Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module
v5.0
and
Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module
v6.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
version 1.2
Last Update: 2018-02-19
Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security
Policy
Table of Contents
1. Cryptographic Modules' Specifications.......................................................................................................3
1.1. Description of the Modules.................................................................................................................3
1.2. Description of the Approved Modes....................................................................................................4
1.3. Cryptographic Boundary.....................................................................................................................7
1.3.1. Hardware Block Diagram...........................................................................................................9
1.3.2. Software Block Diagram.............................................................................................................9
2. Cryptographic Modules' Ports and Interfaces...........................................................................................10
3. Roles, Services and Authentication..........................................................................................................11
3.1. Roles................................................................................................................................................ 11
3.2. Services............................................................................................................................................ 11
3.3. Operator Authentication....................................................................................................................12
3.4. Mechanism and Strength of Authentication......................................................................................13
4. Physical Security......................................................................................................................................14
5. Operational Environment..........................................................................................................................15
5.3 Applicability......................................................................................................................................15
5.4. Policy..................................................................................................................................................... 15
6. Cryptographic Key Management..............................................................................................................16
6.1. Random Number and Key Generation.............................................................................................16
6.2. Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP).............................................................................................16
6.3. Key/CSP Storage.............................................................................................................................17
6.4. Key/CSP Zeroization........................................................................................................................17
7. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC).................................................18
7.1. Statement of compliance.......................................................................................................................18
8. Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................................. 19
8.1. Power-Up Tests................................................................................................................................19
8.2. Conditional Tests..............................................................................................................................20
9. Guidance.................................................................................................................................................. 21
9.1. Crypto Officer Guidance...................................................................................................................21
9.2. User Guidance......................................................................................................................................22
9.2.1. TLS and Diffie-Hellman............................................................................................................22
9.2.2. AES XTS Guidance..................................................................................................................22
9.2.3. Random Number Generator.....................................................................................................22
9.2.4. AES GCM IV.............................................................................................................................22
9.2.5. Triple-DES Keys.......................................................................................................................23
9.2.6. RSA and DSA Keys..................................................................................................................23
9.2.7. Handling Self-Test Errors.........................................................................................................23
10. Mitigation of Other Attacks......................................................................................................................24
11. Glossary and Abbreviations....................................................................................................................25
12. References............................................................................................................................................. 26
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security
Policy
1. Cryptographic Modules' Specifications
This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for both the Red Hat Enterprise Linux
OpenSSL Cryptographic Module v5.0 and the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL
Cryptographic Module v6.0and was prepared as part of the requirements for conformance to
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Level 1.
1.1. Description of the Modules
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module v5.0 and the Red Hat Enterprise
Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module v6.0 (hereafter referred to as the “Modules”) are
software libraries supporting FIPS 140-2 Approved cryptographic algorithms. The code base of
the Modules is formed in a combination of standard OpenSSL shared library, OpenSSL FIPS
Object Module and development work by Red Hat. The Modules provide a C language
application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require cryptographic
functionality.
The following table shows the security level for each of the eleven sections of the validation.
Security Component FIPS 140-2 Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Table 1: Security Level of the Modules
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module v5.0has been tested on the
following multi-chip standalone platforms:
Manufact
urer
Model O/S & Ver. Processor
Dell PowerEdge
R630
Red Hat Enterprise Linux
7.4
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-
2640 v3
Table 2: Test Platform
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module v6.0has been tested on the
following multi-chip standalone platforms:
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security
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Manufact
urer
Model O/S & Ver. Processor
Dell PowerEdge
R630
Red Hat Enterprise Linux
7.5
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-
2640 v3
Table 3: Test Platform
The Module has been tested for the following configurations:
• 32-bit library, x86_64 with and without AES-NI enabled
• 64-bit library, x86_64 with and without AES-NI enabled
•
To operate the Modules, the operating system must be restricted to a single operator mode of
operation. (This should not be confused with single user mode which is run level 1 on Red Hat
Enterprise Linux (RHEL). This refers to processes having access to the same cryptographic
instance which RHEL ensures this cannot happen by the memory management hardware.)
1.2. Description of the Approved Modes
The Modules support two modes of operation:
• in "FIPS mode" (the FIPS Approved mode of operation) only approved or allowed
security functions with sufficient security strength can be used.
