FEITIAN Technologies Company, LTD
ePass Token
Hardware Version: 1.0.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 3
Document Version: 1.0
Prepared for: Prepared by:
FEITIAN Technologies Company, LTD Corsec Security, Inc.
Floor 17th, Tower B, Huizhi Mansion
No.9 Xueqing Road
Haidian District, Beijing 100085
China
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway
Suite 220
Fairfax, Virginia 22033
United States of America
Phone: +(86) 010-62304466 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
Email: world.sales@ftsafe.com Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.FTSafe.com http://www.corsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................3
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................3
1.2 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................................3
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................................3
2 EPASS TOKEN........................................................................................................................4
2.1 OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................................4
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................5
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ..........................................................................................................................................6
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES...........................................................................................................................................7
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role.................................................................................................................................................9
2.4.2 User Role................................................................................................................................................................14
2.4.3 Additional Services...............................................................................................................................................17
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY...........................................................................................................................................19
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................19
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................20
2.8 EMI/EMC............................................................................................................................................................28
2.9 SELF-TESTS ..........................................................................................................................................................28
2.9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................28
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests.........................................................................................................................................28
2.10 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................28
3 SECURE OPERATION .........................................................................................................29
3.1 DETECTING A FIPS CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ............................................................................................29
3.2 INITIAL SETUP......................................................................................................................................................30
3.2.1 Zeroization ............................................................................................................................................................30
3.3 NON-APPROVED MODE ...................................................................................................................................30
4 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................31
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – FEITIAN'S EPASS TOKEN.....................................................................................................................................4
FIGURE 2 – PHYSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY ..........................................................................................................6
FIGURE 3 - "FIPS" LABEL LOCATION ................................................................................................................................... 29
FIGURE 4 - "FIPS-MODE-DETECT" TOOL........................................................................................................................... 29
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .........................................................................................................4
TABLE 2 – OPERATOR AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM......................................................................................................7
TABLE 3 – APDU COMMAND STRUCTURE...........................................................................................................................8
TABLE 4 – APDU COMMAND RESPONSE STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................8
TABLE 5 – MAPPING OF CRYPTO-OFFICER ROLE’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS...9
TABLE 6 – MAPPING OF USER ROLE’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS...................... 14
TABLE 7 – MAPPING OF UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS ........ 18
TABLE 8 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS .......................................................................................... 20
TABLE 9 – FIPS-ALLOWED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS ........................................................................................... 20
TABLE 10 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS .............................. 21
TABLE 11 – NON-APPROVED SERVICES .............................................................................................................................. 30
TABLE 12 – ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................................ 31
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the ePass Token from FEITIAN
Technologies Company, LTD. This Security Policy describes how the ePass Token meets the security
requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S.
and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS
140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) Cryptographic Module Validation
Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This
policy was prepared as part of the Level 3 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The ePass Token is
referred to in this document as ePass Token, crypto-module, or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS
140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
• The FEITIAN website (http://www.ftsafe.com) contains information on the full line of products
from FEITIAN.
• The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm)
contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the
module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Model document
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security,
Inc. under contract to FEITIAN. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS
140-2 Submission Package is proprietary to FEITIAN and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact FEITIAN.
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2 ePass Token
2.1 Overview
FEITIAN is a leading innovator of smart card and Chip Operating System (COS) based security
technologies and applications. Their product offerings include devices that provide software protection,
strong authentication, and smart card operating systems. Evidence of FEITIAN’s continued leadership and
innovation is demonstrated within this Security Policy, which specifies their second FIPS 140-2 validated
cryptographic module. This new module, referred to as the ePass Token, is a USB1
token containing
FEITIAN’s own FEITIAN-FIPS-COS cryptographic operating system. The FEITIAN-FIPS-COS (FIPS
140-2 Certificate #1927) is embedded in an ST23YT66 Integrated Circuit (IC) chip and has been developed
to support FEITIAN’s ePass USB token (Figure 1). The ePass token is designed to provide strong
authentication and identification and to support network login, secure online transactions, digital signatures,
and sensitive data protection. FEITIAN’s ePass token guarantees safety of its cryptographic IC chip and
other components with its hard, semi-transparent, polycarbonate shell.
Figure 1 – FEITIAN's ePass Token
The ePass Token is validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section levels (Table 1):
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 3
1
USB – Universal Serial Bus
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Section Section Title Level
5 Physical Security 3
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 3
8 EMI/EMC2
3
9 Self-tests 3
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.2 Module Specification
The ePass Token is a hardware module with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The overall security
level of the module is 3. The logical and physical cryptographic boundaries of the ePass Token are defined
by the hard, semi-transparent, polycarbonate casing of the USB token. The ePass Token is comprised of a
STMicroelectronics ST23YT66 serial access microcontroller sitting atop a Printed Circuit Board (PCB).
