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GE MDS LLC
Orbit MCR and Orbit ECR
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version: 2.10
Date: 2021-05-12
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................4
1.1 Variants and Order Packages .......................................................................................................4
1.2 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.........................................................................7
1.2.1 Excluded Components ....................................................................................................................8
1.3 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary...........................................................................8
1.4 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................8
2 Cryptographic Functionality.............................................................................................9
2.1 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................... 16
2.2 Public Keys................................................................................................................................. 20
3 Roles, Authentication and Services................................................................................21
3.1 Assumption of Roles.................................................................................................................. 21
3.2 Authentication Methods ........................................................................................................... 22
3.2.1 Normal Password......................................................................................................................... 22
3.2.2 One Time Password ..................................................................................................................... 22
3.3 Services...................................................................................................................................... 22
4 Self-tests........................................................................................................................27
5 Physical Security Policy..................................................................................................30
6 Operational Environment ..............................................................................................31
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...........................................................................................31
8 Security Rules and Guidance..........................................................................................32
9 References and Definitions............................................................................................33
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Small Form Factor Cryptographic Module Configurations............................................................4
Table 2 – Large Form Factor Cryptographic Module Configurations............................................................5
Table 3 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................6
Table 4 – Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................................... 7
Table 5 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions..............................................................9
Table 6 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation.........................................12
Table 7 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions ................................................................13
Table 8 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode*................................................................................................14
Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) .............................................................................................16
Table 10 – Public Keys................................................................................................................................. 20
Table 11 – Roles Description....................................................................................................................... 21
Table 12 – Authenticated Services..............................................................................................................22
Table 13 – Unauthenticated Services .........................................................................................................24
Table 14 – CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................25
Table 15 – Public Key Access Rights within Services...................................................................................26
Table 16 – Power Up Self-tests...................................................................................................................27
Table 17 – Conditional Self-tests ................................................................................................................28
Table 18 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................31
Table 19 – References................................................................................................................................. 33
Table 20 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................33
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Module (Large Form Factor on left (MCR), Small Form Factor on right (ECR)) ...........................7
Figure 2 – Tamper Seal Location (Large Form Factor) ................................................................................30
Figure 3 – Tamper Seal Location (Small Form Factor) ................................................................................30
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the GE MDS Orbit Multiservice Connect Router (MCR) and
Edge Connect Router (ECR) module family, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a secure wireless
communications device, which operates on cellular bands (2G/3G/4G LTE), licensed and unlicensed bands,
and 802.11 Wi-Fi. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 2 requirements.
1.1 Variants and Order Packages
The Module validation encompasses the following components:
• Chassis: ECR Chassis v1.0, MCR Chassis v1.0
• Internal components: U91, L1B, L2X, L2B, L4A, L4E, L4C, L7A, L7W, L9C, 4G1, 4G2, 4G3, 4G4, 4G5,
4GP, 4GY, 4GZ, 4GA, E4S, E42, W51, W52, 3G1, NNN. These do not perform cryptographic
operations.
• Platform boards: ECR: 1; MCR: 1, 2 and 3. Changes to these result in a new designated type.
• Orbit Firmware v7.1.1 and v7.1.3
These components are included with other options (e.g. faceplates, special handling, mounting brackets)
to create an order package, as described in Tables 1 and 2 (below). The possible order packages are
defined by a 21 character configuration string that is constructed upon order entry and determines which
options are populated in the factory. The columns shown in gray, are for items that have no impact on
the cryptographic modules (e.g. country/regulatory, safety certification, reserved fields). The NICs and
GPS are not security relevant because they do not perform cryptographic operations or process critical
security parameters (CSPs).
The Module is a multi-chip standalone embodiment; the cryptographic boundary is the device chassis.
Table 1 – Small Form Factor Cryptographic Module Configurations
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Table 2 – Large Form Factor Cryptographic Module Configurations
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2
validated wireless network routers.
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The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 3 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks 2
Overall 2
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1.2 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical forms of the Module are depicted in Figure 1. The boundary is the chassis of the device. The
Module relies on RF antennas as input/output devices.
The module has two form factors, both of which have multiple variants. All port possibilities are
encompassed in Table 4.
Figure 1 – Module (Large Form Factor on left (MCR), Small Form Factor on right (ECR))
Table 4 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Power input 10-60 V DC Power
RJ-45 Eth Ports (1, 2, or 4*)
Ethernet ports (metal
shielded)
Control in | Data in | Data out | Status out
RJ-45 Serial Ports (1 or 2*)
RS-232 or RS-485 (un-
shielded)
Control in | Data in | Data out | Status out
USB Mini (type B) Virtual console port Control in | Data in | Data out | Status out
TNC port (0 or 1)
Licensed or unlicensed radio
port
Control in | Data in | Data out | Status out
SMA ports (0, 1, 2, or 3,
female)
Cellular radio and/or GPS port Control in | Data in | Data out | Status out
RP-SMA port (0 , 1, or 2,
female)
802.11 Wi-Fi port Control in | Data in | Data out | Status out
SIM card slot (0,1, or 2) SIM card slot Data in
LED Status indicators
Five (5) LEDs to indicate
device status
Status out
*Large Form Factor (MCR) only
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1.2.1 Excluded Components
In the MCR variant, the following components have been excluded:
• MAX3161 (serial transceiver)
• MAX3238 (serial transceiver)
These components are not security relevant and do not provide any cryptographic functionality. The data
they process is taken directly from, or provided directly to, the module’s ports and interfaces.