• in "non-FIPS mode" (the non-Approved mode of operation) non-approved security
functions can also be used.
The Modules verify the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA-256 digest
computed at build time. If the digests matched, the power-up self-test is then performed. The
modules enter FIPS mode after power-up tests succeed. Once the modules iare operational,
the mode of operation is implicitly assumed depending on the security function invoked and
the security strength of the cryptographic keys.
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module v5.0 supports the following FIPS
140-2 Approved algorithms in FIPS Approved mode:
Algorithm Validation
Certificate
Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
AES Certs. #4644, #4664,
#4666, #4667,
#4695, #4696,
#4697, #4698,
#4699, and #4700
FIPS 197 (AES)
SP 800-38A
SP 800-38C (CCM)
SP 800-38D (GCM)
SP 800-38E (XTS)
SP 800-38F (Key
Wrapping)
Encryption and
Decryption
AES keys 128 bits, 192
bits (except XTS-AES)
and 256 bits
Triple-DES Certs. #2471, #2481,
#2483, and #2484
SP 800-67
Encryption and
Decryption
Triple-DES keys 168
bits
DSA Certs. #1228, #1235,
#1237, and #1238,
FIPS 186-4 DSA keys:
• L=2048, N=224
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Algorithm Validation
Certificate
Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
Domain Parameters
Generation and
Verification, Key
Generation,
Signature
Generation
• L=2048, N=256
• L=3072, N=256
Note: 1024 bit DSA
signature verification is
legacy-use.
RSA Key Generation Certs. #2535, #2544,
#2546, and #2547
FIPS 186-4
Appendix B.3.3
Key Generation
RSA keys:
• 1024 bits
• 2048 bits
• 3072 bits
Note: 1024 bit RSA
signature verification is
legacy-use.
Signature
Generation and
Verification (ANSI
X9.31 and PKCS#1
v1.5)
ECDSA Certs. #1144, #1148,
#1150, and #1151
FIPS 186-4
Key Pair Generation
and Public Key
Verification
ECDSA keys based on
P-256, P-384, or P-521
curve
FIPS 186-4
Signature
Generation
FIPS 186-4
Signature
Verification
DRBG Certs. #1567, #1576,
#1578, #1579,
#1593, #1594,
#1595, #1596,
#1597, and #1598
SP 800-90A
Random Number
Generation
Entropy input string,
seed, V and Key
SHA-1
SHA-224
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Certs. #3807, #3821,
#3823, #3824,
#3842, #3843,
#3844, #3845,
#3846, and #3847
FIPS 180-4
Hashing
N/A
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-224
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
Certs. #3076, #3088,
#3090, #3091,
#3107, #3108,
#3109, #3110,
#3111 and #3112
FIPS 198-1
Message Integrity
At least 112 bits HMAC
Key
SP 800-56A DLC Certs. #1298, #1312, SP 800-56A Public key size 2048
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Algorithm Validation
Certificate
Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
primitive
Diffie-Hellman
#1318 and #1320
Key Agreement and
Establishment
bits or larger, and
private key size 224
bits or 256 bits
SP 800-56A DLC
primitive
EC Diffie-Hellman
NIST curves P-256, P-
384, P-521
SP 800-135 Section 4.2
Key Derivation in TLS
v1.0, v1.1 and v1.2
Certs. #1299, #1313,
#1319, #1321,
#1338 and #1339
SP800-135
Key Derivation in
TLS
None
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module v6.0supports the following FIPS
140-2 Approved algorithms in FIPS Approved mode:
Algorithm Validation
Certificate
Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
AES Certs. #5203, #5204,
#5205, #5207,
#5208, #5209,
#5210, #5211,
#5212, and #5227
FIPS 197 (AES)
SP 800-38A
SP 800-38C (CCM)
SP 800-38D (GCM)
SP 800-38E (XTS)
SP 800-38F (Key
Wrapping)
Encryption and
Decryption
AES keys 128 bits, 192
bits (except XTS-AES)
and 256 bits
Triple-DES Certs. #2638, #2639,
#2641,and #2642
SP 800-67
Encryption and
Decryption
Triple-DES keys 168
bits
DSA Certs. # #1346,
#1347, #1349 and
1350
FIPS 186-4
Domain Parameters
Generation and
Verification, Key
Generation,
Signature
Generation
DSA keys:
• L=2048, N=224
• L=2048, N=256
• L=3072, N=256
Note: 1024 bit DSA
signature verification is
legacy-use.