The PCB carries the signals and instructions of the microcontroller to the other components contained
within the ePass Token. All cryptographic functions and firmware are stored within the microcontroller
package and executed by an 8/16-bit ST23 CPU (Core Processing Unit). An LED3
contained within the
USB token shows power, initialization, and operation status through the semi-transparent casing of the
USB token. All other logical functions take place through the USB connector, covered in Section 2.3 of
this document. Please refer to Figure 2 below for a depiction of the physical cryptographic boundary and
logical flows of the ePass Token.
2
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
3
LED – Light Emitting Diode
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Figure 2 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The ePass Token is shipped in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation, as indicated on the module and will
always operate in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. Section 3 details how to tell if the module is a FIPS
module and is running in a FIPS approved mode of operation. Section 2.7 gives a complete list of FIPS-
Approved algorithms within the module.
2.3 Module Interfaces
The cryptographic boundary of the ePass token is the outer polycarbonate casing of the USB token. There
is only one physical point, the USB connector, at which the module interfaces with equipment outside of
the physical boundary. The USB connector facilitates the following logical interfaces:
• Data Input
• Data output
• Control Input
• Status Output
• Power
The USB connector contains 4 pins: Data+ (D+), Data- (D-), VCC4
, and Ground (GND). These 4 pins
carry out the logical interfaces as defined by FIPS 140-2 and are described below:
- The D+ and D- pins carry all Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, and Status Output signals to
and from the module.
- The VCC pin handles up to 5V5
DC6
power input from whatever source the USB connector is
plugged into.
4
VCC – Common Collector Voltage
5
V - Volt
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- The GND pin also handles up to 5V DC power and helps to regulate the power consumed by the
USB token.
An LED contained within the USB token is used for status output. This LED shows power, initialization,
and operational status through the semi-transparent casing of the USB token.
2.4 Roles and Services
The module supports the two roles required by FIPS 140-2: Crypto-Officer and User. The Crypto-Officer
is the role responsible for module initialization, including file system management, key management, and
access control management. The User role is the everyday user of the device. Once authenticated, the
Crypto-officer and User role is implicitly selected, allowing the operator to access services from both roles.
Please see Table 2 for details regarding the authentication mechanism. Table 5 and Table 6 below specify
the full list of services per supported role. Unauthenticated services are also supported by the module. The
services not requiring authentication are listed in Table 7.
Table 2 – Operator Authentication Mechanism
Authentication
Mechanism
Authentication Data Authentication Mechanism
Identity-based 128-bit AES7
Key Shared Secret The AES key is 128 bits in length. The
probability that a random attempt will
succeed or a false acceptance occur is
no greater than 1/2^128, which is less
than 1/1,000,000.
The module will allow fewer than 600
authentication attempts in a one minute
period. Therefore, the random success
rate for multiple retries is 600/2^128,
which is less than 1/100,000.
Identity-based 3-key Triple-DES Shared Secret Each Triple-DES key is effectively 56
bits in length, resulting in a total of 168
bits of total keying material. The
probability that a random attempt will
succeed or a false acceptance occur is
no greater than 1/2^168, which is less
than 1/1,000,000.
The module will allow fewer than 600
authentication attempts in a one minute
period. Therefore, the random success
rate for multiple retries is 600/2^168,
which is less than 1/100,000.
6
DC – Direct Current
7
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
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Authentication
Mechanism
Authentication Data Authentication Mechanism
Identity-based RSA Key Pairs The modules supports RSA public key
authentication. Using conservative
estimates and equating a 2048-bit RSA
key to an 112-bit symmetric key, the
probability for a random attempt to
succeed is 1/2112
The module will allow fewer than 600
authentication attempts in a one minute
period. Therefore, the random success
rate for multiple retries is 600/2^112,
which is less than 1/100,000.
All services provided by ePass Token are implemented in accordance with ISO8
/IEC9
7816-4, which
defines the interface available as a command and response pair referred to as an Application Protocol Data
Unit (APDU). The module will process only one command at a time, per channel (of four available logical
channels), and must process and respond before allowing another command to be processed over any given
channel. Table 3 and Table 4 show a typical ADPU command structure and command response structure
used by the module, respectively.
Table 3 – APDU Command Structure
Header Lc Field Data Field Le Field
CLA INS 1 byte Input Data (1 or 3 bytes) 1 byte
ADPU command structure descriptions:
• CLA – The Class byte indicates the class of the command as follows:
o If the class of the command is inter-industry or not
o If secure messaging is required
o Logical channel 0-3
• INS – The Instruction byte indicates the command to process as follows:
o Command word
o Data encoding
• Lc – Length in bytes of the data field
• Data Field – Data input with command for processing
• Le – Maximum number of bytes expected in the response
Table 4 – APDU Command Response Structure
Data Field Trailer
Response data Status bytes
ADPU command response structure descriptions:
• Data Field – Data output, if applicable
• Trailer – Status bytes (e.g. 9000, 64XX)
8
ISO – International Organization for Standardization
9
IEC – International Electrotechnical Commission
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2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role
This section provides a list of all services accessible to a Crypto-Officer (Table 5). The list includes a full
description of each service, and in addition, it describes the type of access that each service has to a CSP10
.
