THALES

Ezio PKI Card

FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy Level 2

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References

Acronym	Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2]	NIST, *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*, May 25, 2001
[GlobalPlatform]	*GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.1.1,* March 2003, http://www.globalplatform.org *GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.1.1* Amendment A, March 2004 *GlobalPlatform Consortium: GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.2* Amendment D, Sept 2009
[ISO 7816]	ISO/IEC 7816-1: 1998 *Identification cards -- Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts -- Part 1: Physical characteristics* ISO/IEC 7816-2:2007 *Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 2: Cards with contacts -- Dimensions and location of the contacts* ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006 *Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 3: Cards with contacts -- Electrical interface and transmission protocols* ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 *Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange*
[JavaCard]	*Java Card 2.2.2 Runtime Environment (JCRE) Specification* *Java Card 2.2.2 Virtual Machine (JCVM) Specification* *Java Card 2.2.2 Application Programming Interface* *Java Card 3.0.1 Application Programming Interface [only for algos ECDSA, SHA2]* Published by Sun Microsystems, March 2006
[SP800-131A]	*Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths*, January 2011
[ANS X9.31]	American Bankers Association, *Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA)*, ANSI X9.31-1998 - Appendix A.2.4.
[SP 800-67]	NIST Special Publication 800-67, *Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher*, version 1.2, July 2011
[FIPS 197]	NIST, *Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)*, FIPS Publication 197, November 26, 2001.
[PKCS#1]	*PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard*, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002
[FIPS 186-4]	NIST, *Digital Signature Standard (DSS)*, FIPS Publication 186-4, July 2013 (DSA2, RSA2 and ECDSA2)
[SP 800-56A]	NIST Special Publication 800-56A, *Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography*, March 2007
[FIPS 180-4]	NIST, *Secure Hash Standard*, FIPS Publication 180-4, August 2015
[AESKeyWrap]	NIST, *AES Key Wrap Specification*, 16 November 2001. This document defines symmetric key wrapping.
[IG]	NIST, *Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program,* last updated 29 June 2012.
[SP 800-90A]	NIST, *Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators*, Special Publication 800-90A, January 2012.
[SP 800-108]	NIST, *Recommendation for Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions,* Special Publication 800-108, October 2009.

Table 1 – References

Acronyms and definitions

Acronym	Definition
GP	Global Platform
CVC	Card Verifiable Certificate
MMU	Memory Management Unit
OP	Open Platform
RMI	Remote Method Invocation

Table 2 – Acronyms and Definitions

1 Introduction

This document defines the Security Policy for the Thales TOPDLv2.1 and the ID Prime MD applet (IAS Classic V4.3.6.A) card called Ezio PKI Card and herein denoted as the Cryptographic Module. The Cryptographic Module or CM, validated to FIPS 140-2 overall Level 2, is a secure controller module implementing the Global Platform operational environment, with Card Manager, the IDPrime MD applet (associated to MSPNP applet V1.2).

The CM is a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The CM includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:

Security Requirement	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	3
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
EMI/EMC	3
Self-Tests	2
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	2

Table 3 – Security Level of Security Requirements

The Module is the physical boundary of the single chip, which provides a Global Platform JavaCard operational environment. The Module is a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS140-2 definitions.

The CM implementation is compliant with:

- [ISO 7816] Parts 1-4
- [JavaCard]

- [GlobalPlatform]

1.1 IDPrime MD Applet

IDPrime MD Applet (called IAS Classic V4.3.6A) is a Java applet that provides all the necessary functions to integrate a smart card in a public key infrastructure (PKI) system, suitable for identity and corporate security applications. It is also useful for storing information about the cardholder and any sensitive data. IDPrime MD Applet implements state–of–the–art security and conforms to the latest standards for smart cards and PKI applications. It is also fully compliant with digital signature law.

The IDPrime MD Applet, designed for use on JavaCard 2.2.2 and Global Platform 2.1.1 compliant smart cards.

The main features of IDPrime MD Applet are as follows:

- Digital signatures—these are used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of a message. (RSA, ECDSA)
- Storage of sensitive data based on security attributes
- PIN management.
- Secure messaging based on the AES algorithms.
- Public key cryptography, allowing for RSA keys and ECDSA keys
- Storage of digital certificates—these are issued by a trusted body known as a certification authority (CA) and are typically used in PKI authentication schemes.
- CVC verification
- Decryption RSA, ECDH
- On board key generation (RSA, ECDSA)
- Mutual authentication between IDPrime MD Applet and the terminal (ECDH)
- Support of integrity on data to be signed.
- Secure Key Injection according to Microsoft scheme.
- Touch Sense feature (not available on smart card, only on Token)
- PIN Single Sign On (PIN SSO)
- PINPad Firewall enforcement

MSPNP applet is associated to IDPrime MD applet and offers:

- GUID tag reading, defined in Microsoft Mini Driver specification.

2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

2.1 Hardware and Cryptographic Physical Boundary

The *Module* is designed to be embedded into plastic card body, passport, USB key, secure element etc., with a contact plate connection and/or RF antenna. The physical form of the *Module* is depicted in Figure 1 (to scale). The red outline depicts the physical cryptographic boundary, representing the surface of the chip and the bond pads. The cross-hatching indicates the presence of the hard opaque outer layer shielding. In production use, the *Module* is wire-bonded to a frame connected to a contact plate (pads CLK, RST, VDD, I/O and VSS) and/or to an RF antenna (pads LA and LB), enclosed in epoxy and mounted in a card body. The *Module* relies on [ISO 7816] and/or [ISO 14443] card readers as input/output devices.