1.3 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The module contains a processor card containing a CPU, RAM, FLASH, and firmware within the
cryptographic boundary.
1.4 Modes of Operation
The module supports both an Approved and a non-Approved mode of operation. The module is provided
from the manufacturer in the non-approved mode. The Crypto Officer sets the mode of operation through
the management interface. Internally, the module uses a boot parameter to explicitly operate in one of
the modes of operation. To verify that a module is in the Approved mode of operation, the operator can
query the FIPS Mode parameter through the system menu of any of the user interfaces.
FIPS mode for the device can be activated from the System menu in the UI. The user will be prompted for
confirmation, as activating FIPS mode will result in a factory reset. A factory reset will clear all user
settings, including CSPs. In addition, the non-Approved algorithms listed at the bottom of Section 2 are
disabled.
Once the unit is brought into FIPS mode, default passwords and keys must be changed before the module
will report that it has reached “FIPS operational status” (FIPS Approved mode + proper initialization). The
user can query the FIPS operational status in the System menu in the UI. If these requirements have been
met, FIPS operational status will be set to TRUE.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in the tables below.
Table 5 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert #
OpenSSL
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, CFB-128, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits (ECB and CFB are 128-bit only)
4539
AES-CCM [SP 800-38C]
Functions: Authenticated Encryption, Authenticated Decryption
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
4539
AES-CMAC [SP 800-38B]
Functions: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
4539
AES-GCM* [SP 800-38D]
Functions: Authenticated Encryption, Authenticated Decryption
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
4539
CVL:
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific
[SP 800-135]
Functions: IKE v1 KDF, IKEv2 KDF, TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, SSH
KDF, SNMP KDF
1219
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: CTR DRBG
Modes: AES-256
Security Strengths: 256 bits
1496
DSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
1210
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
2997
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Algorithm Description Cert #
KTS [SP800-38F §3.1]
Functions: Key Wrap, Key Unwrap
Mode: AES-CBC + HMAC
Strength: 128 or 256 bits
AES #4539
HMAC
#2997
RSA [FIPS 186-4, ANSI X9.31-1998, and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
2471
SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
3720
Triple-DES [SP 800-20]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC
Key sizes: 3-key
2416
Mocana
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
5887
AES-KW [SP 800-38F]
Functions: Key Wrap, Key Unwrap
Mode: KW
Key size: 128 bits
5887
CVL:
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific
[SP 800-135]
Functions: TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF
2118
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: CTR DRBG (Derivation Function and Prediction Resistance
Enabled)
Modes: AES-256
Security Strengths: 256 bits
2450
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Algorithm Description Cert #
DSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: PQG Generation, PQG Verification, Key Pair Generation,
Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
1484
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
3864
KTS [SP 800-38F]
Functions: Key Wrap, Key Unwrap
Mode: AES-KW
Strength: 128 bits
AES #5887
RSA [FIPS 186-4 and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
3085
SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
4639
Triple-DES [SP 800-20]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC
Key sizes: 3-key
2867
Linux Kernel
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
5888
AES-CCM [SP 800-38C]
Functions: Authenticated Encryption, Authenticated Decryption
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
5888
AES-CMAC [SP 800-38B]
Functions: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: AES with 128 bits
5888
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Algorithm Description Cert #
AES-GCM* [SP 800-38D]
Functions: Authenticated Encryption, Authenticated Decryption
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
5888
AES-GMAC [SP 800-38D]
Functions: Generation and Verification of Message Authentication Code
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
5888
SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
4640
Triple-DES [SP 800-20]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC
Key sizes:3-key
2868
IEEE 802.11 Crypto API
AES-KW [SP 800-38F]
Functions: Key Wrap, Key Unwrap
Mode: KW
Key size: 128 bits
5889
KTS [SP 800-38F]
Functions: Key Wrap, Key Unwrap
Mode: AES-KW
Strength: 128 bits
5889
Libssh2
CVL:
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific
[SP 800-135]
Functions: SSH KDF
1221
* The module is compliant to IG A.5: GCM is used in the context of TLS and IPSec/IKEv2. In the event of power loss, GCM keys
are re-established as part of the re-establishment of the TLS or IPSec channel. The above behavior ensures the same GCM IV is
never used twice.
Table 6 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description IG Ref.
[SP800-133]
Function: Key Generation
IG D.12
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Algorithm Description IG Ref.
CKG
(Cryptographic
Key Generation)
[133] Section 6.1 Asymmetric signature key generation using
unmodified DRBG output
[133] Section 6.2 Asymmetric key establishment key generation using
unmodified DRBG output
[133] Section 7.1 Direct symmetric key generation using unmodified
DRBG output
[133] Section 7.3 Derivation of symmetric keys from a key agreement
shared secret.
