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CA, Inc. dba CA Technologies
CA Technologies C-Security Kernel
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version: 1.2
Date: September 29, 2017
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................4
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.........................................................................5
1.2 Software and Logical Cryptographic Boundary............................................................................6
1.3 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................6
2 Cryptographic Functionality.............................................................................................7
2.1 Critical Security Parameters.........................................................................................................9
2.2 Public Keys....................................................................................................................................9
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication...............................................................................10
3.1 Assumption of Roles.................................................................................................................. 10
3.2 Services...................................................................................................................................... 10
4 Self-tests........................................................................................................................13
5 Physical Security............................................................................................................13
6 Operational Environment ..............................................................................................14
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy.................................................................................14
8 Security Rules and Guidance..........................................................................................14
9 References and Definitions............................................................................................14
10 Appendix A – Installation Instructions ...........................................................................17
10.1 Windows 7 INSTALLATION ........................................................................................................ 17
10.2 CA Technologies C-Security Kernel FIPS API.............................................................................. 18
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List of Tables and Figures
Table 1 – Tested Operating Environment..................................................................................................... 4
Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements........................................................................................5
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................................... 5
Figure 1 – Module Block Diagram................................................................................................................. 6
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions..............................................................7
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions ..................................................................8
Table 6 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...............................................................................................9
Table 7 – Public Keys..................................................................................................................................... 9
Table 8 – Roles Description......................................................................................................................... 10
Table 9 – Authorized Services available in FIPS mode................................................................................10
Table 10 – Services available in non-FIPS mode .........................................................................................11
Table 11 – CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................12
Table 12 – Power-on Self-tests ...................................................................................................................13
Table 13 – Conditional Self-tests ................................................................................................................13
Table 14 – References................................................................................................................................. 14
Table 15 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................15
Table 16 – Source Files................................................................................................................................ 16
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the CA, Inc. dba CA Technologies, “CA Technologies C-
Security Kernel” (Software Version 3.11.2), hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a
cryptography software library. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 1 requirements.
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2
validated cryptographic functionality. The Module is a software-only module, multi-chip standalone
module embodiment; the cryptographic boundary is the collection of object files from the source code
files listed in Table 16 – Source Files. No software components have been excluded from the FIPS 140-2
requirements.
Operational testing was performed for the following Operating Environment:
Table 1 – Tested Operating Environment
Operating System Processor Platform
1 Debian 8.8 Intel Xeon® 1275v3 CA PAM 304L Server
As allowed by FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5, the validation status of the Module is
maintained when operated in the following additional operating environments:
• Windows 7 (32-bit)
• Windows 8.1 (32-bit and 64-bit)
• Windows Server 2008
• Windows Server 2012
• Windows 10
The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of
the generated keys when the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
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The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical cryptographic boundary is the general purpose computer where the Module is installed.
The Module relies on the computer system where it is running for input/output devices.
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Description Logical Interface Type
API entry point Control in
API function parameters Data in
API return value Status out
API function parameters Data out
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1.2 Software and Logical Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 1 depicts the Module operational environment.
Figure 1 – Module Block Diagram
The above diagram shows the Logical Boundary highlighted in red contained within the Physical
Boundary. The Logical Boundary contains all FIPS API entry points. The Logical Boundary is invoked by
the Application through the API Calls.
1.3 Modes of Operation
The Module supports a FIPS Approved mode of operation and a non-FIPS Approved mode of operation.
FIPS Approved algorithms are listed in Table 4. Non-FIPS Approved but allowed algorithms are listed in
Table 5. The module is in the Approved mode of operation when any of the cryptographic functions
listed in Table 4 and Table 5 are invoked by the calling application.
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The Module is in the non-FIPS Approved mode of operation when any of the non-Approved
cryptographic functions are invoked by the calling application (not recommended for applications
requiring a FIPS 140-2 validated module). Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) are not shared between
the FIPS Approved mode of operation and the non-FIPS Approved mode of operation.
For installation instructions, see Appendix A – Installation Instructions.
The conditions for using the module in an Approved Mode of operation are:
1. The Module is a cryptographic library and it is intended to be used with a calling application. The
calling application is responsible for the usage of the primitives in the correct sequence.
