© 2020 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation
Transceiver Cryptographic Module (TCM)
(Firmware Version: 0.1.L)
(Hardware Part/Version: C80101 Ver 2.0, PL-0021868 Ver 2.5, PL-0021868 Ver 3.0)
FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Document Version 1.4
Prepared by:
Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation
20430 Century Boulevard
Germantown, MD 20874
Phone: (240) 686-3300
Fax: (240) 686-3301
http://www.comtechmobile.com/
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Revision History
Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes
0.1 2009-06-29 David Wenzel Initial draft.
0.2 2009-07-28 David Wenzel Updated images of module. Added details for Crypto-
Officer setup and management of device.
0.3 2009-08-04 David Wenzel Changed from single-chip to multi-chip embedded
module; Added Software Erase service;
0.4 2009-09-01 David Wenzel Added Authenticated User role;
0.5 2009-09-14 David Wenzel Added hardware part/version info; Added information
on the epoxy covering;
0.6 2009-10-07 David Wenzel Updated firmware version number;
0.7 2009-11-07 David Wenzel Added Set Password services;
0.8 2009-11-18 David Wenzel Updates from Lab Comments
0.9 2010-01-14 David Wenzel Updated firmware version number;
1.0 2016-03-23 Chris Thorne Updated for changes in NIST requirements.
1.1 2016-04-18 Chris Thorne Addressed name and formatting issues.
1.2 2018-04-20 Cris Mamaril Updated Cover sheet and Sections 2.3 and 2.5
1.3 2018-04-23 Sathish Nath Updated Ver and Part numbers
1.4 2020-08-11 Sathish Nath Updated from Lab comments
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE.........................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 REFERENCES...................................................................................................................................................5
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ...........................................................................................................................5
2 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE (TCM)..............................................................................6
2.1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION ................................................................................................................................6
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES.....................................................................................................................................7
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES.....................................................................................................................................9
2.4.1 Normal User Role................................................................................................................................10
2.4.2 Authenticated User Role......................................................................................................................10
2.4.3 Crypto-Officer Role .............................................................................................................................11
2.4.4 Authentication Mechanism ..................................................................................................................11
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................12
2.5.1 Module Ver 2.0/2.5 ..............................................................................................................................12
2.5.2 Module Ver 3.0 ....................................................................................................................................12
2.5.3 Crypto Boundary .................................................................................................................................12
2.5.4 Differences between Ver 2.0 and Ver 2.5/3.0 ......................................................................................15
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................................15
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT..........................................................................................................15
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..................................................................................................................................................18
2.9 DESIGN ASSURANCE.....................................................................................................................................18
2.10 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.................................................................................................................18
3 SECURE OPERATION....................................................................................................................................19
3.1 CRYPTO-OFFICER GUIDANCE .......................................................................................................................19
3.1.1 Key Management .................................................................................................................................19
3.1.2 Management ........................................................................................................................................19
3.2 AUTHENTICATED USER GUIDANCE ..............................................................................................................19
3.3 GENERAL USER GUIDANCE ..........................................................................................................................19
4 ACRONYMS......................................................................................................................................................21
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BLOCK DIAGRAM.......................................................................6
FIGURE 2 – VER 2.0 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACE PADS ..........................................................8
FIGURE 3 – VER 2.5/3.0 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACE PADS ....................................................8
FIGURE 4 – VER 2.0/2.5 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE TOP VIEW .............................................................12
FIGURE 5 – VER 2.0/2.5 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SIDE VIEW ............................................................13
FIGURE 6 – VER 2.0 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOTTOM VIEW...........................................................13
FIGURE 7 – VER 2.5 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOTTOM VIEW............................................................13
FIGURE 8 – VER 3.0 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE TOP VIEW ...................................................................14
FIGURE 9 – VER 3.0 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SIDE VIEW ..................................................................14
FIGURE 10 – VER 3.0 TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOTTOM VIEW..........................................................14
FIGURE 11 - VER 2.5 AND VER 3.0 BACK SIDE PCB DIFFERENCES................................................................................15
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Table of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION...................................................................................................7
TABLE 2 – TRANSCEIVER CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PIN-OUT ......................................................................................9
TABLE 3 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACES ................................................................................................................9
TABLE 4 – MAPPING OF NORMAL USER SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS.......................10
TABLE 5 – MAPPING OF AUTHENTICATED USER SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS..........10
TABLE 6 – MAPPING OF CRYPTO-OFFICER SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS ..................11
TABLE 7 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS.................................................................................................................12
TABLE 8 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS.....................................17
TABLE 9 – ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................................................21
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Transceiver Cryptographic Module (TCM)
from Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation. This Security Policy describes how the Transceiver Cryptographic
Module meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 and how to run
the module in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of
the module.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 – Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information
about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at:
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
The Transceiver Cryptographic Module is referred to in this document as the Crypto Module, the cryptographic
module, or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
 The Comtech website (http://www.comtechmobile.com) contains information on the full line of products
from Comtech.