NOTE:
• R – Read: The CSP is read.
• W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
• X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
Table 5 – Mapping of Crypto-Officer Role’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of
Access
Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Read Binary B0 Allows read access to a
binary file. A binary file is
a file whose content is a
sequential string of bits.
• Offset address of
the binary file to
read
• Length of the data
to be read
• File data or
“Nonexistent”
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Update Binary D6 Allows write access to a
binary file.
• Offset address of
the binary file to
read
• Length of the data
to be read
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Read Record B2 Allows read access to a
record. A record is a
type of data storage
structure as defied within
ISO 7816. Records are
stored in files.
• Record number
• Read parameter
(i.e, all records
starting at
specified record
number, or just
one record)
• Record data or
“Nonexistent”
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Update
Record
DC Allows write access to a
record.
• Record number
• Length of record
• Record data
• Read parameter
(i.e, update the
record specified by
the record
number)
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
10
CSP – Critical Security Parameter
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Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Append
Record
E2 Allows a record to be
appended
• Record number
• Current file
• Length of record
• Record data
• Read parameter
(i.e, update the
record specified by
the record
number)
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
External
Authenticate
82 Authenticates an external
entity to the
cryptographic module.
This service may also be
used to both authenticate
and initiate a secure
session with an external
entity.
NOTE: Prerequisite to
this service is the use of
Get Challenge service.
The key as referenced
within the service call
exists under the current
file.
• Initiate a secure
session:
• Authentication
data of external
entity (32 bytes)
plus the MAC11
(8
bytes)
Or
• Authenticate only:
• Algorithm type
(AES, Triple-DES12
,
RSA13
)
• Key ID (Key
Index)
• Length of data in
the field
• Authentication
data (data field)
• Status (e.g. 9000)
• Retry number for
the referenced key
incremented by
one.
NOTE: If successful, this
number is then reset to the
maximum.
Initiate a secure session:
• INIT_KEYenc: R, X
• INIT_KEYmac: R, X
• Kenc: R, X
• Kmac: R, X
• KSenc: W
• KSmac :W
Or
Authenticate Only:
• Symmetric key: R,
X
• RSA Private Key:
R, X
Internal
Authenticate
88 Authenticates the
cryptographic module to
an external entity
NOTE: In order for this
service to be utilized, the
external entity must have
privileged access to the
referenced key.
• Algorithm type
(AES,Triple-DES,
RSA)
• Key ID (Key
Index)
• Length of data in
the field
• Random data (data
field)
• Authentication data
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
Authenticate Only:
• Symmetric key: R,
X
• RSA Private Key:
R, X
11
MAC – Message Authentication Code
12
DES – Data Encryption Standard
13
RSA – Rivest, Adleman, and Shamir
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Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Verify 20 Provides PIN14
verification.
NOTE: In order for this
service to be utilized, the
external entity must have
privileged access to the
referenced PIN.
• Reference to the
PIN
• PID15
• Data to be verified
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
• PIN: R, X
Change
Reference
Data
24 Modify the PIN
NOTE: In order for this
service to be utilized the
external entity must have
privileged access to the
referenced PIN.
• Old PIN
• New PIN
• Reference to the
PIN
• PID
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
• PIN: R, W, X
Enable
Verification
Requirement
28 Modifies a PIN’s state
from invalid to valid.
NOTE: Utilization of this
service requires
permission to activate the
PIN.
• Reference to the
PIN
• PID
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Disable
Verification
Requirement
26 Modifies a PINs state
from valid to invalid.
NOTE: Utilization of this
service requires
permission to invalidate
the PIN.
• Reference to the
PIN
• PID
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Reset Retry
Counter
2C Resets the retry counter
of the PIN to its initial
value.
NOTE: Utilization of this
service requires
permission to modify
PIN.
• Reset parameter
(resets recount
maximum number
and remaining
count to default)
• Restore parameter
(restores recount
to initial default
value)
• Reference to PIN
• PID
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
14
PIN – Personal Identification Number
15
PID – Personal Identification number index
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Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Generate
Asymmetric
Key Pair
46 Generates an
Asymmetric key pair
• Key parameter
information
• Algorithm ID
• Modulus Length
• Private Key File
Identifier (FID)
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
• RSA Private Key:
W
• RSA Public Key: W
• DRBG16
Seed:
R,W, X
Encrypt 2A Performs an encrypt
operation using an
Approved security
function.
NOTE: The MSE service
must have previously
been utilized to choose
the algorithm and key for
the security operation.
• Plaintext data • Ciphertext data
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
• Symmetric key: R,
X
• RSA Public Key: R,
X
Decrypt 2A Performs a decrypt
operation
NOTE: The MSE service
must have previously
been utilized to choose
the algorithm and key for
the security operation.