[133] Section 7.4 Derivation of symmetric keys from a pre-shared key
[133] Section 7.5 Derivation of symmetric keys from a password
KDA, Key
Extraction-then-
Expansion
[SP 800-56C Rev 1]
Functions: HMAC-SHA1 KDF PRF is used for expanding Group and
Pairwise keys in 802.1x used by the NX/LN and Wi-Fi.
IG D.10
KDF, Password-
Based
[SP 800-132]
Options: PBKDF with Option 1a
Functions: HMAC-based KDF SHA-256 with a 32-byte salt created
from the username padded with zeros and 1024 rounds used to
obfuscate the user password before storage. The user password is the
input to the KDF and has a minimum length of 8 bytes. Keys derived
from passwords, as shown in SP 800-132, may only be used in storage
applications. The result is not used for generation of any MK material
in FIPS mode.
IG D.6
Table 7 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
Diffie-Hellman,
non-compliant to
SP800-56A
[IG D.8]
Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1219, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength)
Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1221, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
MD5 within TLS [IG D.2]
Use of MD5 along with SHA1 in TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF
NDRNG [IG 7.15]
Hardware Derived Non-Deterministic RNG, using a ring oscillator. Seeds the FIPS
Approved DRBGs with 256 bits of strength. OpenSSL implementation seeds and
reseeds with 1024 bits from the HW RNG. Mocana implementation seeds with 1152
bits and reseeds with 768 bits from the HW RNG.
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Algorithm Description
RSA, non-
compliant to
SP800-56B
[IG D.9]
RSA (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of
encryption strength)
RSA, additional
modulus sizes
[IG A.14]
RSA vendor affirmed moduli: 2049-3071 bits, 3073-16384 bits.
Table 8 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode*
Protocol Description
EAP-TLS [IG D.9]
Uses the same cipher suites as TLS (see below).
Used by IEEE 802.1x when performing mutual authentication, between Wi-Fi and
NX/LN wireless devices and a RADIUS server. Uses Public Key (RSA or DSA) keys and
X.509 Certificates.
IKE v1 [IG D.8 and SP 800-135]
Key Exchange Mechanisms: Oakley Groups 14 & 15, DH key agreement with Pre-
Shared Key and RSA authentication
Session Encryption: 3DES-CBC, AES-CBC, & AES-CTR encryption
Session Authentication: HMAC with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Session Key Derivation: IKEv1 KDF with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
IKE v2 [IG D.8 and SP 800-135]
Key Exchange Mechanisms: Oakley Groups 14 & 15, DH key agreement with Pre-
Shared Key and RSA authentication
Session Encryption: 3DES-CBC, AES-CBC, AES-CTR, AES-GCM (w/ 16 octet ICV)
encryption
Session Authentication: HMAC-SHA1-96, HMAC-SHA1-160, AES-GCM (AEAD), AES-
GMAC (128, 192, 256), HMAC-SHA-256-128, HMAC-SHA-384-192, HMAC-SHA-512-
256 integrity
Session Key Derivation: IKEv2 KDF with CMACSHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.
SNMPv3 [IG D.8 and SP 800-135]
Session Encryption: AES-128-CFB
Session Authentication: HMAC-SHA1-96
SSH v2 [IG D.8 and SP 800-135]
Key Exchange Mechanisms: DH Group Exchange SHA1 & SHA256, DH Group 14 SHA1
Session Encryption: 3DES-CBC, AES-CBC (128, 192, 256), AES-CTR (128, 192, 256)
Session Authentication: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA512
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Protocol Description
TLS v1.0/v1.1/v1.2 [IG D.8 and SP 800-135]
OpenSSL Cipher suites:
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Mocana Cipher Suites:
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
*Protocols are not reviewed or tested by the CMVP or CAVP.
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Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only:
• DES
• MD5
• RC4
• RSA, DSA, and ECDSA, disallowed variants (e.g. 1024, 1536, and non-NIST curves)
• PBKDF2 used for MK generation for use with Option 1b and 2a
• Ed25519
• Curve25519
• ChaCha20
• Poly1305
2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module (including
all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 4.
Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description / Usage
Static Server Keys
RSA Private Keys
(X.509)
RSA (size 2048 to 16384 bits) private keys for various protocols which use X.509
certificates: TLS, IPSEC, EAP-TLS (for Wi-Fi device auth, licensed radio device auth,
unlicensed radio device auth)
Can be generated or imported. Used for signatures (w/DH) or for RSA key transport.
DSA Private Keys
(X.509)
DSA-2048 or DSA-3072 private keys for various protocols which use X.509 certificates:
TLS, IPSEC, EAP-TLS (for WiFi device auth, licensed radio device auth, unlicensed radio
device auth)
Can only be imported. Used for signature generation (w/ephemeral DH) or directly as a
DH key (TLS_DH_* cipher suites).
SSH Private Keys RSA and DSA private keys for SSH, size 2048 or 3072. Generated internally on
initialization or manually. Used for signature generation (w/DH).
