© 2018 Copyright Dell, Inc.
Dell, Inc. grants permission to freely reproduce in entirety without revision.
Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell
CMC and Dell OME-M
v2.4
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary
Security Policy
Document Revision 2.3
12/19/2018
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Dell, Inc. grants permission to freely reproduce in entirety without revision.
© 2018 Dell Inc. All Rights Reserved. Dell, the Dell logo, and other Dell names and marks are
trademarks of Dell Inc. in the US and worldwide. Dell disclaims proprietary interest in the marks and
names of others.
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Revision History
Revision Date Authors Summary
1.0 01/18/2017 Kwok Wong Modified from the OEM SP from 140-2 Cert.
#2496
2.0 12/15/2017 Jason Dale Updated to include new algorithm certificates.
2.1 01/25/2018 Alaric Silveira Updated based on CMVP review feedback.
2.2 05/10/2018 Alaric Silveira Updated for 140-2 Cert. #2861
2.2 06/14/2018 Zack Baron Updated to include new algorithm certificates
2.2 08/01/2018 Zack Baron Updated footnote for linux operating systems
2.2 09/04/2018 Zack Baron Updated Linux to Custom Linux
2.3 12/19/2018 Zack Baron Updated to include OME-M
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Dell, Inc. grants permission to freely reproduce in entirety without revision.
Table of Contents
Revision History ...........................................................................................................................................3
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................5
Dell Cryptographic Library...........................................................................................................................5
Module Specification ................................................................................................................................5
Security Level........................................................................................................................................6
FIPS Approved Mode of Operation.......................................................................................................7
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ....................................................................................................8
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms............................................................................................9
Module Interfaces......................................................................................................................................9
Roles, Services and Authentication.........................................................................................................10
Finite State Model ...................................................................................................................................11
Physical Security.....................................................................................................................................11
Operational Environment ........................................................................................................................12
Key Management ....................................................................................................................................12
Minimum Entropy Provided by Random Number Generation....................................................13
Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility.....................................................................................15
Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................................15
Guidance and Secure Operation..............................................................................................................16
Crypto-officer Guidance......................................................................................................................16
User Guidance .....................................................................................................................................16
Mitigation of Other Attacks ....................................................................................................................17
Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M © 2018 Copyright Dell, Inc.
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Introduction
This non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 security policy for the Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC,
and Dell OME-M details the secure operation of the Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and
Dell OME-M as required in the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS 140-2)
as published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the United State
Department of Commerce. This document, the Cryptographic Module Security Policy, also referred to as
the Security Policy, specifies the security rules under which the Dell OpenSSL Cryptographic Library
must operate.
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M provides cryptography to Dell
iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M lifecycle controlers and provides them with the protection afforded
by industry-standard, government-approved algorithms to ensure secure, remote management. Dell
iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M leverage the Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and
Dell OME-M to ensure use of FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography.
Dell Cryptographic Library
The following sections describe the Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M.
Module Specification
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M (hereinafter referred to as the
“Library,” “cryptographic module,” or the “module”) is a software-only cryptographic module executing
on a general-purpose computing system running Linux (Custom Linux 3.2.18, Custom Linux 3.4.11,
Custom Linux 3.16.47, Custom Linux 4.1.12, Custom Linux 4.9.31, or Custom Linux 4.9.77-30)1
.
1
Linux operating system versions
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The physical perimeter of the general-purpose computing system comprises the module’s physical
cryptographic boundary, while the Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M
constitutes the module’s logical cryptographic boundary.
Security Level
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M meets the overall requirements
applicable to Level 1 security overall of FIPS 140-2 and the following specified section security levels.
Table 1 - Module Security Level Specification
# FIPS 140-2 Section Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Figure 1 - Logical Diagram
Physical Cryptographic Boundary (General Purpose Computing System)
Operating System
Linking
Application
Logical Cryptographic Boundary
Dell Crypto Library
for Dell iDRAC,
Dell CMC, and Dell
OME-M
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FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M provides both FIPS-Approved
and non-FIPS-Approved services, and thus provides both a FIPS-Approved and non-Approved mode of
operation. To use the Library in a FIPS-compliant mode of operation, the operator should follow these
rules:
1. As allowed by FIPS 140-2 overall Level 1 security, the module does not provide any indicator of
its FIPS mode of operation. Thus, an operator (calling process) must ensure to follow each of the
rules in this section (during the development of a calling application) to ensure that the module
operates in its FIPS mode.
2. The module affords no persistent or permanent configuration to ensure use of its Approved mode
or operation, rather the module, when in its operational state, alternates service by service
between its Approved and non-Approved mode of operation (depending on what services the
operator calls).
3. The list of services enumerated in the Roles, Services and Authentication section includes all
security functions, roles, and services provided by the cryptographic module in both its Approved
and non-Approved modes of operation.