RSA Key Generation Certs. #2786, #2787,
#2789 and #2792
FIPS 186-4
Appendix B.3.3
Key Generation
RSA keys:
• 1024 bits
• 2048 bits
• 3072 bits
Note: 1024 bit RSA
signature verification is
Signature
Generation and
Verification (ANSI
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Algorithm Validation
Certificate
Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
X9.31 and PKCS#1
v1.5)
legacy-use.
ECDSA Certs. ##1347,
#1348, #1350 and
#1353
FIPS 186-4
Key Pair Generation
and Public Key
Verification
ECDSA keys based on
P-256, P-384, or P-521
curve
FIPS 186-4
Signature
Generation
FIPS 186-4
Signature
Verification
DRBG Certs. #1975, #1976,
#1977, #1979,
#1980, #1981,
#1982, #1983,
#1984 and #1993
SP 800-90A
Random Number
Generation
Entropy input string,
seed, V and Key
SHA-1
SHA-224
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Certs. #4193,
#4194, #4195,
#4197, #4198,
#4199, #4200,
#4201, #4202 and
#4207
FIPS 180-4
Hashing
N/A
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-224
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC-SHA-512
Certs. #3445, #3446,
#3447, #3449,
#3450, #3451,
#3452, #3453,
#3454 and #3459
FIPS 198-1
Message Integrity
At least 112 bits HMAC
Key
SP 800-56A DLC
primitive
Diffie-Hellman
Certs. #1687,
#1689, #1693 and
#1700
SP 800-56A
Key Agreement and
Establishment
Public key size 2048
bits or larger, and
private key size 224
bits or 256 bits
SP 800-56A DLC
primitive
EC Diffie-Hellman
NIST curves P-256, P-
384, P-521
SP 800-135 Section 4.2
Key Derivation in TLS
v1.0, v1.1 and v1.2
Certs. #1688,
#1690, #1691,
#1692, #1694 and
#1701
SP800-135
Key Derivation in
TLS
None
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
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The Modules support the following non-Approved algorithms but allowed in FIPS Approved
mode:
Algorithm Usage Keys/CSPs
RSA (encrypt, decrypt)
with key size equal or
larger than 2048 bits
Key Wrapping RSA private keys
Diffie-Hellman with
public key size 2048
bits or larger and
private key size 224
bits or 256 bits
Key Agreement Diffie-Hellman private keys
EC Diffie-Hellman with
key sizes according to
P-256, P-384 and P-521
NIST curves
Key Agreement EC Diffie-Hellman private keys
MD5 Message Digest used only in TLS N/A
Table 6: Non-Approved but allowed Algorithms for both Modules
According to Table 2: “Comparable strengths” in NISP SP 800-57 Part1 (dated on March 8,
2007), the key sizes of RSA, Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman provides the following
security strength for the corresponding key establishment method shown below:
1. RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
2. Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128
bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
3. EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between
112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
However, the size alone does not determine the security strength of the RSA, Diffie-Hellman
and EC Diffie-Hellman keys. Since the seed source for key generation is outside the logical
boundary of the module, the following caveat is applicable:
The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy
Per FIPS 140-2 IG G.5, the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the
Modules or the security strengths of the generated keys when those Modules are ported and
executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.
The Modules support the following non-FIPS 140-2 Approved algorithms, which shall not be
used in the FIPS Approved mode. Any use of the non-Approved functions will cause the
Modules to operate in the non-FIPS mode implicitly:
Algorithm Usage Keys/CSPs
RSA (encrypt, decrypt) with
key size smaller than 2048 bits
key wrapping RSA keys
RSA with key sizes not listed in sign, verify, and key RSA keys
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security
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Algorithm Usage Keys/CSPs
Table 3 generation
DSA with key sizes not listed in
Table 3
sign, verify, and key
generation
DSA keys
Diffie-Hellman with key sizes
not listed in Table 4
key agreement and
establishment
Diffie-Hellman keys
ANSI X9.31 RNG (with AES-128
core)
random number
generation
PRNG seed value and seed key
128 bits
Camellia Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
CAST Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
DES Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
IDEA Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
MD2 Hash function N/A
MD4 Hash function N/A
RC2 Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
RC4 Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
RC5 Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
RIPEMD Hash function N/A
Whirlpool Hash function N/A
Table 7: Non-Approved Algorithms for both Modules
1.3. Cryptographic Boundary
The Modules' physical boundaries are the surface of the case of the platform (depicted in the
hardware block diagram).