TLS Ephemeral Keys
DH Private Key DH-2048 or DH-3072 Private key used for PFS during a TLS exchange.
Master Secret 384-bit TLS Master Secret derived from DH exchange
Session
Encryption Keys
TLS Session encryption keys (AES-128, AES-256, or 3-key Triple-DES).
Session Auth
Keys
TLS Session authentication keys (HMAC-SHA-1, or HMAC-SHA-256)
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CSP Description / Usage
EAP-TLS Ephemeral Keys
DH Private Key DH-2048 or DH-3072 Private key used for PFS during a TLS exchange
Master Secret 384-bit TLS Master Secret derived from DH exchange
Session
Encryption Keys
TLS Session encryption keys (AES-128, AES-256, or 3-key Triple-DES)
Session Auth
Keys
TLS Session authentication keys (HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-256)
EAPOL Keys
Pairwise Master
Key
256-bit shared secret keying material. Established as part of mutual authentication
performed using EAP-TLS exchange between client and RADIUS server (802.1X). Can
also be pre-shared.
Key
Confirmation
Key
128-bit HMAC/SHA-1 key used for authentication of the EAPOL exchange. Derived
from Pairwise Master Key using a KDF.
Key Encryption
Key
128-bit AES-CBC key used in AES-KEYWRAP protocol to encrypt the Unicast Temporal
Key. Derived from Pairwise Master Key using a KDF.
Unicast
Temporal Key
128-bit (Wi-Fi) or 256-bit (NX/LN) AES-CCM key. Derived from Pairwise Master Key
using a KDF. The first 128 bits of the 256 bits of key material is used when doing AES-
128 (NX/LN).
Group Temporal
Key
128-bit (Wi-Fi) or 256-bit (Nx/LN) AES-CCM key. Created by access point and
distributed to all peers, wrapped with key encryption key (enc) and key confirmation
key (auth). The first 128 bits of the 256 bits of key material is used when doing AES-128
(NX/LN).
Integrity Group
Temporal Key
128-bit AES-CMAC key (Wi-Fi). Created by access point and distributed to all peers,
wrapped with key encryption key (enc) and key confirmation key (auth).
IKEv1 Keys
Pre-Shared Key 160-512 bit key used to authenticate/encrypt VPN tunnel when using IKEv1
SKEYID 160-512 bit keys used by each IKE SA to derive the other key material
SKEYID_d 160-512 bit keys used by each IKE SA to derive keys
SKEYID_e
Keys used by each IKE SA to protect the confidentiality of its messages (AES-128, AES-
256, or 3-key Triple-DES)
SKEYID_a
Keys used by each IKE SA to authenticate messages (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, or HMAC-SHA-512)
Child SA Keys 128-512 bit keys used to protect each Child SA
IKEv2 Keys
Pre-Shared Key 160-512 bit key used to authenticate/encrypt VPN tunnel when using IKEv2
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CSP Description / Usage
SKEYSEED 160-512 bit keys used by each IKE SA to derive the other key material
SK_d 160-512 bit keys used to derive new keys for each Child SA
SK_ai
160-512 bit HMAC key used for authenticating the message exchanges from the
Initiator to the Responder
SK_ar
160-512 bit HMAC key used for authenticating the message exchanges from the
Responder to the Initiator
SK_ei
Used for encrypting messages from the Initiator to the Responder (AES-128, AES-256,
or 3-key Triple-DES)
SK_er
Used for encrypting messages from the Responder to the Initiator (AES-128, AES-256,
or 3-key Triple-DES)
SK_pi
160-512 bit HMAC keys used to generate the AUTH payload messages from the
Initiator to the Responder
SK_pr
160-512 bit HMAC keys used to generate the AUTH payload messages from the
Responder to the Initiator
Child SA Keys 128-512 bit keys used to protect each Child SA
SSH Ephemeral Keys
Shared Secret Derived from Diffie-Hellman 2048 Exchange
Exchange Hash Derived from Diffie-Hellman 2048 Exchange
Session ID The initial Exchange Hash between a Client and a Server (160-512 bits). Copied of
Exchange Hash from first connection between a Client and a Server.
Client to Server
Initial IV
Initial IV (64 or 128 bits) used with block ciphers for messages from the Client to the
Server. Computed from Shared Secret, Exchange Hash, SSH Session ID and the byte “A”
using the selected hash function.
Server to Client
Initial IV
Initial IV (64 or 128 bits) used with block ciphers for messages from the Server to the
Client. Computed from Shared Secret, Exchange Hash, SSH Session ID and the byte “B”
using the selected hash function.
Client to Server
Encryption Key
Used to encrypt data from Client to Server. Computed from Shared Secret, Exchange
Hash, SSH Session ID and the byte “C” using the selected hash function. (AES-128, AES-
256, or 3-key Triple-DES)
Server to Client
Encryption Key
Used to encrypt data from Server to Client. Computed from Shared Secret, Exchange
Hash, SSH Session ID and the byte “D” using the selected hash function. (AES-128, AES-
256, or 3-key Triple-DES)
Client to Server
Integrity Key
160-512 bit HMAC key used to verify data from Client to Server. Computed from
Shared Secret, Exchange Hash, SSH Session ID and the byte “E” using the selected hash
function.