2. The Module relies on an entropy source external to the module boundary. The module contains an
Approved DRBG which generates random strings whose strengths are modified by available entropy.
3. The keys used by the module for cryptographic purposes are determined by the calling application.
The calling application is required to provide keys in accordance with FIPS 140‐2 requirements.
2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in the tables below.
Table 4 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
4635
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: Hash DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
1561
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
3068
RSA [FIPS 186-4, and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 1024 (verification only), 2048
2530
SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
3799
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Algorithm Description Cert #
Triple-DES (TDES) [SP 800-20]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC
Key sizes: 3-key
2465
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
RSA Primitives
and Operations
[IG D.9]
Per IG D.9, RSA is an allowed method for supporting key transport in an Approved
FIPS mode of operation. RSA may be used by a calling application as part of a key
encapsulation scheme. No keys are established into the module using RSA.
Key sizes: 2048 bits
When used for system level key establishment this service provides 112 bits of
security.
Non-SP 800-56A
Compliant DH
Primitive
[IG D.8]
Per IG D.8, Scenario 6 – non-Approved (not compliant with SP 800-56A) primitive
only, a partial DH key agreement scheme is allowed in an Approved FIPS mode of
operation. No keys are established into the module using DH.
When used for system level key establishment this service provides 112 bits of
security.
Non-SP 800-56A
Compliant ECDH
Primitive
[IG D.8]
Per IG D.8, Scenario 6 – non-Approved (not compliant with SP 800-56A) primitive
only, a partial ECDH key agreement scheme is allowed in an Approved FIPS mode of
operation. No keys are established into the module using ECDH.
When used for system level key establishment this service provides 256 bits of
security.
MD5 for use
within TLS
[IG D.2]
MD5 is allowed in an Approved mode of operation when used as part of an approved
key transport scheme (e.g. SSL v3.1) where no security is provided by the algorithm.
Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only:
• AES GCM (non-compliant)
• RSA Signature Generation with 1024 bit key
• DES
• MD5
• RC4
• RIPEMD-160
• HMAC-MD5
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2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module
(including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 4. The CSP names
correspond to the API parameter inputs.
Table 6 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description / Usage
Hash_DRBG Entropy input V (440) and C (440)
HMAC Key Keyed Hash key
AES EDK AES (128/192/256) encrypt/decrypt key
TDES EDK TDES (3-Key) encrypt/decrypt key
RSA KDK Private component of an RSA key pair (2048bit), used by RSA key establishment
RSA SGK Private component of an RSA key pair (2048bit), used by RSA signature generation
DH Private Private Key Agreement Key
2.2 Public Keys
Table 7 – Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
RSA KEK Public component of an RSA key pair (2048bit), used by RSA key establishment
RSA VK Public component for an RSA key pair (2048bit), used by RSA signature verification
DH Public Public Key Agreement Key
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3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The Module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). The
cryptographic module does not provide an authentication or identification method of its own. The CO
and the User roles are implicitly identified by the service requested.
Table 8 lists all operator roles supported by the Module. The Module does not support a maintenance
role or bypass capability.
Table 8 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
CO The Cryptographic Officer
Role is assigned the Zeroize
service.
None None
User The User Role is assigned all
services except Zeroize.
None None
3.2 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below with a description of service CSP
access. The calling application may use the wolfCrypt_GetStatus_fips() API to determine the current
status of the Module. A return code of 0 means the Module is in a state without errors. Any other
return code is the specific error state of the module.
Table 9 – Authorized Services available in FIPS mode
Service Description Role
Module Reset
(Self-test)
Reset the Module by restarting the application calling the Module.
Does not access CSPs.
User
Show status Functions that give module status feedback. Does not access CSPs. User
Zeroize Functions that destroy CSPs. FreeRng_fips destroys RNG CSPs. All
other services automatically overwrite memory bound CSPs.
Cleanup of the stack is the duty of the application. Restarting the
general purpose computer clears all CSPs in RAM.
CO
Random number
generation
Uses the SP 800-90A DRBG for random number generation. This
service is not used by the module to generate keys for the module’s
use. It merely outputs random numbers per the calling application’s
request.