Figure 1 - Physical form and Cryptographic Boundary (P60D144)

Contact No.	Description	Logical interface type
VCC	Supply voltage	Power
RST	Reset signal	Control in
CLK	Clock signal	Control in
GND	Ground	Power
I/O	Input/output	Data in, data out, control in, status out
LA	LA (Antenna coil connection)	Power, Data in, Data out, Control in, Status out
LB	LB (Antenna coil connection)	Power, Data in, Data out, Control in, Status out

Table 4 – Module Physical Ports and Corresponding Logical Interfaces

For contact interface operation, the *Module* conforms to [ISO 7816] part 1 and part 2. The electrical signals and transmission protocols follow the [ISO 7816] part 3. The conditions of use are the following:

Conditions	Range
Voltage	3 V and 5.5 V
Frequency	1MHz to 10MHz

Table 5 - Voltage and Frequency Ranges

For contactless interface operation, the *Module* conforms to [ISO 14443] part 1 for physical connections, and to [ISO 14443] parts 2, 3 and 4 for radio frequencies and transmission protocols. The external antenna loop required for contactless operation is outside the module cryptographic boundary.

The conditions of use are the following:

Conditions	Range
Supported bit rate	106 Kbits/s, 212 Kbits/s, 424 Kbits/s, 848 Kbits/s
Operating field	Between 1.5 A/m and 7.5 A/m rms
Frequency	13.56 MHz +- 7kHz

3 Cryptographic Module Specification

3.1 Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary

Figure 2 - Module Block Diagram below depicts the Module operational environment and applets.



Figure 2 - Module Block Diagram

The Card Manager (CM) supports [ISO7816] T=0 and T=1 and (for contactless mode and dual mode) [ISO14443] T=CL communication protocols.

The CM provides services to both external devices and internal applets as the IDPrime MD.

Applets, as IDPrime MD, access module functionalities via internal API entry points that are not exposed to external entities. External devices have access to CM services by sending APDU commands.

The CM provides an execution sandbox for the IDPrime MD Applet and performs the requested services according to its roles and services security policy.

The CM inhibits all data output via the data output interface while the module is in error state and during self-tests.

The *JavaCard API* is an internal interface, available to applets. Only applet services are available at the card edge (the interfaces that cross the cryptographic boundary).

The *Javacard Runtime Environment* implements the dispatcher, registry, loader, logical channel and RMI functionalities.

The *Virtual Machine* implements the byte code interpreter, firewall, exception management and byte code optimizer functionalities.

The *Card Manager* is the card administration entity – allowing authorized users to manage the card content, keys, and life cycle states.

The *Memory Manager* implements services such as memory access, allocation, deletion, garbage collector.

The *Communication* handler implements the ISO 7816 and ISO 14443 communications protocols in contactless mode and dual mode.

The *Cryptography Libraries* implement the algorithms listed in Section 2.

3.2 Versions and mode of operation

Hardware: NXP P60D144P VA (MPH149)
Firmware: TOPDLV2.1 (Filter04), IDPrime MD Applet version V4.3.6.A and MSPNP Applet V1.2

The Module implements only an Approved mode of operation, as delivered from the manufacturing environment. The explicit indicator of FIPS mode is available using the *Module Information* service (specifically, the GET DATA command with tag 0103). The *Module* responds with a multi-byte data set; the most significant bit of the 5th byte set to 1 is the explicit indicator of the FIPS approved mode.

Specifically, the first five bytes will be:

B0 84 49 53 **81** (represented in hexadecimal with the 5th byte shown in bold red font)

Where the 5th byte is **1**000 0001 (represented in binary, with FIPS Approved mode indicator in bold red font).

The **IDPrime MD Applet** is identified with an applet version and a software version as follow:

Field	CLA	INS	P1-P2 (Tag)	Le (Expected response length)	Purpose
Value	00	CA	DF-30	07	Get Applet Version
			7F-30	19	Get Software Version

Table 6 – Applet Version and Software Version imput data

The Applet version is returned without any TLV format as follows:

IDPrimeMD– Applet Version Data (tag DF30)	
Value	**Value Meaning**
34 2E 33 2E 36 2E 41	Applet Version Display value = '4.3.6.A'

Table 7 –Applet Version returned value

The Software Version is returned in TLV format as follows:

IDPrimeMD– Software Version Data (tag 7F30)					
Tag	**Length**				
7F30	17				
		Tag	**Length**	**Value**	**Value meaning**
		C0	0E	34 2E 33 2E 36 2E 41	Software Version Display value = '4.3.6.A'
		C1	07	49 41 53 20 43 6C 61 73 73 69 63 20 76 34	Applet Label Display value = 'IAS Classic v4'

Table 8 –Software Version Returned Values

3.3 Cryptographic Functionality

The Module implements the *FIPS Approved* cryptographic functions listed in the following table:

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
AES	[FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm. The Module supports 128-, 192- and 256-bit key lengths with ECB and CBC modes.	3543
AES CMAC	[SP 800-38D] The Module supports 128-, 192- and 256-bit key lengths.	3543
CKG	[SP 800-133] §6: Asymmetric (FIPS 186-4, SP800-56A) §7: Symmetric (Direct output from DRBG) Note: The resulting symmetric key or generated seed is an unmodified output from a DRBG.	Vendor Affirmed
CVL (ECC CDH)	[SP 800-56A] The Section 5.7.1.2 ECC CDH Primitive using the NIST defined curves: P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521.	597
CVL (RSASP1)	[FIPS 186-4] [PKCS#1 v2.1] RSA signature generation primitive using 2048-bit keys.	815
CVL (RSADP)	[SP 800-56B] RSA key decryption primitive using 2048-bit keys.	834
DRBG	[SP 800-90A] Deterministic Random Bits Generator (CTR-DRBG based on AES 128 without derivation function).	900
ECDSA	[FIPS 186-4] Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm: signature generation, verification and key pair generation. The Module supports the P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 NIST Elliptic Curves. P-192 EC is not used by the Module.	721
KDF AES CMAC	[SP 800-108] The Module supports 128-, 192- and 256-bit key.	85
KTS	[SP800-38F] Symmetric Key wrapping using 128-, 192-, or 256-bit keys (based on AES and AES CMAC Cert. #3543), meets the SP800-38F §3.1 ¶3. Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.	3543
KTS	SP 800-56B Key wrapping using 2048-bit keys. Key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength. Vendor affirmed, based on OAEP scheme as described in SP800-56B for PKCS1 v2.1. (Unwrapped output provided under Secure Messaging)	Vendor Affirmed
RSA	FIPS 186-4] RSA signature generation, verification, and key pair generation. The Module supports PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS with 2048-bit key.	1822
RSA CRT	FIPS 186-4] RSA signature generation, verification, CRT key pair generation. The Module supports PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS with 2048-bit key	1823
SHS-1 SHS-2	[FIPS 180-4] Secure Hash Standard compliant one-way (hash) algorithms. The Module supports the SHA-1 (160-bits), SHA-2 (224-bit, 256-bit, 384-bit, 512-bit) variants.	2921
Triple-DES	[SP 800-67] Triple Data Encryption Algorithm. The Module supports the 3-Key options; CBC and ECB modes. Note that the Module does not support a mechanism that would allow collection of plaintext / ciphertext pairs aside from authentication, limited in use by a counter. Note, however, the number of encryption options using the same key is limited to 2^16. It is the responsibility of the user to ensure this limit is not exceeded.	1984

Table 9 – FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm	Description
EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement *	Non SP 800-56A compliant - key agreement using NIST defined, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves. Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
NDRNG	Used to initialize the CTR DRNG - True Random Number Generator. Provides at least 128 bits of entropy.

Table 10 – Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions

* ECC CDH component is implemented in the platform and validated as CVL Cert. #597. The ID Prime applet uses that component to perform the full key agreement and is the only cryptographic functionality implemented in the applet.

The CM includes an uncallable DES implementation. This algorithm is not used and no security claims are made for its presence in the Module.

FIPS approved security functions used specifically by the **IDPrime MD Applet** are:

- **DRBG**
- **AES CMAC**
- **AES**
- **RSA**
- **ECDSA**
- **SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512**
- **ECC-CDH**

(Note: no security function is used in **MSPNP applet**)

4 Module Critical Security Parameters

All CSPs used by the CM are described in this section. All usages of these CSPs by the CM are described in the services detailed in Section 5.

4.1 Platform Critical Security Parameters

Key	Description / Usage
OS-DRBG-EI-KEY	AES-128 random key generated by the card during startup is used as a entropy input for the [SP800-90A] DRBG implementation.
OS-DRBG-STATE	16-byte AES state V and 16-byte AES key used in the [SP800-90A] CTR DRBG implementation.
OS-GLOBALPIN	6 to 16 byte Global PIN value. Character space is not restricted by the module.
OS-MKDK	AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) key used to encrypt OS-GLOBALPIN value
SD-KENC	AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) encryption master key used to derive SD-SENC
SD-KMAC	AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) Security Domain MAC master key, used derive SD-SMAC
SD-KDEK	AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) Security Domain Sensitive data decryption key.
SD-SENC	AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) Security Domain Session decryption key used to decrypt secure channel messages.
SD-SMAC	AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) Security Domain Session MAC key, used to verify secure channel message integrity.
SD-SDEK	AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) Session DEK key used by the CO role to decrypt CSPs.
DAP-SYM	AES-128/192/256 (SCP03) key optionally loaded in the field and used to verify the MAC of packages loaded into the Module.

Table 11 - Platform Critical Security Parameters

Keys with the “SD-“ prefix pertain to a Global Platform Security Domain key set. The module supports the Issuer Security Domain at minimum, and can be configured to support Supplemental Security Domains.

