



## IBM 4767 Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy



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## 1 Document History

### Document History

Version	Date	Contents	Approval
1.0	10/31/2017	First release	N/A
1.1	3/9/2018	Updates per CMVP Comments	
1.2	8/23/2019	Updated H/W part number format; Added Modules 3 and 4 to Table 1	
1.3	12/15/2020	Updated H/W part numbers 03FM669-H07054 and 03GN979-N38170	
1.4	3/28/2023	Corrected H/W part number 00LV498-N37142 to be 00LV498-N37015	



## 2 Introduction

This document defines the Security Policy for the IBM 4767 Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module, hereafter denoted the Module. This Module with Miniboot software resident in ROM and code flash, provides security officers, users, and the security policy governing access to those services. This policy applies to multiple members of the 4767 product family.

A multi-chip embedded product, the 4767 is a cryptographic coprocessor, a general-purpose computing environment with accelerator engines, executing software and retaining secrets, despite foreseeable physical or logical attacks. End users can base high-assurance applications, such as digital signature generation or financial transaction processing, on this platform.

Firmware identifiers refer to unambiguously identifiable leading characters of Segment 1 (firmware) hash, a unique value describing firmware configuration. The actual value, a cryptographic hash of the segment image, is returned by configuration queries.

Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations

	Module	HW P/N and Version	FW Version
1	4767-001	00LU348-N37040 POST0 v0110 MBO v0102	Segment 1 Information Name: 5.3.19 P0130 M0130 P0130 F0D01 Hash data: E2157B6FCEF7A8760974E37D698E6A79C5A6FEA352BB0CC8 E33B82A7951B049B749F12AEF8956ACA1CE845B2CBBBD7946 7B297C30D1D5234BB33E89168894F8D2
2	4767-002	00LV498-N37015 POST0 v0123 MBO v0121	Segment 1 Information Name: 5.3.19 P0130 M0130 P0130 F0D01 Hash data: E2157B6FCEF7A8760974E37D698E6A79C5A6FEA352BB0CC8 E33B82A7951B049B749F12AEF8956ACA1CE845B2CBBBD7946 7B297C30D1D5234BB33E89168894F8D2
3	4767-002	00LV498-N37493 POST0 v0123 MBO v0121	Segment 1 Information Name: 5.3.19 P0130 M0130 P0130 F0D01 Hash data: E2157B6FCEF7A8760974E37D698E6A79C5A6FEA352BB0CC8 E33B82A7951B049B749F12AEF8956ACA1CE845B2CBBBD7946 7B297C30D1D5234BB33E89168894F8D2
4	4767-002	00LV498-N37867 POST0 v0123 MBO v0121	Segment 1 Information Name: 5.3.19 P0130 M0130 P0130 F0D01 Hash data: E2157B6FCEF7A8760974E37D698E6A79C5A6FEA352BB0CC8 E33B82A7951B049B749F12AEF8956ACA1CE845B2CBBBD7946 7B297C30D1D5234BB33E89168894F8D2
5	4767-002	03FM669-H07054 POST0 v0123	Segment 1 Information Name: 5.3.19 P0130 M0130 P0130 F0D01 Hash data:



		MBO v0121	E2157B6FCEF7A8760974E37D698E6A79C5A6FEA352BB0CC8 E33B82A7951B049B749F12AEF8956ACA1CE845B2CBBBD7946 7B297C30D1D5234BB33E89168894F8D2
6	4767-002	03GN979-N38170 POST0 v0123 MBO v0121	Segment 1 Information Name: 5.3.19 P0130 M0130 P0130 F0D01 Hash data: E2157B6FCEF7A8760974E37D698E6A79C5A6FEA352BB0CC8 E33B82A7951B049B749F12AEF8956ACA1CE845B2CBBBD7946 7B297C30D1D5234BB33E89168894F8D2

The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2 validated Level 4. End users can base high-assurance applications, such as digital signature generation or financial transaction processing, on this platform.

Note that this policy covers services of trusted, lower layers of internal firmware (Layers 0 and 1, and a stub of Layer 2). Higher layers, OS and applications (2 and 3) are not included in the current validation. Layers 2 and 3 must not be run, otherwise, it will no longer be running as a validated FIPS module. The installation of such components is out of scope and would require a separate validation to maintain FIPS 140-2 compliance. However, the security foundations do not require a cooperative or trustworthy OS/application for consistent and secure Miniboot operation.

