Ruckus FastIron ICX™ 7450 Series Switch/Router
Firmware Version: IronWare OS 09.0.10
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.5
Last Update Date: 10-04-2024
Prepared by:
Ruckus Wireless LLC
Salarpuria Supreme, #137, Marathahalli
Bangalore, Karnataka 560037
India
www.commscope.com
Table of Contents
1. General..............................................................................................................................1
2. Cryptographic Module Specification................................................................................2
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces...................................................................................12
4. Roles, Services, and Authentication...............................................................................12
5. Software/Firmware Security...........................................................................................19
6. Operational Environment ...............................................................................................19
7. Physical Security ............................................................................................................19
8. Non-Invasive Security ....................................................................................................20
9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management ....................................................................20
10. Self-Test..........................................................................................................................27
11. Life-Cycle Assurance .....................................................................................................30
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks............................................................................................31
I. Terms and Definitions ....................................................................................................31
1
1. General
This is a non-proprietary cryptographic module security policy for Ruckus FastIron ICX™ 7450
Series Switch/Router (hereinafter referred to as the module). The firmware version running on
each module is IronWare OS 09.0.10. This security policy describes how the module meets the
FIPS 140-3 Level 1 security requirements, and how to operate the module in an approved mode.
This security policy may be freely distributed.
FIPS 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 — Security Requirements
for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules.
More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the NIST
website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
The table below indicates the actual security levels for each area of the module.
ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6.
[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security
Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Table 1 - Security Levels
The module is designed to meet an overall security level 1.
2
2. Cryptographic Module Specification
Cryptographic Boundary
The module is a hardware, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The cryptographic
boundary is defined as the module’s chassis unit encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right,"
“rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case representing the module’s physical perimeter. This section
illustrates the module hardware with the help of photographs.
Figure 1 - Front/top side of ICX7450-48P with IPSec module inserted
Figure 2 - Back side of ICX7450-48P with IPSec module inserted
Figure 3 - Front/top side of ICX7450-24P with ICX7400-4X10GF, ICX7400-4X1GF, ICX7400-4X10GC and
ICX7400-1X40GQ and ICX7400-SERVICE MOD
3
Figure 4- Back side of ICX7450-24P with ICX7400-4X10GC, ICX7400-1X40GQ and ICX7400-4X10GF
Figure 5 - Front/top side of ICX7450-48P with ICX74004X1GF, ICX7400-4X10GC and ICX7400-4X10GF
4
Figure 6 - ICX7450-48P with ICX7400-4X1GF, ICX7400-4X10GF, ICX7400-4X10GC, ICX7400-
1X40GQ, ICX7400-SERVICE-MOD
Figure 7 - Front/top side of ICX7450-48F with ICX7400-4X1GF, ICX7400-4X10GC and ICX7400-4X10GF
5
Figure 8 - Back side of ICX7450-48F with ICX7400-4X10GC, ICX7400-1X40GQ and ICX7400-4X10GF
The module delivers the performance, flexibility, and scalability required for enterprise access
deployment. Table 2 below lists the model and firmware version included in this validation.
Hardware
Model
Hardware
[Part Numbers and
Versions]
Firmware
Version
Distinguishing
Features
ICX7450-24P ICX7450-24P-E2 with
[ICX7400-4X1GF, ICX7400-
4X10GF, ICX7400-4X10GC,
ICX7400-1X40GQ,
ICX7400-SERVICE-MOD]
IronWare OS
09.0.10
ICX7450-24P module has the following
physical ports:
• 1x RJ-45 Ethernet Mgmt port
• 1x USB Type-C serial console
port
• 24x 10/100/1000 Mbps RJ-45
PoE+ ports
In addition, each of the network modules
has the following physical ports:
• 4x 1GbE SFP ports on
ICX7400-4X1GF
• 4x 1GbE uplink/stacking SFP+
ports on ICX7400-4X10GF
• 4x 1GbE 10GBASE-T copper
Ethernet ports on ICX7400-
4X10GC
• 1x 4 GbE uplink/stacking
QSFP+ ports on ICX7400-
1X40GQ
Please refer to Cryptographic Module
Interfaces section for more information
6
Hardware
Model
Hardware
[Part Numbers and
Versions]
Firmware
Version
Distinguishing
Features
ICX7450-48P ICX7450-48P-E2 with
[ICX7400-4X1GF, ICX7400-
4X10GF, ICX7400-4X10GC,
ICX7400-1X40GQ,
ICX7400-SERVICE-MOD]
IronWare OS
09.0.10
ICX7450-48P module has the following
physical ports:
• 1x RJ-45 Ethernet Mgmt port
• 1x USB Type-C serial console
port
• 48x 10/100/1000 Mbps RJ-45
PoE+ ports
In addition, each of the network modules
has the following physical ports:
• 4x 1GbE SFP ports on
ICX7400-4X1GF
• 4x 1GbE uplink/stacking SFP+
ports on ICX7400-4X10GF
• 4x 1GbE 10GBASE-T copper
Ethernet ports on ICX7400-
4X10GC
• 1x 4 GbE uplink/stacking
QSFP+ ports on ICX7400-
1X40GQ
Please refer to Cryptographic Module
Interfaces section for more information
ICX7450-48F ICX7450-48F-E2 with
[ICX7400-4X1GF, ICX7400-
4X10GF, ICX7400-4X10GC,
ICX7400-1X40GQ,
ICX7400-SERVICE-MOD]
IronWare OS
09.0.10
ICX7450-48F module has the following
physical ports:
• 1x RJ-45 Ethernet Mgmt port
• 1x USB Type-C serial console
port
• 48x 1GbE SFP ports
In addition, each of the network modules
has the following physical ports:
• 4x 1GbE SFP ports on
ICX7400-4X1GF
• 4x 1GbE uplink/stacking SFP+
ports on ICX7400-4X10GF
• 4x 1GbE 10GBASE-T copper
Ethernet ports on ICX7400-
4X10GC
• 1x 4 GbE uplink/stacking
QSFP+ ports on ICX7400-
1X40GQ
Please refer to Cryptographic Module
Interfaces section for more information
Table 2 – Tested Operational Environments
7
Modes of Operation
By default, the module is delivered with a non-approved mode of operation but supports an
approved mode of operation. Once the module is configured to operate in the approved mode of
operation by following the steps in section "Secure Operation" of this document by the Crypto
Officer, the module can only operate in the approved mode. The module does not claim
implementation of a degraded mode of operation.
The tables below list all approved or vendor-affirmed security functions of the module, including
specific key size(s) (in bits unless noted otherwise) employed for Approved services, and
implemented modes of operation. There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not
implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the
module are shown in these tables.
Approved Security Functions
The module implements the following approved cryptographic algorithms that have been ACVP
certified.