4.2 IDPrime MD Applet Critical Security Parameters

Key	Description / Usage
IAS-SC-SMAC-AES	AES 128/192/256 Session key used for Secure Messaging (MAC)
IAS-SC-SENC-AES	AES 128/192/256 Session key used for Secure Messaging (Decryption)
IAS-AS-RSA	2048- private part of the RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Signature
IAS-AS-ECDSA	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDSA key pair used for Asymmetric signature
IAS-AC-RSA	2048- private part of the RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Cipher (key wrap, key unwrap)
IAS-ECDH-ECC	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDH key pair used for shared key mechanism
IAS-KG-AS-RSA	2048- private part of the RSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric signature
IAS-KG-AS-ECDSA	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric signature
IAS-KG-AC-RSA	2048- private part of the RSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric cipher (key wrap, key unwrap)
IAS-KG-AC-ECDH	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDSA generated key pair used for shared key mechanism
IAS-ECDSA-AUTH-ECC	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 private part of the ECDSA private key used to Authenticate the card
IAS-SC-DES3	3-Key Triple-DES key used for authentication.
IAS-SC-P-SKI-AES	AES 128/192/256 Session key used for Secure Key Injection
IAS-SC-T-SKI-AES	AES 128/192/256 Session key used for Secure Key Injection
IAS-SC-PIN-TDES	3-Key Triple-DES key used for PIN encryption (PIN History)
IAS-OWNERPIN	4 to 64 byte PIN value managed by the Applet.

Table 12 – IDPrime MD Applet Critical Security Parameters

4.3 IDPrime MD Applet Public Keys

Key	Description / Usage
IAS-KA-ECDH	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 ECDH key pair used for Key Agreement (Session Key computation)
IASAS-CA-ECDSA-PUB	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 CA ECDSA Asymmetric public key entered into the module used for CA Certificate Verification.
IASAS-IFD-ECDSA-PUB	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 IFD ECDSA Asymmetric public key entered into the module used for IFD Authentication.
IAS-AS-RSA-PUB	2048- public part of RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Signature
IAS-AS-ECDSA-PUB	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of ECDSA key pair used for Asymmetric signature
IAS-AC-RSA-PUB	2048 public part of the RSA key pair used for Asymmetric Cipher (key wrap, key unwrap)
IAS-ECDH-ECC-PUB	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of the ECDH key pair used for shared key mechanism
IAS-KG-AS-RSA-PUB	2048- public part of the RSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric signature
IAS-KG-AS-ECDSA-PUB	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of the ECDSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric signature
IAS-KG-AC-RSA-PUB	2048- public part of the RSA generated key pair used for Asymmetric cipher (key wrap, key unwrap)
IAS-KG-AC-ECDH-PUB	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of the ECDSA generated key pair used for shared key mechanism
IAS-ECDSA-AUTH-ECC-PUB	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 public part of the ECDSA key pair used to Authenticate the card

Table 13 – IDPrime MD Applet Public Keys

5 Roles, Authentication and Services

Table 15 lists all operator roles supported by the Module. This Module does not support a maintenance role. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle. The Module supports GP logical channels, allowing multiple concurrent operators. Authentication of each operator and their access to roles and services is as described in this section, independent of logical channel usage. The Module supports identity-based authentication methods. Only one operator at a time is permitted on a channel. Applet de-selection (including Card Manager), card reset or power down terminates the current authentication; re-authentication is required after any of these events for access to authenticated services. Authentication data is encrypted during entry (by SD-SDEK), is stored encrypted (by OS-MKDK) and is only accessible by authenticated services.

Role ID	Role Description
CO	(Cryptographic Officer) This role is responsible for card issuance and management of card data via the Card Manager applet. Authenticated using the SCP authentication method with SD-SENC.
IUSR	(User) The IDPrime MD User, authenticated by the IDPrime MD applet – see below for authentication mechanism.
ICAA	(Card Application Administrator) The IDPrime MD Card Application Administrator authenticated by the IDPrime MD applet – see below for authentication mechanism.
UA	Unauthenticated role

Table 14 - Role Description

5.1 Secure Channel Protocol (SCP) Authentication

The Open Platform Secure Channel Protocol authentication method is performed when the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE service is invoked after successful execution of the INITIALIZE UPDATE command. These two commands operate as described next.

The SD-KENC and SD-KMAC keys are used along with other information to derive the SD-SENC and SD-SMAC keys, respectively. The SD-SENC key is used to create a cryptogram; the external entity participating in the mutual authentication also creates this cryptogram. Each participant compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram and if this succeeds, the two participants are mutually authenticated (the external entity is authenticated to the Module in the CO role).

For SCP03, AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 keys are used for Global Platform secure channel operations, in which the Module derives session keys from the master keys and a handshake process, performs mutual authentication, and decrypts data for internal use only. The Module encrypts a total of one block (the mutual authentication cryptogram) over the life of the session encryption key; no decrypted data is output by the Module. AES key establishment provides a minimum of 128 bits of security strength. The Module uses the SD-KDEK key to decrypt critical security parameters, and does not perform encryption with this key or output data decrypted with this key.

The strength of GP mutual authentication relies on AES key length, and the probability that a random attempt at authentication will succeed is:

- $\left(\frac{1}{2^{128}}\right)$ for AES 16-byte-long keys;
- $\left(\frac{1}{2^{192}}\right)$ for AES 24-byte-long keys;
- $\left(\frac{1}{2^{256}}\right)$ for AES 32-byte-long keys;

Based on the maximum count value of the failed authentication blocking mechanism, the minimum probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is 255/2^128.