The cryptographic boundary is the enclosure of the self-contained Module of the 4767 card. The Module is labeled unambiguously with model and part numbers of the host PCIe card, and that of the Module itself. The correspondence between end-user product, Module, and security policy is self-explanatory. The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:

Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements

Security Requirement	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	4
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	4
Roles, Services, and Authentication	4
Finite State Model	4
Physical Security	4
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	4
EMI/EMC	4
Self-Tests	4
Design Assurance	4
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

## 2.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary

The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1 for 4767-001 and in Figure 2 for 4767-002; the red outlines depict the physical cryptographic boundary. Figure 1 displays the physical attributes of the 4767-001 PCIe Module. The 4767-001 Module is comprised of two (2) electrical component cards with one being enclosed in a secure envelope mounted in a suspended fashion on top of the other. Figure 2 displays the physical attributes of the 4767-002 PCIe Module. The 4767-002 Module also consists of two (2) electrical component cards with one mounted on top of the other and then both enclosed in a secure envelope. The Module relies on a host system that supplies a PCIe interface for input/output communication.



Figure 1 – 4767-001 Module



Figure 2 – 4767-002 Module





Table 3 – Physical Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Description	Logical Interface Type
<b>PCI Express signals:</b>	<b>4-lane (x4) external</b>	
PCIe data/addresses	Bidirectional	Data input Data output
PCIe control	bidirectional; PCIe v2.0 compliant “single function” device	Control input Status output
<b>Auxiliary signals:</b>	<b>tunneled over shared flexcables</b>	
Serial ports	only used as status output by current IBM firmware	Status out
USB port	bidirectional; may tunnel other signals (such as Ethernet-over- USB) not used by current IBM firmware	N/A (with current firmware)
PCIe power	3.3 V	Power
Battery power	variable, nominal 3.0 V	Power
External warning	host connectivity test, latching removal from host bus monitored within Module	Control input (from sensor) Status output (to host)

## 2.2 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary

Figure 3 depicts the Module operational environment with the secure enclosure outlined in red.

Note: POST2 is also in scope because it is part of the signed Segment1 image (and is included as one of the named components in the Segment1 image).




Figure 3 – Module Block Diagram




Figure 4 – Module software architecture – example usage

### 2.3 Mode of Operation

The Module uses only approved algorithms and modes of operation. If the Module is functional, and the validated firmware variant is loaded to a validated hardware platform(s), the Module is in FIPS mode for Segments 0 and 1. The running of Seg2 and Seg3 are outside this FIPS validation. However, the loading of Seg2 and Seg3 are inside this FIPS validation. The “Signed Health Query” (Miniboot 1), in addition to segment ownership and revision number, returns code layers’ contents’ SHA-512 hashes. Please see Table 1 - Cryptographic Module Configurations for Module Hardware Part Number and the Segment 1



hash being validated.

### 3 Cryptographic Functionality

The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in the tables below.

Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
AES	[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB, CBC Key sizes: 256 bits The following Key sizes are tested, but not used: 128, 192 <b>NOTE:</b> This function is only used internally within Miniboot and not available as an external service.	4814 and 4815
AES/CMAC	Functions: Generation and Verification The following Key sizes are tested, but not used: 128, 192, 256 bits	4814 and 4815
CKG	A vendor affirmed (VA) cryptographic key generator [SP800-133] is included as allowed by IG D.12. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o Asymmetric Key Generation (SP 800-133 § 6)</li><li>o Symmetric Key Generation (SP 800-133 § 7.1)</li></ul> (Note: The resulting symmetric keys and generated seeds for asymmetric keys are unmodified output from the DRBG.)	VA
DRBG	[NIST SP800-90A Rev 1] AES-256 CTR_DRBG using a derivation function and 1024 bits of entropy input	1674 and 1675
ECDSA	[FIPS 186-4] Functions: Key generation and signature verification Curves/Key sizes: P-521 w/ SHA 512	1214 and 1215
CVL ECDSA SigGen Component	[FIPS 186-4] Functions: Signature generation Curves/Key sizes: P-521 w/ SHA 512	1486 and 1487



Algorithm	Description	Cert #
HMAC	[FIPS 198-1] Functions: Generation, Verification SHA sizes: All the following are tested, but not used: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 <b>NOTE:</b> This is tested, but not used.	3217 and 3218
SHA	[FIPS 180-4] Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature Applications SHA sizes: SHA-256, SHA-512 The following are tested, but not used: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256	3956 and 3957
Triple-DES	Functions: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB, CBC Key sizes: 192 bits <b>NOTE:</b> This is tested, but not used.	2548 and 2549
Triple-DES/CMAC	<b>NOTE:</b> This is tested, but not used.	2548 and 2549

Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm	Description
NDRNG	Hardware generated and used as seeds for the DRBG

### 3.1 Critical Security Parameters (CSP)

All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module (including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 4.

