal to the ACM Dynamic
NOR Flash SSP and boot code storage Static
NAND Flash SSP storage and firmware image storage Static
One-time Programable (OTP) Root Key and Certificate Authority Key storage Static
Table 17: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
The CM limits the input of SSPs to plaintext Authentication Credential PINs and RSA-2048
public keys. RSA-2048 public key input only occurs during the manufacturing process. Instead
of storing PIN values as plaintext, the CM stores an HMAC SHA-256 Digest of the PIN. A
Hardware Security Module (HSM), which resides within a secure Western Digital facility,
generates, and stores the RSA Public/Private key pairs input during the manufacturing process.
The CM does not support the output of intermediate values generated during key generation.
The module does not support the output of SSPs beyond the cryptographic boundary of the
module.
Name From To
Format
Type
Distributio
n Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Authenticatio
n Credential
PIN
Operato
r
Cryptographi
c Module
Plaintex
t
N/A
Electroni
c
FW_Authenticit
y
Public Key HSM
Cryptographi
c Module
Plaintex
t
N/A
Electroni
c
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3374)
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization of persistent SSPs complies with the cryptographic erasure requirements for solid
state drives within [SP 800-88], Guidelines for Media Sanitization. The Cryptographic Module
zeroizes ephemeral SSPs by overwriting the SSP memory location with all zeros within the
scope of the function call. . Note: The output status of the methods of success of zeroization are
implicit and any attempt to use previous keys/CSPs will trigger an error.
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Zeroization Method Description Rationale
Operator
Initiation
Format_NVM_SecureErase
Format_NVM_SecureErase
cryptographically erases user
data regardless of location
(e.g., within an exposed LBA,
within a cache, within
deallocated LBAs, etc.) by
regenerating the Namespace
Keyset (NSK) and Media
Encryption Keyset (MEK)
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
issues a
Format NVM
command as
specified in
[NVMe
Command].
Power Cycle
Power cycling involves
disconnecting and
reconnecting the CM to its
source of power.
Plaintext SSPs
stored in IRAM
memory within
the ACM are
destroyed
instantaneously
when power is
removed.
The operator
physically or
remotely
disconnects
the CM from
its source of
power.
Revert
The Revert method
cryptographically erases
CSPs. Revert removes the
owner's Authentication
Credentials and returns the
Cryptographic Module to its
original manufactured state
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
transmits a
command to
the CM as
the TPer to
initiate a
zeroisation
process.
RevertSP
The RevertSP method
cryptographically erases
CSPs. RevertSP removes
the owner's Authentication
Credentials and returns the
Cryptographic Module to its
original manufactured state.
Global Range data is
preserved if the
KeepGlobalRangeKey
parameter is set to True.
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
transmits a
command to
the CM as
the TPer to
initiate a
zeroisation
process.
TCG Erase, Single User
Mode
In Single User Data mode,
executing the TCG Erase
method cryptographically
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
The operator
transmits a
command to
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Zeroization Method Description Rationale
Operator
Initiation
erases user data by
regenerating and replacing
the Locking Range Key
(LRK) and Media Encryption
Key (MEK) associated with a
data range.
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
the CM as to
instruct the
TPer to
initiate a
user data
erasure
process.
TCG GenKey
In Single User Data mode
and non-Single User Mode,
executing the TCG GenKey
method cryptographically
erases user data by
regenerating and replacing
the Locking Range Key
(LRK) and Media Encryption
Key (MEK) associated with a
data range
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
transmits a
command to
the CM as to
instruct the
TPer to
initiate a key
generation
process.
Secure Manufacturing
Reconfiguration Process
The secure manufacturing
reconfiguration processes
incorporates a hardware
security module (HSM) and
supporting security software
to inject cryptographic keys,
digital certificates and assure
only authentic firmware is
installed on the
Cryptographic Module.
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
transmits
proprietary
commands
to the CM to
initiate a
rebuild
process that
zeroizes and
regenerates
the
symmetric
and
asymmetric
key trees
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods
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9.4 SSPs
All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3
Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Admin Authority
Key (Ka)
The Ka key
encrypts and
decrypts UAKs
and the UMK.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Derived
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Derived_Key_Generation
Decryption
Encryption
Admin SP
Admin1 PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
for the Admin
SP Admin1
Authority.
12 to 32
bytes -
96 to
256 bits
Plaintext -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Derived_Key_Generation
Admin SP
Admin1 PIN
Digest
Authenticates
the Admin SP
Admin1
Authority.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Message
Digest -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Authority_Digest_Verificati
on
Anybody User
Access Key
(UAKa)
The Anybody
Authority uses
UAKa to
decrypt the
RAK of
unlocked LBA
bands.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Decryption
DRBG.Key
Internal state
associated
with the [SP
800-90A]
CTR_DRBG
using AES-256
256 bits
- 256
bits
Entropy -
CSP
RBG RBG
DRBG.Seed
Internal state
associated
with the [SP
800-90A]
5120
bits -
431.379
bits
Entropy -
CSP
Entropy
RBG Seeding
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
CTR_DRBG
using AES-
256.
DRBG.V
Internal state
associated
with the [SP
800-90A]
CTR_DRBG
using AES-
256.
128 bits
- 128
bits
Entropy -
CSP
RBG RBG
ESV
Entropy source
input to the
[SP 800-90A]
CTR_DRBG
32-bit
sample -
N/A
Entropy -
CSP
Entropy Entropy
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK)
The Global
Active
Encryption Key
encrypts and
decrypts the
SED Active
Keyset, NSK
and the UAKa
key.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Decryption
Encryption
Global Active
Signing Key
Signs the
encrypted SED
Active
Encryption Key
and SED
Active Signing
Key.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
KDF Salt
(Unique to
Admin SP
KDF Salts are
integral to the
PBKDF2
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
PSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Admin1, each
Locking SP
Admin and
each Locking
SP User)
generation of
each Ka and
Ku derived
authority key.
