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Juniper Networks SRX320 Services Gateway with JUNOS 17.4R1-S1
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy
Version 1.4
24 September 2019
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary .........................................................................................7
1.2 Mode of Operation .......................................................................................................................................8
1.3 Zeroization ....................................................................................................................................................9
2 Cryptographic Functionality............................................................................................................ 10
2.1 Approved Algorithms..................................................................................................................................10
2.2 Allowed Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................13
2.3 Supported Protocols ...................................................................................................................................14
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms................................................................................................................................15
2.5 Critical Security Parameters........................................................................................................................15
3 Roles, Authentication and Services ................................................................................................. 17
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles........................................................................................17
3.2 Authentication Methods.............................................................................................................................17
3.3 Services .......................................................................................................................................................18
3.4 Non-Approved Services ..............................................................................................................................21
4 Self-Tests........................................................................................................................................ 22
5 Security Rules and Guidance........................................................................................................... 25
6 References and Definitions............................................................................................................. 26
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List of Figures
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations....................................................................................................................5
Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements..................................................................................................................6
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 4 – Data Plane Approved Cryptographic Functions ....................................................................................................10
Table 5 – Control Plane Authentec Approved Cryptographic Functions..............................................................................10
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions........................................................................................................12
Table 7 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions........................................................................................................12
Table 8 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions.......................................................................................................13
Table 9 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions ...........................................................................................................13
Table 10 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions ........................................................................................................................13
Table 11 – Supported Protocols in FIPS Mode......................................................................................................................14
Table 12 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)......................................................................................................................15
Table 13 – Public keys...........................................................................................................................................................16
Table 14 - Authenticated Services ........................................................................................................................................18
Table 15 – Unauthenticated Traffic ......................................................................................................................................18
Table 16 - CSP Access Rights within Services........................................................................................................................19
Table 17: Public Key Access Rights within Services...............................................................................................................20
Table 18 - Authenticated Services ........................................................................................................................................21
Table 19 - Unauthenticated traffic........................................................................................................................................21
Table 20– References............................................................................................................................................................26
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions ...................................................................................................................................27
Table 22 – Datasheets...........................................................................................................................................................28
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - SRX320 (Front) ........................................................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 - SRX320 (Rear)..........................................................................................................................................................7
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1 Introduction
The Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways are a series of secure routers that provide essential capabilities to
connect, secure, and manage work force locations sized from handfuls to hundreds of users. By consolidating fast, highly
available switching, routing, security, and applications capabilities in a single device, enterprises can economically
deliver new services, safe connectivity, and a satisfying end user experience. All models run Juniper’s JUNOS firmware –
in this case, a specific FIPS-compliant version, when configured in FIPS-MODE, called JUNOS version 17.4R1-S1.
This Security Policy covers the SRX320 model. These model is meant for small distributed enterprises. The firmware
image is junos-srxsme-17.4R1-S1.9.tgz and the firmware Status service identifies itself as “Junos OS 17.4R1-S1”.
The cryptographic module is defined as a multiple-chip standalone module that execute JUNOS firmware on the Juniper
Networks SRX-Series Services Gateway listed in the table below.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Model Hardware Versions Firmware Distinguishing Features
SRX320 SRX320 JUNOS 17.4R1-S1 6x 10/100/1000;
2x SFP
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The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 overall:
Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 1
2 Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles and Services 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-test 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 1
The module has a limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. It includes a firmware load service
to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the
FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into the module is out of the scope of this validation and require a
separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The module does not implement any mitigation of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
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1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical forms of the module is depicted in Figures 1 below. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular
nickel or clear zinc coated, cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminium enclosure. The cryptographic boundary
is defined as the outer edge of the chassis.
Figure 1 - SRX320 (Front)
Figure 2 - SRX320 (Rear)
The following table maps each logical interface type defined in the FIPS 140-2 standard to one or more physical
interfaces.