Table 6 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

Key	Description / Usage
Cipherpage 1 Key	Encrypts Miniboot CSPs in flash memory, where data including the Device keypair private key is stored. (AES-256 CBC mode)
Device keypair (DKP1) private key	Keys unique to a specific card, validated by IBM trust chain ending at the IBM Root key. Enables proof externally that card is genuine and untampered. Signs certificates for Operating System public keys. Signs responses to Miniboot queries from host. Signs certificate for next subsequently generated device keypair. (ECC P521)



NDRBG seed	Entropy input / seed value generated by NDRBG and used to seed the DRBG.
DRBG state	State of the hardware DRBG in the ASIC. State must be saved between uses and restored to the hardware before each use. State includes V and Key.

### 3.2 Public Keys

Table 7 - Public Keys

Key	Description / Usage
Officer1 public key	Authenticates commands controlled by Officer 1, including new Seg1 or Seg2 firmware. (ECC P-521)
Officer2 public key	Authenticates commands controlled by Officer 2, including new Seg3 firmware. (ECC P-521)
Officer3 public key	Authenticates commands controlled by Officer 3. (ECC P-521)
Device keypair (DKP1) public key	Authenticate Seg1 responses, authenticate Operating System public keys. (ECC P-521)
IBM Class Root public key	Authenticate certificate for the first Device public key (DKP1 public key) to be generated. (ECC P-521)

## 4 Roles, Authentication and Services

### 4.1 Assumption of Roles

The Role descriptions are noted in the Role Description table:

Table 8 - Role Description

Role ID	Role Description	Authentication Type	Authentication Data
CO1 and User role	Cryptographic Officer 1 - Owns Segment 1 and established by IBM as the base authority - Also User role	Identity-based	Digital Signature ECC P-521
CO2	Cryptographic Officer 2 - Owns Segment 2 and established by CO1	Identity-based	Digital Signature ECC P-521



Role ID	Role Description	Authentication Type	Authentication Data
CO3	Cryptographic Officer 3 - Owns Segment 3 and established by CO2	Identity-based	Digital Signature ECC P-521

## 4.2 Authentication Methods

The authentication method and its strength of mechanism are in the Authentication Method table:

Table 9 - Authentication Method

Authentication Method	Strength of Mechanism
Digital Signature ECC P-521	ECC P-521 using SHA-512 is used for the signing and verification of digital signatures. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is $1/2^{256}$ , which is less than $1/1,000,000$ . The module can only perform one (1) digital signature verification per second. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute through random attempts is $60/2^{256}$ , which is less than $1/100,000$ .

## 4.3 Services

All services implemented by the Module are listed in the table(s) below. Each service description also describes all usage of CSPs by the service.

Table 10 – Authenticated Services

Service	Description	CO1/User	CO2	CO3
Establish Officer 2	Register new Officer 2	X		
Establish Officer 3	Register new Officer 3		X	
Surrender Officer 2	Clear Layer 2 and 3 parameters, public keys, and persistent data		X	
Surrender Officer 3	Clear Layer 3 parameters, public key, and persistent data			X
Ordinary Burn 1	Load Layer 1 (owner) public key; optionally clear Layer 2 and 3 parameters and persistent data, as defined by Segment 2/3 persistent object definitions	X		



Service	Description	CO1/User	CO2	CO3
Ordinary Burn 2	Use the Officer2 public key; optionally clear Layer 3 parameters and persistent data; write Segment 2 code (over previous active one)		X	
Emergency Burn 2	Clear Layer 2 and 3 persistent data; write Segment 2 code	X		
Ordinary Burn 3	Use the Officer3 public key; write Segment 3 code (over previous active one)			X
Emergency Burn 3	Write Segment 3 code; clear Layer 3 persistent data		X	
Software-induced tamper	<p>Destroy all card-resident secrets, rendering the card unusable.</p> <p>The additional Software-induced tamper service is not the same thing as the actual physical tamper response mechanism, but rather, a rarely used software command to render the card inoperable by triggering the tamper response mechanism to zeroize the module. It's more like a zeroize command. It doesn't require opening the hardware to zeroize.</p> <p>Note that this command must be targeted to particular cards, requires IBM cooperation to create (instances are unique), and is therefore not expected to be used during the lifetime of a typical deployment.</p>	X		