Locking Range
Keyset (LRK)
LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User unique)
LRKs in
combination
with the NSKs
derive MEKs,
which encrypt
LBA bands
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
MEK Generation
Locking SP
Admin [1-4] PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
for a Locking
SP Admin
Authority
12 to 32
bytes -
96 to
256 bits
Plaintext -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Derived_Key_Generation
Locking SP
Admin [1-4] PIN
Digest
Authenticates
the associated
Locking SP
Admin
Authority
256 bits
- 256
bits
Message
Digest -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Authority_Digest_Verificati
on
Locking SP
User [1-10] PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
for a Locking
SP User
Authority
12 to 32
bytes -
96 to
256 bits
Plaintext -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Derived_Key_Generation
Locking SP
User [1-10] PIN
Digest
Authenticates
Locking SP
User PIN.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Message
Digest -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
MEK - Media
Encryption
Keyset
MEK.AESEnc
MEKs encrypt
and decrypt
LBA bands. An
MEK.AESDec
256 bits
- 256
bits
Derived
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
MEK Generation
User_Data_Decryption
User_Data_Encryption
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Key
MEK.AESDec
Key MEK.XTS
Tweak Key (16
total - 1 per
LBA range)
key is the last
entry of the
key schedule
for an
MEK.AESEnc
key.
MSID
The MSID
string is the
default
password for
the SID and
Admin SP
Admin1
authorities.
Inserted during
the
manufacturing
process, this
thirty-two-
character
value is
generated by
the CM by
processing a
CTR-DRBG
generated
random
number
through an
Alphanumeric
Character
Conversion
algorithm. The
32 bytes
- 162.8
bits
Plaintext -
PSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
algorithm's
output is
limited to a
thirty-four-
element
character set.
MSID Digest
Authenticates
the MSID PIN
256 bits
- 256
bits
Message
Digest -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Authority_Digest_Verificati
on
Namespace
Keyset (NSK)
NSK.AES Key
NSK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User unique)
NSKs in
combination
with the LRKs
derive MEKs,
which encrypt
LBA bands
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
MEK Generation
Non-Admin
Authority Key
(Ku) (Locking
SP User
unique)
Ku keys
encrypt and
decrypt all
UAKs except
UAKa.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Derived
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Derived_Key_Generation
Decryption
Encryption
OEM Firmware
Key (OEM FW
Key)
The OEM FW
Key verifies
the overall
download
firmware
image.
2048-
bits -
112 bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
(A3374)
OEM Original
Factory State
Key
(OEM_OFS
Key)
The
OEM_OFS
Key verifies
the OEM
Original
Factory
Settings files.
2048-
bits -
112 bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
(A3374)
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Product Group
Key
(PROD_GROU
P Key)
The
PROD_GROU
P Key verifies
OEM_FW Key
certificates.
2048-
bits -
112 bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
(A3375)
PSID
The PSID
string serves
as
authentication
data and proof
of physical
presence for
the Zeroise
Service.
Inserted during
the
manufacturing
process, this
thirty-two-
character
value is
generated by
the CM by
processing a
CTR-DRBG
generated
random
number
through an
Alphanumeric
Character
Conversion
algorithm. The
32 bytes
- 162.8
bits
Plaintext -
PSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
algorithm's
output is
limited to a
thirty-four-
element
character set.
PSID Digest
Authenticates
the PSID
256 bits
- 256
bits
Message
Digest -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Authority_Digest_Verificati
on
Range Access
Key (RAK)
(Locking SP
User unique)
RAKs encrypt
and decrypt
LRKs.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Decryption
Encryption
Root
Encryption Key
The Root
Encryption Key
encrypts the
Global Active
Encryption
Key, Global
Active Signing
Key.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Key Wrap
Root Signing
Key
Signs the
encrypted
Global Active
Encryption
Key, Global
Active Signing
Key.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Keyed_Digest_Generation
Security Core
Firmware Key
(SC_FW Key)
The SC_FW
Key verifies
Access Control
Module (ACM)
2048
bits -
112 bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
(A3375)
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
security core
firmware.
Security
Protocol
Firmware Key
(SP_FW Key)
The SP_FW
Key verifies
ACM security
protocol and
services
firmware.
2048-
bits -
112 bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
(A3374)
SED Active
Encryption Key
The SED
Active
Encryption Key
encrypts and
decrypts the
SED AdminSP
Encryption
Key, SED
AdminSP
Signing Key,
SED
LockingSP
Encryption
Key, and SED
LockingSP
Signing Key.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Encryption
SED Active
Signing Key
Signs the
encrypted SED
AdminSP
Encryption Key
and SED
AdminSP
Signing Key.
Signs the
encrypted SED
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Keyed_Digest_Generation
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
LockingSP
Encryption Key
and SED
LockingSP
Signing Key.
SED AdminSP
Encryption Key
Encrypts and
decrypts CSPs
associated
with an Admin
SP.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Encryption
SED AdminSP
Signing Key
Signs
encrypted
CSPs
associated
with an Admin
SP.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Keyed_Digest_Generation
SED
LockingSP
Encryption Key
Encrypts and
decrypts CSPs
associated
with a Locking
SP.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Encryption
SED
LockingSP
Signing Key
Signs
encrypted
CSPs
associated
with a Locking
SP.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Keyed_Digest_Generation
SED Volatile
Encryption Key
Encrypts, and
decrypts LRKs
and MEKs.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Encryption
SED Volatile
Signing Key
Signs
encrypted
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Keyed_Digest_Generation
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
LRKs and
MEKs.
SID PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
for the Admin
SP SID
Authority.
12 to 32
bytes -
96 to
256 bits
Plaintext -
CSP
Derived_Key_Generation
PBKDF (A3374)
SID PIN Digest
Authenticates
the SID
Authority.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Message
Digest -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Generati
on
Keyed_Digest_Generation
Storage Device
Boot FW Key
(SD_BFW Key)
The SD_BFW
Key is public
key used to
verify all boot
flash images.