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CSP Description / Usage
Server to Client
Integrity Key
160-512 bit HMAC key used to verify data from Server to Client. Computed from
Shared Secret, Exchange Hash, SSH Session ID and the byte “F” using the selected hash
function.
SNMPv3 Keys
Session
Authentication
Key
HMAC-SHA-1 key. Specified directly by security officer, or derived from passphrase via
the SNMP KDF (SP800-135).
Session
Encryption Key
AES-128 key. Specified directly by security officer, or derived from passphrase via the
SNMP KDF (SP800-135).
Remote Management protocol Keys
Pre-shared key Pre shared key for remote management and to protect the programming protocol.
Also used as a session HMAC (SHA1) key to provide authentication of Remote
Management protocol handshake messages. (Size varies)
Remote
Management
programming
session
asymmetric
private key
2048-bit RSA key that is generated at the start of each reprogramming session.
(Multicast file transport)
Remote
Management
programming
session
symmetric key
AES-256 key generated by RSA Key exchange, for use with AES-256-CCM protection of
data blocks. (Multicast file transport)
Other Keys & CSPs
Parameter Store
encryption key
Encrypts values in the parameter database which are marked to be protected. (e.g.,
PSK values.) Initialized to default value. AES-128-CFB.
Certificate Store
encryption key
Encrypts the certificate database (stored CSP data which is not in the parameter store).
Initialized to default value. AES-256-CBC.
DRBG Seeds Output values from the NDRNG to initialize the module’s DRBGs. (≥768 bits)
DRBG States Internal state values of the module’s CTR DRBGs. (128-bit V, 256-bit Key)
Passwords
Local passwords Passwords used for operator authentication
RADIUS shared
secret
Shared secret to mutually authenticate the RADIUS server and the module
One Time
Passwords
Temporary passwords for one-time authentication
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CSP Description / Usage
SSH Client
Shared Secret
Password used by the module to authenticate as a client to an external SSH server
2.2 Public Keys
Table 10 – Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
RSA Public Keys
(X.509)
RSA (size 2048 to 16384 bits) public device keys for various protocols which use X.509
certificates: TLS, IPSEC, EAP-TLS (for WiFi device auth, licensed radio device auth,
unlicensed radio device auth)
Can be generated or imported, although generation requires external signing by a CA.
Passed to client; used for signatures (w/DH) or for RSA key transport.
DSA Public Keys
(X.509)
DSA-2048 or DSA-3072 public device keys for various protocols which use X.509
certificates: TLS, IPSEC, EAP-TLS (for WiFi device auth, licensed radio device auth,
unlicensed radio device auth)
Can only be imported. Passed to client; used for signatures (w/DH).
CA Public Keys
(X.509)
RSA (size 2048 to 16384 bits) or DSA public keys (size 2048 or 3072) corresponding to
certificate authorities; for various protocols which use X.509 certificates: TLS, IPSEC, EAP-
TLS (for WiFi device auth, licensed radio device auth, unlicensed radio device auth)
Can only be imported.
SSH Public Keys RSA and DSA public keys for SSH (size 2048 or 3072). Generated internally on
initialization or manually. Passed to client; used for signatures (w/DH).
Firmware
package
verification key
Used to verify new firmware packages. RSA-3072 with SHA-256.
HAB public key RSA-3072 with SHA-256 to perform firmware integrity checking on boot.
TLS DH public
key
DH-2048 or DH-3072 Public key used for PFS during a TLS exchange. Derived from TLS
exchange.
Remote
Management
programming
session
asymmetric
public key
RSA-2048 public key generated from the Remote Management programming session
asymmetric private key at the start of each transmission of a data block. (Multicast file
transport)
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports five (5) distinct operator roles: Admin (CO), Tech, Oper (User), SNMP, and Factory
Reset. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using individual sessions per operator.
Re-authentication is enforced when changing roles. The module clears all authenticated sessions on
power cycle.
The table below lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Module does not support a
maintenance role or bypass capability. The Module supports concurrent operators, with the exception
that each physical or virtual serial port can only support one operator at a time. The module supports a
maximum of five (5) concurrent operators, which are physically separated by separate ports or logically
separated by separate sessions. However, an Admin operator is always able to log in, in which case the
Admin selects a currently active operator to be logged out.
Passwords (including One Time Passwords) are stored in the module in hashed form (1024-round PBKDF2
with HMAC/SHA-256) and are considered CSPs. Entered passwords are either manually distributed over a
local channel (e.g., serial connection) or logically protected by an encrypted channel (e.g., TLS, SSH).