Table 11 – Unauthenticated Services

Service	Description
Cold Boot	Reboots the module and performs power-on self-tests, triggered by the strobing of a bit in the HRCSR by a host device driver.
Query Status	Read infrastructure status, including layer owners. Reset the Module CPU (MCPU) (OS/application).
Query Status/Noreset	Read infrastructure status, including layer owners. Do not reset Module CPU.
Query Signed Health ("Get Health")	Read status, including owner identities and public keys. Resets Module CPU. It does so conditionally (only if segment 2 or segment 3 has been updated since the MCPU was last reset [in practice this is only possible for segment 3])



Service	Description
Query Signed Health/Noreset (“Query Firmware”)	Read status, including owner identities and public keys. Do not reset Module CPU.
Query Certificate	Returns the entire Seg1 certificate list, one certificate at a time (repeated calls to MB1).
Algorithm test	Hashes host-supplied data as an interactive communications/infrastructure self-test. Does not access CSPs.
Continue to Segment 1	Advance into Segment 1 code if status permits
Continue to Segment 2	Advance into Segment 2 code if possible. POST 2 self-test must have completed successfully.

#### 4.4 Services cross-reference table

All services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below. Each service is cross-referenced with the Module CSPs, NDRBG seed, and DRBG state.

##### Cross-reference Key

- G Generates keys
- I Inputs key from outside of the module
- O Output key
- W Write/Store key
- U Use key
- Z Zeroize

Table 12 – Services cross-reference

Service	Cipherpage 1 Key	Device keypair (DKP1) private key	NDRBG seed	DRBG state	Officer1 public key	Officer2 public key	Officer3 public key	Device keypair (DKP1) public key	IBM Class Root public key
Establish Officer 2	U	U	-	-	U	-	-	-	-
Establish Officer 3	U	U	-	-	-	U	-	-	-
Surrender Officer 2	U	U	-	-	-	U	-	-	-





Service	Cipherpage 1 Key	Device keypair (DKP1) private key	NDRBG seed	DRBG state	Officer1 public key	Officer2 public key	Officer3 public key	Device keypair (DKP1) public key	IBM Class Root public key
Surrender Officer 3	U	U	-	-	-	-	U	-	-
Ordinary Burn 1	UGW	UGW	-	GU	UW	-	-	GW	-
Ordinary Burn 2	U	U	-	GU	-	UW	-	-	-
Emergency Burn 2	U	U	-	GU	U	WU	-	-	-
Ordinary Burn 3	U	U	-	GU	-	-	UW	-	-
Emergency Burn 3	U	U	-	GU	-	U	WU	-	-
Software-induced tamper	UZ	-	Z	Z	U	-	-	-	-
Cold Boot	-	-	GU	G	-	-	-	-	-
Query Status	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Query Status/Noreset	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Query Signed Health ("Get Health")	U	U	-	-	O	O	O	-	-
Query Signed Health/Noreset ("Query Firmware")	U	U	-	-	O	O	O	-	-
Query Certificate	U	U	-	GU	-	-	-	O	O
Algorithm test	-	-	GU	GU	-	-	-	-	-
Continue to Segment 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Continue to Segment 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

## 5 Self-tests

Each time the Module is powered on, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power on self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module.



On power on or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in the Power on Self-tests table below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the Module halts and a POST error code is generated. In addition to startup tests, the Module executes conditional data tests.