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet LAN Communications Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Serial Console serial port Control in, Status out
Power Power connector Power in
Reset Reset button Control in
LED Status indicator lighting Status out
USB Firmware load port Control in, Data in
Copyright Juniper Networks, 2019 Version 1.4 (24 September 2019) Page 8 of 28
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1.2 Mode of Operation
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-Approved cryptographic
algorithms are supported. The module supports non-Approved algorithms when operating in the non-Approved mode of
operation as described in Sections 2 and 3.4. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of operation and the
Approved mode of operation, the CO must zeroize all CSPs by following the instructions in Section 1.3.
Then, the CO must run the following commands to configure the module into the Approved mode of operation:
co@fips-srx# set system fips level 2
co@fips-srx# commit
When AES-GCM is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPSec, the CO must also configure the module to use
IKEv2 by running the following commands:
co@fips-srx:fips# set security ike gateway <name> version v2-only (<name> - the user configured
name for the IKE gateway)
co@fips-srx:fips# commit
When Triple-DES is configured as the encryption-algorithm for IKE or IPsec, the CO must configure the IPsec proposal
lifetime-kilobytes to comply with [IG A.13] using the following command:
co@fips-srx:fips# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec_proposal_name> lifetime-kilobytes
<kilobytes>
co@fips-srx:fips# commit
When Triple-DES is the encryption-algorithm for IKE (regardless of the IPsec encryption algorithm), the lifetime-kilobytes
for the associated IPsec proposal must be greater than or equal to 12800. When Triple-DES is the encryption-algorithm
for IPsec, the lifetime-kilobytes must be less than or equal to 33554432.
Once the JUNOS firmware image is installed on the device, and configured into Approved mode and rebooted, and
integrity and self-tests have run successfully on initial power-on, the module is operating in the Approved mode.
While the module automatically creates a backup of the stored firmware image upon upgrade, the CO must ensure that
the backup image of the firmware is also a JUNOS-FIPS-MODE image by issuing the “request system snapshot slice
alternate” command when initial configuration is complete. This ensures that the backup image is operating in Approved
mode if fallback is required.
The operator can verify the module is operating in the Approved mode by verifying the following:
 The “show version” command indicates that the module is running the Approved firmware (i.e. JUNOS Software
Release 17.4R1-S1).
 The command prompt ends in “:fips”, which indicates the module has been configured in the Approved mode of
operation.
 The “show security ike” and “show security ipsec” commands show IKEv2 is configured when either an IPsec or
IKE proposal is configured to use AES-GCM.
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1.3 Zeroization
The following command allows the Cryptographic Officer to zeroize CSPs contained within the module:
co@fips-srx> request system zeroize
Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the FIPS Approved, vendor affirmed, and non-Approved-but-Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in Table 4 through Table 10 below. Table 11 summarizes the high level protocol algorithm support.
2.1 Approved Algorithms
References to standards are given in square bracket [ ]; see the References table.
Items enclosed in curly brackets { } are CAVP tested but not used by the module in the Approved mode.
Table 4 – Data Plane Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#5334 AES [197]
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
GCM [38D] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
#3530 HMAC [198]
SHA-1 λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256 λ = 128
#4284 SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Digest Generation
#2694 Triple-DES [67] TCBC [38A] Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 5 – Control Plane Authentec Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#5337 AES [197]
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
GCM [38D] Key Sizes: 128, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD
N/A1
CKG [133] Section 6.2
Asymmetric key generation
using unmodified DRBG
output
#1799 CVL
IKEv1 [135] SHA 256, 384
Key Derivation
IKEv2 [135] SHA 256, 384
1
Vendor Affirmed and in accordance with SP 800-133.
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Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#1435 ECDSA [186]
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA {256}, 384)
KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
#3534 HMAC [198]
SHA-256 λ = 128, 256 IKE Message Authentication,
IKE KDF Primitive
SHA-384 λ = 192, 384
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #5337 and HMAC Cert. #3534
Key establishment
methodology provides
between 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Triple-DES Cert. #2697 and HMAC Cert.
#3534
Key establishment
methodology provides 112
bits of encryption strength
#2894 RSA [186]
PKCS1_V1_
5
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)2
SigGen, SigVer
#4288 SHS [180]
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest Generation
#2697 Triple-DES [67] TCBC [38A] Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
2
RSA 4096 SigGen was tested to FIPS 186-4; however, the CAVP certificate lists 4096 under FIPS 186-2.