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function /Notes
#A2345 AES
• FIPS197
• SP800-38A
AES-ECB 128 and 256 bits Data
Encryption/Decryption
#A2345 AES
• FIPS197
• SP800-38A
AES-CBC 128 and 256 bits Data
Encryption/Decryption
#A2345 AES
• FIPS197
• SP800-38A
AES-CFB128 128 and 256 bits Data
Encryption/Decryption
#A2345 AES
• FIPS197
• SP800-38A
AES-CTR 128 and 256 bits Data
Encryption/Decryption
#A2345 AES
• FIPS197
• SP 800-38D
AES-GCM 128 and 256 bits Authenticated
Encryption/Decryption
#A2345 AES
• FIPS197
• FIPS800-38B
AES-CMAC 128 bits Assurance of the
authenticity
#A2345 AES
• SP800-38F
AES-KW 128 bits Authenticated
Encryption/Decryption
#A2345 AES
• SP800-38F
AES-KWP 128 bits Authenticated
Encryption/Decryption
#A2345 DRBG
• SP800-90Arev1
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256 bits)
N/A Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
#A2345 ECDSA
• FIPS186-4
ECDSA KeyGen Curves: P-256, P-384 ECDSA Key Generation
#A2345 ECDSA
• FIPS186-4
ECDSA SigGen Curves: P-256, P-384 ECDSA Digital Signature
Generation
8
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function /Notes
#A2345 ECDSA
• FIPS186-4
ECDSA SigVer Curves: P-256, P-384 ECDSA Digital Signature
Verification
#A2345 KAS-ECC-SSC
• SP800-56Arev3
KAS-ECC-SSC
Scheme:
Ephemeral
Unified
KAS-ECC-SSC with
Curves P-256, P-384,
P-521
KAS-ECC Shared Secret
Computation
#A2345 KAS
• SP800-56Arev3
KAS (ECC)
Scheme:
ephemeralUnified
KAS Role:
initiator,
responderP
KAS (KAS-SSC
Cert. #A2345,
CVL Cert.
#A2345
KAS-ECC with Curves
P-256, P-384, P-521;
Key establishment
methodology provides
between 128 and 256
bits of encryption
strength
Key Agreement Scheme
per SP800-56Arev3
with key derivation
function (SP800-135rev1)
Note: The module’s KAS
(ECC) implementation is
FIPS140-3 IG D.F
Scenario 2 (path 2)
compliant
#A2345 KAS-FFC-SSC
• SP800-56Arev3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Scheme:
dhEphem
MODP-2048, MODP-
4096, MODP-8192
KAS-FFC Shared Secret
Computation
#A2345 KAS
• SP800-56Arev3
KAS (FFC)
Scheme:
dhEphem
KAS (KAS-SSC
Cert. #A2345,
CVL Cert.
#A2345
KAS-FFC with MODP-
2048, MODP-4096,
MODP-8192
Key establishment
methodology provides
between 112 and 200
bits of encryption
strength
Key Agreement Scheme
per SP800-56Arev3
with key derivation
function (SP800-135rev1)
Note: The module’s KAS
(ECC) implementation is
FIPS140-3 IG D.F
Scenario 2 (path 2)
compliant
#A2345 KBKDF
• SP800-108rev1
KDF Mode:
Counter
N/A SP800-108Rev1
Compliant Key
Derivation Function
(KDF)
#A2345 KDF SSH (CVL)
• SP800-135rev1
SSHv2 KDF N/A SP800-135Rev1
Compliant Key
Derivation Function
(KDF) for SSHv2
#A2345 KDF TLS (CVL)
• SP800-135rev1
TLSv1.1/1.2 KDF N/A SP800-135rev1
Compliant Key
Derivation Function
(KDF) for TLSv1.1/1.2
#A2345 KDF SNMP (CVL)
• SP800-135rev1
SNMPv3 KDF N/A SP800-135rev1
Compliant Key
Derivation Function
(KDF) for SNMPv3
#A2345 KDF IKEv2 (CVL)
• SP800-135rev1
IKEv2 KDF N/A SP800-135rev1
Compliant Key
Derivation Function
(KDF) for IKEv2
9
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function /Notes
#A2345 KTS (MACSec)
• SP800-38F
KTS (AES Cert.
#A2345)
Key establishment
methodology provides
128 bits of encryption
strength
Key Transport using
AES-KW/KWP in
MACSec
#A2345 KTS (SSH)
SP800-38F
KTS (AES Cert.
#A2345 and
HMAC Cert.
#A2345)
Key establishment
methodology provides
128 or 256 bits of
encryption strength
Key Transport using AES
and HMAC in SSH
#A2345 KTS (TLS)
• SP800-38F
KTS (AES Cert.
#A2345 and
HMAC Cert.
#A2345)
Key establishment
methodology provides
128 or 256 bits of
encryption strength
Key Transport using AES
and HMAC in TLS
#A2345 KTS (TLS)
• SP800-38F
KTS (AES-GCM
Cert. #A2345)
Key establishment
methodology provides
128 or 256 bits of
encryption strength
Key Transport using
AES-GCM in TLS
#A2345 SHS
• FIPS180-4
SHA-1
Message Length:
0-51200
Increment 8
N/A Secure hashing
Note: SHA-1 is not used
for digital signature
generation
#A2345 SHS
• FIPS180-4
SHA2-256
Message Length:
0-51200
Increment 8
N/A Secure hashing
#A2345 SHS
• FIPS180-4
SHA2-384
Message Length:
0-51200
Increment 8
N/A Secure hashing
#A2345 HMAC
• FIPS198-1
HMAC-SHA-1 At least 160 bits Hash based message
authenticate code
generation and
verification
#A2345 HMAC
• FIPS198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
At least 160 bits Hash based message
authenticate code
generation and
verification
#A2345 HMAC
• FIPS198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
At least 160 bits Hash based message
authenticate code
generation and
verification
#A2345 RSA
• FIPS186-4
RSA KeyGen
Mode: B.3.3
Modulus: 2048 bits Key Generation
#A2345 RSA
• FIPS186-4
RSA SigGen
(PKCS 1.5)
Modulus: 2048 bits Signature Generation
#A2345 RSA
• FIPS186-4
RSA Sigver
(PKCS 1.5)
Modulus: 2048 bits Signature Verification
10
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function /Notes
#A2345 Safe Primes Key
Generation
• SP800-56Arev3
N/A Safe Prime Groups:
MODP-2048, MODP-
4096, MODP-8192
KAS-FFC Keypair
domain parameters
generation
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG
• SP800-133rev2
N/A N/A Vendor Affirmed
Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG)
compliant with SP800-
133rev2 and IG D.H
The cryptographic module
performs Cryptographic
Key Generation (CKG)
for asymmetric keys as
per sections 4 and 5 in
SP800-133rev2 (vendor
affirmed). A seed (i.e., the
random value) used in
asymmetric key
generation is a direct
output from SP800-
90Arev1 CTR_DRBG
Table 3 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library I)
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function /Notes
AES
#4550
AES
• FIPS197
• SP800-38A
AES-ECB 128 bits ECB is a pre-requisite
algorithm for GCM
AES
#4550
AES
• FIPS197
• SP800-38D
AES-GCM 128 bits Authenticated
Encryption/Decryption in
MACSec
Table 4 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library II)
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function /Notes
AES
#5074
AES
• FIPS197
• SP800-38A
AES-ECB 128 bits ECB is a pre-requisite
algorithm for GCM
AES
#5074
AES
• FIPS197
• SP800-38D
AES-GCM 128 bits Authenticated
Encryption/Decryption in
IPSec/IKE
Table 5 - Approved Algorithms (Crypto Library III)
Notes:
● There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in Tables 3-5.