Table 11 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
Admin (CO) Access to all module functionality Role-based Username & Password
Role-based One-Time Password
Role-based RADIUS
Tech Read/write access of non-CSPs;
can also set own password
Role-based Username & Password
Role-based RADIUS
Oper (User) Read-only operations Role-based Username & Password
Role-based RADIUS
SNMP Read-only operations over SNMP Identity-based ID & Password to derive
SNMPv3 session key(s)
Factory
Reset
Reset the module to factory
defaults
Role-based One-Time Password
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3.2 Authentication Methods
3.2.1 Normal Password
The module can use password-based authentication over CLI (Serial, USB, or SSH) the WebUI, NETCONF,
or SNMPv3. By default, the module enforces a minimum length of eight (8) characters, including one (1)
capital, one (1) lowercase, and one (1) numerical character. The Admin role can modify the requirements
but cannot reduce the minimum length.
For a worst-case scenario, the Admin may require that a password contain eight (8) numeric characters,
in which case a minimum-length password would be all numeric. The resulting probability of false
authentication would be 1 in 10^8, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000.
The module allows 60 password attempts per minute. This is enforced by the time it takes the module to
calculate a password hash with PBKDF2 (see Section 3.1). Combining this with the worst-case password
complexity scenario, a one-minute session of random login attempts would have a success probability of
1 in 1,670,000, which is less than 1 in 100,000.
Note that the use of RADIUS does not affect the above password requirements.
3.2.2 One Time Password
The one-time password is a random 40-byte binary value. The value is hashed with PBKDF2 (see Section
3.1 for specifics) and compared against a stored digest.
Since the value is fully random, the probability of false authentication for a One Time Password is 1 in
256^40 (1 in approximately 2.14 x 10^96), which is less than 1 in 1,000,000. The same velocity checking
described in Section 3.2.1 applies (60 attempts per minute), which means the success probability of a one-
minute attack is 1 in 3.56 x 10^94, which is less than 1 in 100,000.
3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. Each service description also
describes all usage of CSPs by the service. These services are available in the Approved mode and in the
non-Approved mode.
Table 12 – Authenticated Services
Service Description Admin Tech Oper SNMP
Fact.
Reset
Local User Authentication Authenticate locally with a fixed
username and password.
X X X
RADIUS User Authentication Authenticate remotely using
RADIUS
X X X
Authentication Data
Management
Configure and change RADIUS
shared secret, and passwords for
all operators, excluding OTPs
X
Update Tech Password Admin or Tech user updates
Tech password
X X
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Service Description Admin Tech Oper SNMP
Fact.
Reset
Generate OTP Generate a One-Time Password
for Admin or Factory Reset
X
One-Time Password
Authentication
Authenticate using a One-Time
Password (OTP)
X X
SNMP Session Authenticate and query using an
SNMP session
(SNMPv3 in FIPS mode,
SNMPv1/v2c/v3 in non-FIPS mode)
X
SSH Session Establish a session with a client
using the SSH Service
X X X
SSH Client Session Use SSH client to connect to
remote SSH server.
X X X
Web UI Session Establish a Web session with a
client via the WebUI service
(HTTPS in FIPS mode, HTTP or HTTPS
in non-FIPS mode)
X X X
SSH Server Management Generate private/public key pair
for use by SSH service
X X
Remote Management
Service
Reprogram a device remotely via
a secure file transfer
X X
IPSec/IKE VPN Configure the secure end-to-end
IP links, which use IPsec VPN and
a pre-shared key or certificate-
based setup
X
PKI/Certificate Management Generate/upload private
keys/certificates for use in
certificate-based security setup.
X
Ethernet Device
Authentication
Configure the IEEE 802.1X based
authentication and MAC
authentication bypass (MAB)
based authentication.
X
WiFi Device Security Configure secure Wi-Fi link which
uses a pre-shared key or EAP-
TLS/RADIUS using certificates.
X
NX/LN Device Security Configure the secure radio link
which uses a pre-shared key or
EAP-TLS/RADIUS using
certificates.
X
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Service Description Admin Tech Oper SNMP
Fact.
Reset
Event Logging Securely send event logs to
central SYSLOG sever by
configuring SYSLOG over TLS.
X X
Show Status View module status parameters. X X X X
Reset to factory settings Resets the module to factory
settings.
X X
The majority of the module’s authenticated services are for configuration purposes. Most of these are
available over multiple interfaces – HTTPS, NETCONF, SSH, etc. Configuration of cryptography-related
functionality is restricted to the Admin (CO) role. The Tech role is restricted to the configuration of non-
cryptographic functionality.
Table 13 – Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Self-tests Run self-tests by power cycling the module.
General network
services
Communicate on a network; provide DHCP, DNS, NTP, SNTP, NHRP, etc.
Without authentication, the module is limited to generic network services. Unauthenticated operators
cannot modify module CSPs in any way.