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Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#2060 DRBG [90A] HMAC SHA-256
Control Plane Random Bit
Generation/ Open SSL Random Bit
Generator
Table 7 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#5386 AES [197]
CBC [38A]
CTR[38A]
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A3
CKG
[133] Section 6.1
[133] Section 6.2
Asymmetric key generation using
unmodified DRBG output
#1422 ECDSA [186]
P-256 (SHA 256)
{P-384 (SHA 256)}
KeyGen
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA {256}, 384)
SigGen, SigVer
#3567 HMAC [198]
SHA-1 λ = 160
SSH Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
SHA-256 λ = 256
SHA-512 λ = 512
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #5386 and HMAC Cert. #3567
Key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
Triple-DES Cert. #2713 and HMAC Cert.
#3567
Key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption
strength
#2880 RSA [186]
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)4
SigGen
n=2048 (SHA 256) SigVer
3
Vendor Affirmed and in accordance with SP 800-133.
4
RSA 4096 SigGen was tested to FIPS 186-4; however, the CAVP certificate lists 4096 under FIPS 186-2.
Copyright Juniper Networks, 2019 Version 1.4 (24 September 2019) Page 13 of 28
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CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Mode Description Functions
n=2048 (SHA 256)
{n=3072 (SHA 256)}
{KeyGen}
#4320 SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest Generation,
SSH KDF Primitive
SHA-512 Message Digest Generation
#2713
Triple-DES
[67]
TCBC [38A] Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 8 – OpenSSH Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#1848 CVL SSH [135] SHA 1, 256, 384 Key Derivation
Table 9 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions
#4287 SHS [180]
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest Generation
2.2 Allowed Algorithms
Table 10 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
Diffie-Hellman [IG] D.8 Provides 112 bits of encryption strength. Key agreement; key establishment
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman [IG] D.8
Provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption
strength.
Key agreement; key establishment
NDRNG [IG] 7.14
Scenario 1a
Provides 256 bits of entropy. Seeding the DRBG
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2.3 Supported Protocols
Table 11 – Supported Protocols in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
IKEv1
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
Triple-DES CBC5
AES CBC 128/192/256
AES GCM 128/256
SHA-256,384
IKEv26
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
Triple-DES CBC7
AES CBC 128/192/256
AES GCM8
128/256
SHA-256,384
IPsec ESP
IKEv1 with optional:
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
IKEv1
3 Key Triple-DES CBC9
AES CBC 128/192/256 HMAC-SHA-1-96
HMAC-SHA-256-
128
IKEv2 with optional:
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
IKEv2
3 Key Triple-DES CBC10
AES CBC 128/192/256
AES GCM11
128/192/256
SSHv2
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 2047)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
ECDSA P-256
Triple-DES CBC12
AES CBC 128/192/256
AES CTR 128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-512
No parts of the IKEv1, IKEv2, ESP or SSHv2 protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
5
The Triple-DES key for the IETF IKEv1 protocol is generated according to RFC 2409.
6
IKEv2 generates the SKEYSEED according to RFC7296.
7
The Triple-DES key for the IETF IKEv2 protocol is generated according to RFC 7296.
8
The GCM IV is generated according to RFC5282. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES-GCM transforms. Transforms are counted on a per key basis.
9
The Triple-DES key for the ESP protocol is generated by the IETF IKEv1 protocol according to RFC 2409
10
The Triple-DES key for the ESP protocol is generated by the IETF IKEv2 protocol according to RFC 7296.
11
The GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES-GCM transforms. Transforms are counted on a per key basis.
12
The Triple-DES key for the IETF SSHv2 protocol is generated according to RFCs 4253 and 4344.
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The IKE and SSH algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In Table
11 – Supported Protocols in FIPS Mode above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent, and may be
used in any viable combination. These security functions are also available in the SSH connect (non-compliant) service.
2.4 Disallowed Algorithms
These algorithms are non-Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is operated in an Approved mode of
operation.
 ARCFOUR;
 Blowfish;
 CAST;
 DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant);
 HMAC-MD5;
 HMAC-RIPEMD160; and
 UMAC.