11
● The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG C.H scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable
GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two
parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the
cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by
the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of
possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this
condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s
power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption
shall be established.
● The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG C.H scenario #1 following RFC
7296 for IPSec/IKE. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IPSec/IKE to establish the shared
secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. The operations of
one of the two parties involved in the IKE key establishment scheme shall be performed
entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. When the IV
exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client
or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption
key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES
GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
● The AES GCM IV is generated internally in the cryptographic module in accordance with
IEEE 802.1AE and its amendments. The IV length used is 96 bits (per SP800-38D and FIPS
140-3 IG C.H). The AES GCM IV construction is performed in compliance with IEEE
802.1AE and its amendments. If the module loses power, then new AES GCM keys should be
established. The module should only be used with FIPS 140-3 validated modules when
supporting the MACsec protocol for providing Peer, Authenticator functionality. The Peer and
the Authenticator Modules Security Policies shall state that the link between the Peer and the
Authenticator should be secured to prevent the possibility for an attacker to introduce foreign
equipment into the local area network.
● No parts of the SSH, TLS, SNMP and IKEv2 protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested
by the CAVP and CMVP.
As the module can only be operated in the Approved mode of operation, and any algorithms not
listed in the tables 3-5 above will be rejected by the module while in the approved mode, the tables
defined in SP800-140B for the following categories are missing from this document.
● Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in Approved Mode of Operation
● Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in Approved Mode of Operation with No Security
Claimed
● Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in Approved Mode of Operation
12
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-3 defined logical
interfaces: Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Control Output (N/A) and Status Output. The
logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table. Please note that the
module doesn’t support Control Output logical interface.
Physical Port Logical Interface Data that passes over
port/interface
Console port, Mgmt port, SFP/SFP+ ports,
QSFP+ ports, Ethernet ports
Data Input SSH, TLS, SNMPv3,
IPSec/IKEv2 or MACSec traffic
Console port, Mgmt port, SFP/SFP+ ports,
QSFP+ ports, Ethernet ports
Data Output SSH, TLS, SNMPv3,
IPSec/IKEv2 or MACsec traffic
Console port, Mgmt port, SFP/SFP+ ports,
QSFP+ ports, Ethernet ports
Control Input Control Input
Console port, Mgmt port, SFP/SFP+ ports,
QSFP+ ports, Ethernet ports, and LEDs
Status Output Status information
N/A Control Output NA
Power N/A Provides the power supply to the
module
Table 6 – Ports and Interfaces
4. Roles, Services, and Authentication
The module supports role-based authentication. In approved mode, the cryptographic module
supports the following roles:
1. Crypto Officer Role: The Crypto Officer role has complete access to the system.
The Crypto Officer is the only role that can perform firmware loading, security
functions configuration (SSHv2, TLSv1.1/v1.2, SNMPv3, IPSec/IKEv2 and
MACSec) and account management. A crypto officer can create additional accounts
thereby creating additional crypto officers.
2. Port Config Admin Role: The Port Config Admin role has read and write access
for configuring specific ports but not for global (system‐wide) parameters.
3. User Role: The User role on the device has read-only privileges and no
configuration mode access.
The module does not support the maintenance role.
For all other services, an operator must authenticate to the module as described in Table below.
The module provides services for remote communication (SSHv2 and SNMPv3) for management
and configuration of cryptographic functions.
The following subsections describe services available to operators based on role.
Role Service Input Output
Crypto Officer Perform Self-test Command to trigger self-test The self-tests completion status
information
Crypto Officer Perform Zeroization Command to zeroize the
module
The zeroization completion status
information
13
Role Service Input Output
Crypto Officer Update Firmware Command to upload a new
validated firmware
The firmware update completion
status information
Crypto Officer CO Authentication CO role authentication request Status of the CO role authentication
Crypto Officer Configuration
Management
Commands to configure the
module
Status of the completion of network
related configuration
Crypto Officer Configure RADIUS
Server
Commands to configure
RADIUS Server
Status of the completion of RADIUS
Server configuration
Crypto Officer Configure SSHv2
Function
Commands to configure
SSHv2 function
Status of the completion of SSHv2
configuration
Crypto Officer Configure SSL over
TLSv1.1/1.2 Function
Commands to configure SSL
over TLSv1.1/2 function
Status of the completion of SSL over
TLSv1.1/1.2 configuration
Crypto Officer Configure SNMPv3
Function
Commands to configure
SNMPv3 function
Status of the completion of SNMPv3
configuration
Crypto Officer Configure IPsec/IKE
Function
Commands to configure
IPSec/IKE function
Status of the completion of
IPSec/IKE configuration
Crypto Officer Configure MACSec
Function
Commands to configure
MACSec function
Status of the completion of MACSec
configuration
Crypto Officer Account management Command to create user
account
The status of the new user accounts
Crypto Officer Show Version Command to show version Module’s name and versioning
information
Crypto Officer Show Status Command to get the status of
the module
Module’s current status information
Crypto Officer Port Configuration
Management
Commands to configure the
port parameters of
switch/router
Port configuration completion status
information
Crypto Officer Run SSHv2 Function Initiate SSHv2 tunnel
establishment request
Status of SSHv2 tunnel
establishment
Crypto Officer Run SSL over
TLSv1.1/v1.2 Function
Initiate SSL over
TLSv1.1/v1.2 tunnel
establishment request