2048-
bits -
112 bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
(A3374)
Storage Device
Certification
Authority Key
(SD_CA Key)
The SD_CA
Key is the
Master RSA
2048 public
key. It verifies
the authenticity
of the other
key certificates
and the
Secure Loader
image
2048-
bits -
112 bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
(A3374)
User Access
Key (UAK)
(Locking SP
User unique)
Encrypts and
decrypts RAKs
associated
with a Locking
SP User.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Encryption
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Description
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generated By
Establishe
d By
Used By
User
Management
Key (UMK
Encrypts and
decrypts
UAKs.
256 bits
- 256
bits
Symmetri
c Key -
CSP
Symmetric_Key_Generatio
n
Encryption
Table 20: SSP Table 1
Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Admin Authority Key
(Ka)
IRAM:Plaintext
Ephemeral
Destroyed
after use.
N/A
User Access Key (UAK)
(Locking SP User
unique):Encrypts
User Management Key
(UMK:Encrypts
Admin SP Admin1
PIN:Derived From
KDF Salt (Unique to
Admin SP Admin1,
each Locking SP Admin
and each Locking SP
User):Derived From
Locking SP Admin [1-4]
PIN:Derived From
Admin SP Admin1
PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
IRAM:Plaintext
Ephemeral
Destroyed
after use.
Power Cycle
Admin SP Admin1 PIN
Digest:Paired With
KDF Salt (Unique to
Admin SP Admin1,
each Locking SP Admin
and each Locking SP
User):Paired With
Admin Authority Key
(Ka):Paired With
Admin SP Admin1
PIN Digest
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Admin SP Admin1
PIN:Generated from
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SED AdminSP Signing
Key:Generated from
Anybody User
Access Key (UAKa)
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
IRAM:Plaintext
Power up to
power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Range Access Key
(RAK) (Locking SP User
unique):Decrypts
DRBG.Key IRAM:Plaintext
Power up to
power
down
Power Cycle
DRBG.Seed:Paired
With
DRBG.V:Paired With
DRBG.Seed IRAM:Plaintext
Power up to
power
down
Power Cycle
DRBG.V:Paired With
DRBG.Key:Paired With
DRBG.V IRAM:Plaintext
Power up to
power
down
Power Cycle
DRBG.Seed:Paired
With
DRBG.Key:Paired With
ESV IRAM:Plaintext
Power up to
power
down
Power Cycle
DRBG.Seed:Paired
With
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK)
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Secure Manufacturing
Reconfiguration Process
SED Active Signing
Key:Encrypts
SED Active Encryption
Key:Decrypts
Namespace Keyset
(NSK) NSK.AES Key
NSK.XTS Key (Locking
SP User
unique):Encrypts
Namespace Keyset
(NSK) NSK.AES Key
NSK.XTS Key (Locking
SP User
unique):Decrypts
User Access Key (UAK)
(Locking SP User
unique):Encrypts
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
User Access Key (UAK)
(Locking SP User
unique):Decrypts
SED Active Encryption
Key:Encrypts
Global Active
Signing Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Secure Manufacturing
Reconfiguration Process
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK):Derived From
SED Active Encryption
Key:Derived From
SED Active Signing
Key:Derived From
KDF Salt (Unique to
Admin SP Admin1,
each Locking SP
Admin and each
Locking SP User)
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Admin SP Admin1
PIN:Paired With
Locking SP Admin [1-4]
PIN:Paired With
Locking SP User [1-10]
PIN:Paired With
Admin Authority Key
(Ka):Paired With
Non-Admin Authority
Key (Ku) (Locking SP
User unique):Paired
With
Locking Range
Keyset (LRK)
LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key
(Locking SP User
unique)
DRAM:Encrypted
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Generation
to power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
TCG Erase, Single User
Mode
TCG GenKey
Namespace Keyset
(NSK) NSK.AES Key
NSK.XTS Key (Locking
SP User unique):Paired
With
MEK - Media Encryption
Keyset MEK.AESEnc
Key MEK.AESDec Key
MEK.XTS Tweak Key
(16 total - 1 per LBA
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
range):Paired With
SED Volatile Encryption
Key:Encrypted by
Range Access Key
(RAK) (Locking SP User
unique):Encrypts
Locking SP Admin
[1-4] PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
DRAM:Plaintext
Ephemeral
Destroyed
after use.
Power Cycle
Locking SP Admin [1-4]
PIN Digest:Paired With
KDF Salt (Unique to
Admin SP Admin1,
each Locking SP Admin
and each Locking SP
User):Paired With
Locking SP Admin
[1-4] PIN Digest
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Locking SP Admin [1-4]
PIN:Generated from
SED LockingSP Signing
Key:Generated from
Locking SP User [1-
10] PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
DRAM:Plaintext
Ephemeral
Destroyed
after use.
Power Cycle
Locking SP User [1-10]
PIN Digest:Paired With
Non-Admin Authority
Key (Ku) (Locking SP
User unique):Paired
With
KDF Salt (Unique to
Admin SP Admin1,
each Locking SP Admin
and each Locking SP
User):Paired With
Locking SP User [1-
10] PIN Digest
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Locking SP User [1-10]
PIN:Generated from
SED LockingSP Signing
Key:Derived From
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
MEK - Media
Encryption Keyset
MEK.AESEnc Key
MEK.AESDec Key
MEK.XTS Tweak
Key (16 total - 1 per
LBA range)
DRAM:Encrypted
Generation
to power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range Keyset
(LRK) LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key (Locking
SP User
unique):Generated from
Namespace Keyset
(NSK) NSK.AES Key
NSK.XTS Key (Locking
SP User
unique):Generated from
SED Volatile Encryption
Key:Encrypted by
MSID
IRAM:Plaintext
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Ephemeral
Destroyed
after use.
N/A
SED Active Signing
Key:Derived From
MSID Digest:Paired
With
MSID Digest
IRAM:Plaintext
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Ephemeral
Destroyed
after use
Revert
RevertSP
MSID:Generated from
SED Active Signing
Key:Generated from
Namespace Keyset
(NSK) NSK.AES
Key NSK.XTS Key
(Locking SP User
unique)
DRAM:Encrypted
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Generation
to power
down.