4. An operator does not configure the module during power-up initialization to operate only in one
mode or another mode. The module provides no such configuration, but instead requires the
operator to only solicit Approved services and to not solicit non-Approved services. The
following services are non-Approved services:
a. Random Number Generation using Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, and ANSI X9.31 RNG
(all non-compliant)
b. ECDSA (non-compliant)
c. Triple-DES CMAC (non-compliant)
d. AES CMAC (non-compliant), AES-GCM (non-compliant), and AES-XTS (non-
compliant)
5. An operator must avoid violating Approved-mode key generation and usage requirements by:
a. Not generating keys in a non-Approved mode of operation and then switch to an
Approved-mode of operation (for example, using the same keys for the ECDH and
ECDSA algorithms)
b. Not electronically importing keys in plaintext in a non-Approved mode of operation and
then switch to an Approved-mode of operation and use those keys for Approved services
c. Not generating keys in an Approved-mode of operation and then switching to a non-
Approved mode of operation and using the generated keys for non-Approved services
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d. Not changing the default RNG to non-approved algorithms via calls like
ENGINE_set_RAND() and ENGINE_set_default_RAND(). When the module is in the
Approved mode of operation, the default RNG is the validated AES-256 CTR_DRBG.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module uses cryptographic algorithm implementations that have received the following certificate
numbers from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program.
Table 2 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates
Algorithm CAVP Certificate
Custom Linux 3.2.18 on PowerPC 440EPX, Custom Linux 3.4.11 on
Renesas SH7758
AES #4248
DRBG #1327
DSA #1138
HMAC #2786
RSA #2293
SHA #3485
Triple-DES #2303
Custom Linux 4.9.31 on PowerPC 440EPX
AES #5477
DRBG #2155
DSA #1408
HMAC #3632
RSA #2941
SHA #4395
Triple-DES #2756
Custom Linux 3.16.47 on Renesas SH7758
AES #5478
DRBG #2156
DSA #1409
HMAC #3633
RSA #2942
SHA #4396
Triple-DES #2757
Custom Linux 4.1.2 on ARMv7 NPCMX50
AES #5032
DRBG #1844
DSA #1323
HMAC #3346
RSA #2716
SHA #4091
Triple-DES #2594
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Custom Linux 4.9.77-30 on Intel Atom E3950
AES #C 194
DRBG #C 194
DSA #C 194
HMAC #C 194
RSA #C 194
SHA #C 194
Triple-DES #C 194
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module uses the following non-FIPS 140-2 approved, but allowed, algorithms.
• RSA with 2048-bit to 16384-bit key sizes provides between 112 and 270 bits of encryption
strength – allowed for use as part of a key-establishment scheme.
• Diffie-Hellman with 2048-bit to 16384-bit key sizes provides between 112 and 270 bits of
encryption strength – allowed for use as part of a key-agreement scheme.
• Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with 224, 256, 384, and 521-bit prime field sizes provides between
112 and 256 bits of encryption strength – allowed for use as part of a key-agreement scheme.
The module also provides the following non-Approved algorithms:
• Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, and ANSI X9.31 RNG (non-compliant)
• ECDSA (non-compliant)
• Triple-DES CMAC (non-compliant)
• AES CMAC (non-compliant), AES-GCM (non-compliant), and AES-XTS (non-compliant)
As described above, in order to utilize the Library in FIPS-compliant mode, a calling process cannot
solicit non-Approved algorithms.
Module Interfaces
The module is classified as a multiple-chip standalone module for FIPS 140-2 purposes. As such, the
module’s physical cryptographic boundary encompasses the general-purpose computing system running
Linux1
and interfacing with the peripherals (through its console port, network (Ethernet and QSFP) ports,
USB ports, and power adapter).
However, the module provides only a logical interface via an application programming interface (API)
and does not interface with or communicate across any of the physical ports of the computing system.
This logical interface exposes services that operators (calling applications) may use directly.
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The module’s C-language API interface provided by the module is mapped onto the four FIPS 140-2
logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. It is through this logical API
that the module logically separates them into distinct and separate interfaces. The mapping of the
module’s API to the four FIPS 140-2 interfaces is as follows:
• Data input – API entry point data input stack parameters
• Data output – API entry point data output stack parameters
• Control input – API entry point and corresponding stack parameters
• Status output – API entry point return values and status stack parameters
Roles, Services and Authentication
The module supports both of the FIPS 140-2 required roles, the Crypto-officer and the User role, and
supports no additional roles. An operator implicitly selects the Crypto-officer role when loading (or
causing loading of) the library and selects the User role when soliciting services from the module through
its API. The module requires no operator authentication. The following table enumerates the module’s
services.
Table 3 - Service Descriptions for Crypto-officer and User Roles
Service Description and Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Access
Crypto-Officer services
Library Loading The process of loading the assembly
Self-test Perform self-tests (FIPS_selftest)
User services
Show Status Fucntions that provide module status information
• Version (an unsigned long or const char *)
• FIPS Mode (Boolean)
• FIPS POST Status (returns 1 if they failed)
Does not access CSPs.