Status of TLSv1.1/v1.2 tunnel
establishment
Crypto Officer Run SNMPv3 Function Initiate SNMPv3 tunnel
establishment request
Status of SNMPv3 tunnel
establishment
Crypto Officer Run IPSec/IKE Function Initiate IPsec/IKE tunnel
establishment request
Status of IPSec/IKE tunnel
establishment
Crypto Officer Run MACSec Function Initiate MACSec tunnel
establishment request
Status of MACSec tunnel
establishment
Table 7 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output (Crypto Officer role)
Role Service Input Output
User Show Version Command to show version Module’s name and versioning
information
User Show Status Command to get the status of
the module
Module’s current status information
User User Authentication User role authentication
request
Status of the User role authentication
User Run SSHv2 Function Initiate SSHv2 tunnel
establishment request
Status of SSHv2 tunnel
establishment
Table 8 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output (User role)
Role Service Input Output
Port Config Admin Show Version Command to show version Module’s name and versioning
information
Port Config Admin Show Status Command to get the status of
the module
Module’s current status information
14
Role Service Input Output
Port Config Admin Port Config Admin
Authentication
Port Config Admin role
authentication request
Status of the Port Config Admin role
authentication
Port Config Admin Port Configuration
Management
Commands to configure the
port parameters of
switch/router
Port configuration completion status
information
Port Config Admin Run SSHv2 Function Initiate SSHv2 tunnel
establishment request
Status of SSHv2 tunnel
establishment
Table 9 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output (Port Config Admin role)
Role
Authentication
Method
Authentication Strength
Crypto Officer,
User, Port
Config Admin
Password-based
authentication
The minimum length is eight (8) characters (94 possible characters). The
probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is
1/(948
) which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully
authenticating to the module within one minute is 10/(948
), which is less than
1/100,000. The configuration supports at most ten failed attempts to authenticate
in a one-minute period. This calculation is based on the assumption that the
typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52
alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose
from in total
Crypto Officer,
User, Port
Config Admin
RSA-based
authentication
RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048 bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength,
which means an attacker would have a 1 in 2112 chance of randomly obtaining
the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chances required by
FIPS 140-3. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key
guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately
8.65x10^31 (2112 /60 = 8.65 x 1031) attempts per second, which is less than
1/100,000
Crypto Officer,
User, Port
Config Admin
ECDSA-based
authentication
When configuring the smallest curve P-256, the probability that a random attempt
will succeed, or a false acceptance will occur is 1/2^128, which is less than
1/1,000,000. 256 attempts are allowed in a one-minute period. Therefore, the
probability of a random success in a one-minute period is 256/2^128, which is
less than 1/100,000
Table 10 – Roles and Authentication
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs
Indicator
Perform Self-
test
The module runs
pre-operational
self-tests and
conditional
algorithm Self-
tests (CASTs)
N/A N/A Crypto
Officer
N/A Self-test
completion
message
Perform
Zeroization
Zeroize service
destroys all
SSPs in the
module
N/A ALL Crypto
Officer
Z Zeroize
completion
message
Update
Firmware
The module’s
firmware is
updated to a new
version
RSA SigVer Firmware Load Test Key Crypto
Officer
E Global
indicator and
Firmware
update
completion
message
Show Status Provide
module’s name
and current
status
information
N/A N/A Crypto
Officer;
User;
Port Config
Admin
R N/A
15
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs
Indicator
Show Version Provide modules
version
information
N/A N/A Crypto
Officer;
User;
Port Config
Admin
R N/A
CO
Authenticatio
n
CO role
authentication
N/A Crypto Officer Password Crypto
Officer
G, R, W, E N/A
User
Authenticatio
n
User role
authentication
N/A User Password User G, R, W, E N/A
Port Config
Admin
Authenticatio
n
Port Config
Admin role
authentication
N/A Port Config Admin Password Port Config
Admin
G, R, W, E N/A
Configure
SSHv2
Function
Configure
SSHv2 Function
AES-CBC,
AES-CTR,
CKG,
CTR_DRBG,
KDF SSH,
HMAC-SHA-
1,
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
KAS-ECC-
SSC,
KAS (ECC),
KAS-FFC-
SSC,
KAS (FFC),
KTS,
ECDSA
KeyGen,
ECDSA
SigGen,
ECDSA
SigVer,
RSA KeyGen,
RSA SigGen,
RSA SigVer,
Safe Primes
KeyGen
DRBG Entropy Input,
DRBG Seed,
DRBG Internal State V
value,
DRBG Key,
SSH ECDSA Private Key,
SSH ECDSA Public Key,
SSH RSA Private Key,
SSH RSA Public Key,
SSH DH Private Key,
SSH DH Public Key,
SSH DH Shared Secret Key,
SSH ECDH Private Key,
SSH ECDH Public Key,
SSH ECDH Shared Secret
Key,
SSH Session Encryption
Key,
SSH Session Integrity Key
Crypto
Officer
R, W, G Global
indicator and
SSH
connection
success log
message
Configure
SSL over
TLSv1.1/v1.2
Function
Configure
TLSv1.1/v1.2
Function
AES-ECB,
AES-CBC,
AES-GCM,
CKG,
CTR_DRBG,
KDF TLS,
HMAC-SHA-
1,
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
HMAC-SHA2-
384,
KAS-ECC-
SSC,
DRBG Entropy Input,
DRBG Seed,
DRBG Internal State V
value,
DRBG Key,
TLS ECDSA Private Key,
TLS ECDSA Public Key,
TLS RSA Private Key,
TLS RSA Public Key,
TLS DH Private Key,
TLS DH Public key,
TLS DH Shared Secret,
TLS ECDH Private Key,
TLS ECDH Public key,
Crypto
Officer
R, W, G Global
indicator and
TLS
connection
success log
message
16
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs
Indicator
KAS (ECC),
KAS-FFC-
SSC,
KAS (FFC),
KTS,
ECDSA
KeyGen,
ECDSA
SigGen,
ECDSA
SigVer,
RSA KeyGen,
RSA SigGen,
RSA SigVer,
Safe Primes
KeyGen
TLS ECDH Shared Secret,
TLS Pre-Master Secret,
TLS Master Secret,
TLS Session Encryption
Key,
TLS Session Integrity Key
SNMPv3
Function
Configuration
Configure
SNMPv3
Function
AES-CFB128,
KDF SNMP,
HMAC-SHA-
1,
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
HMAC-SHA2-
384
SNMPv3 User
Authentication Secret,
SNMPv3 Session Encryption
Key,
SNMPv3 Session Integrity
Key
Crypto
Officer
R, W, G Global
indicator and
SNMPv3
connection
success log
message
Configure
IPsec/IKEv2
Function
Configure
IPSec/IKEv2
Function
AES-CBC,
AES-GCM,
CKG,
CTR_DRBG,
KDF IKEv2,
ECDSA
KeyGen,
ECDSA
SigGen,
ECDSA
SigVer,
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
HMAC-SHA2-
384,
KAS-ECC-
SSC,
KAS (ECC),
KAS-FFC-
SSC,
KAS (FFC),
RSA KeyGen,
RSA SigGen,
RSA SigVer,
Safe Primes
KeyGen
DRBG Entropy Input,
DRBG Seed,