Format_NVM_SecureErase
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range Keyset
(LRK) LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key (Locking
SP User unique):Paired
With
MEK - Media Encryption
Keyset MEK.AESEnc
Key MEK.AESDec Key
MEK.XTS Tweak Key
(16 total - 1 per LBA
range):Paired With
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK):Encrypted by
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Non-Admin Authority
Key (Ku) (Locking
SP User unique)
Ephemeral
Destroyed
after use
N/A
Locking SP User [1-10]
PIN:Derived From
KDF Salt (Unique to
Admin SP Admin1,
each Locking SP Admin
and each Locking SP
User):Derived From
Anybody User Access
Key (UAKa):Encrypts
OEM Firmware Key
(OEM FW Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
N/A
Product Group Key
(PROD GROUP
Key):Verified by
OEM Original
Factory State Key
(OEM_OFS Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
N/A
Product Group Key
(PROD GROUP
Key):Verified by
Product Group Key
(PROD_GROUP
Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
N/A
Storage Device
Certification Authority
Key (SD_CA
Key):Verified By
PSID
IRAM:Plaintext
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Generation
to power
down.
Power Cycle
PSID Digest:Paired
With
SED Active Encryption
Key:Encrypted by
SED Active Signing
Key:Signed by
PSID Digest
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
N/A
Revert
RevertSP
PSID:Generated from
SED Active Signing
Key:Generated from
Range Access Key
(RAK) (Locking SP
User unique)
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Anybody User Access
Key (UAKa):Encrypted
by
Locking Range Keyset
(LRK) LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key (Locking
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SP User
unique):Encrypts
Root Encryption Key
One-time
Programable
(OTP):Encrypted
Secure Manufacturing
Reconfiguration Process
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK):Encrypts
Global Active Signing
Key:Encrypts
Root Signing
Key:Wraps
Root Signing Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Secure Manufacturing
Reconfiguration Process
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK):Signs
Root Encryption
Key:Wrapped by
Security Core
Firmware Key
(SC_FW Key)
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
N/A
Storage Device
Certification Authority
Key (SD_CA
Key):Verified by
Security Protocol
Firmware Key
(SP_FW Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
N/A
Storage Device
Certification Authority
Key (SD_CA
Key):Verified by
SED Active
Encryption Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
SED AdminSP
Encryption
Key:Encrypts
SED AdminSP Signing
Key:Encrypts
SED LockingSP Signing
Key:Encrypts
SED LockingSP
Encryption
Key:Encrypts
SED Active Signing
Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
SED AdminSP
Encryption Key:Signs
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SED AdminSP Signing
Key:Signs
SED LockingSP
Encryption Key:Signs
SED LockingSP Signing
Key:Signs
SED AdminSP
Encryption Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Admin SP Admin1
PIN:Encrypts
Admin SP Admin1 PIN
Digest:Encrypts
SED AdminSP
Signing Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Admin SP Admin1
PIN:Signs
Admin SP Admin1 PIN
Digest:Signs
SED LockingSP
Encryption Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Locking SP Admin [1-4]
PIN:Encrypts
Locking SP Admin [1-4]
PIN Digest:Encrypts
Locking SP User [1-10]
PIN:Encrypts
SED LockingSP
Signing Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range Keyset
(LRK) LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key (Locking
SP User unique):Signs
SED Volatile
Encryption Key
IRAM:Plaintext
Power up to
power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range Keyset
(LRK) LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key (Locking
SP User
unique):Encrypts
MEK - Media Encryption
Keyset MEK.AESEnc
Key MEK.AESDec Key
MEK.XTS Tweak Key
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
(16 total - 1 per LBA
range):Encrypts
SED Volatile Signing
Key
IRAM:Plaintext
Power up to
power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range Keyset
(LRK) LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key (Locking
SP User unique):Signs
MEK - Media Encryption
Keyset MEK.AESEnc
Key MEK.AESDec Key
MEK.XTS Tweak Key
(16 total - 1 per LBA
range):Signs
SID PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
IRAM:Plaintext
Ephemeral
Destroyed
after use
N/A
SID PIN Digest:Paired
With
SID PIN Digest
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
SID PIN:Generated
from
SED Active Signing
Key:Generated from
SED Active Signing
Key:Signed By
Storage Device Boot
FW Key (SD_BFW
Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encrypted
N/A
Storage Device
Certification Authority
Key (SD_CA
Key):Verified
Storage Device
Certification
Authority Key
(SD_CA Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Plaintext
One-time
Programable
(OTP):Encrypted
N/A
Storage Device Boot
FW Key (SD_BFW
Key):Signs
Storage Device Secure
Message Key (SD_SM
Key):Signs
Security Core Firmware
Key (SC_FW
Key):Signs
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Security Protocol
Firmware Key (SP_FW
Key):Signs
User Access Key
(UAK) (Locking SP
User unique)
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Range Access Key
(RAK) (Locking SP User
unique):Encrypts
User Management
Key (UMK
NAND
Flash:Encrypted
Revert
RevertSP
Anybody User Access
Key (UAKa):Encrypts
Table 21: SSP Table 2
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10 Self-Tests
The Cryptographic Module performs pre-operational and conditional self-tests automatically at powered up. Pre-operational self-
tests tests ensure that the Cryptographic Module is not corrupted. The conditional self-tests assure that the cryptographic algorithms
comply with their associated certificate. The Cryptographic Module inhibits all data output via the “data output” interface and the
execution of loaded or modified approved security functions while executing the pre-operational self-tests.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The Cryptographic Module performs the pre-operational self-test listed below at power up, in response to a self-initiated reset and
prior to booting to a new firmware image. Upon failure, the Cryptographic Module transitions to a Device Unavailable Error state.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test Method Test Type Indicator Details
ESV APT
Sequential
data collection
Adaptive
Proportion Test
Critical
Function
Pass: Success Indicator
Fail: Device Unavailable
Verifies that the APT
Threshold was not exceeded
as specified in [SP 800 90B]
ESV RCT
SP 800-90B
Health-Test
Repetition Count
Test (RCT)
Critical
Function
Pass: Success Indicator
Fail: Device Unavailable
Verifies that the RCT
Threshold was not exceeded
as specified in [SP 800 90B]