• Ciphertext • Plaintext • Symmetric key: R,
X
• RSA Private Key:
R, X
Verify Digital
Signature
2A Verifies a digital signature
using RSA PKCS17
#1
• Data Object of the
signed data plus
the digital
signature
• Status of the
verification
• RSA Private Key:
R, X
Compute
Digital
Signature
2A Computes a digital
signature using RSA
PKCS#1.
• Input data for
generating the
digital signature
• Digital Signature • RSA Public Key: R,
X
Verify
Cryptographic
Checksum
2A Performs AES or Triple-
DES checksum
verification.
• Plaintext data
object plus the
cryptographic
checksum data
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300)
• Symmetric Key: R,
X
Compute
Cryptographic
Checksum
2A Computes an AES or
Triple-DES checksum.
The length of the
checksum is 8 bytes.
• The data used to
compute the
cryptographic
checksum
• Cryptographic
checksum
• Symmetric Key: R,
X
16
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
17
PKCS - Public-Key Cryptography Standards
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Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Create File E0 Creates a file • File control
parameters (data
field)
• Length of data field
• Status (e.g. 9000) No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Delete File E4 Deletes a file and all files
which exist within that
file
• File ID • Status (e.g. 9000) No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Terminate
Card
FE Terminates all
applications on the card
• None • None No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Install Secret E3 This service is used to
enter AES keys, Triple-
DES keys, and PINs. The
keys which may be
entered are as follows:
• Kenc
• Kmac
• Internal Auth
key
• External Auth
key
• Symmetric Key
• PIN
• Encrypted PIN or
Key data
• “Final” secret or
“Not Final” secret
flag
• Status (eg. 9000,
6700, 6982, 6986,
6A8, 6A82, 6B00,
6CXX)
• Kenc : W
• Kmac : W
• Internal Auth key:
W
• External Auth key:
W
• Symmetric Key: W
• PIN: W
Update Key E5 Allows the updating of
the INIT_KEYs or secret
file keys.
• INIT_KEYs
• Secret Key data
• New error
counter plus the
key value
• Status (eg. 9000,
6700, 6982, 6986,
6A8, 6A82, 6B00,
6CXX)
• Symmetric Key: W
• INIT_KEYenc : W
• INIT_KEYmac: W
• Kenc : W
• Kmac : W
• Internal Auth key:
W
• External Auth key:
W
Get File List 34 Allows the reading of the
FID list of child files of
the current file.
• None • FID list or
“Nonexistent”
• Status (eg. 9000,
6700, 6982, 6986,
6A8, 6A82, 6B00,
6CXX)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
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Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Read Public
Key
B4 Allows the output of a
public key
• FID of the public
key
• Public Key
component read
parameter (Read
all component,
read E component,
or read N
component)
• Public Key data or
“Nonexistent”
• Status (eg. 9000,
6700, 6982, 6986,
6A8, 6A82, 6B00,
6CXX)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Import RSA
Key
E7 Allows the input of an
RSA key.
• Encrypted key data
• FID of the RSA
Key
• Status (eg. 9000,
6700, 6982, 6986,
6A8, 6A82, 6B00,
6CXX)
• RSA key pair: W
2.4.2 User Role
This section provides a list of all services accessible to a User (Table 6). The list includes a full description
of each service and, in addition, it describes the type of access that each service has to CSPs.
NOTE:
• R – Read: The CSP is read.
• W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
• X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
Table 6 – Mapping of User Role’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Read Binary B0 Allows read access
to a binary file.
• Offset address of the
binary file to read
• Length of the data to
be read
• File data or
“Nonexistent”
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
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Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Read Record B2 Allows read access
to a record.
• Record number
• Read parameter (i.e,
all records starting at
specified record
number, or just one
record)
• Record data or
“Nonexistent”
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
External
Authenticate
82 Authenticates an
external entity to
the cryptographic
module. This
service may also be
used to both
authenticate and
initiate a secure
session with an
external entity.
NOTE: Prerequisite
to this service is the
use of Get
Challenge service.
The key as
referenced within
the service call
exists under the
current file.
• Initiate a secure
session:
• Authentication data
of external entity (32
bytes) plus the MAC
(8 bytes)
Or
• Authenticate only:
• Algorithm type (AES,
Triple-DES, RSA)
• Key ID (Key Index)
• Length of data in the
field
• Authentication data
(data field)
• Status (e.g. 9000)
• Retry number for
the referenced key
incremented by one.
NOTE: If successful this
number is then reset to the
maximum.
Initiate a secure session:
• Kenc: R, X
• Kmac: R, X
• KSenc: W
• KSmac :W
Or
Authenticate Only:
• Symmetric key: R,
X
• RSA Private Key: R,
X
Internal
Authenticate
88 Authenticates the
cryptographic
module to an
external entity.
NOTE: In order for
this service to be
utilized the external
entity must have
privileged access to
the referenced key.
• Algorithm type (AES,
Triple-DES, RSA)
• Key ID (Key Index)
• Length of data in the
field
• Random data (data
field)
• Authentication data
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
• Symmetric key: R,
X
• RSA Private Key: R,
X
Verify 20 Provides PIN
verification.