 The CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program) contains
contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document,
the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Machine
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary
to Comtech and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents,
please contact Comtech.
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2 Transceiver Cryptographic Module (TCM)
2.1 Overview
Comtech Mobile Datacom offers secure, real-time packet data messaging and position reporting services using L-
Band satellite networks. Comtech's technology allows government agencies to communicate accurately, securely,
and in a timely manner with vehicles through mobile satellite communications. This end-to-end satellite-based
solution includes earth stations located strategically around the world, leased satellite capacity, mobile terminals,
and tailored software solutions that meet and support Comtech’s clients' critical needs.
The Transceiver Cryptographic Module (TCM) is a compact hardware module with a firmware component for
implementation of cryptographic algorithms. The Crypto Module, in connection with Comtech’s ASDR
Transceiver, enables secure over-the-air communications. The module provides a serial interface for
communication over a pair of SPI ports.
2.2 Module Specification
The Crypto Module hardware consists of a 32-bit ARM processor and supporting components. A block diagram of
the module and interfaces is given in Figure 1 below, and the cryptographic boundary is depicted in this diagram.
Figure 1 – Transceiver Cryptographic Module Block Diagram
The module contains a single Printed Circuit Board (PCB) encased in epoxy. The following is a list of the key
circuit components and interfaces:
1. 32-bit ARM Processor: the processor contains firmware to control communication with external devices
and perform cryptographic functions.
2. SPI Ports: the Serial Peripheral Interface ports provide an interface with the Crypto Module for passing
data and control information.
3. GPIO Pins: the GPIO pins provide an interface for hand-shaking between the Crypto Module and external
devices.
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The Transceiver Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip embedded module that meets overall level 2 FIPS 140-2
requirements. The module is validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section levels:
Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)/
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
3
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module provides a serial interface to external devices over a pair of SPI buses. Application Programming
Interface (API) commands can be provided to the module using the serial interface. The interface consists of two
single direction SPI ports:
o SPI Port 0 provides a path for data to be sent to the Crypto Module
o SPI Port 1 provides a path to receive data from the Crypto Module
The module also provides access to a set of GPIO pins. These pins are primarily intended for hand-shaking with
external devices.
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Figure 2 – Ver 2.0 Transceiver Cryptographic Module Interface Pads
Figure 3 – Ver 2.5/3.0 Transceiver Cryptographic Module Interface Pads
The module’s physical interfaces are composed of connector pin pads, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. A subset of the
connector pins is used for providing data/control input or data/status output. The remaining pins are used to
interface with an external power source. Functions of active pins are listed in Table 2.
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Table 2 – Transceiver Cryptographic Module Pin-out
Pin Pin Description
1 3.3 V
2 3.3 V
3 1.8 V
4 1.8 V
5 Ground (GND)
6 GND
7 GND
8 GPIO 0
9 GPIO 1
10 SPI 0 CLK
11 SPI 0 MOSI
12 SPI 0 MISO
13 SPI 0 NSS
14 SPI 1 CLK
15 SPI 1 MISO
16 SPI 1 MOSI
17 SPI 1 NSS
18 GPIO 6 (not currently used)
19 GPIO 7 (not currently used)
20 CRYPTO RESET
21 GND
22 GND
23 GND
All of the physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in the
following table:
Table 3 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Transceiver Cryptographic Module Port/Interface
Data Input Pin 10, Pin 11, Pin 12, Pin 13
Data Output Pin 14, Pin 15, Pin 16, Pin 17
Control Input Pin 8, Pin 10, Pin 11, Pin 12, Pin 13, Pin 20
Status Output Pin 9, Pin 14, Pin 15, Pin 16, Pin 17
Power Pins 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 21, 22, 23
The module exposes pads for interface connections along the edges of the PCB, as shown in Figure 2. Several non-
sensitive signals are also exposed on the bottom and top edges of the PCB board. These exposed connections
already reference to pins and mappings discussed above. These include power interfaces (+1.8V, +3.3V and GND).
Additionally, connections do not have any signal present at all. All of these connections are not relevant to the
cryptographic module’s security since they are do not perform data input or data output. There are also no traces
that indicated the interconnection of parts of the module.