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3374)
A3374, A3375,
SHS 2942
2048-bit, PKCS1
v1.5w/SHA2-256
SW/FW
Integrity
Pass: Boot to the
firmware image Fail:
Device Unavailable
Verify Digital Signature
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
(AES 3580)
AES, 256-bit, CBC KAT CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device Degraded
Encrypt, Decrypt, verify Power up
AES-ECB
(AES 3580)
AES, 256-bit, ECB KAT CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device Degraded
Encrypt, Decrypt, verify Power up
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-ECB
(A3410)
AES, 256-bit, ECB,
DEE
KAT CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device Degraded
Encrypt, Decrypt, verify Power up
AES-KWP
(A3374)
256-bit KEK KAT CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device Degraded
Authenticated Encrypt,
Authenticated Decrypt, verify
Power up
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
5120-bit seed KAT CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device
Unavailable Error
SP 800-90ARev1 section
11.3 health test
(Instantiate,generate and
reseed)
Power up
ESV APT APT threshold Health Test CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device
Unavailable
Verifies that the APT
threshold was not exceeded
as specified in [SP 800 90B]
Power up
ESV RCT RCT threshold Health Test CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device
Unavailable
Verifies that the RCT
threshold was not exceeded
as specified in [SP 800 90B]
Power up
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(HMAC
2280)
Message, 256-bit
key, 256-bit hash
digest
KAT CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device Degraded
Verify Power up
PBKDF
(A3374)
256-bit Salt Iteration
Count: 1024
KAT CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device Degraded
Verify Power up
RSA SigVer
KAT
2048- bit public key,
256-bit hash digest
KAT CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device Degraded
Verify Power up
RSA SigVer
Load Test
2048-bit public key,
256-bit hash digest,
OEM_Release Key
Digital
Signature
Verification
SW/FW
Load
Pass: Boot to
new image Fail:
UEC error code
Verify
Firmware
Download
SHA2-256
(SHS 2942)
Message, 256-bit
hash digest
KAT CAST
Pass: Success
Indicator Fail:
Device Degraded
Verify Power up
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Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
ESV APT
Adaptive Proportion
Test
Critical Function N/A Power cycle
ESV RCT
Repetition Count Test
(RCT)
Critical Function N/A Power Cycle
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
4) (A3374)
2048-bit, PKCS1
v1.5w/SHA2-256
SW/FW Integrity N/A Power cycle
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CBC (AES 3580) KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
AES-ECB (AES 3580) KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
AES-ECB (A3410) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
AES-KWP (A3374) KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
Counter DRBG (A3374) KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
ESV APT Health Test CAST On Demand
After 2^232
CTR_DRBG reseeds.
ESV RCT Health Test CAST On Demand
After 2^232
CTR_DRBG reseeds.
HMAC-SHA2-256
(HMAC 2280)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
PBKDF (A3374) KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
RSA SigVer KAT KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
RSA SigVer Load Test
Digital Signature
Verification
SW/FW Load On Demand Power cycle
SHA2-256 (SHS 2942) KAT CAST On Demand Power cycle
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information
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10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions
Recovery
Method
Indicator
Device
Degraded
This error indicates that one of
the conditional self-tests listed in
Table 20 failed. In this state, the
module no longer services any
I/O command. The module only
responds to non-I/O status
inquiry commands.
Conditional
test failure
Power
cycle
UEC failure
code
Device
Unavailable
Error
This error indicates that a boot
initialization, security subsystem
initialization or firmware integrity
failure event occurred. See
Table 19. In this state, the
module no longer responds to
any operator commands.
Pre-
operational
test failure
Power
cycle
Device is
unresponsive
Table 26: Error States
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The operator may initiate an on-demand periodic self-test by power cycling the CM.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
After initialization, the CM operates and powers up in isFIPS mode. Prior to configuring the CM
to comply with isFIPS mode configuration requirements it operates in a noncompliant state.
Regardless, the CM functions as a Secure Erase Drive (SED) that is compliant with the TCG
Storage SSC: Opal Specification [TCG Opal].
Installation and Initialization:
The Crypto Officer is responsible for executing a Take-Ownership scenario to configure the
Cryptographic Module to operationally comply with operator site requirements and assure that
the Cryptographic Module is compliant with FIPS 140-3 at SL2
Informative
Having the MSID Authentication Credential PIN electronically available to the operator
constitutes a risk to the overall security of the Cryptographic Module. Therefore, the Crypto
Officer should execute a Take-Ownership scenario the first time the Cryptographic Module is
inserted into a system and replace any Authentication Credential PIN that is set to the default
MSID value with a value that is different from the MSID value and between 12 and 32 bytes in
length. This assures compliance with ISO/IEC19790, Section 7.4.4 which states that, “…If
default authentication data is used to control access to the module, then default authentication
data shall [04.46] be replaced upon first-time authentication. This default authentication data
does not need to meet the zeroization requirements (7.9.7).”
Take-Ownership Scenario Example
1. Authenticate to the SID.
a. If the default MSID was used to authenticate to the SID, change the SID PIN to a
random value between 12 and 32 bytes in length.
2. Use the Get service to determine if the logical firmware download port is set to lock on
PowerCycle.
a. If the logical firmware download port’s LockOnReset attribute is not set to
PowerCycle utilize the Set service to set the LockOnReset attribute to PowerCycle.
3. Authenticate to Admin SP Admin1.
a. If the Crypto Officer authenticated to Admin SP Admin1 with the default MSID value,
change the Admin SP Admin1 PIN to a random value between 12 and 32 bytes in
length.
4. Authenticate to each Locking SP Admin that is within the scope of the operator site
requirements.
a. If the Crypto Officer authenticated to a Locking SP Admin with the default MSID
value, change the Locking SP Admin PIN to a random value between 12 and 32
bytes in length.