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module v5.0 logical cryptographic
boundary is the shared library files and their integrity check HMAC files, which are delivered
through Red Hat Package Manager (RPM) as listed below.
The openssl-libs-1.0.2k-8.el7.x86_64.rpm (64 bits) and openssl-libs-1.0.2k-
8.el7.i686.rpm (32 bits) file contains the following files that are part of the module boundary:
• /usr/lib{64,}/.libcrypto.so.1.0.2k.hmac
• /usr/lib{64,}/.libssl.so.1.0.2k.hmac
• /usr/lib{64,}/libcrypto.so.1.0.2k
• /usr/lib{64,}/libssl.so.1.0.2k
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The Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module v6.0 logical cryptographic
boundary is the shared library files and their integrity check HMAC files, which are delivered
through Red Hat Package Manager (RPM) as listed below.
The openssl-libs-1.0.2k-12.el7.x86_64.rpm (64 bits) and openssl-libs-1.0.2k-
12.el7.i686.rpm (32 bits) file contains the following files that are part of the module boundary:
• /usr/lib{64,}/.libcrypto.so.1.0.2k.hmac
• /usr/lib{64,}/.libssl.so.1.0.2k.hmac
• /usr/lib{64,}/libcrypto.so.1.0.2k
• /usr/lib{64,}/libssl.so.1.0.2k
The OpenSSL RPM package of the Modules include the binary files, integrity check HMAC files,
Man Pages and the OpenSSL Engines provided by the standard OpenSSL shared library. The
OpenSSL Engines and their shared object files are not part of the Modules, and therefore they
must not be used.
The Modules shall be installed and instantiated by the dracut-fips package with the RPM file
version specified above. The dracut-fips RPM package is only used for the installation and
instantiation of the Modules. This code is not active when the Modules are operational and do
not provide any services to users interacting with the Modules. Therefore the dracut-fips RPM
package is outside the Modules' logical boundary.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security
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1.3.1. Hardware Block Diagram
Figure 1: Hardware Block Diagram
1.3.2. Software Block Diagram
Figure 2: Software Block Diagram
(the cryptographic boundary includes the HMAC integrity files)
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2. Cryptographic Modules' Ports and Interfaces
The physical ports of the Modules are the same as the computer system on which it executes.
The logical interface is a C-language Application Program Interface (API).
The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data
Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input
interface consists of the actual API functions. The Status Output interface includes the return
values of the API functions. The ports and interfaces are shown in the following table.
FIPS Interface Physical Port Modules' Interfaces
Data Input Ethernet ports API input parameters, kernel
I/O – network or files on
filesystem
Data Output Ethernet ports API output parameters, kernel
I/O – network or files on
filesystem
Control Input Keyboard, Serial port, Ethernet port,
Network
API function calls, or
configuration files on
filesystem
Status Output Serial port, Ethernet port, Network API
Power Input PC Power Supply Port N/A
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces
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3. Roles, Services and Authentication
This section defines the roles, services, and authentication mechanisms and methods with
respect to the applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.
3.1. Roles
There are two users of the Module:
• User
• Crypto Officer
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services
implemented by the Modules. For User documentation, please refer to the man pages of
ssl(3), crypto(3) as an entry into the Modules' API documentation for SSL/TLS and generic
crypto support. Installation of the Modules is only done by the Crypto Officer.
3.2. Services
The Modules support services that are available to users in the various roles. All of the
services are described in detail in the Modules’ user documentation. The following tables
show the services available to the various roles and the access to cryptographic keys and
CSPs resulting from services.
The following table lists the Approved services available in FIPS Approved mode. Please refer
to Table 4 and 5 for the Approval key size of each algorithm used in the services.