User
Symmetric
encrypt/decrypt
Used to encrypt and decrypt data using AES EDK and TDES EDK. CSPs
passed in by the application
User
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Service Description Role
Message digest Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest. MD5 used only
to support TLS 1.1 and lower. Does not access CSPs.
User
Keyed hash Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC. The HMAC Key
is passed in by the application.
User
Key transport Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the application.
RSA KDK and RSA KEK are passed in by the calling application. When
decrypting a key value, a symmetric key is output to the calling
application.
User
Key agreement Used for DH key agreement on behalf of the application. The DH
keys are passed in by the calling application. A symmetric key is
output to the calling application.
User
Digital signature Used to generate or verify RSA digital signatures. RSA SGK and RSA
VK are passing in by the calling application.
User
Table 10 – Services available in non-FIPS mode
Service Description
AES GCM Used to encrypt and decrypt data using AES GCM
Message digest MD5 MD5 message digest not an approved FIPS cryptographic function.
DES Single DES symmetric encrypt/decrypt not an approved FIPS cryptographic
function.
RC4 RC4 symmetric encrypt/decrypt not an approved FIPS cryptographic function.
HMAC MD5 Keyed hash using MD5 is not an approved FIPS cryptographic function.
Message digest RIPEMD-
160
RIPEMD-160 digest not an approved FIPS cryptographic function.
Digital Signature Used to generate RSA 1024-bit digital signatures. RSA SGK and RSA VK are
passed in by the calling application.
See Chapter 10: wolfCrypt Usage Reference in the wolfSSL Manual for additional information on the
cryptographic services listed in this section.
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Table 11 – CSP Access Rights within Services, defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the
different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
• R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module
uses the CSP.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 11 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
Hash_DRBG
HMAC
Key
AES
EDK
TDES
EDK
RSA
KDK
RSA
SGK
DH
Private
Module Reset (Self-test) - - - - - - -
Show Status - - - - - - -
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Random number generation R,E - - - - - -
Symmetric encrypt/decrypt - - R,E,Z R,E,Z - - -
Message digest - - - - - - -
Keyed hash - R,E,Z - - - - -
Key transport - - - - R,E,Z - -
Key agreement - - - - - - R,E,Z
Digital signature - - - - - R,E,Z -
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4 Self-tests
Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. The Module provides a default entry point to automatically
run the power on self-tests compliant with IG 9.10. Power on self–tests are available on demand by
reloading the Module.
On power-on or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in Table 12. All KATs must
complete successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the
Module enters the self-test failure error state. To recover from an error state, reload the Module into
memory.
During the FIPS 140-2 validation testing process, UL Verification Services Inc. (UL) verified that the HASH
DRBG implements the required Health Testing described in SP 800-90A Section 11.3. UL is accredited by
the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) to perform cryptographic testing
under Lab Code 100432-0.
Table 12 – Power-on Self-tests
Test Target Description
Software Integrity HMAC-SHA-256
AES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC
Key sizes: 128 bits
DRBG KATs: HASH DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
HMAC KATs
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-512
RSA KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
TDES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC,
Key sizes: 3-key
Table 13 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
5 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-2 Area 5 Physical Security requirements do not apply because the Module is a software
module.
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6 Operational Environment
The tested environments place user processes into segregated spaces. A process is logically removed
from all other processes by the hardware and Operating System. Since the Module exists inside the
process space of the application this environment implicitly satisfies requirement for a single user mode.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module is not intended to mitigate against attacks that are outside the scope of FIPS 140-2.
8 Security Rules and Guidance
The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1
module.
1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. Power-on self-tests do not require any operator action.
3. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
4. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the Module.
5. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
6. The calling application is the single operator of the Module.
7. The Module does not support manual key entry.
8. The Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
9. The module does not support key generation.
9 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 14 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
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Table 15 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CO Cryptographic Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman Algorithm
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
TDES Triple-DES
TLS Transport Layer Security
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
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The source code files in Table 16 create the object files of the CA Technologies C-Security Kernel module
on the supported operating environment.