NOTE: In order for
this service to be
utilized the external
entity must have
privileged access to
the referenced PIN.
• Reference to the PIN
• PID
• Data to be verified
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
• PIN: R, X
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Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Change
Reference
Data
24 Modifies the PIN.
NOTE: In order for
this service to be
utilized the external
entity must have
privileged access to
the referenced PIN.
• Old PIN
• New PIN
• Reference to the
password
• PID
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
• PIN: R, W, X
Reset Retry
Counter
2C Resets the retry
counter of the PIN
to its initial value.
NOTE: Utilization
of this service
requires permission
to modify PIN.
• Reset parameter
(resets recount
maximum number
and remaining count
to default)
• Restore parameter
(restores recount to
initial default value)
• Reference to PIN
• PID
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Generate
Asymmetric
Key Pair
46 Generates an
asymmetric key pair.
• Key parameter
information
• Algorithm ID
• Modulus Length
• Private Key File
Identifier (FID)
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
• RSA Private Key:
W
• RSA Public Key: W
• DRBG Seed: R,W,
X
Encrypt 2A Performs an encrypt
operation using an
Approved security
function.
NOTE: The MSE
service must have
previously been
utilized to chose the
algorithm and key
for the security
operation.
• Plaintext data • Ciphertext data
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
• Symmetric key: R,
X
• RSA Public Key: R,
X
Decrypt 2A Performs a decrypt
operation.
NOTE: The MSE
service must have
previously been
utilized to chose the
algorithm and key
for the security
operation.
• Ciphertext • Plaintext • Symmetric key: R,
X
• RSA Private Key: R,
X
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Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Verify Digital
Signature
2A Verifies a digital
signature using RSA
PCKS#1.
• Data Object of the
signed data plus the
digital signature
• Status of the
verification
• RSA Public Key: R,
X
Compute
Digital
Signature
2A Computes a digital
signature using RSA
PCKS#1.
• Input data for
generating the digital
signature
• Digital Signature • RSA Private Key: R,
X
Verify
Cryptographic
Checksum
2A Performs and AES
or Triple-DES
checksum
verification.
• Plaintext data object
plus the
cryptographic
checksum data
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300)
• Symmetric Key: R,
X
Compute
Cryptographic
Checksum
2A Performs an AES or
Triple-DES
checksum. The
length of the
checksum is 8 bytes.
• The data used to
compute the
cryptographic
checksum
• Cryptographic
checksum
• Symmetric Key: R,
X
Get File List 34 This command is
used to read the
FID list of child files
of the current file.
• None • FID list or
“Nonexistent”
• Status (eg. 9000,
6700, 6982, 6986,
6A8, 6A82, 6B00,
6CXX)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Read Public
Key
B4 Allows the output
of a public key.
• FID of the public key
• Public Key
component read
parameter (Read all
component, read E
component, or read
N component)
• Public Key data or
“Nonexistent”
• Status (eg. 9000,
6700, 6982, 6986,
6A8, 6A82, 6B00,
6CXX)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Import RSA
Key
E7 Allows the input of
an RSA key.
• Encrypted key data
• FID of the RSA Key
• Status (eg. 9000,
6700, 6982, 6986,
6A8, 6A82, 6B00,
6CXX)
• RSA key pair: W
2.4.3 Additional Services
The module provides a limited amount of services for which the operator does not have to assume an
authorized role. Table 7 provides the list of services for which the operator is not required to assume an
authorized role. The list includes a full description of each service and, in addition, it describes the type of
access that each service has to CSPs. None of the services listed in the table disclose cryptographic keys
and CSPs or otherwise affect the security of the module
NOTE:
• R – Read: The CSP is read.
• W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
• X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or allowed security function or authentication
mechanism.
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Table 7 – Mapping of Unauthenticated Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of
Access
Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Put Data DA Allows data to be
received and stored
by the cryptographic
module. In the Put
Data service, only
the OEM
information is
allowed to be set.
• Data object tag (‘81’
which indicates OEM
info, followed by up
to 32 bits of OEM
info.
• Length of object data
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Get Data CA This service allows
data to be retrieved.
Data refers to global
data, which belongs
to the cryptographic
module, such as the
serial number, OEM
information, chip
information which
includes algorithm
support, RAM size.
• Data object tag (e.g.,
‘80’ which indicates
card serial number)
• Content of object
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Get Challenge 84 Requests a random
value that will be
used as a challenge
within the External
Authenticate
service.
• None • Random value
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
• DRBG Key Value:
R, W, X
• DRBG ’V’ Value: R;
W, X
Manage
Security
Environment
(MSE)
22 Prepares the
cryptographic
module for the
subsequent
commands, SET,
STORE, RESTORE,
SEID, and ERASE.
• CRDO19
• Algorithm Reference
• Key Reference
• File Reference
• Length of CRDOs
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6300, 62CX, 6581,
6700, 6982, 6984,
6A81, 6A2, 6A86,
6A88)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Select A4 Allows the selection
of a specified file.