Service Role CSPs Access
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
User AES and Triple-DES key read/write/execute
Asymmetric key
generation
User RSA, DSA and ECDSA private key read/write/execute
Digital signature
generation and verification
User RSA, DSA and ECDSA private key read/write/execute
TLS network protocol User AES or Triple-DES key, HMAC Key read/write/execute
TLS key agreement User AES or Triple-DES key, RSA, DSA or
ECDSA private key, HMAC Key,
Premaster Secret, Master Secret,
Diffie-Hellman Private Components
and EC Diffie-Hellman Private
Components
read/write/execute
RSA key wrapping User RSA, private key read/write/execute
Certificate Management/
Handling
User RSA, DSA or ECDSA private key
parts of certificates
read/write/execute
Keyed Hash (HMAC) User HMAC Key read/write/execute
Keyed Hash (CMAC) User CMAC key read/write/execute
Message digest (SHS) User none read/write/execute
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Service Role CSPs Access
Random number
generation (SP800-90A
DRBG)
User Entropy input string and seed read/write/execute
Show status User none execute
Module initialization User none execute
Self-test User none read/execute
Zeroize User All aforementioned CSPs read/write/execute
Module installation Crypto
Officer
none read/write
Table 9: Approved Service Details
The following table lists the non-Approved services available in non-FIPS mode. Please refer to
Table 6 for the non-Approved key size of each algorithm.
Service Role Access
Asymmetric encryption/decryption using non-Approved RSA key
size
User read/write/execute
Symmetric encryption/decryption using non-Approved algorithms User read/write/execute
Hash operation using non-Approved algorithms User read/write/execute
Digital signature generation and verification using non-Approved
RSA and DSA private key
User read/write/execute
TLS connection using keys established by Diffie-Hellman with
non-Approved key sizes
User read/write/execute
Asymmetric key generation using non-Approved RSA and DSA
key size
User read/write/execute
Random number generation using ANSI X9.31 RNG User read/write/execute
Table 10: Non-Approved Service Details
Note:
The Modules do not share CSPs between an Approved mode of operation and a non‐Approved
mode of operation. All cryptographic keys used in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation must
be generated in the FIPS-Approved mode or imported while running in the FIPS-Approved
mode. If the DRBG is used for key generation for non-Approved services in non-FIPS mode,
reseeding the DRBG before and after the key generation is mandatory.
More information about the services and their associated APIs can be found in the Man Pages
included in the rpm packages. The evp(3) is the starting point of the Man Pages.
3.3. Operator Authentication
At security level 1, authentication is neither required nor employed. The role is implicitly
assumed on entry.
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3.4. Mechanism and Strength of Authentication
At security level 1, authentication is not required.
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4. Physical Security
The Modules comprise of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
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5. Operational Environment
This Modules operate in a modifiable Operational Environment per the FIPS 140-2 definition.
5.3 Applicability
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which
include but are not limited to:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux Atomic Host
• Red Hat Virtualization (RHV)
• Red Hat OpenStack Platform
• OpenShift Container Platform
• Red Hat Gluster Storage
• Red Hat Ceph Storage
• Red Hat CloudForms
• Red Hat Satellite.
Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found
unchanged.
The modules operate in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1
specifications. The modules run on a commercially available general-purpose operating
system executing on the hardware specified in section 1.2.
5.4. Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly
excluded). The application that request cryptographic services is the single user of the
modules, even when the application is serving multiple clients.
In the operational mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)), and strace(1) shall
be not used.
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6. Cryptographic Key Management
The application that uses the Modules is responsible for appropriate destruction and
zeroization of the key material. The library provides functions for key allocation and
destruction, which overwrites the memory that is occupied by the key information with
“zeros” before it is deallocated.
6.1. Random Number and Key Generation
The Modules provide an SP800-90A-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) for
creation of key components of asymmetric keys, and random number generation.
The /dev/urandom from the Operational Environment is used as a source of random numbers
for DRBG seeds and entropy input string.
The Modules perform continuous self-tests on the output of SP800-90A DRBG to ensure that
consecutive random numbers do not repeat.
The Key Generation methods implemented in the modules for Approved services in FIPS mode
is compliant with [SP800-133].
For generating RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys the modules implement asymmetric key generation
services compliant with [FIPS186-4]. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in asymmetric key
generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90A] DRBG.