Table 16 – Source Files
Source File Name Description
aes.c AES algorithm
des3.c TDES algorithm
fips.c FIPS entry point and API wrappers
fips_test.c Power on Self Tests
hmac.c HMAC algorithm
random.c DRBG algorithm
rsa.c RSA algorithm
sha.c SHA algorithm
sha256.c SHA-256 algorithm
sha512.c SHA-512 algorithm
wolfcrypt_first.c First FIPS function and Read Only address
wolfcrypt_last.c Last FIPS function and Read Only address
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10 Appendix A – Installation Instructions
This Appendix describes using the CA Technologies C-Security Kernel in FIPS 140­2 mode as a software
component. The intended audience is Users and Crypto Officers using/needing FIPS software.
10.1 Windows 7 INSTALLATION
CA Technologies C Security Kernel in FIPS mode for Windows 7 requires the wolfCrypt FIPS library
version 3.6.6 or later. The wolfCrypt FIPS releases can be obtained with a link provided by wolfSSL
through direct email.
To verify the fingerprint of the package calculate the SHA-256 sum using a FIPS 140-2 validated
cryptographic module. The following command serves as an example:
shasum –a 256 wolfssl-3.6.6-commercial-fips-windows.7z
02da35d0a4d6b8e777236fe30da7a6ff93834fb16939ea16da663773f1b34cf0
And compare the sum to the sum provided with the package. If for some reason the sums do not match
stop using the module and contact CA, Inc. dba CA Technologies.
To unpack the bundle:
7za x wolfssl-3.6.6-commercial-fips-windows.7z
When prompted, enter the password. The password is provided in the distribution email.
wolfCrypt with FIPS for Windows is used as a static library. One has to:
1. Build the library
2. Link it against their application
3. Get the In Core Integrity check value from the target platform
4. Copy the value given for "hash" in the output, and replace the value of "verifyCore[]" in
fips_test.c with this new value
5. Rebuild the library
6. Relink it into the application
To build and install wolfCrypt with FIPS:
1. In Visual Studio open IDE\WIN\wolfssl-fips.sln
2. Select the build type and target (Release x64)
3. Build the solution
4. The library should be in the directory IDE\WIN\Release\x64 as wolfssl-fips.lib, it can be added to
your project
5. In your application project, add the following preprocessor macros:
• HAVE_FIPS
• HAVE_HASHDRBG
• HAVE_AESGCM
• WOLFSSL_SHA512
• WOLFSSL_SHA384
• NO_MD4
• NO_HC128
• NO_RABBIT
• NO_DSA
• NO_PWDBASED
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6. Build the solution
7. Run the code from the Release\x64 directory, the default FIPS check failure should be output in
the shell
The first run should indicate the In Core Integrity check has failed:
in my Fips callback, ok = 0, err = -203 message = In Core
Integrity check FIPS error
hash =
622B4F8714276FF8845DD49DD3AA27FF68A8226C50D5651D320D914A5660B3F5
In core integrity hash check failure, copy above hash into
verifyCore[] in fips_test.c and rebuild
The In Core Integrity checksum will vary with compiler versions, runtime library versions, target
hardware, and build type.
10.2 CA Technologies C-Security Kernel FIPS API
The CA Technologies C-Security Kernel adds the string _fips to all FIPS mode APIs. For example,
ShaUpdate() becomes ShaUpdate_fips(). The FIPS mode functions can be called directly, but they can
also be used through macros.
HAVE_FIPS is defined when using the CA Technologies C-Security Kernel in FIPS mode and that creates a
macro for each function with FIPS support. For the above example, a user with an application calling
ShaUpdate() can recompile with the FIPS module and automatically get ShaUpdate_fips() support
without changing their source code. Of course, recompilation is necessary with the correct macros
defined.
A new error return code:
FIPS_NOT_ALLOWED_E
may be returned from any of these functions used directly or even indirectly.
The error is returned when the Power-On Self-Tests (POST) are not yet complete or they have failed.
POST is done automatically as a default entry point when using the library, no user interaction is
required to start the tests. To see the current status including any error code at any time call
wolfCrypt_GetStatus_fips(). For example, if the AES Known Answer Test failed during POS GetStatus may
return
AES_KAT_FIPS_E