5.2 IDPrime MD User Authentication

This authentication method compares a PIN value sent to the Module to the stored PIN values if the two values are equal, the operator is authenticated. This method is used in the IDPrime MD Applet services to authenticate to the IUSR role.

The module enforces string length of 4 bytes minimum (16 bytes maximum) for the Global PIN and 8 bytes for the Session PIN.

For the Global PIN, an embedded PIN Policy allows at least a combination of Numeric value (‘30’ to ‘39’) or alphabetic upper case (‘A’ to ‘Z’) or alphabetic lower case (‘a’ to z’), so the possible combination of value for the Global PIN is greater than 10^6. Then the strength of this authentication method is as follow:

- The probability that a random attempt at authentication will succeed is lower than 1/10^6
- Based on a maximum count of 15 for consecutive failed service authentication attempts, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is lower than 15/10^6

5.3 IDPrime MD Card Application Administrator Authentication (ICAA)

a) **The 3-Key Triple-DES key** establishment provides 168 bits of security strength. The Module uses the IAS-SC-DES3 to authenticate the ICAA role.

- The probability that a random attempt at authentication will succeed is 1/2^64 (based on block size)
- Based on the maximum count value of the failed authentication blocking mechanism, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is 255/2^64

b) PIN Authentication

This authentication method compares a PIN value sent to the Module to the stored OWNERPIN values if the two values are equal, the operator is authenticated. This method is used in the IDPrime MD Applet services to authenticate the ICAA role.
The module enforces string length of 4 bytes minimum (64 bytes maximum).
An embedded PIN Policy allows at least a combination of Numeric value (‘30’ to ‘39’) or alphabetic upper case (‘A’ to ‘Z’) or alphabetic lower case (‘a’ to z’), so the possible combination of value for the Global PIN is greater than 10^6. Then the strength of this authentication method is as follows:

- The probability that a random attempt at authentication will succeed is lower than1/10^6

- Based on a maximum count of 15 for consecutive failed service authentication attempts, the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one minute period is lower than 15/10^6

5.4 Platform Services

All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. Each service description also describes all usage of CSPs by the service.

Service	Description
Card Reset (Self-test)	Power cycle the Module by removing and reinserting it into the contact reader slot, or by reader assertion of the RST signal. The *Card Reset* service will invoke the power on self-tests described in Section §10-Self-test. Moreover, on any card reset, the Module overwrites with zeros the RAM copy of, OS-DRBG-STATE, SD-SENC, SD-SMAC and SD-SDEK. The Module can also write the values of all CSPs stored in EEPROM as a consequence of restoring values in the event of card tearing or a similar event. During the self-tests, the module generates the RAM copy of OS-DRBG-STATE and updates the EEPROM copy of OS-DRBG-STATE
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	Authenticates the operator and establishes a secure channel. Must be preceded by a successful INITIALIZE UPDATE. Uses SD-SENC and SD-SMAC.
INITIALIZE UPDATE	Initializes the Secure Channel; to be followed by EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE. Uses the SD-KENC, SD-KMAC and SD-KDEK master keys to generate the SD-SENC, SD-SMAC and SD-SDEK session keys, respectively.
GET DATA	Retrieve a single data object. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).
MANAGE CHANNEL	Open and close supplementary logical channels. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).
SELECT	Select an applet. Does not use CSPs.

Table 15 - Unauthenticated Services and CSP Usage

Service	Description	CO
DELETE	Delete an applet from EEPROM. This service is provided for the situation where an applet exists on the card, and does not impact platform CSPs. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).	X
GET STATUS	Retrieve information about the card. Does not use CSPs. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).	X
INSTALL	Perform Card Content management. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP). Optionally, the Module uses the DAP-SYM key to verify the package signature.	X
LOAD	Load a new application (e.g. an applet). Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).	X
PUT DATA	Transfer data to an application during command processing. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).	X
PUT KEY	Load Card Manager keys The Module uses the SD-KDEK key to decrypt the keys to be loaded. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).	X
SET STATUS	Modify the card or applet life cycle status. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).	X
STORE DATA	Transfer data to an application or the security domain (ISD) processing the command. Optionally, updates OS-GLOBALPIN. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).	X
GET MEMORY SPACE	Monitor the memory space available on the card. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).	X
SET ATR	Change the card ATR. Optionally uses SD-SENC, SD-SMAC (SCP).	X

Table 16 – Authenticated Card Manager Services and CSP Usage

All of the above commands use the SD-SENC and SD-SMAC keys for secure channel communications, and SD-SMAC for firmware load integrity.

The card life cycle state determines which modes are available for the secure channel. In the SECURED card life cycle state, all command data must be secured by at least a MAC. As specified in the GP specification, there exist earlier states (before card issuance) in which a MAC might not be necessary to send Issuer Security Domain commands. Note that the LOAD service enforces MAC usage.

5.5 IDPRIME MD Services

All services implemented by the IDPrime MD applet are listed in the table below.