The public and private key pairs used in the Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman KAS are
generated internally by the modules using the same DSA and ECDSA key generation
compliant with [FIPS186-4] which is compliant with [SP800-56A].
6.2. Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP)
An authorized application as user (i.e., the User role) has access to all key data generated
during the operation of the Modules. The following table summarizes the Critical
Security Parameters (CSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the
modules:
Key/CSP Generation Storage Zeroization
Symmetric Keys
(AES, Triple-DES )
N/A(passed in as API input
parameter) Alternatively, key
can be established during a
TLS handshake
RAM EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup()
MAC Keys (HMAC,
CMAC)
HMAC_CTX_cleanup()
CMAC_CTX_cleanup()
Asymmetric Private
Keys (RSA, DSA,
ECDSA)
Generated using FIPS 186-4
key generation method and
the random value used in the
key generation is generated
using SP800-90A DRBG.
RAM DSA_free(), RSA_free(),
EC_GROUP_clear_free() and
EC_POINT_clear_free()
Diffie-Hellman Generated as specified in RAM DH_free()
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Key/CSP Generation Storage Zeroization
Private Components SP800-56A and the random
value used in the key
generation is generated using
SP800-90A DRBG.
EC Diffie-Hellman
Private Components
EC_GROUP_clear_free() and
EC_POINT_clear_free()
SP 800-90A DRBG
seed and entropy
input
Obtained from NDRNG RAM FIPS_drbg_free()
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
and Master Secret
Established during the TLS
handshake
RAM SSL_free() and SSL_clear()
Table 11: Key Life Cycle
6.3. Key/CSP Storage
Public and private keys are provided to the Modules by the calling process, and are destroyed
when released by the appropriate API function calls. The Modules do not perform persistent
storage of CSPs.
6.4. Key/CSP Zeroization
The memory occupied by keys is allocated by regular libc malloc/calloc() calls. The application
is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the OpenSSL API. The
destruction functions then overwrite the memory occupied by keys with pre-defined values
and deallocates the memory with the free() call. In case of abnormal termination, or swap
in/out of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten
by the Linux kernel before the physical memory is allocated to another process.
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7. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
MARKETING NAME......................…. PowerEdge R630
REGULATORY MODEL................….. E26S
REGULATORY TYPE.....................…. E26S001
EFFECTIVE DATE..........................… September 03, 2014
EMC EMISSIONS CLASS...............… Class A
7.1. Statement of compliance
This product has been determined to be compliant with the applicable standards, regulations,
and directives for the countries where the product is marketed. The product is affixed with
regulatory marking and text as necessary for the country/agency. Generally, Information
Technology Equipment (ITE) product compliance is based on IEC and CISPR standards and
their national equivalent such as Product Safety, IEC 60950-1 and European Norm EN 60950-1
or EMC, CISPR 22/CISPR 24 and EN 55022/55024. Dell products have been verified to comply
with the EU RoHS Directive 2011/65/EU. Dell products do not contain any of the restricted
substances in concentrations and applications not permitted by the RoHS Directive.
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8. Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the Modules perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the Modules,
and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, some functions
require continuous verification of function, such as the Random Number Generator. All of
these tests are listed and described in this section. No operator intervention is required during
the running of the self-tests.
See section 9.3 for descriptions of possible self-test errors and recovery procedures.
8.1. Power-Up Tests
The Modules perform both power-up self-tests (at module initialization) and continuous
conditional tests (during operation). The power-up self test start with the integrity test, where
the FIPS_mode_set() function verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC
SHA-256 digest, which is computed at build time. If this computed HMAC SHA-256 digest
matches the stored, known digest, then the rest of the power-up self-test (consisting of the
algorithm-specific Pairwise Consistency and Known Answer Tests) is performed. Input, output,
and cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the Modules are in a self-test or error
state because the Modules are single-threaded and will not return to the calling application
until the power-up self-tests are complete. After successful completion of the power-up tests,
the modules are loaded and cryptographic functions are available for use. If the power-up self-
tests fail, subsequent calls to the Modules will also fail - thus no further cryptographic
operations are possible.