2.4 Roles and Services
The module supports role-based authentication. There are three roles in the module that operators may assume:
Normal User role, Authenticated User role, and Crypto-Officer (CO) role. The Normal User role is an
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unauthenticated role assumed by the end users for general device services. The Authenticated User role is an
authenticated role used for performing approved security functions, including encryption, decryption, and FIPS
algorithm testing. The Crypto-Officer role is an authenticated role used to perform administrative services on the
cryptographic key table. All users access the module via the SPI interfaces provided on the module. Locally, an
operator connects to the module as a Normal User first, and then enters a password to log in as an Authenticated
User or a Crypto-Officer.
2.4.1 Normal User Role
The Normal level user is an unauthenticated role which has access to the following services:
Table 4 – Mapping of Normal User Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of
Access
General
Information
Retrieves status information,
hardware and firmware version
information as well as the
Crypto Module serial number
Command Status output --
Authentication Current level of authentication;
if password, change access
level to an authenticated role
Command and
password
Authentication status;
Change in access level;
Password – Execute
Software Erase Erases application code image
from FLASH and reboots
module
Command Acknowledgment
output
--
Self-Test Perform a series of self-tests
including firmware integrity
and cryptographic Known
Answer Tests
Power off / Power on Status results --
2.4.2 Authenticated User Role
The Authenticated User is an authenticated role which has access to the following services:
Table 5 – Mapping of Authenticated User Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of
Access
General
Information
Retrieves status information,
hardware and firmware version
information as well as the
Crypto Module serial number
Command Status output --
Encryption Encrypts packet data Command and data Encrypted packet Traffic Keys – Execute
Decryption Decrypts packet data Command and data Decrypted plaintext Traffic Keys – Execute
FIPS test
algorithms
Perform FIPS tests Command and data Test result data --
Authentication Current level of authentication;
if password, change access
level to an authenticated role
Command and
password
Authentication status;
Change in access level;
Password – Execute
Set Password Changes Authenticated User
password
Command and
password
Set Password result Password – Read/Write
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Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of
Access
Software Erase Erases application code image
from FLASH and reboots
module
Command Acknowledgment
output
--
Self-Test Perform a series of self-tests
including firmware integrity
and cryptographic Known
Answer Tests
Power off / Power on Status results --
2.4.3 Crypto-Officer Role
Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto-Officer role are provided in the table below.
Table 6 – Mapping of Crypto-Officer Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of
Access
General
Information
Retrieves status information,
hardware and firmware version
information as well as the
Crypto Module serial number
Command Status output --
Encryption Encrypts packet data Command and data Encrypted packet Traffic Keys – Execute
Decryption Decrypts packet data Command and data Decrypted plaintext Traffic Keys – Execute
FIPS test
algorithms
Perform FIPS tests Command and data Test results --
Authentication Current level of authentication;
if password, change access
level to an authenticated role
Command and
password
Authentication status;
Change in access level
Password – Execute
Set Password Changes Authenticated User or
Crypto-Officer password
Command and
password
Set Password result Password – Read/Write
Software Erase Erases application code image
from FLASH and reboots
module
Command Acknowledgment
output
--
Self-Test Perform a series of self-tests
including firmware integrity
and cryptographic Known
Answer Tests
Power off / Power on Status results --
Key Management Add or delete keys from the
table of cryptographic keys
Command and data Acknowledgement Security Keys – Execute
Traffic Keys – Execute
Traffic Keys – Write
2.4.4 Authentication Mechanism
All users access the module through directly connected SPI ports. Authenticated Users and Crypto-Officers
authenticate themselves using passwords.
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Table 7 – Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication Type Strength
Passwords The minimum length of the password is six alphanumeric characters with any printable symbols.
Assuming only 94 characters with repetition, the chance of a random attempt falsely succeeding is 1 in
(946
=) 689,869,781,056. Due to the interface speed of the module (115,200 bps), less than 144,000
authentication attempts could be performed within one-minute. This means there would still be a less
than 2.08e-7 chance of such an attack working if repeated over one-minute.
2.5 Physical Security
The Transceiver Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module contained on a single PCB.
There are three versions of the module. Ver. 2.0 and Ver 2.5, whose top half is encased in epoxy, and Ver. 3.0,
whose top half is enclosed with an injection molded polycarbonate cover permanently attached to the PCB using 3M
™ Very High Bond (VHB) adhesive.