Table 14 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes
of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
• R = Read: The module reads the CSP, and exports it from the module.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The module writes the CSP with specified data.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
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Table 14 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
RSA
Private
Keys
(X.509)
DSA
Private
Keys
(X.509)
SSH
Private
Keys
TLS
Ephemeral
Keys
EAP-TLS
Ephemeral
Keys
EAPOL
Pairwise
Master
Key
Other
EAPOL
Keys
IKEv1
Keys
IKEv2
Keys
SSH
Ephemeral
Keys
SNMPv3
Keys
Static
Remote
Management
Protocol
Keys
Ephemeral
Remote
Mgmt
Protocol
Keys
Parameter
Store
encryption
key
Certificate
Store
encryption
key
DRBG
Seeds
and
DRBG
States
Local
passwords
RADIUS
Shared
Secret
One
Time
Passwords
SSH
Client
Shared
Secret
Local User
Authentication
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- GEZ WE -- -- --
RADIUS User
Authentication
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- GEZ -- E -- --
Auth. Data
Management
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- W W -- --
Update Tech
Password
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- GEZ W* -- -- --
Generate OTP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- GEZ -- -- GRZ --
OTP Auth. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- WEZ --
SNMP Session -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- GEZ -- -- E -- GEZ -- -- -- --
SSH Session -- -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- GEZ -- -- -- -- -- GEZ -- -- -- --
SSH Client Session -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- GEZ -- -- -- -- -- GEZ -- -- -- RE
Web UI Session E E -- GEZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E GEZ -- -- -- --
SSH Server
Management
-- -- GW -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- GEZ -- -- -- --
Remote
Management
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- WE GEZ E -- GEZ -- -- -- --
PKI/Certificate
Management
GWEZ GWEZ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E WE GEZ -- -- -- --
IPSec/IKE VPN -- -- -- -- -- -- -- WGEZ WGEZ -- -- -- -- -- E GEZ -- -- -- --
Ethernet Device
Authentication
E E -- GEZ GEZ E WGEZ -- -- -- -- -- -- E E GEZ -- -- -- --
Wi-Fi Device
Security
E E -- GEZ GEZ GWEZ WGEZ -- -- -- -- -- -- E E GEZ -- -- -- --
NX/LN Device
Security
E E -- GEZ GEZ GWEZ WGEZ -- -- -- -- -- -- E E GEZ -- -- -- --
Event Logging E E -- GEZ -- E -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E GEZ -- -- -- --
Show Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- R R -- -- R -- -- R -- R
Reset to factory
settings
ZG** Z ZG** Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
* For the Tech role, password change is limited to the role’s own password.
** “ZG” keys are zeroized and then replaced with newly generated values.
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Table 15 – Public Key Access Rights within Services
Service
Public Keys
RSA
Public
Keys
(X.509)
DSA
Public
Keys
(X.509)
CA
Public
Keys
(X.509)
SSH
Public
Keys
FW
Package
Verification
Key
HAB
public
key
TLS
DH
Public
Key
Remote
Management
Asymmetric
Public
Key
Local User Authentication -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
RADIUS User Authentication -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Auth. Data Management -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Update Tech Password -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Generate OTP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
OTP Auth. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
SNMP Session -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
SSH Session -- -- -- E -- -- -- --
SSH Client Session -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Web UI Session RE RE E -- -- -- GEZ --
SSH Server Management -- -- -- GW -- -- -- --
Remote Management -- -- -- -- -- -- -- WE
PKI/Certificate Management GWEZ GWEZ GWEZ -- -- -- -- --
IPSec/IKE VPN -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Ethernet Device Authentication RE RE E -- -- -- GEZ --
Wi-Fi Device Security RE RE E -- -- -- GEZ --
NX/LN Device Security RE RE E -- -- -- GEZ --
Event Logging RE RE E -- -- -- GEZ --
Show Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- R
Reset to factory settings ZG* Z Z ZG* E E Z Z
* “ZG” keys are zeroized and then replaced with newly generated values.
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4 Self-Tests
Each time the Module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that the firmware has not been damaged. Power up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling
the module.
On power up or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in Table 16 below. All power-on self-
tests must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If any of the
KATs fail, the Module enters the SOFT ERROR 1 state and reboots. If the Firmware Integrity test fails, the
module either enters the HARD ERROR 1 state and halts (bootloader integrity failure) or enters the HARD
ERROR 2 state and reboots (post-bootloader integrity failure).
The module will try to recover from Conditional Self-Test failures (SOFT ERROR 2 to retry the action or re-
instantiate the library, and SOFT ERROR 3 to reject bad firmware); if this fails, the module enters the SOFT
ERROR 1 state and reboots.
Table 16 – Power Up Self-Tests
Test Target Description
Firmware Integrity RSA 3072 / SHA-256 verification of internal firmware on boot.