DRBG Internal State V
value,
DRBG Key,
IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret,
IPSec/IKE ECDH Private
Key,
IPSec/IKE ECDH Public
Key,
IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared
Secret,
IPSec/IKE DH Private Key,
IPSEC/IKE DH Public key,
IPSec/IKE DH Shared
Secret,
IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key,
IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key,
IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private
Key,
IPSEC/IKE ECDSA Public
Key,
IPSec/IKE Session
Encryption Key,
IPSec/IKE Session Integrity
Key
Crypto
Officer
G, R, W Global
indicator and
IPSec/IKE
connection
success log
message
Configure
MACSec
Function
Configure
MACSec
Function
AES-CMAC;
AES-GCM;
AES-KW;
AES-KWP;
KBKDF;
MACSec CAK;
MACSec ICK;
MACSec KEK;
MACSec SAK
Crypto
Officer
G, R, W Global
indicator and
MACSec
connection
success log
message
17
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs
Indicator
KTS
Port
Configuration
Management
Perform Port
Configuration
N/A Crypto Officer Password;
Port Config Admin Password
Crypto
Officer;
Port Config
Admin
R, E N/A
Account
management
Account
Creation
N/A Crypto Officer Password;
User Password;
Port Config Admin Password
Crypto
Officer
W N/A
Run SSHv2
Function
Negotiation and
encrypted data
transport via
SSH
AES-CBC,
AES-CTR,
CKG,
CTR_DRBG,
KDF SSH,
HMAC-SHA-
1,
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
KAS-ECC-
SSC,
KAS (ECC),
KAS-FFC-
SSC,
KAS (FFC),
KTS,
ECDSA
KeyGen,
ECDSA
SigGen,
ECDSA
SigVer,
RSA KeyGen,
RSA SigGen,
RSA SigVer,
Safe Primes
KeyGen
DRBG Entropy Input,
DRBG Seed,
DRBG Internal State V
value,
DRBG Key,
SSH ECDSA Private Key,
SSH ECDSA Public Key,
SSH RSA Private Key,
SSH RSA Public Key,
SSH DH Private Key,
SSH DH Public Key,
SSH DH Shared Secret Key,
SSH ECDH Private Key,
SSH ECDH Public Key,
SSH ECDH Shared Secret
Key,
SSH Session Encryption
Key,
SSH Session Integrity Key
Crypto
Officer
R, W, G Global
indicator and
SSH
connection
success log
message
Run SSL over
TLSv1.1/v1.2
Function
Negotiation and
encrypted data
transport via SSL
(TLSv1.1/v1.2)
AES-ECB,
AES-CBC,
AES-GCM,
CKG,
CTR_DRBG,
KDF TLS,
HMAC-SHA-
1,
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
HMAC-SHA2-
384,
KAS-ECC-
SSC,
KAS (ECC),
KAS-FFC-
SSC,
KAS (FFC),
KTS,
ECDSA
KeyGen,
DRBG Entropy Input,
DRBG Seed,
DRBG Internal State V
value,
DRBG Key,
TLS ECDSA Private Key,
TLS ECDSA Public Key,
TLS RSA Private Key,
TLS RSA Public Key,
TLS DH Private Key,
TLS DH Public key,
TLS DH Shared Secret,
TLS ECDH Private Key,
TLS ECDH Public key,
TLS ECDH Shared Secret,
TLS Pre-Master Secret,
TLS Master Secret,
TLS Session Encryption
Key,
TLS Session Integrity Key
Crypto
Officer
R, W, G Global
indicator and
TLS
connection
success log
message
18
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs
Indicator
ECDSA
SigGen,
ECDSA
SigVer,
RSA KeyGen,
RSA SigGen,
RSA SigVer,
Safe Primes
KeyGen
Run SNMPv3
Function
Negotiation and
encrypted data
transport via
SNMPv3
AES-CFB128,
KDF SNMP,
HMAC-SHA-
1,
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
HMAC-SHA2-
384
SNMPv3 User
Authentication Secret,
SNMPv3 Session Encryption
Key,
SNMPv3 Session Integrity
Key
Crypto
Officer
R, W, G Global
indicator and
SNMPv3
connection
success log
message
Run
IPSec/IKEv2
Function
Negotiation and
encrypted data
transport via
IPSec
AES-CBC,
AES-GCM,
CKG,
CTR_DRBG,
KDF IKEv2,
ECDSA
KeyGen,
ECDSA
SigGen,
ECDSA
SigVer,
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
HMAC-SHA2-
384,
KAS-ECC-
SSC,
KAS (ECC),
KAS-FFC-
SSC,
KAS (FFC),
RSA KeyGen,
RSA SigGen,
RSA SigVer,
Safe Primes
KeyGen
DRBG Entropy Input,
DRBG Seed,
DRBG Internal State V
value,
DRBG Key,
IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret,
IPSec/IKE ECDH Private
Key,
IPSec/IKE ECDH Public
Key,
IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared
Secret,
IPSec/IKE DH Private Key,
IPSEC/IKE DH Public key,
IPSec/IKE DH Shared
Secret,
IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key,
IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key,
IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private
Key,
IPSEC/IKE ECDSA Public
Key,
IPSec/IKE Session
Encryption Key,
IPSec/IKE Session Integrity
Key
Crypto
Officer
R, E Global
indicator and
IPSec/IKE
connection
success log
message
Run MACSec
Function
Negotiation and
encrypted data
transport via
MACSec
AES-CMAC,
AES-GCM,
AES-KW,
AES-KWP,
KTS,
KBKDF
MACSec CAK,
MACSec ICK,
MACSec KEK,
MACSec SAK
Crypto
Officer
R, E Global
indicator and
MACSec
connection
success log
message
Table 11 - Approved Services
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output)
19
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP
Unauthenticated Services
The services for someone without an authorized role are to view the status output from the module’s
LEDs and to cycle power the module.
5. Software/Firmware Security
Integrity Techniques
The module performs the Firmware Integrity tests by using CRC-32 during the Pre-Operational
Self-Test. At Module’s initialization, the integrity of the runtime executable binary file is verified
using the following two integrity check mechanisms to ensure that the module has not been
tampered:
• Bootloader Integrity Test (CRC-32)
• Firmware Integrity Test (CRC-32)
If at the load time the CRC-32 value does not match the stored, known CRC-32 value, the module
would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited.
In addition, the module also supports the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-
256 (RSA Cert. #A2345) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A
Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the binary the factory and used
for firmware load test. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate into the
module before loading any firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module
is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be
rejected if the verification fails.
Integrity Test On-Demand
Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at
power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the module to initiate the firmware integrity test
on-demand. This automatically performs the integrity test of all firmware components included
within the boundary of the module.
6. Operational Environment
The module is a hardware module. The module’s operational environment is non-modifiable. The
module’s firmware version running on each model is IronWare OS 09.0.10. Any other firmware
loaded into these modules is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3
validation.
7. Physical Security
The module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module. The module meets the FIPS
140-3 Level 1 security requirements as production grade equipment.
20
8. Non-Invasive Security
No approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics are defined at this time.