2.5.1 Module Ver 2.0/2.5
The epoxy cover used in Ver 2.0/2.5 is resistant to probing and is opaque within the visible spectrum. More
information on the epoxy characteristics can be found in the Technical Data sheet for the 3M Epoxy Potting
Compound DP270. The tamper-evident epoxy is applied by Comtech before providing the module to the Crypto-
Officer. The module has been designed to satisfy level 2 physical security requirements.
2.5.2 Module Ver 3.0
Ver 3.0 employs an injection molded polycarbonate cover permanently attached using 3M Very High Bond (VHB)
adhesive. The 3M product was selected due to its shear strength properties. With this specialty adhesive, it would
take 238 pounds of force to detach the cover from the PCB. Furthermore, tamper evident tape is utilized in two
locations to provide an additional layer of tamper evidence. The cover is resistant to probing and is opaque within
the visible spectrum. More information on 3M VHB characteristics can be found in the 3M 4936 VHB Technical
Data sheet. The tamper-evident cover and tape are applied by Comtech before providing the module to the Crypto-
Officer. The module has been designed to satisfy level 2 physical security requirements.
2.5.3 Crypto Boundary
The cryptographic boundary is defined as encompassing the “top,” “front,” “left,” “right,” “rear,” and “bottom”
surfaces of module. Figures 3, 4, and 5 show top, side, and bottom views of an epoxy encased Crypto Module while
Figures 6,7, and 8 show respective views of a module utilizing the polycarbonate cover and tamper-evident tape.
Figure 4 – Ver 2.0/2.5 Transceiver Cryptographic Module Top View
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Figure 5 – Ver 2.0/2.5 Transceiver Cryptographic Module Side View
Figure 6 – Ver 2.0 Transceiver Cryptographic Module Bottom View
Figure 7 – Ver 2.5 Transceiver Cryptographic Module Bottom View
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Figure 8 – Ver 3.0 Transceiver Cryptographic Module Top View
Figure 9 – Ver 3.0 Transceiver Cryptographic Module Side View
Figure 10 – Ver 3.0 Transceiver Cryptographic Module Bottom View
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The module conforms to the Electromagnetic Interference/ Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) requirements
specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, and
Class B (for home use).
2.5.4 Differences between Ver 2.0 and Ver 2.5/3.0
There are two differences between Module Ver 2.0 and Ver 2.5/3.0
1) 1M bias resistor changed to 10K on a crystal oscillator for improved oscillator reliability
2) Layout changes to improve power distribution on +1.8V and +3.3V rails. +3.3V converted from a PCB
trace to a high capacitance island to improve noise immunity.
The visible layout changes are shown in Figure 9.
Figure 11 - Ver 2.5 and Ver 3.0 Back side PCB differences
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment requirements do not apply to the Transceiver Cryptographic Module, because the
module does not provide a general-purpose operating system (OS) to the user. The OS is not externally accessible
and only the module’s custom written firmware provides a logical interface into the module. The module provides a
method to update the firmware in the module only while operating in a non-FIPS mode.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The cryptographic module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
 AES – CBC; 128, 192, and 256
 AES – CFB; 128, 192, and 256
 Triple-DES – CBC; Keying option 1, encrypt/decrypt
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 SHA-1 Byte oriented
 SHA-256 Byte oriented
 HMAC SHA-11
 HMAC SHA-256
AES Certificate #1201; Triple-DES Certificate #869; SHS Certificate #1106 & HMAC Certificate #698.
The cryptographic module implements the following non-FIPS-approved algorithms:
 Digital Encryption Standard (DES)
 Triple DES – CBC, Keying option 2 (2-key Triple DES)
 Towitoko MAC algorithm
The module supports the critical security parameters found in Table 8.
1
Key lengths that are less than 112 bits (14 bytes) in length cannot be used for HMAC SHA-1 in FIPS mode, except
for legacy-use HMAC-SHA-1 verification.
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Table 8 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
DES Traffic Keys Triple-DES 192-bit
CBC key
Generated externally;
input in plaintext
Never output from
module
Stored in RAM in
plaintext
Erasing from RAM Encrypts/decrypts
traffic data
AES Traffic Keys AES 128, 192, and 256-
bit CBC and CFB keys
Generated externally;
input in plaintext
Never output from
module
Stored in RAM in
plaintext
Erasing from RAM Encrypts/decrypts
traffic data
Security Keys AES 256-bit CFB keys Generated externally;
hardcoded in
application
Never output from
module
Stored in Flash in
plaintext
Erasing flash image Decrypts traffic keys
Passwords Authenticated User and
Crypto-Officer
passwords
Generated externally;
defaults hardcoded in
application; new values
input in plaintext
Never output from
module
Stored in Flash in
plaintext
Erasing flash image Authenticates users
Note: Keys and CSPs used in the FIPS Approved mode may not be used in the non-Approved mode, and vice versa.