Service	Description	ICAA	IUSR	UA
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	Authenticates the external terminal to the card. Sets the secure channel mode.	X	X	X
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	Authenticates the card to the terminal	X	X	X
SELECT	Selects a DF or an EF by its file ID, path or name (in the case of DFs).	X	X	X
CHANGE REFERENCE DATA	Changes the value of a PIN. (Note: User Auth is always done within the command itself by providing previous PIN)	X	X	
RESET RETRY COUNTER	Unblocks and changes the value of a PIN	X	X	
CREATE FILE	Creates an EF under the root or the currently selected DF or creates a DF under the root.	X	X	
DELETE FILE	Deletes the current DF or EF.	X	X	
DELETE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR	Deletes an RSA or ECDSA Asymmetric Key Pair	X	X	
ERASE ASYMMETRIC KEY	Erases an RSA or ELC Asymmetric Key Pair	X	X	
GET DATA (IDPrime MD Applet Specific)	Retrieves the following information: ■ CPLC data ■ Applet version ■ Software version (includes applet version - BER-TLV format) ■ Available EEPROM memory ■ Additional applet parameters ■ PIN Policy Error ■ Applet install parameter (DF0Ah tag)	X	X	X
GET DATA OBJECT	Retrieves the following information: ■ Public key elements ■ KICC ■ The contents of a specified SE ■ Information about a specified PIN ■ Key generation flag	X	X	X

Service	Description	ICAA	IUSR	UA
	■ Touch Sense flag			
PUT DATA (IDPrime MD Applet Specific)	Creates or updates a data object ■ Create container[1] ■ Update public/private keys(1)		X	
PUT DATA (IDPrime MD Applet Specific)	Creates or updates a data object ■ Access Conditions ■ Applet Parameters (Admin Key, Card Read Only and Admin Key Try Limit) ■ PIN Info	X		
READ BINARY	Reads part of a binary file.	X	X	X
ERASE BINARY	Erases part of a binary file.	X	X	
UPDATE BINARY	Updates part of a binary file.	X	X	
GENERATE AUTHENTICATE	Used to generate secure messaging session keys between both entities (IFD and ICC) as part of elliptic curve asymmetric key mutual authentication.	X	X	X
GENERATE KEY PAIR	Generates an RSA or ECDSA key pair and stores both keys in the card. It returns the public part as its response.		X	
PSO – VERIFY CERTIFICATE	Sends the IFD certificate C_CV.IFD.AUT used in asymmetric key mutual authentication to the card for verification. No real reason to use it in the personalization phase, but it is allowed.		X	
PSO - HASH	Entirely or partially hashes data prior to a PSO–Compute Digital Signature command or prepares the data if hashed externally		X	
PSO – DECIPHER*	(RSA) Deciphers an encrypted message using a decipher key stored in the card. (ECDSA) Generates a shared symmetric key.		X	
PSO – COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE	Computes a digital signature.		X	
PUT SECURE KEY	Secure Key Injection Scheme from Microsoft Minidriver spec V7		X	
UNAUTHENTICATE EXT	Breaks a secure messaging session, or invalidates an MS3DES3 External Authentication.			X

[1] Secure Messaging in Confidentiality is mandatory

Service	Description	ICAA	IUSR	UA
CHECK RESET AND APPLET SELECTION	Tells the terminal if the card has been reset or the applet has been reselected since the previous time that the command was performed.	X	X	X
GET CHALLENGE	Generates an 8 or 16-byte random number.			X
MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT	Supports two functions, Restore and Set. ■ Restore: replaces the current SE by an SE stored in the card. ■ Set: sets or replaces one component of the current SE.			X
VERIFY	Authenticates the user to the card by presenting the User PIN. The User Authenticated status is granted with a successful PIN verification. (Depending on configuration, it can include the firewall option or not)		X	
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATION (ADMIN)	Performs external authentication for ADMIN role (using 3DES challenge response)	X		

Table 17 – IDPrime MD Applet Services and CSP Usage

* - Service also available for non-Approved of operation when using key sizes that provide less than 112 bits of security strength.

All services implemented by the MSPNP applet are listed in the table below.

Service	Description	ICAA	IUSR	UA
GET DATA (MSPNP applet specific)	Retrieves the following information: ■ GUID			X

Table 18 – MSPNP applet Services

5.6 CSP and Key Access by Service

All services are accessing the CSPs according to the table below:

- G = Generate: The *Module* generates the CSP.
- R = Read: The *Module* reads the CSP (read access to the CSP by an outside entity).
- E = Execute: The *Module* executes using the CSP.
- W = Write: The *Module* writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is imported into the *Module* or when the module overwrites an existing CSP.
- Z = Zeroize: The *Module* zeroizes the CSP. For the Context service,
- -- = Not accessed by the service.