9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management
Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establis
hment
Storage Zeroization Use & related
Keys
DRBG
Entropy
Input
384 bits N/A Generated from
noise source
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to seed
the DRBG
DRBG Seed 256 bits DRBG
Cert. #A2345
Internally Derived
from entropy input
string as defined by
SP800-90Arev1
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used DRBG
generation
DRBG
Internal
State V
value
256 bits DRBG
Cert. #A2345
Internally Derived
from entropy input
string as defined by
SP800-90Arev1
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used DRBG
generation
DRBG Key 256 bits DRBG
Cert. #A2345
Internally Derived
from entropy input
string as defined by
SP800-90Arev1
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used DRBG
generation
Port Config
Admin
Password
8 to 60
Characters
N/A N/A Import:
Encrypted
by SSH
session key
Export: No
MD/EE Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for Port
Config Admin
authentication
Crypto
Officer
Password
8 to 60
Characters
N/A N/A Import:
Encrypted
by SSH
session key
Export: No
MD/EE Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
Crypto
Officer
authentication
User
Password
8 to 60
Characters
N/A N/A Import:
Encrypted
by SSH
session key
Export: No
MD/EE Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for User
authentication
RADIUS
Secret
8 to 64
Characters
N/A N/A Import:
Encrypted
by SSH
session key
Export: No
MD/EE Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
RADIUS
Server
authentication
SSH
ECDSA
Private Key
P-256, P-
384
CKG,
DRBG,
ECDSA KeyGen,
ECDSA SigGen
Cert. #A2345
Internally generated
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using FIPS
186-4 ECDSA key
generation method,
and the random
value used in key
generation is
generated using
Import: No
Export: No
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for SSH
authentication
21
Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establis
hment
Storage Zeroization Use & related
Keys
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
SSH
ECDSA
Public Key
P-256, P-
384
ECDSA SigVer
Cert #A2345
Internally derived
per the FIPS 186-4
ECDSA key
generation method
Import: No
Export: to
the SSH peer
application
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for SSH
authentication
SSH RSA
Private Key
2048 bits CKG,
DRBG,
RSA KeyGen,
RSA SigGen
Cert. #A2345
Internally generated
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using FIPS
186-4 RSA key
generation method,
and the random
value used in key
generation is
generated using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for SSH
authentication
SSH RSA
Public Key
2048 bits RSA SigVer
Cert #A2345
Internally derived
per the FIPS 186-4
RSA key generation
method
Import: No
Export: to
SSH peer
application
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for SSH
authentication
SSH DH
Private Key
MODP-
2048,
4096,
8192 bits
CKG,
DRBG,
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally
generated.
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using
SP800-56Arev3
Diffie-Hellman key
generation
method, and
the random
value used in
key generation
is generated
using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
SSH DH
Shared secret
SSH DH
Public Key
MODP-
2048,
4096,
8192 bits
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
internally per the
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
(SP800-56Arev3)
Import: No
Export: to
SSH peer
application
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
SSH DH
Shared secret
SSH DH
Shared
Secret
MODP-
2048, 4096,
8192 bits
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
using
SP800-56A rev3
EC Diffie-Hellman
shared secret
computation
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
SSH Session
Encryption
Key, SSH
Session
Integrity Key
SSH ECDH
Private Key
P-256,
P-384,
P-521
CKG,
DRBG,
KAS-ECC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally
generated.
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using
SP800-56Arev3 EC
Diffie-Hellman key
generation
method, and
the random
value used in
key generation
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
SSH ECDH
Shared secret
22
Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establis
hment
Storage Zeroization Use & related
Keys
is generated
using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
SSH ECDH
Public Key
P-256,
P-384,
P-521
KAS-ECC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
internally per the
EC Diffie-Hellman
key agreement
(SP800-56Arev3)
Import: No
Export: to
SSH peer
application
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
SSH ECDH
Shared secret
SSH ECDH
Shared
Secret
P-256,
P-384,
P-521
KAS-ECC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
using
SP800-56A rev3
EC Diffie-Hellman
shared secret
computation
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
SSH Session
Encryption
Key
SSH Session
Integrity Key
SSH Session
Encryption
Key
128, 256
bits
AES-CTR,
KDF SSH,
KTS
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135rev1
KDF (SSHv2)
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for SSH
session
confidentiality
protection
SSH Session
Integrity
Key
At least
160 bits
HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
KDF SSH
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135rev1
KDF (SSHv2)
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for SSH
session
integrity
protection
IPSec/IKE
Pre-Shared
Secret
8 to 60
Characters
N/A N/A Import:
Encrypted by
SSH session
key
Export: No
MD/EE Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to
authenticate
IPsec/IKE
peer
IPSec/IKE
ECDH
Private Key
P-256, P-
384
CKG,
DRBG,
KAS-ECC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally
generated.
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using
SP800-56Arev3 EC
Diffie-Hellman key
generation
method, and
the random
value used in
key generation
is generated
using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE
ECDH Shared
secret
IPSec/IKE
ECDH
Public Key
P-256, P-
384
KAS-ECC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
internally per the
EC Diffie-Hellman
key agreement
(SP800-56Arev3)
Import: No
Export: to
the
IPSec/IKE
peer
application
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE
ECDH Shared
secret
IPSec/IKE
ECDH
Shared
Secret
P-256, P-
384
KAS-ECC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
using
SP800-56A rev3
EC Diffie-Hellman
shared
secret
computation
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE
Session
Encryption
Key,
IPSec/IKE
session
Integrity Key
23
Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establis
hment
Storage Zeroization Use & related
Keys
IPSec/IKE
DH Private
Key
MODP-
2048
CKG,
DRBG,
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally
generated.