5. Authenticate to each Locking SP User that is within the scope of the operator site
requirements.
a. If the default MSID was used to authenticate to a Locking SP User, change the
Locking SP User PIN to a random value between 12 and 32 bytes in length.
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b. Utilize the Get Range Attributes service to determine the state of the Locking SP
User’s LockOnReset attribute. If the LockOnReset attribute is not set to PowerCycle,
use the Set Range Attribute service to set the LockOnReset attribute to Power Cycle.
c. Utilize the Get Range Attributes service to determine the state of the Locking SP
User’s ReadLockEnabled attribute. If the ReadLockEnabled attribute is not set to
True, use the Set Range Attribute service to set the ReadLockEnabled attribute to
True.
d. Utilize the Get Range Attributes service to determine the state of the Locking SP
User’s WriteLockEnabled attribute. If the WriteLockEnabled attribute is not set to
True, use the Set Range Attribute service to set the WriteLockEnabled attribute to
True.
Delivery:
The Cryptographic Officer shall inspect the tamper evident seals that cover the heads of the
screws on the top of the enclosure and over the UART access point for evidence of tampering.
See Figure 9 for an example of tamper evidence. If tamper evidence is apparent, the CO
should return the module to Western Digital.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Solid-state drives can be fragile. Do not drop or jar the drive. Handle the drive only by the
enclosure.
SSD electronics are sensitive to static electricity. Do not remove the CM from its antistatic
container until ready to install. The operator engaged in the installation process should wear an
antistatic wrist strap to ground to assure the discharge static electricity from any item or surface
that my touch the CM. Handle the drive only by the metal case surrounding the drive. Avoid
contacting with the EDSFF connector.
To assure proper installation and operation, verify all cooling requirements are met prior to
initiating the installation instructions within the Ultrastar®
DC SN655 Product Manual [Product
Manual].
The Ultrastar®
DC SN655 Product Manual [Product Manual] provides administrator guidance.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Inspect the CM for damage to the case or U.3 connector. Return the CM for warranty
replacement service if any damage is detected.
The Ultrastar®
DC SN655 Product Manual [Product Manual] provides non-administrator
guidance.
11.4 Design and Rules
On power-up, if previously configured to comply with isFIPS mode, the Cryptographic Module
automatically initializes to isFIPS mode without operator intervention. After successfully
completing pre-operational and conditional self-tests, the CM transitions to an isFIPS mode
operational state. In this state, the module awaits service requests from the operator.
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The implemented security features protect against remote and physical attacks across the
complete product cycle from manufacturing build time to returns and failure analysis. The
secure firmware boot and firmware download process assure firmware image integrity and
prevents compromised firmware attacks. These features prevent the counterfeiting of the CM,
hacking and unauthorized access to CM ports. The authentication scheme enforces port
restrictions for processes that are only allowed within a secure manufacturing environment.
These security features utilize cryptographically secure messages to block unauthorized access
to CM ports and imposes manufacturing command set restrictions. The CM utilizes a
cryptographic encryption and HMAC signing scheme to assure the protection of all SSPs stored
outside the ACM RoT.
Rules of Operation
1. The Cryptographic Module provides three distinct operator roles: User, Maintenance and
Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Cryptographic Module provides role-based authentication.
3. On power cycle the Module clears previous authentications.
4. The Cryptographic Module complies with the lock-based authentication model. On
power cycle, the Module locks unlocked services that require authentication to unlock
(IG 4.1.A).
5. Accept as allowed under the lock-based authentication model, the operator does not have
access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
6. The Cryptographic Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power
cycling power or resetting the Module.
7. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
8. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to
a compromise of the Cryptographic Module.
10. The Cryptographic Module implements multiple zeroization service that vary in scope.
The scope of each zeroization service is defined in Section 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods.
11. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators.
12. The Cryptographic Module supports a maintenance role.
13. The Cryptographic Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
14. The Cryptographic Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices
used for entry/output of data.
15. The Cryptographic Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
16. The Cryptographic Module does not store any plaintext CSPs.
17. The Cryptographic Module does not output intermediate key values.
18. The Cryptographic Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.
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11.5 Maintenance Requirements
The CM does not require periodic maintenance actions to maintain functional or secure
operation.
11.6 End of Life
All CSPs stored within the volatile memory of the CM’s ACM RoT are inaccessible from outside
the ACM RoT. The CM encrypts and signs all CSPs before storing them in volatile or non-
volatile memory outside ACM RoT. Removing power instantaneously erases all CSPs stored
within the CM’s volatile memory.
Prior to the environmentally disposal of the CM owner should cryptographically erase the CM.
For this purpose, the CM supports the TCG Opal Revert method [TCG Opal]. Revert enables
the CM’s owner to cryptographically erase all CSPs and overwrite existing TCG settings to the
default values that were set during manufacturing. If environmental disposal requirements
require the zeroization of the Root Keyset, which consists of the Root Encryption Key and Root
Signing Key, the CM owner must return the CM to Western Digital. Western Digital’s proprietary
Secure Manufacturing Reconfiguration Process supports Root Keyset zeroization.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Cryptographic Module lacks features to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of
the requirements within FIPS 140-3 SL2.
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References and Definitions
The Security Policy refers to the following specifications, references, and definitions.