CSPs and Keys										
Service	OS-DRBG-EI	OS-DRBG-STATE	OS-GLOBALPIN	OS-MKDK	SD-KENC	SD-KMAC	SD-KDEK	SD-SENC	SD-SMAC	DAP-SYM
Card Reset (Self-test)	ZEW	ZEGW	-	-	-	-	-	Z	Z	-
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	-	-	-	E	E	E	E	GE	GE	-
INITIALIZE UPDATE	-	EW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GET DATA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MANAGE CHANNEL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SELECT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DELETE (Deleting IDPrime MD applet will zeroize all its CSPs)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	-
GET STATUS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	E	-
INSTALL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	-
LOAD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	-
PUT DATA	-	-	-	E	-	-	-		E	-
PUT KEY	-	-	-	E	-	WE	WE	WE	E	WE
SET STATUS	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	-	-	Z
STORE DATA	-	-	-	E	-	-	-		E	-
GET MEMORY SPACE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	-
SET ATR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	E	-

Table 19 – Platform CSP and Key Access by Service

	CSP															
Service	**IAS-SC-SMAC-AES**	**IAS-SC-SENC-AES**	**IAS-AS-RSA**	**IAS-AS-ECDSA**	**IAS-AC-RSA**	**IAS-ECDH-ECC**	**IAS-KG-AS-RSA**	**IAS-KG-AS-ECDSA**	**IAS-KG-AC-RSA**	**IAS-KG-AC-ECDH**	**IAS-ECDSA-AUTH-ECC**	**IAS-SC-DES3**	**IAS-SC-P-SKI-AES**	**IAS-SC-T-SKI-AES**	**IAS-SC-PIN-TDES**	**IAS-OWNERPIN**
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	E	--
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	E	--	--	--	--	--
SELECT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CHANGE REFERENCE DATA	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	E	E W Z
RESET RETRY COUNTER	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	E	--	--	--	E W Z
CREATE FILE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
DELETE FILE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
DELETE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR	--	--	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	--	Z	--	--	--	--	--
ERASE ASYMMETRIC KEY	--	--	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	--	Z	--	--	--	--	--
GET DATA (IDPrime MD Applet Specific)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GET DATA OBJECT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PUT DATA (IDPrime MD Applet Specific)	E	E	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	--	WZ	--	--	--	--	--
PUT DATA (IDPrime MD Applet Specific)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	W Z	--
READ BINARY	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
ERASE BINARY	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
UPDATE BINARY	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GENERATE AUTHENTICATE	G	G	--	--	--	E	--	--	--	GE	--	--	--	--	--	--
GENERATE KEY PAIR	E	E	--	--	--	--	G	G	G	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

CSP																
Service	**IAS-SC-SMAC-AES**	**IAS-SC-SENC-AES**	**IAS-AS-RSA**	**IAS-AS-ECDSA**	**IAS-AC-RSA**	**IAS-ECDH-ECC**	**IAS-KG-AS-RSA**	**IAS-KG-AS-ECDSA**	**IAS-KG-AC-RSA**	**IAS-KG-AC-ECDH**	**IAS-ECDSA-AUTH-ECC**	**IAS-SC-DES3**	**IAS-SC-P-SKI-AES**	**IAS-SC-T-SKI-AES**	**IAS-SC-PIN-TDES**	**IAS-OWNERPIN**
PSO – VERIFY CERTIFICATE	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSO - HASH	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSO – DECIPHER	--	--	--	--	E	--	--	--	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSO – COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE	--	--	E	E	--	--	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PUT SECURE KEY	--	--	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	--	WZ	--	E	EWZ	--	--
UNAUTHENTICATE EXT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CHECK RESET AND APPLET SELECTION	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GET CHALLENGE	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
VERIFY	E	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	E
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATION (ADMIN)	-	-	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	E

Table 20 – IDPrime MD Applet CSP and Key Access by Service

Public Keys												
Service	**IAS-KA-ECDH**	**IASAS-CA-ECDSA-PUB**	**IASAS-IFD-ECDSA-PUB**	**IAS-AS-RSA-PUB**	**IAS-AS-ECDSA-PUB**	**IAS-AC-RSA-PUB**	**IAS-ECDH-ECC-PUB**	**IAS-KG-AS-RSA-PUB**	**IAS-KG-AS-ECDSA-PUB**	**IAS-KG-AC-RSA-PUB**	**IAS-KG-AC-ECDH-PUB**	**IAS-ECDSA-AUTH-ECC-PUB**
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	--	--	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	E
SELECT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CHANGE REFERENCE DATA	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
RESET RETRY COUNTER	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
CREATE FILE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
DELETE FILE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
DELETE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	--	Z
ERASE ASYMMETRIC KEY	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	--	Z
GET DATA (IDPrime MD Applet Specific)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GET DATA OBJECT	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
PUT DATA (IDPrime MD Applet Specific)	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	--	WZ
PUT DATA (IDPrime MD Applet Specific)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
READ BINARY	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
ERASE BINARY	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
UPDATE BINARY	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GENERATE AUTHENTICATE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	GE	--
GENERATE KEY PAIR	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	G	G	G	--	--
PSO – VERIFY CERTIFICATE	--	E	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSO - HASH	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PSO – DECIPHER	--	--	--	--	--	E[2]	--	--	--	E[2]	--	--
PSO – COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
PUT SECURE KEY	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	WZ	--	WZ
UNAUTHENTICATE EXT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

[2] Public key is used for AC Keys in order to perform the pair wise consistency check from SP800-56B.