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using
SP800-56Arev3
Diffie-Hellman key
generation
method, and
the random
value used in
key generation
is generated
using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE
DH Shared
secret
IPSec/IKE
DH Public
key
MODP-
2048
CKG,
DRBG,
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
internally per the
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
(SP800-56Arev3)
Import: No
Export: to
IPSec/IKE
peer
application
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE
DH Shared
secret
IPSec/IKE
DH Shared
Secret
MODP-
2048
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
using
SP800-56Arev3
Diffie-Hellman
shared secret
computation
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
IPSec/IKE
Session
Encryption
Key,
IPSec/IKE
Session
Integrity Key
IPSec/IKE
RSA Private
Key
2048 bits CKG,
DRBG,
RSA KeyGen,
RSA SigGen
Cert. #A2345
Internally generated
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using FIPS
186-4 RSA/RSA
key generation
method, and the
random value used
in key generation is
generated using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
IPSec/IKE
authentication
IPSec/IKE
RSA Public
Key
2048 bits CKG,
DRBG,
RSA KeyGen
RSA SigVer
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
per the FIPS 186-4
RSA key generation
method
Import: No
Export: to
IPSec/IKE
peer
application
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
IPSec/IKE
authentication
IPSec/IKE
ECDSA
Private Key
P-256, P-
384
CKG,
DRBG,
ECDSA KeyGen,
ECDSA SigGen
Cert. #A2345
Internally generated
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using
FIPS 186-4 ECDSA
key
generation
method, and
the random
value used in
key generation
is generated
using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
IPSec/IKE
authentication
IPSec/IKE
ECDSA
Public Key
P-256,
P-384
CKG,
DRBG,
ECDSA KeyGen,
Internally derived
per the FIPS 186-4
Import: No N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Used for
IPSec/IKE
authentication
24
Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establis
hment
Storage Zeroization Use & related
Keys
ECDSA SigVer
Cert. #A2345
ECDSA key
generation method
Export: to
IPSec/IKE
peer
application
Zeroization
Command
IPSec/IKE
Session
Encryption
Key
128, 256
bits
AES-CBC
Cert. #A2345,
AES-GCM
Cert. #5074
Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135rev1
KDF (IKEv2)
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
IPSec/IKE
session
confidentiality
protection
IPSec/IKE
Session
Integrity
Key
At least 160
bits
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
HMAC-SHA2-
384
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135rev1
KDF (IKEv2)
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
IPSec/IKE
session
integrity
protection
SNMPv3
User
Authenticati
on Secret
8 to 20
characters
N/A Please see
Establishment
Import:
Encrypted by
SSH session
key
Export: No
MD/EE Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
SNMPv3 User
Authentication
SNMPv3
Session
Encryption
Key
128 bits AES-CFB128,
KDF SNMP
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135rev1
KDF (SNMPv3)
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
SNMPV3
session
confidentiality
protection
SNMPv3
Session
Integrity
Key
At least 160
bits
HMAC-SHA-1,
KDF SNMP
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135rev1
KDF (SNMPv3)
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
SNMPv3
session
integrity
protection
25
Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establis
hment
Storage Zeroization Use & related
Keys
TLS ECDSA
Private Key
P-256, P-
384
CKG,
DRBG,
ECDSA KeyGen,
ECDSA SigGen
Cert. #A2345
Internally generated
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using
FIPS 186-4 ECDSA
key
generation
method, and
the random
value used in
key generation
is generated
using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for TLS
authentication
TLS ECDSA
Public Key
P-256, P-
384
ECDSA SigVer
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
per the FIPS 186-4
ECDSA key
generation method
Import: No
Export: to
TLS peer
application
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for TLS
authentication
TLS RSA
Private Key
2048 bits CKG,
DRBG,
RSA KeyGen,
RSA SigGen,
Cert. #A2345
Internally generated
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using
FIPS 186-4 RSA
key
generation
method, and
the random
value used in
key generation
is generated
using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for TLS
authentication
TLS RSA
Public Key
2048 bits RSA SigVer
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
per the FIPS 186-4
RSA key generation
method
Import: No
Export: to
TLS peer
application
N/A Flash
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for TLS
authentication
TLS DH
Private Key
MODP-
2048
CKG,
DRBG,
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally
generated.
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using
SP800-56Arev3
Diffie-Hellman key
generation
method, and
the random
value used in
key generation
is generated
using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
TLS DH
Shared secret
TLS DH
Public Key
MODP-
2048
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
internally per the
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
(SP800-56Arev3)
Import: No
Export: to
TLS peer
application
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
TLS DH
Shared secret
TLS DH
Shared
Secret
MODP-
2048
KAS-FFC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
using
SP800-56A rev3
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Used to derive
TLS Session
Encryption
26
Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establis
hment
Storage Zeroization Use & related
Keys
Diffie-Hellman
shared
secret
computation
Zeroization
Command
Key, TLS
Session
Integrity Key
TLS ECDH
Private Key
P-256, P-
384
CKG,
DRBG,
KAS-ECC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally
generated.
conformant to
SP800-133r2
(CKG) using
SP800-56Arev3 EC
Diffie-Hellman key
generation
method, and
the random
value used in
key generation
is generated
using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
TLS ECDH
Shared Secret
TLS ECDH
Public key
P-256, P-
384
KAS-ECC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
internally per the
EC Diffie-Hellman
key agreement
(SP800-56Arev3)
Import: No
Export: to
TLS peer
application
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
TLS ECDH
Shared secret
TLS ECDH
Shared
Secret
P-256, P-
384
KAS-ECC-SSC
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
using
SP800-56A rev3
EC Diffie-Hellman
shared
secret
computation
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
TLS Session
Encryption
Key, TLS
Session
Integrity Key
TLS Pre-
Master
Secret
256 bits N/A Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135rev1
KDF (TLSv1.1/1.2)
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to derive
TLS Session
Encryption
Key, TLS
Session
Integrity Key
TLS Master
Secret
48 bytes N/A Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135rev1
KDF (TLSv1.1/1.2)
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
TLS pre
master secret,
TLS
Encryption
Key TLS
Session
Integrity Key
TLS Session
Encryption
Key
128 or 256
bits
AES-ECB,
AES-CBC,
AES-GCM,
KDF TLS,
KTS
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135 rev1
KDF TLSv1.1/1.2
KDF
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for TLS
session
confidentiality
protection
TLS Session
Integrity
Key
At least 160
bits
KDF TLS
HMAC-SHA2-
256,
HMAC-SHA2-
384
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
via key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135 rev1
KDF TLSv1.1/1.2
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for TLS
session
integrity
protection
MACSec
CAK
128 bits N/A N/A Import:
Encrypted
by SSH
session key
Export: No
MD/EE Flash
(plaintext)
Explicit
zeroization
by
zeroization
command
Used to derive
MACSec ICK
and MACSec
KEK
27
Key/SSP
Name/Type
Strength Security
Function and
Cert Number
Generation Import/
Export
Establis
hment
Storage Zeroization Use & related
Keys
MACSec
ICK
128 bits AES-CMAC,
KBKDF
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
using SP800-108
KDF
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
used for
MACSec Peer
authentication
MACSec
KEK
128 bits AES-KW,
AES-KWP,
KBKDF,
KTS
Cert. #A2345
Internally derived
using SP800-108
KDF
Import: No
Export: No
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used to
transport
MACSec
SAK to
MACSec Peer
MACSec
SAK
128 bits AES-CMAC
KBKDF,
Cert. #A2345
AES-GCM
AES Cert: #4550
Internally derived
using SP800-108
KDF
Import: No
Export:
Encrypted
by MACSec
KEK
N/A DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
SSP
(CSP/PSP)
Zeroization
Command
Used for
MACSec
session
protection
Firmware
Load Test
Key
2048 bits RSA SigVer,
SHA2-256
Cert. #A2345
Pre-loaded at the
factory (in the
module’s
executable binary)
N/A N/A Flash
(Plaintext)
N/A User for
Firmware load
test
Table 12 - SSPs
Notes:
1. The module uses procedural zeroization to explicitly zeroize all SSPs listed in Table 12.
2. The zeroization operations shall be performed under the control of the CO role by using the
CLI command “fips zeroize all”
3. To initiate zeroization, see Section End of Life / Sanitization in this document for more
details.
4. The zeroized SSPs cannot be retrieved or reused. Once the command is initiated, the SSPs
are overwritten with 0s.
RBG Entropy Source.