NIST Specifications
Abbreviation Specification Name
[FIPS 140 IG]
Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, September 2, 2025
[FIPS 140]
Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-3, NIST, March
2019
[FIPS 180] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST, August 2015
[FIPS 186] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-5, NIST, February 2023
[FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, May 2023
[FIPS 198] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008
[SP 800 131A]
Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths (Revision 2), NIST, March 2019
[SP 800 132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, December 2010
[SP 800 133] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation (Revision 2), NIST, June 2020
[SP 800 140B]
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) Security Policy Requirements:
CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759 and ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B
(Revision 1), NIST, November 2023
[SP 800 140C]
CMVP Approved Security Functions: CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC
24759 (Revision 2), NIST, July 2023
[SP 800 140D]
CMVP Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and Establishment
Methods: CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759 (Revision 2), NIST,
July 2023
[SP 800 38A]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques,
NIST, December 2001
[SP 800 38E]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, NIST, January 2010
[SP 800 38F]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping,
NIST, December 2012
[SP 800 57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 5), NIST, May 2020
[SP 800 88] Guidelines for Media Sanitization (Revision 1), NIST, December 2014
[SP 800 90A]
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators (Revision 1), NIST, June 2015
[SP 800 90B]
Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, NIST,
January 2018
Trusted Computing Group Specifications
Abbreviation Specification Name
[TCG Core]
TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Version 2.01 Revision 1.00
(August 5, 2015)
[TCG Namespace]
TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Configurable Namespace Locking,
Specification Version 1.00, Final Revision 1.33 (February 22, 2019)
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Abbreviation Specification Name
[TCG Opal Guideline]
TCG Storage Opal Integration Guidelines, Version 1.00, Final Revision 1.00
(March 16, 2016)
[TCG Opal]
TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.01,
Final Revision 1.00 (August 5, 2015)
[TCG PSID]
TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: PSID, Specification Version 1.00, Final
Revision 1.00 (August 5, 2015)
[TCG SIIS]
TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version 1.07, (January
30, 2018)
[TCG Opal Single
User]
TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Single User Mode Specification, Version
1.00, Final Revision 1.00 (February 24, 2012)
[TCG Opal Datastore]
TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Additional DataStore Tables,
Specification Version 1.00
NVMe and PCIe Specifications
Abbreviation Specification Name
[NVMe Base] NVM Express® Base Specification, Revision 1.3.c, May 24, 2018
[NVMe Command] NVM Express® NVM Command Set Specification, Revision 1.0, May 18, 2021
[NVMe Management]] NVM Express® Management Interface, Revision 1.1, April 29, 2019
[PCIe Base] PCI Express® Base Specification, Revision 3.0, November 10 ,2010
Corporate References
Abbreviation Specification Name
[Product
Manual]
Ultrastar
®
DC SN655 NVMe Solid-State Drive Product Manual,
https://www.westerndigital.com/support
[Datasheet] Ultrastar
®
DC SN655 Datasheet, https://www.westerndigital.com/support
Other References
Abbreviation Reference Name
[IETF] IETF RFC 2119, 1997, “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels.”
[ISO 19790] ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology - Security techniques - Security
requirements for cryptographic modules, International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), December 2015
[OCP Datacenter]
Open Computing Project, Datacenter NVMe® SSD Specification, Version 2.0,
July 30, 2021
[OCP NVMe Cloud]
Open Compute Project, NVMe Cloud SSD Specification, Version 1.0, March 18,
2020
[PW] Calculating Password Entropy:
https://www.pleacher.com/mp/mlessons/algebra/entropy.html
[SFF-8639]
SFF-8639, SFF-TA-1001 Specification for Universal x4 Link Definition for SFF-
8639, Rev 1.1 May 28, 2018
[SFSC] Security Features for SCSI Commands, Revision 2, September 2015
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Definitions
Name Definition
Access Control Entry (ACE)
Access control entries are entries in an access control list containing
information describing the access rights related to a particular
security identifier or user.
Access Control List (ACL)
Access control list refers to the permissions attached to an object
that specify which users have access to that object and the
operations the user can perform.
Allowed
NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or
acceptable, i.e., no known security risk as opposed to deprecated,
restricted, and legacy use. [SP 800 131A]
Anybody A formal TCG term for an unauthenticated role. [TCG Core]
Approved mode of operation
A mode of the Cryptographic Module that employs only approved
security functions. [FIPS 140]
Approved [FIPS 140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication.
Authenticate Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object.
Authentication Credential
PIN
An authentication credential (i.e., a password) associated with the
SID, Admin SP Admin1, Locking SP Admin or Locking SP User
Authority as defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class
Opal, Specification [TCG Core].
Authorize Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object.
Ciphertext Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function.
Confidentiality
A cryptographic property that blocks disclosure of sensitive
information to unauthorized parties.
Credential
A formal TCG term for data used to authenticate an Operator. [TCG
Core]
Critical Security Parameter
(CSP)
Security-related information (e.g., secret, and private cryptographic
keys, and authentication data such as credentials and PINs) whose
disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS 140]
Crypto Officer
An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management
functions. [FIPS140]
Cryptographic Boundary
An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the
physical and/or logical bounds of a Cryptographic Module and
contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS 140]
Cryptographic Key
A sequence of symbols that controls the operation of a cryptographic
transformation. A cryptographic transformation can include but not
limited to encipherment, decipherment, cryptographic check function
computation, signature generation, or signature verification.
Cryptographic Module
The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware used to implement
approved security functions contained within the cryptographic
boundary. [FIPS 140]
Data at Rest
User data residing on the storage device media rather than in
transition.
Discovery
A TCG method that provides the properties of the TCG device.
[TCG Opal]
Global Active Keyset (AEK)
Set defined by the 256-bit Global Active Encryption Key and the 256-
bit Global Active Signing Key
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Name Definition
Hardware Security Module
(HSM)
A hardware security module is a physical computing device that
safeguards and manages digital keys, performs encryption and
decryption functions for digital signatures, strong authentication, and
other cryptographic functions.
IF-RECV
An interface command used to retrieve security protocol data from
the TPer [TCG Core].
IF-SEND
An interface command used to transmit security protocol data to the
TPer [TCG Core].
Integrity
A cryptographic property that blocks the modification or deletion of
sensitive in an unauthorized and undetected manner.
Interface
A logical entry or exit point of a Cryptographic Module that provides
access to the Cryptographic Module for logical information flows.
[FIPS 140]
Key Derivation Function
(KDF)
An Approved cryptographic algorithm that derives one or more keys
from a secret value and other information.
Key Encrypting Key (KEK) A cryptographic key used to encrypt or decrypt other keys.
Key Management
The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other
related security parameters during the entire life cycle of the
Cryptographic Module. The handling of authentication data is
representative of a key management activity.
Key Wrap
An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide
Confidentiality and Integrity.