Algorithm Test
AES KAT, encryption and decryption are tested separately
Triple-DES KAT, encryption and decryption are tested separately
DSA Pairwise consistency test (PCT), sign and verify
RSA KAT, signature generation and verification are tested
separately
ECDSA PCT, sign and verify
Diffie-Hellman Primitive "Z" Computation KAT
EC Diffie-Hellman Primitive "Z" Computation KAT
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT
SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG KAT
SP 800-90A DRBG_HMAC KAT
HMAC-SHA-1, -244, -256, -384,
-512
KAT
SHA-1, -224, -256, -384, -512 KAT
CMAC KAT
Module integrity HMAC-SHA-256
Table 12: Modules' Self-Tests
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8.2. Conditional Tests
Algorithm Test
DSA PCT: signature generation and verification
ECDSA PCT: signature generation and verification
RSA PCT: signature generation and verification, encryption and
decryption
DRBG SP800-90A Continuous Random Number Generation Test
Table 13: Modules' Conditional Tests
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9. Guidance
9.1. Crypto Officer Guidance
The version of the RPM containing the FIPS validated Modules is stated in section 1. The RPM
package of the Modules can be installed by standard tools recommended for the installation
of RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm, and the RHN
remote management tool). The integrity of the RPM is automatically verified during the
installation of the Modules and the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM file if the RPM tool
indicates an integrity error.
The OpenSSL static libraries libcrypto.a and libssl.a in openssl-static package are not
approved to be used. The applications must be dynamically linked to run the OpenSSL.
The RPM package of the Modules can be installed by standard tools recommended for the
installation of RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm,
and the RHN remote management tool).For proper operation of the in-module integrity
verification, the prelink has to be disabled.
1 Disable the prelink:
# sed -i 's/PRELINKING=yes/PRELINKING=no/g' /etc/sysconfig/prelink
2 Run following command to return binaries to a non-prelink state:
# /usr/sbin/prelink -ua
Crypto officer should perform the following for Modules initialization:
1. Install the dracut-fips package:
# yum install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image:
# dracut -f
After regenerating the initramfs, the Crypto Officer has to append the following string to the
kernel command line by changing the setting in the boot loader:
fips=1
If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition of
/boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command
"df /boot"
or
"df /boot/efi"
respectively. For example:
$ df /boot
Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot
The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string
needs to be appended to the kernel command line:
"boot=/dev/sda1"
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Reboot to apply these settings.
The next step is to check the presence of the configuration file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled
and make sure it contains value 1.
0.0.1 The version of the RPM containing the validated Modules is the version listed in chapter
1. The integrity of the RPM is automatically verified during the installation of the Modules and
the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM file if the RPM tool indicates an integrity error.
9.2. User Guidance
To operate the Modules in FIPS Approved mode, the user should use services and security
functions listed in Table 6. Any use of non-approved services will put the modules in the non-
FIPS mode implicitly.
Interpretation of the return code is the responsibility of the host application.
ENGINE_register_*, ENGINE_set_default_* and FIPS_mode_set(0) function calls are prohibited.
9.2.1. TLS and Diffie-Hellman
The TLS protocol implementation provides both, the server and the client sides. As required
by SP800-131A, Diffie-Helllman with keys smaller than 2048 bits must not be used any more.
The TLS protocol lacks the support to negotiate the used Diffie-Hellman key sizes. To ensure
full support for all TLS protocol versions, the TLS client implementation of the cryptographic
Modules accepts Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits offered by the TLS server.
The TLS server implementation of the cryptographic Modules allow the application to set the
Diffie-Hellman key size. The server side must always set the DH parameters with the API call
of
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh)
For complying with the requirement to not allow Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048
bits, the Crypto Officer must ensure that:
• in case the Modules are used as TLS server, the Diffie-Hellman parameters (dh
argument) of the aforementioned API call must be 2048 bits or larger;
• in case the Modules are used as TLS client, the TLS server must be configured to only
offer Diffie-Hellman keys of 2048 bits or larger.
9.2.2. AES XTS Guidance
The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks
that is 16MB of data.
9.2.3. Random Number Generator
The OpenSSL API call of RAND_cleanup must not be used. This call will cleanup the internal
DRBG state. This call also replaces the DRBG instance with the non-FIPS Approved SSLeay
Deterministic Random Number Generator when using the RAND_* API calls.