• File identifier
• Dedicated file Name
• File path starting at
master file
• File path starting at
dedicated file
• File control
information
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
19
CRDO – Control Reference Data Object
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Service INS Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Manage
Channel
70 Allows the
assignment; opening,
and closing of a
logical channel. A
logical channel is a
logical link between
the host system and
a file on the smart
card.
• Number of logical
channel to be
assigned, opened, or
closed (01-03).
• Status (e.g. 9000,
6283, 6284, 6A80,
6A81, 6A82, 6A86,
6A87)
No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
Hash 2A Performs a hash
using SHA20
-1 or
SHA-256.
• Input data • Hash result or None No CSPs are accessed via
this service.
2.5 Physical Security
The ePass Token is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-2 and is
designed to meet Level 3 physical security requirements.
The ePass Token is a made of a completely hardened, production-grade polycarbonate. The colored
polycarbonate obscures a clear view of the hardware components within. There is a removable cap that
reveals the plastic USB connector and a hard, non-malleable metal casing surrounding the USB connector.
The USB connector is made of hard production-grade, black plastic.
The coloring of the module obscures any visible writing on the PCB. The visible critical components
within the module are further covered to meet FIPS 140-2 level 3 physical security requirements. The
ST23YT66 microcontroller is covered with a black, opaque, tamper-resistant, epoxy encapsulate, thus
completely covering all critical cryptographic components from plain view. All other non-critical viewable
components are unmarked and unidentifiable. The USB connector located outside of the plastic casing of
the USB token is made of a hardened, production grade plastic and prevents access to the rest of the USB
token.
Any attempt at removal or penetration of the plastic enclosure has a high probability of causing serious
damage to the module and the hardware components within the enclosure, which will reveal clear tamper
evidence. Removal of the metal surrounding the USB connector will result in the physical damage of the
USB connector and its associated pins, rendering the entire cryptographic module useless. If the USB
connector is exposed, there is no power going to the USB token. Once power is removed from the
cryptographic module, all plaintext keys and unprotected CSPs are zeroized.
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment for the ePass Token includes the ST23YT66 microcontroller containing an
8/16-bit ST23 CPU. The token’s operational environment is non-modifiable and does not possess a general
purpose operating system.
20
SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
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2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms show in Table 8:
Table 8 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm Certificate
Number
AES in ECB21
, CBC22
modes using 128-bit key sizes 1473
Triple-DES in ECB, CBC modes using Keying Option 1 991
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation– using 2048-bit keys 720
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification – using 1024- and 2048-
bit keys
720
ANSI23
X9.31 Key Pair Generation 720
SHA-1 and SHA-256 1332
SP24
800-90 CTR25
_DRBG 58
Caveat:
Additional information concerning SHA-1 and specific guidance on transitions to the use of stronger
cryptographic keys and more robust algorithms is contained in NIST Special Publication 800-131A.
Table 9 lists the non-Approved algorithms implemented in the module which are allowed in a FIPS-
Approved mode of operation.
Table 9 – FIPS-Allowed Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm
Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG)
RSA PKCS#1v1.5 2048-bit (Key establishment methodology provides
112 bits of security; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption
strength)
21
ECB – Electronic Codebook
22
CBC – Cipher-Block Chaining
23
ANSI – American National Standards Institute
24
SP – Special Publication
25
CTR - Counter
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The module supports the critical security parameters (CSPs) listed below in Table 10. Internally generated keys are generated following scenario 1 of
Implementation Guidance number 7.8.
Table 10 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type Use
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization
Key To
Entity
Symmetric Key AES 128-bit
key; Triple-
DES 168-bit
Key
These keys are
used to
encrypt/decrypt
data, or within
a symmetric
MAC algorithm
to generate
authentication
data.
Generation:
This key is not
generated
within the
module.
Input: This key
may be input
encrypted
within a secure
channel.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
These keys are
stored in
EEPROM26
in
special files
used to store
symmetric keys
and PINs.
Procedurally
overwrite keys
with arbitrary
data using the
Update Key
service.
Storage: 4-bit
key ID
Input/Output:
This key is
associated with
the Crypto-
Officer role
during Input.
Internal Auth
Key
AES 128-bit
key; Triple-
DES 168-bit
Key
These keys are
used to
authenticate
the module to
an external
entity.
Generation:
This key is not
generated
within the
module.
Input: This key
may be input
encrypted
within a secure
channel.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
These keys are
stored in
EEPROM in
special files
used to store
symmetric keys
and PINs.
Procedurally
overwrite keys
with arbitrary
data using the
Update Key
service.
Storage: 4-bit
key ID
Input/Output:
This key is
associated with
the Crypto-
Officer role
during Input
26
EEPROM - Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
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Key Key Type Use
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization
Key To
Entity
External Auth
Key
AES 128-bit
key; Triple-
DES 168-bit
Key; RSA
2048-bit key
These keys are
used to modify
the security
state of the
currently
selected DF27
.