OpenSSL
AES
Cert. #4539
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Mode: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
CCM
Cert. #4539
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Key sizes: 192 bits
CMAC
Cert. #4539
KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: AES (128, 192, 256 bits), Triple-DES (192 bits)
DRBG
Cert. #1496
KATs: HASH DRBG, HMAC DRBG, CTR DRBG
Security Strengths: 128, 192, 256 bits
DSA
Cert. #1210
PCT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
GCM
Cert. #4539
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Key sizes: 256 bits
HMAC
Cert. #2997
KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
RSA
Cert. #2471
KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHA
Cert. #3720
KATs: SHA-1
Triple-DES
Cert. #2416
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB
Key sizes: 3-key
Mocana
AES
Cert. #5887
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, CTR, CFB
Key sizes: 256 bits (128 for CFB)
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Test Target Description
DRBG
Cert. #2450
KATs: CTR DRBG
Modes: AES-256
Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA
Cert. #1484
PCT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
HMAC
Cert. #3864
KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
RSA
Cert. #3085
KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHA
Cert. #4639
KATs: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Triple-DES
Cert. #2867
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TCBC,
Key sizes: 3-key
Linux Kernel
AES
Cert. #5888
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
CCM
Cert. #5888
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Key sizes: 128 bits
GCM
Cert. #5888
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
SHA
Cert. #4640
KATs: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Triple-DES
Cert. #2868
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB, TCBC
Key sizes: 3-key
CMAC
Cert. #5888
KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: AES with 128 bits
IEEE 802.11 Crypto API
AES
Cert. #5889 and
Cert. #4539
KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: AES-KW
Security Strengths: 128 bits
Note: AES-KW Cert. #5889 uses the AES Cert. #4539 from OpenSSL, which provides the
underlying KAT.
Table 17 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
DRBG Health
Checks
Performed conditionally per SP 800-90A-rev1 Section 11.3.
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the
NDRNG.
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Test Target Description
DRBG
Certs. #1496 and
#2450
DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
DSA
Certs. #1210 and
#1484
DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key pair generation.
RSA
Certs. #2471 and
#3085
RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
Firmware Load RSA 3072 / SHA-256 signature verification performed when firmware is loaded.
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5 Physical Security Policy
The module is encased in a metal enclosure, protected by a tamper-evident seal. Each form factor contains
one (1) seal, which is placed on the left side of the device in the factory (see Figures 2 and 3). Ensure the
seal is in-place at the location shown in the figures below, and that neither it nor the module enclosure
have been damaged. During operational usage, it is recommended to inspect the seal and enclosure once
every three months (Table 18). If the magnetometer (see Section 7) is active and calibrated, it is also
recommended to inspect the tamper seal if the magnetometer logs an event.
Figure 2 – Tamper Seal Location (Large Form Factor)
Figure 3 – Tamper Seal Location (Small Form Factor)
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Table 18 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper Evident Seal 3 months; whenever
magnetometer logs an event (if
active)
Verify that the tamper evident seal
placed on the side of the chassis is
intact and shows no sign of
delamination. See Figures 2 and 3
above for seal placement.
Module enclosure Same as above Verify that the module enclosure does
not show any sign of forced entry.
Verify that the black cover (reading
“MDS ORBIT MCR” or “MDS ORBIT
ECR”) has not been removed or
damaged.
If the above guidelines yield evidence of tamper, the Administrator should assume the module has been
physically compromised, perform zeroization, and take system-level precautions as needed (e.g., revoke
the trust of the module’s certificates on other systems).
6 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The
Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the
scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into
this module is out of the scope of this validation and will require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The unit contains a three-axis magnetometer that can be used to detect changes in the unit’s “magnetic
environment” after installation (e.g., if the module is moved such that local magnetic fields change, or if
a metal cabinet containing the Module is opened, or if the metal chassis of the Module itself is opened)
and generate notification of the change if it exceeds configurable thresholds.
This does not provide Level 3 physical security (e.g., tamper response) but can be used in conjunction with
the tamper evident seal to remotely detect and then locally verify that tamper has occurred.
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8 Security Rules and Guidance
The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 2
module.
1. The module provides five (5) distinct operator roles: Admin (CO), Tech, Oper (User), SNMP, and
Factory Reset.
2. The module provides a combination of role-based and identity-based authentication.
3. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle, as all session data is stored in volatile
memory (RAM and tmpfs).
4. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services aside from those allowed by IG 3.1.
5. The operator can command the module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling power or
resetting the module.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. Data output is logically
disconnected from the processes performing key generation. The network interface manager does
not start up interfaces until long after FIPS tests are complete.
8. The UI provides the control/status/data interface separation for all network interfaces. The console
port is a control interface except when the terminal server application has it in data mode.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the module.
10. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
11. The module supports concurrent operators.
12. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
13. The module does not support manual key entry.
14. The module does have external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
15. Plaintext CSPs can be entered into the module, but the module will not output them upon being
queried.
16. The module does not output intermediate key values.
17. The module limits the use of the same Triple-DES key to 220
encryptions, based on only using the
following IETF protocols, and 216
for non-IETF protocols. The user is responsible for ensuring the
module’s compliance.
a. SSH - RFC4251
b. SCEP - draft-nourse-scep-23
c. IPSec/IKE VPN - RFC6071, RFC2409 , RFC7296, RFC4307, RFC2451
18. The module supports communicating with a RADIUS server, which should be protected within an
IPSEC tunnel setup by the user.
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9 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 19 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
Table 20 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
ECR Edge Connect Router
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
HAB High Assurance Boot
KAT Known Answer Test
LN Licensed radio module
MCR Multiservice Connect Router
NX Unlicensed radio module
OTP One Time Password
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RP-SMA Reversed-Polarity SMA
SIM Subscriber Identification Module
SMA Sub-Miniature version A
TNC Threaded Neill-Concelman
USB Universal Serial Bus