2.5 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 12 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage CKG
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG N/A
DRBG_State V and Key values for the HMAC_DRBG N/A
Entropy Input Entropy input string for the HMAC_DRBG N/A
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st
time SSH is configured, the keys are generated.
ECDSA P-256. Used to identify the host.
[133] Section 6.1
SSH DH
SSH Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key
used in SSH. Diffie-Hellman (N = 256 bit, 320 bit, 384 bit, 512 bit, or 1024
bit13
), EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC Diffie-Hellman P-384
[133] Section 6.2
SSH-SEK SSH Session Key; Session keys used with SSH. Triple-DES (3key), AES, HMAC. [135] Section 5.2
ESP-SEK IPSec ESP Session Keys. Triple-DES (3 key), AES, HMAC. [135] Section 4.1
13
SSH generates a Diffie-Hellman private key that is 2x the bit length of the longest symmetric or MAC key negotiated.
Copyright Juniper Networks, 2019 Version 1.4 (24 September 2019) Page 16 of 28
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Name Description and usage CKG
IKE-PSK Pre-Shared Key used to authenticate IKE connections. N/A
IKE-Priv IKE Private Key. RSA 2048, ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384
[133] Section 6.1
[186]
IKE-SKEYID IKE SKEYID. IKE secret used to derive IKE and IPsec ESP session keys. [135] Section 4.1
IKE-SEK IKE Session Keys. Triple-DES (3 key), AES, HMAC. [135] Section 4.1
IKE-DH-PRI
IKE Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key
used in IKE. Diffie-Hellman N = 224 bit, EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC Diffie-
Hellman P-384
[133] Section 6.2
CO-PW ASCII Text used to authenticate the CO. N/A
User-PW ASCII Text used to authenticate the User. N/A
Table 13 – Public keys
Name Description and usage CKG
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P-256. [133] Section 6.1
SSH-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used
in SSH key establishment. DH (L = 2048 bit), EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC
Diffie-Hellman P-384
[133] Section 6.2
IKE-PUB IKE Public Key RSA 2048, ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384 [133] Section 6.1
IKE-DH-PUB
Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used
in IKE key establishment. Diffie-Hellman L = 2048 bit, EC Diffie-Hellman P-256,
or EC Diffie-Hellman P-384
[133] Section 6.2
Auth-UPub
SSH User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the
module. ECDSA P-256 or P-384
N/A
Auth-COPub
SSH CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module.
ECDSA P-256 or P-384
N/A
Root CA
Juniper Root CA. ECDSA P-256 or P-384 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the
validity of the Juniper Package CA at software load.
N/A
Package CA
Package CA. ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of
Juniper Images at software load and boot.
N/A
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent operators, but
does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the separation of roles using either
identity-based operator authentication.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As root or super-
user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module.
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The user role may not change the configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-based authentication - username and password over the Console and SSH
as well as username and public key over SSH.
Password authentication: The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the 96 human
readable ASCII characters. The maximum password length is 20 characters.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming 0 time to
process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-second delay. Each failed
attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous (e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay,
5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-second delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of nine (9) possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best approach for the
attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be spawned. This would allow the
attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute; this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no
such thing as 0.6 attempts. Thus the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million.
The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 9/(9610
), which is less than
1/100,000.
ECDSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. Processing constraints allow for a maximum of 56,000,000
ECDSA attempts per minute. The module supports ECDSA (P-256 and P-384). The probability of a success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 56,000,000/(2128
).
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 16 - CSP Access Rights within Services lists
the access to CSPs by each service.
Table 14 - Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic IPsec protected connection (ESP) x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI) x x
IPsec connect Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset x
Software load Firmware update x
Table 15 – Unauthenticated Traffic
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
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Table 16 - CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
Entropy
Input
SSH
PHK
SSH
DH
SSH-SEK
ESP-SEK
IKE-PSK
IKE-Priv
IKE-SKEYID
IKE-SEK
IKE-DH-PRI
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure
security
--14
E -- GWR -- -- -- WR GWR -- -- -- W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- E -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize -- Z -- Z -- -- -- Z Z -- -- -- Z Z
SSH connect -- E -- E GE GE -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
IPsec connect -- E -- -- -- -- G E E GE G GE -- --
Console access -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote reset GZE GZ GZE -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z Z Z
Local reset GZE GZ GZE -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z Z Z
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Software load -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
14
G = Generate: The module generates the key.