LBA Range
A formal term that defines a contiguous logical block range
(sequential LBAs) to store encrypted User Data; ramgess do not
overlap, and each has its own unique encryption key and other
settable properties.
Manufactured SID (MSID)
A unique default value assigned to each SED during manufacturing.
An externally visible MSID value is not required if the user can derive
the MSID from other information printed on the drive. The MSID is
readable with the TCG protocol. It is the initial and default value for
all Authentication Credentials. [TCG Core]
Method
A remote procedure call to an SP that initiates an action on the SP.
[TCG Core]
Object
An object is any row of an object table. The object type is defined by
the object table in which the object occurs. The columns of the
object table define the contents of each object in it. [TCG Core]
Object Table
Object tables provide storage for data that binds a set of methods
and access controls to that data. [TCG Core]
ObjectUID
The Unique ID (UID) of an Object. Each object table has a column
named UID. This column contains an 8-byte unique identifier for that
row. [TCG Core]
OFS file
The CM uses an OFS file to reset the Cryptographic Module’s
configuration back to its original factory setting during Revert and
RevertSP operations.
One Time Programable (OTP)
OTP memory is a special type of write once read only non-volatile
memory.
Operator
A consumer, either human or automation, of cryptographic services
that is external to the Cryptographic Module. [FIPS 140]
Personal Identification
Number (PIN)
A formal TCG term designating a string of octets used to
authenticate an identity. [TCG Core]
Plaintext Unencrypted data.
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Name Definition
Port
A physical entry or exit point of a Cryptographic Module that. A port
provides access to the Cryptographic Module’s physical signals.
[FIPS 140]
PSID (Physical Security
Identifier)
A SED unique value printed on the Cryptographic Module’s label
used as authentication data and proof of physical presence for the
Zeroise Service.
Public Security Parameters
(PSP)
Public information, that if modified can compromise the security of
the Cryptographic Module (e.g., a public key).
Read Data An external request to transfer User Data from the SED.
Reserved Area
Internal data on the storage medium within the cryptographic
boundary that is not accessible to an operator.
Root Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consist of the Root Encryption Key and
Root Signing Key.
SD_CA Key
Storage Device Certification Authority Key (X509v3). This key
serves as the Cryptographic Module’s Master RSA Public Key and is
the root source of verification for all other key certificates. The
SD_CA Key signs the SecureLoader. A manufacturing process
injects the SD_CA Key within the CM and stores a hash of the
SD_CA Key in OTP memory
Security Identifier (SID)
The authority that represents the TPer owner. Crypto Officer serves
in this role. [TCG Core]
Security Provider (SP)
A TCG term used to define a collection of Tables and Methods with
access control.
SED Active Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the SED Active Encryption Key
and the SED Active Signing Key.
SED AdminSP Active Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the SED AdminSP Active
Encryption Key and the SED AdminSP Active Signing Key.
SED Global Active Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the Global Active Encryption
Key (AEK) and the Global Active Signing Key.
SED LockingSP Active
Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the SED LockingSP Active
Encryption Key and the SED LockingSP Active Signing Key. The
keyset protects TCG protocol LockingSP CSPs.
SED Volatile Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the SED Volatile Key and the
SED Volatile Signing Key.
Self-Encrypting Drive (SED)
A storage device that provides data storage services, which
automatically encrypts all user data written to the device and
automatically decrypts all user data read from the device.
Session
A formal TCG term that envelops the lifetime of an Operator’s
authentication. [TCG Core]
Small Form Factor (SFF)
Small form factor is a computer form factor designed to minimize the
volume and footprint of a desktop computer.
Storage Medium
The non-volatile, persistent storage location within a SED partitioned
into disjointed sets defined by a User Data area, and a Reserved
Area.
Table
The basic data structures within a Security Provider (SP). Object
tables store persistent SP state data defined in TCG Core
specification. [TCG Core]
TableUID
The Unique ID (UID) of a Table. Each object table has a column
named UID. This column contains an 8-byte unique identifier for that
row. [TCG Core]
TPer
A Trusted Peripheral. The TPer manages trusted storage-related
functions and data structures. [TCG Core]
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Name Definition
TPer Owner The SID Authority (Crypto Officer) represents TPer Owner.
Triple Level Cell (TLC)
Triple level cells refer to NAND flash devices that store three bits of
information per cell, with eight total voltage states.
User Data
Data transferred from/to a SED using the NVMe Read and Write
commands.
User An Operator that consumes cryptographic services. [FIPS 140]
Write Data An external request to transfer User Data to a SED.
Zeroise Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS 140]
Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AEK Active Encryption Key
AEN Asynchronous Event Notification
AES Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197)
ACE Access Control Entry
ACL Access Control List
CBC Cipher Block Chaining, an operational mode of AES
CM Cryptographic Module
CO Crypto Officer [FIPS 140]
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter [FIPS 140]
DEE Data Encryption Engine
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EDC Error Detection Code
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FID Flash Internal Data
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FSEC Flash Security Data
HSM Hardware Security Module
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEK Key Encrypting Key
LBA Logical Block Address
MEK Media Encryption Key
MSID Manufactured Security Identifier
NAND Negative AND Flash Memory technology
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
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Acronym Definition
NOR Negative OR Flash Memory technology
OFS Original Factory Setting
OTP One Time Programable
PBKDF2 Password Base Key Derivation Function
PIN Personal Identification Number
POR Power on Reset
PSID Physical Security Identifier
PSP Public Security Parameter
RID Reserved Area Internal Data
SAS Serial Attached SCSI
SD_CA Storage Device Certification Authority
SECD Security Data
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SFF Small Form Factor
SID Security Identifier, The TCG authority representing the TPer Owner (Cryptographic Officer)
SIO Serial Input/Output
SOC System-on-a-Chip
SP Security Provider [TCG Core], also Security Policy [FIPS 140]
SSC Subsystem Class
SWG Storage Work Group
TCG Trusted Computing Group
TLC Triple Level Cell
UEC Universal Error Code
UID Unique Identifier
XTS A mode of AES that utilizes "Tweakable" block ciphers