Table 13 – Power on Self-tests

Test Target	Description
<b>Symmetric Algorithms</b>	
AES	KATs: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB, CBC Key sizes: 256 bits
<b>Asymmetric Algorithms</b>	
ECDSA	PCT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification Curves/Key sizes: P-521 w/ SHA 512
<b>Hash Algorithms and Derivatives</b>	
SHA	KATs: SHA-256, SHA-512
<b>Deterministic Random Number Generation</b>	
DRBG Health Checks	Tested by supplying a known state to the hardware and performing the following operations in sequence at start up. 1) Instantiate without entropy XOR, zeroize key and IV 2) Reseed 3) Generate  4) Uninstantiate
DRBG	KATs: NIST SP800-90A Rev 1
<b>Firmware Integrity Test</b>	
POST0  32-bit Checksum	POST0 does perform a checksum of itself, to verify against flash bit-rot type errors. Any error results in an immediate error code and halt, with no opportunity for repair. POST0 also does a checksum test of the Miniboot0 image, before the flow of control can proceed to MB0. Any error results in an immediate error code and halt, with no opportunity for repair. The reason that a checksum is done instead of a hash, is that the hardware engines which would be used for hashing have not yet been tested, and as such, aren't allowed to be use.
POST1  32-bit Checksum  SHA-256	POST1 also does a checksum of itself for the in-DRAM copy as an integrity test.  MB0 does a SHA-256 hash check of POST1 and MB1 as an entity for the in-DRAM copy as an integrity test.
POST2	POST2 copies itself from flash to DRAM at checkpoint 0218; the code (running out of flash) then validates the checksum on the RAM copy of itself at that time.



Test Target	Description
32-bit Checksum	
MB0	POST0 checks it first then jumps to MB0, which checks it again.
32-bit Checksum	
MB1	MB0 does a SHA-256 hash check of POST1 and MB1 as an entity for the in-DRAM copy as an integrity test.
SHA-256	MB0 validates the hash of POST1 and MB1 on the active FLASH copy.
FPGA	FPGA from VHDL, broken into four parts with SHA-256 for each part. MB1 validates the hash on the active FLASH copy.
SHA-256	

Table 14 – Conditional Self-tests

Test Target	Description
DRBG	Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
NDRNG	Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the NDRNG.
Firmware Load	ECC P-521 signature verification when the firmware is loaded onto the card. Once the firmware has been stored in the flash on the card, hashes are used to verify the image integrity prior to invoking the firmware. This is done for Segment 1 [, 2, and 3]. Officer1 keys are used for Segment 1 and some Segment 2 firmware. Officer2 keys are used for other Segment 2 and all Segment 3 firmware.
ECDSA	Self-test in place for the underlying mathematical functions used for ECDSA (e.g., Point multiply, point verify, etc.). Pairwise consistency testing on all of the ECC keys generated, which, in effect, tests ECDSA (e.g., verifies that a generated keypair can be used to sign and then verify a data item).

## 6 Physical Security Policy

Module physical security mechanisms are mainly automatic. Intrusions, which destroy card secrets through an internal, independent action, are host-observable as system administration events. Pictures of the Module security cover are presented in Figures 1 and 2.

System administrators may notice tamper detection through unusual Module startup, such as a card failing to initialize. The details of such administrator-level logging are platform-dependent. It is recommended to investigate the tamper event type reported by the Module, possibly cross-checking the tamper event with other logs.

The types of tamper events are listed in the following table:



Table 15 – Physical Security Tamper Types and Recommended Actions

Physical Security Mechanism	Severity/Effect	Recommended Frequency of Inspection	Test Guidance
Hard Tamper	Zeroization	N/A (Automatic)	N/A
Soft Tamper	Module Reset	N/A (Automatic)	N/A
External Warning	Warning	Module Restart	Application Discretion
Low Battery	Warning	As frequent as possible	Replace as soon as possible

Physical security is constantly monitored through a tamper detection/ response envelope with tamper response and zeroization circuitry. No external physical monitoring is required. Environmental failure protection (EFP) is included.

A hard tamper event is caused by very high overvoltage, temperature or its rate of change out of reasonable operational range, or physical tamper (penetration of the tamper-detection matrix). Module memory-type devices (i.e. BBRAM, communication FIFOs) are actively zeroized. Module secrets are immediately destroyed: BBRAM is actively cleared at microelectronic speeds (sub-milliseconds). The Module becomes permanently inoperative: Miniboot startup does not successfully terminate without secrets in BBRAM.

Hard tamper technical specifics:

- Mesh sensors opens and shorts
- High Voltage on +3.3V and VBAT ( $4.2V \pm 0.2V$ )
- High Voltage on +5V ( $6.28V \pm 0.01V$ )
- Dead Battery (VBAT less than  $2.4V \pm 0.1V$ )
- Tamper controller software configuration change attempt
- Shipping/Storage temperature below  $-38^{\circ}C \pm 3^{\circ}C$  or above  $+90^{\circ}C \pm 2^{\circ}C$  limits

A soft tamper event is caused by moderate overvoltage or temperature moderately out of operational range. Reaction is instantaneous. The Module is held under reset while the soft tamper conditions persist. Secrets are not destroyed.