R = Read: The key is read from the module (e.g. the key is output).
E = Execute: The module executes using the key.
W = Write: The key is written to persistent storage in the module.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the key.
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Table 17: Public Key Access Rights within Services
Service
Public key
SSH-PUB
SSH-DH-PUB
IKE-PUB
IKE-DH-PUB
Auth-UPub
Auth-COPub
Root-CA
Package-CA
Configure
security
GWR15
-- GWR -- W W -- --
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize Z -- Z Z Z Z -- --
SSH connect E GE -- -- E E -- --
IPsec connect -- -- E GE -- -- -- --
Console access -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Remote reset -- Z -- Z Z Z -- E
Local reset -- Z -- Z Z Z -- E
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Software load -- -- -- -- -- -- EW EW
15
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is written to persistent storage in the module
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
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3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions provided by the non-
Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of SSH Connect (non-compliant).
SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security functions identified in Section 2 and the SSHv2 row of Table 11 – .
Table 18 - Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security (non-compliant) Security relevant configuration x
Configure (non-compliant) Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic (non-compliant) IPsec protected connection (ESP) x
Status (non-compliant) Show status x x
Zeroize (non-compliant) Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect (non-compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
IPsec connect (non-compliant) Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) x
Console access (non-compliant) Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset (non-compliant) Software initiated reset x
Table 19 - Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset (non-compliant) Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic (non-compliant) Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
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4 Self-Tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive
data has not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the module.
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be completed successfully
prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails, the module enters the Critical Failure error
state.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
 Firmware Integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
 Data Plane KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
 Control Plane Authentec KATs
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o ECDSA P-256 w/ SHA-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Decrypt KAT
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o KDF-IKE-V1 KAT
o KDF-IKE-V2 KAT
 HMAC_DRBG KAT
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate.
 OpenSSL KATs
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o EC Diffie-Hellman P-256 KAT
 Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
 OpenSSH KAT
o KDF-SSH KAT
 Libmd KATs
o HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
o SHA-2-512 KAT
 Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational environment.
Upon successful completion of self-tests, the module outputs “FIPS self-tests completed.” to the local console. If a self-
test fails, the module outputs “<self-test name>: Failed” to the local console and automatically reboots.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
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 Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA and RSA key pairs.
 Firmware Load Test (ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 signature verification)
 Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG
 Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG
In addition to the continuous RNG tests, the module implements health-checks on the internal operating temperature. If
the temperature of the device exceeds 75°C (167° F) the module transmits a warning and shuts down. This ensures that
the entropy source will be within the range of the operating conditions under which it generates randomdata.
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5 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context specifically refers to a
requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements indicate a security rule
implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic
services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the
module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting plaintext CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the firmware load
service (legacy being those Junos firmware images signed with RSA signatures instead of ECDSA).
12. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. The cryptographic officer must configure the module to use IKEv2 when GCM is configured for IKE or IPsec ESP.
14. If the module loses power and then it is restored, then a new key shall be established for use with the AES GCM
encryption/decryption processes.
15. The cryptographic officer must configure the module to IPsec ESP lifetime-kilobytes to ensure the module does
not encrypt more than 232
blocks with a single Triple-DES key when Triple-DES is the encryption-algorithm for IKE
and/or IPsec ESP.
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6 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 20– References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
December 2012
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-
Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011.
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013.
[186-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2, January 2000.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D,
November 2007
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, May 2004
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, June
2015.
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Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EC Diffie-Hellman Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
ICV Integrity Check Value (i.e. Tag)
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IOC Input/Output Card
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
MD5 Message Digest 5
NPC Network Processing Card
RE Routing Engine
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SPC Services Processing Card
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
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Table 22 – Datasheets
Model Title URL
SRX320 SRX300 Line of Services Gateways
for the Branch
http://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datas
heets/1000550-en.pdf