Public Keys												
Service	**IAS-KA-ECDH**	**IASAS-CA-ECDSA-PUB**	**IASAS-IFD-ECDSA-PUB**	**IAS-AS-RSA-PUB**	**IAS-AS-ECDSA-PUB**	**IAS-AC-RSA-PUB**	**IAS-ECDH-ECC-PUB**	**IAS-KG-AS-RSA-PUB**	**IAS-KG-AS-ECDSA-PUB**	**IAS-KG-AC-RSA-PUB**	**IAS-KG-AC-ECDH-PUB**	**IAS-ECDSA-AUTH-ECC-PUB**
CHECK RESET AND APPLET SELECTION	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GET CHALLENGE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
VERIFY	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATION (ADMIN)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Table 21 – IDPrime MD Applet Public Key Access by Service

6 Finite State Model

The CM is designed using a finite state machine model that explicitly specifies every operational and error state.

The CM includes Power on/off states, Cryptographic Officer states, User services states, applet loading states, Key/PIN loading states, Self-test states, Error states, and the GP life cycle states.

An additional document (Finite State Machine document) identifies and describes all the states of the module including all corresponding state transitions.

7 Physical Security Policy

The CM is a single-chip implementation that meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations. The CM uses standard passivation techniques and is protected by passive shielding (metal layer coverings opaque to the circuitry below) and active shielding (a grid of top metal layer wires with tamper response). A tamper event detected by the active shield places the Module permanently into the Card Is Killed error state.

The CM is mounted in a plastic smartcard; physical inspection of the Module boundaries is not practical after mounting. Physical inspection of modules for tamper evidence is performed using a lot sampling technique during the card assembly process. The Module also provides a key to protect the Module from tamper during transport and the additional physical protections listed in Section 12 below.

8 Operational Environment

The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

9 Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

The Module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by part 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B.

10 Self-tests

10.1 Power-on Self-tests

On power on or reset, the *Module* performs self-tests described in following table. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the *Module*. If one of the KATs fails, the *Module* enters the *Card Is Mute* error state.

Test Target	Description
FW Integrity	16 bit CRC performed over all code located in EEPROM. This integrity test is not required or performed for code stored in masked ROM code memory.
DRBG	Performs SP800-90A Health tests with fixed inputs, inclusive of KAT
Triple-DES	Performs separate encrypt and decrypt KATs using 3-Key TDEA in ECB mode.
AES	Performs decrypt KAT using an AES 128 key in ECB mode. AES encrypt is self-tested as an embedded algorithm of AES-CMAC.
AES-CMAC	Performs an AES-CMAC Generate KAT using an AES 128 key. Note that AES-CMAC Verify is identical to a Generate KAT (perform Generate then compare to the input) hence a single KAT verifies both functions.
RSA	Performs separate RSA PKCS#1 signature and verification KATs using an RSA 2048 bit key.
RSA CRT	Performs RSA PKCS#1 signature KAT using an RSA 2048 bit key. RSA CRT signature verification is tested as part of the RSA signature verification KAT as described above.
ECDSA	Performs separate ECDSA signature and verification KATs using P-224.
ECC CDH	Performs a KAT for ECC CDH using P-224 keys constituents.
SHA-1, SHA-2	Performs separate KATs for SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512.

Table 22 – Power-On Self-Tests

10.2 Conditional Self-tests

On every call to the [SP 800-90] DRBG, the FIPS 140-2 Continuous RNG test to assure that the output is different than the previous value.

When any asymmetric key pair is generated (for RSA or ECC keys) the CM performs a pair-wise consistency test.

When new firmware is loaded into the CM using the LOAD command, the CM verifies the integrity and authenticity of the new firmware (applet) using the SD-SMAC key for MAC process. Optionally, the CM may also verify a signature of the new firmware (applet) using the DAP-SYM key; the signature block in this scenario is signed by an external entity using the DAP-SYM key.

11 Design Assurance

The CM meets the Level 3 Design Assurance section requirements.

11.1 Configuration Management

An additional document (Configuration Management Plan document) defines the methods, mechanisms and tools that allow to identify and place under control all the data and information concerning the specification, design, implementation, generation, test and validation of the card software throughout the development and validation cycle.

11.2 Delivery and Operation

Some additional documents ('Delivery and Operation', 'Reference Manual', 'Card Initialization Specification' documents) define and describe the steps necessary to deliver and operate the CM securely.

11.3 Guidance Documents

The Guidance document provided with CM is intended to be the 'Reference Manual'. This document includes guidance for secure operation of the CM by its users as defined in the section: Roles, Authentication and Services.

11.4 Language Level

The CM operational environment is implemented using a high level language. A limited number of software modules have been written in assembler to optimize speed or size.

The IDPrime MD Applet is a Java applet designed for the Java Card environment.

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The Module implements defenses against:

- Fault attacks
- Side channel analysis (Timing Analysis, SPA/DPA, Simple/Differential Electromagnetic Analysis)
- Probing attacks
- Card tearing

13 Security Rules and Guidance

The *Module* implementation also enforces the following security rules:

- No additional interface or service is implemented by the *Module* which would provide access to CSPs.
- Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
- There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service (SET STATUS to place the module in a TERMINATED state).
- The *Module* does not support manual key entry, output plaintext CSPs or output intermediate key values.
- Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Mo*d*ule.
- In accordance to NIST guidance (IG A.13), operators are responsible for insuring that a single Triple-DES key is not used to encrypt more than 2^{16} 64-bit data blocks.

END OF DOCUMENT