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2.7.1.1 Key Generation
All keys are generated externally to the module.
2.7.1.2 Key Storage
All Traffic keys are stored in RAM in plaintext along with pre-computed subkeys. Security keys and the
authentication passwords are stored in Flash in plaintext.
2.7.1.3 Key Entry and Output
Security Keys and the default passwords are hardcoded in the application firmware. Traffic Keys are loaded into the
module’s RAM electronically over the SPI interface. Traffic keys are sent in plaintext2
. The module does not
support the output of cryptographic keys or CSPs.
2.7.1.4 Key Zeroization
Traffic Keys are zeroized by erasing from RAM. All other keys and CSPs are zeroized by erasing the Flash image.
2.8 Self-Tests
The Transceiver Cryptographic Module performs the following self-tests at power-up:
 Software integrity check using Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)-32 checksum
 Known Answer Tests (KATs)
o Triple-DES-CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
o AES-CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
o AES-CFB encrypt/decrypt KAT
o SHA-1 HMAC KAT
o SHA-256 HMAC KAT
If any of the above self-tests fail, the module sends a failure response on the serial port and the module locks down.
Otherwise, a success indicator message is posted on the serial port.
2.9 Design Assurance
The source code is primarily written in C. Comtech uses Borland StarTeam to perform source code versioning and
management.
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate other attacks.
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3 Secure Operation
The Transceiver Cryptographic Module meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe
how to place and keep the module in FIPS-approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto-Officer Guidance
The module is available directly from Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation and is shipped via a third party
shipping company, such as FedEx or UPS. The module, sealed with an anti-static bag, is provided in a carton. The
Crypto-Officer must inspect the box, packing materials, and module for signs of tamper, including damage to the
box, packing materials, or the module itself. If any signs of tamper are evident, the module should not be utilized
and instead should be returned to Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation. The Crypto-Officer (CO) is responsible
for key management and maintenance in the FIPS mode of operation.
3.1.1 Key Management
After physically installing the module on the Host, the Crypto-Officer must initialize the module with cryptographic
key data. The Crypto Module comes preloaded with all necessary firmware components, and when powered on, the
module will jump to the main application code and enter FIPS mode. The Crypto-Officer should confirm successful
boot-up by verifying the Power-Up message sent back to the Host from the module.
The module does not initially contain any traffic key data. To load traffic keys, the CO must first authenticate using
the Crypto-Officer password. After authentication, the CO will be able to load traffic keys to the Crypto Module
key table using API commands. When all necessary keys have been loaded, the Crypto-Officer should terminate the
authenticated session.
3.1.2 Management
The Crypto-Officer manages the traffic keys in the Crypto Module key table. The CO should add and remove keys
as required of the device. To manage the key table, the CO must begin an authenticated session using the Crypto-
Officer password. Care should be taken to protect all sensitive key and password information.
The module operates within FIPS mode whenever it enters the main application firmware. To clear the module into
a non-FIPS device, the main application code must be erased using the appropriate API command. New application
firmware can only be loaded to the module from a boot loader in this non-FIPS state.
3.2 Authenticated User Guidance
Authenticated Users have access to approved security functions but do not have the ability to configure sensitive
information on the module. Authenticated Users should be careful not to provide traffic key information to other
parties.
The module operates within FIPS mode whenever it enters the main application firmware. Once an operator has
performed the Software Erase command, the module is no longer operating in a FIPS mode.
3.3 General User Guidance
Normal Users do not have the ability to perform approved security functions or configure sensitive information on
the module. All users should be careful, however, not to provide sensitive device information to other parties.
The module operates within FIPS mode whenever it enters the main application firmware and the operator only uses
FIPS approved algorithms, meaning the use of DES, 2-Key Triple-DES or Towitoko MAC is not allowed in the
approved mode of operation. To clear the module into a non-FIPS device, the main application code must be erased
using the appropriate API command. New application firmware can only be loaded to the module from a boot
loader in this non-FIPS state.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.4 August 11, 2020
Comtech Transceiver Cryptographic Module Page 20 of 21
© 2020 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
The user is responsible for ensuring that the module limits the use of any single Triple-DES key to less than 2^16
encryptions before the key is changed.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.4 August 11, 2020
Comtech Transceiver Cryptographic Module Page 21 of 21
© 2020 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
4 Acronyms
Table 9 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
API Application Programming Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto-Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS Operating System
PCB Printed Circuit Board
RF Radio Frequency