9.2.4. AES GCM IV
In case the Modules’ power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM
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encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed.
9.2.5. Triple-DES Keys
According to IG A.13, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 228
64-
bit blocks of data.
9.2.6. RSA and DSA Keys
The Modules allow the use of 1024 bit RSA and DSA keys for legacy purposes, including
signature generation.
RSA and DSA must be used with either 2048 bit keys or 3072 bit keys because larger key
sizes have not been CAVS tested. To comply with the requirements of FIPS 140-2, a user must
therefore only use keys with 2048 bits or 3072 bits in FIPS Approved mode.
Application can enforce the key generation bit length restriction for RSA and DSA keys by
setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ENFORCE_MODULUS_BITS. This environment
variable ensures that 1024 bit keys cannot be generated.
9.2.7. Handling Self-Test Errors
The effects of self-test failures in the Modules differ depending on the type of self-test that
failed.
Non-fatal self-test errors transition the Modules into an error state. The application must be
restarted to recover from these errors. The non-fatal self-test errors are:
• FIPS_R_FINGERPRINT_DOES_NOT_MATCH - The integrity verification check failed
• FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED - a known answer test failed
• FIPS_R_SELFTEST_FAILED - a known answer test failed
• FIPS_R_TEST_FAILURE – a known answer test failed (RSA); pairwise consistency test
failed (DSA)
• FIPS_R_PAIRWISE_TEST_FAILED – a pairwise consistency test during DSA or RSA key
generation failed
• RAND_R_PRNG_STUCK – the random number generator generated two same
consecutive 128 bit values
These errors are reported through the regular ERR interface of the Modules and can be
queried by functions such as ERR_get_error(). See the OpenSSL manual page for the function
description.
When a fatal error occurs (a self-test or conditional test has failed), the Modules enter an error
state. Any calls to a crypto function of the Modules returns an error with the error message:
'FATAL FIPS SELFTEST FAILURE' printed to stderr and the Modules are terminated with the
abort() call.
The only way to recover from a fatal error is to restart the Modules. If failures persist, the
Modules must be reinstalled. If downloading the software, make sure to verify the package
hash to confirm a proper download.
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10. Mitigation of Other Attacks
RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA
decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from
that attack.
The API function of RSA_blinding_on turns blinding on for key rsa and generates a random
blinding factor. The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling
RSA_blinding_on.
Weak Triple-DES keys are detected as follows:
/* Weak and semi week keys as taken from
* %A D.W. Davies
* %A W.L. Price
* %T Security for Computer Networks
* %I John Wiley & Sons
* %D 1984
* Many thanks to smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) for the reference
* (and actual cblock values).
*/
#define NUM_WEAK_KEY 16
static const DES_cblock weak_keys[NUM_WEAK_KEY]={
/* weak keys */
{0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01},
{0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE},
{0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E},
{0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1},
/* semi-weak keys */
{0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01},
{0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E},
{0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1,0x01},
{0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E},
{0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E},
{0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E,0x01},
{0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE},
{0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1}};
Please note that there is no weak key detection by default. The caller can explicitly set the
DES_check_key to 1 or call DES_check_key_parity() and/or DES_is_weak_key() functions on its
own.
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11. Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Specification
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cypher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message
Auhentication Code
CFB Cypher Feedback
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB Electronic Code Book
FSM Finite State Model
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
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12. References
[1] OpenSSL man pages where crypto(3) provides the introduction and link to all OpenSSL
APIs regarding the cryptographic operation and ssl(3) to all OpenSSL APIs regarding the
SSL/TLS protocol family
[2] FIPS 140-2 Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[3] FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance,
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[4] FIPS 140-2 Derived Test
Requirements,http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[5] FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[6] FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[7] FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC),
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[8] FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[9] ANSI X9.52:1998 Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation,
http://webstore.ansi.org/FindStandards.aspx?
Action=displaydept&DeptID=80&Acro=X9&DpName=X9,%20Inc.
[10] NIST SP 800-67 Revision 1, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
(TDEA) Block Cipher, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[11] NIST SP 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode
for Authentication, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[12] NIST SP 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode
for Authentication and Confidentiality, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[13] NIST SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) and GMAC, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[14] NIST SP 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES
Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[15] NIST SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[16] NIST SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
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