Generation:
This key is not
generated
within the
module.
Input: This key
may be input
encrypted
within a secure
channel.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
These keys are
stored in
EEPROM in
special files
used to store
symmetric keys
and PINs.
Procedurally
overwrite keys
with arbitrary
data using the
Update Key
service.
Storage: 4-bit
key ID
Input/Output:
This key is
associated with
the Crypto-
Officer role
during Input
INIT_KEYenc AES 128-bit
key
This key is used
to derive a
session key
which is then
used to
encrypt/decrypt
data over a
secure session
between an
authorized
external entity
and the
module.
Generation:
This key is not
generated
within the
module. It is a
factory-set key
which is used
only in the
initialized state
of the module.
Input: This key
is factory-set
and cannot be
modified or
input outside of
manufacturing.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
This key is
stored under
in the reserved
file in
EEPROM.
Procedurally
overwrite key
with arbitrary
data using the
Update Key
service.
Storage: 4-bit
key ID
Input/Output:
N/A
27
DF – Dedicated File
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Key Key Type Use
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization
Key To
Entity
INIT_KEYmac AES 128-bit
key
This key is used
to derive a
session key
which is then
used to
authenticate an
operator or
data over a
secure session
between an
authorized
external entity
and the
module.
Generation:
This key is not
generated
within the
module. It is a
factory-set key
which is used
only in the
initialized state
of the module.
Input: This key
is factory-set
and cannot be
modified or
input outside of
manufacturing.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
This key is
stored under
in the reserved
file in
EEPROM.
Procedurally
overwrite keys
with arbitrary
data using the
Update Key
service.
Storage: 4-bit
key ID
Input/Output:
N/A
Kenc AES 128-bit
key
This key is used
to derive a
session key
which is then
used to
encrypt/decrypt
data over a
secure session
between an
authorized
external entity
and the
module.
Generation:
This key is not
generated
within the
module.
Input: This key
may be input
encrypted
within a secure
channel.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
These keys are
stored index
0x00 of the
currently
selected DF.
Procedurally
overwrite keys
with arbitrary
data using the
Update Key
service.
Storage: 4-bit
key ID
Input/Output:
N/A
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Key Key Type Use
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization
Key To
Entity
Kmac AES 128-bit
key
This key is used
to derive a
session key
which is then
used to
authenticate an
operator or
data over a
secure session
between an
authorized
external entity
and the
module.
Generation:
This key is not
generated
within the
module.
Input: This key
may be input
encrypted
within a secure
channel.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
These keys are
stored index
0x00 of the
currently
selected DF.
Procedurally
overwrite keys
with arbitrary
data using the
Update Key
service.
Storage: 4 bit
key ID
Input/Output:
N/A
KSenc AES 128-bit
key
This key is used
to
encrypt/decrypt
data over a
secure session.
Generation:
Generated from
the INIT_KEYenc
or Kenc key as
part of the
Secure Channel
Protocol v01 as
specified within
Global Platform
v2.1.
Input: This key
cannot be input.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
Stored in
module RAM.
Power cycle
the module.
Storage: This
key is
associated with
a logical
channel ID (0-
3) for which it
is being used
to secure
messaging.
Input/Output:
N/A, this key is
not output
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Key Key Type Use
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization
Key To
Entity
KSmac AES 128-bit
key
This key is used
to authenticate
data over a
secure session.
Generation:
Generated from
the
INIT_KEYmac or
Kmac key as part
of the Secure
Channel
Protocol v01 as
specified within
Global Platform
v2.1.
Input: This key
cannot be input.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
Stored in
module RAM.
Power cycle
the module.
Storage: This
key is
associated with
a logical
channel ID (0-
3) for which it
is being used
to secure
messaging.
Input/Output:
N/A, this key is
not output
Personal
Identification
Number (PIN)
6-16 byte
secret
This key is used
to modify the
security state
of the currently
selected DF.
Generation:
This key is not
generated
within the
module.
Input: This key
may be input
encrypted
within a secure
channel.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
EEPROM in
plaintext
Procedurally
overwrite keys
with arbitrary
data using the
Update Key
service.
Storage: 4-bit
key ID
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Key Key Type Use
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization
Key To
Entity
RSA Private
Key
2048-bit RSA
private key
This key is used
to decrypt or
verify data.
Generation:
This key is
generated using
the Approved
SP800-90
DRBG.
Input: This key
may be input
encrypted
within a secure
channel.
N/A: The
module does
not support
the output of
this key.
EEPROM in
plaintext
Procedurally
overwrite keys
with arbitrary
data using the
Import RSA
Key service.
Storage: 4-bit
File ID
NOTE: Only
one RSA
Private key
may be stored
in an RSA
Private Key
file.
RSA Public Key 2048-bit RSA
public key
This key is used
to encrypt or
sign data.
Generation:
This key is
generated using
the Approved
SP800-90
DRBG.