Soft tamper technical specifics:

- Low voltage on +5.0V ( $4.76V \pm 0.01V$ )
- High voltage on +5.0V ( $5.89V \pm 0.05V$ )
- Crypto operating temperature below  $0^{\circ}C \pm 2^{\circ}C$  or above  $83^{\circ}C \pm 2^{\circ}C$  (Note 1)
- System Reset from Host



## 7 Operational Environment

The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this Module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

## 8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

N/A

## 9 Security Rules and Guidance

The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic Module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 4 Module.

1. The Module will provide four distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer 1, Cryptographic Officer 2, and Cryptographic Officer 3.
2. The Module will provide identity-based authentication.
3. The Module will clear previous authentications on power cycle. This is accomplished by clearing RAM and all running applications.
4. When the Module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator will not have access to any cryptographic services.
5. The operator will be capable of commanding the Module to perform the power on self-tests by cycling power or resetting the Module.
6. Power on self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output will be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. This is accomplished by the Custom Communication Hardware in the PCIe interface path.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The Module does not support manual key entry.
13. The Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
14. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
15. The Module does not output intermediate key values.



## 10 References and Definitions

The following are references for this Security Policy.

Table 16 – References

Abbreviation	Full Specification Name
FIPS140-2	<i>Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001</i>
SP800-90A Rev 1	<i>Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, June 2015</i>
Annex A	Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
Annex B	Approved Protection Profiles for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
Annex C	Approved Random Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
Annex D	Approved Key Establishment Techniques for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

Table 17 – Acronyms and Definitions

Acronym	Definition
CA	Certificate Authority
CCP	Card Configuration Parameters
BBRAM	Battery-Backed static RAM
CSP	Critical Security Parameters
EDC	Error Detection code
Device Keypair	Device-specific public-key keypair generated and retained by Segment 1. It is non-exportable, traceable back to the IBM factory CA through a certificate chain, and may be used by external parties to verify the identity of a Module, through outbound authentication (OA).
Firmware identifier	An unambiguous status identifier (“Segment 1 hash”), used to quickly summarize firmware contents. It is the SHA-256 hash of firmware contents, possibly including hardware, such as an FPGA bitfile.  Segments are identified by their own segment hashes, but this document only specifies Segment 1. Modules loaded with validated Segment 2 and 3 must specify their specific validated configurations.



Acronym	Definition
FWID	Abbreviation of Firmware identifier
HLM	<p>Hardware Lock Microcontroller, a dedicated microcontroller which assisted previous 47xx generations with access control and management of persistent storage.</p> <p>While current generations no longer contain an actual HLM controller, some of the relevant functionality has been retained. Documentation refers to these features as “HLM (infrastructure)” for historical reasons.</p>
HSEB	High-speed erase BBRAM, a dedicated BBRAM chip actively erased upon tamper. The most valuable Miniboot secrets reside within this region, which is wiped within milliseconds of detecting a tamper event.
IA	Inbound Authentication, Miniboot authenticates each command request individually.
KAT	Known Answer Test
MCPU	The Module CPU (MCPU) is a redundant embedded PowerPC 476. It is not used in the FIPS mode of operation.
Miniboot	Software component of Module firmware. Miniboot functionality, together with POST, roughly corresponds to those of a system BIOS in PCs, with obvious additions to cover cryptographic functionality, Module-specific hardware, and act as the Module security controller.
OA	<p>Outbound Authentication, infrastructure capable of signing by a card-resident, non-exportable private key.</p> <p>External parties, including other Modules, can verify that signed content has been generated by an untampered Module firmware (Segment 1). An extension allows OA to manage private keys for OS or applications (Segment 2 or 3).</p>
PCIe	PCI Express, the external interface of our Module (also abbreviated as PCI-E).
PN	Part Number
POST	Power-On Self-Test, infrastructure tests resident in ROM and flash.
RAS	Abbreviation of Reliability, Availability, Serviceability
SSP	Security Service Processor (SSP), a dedicated processor executing Miniboot and most of POST (i.e., all privileged code). The SSP is an embedded PowerPC 405.
Segment 1F	Segment 1F is the rewritable part of card infrastructure, including the FPGA programming file, and POST 2, all protected as part of Segment 1. Used only when the FPGA bitfile is explicitly mentioned in Segment 1 operations.