Entropy sources Minimum number of
bits of entropy
Details
ENT (NP).
Periodic sampling of the high-
precision CPU clock within the
ARM CPU is the only single
entropy source used to seed the
SP800-90Arev1 DRBG (DRBG
Cert. #A2345)
256 bits The system tick clock/register as the single
entropy source to provide the sufficient entropy
to seed the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG (DRBG Cert.
#A2345). The entropy source was directly used to
seed the DRBG without the entropy conditioning
process. Please refer to entropy report for details
Table 13 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
10. Self-Test
The modules perform the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and
conditional self-tests. The module runs all self-tests without operator intervention. In the event that
a self-test fails, the module will enter an error state, output an error message and follow up with a
28
module reboot. The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests
on demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling).
Pre-Operational Self-Tests:
• Pre-Operational Firmware Integrity Test
o BootLoader Integrity Test (CRC-32)
o Firmware Integrity Test (CRC-32)
• No Pre-Operational Bypass Test
• No Pre-Operational Critical Functions Test
Conditional Self-Tests
• Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Tests:
o AES-CBC 128 bits encryption KAT
o AES-CBC 128 bits decryption KAT
o AES-CMAC 128 bits encryption KAT
o AES-CMAC 128 bits decryption KAT
o AES-GCM 128 bits authenticated encryption KAT
o AES-GCM 128 bits authenticated decryption KAT
o CTR_DRBG Instantiate KAT
o CTR_DRBG Generate KAT
o CTR_DRBG Reseed KAT
Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90Arev1 Section 11.3 are performed
o ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 SigGen KAT
o ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 SigVer KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
o KAS-FFC-SSC Primitive KAT
o KAS-ECC-SSC Primitive KAT
o RSA 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 SigGen KAT
o RSA 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256 SigVer KAT
o SHA-1 KAT
o SHA2-256 KAT
o SHA2-384 KAT
o KBKDF KAT
o KDF SSH KAT
o KDF SNMP KAT
o KDF IKEv2 KAT
o KDF TLS KAT
o SP800-90B Entropy Source start-up health tests:
▪ Repetition Count Test (RCT)
▪ Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)
o SP800-90B Entropy Source Continuous Health Tests:
▪ Repetition Count Test (RCT)
▪ Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)
29
In addition, the module also performs the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests to the
following two AES-GCM algorithms:
o AES-GCM 128 bits authenticated encryption KAT for AES Cert. #4550
o AES-GCM 128 bits authenticated decryption KAT for AES Cert. #4550
o AES-GCM 128 bits authenticated encryption KAT for AES Cert. #5074
o AES-GCM 128 bits authenticated decryption KAT for AES Cert. #5074
• Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Tests:
o RSA PCT
o ECDSA PCT
o KAS-ECC PCT
o KAS-FFC PCT
• Conditional Firmware Load Test
o Firmware Load Test (RSA 2048 bits modulus with SHA2-256)
• No Conditional Manual Entry Test
• No Conditional Bypass Test
• No Conditional Critical Function Test
Error Handling
If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the cause of the error and enters an
error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited.
The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and reperforming the self-
tests, including the pre-operational software integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module
will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware
integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The table below shows the different causes that lead to the
Error State and the status indicators reported.
Cause of Error Error State Indicator
Pre-operational Firmware Integrity
Test Fails
FIPS: Crypto module POST Failed
Conditional CAST Fails FIPS Fatal Cryptographic Module Failure. Reason: <Reason String>
Conditional PCT Fails Pairwise consistency check failed
Firmware Load Test Fails FIPS: Firmware Integrity Test: Package Checksum Verification: FAIL
Table 14 – Error State Indicators
Periodic/On-Demand Self-Test
The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for
periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling). The full suite of self-
tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic
self-tests.
30
In addition, the Crypto Officer shall perform the periodic test on demand no more than 10 days to
ensure all components are functioning correctly.
11. Life-cycle Assurance
The module is designed to handle the various stages of a module’s life-cycle. The sections below
highlight the details for each stage.
Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-3. Follow the secure operations
provided below to place the module in approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining
the following settings will remove the module from the approved mode of operation. The module
runs firmware version IronWare OS 09.0.10. This is the only allowable firmware image for this
current approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer shall load the FIPS 140-3 validated
firmware only to maintain validation.
The module is initiated into the approved mode of operation via the following procedures through
the Command Line interface (CLI):
1. The Crypto Officer must login by using the default login password.
2. The Crypto Officer shall replace the default login password with a new one upon the first-
time authentication.
3. The Crypto Officer shall create the account for Port Config Admin role and User role
respectively.
4. Enter into the configuration mode by using ‘conf t’ command.
5. Enable approved mode by using ‘fips enable’ command.
6. Configure SSH, TLS, SNMPv3, MACSec, IPSec/IKE and Radius services by using only
approved algorithms listed in Tables 3, 4 and 5 above.
7. Configure the module as the MACSec Peer Authenticator in the MACSec service.
8. If using RADIUS server for roles authentication, please configure a secure TLS tunnel to
secure traffic between the module and the RADIUS server. The RADIUS shared secret must
be at least 8 characters long.
9. Disable the TFTP server.
10. Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using approved algorithms.
11. Save the configuration.
12. Reload the module.
13. Verify the approved mode by using command ‘fips show’ (This command outputs the
module’s status. After the approved mode was enabled, the output would be “approved
mode: Administrative status ON”).
Once the module has completed initialization into the approved mode of operation, the module
automatically enforces a password change for the Crypto Officer. The default login password
won’t be accepted by the module. Any non-approved algorithms or security functions are rejected
automatically by the module and an error message is output.
31
End of Life / Sanitization
Crypto Officers should follow the procedure below for the secure destruction of their module:
Note: This process will cause the module to no longer function after it has wiped all
configurations and keys.
1. Access the module via SSH with Crypto Officer.
2. Authenticate using proper credentials.
3. Execute command: “fips zeroize all”.
a. Confirm command.
4. Module will begin zeroization process and wipe all security parameters and
configurations.
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks
This module is not designed to mitigate against any other attacks outside of the FIPS 140-3 scope.
I. Terms and Definitions
Term Meaning
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
Approved
mode
Device actively running in FIPS 140-3 compliant manner
CC Common Criteria
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (RFC2104)
POST Power-on Self-Test
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PSK Pre-shared keys
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Aldeman Public/Private Key
RNG Random Number Generator
SSL Secure Socket Layer, used in HTTPS protocol for payload encryption.
TLS Transport Layer Security, successor to SSL, used in HTTPS protocol for payload encryption.
KAT Known Answer Test
DSS Digital Signature Standard
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm, proposed by NIST in 1991 for FIPS 186-x
DES Data Encryption Standard (single DES should not be used see TDEA)
NDPP Network Devices Protection Profile
DRBG Deterministic Random Bits Generator
32
ACVP Automated Cryptographic Validation Program
NDcPP Network Device collaborative protection profile