Input: This key
may be input
encrypted
within a secure
channel.
Output in
plaintext using
the Read
Public key
command.
EEPROM in
plaintext
N/A: this key is
a public key
and therefore
does not have
to be zeroized.
Storage: 4-bit
File ID
NOTE: Only
one RSA Public
key may be
stored in an
RSA Public Key
file.
DRBG ‘V’
Value
Internal CTR
DRBG state
value
Used for SP
800-90
CTR_DRBG
Internally
Generated
Never Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power Cycle Associated
with an
internal
module
variable
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Key Key Type Use
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization
Key To
Entity
DRBG Key
Value
Internal CTR
DRBG state
value
Used for SP
800-90
CTR_DRBG
Internally
Generated
Never Plaintext in
volatile
memory
Power Cycle Associated
with an
internal
module
variable
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2.8 EMI/EMC
The ePass Token conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations,
Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B (i.e., for home use).
2.9 Self-Tests
Self-tests are performed by the ePass Token when running in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The
module will run power-up self-tests when first powered up. The module will run conditional self-tests
before a random number is generated or when signing and verifying data.
The module supports only one error condition, referred to as the FIPS Error State. Any failure of a FIPS
self-test will cause the module to enter the FIPS error state, which does not allow for any data output and/or
cryptographic service usage. If an operator attempts to utilize any module services, the service will not be
invoked and status output will be provided via the return value of the APDU. The status output provided in
the APDU response packet will be ‘6F 00’. In order to transition out of the FIPS error state, the module
must be power-cycled.
2.9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The ePass Token performs the following self-tests at power-up:
• Cryptographic Known Answer Tests (KATs)
• AES Encrypt KAT
• AES Decrypt KAT
• Triple-DES Encrypt KAT
• Triple-DES Decrypt KAT
• SHA-1 KAT
• SHA-256 KAT
• RSA signature generation/verification KAT
• DRBG KAT
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous Random Number Generator test for both the NDRNG and the SP800-90 DRBG.
• RSA pairwise consistency test for sign/verify and encrypt/decrypt
2.10Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module is not intended to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2
Level 3 requirements for this validation.
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3 Secure Operation
The ePass Token meets Level 3 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place
and keep the module in FIPS-approved mode of operation.
3.1 Detecting a FIPS Cryptographic Module
The Feitian ePass Token is shipped as a FIPS token that is already operating in a FIPS-approved mode of
operation. It is not possible to change the configuration of the token to operate outside of its shipped
configuration. To determine if the token is a FIPS token, the Cryptographic Officer should check for a
laser-etched “FIPS” on the token casing, located at the top of the token near the USB connector. Please
refer to Figure 3 for the location of the “FIPS” label.
Figure 3 - "FIPS" Label Location
Another way to determine whether the ePass Token is a FIPS token is by executing the supplied “FIPS-
Mode-Detect” tool. After inserting the module into an available USB slot, start up the tool and hit the
“Detect” button. If the tool reports “FIPS”, that means the module is configured to operate as a FIPS token.
See Figure 4 for a screen shot of the “FIPS-Mode-Detect” tool.
Figure 4 - "FIPS-Mode-Detect" Tool
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3.2 Initial Setup
The module is delivered with a pair of AES Keys (INIT_KEYenc and INIT_KEYmac) to allow authentication
and secure initialization of the module. All communications to initialize the module will require a secure
session using this key pair which will encrypt and authenticate all data input.
For additional information regarding module initialization, please refer to the ePass Token User Manual.
3.2.1 Zeroization
In the case that zeroization is required, the Crypto-Officer shall obtain possession of the module and then
maintain sole physical possession of the cryptographic module until all keys have been zeroized. The
Crypto-Officer performs zeroization by procedurally overwriting all of the keys with arbitrary data using
the Update Key service.
3.3 Non-Approved Mode
The ePass Token ships as a FIPS module and is meant to always operate in FIPS-Approve mode of
operation. The module provides access to non-Approved security functions which use non-Approved
algorithms and key sizes. Use of these services transitions the module to the non-Approved mode through
the duration of the service being performed. Table 11 lists the non-Approved services and associated
algorithms and key sizes.
Table 11 – Non-Approved Services
Non-Approved Service Algorithm
Signature Generation RSA 1024-bit
SHA-1
Encryption/Decryption Triple-DES (2-key)
Key Establishment RSA 1024-bit
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4 Acronyms
Table 12 defines the acronyms used in this Security Policy.
Table 12 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption System
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLA Class Byte
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
COS Chip Operating System
CPU Core Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CRDO Control Reference Data Objects
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
DC Direct Current
DES Digital Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FID File Identification
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
IC Integrated Circuit
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
INS Instruction Byte
ISO International Organization for Standardization
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Acronym Definition
KAT Known Answer Test
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
MSE Manage Security Environment
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
PCB Printed Circuit Board
PID Personal Identification number index
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Special Publication
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
USB Universal Serial Bus
V Volt
VCC Common Collector Voltage
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