Zeroize Functions that destroy CSPs:
• fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for the CTR_DRBG context,
overwrites CTR_DRBG CSPs
All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in
allocated memory. Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the
calling application.
Random number generation Used for random number generation.
• Seed or reseed the CTR_DRBG instance
• Determine security strength of the CTR_DRBG
instance
• Obtain random data
Uses and updates the CTR_DRBG CSPs.
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Service Description and Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Access
Asymmetric key generation Used to generate RSA, DH, DSA, and EC keys:
RSA Signature Generation Key (SGK), RSA Signature
Verification Key (SVK), DH Private, DH Public, DSA SGK,
DSA SVK, EC DH Private, EC DH Public
There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism
and algorithm type, the maximum specified in SP 800-90A
Symmetric encrypt/decrypt Used to encrypt or decrypt data.
For symmetric encryption or decryption, the module supports:
• Approved AES: ECB, CBC, CFB128, OFB, or CTR
modes
• Approved Triple-DES: ECB, CBC, CFB8, CFB64, or
OFB modes
• Non-Approved AES CMAC, Triple-DES CMAC,
AES-GCM, or AES-XTS
Message digest Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest.
Does not access CSPs.
Keyed Hash Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC.
Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process).
Key transport2
primivites Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling
process (does not establish keys into the module).
Executes using RSA Key Decryption Key (KDK), RSA Key
Encryption Key (KEK) (passed in by the calling process).
Key agreement primivites Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the
calling process (does not establish keys into the module).
Executes using EC DH Private, DH Private, EC DH Public,
DH Public (passed in by the calling process).
Digital Signature Used to generate or verify RSA or DSA digital signatures.
Executes using RSA Signature Generation Key (SGK), RSA
Signature Verification Key (SVK); DSA SGK, DSA SVK
(passed in by the calling process).
Finite State Model
The module has a finite state model (FSM) that descrbes the module’s behavior and transitions based on
its current state and the command received. The module’s FSM was reviewed as part of the overall FIPS
140-2 validation.
Physical Security
The physical security requirements does not apply to the module. The module is a software-only module
that executes on a general-purpose computing system.
2 "Key transport" can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external application. The latter
definition is the one that applies to the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module
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Operational Environment
The Library executes on a general-purpose operating system (Linux1
) running in single-user mode that
segregates processes into separate process spaces. Thus, the operating system separates each process
space from all others, implicitly satisfying the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single-user mode of
operation.
Table 4 – Tested Operational Environments in Dell iDRAC8
Custom Linux 3.4.11 (single-user mode) Executing on
1 PowerEdge R730 Rack Server with Renesas SH7758 CPU and Dell iDRAC8 firmware 2.41
Custom Linux 3.16.47 (single-user mode) Executing on
1 PowerEdge R730 Rack Server with Renesas SH7758 CPU and Dell iDRAC8 firmware 2.60
Table 5 – Tested Operational Environments in Dell iDRAC9
Custom Linux 4.1.12 (single-user mode) Executing on
1 PowerEdge R740 Rack Server with ARMv7 NPCMX50 CPU and Dell iDRAC9 firmware 3.15
Table 6 – Tested Operational Environments in Dell CMC
Custom Linux 3.2.18 (single-user mode) Executing on
1 PowerEdge M1000e Chassis with PowerPC 440EPX CPU and Dell CMC firmware 5.21
Custom Linux 4.9.31 (single-user mode) Executing on
1 PowerEdge M1000e Chassis with PowerPC 440EPX CPU and Dell CMC firmware 6.10
Table 7 – Tested Operational Environments in Dell OME-M
Custom Linux 4.9.77-30 (single-user mode) Executing on
1 PowerEdge MX7000 Modular Chassis with Intel Atom E3950 Processor and Dell OME-M
firmware 1.00.10
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Key Management
The module possesses its HMAC-SHA-1 self-integrity test key and power-up self-test known answer test
(KAT) keys. Beyond those keys, the module does not store any other keys persistently. It is the calling
applications responsibility to appropriately manage keys. The module can generate keys (DSA, EC, and
RSA asymmetric key pairs), can accept keys entered by an operator, and affords an operator the ability to
zeroize keys held in RAM.
Minimum Entropy Provided by Random Number Generation
When the approved AES-256 CTR_DRBG is instantiated, it is seeded with 48 bytes (384 bits) from the
entropy pool. Given that the lowest measured amount of entropy across all platforms was between 2.5 and
5.7 bits per byte of entropy, using a conservative estimate of 2.5 bits per byte of entropy yields 48 bytes *
2.5 bits/byte = 120 bits. Therefore, at the minimum, the approved AES-256 CTR_DRBG can provide at
least 120 bits of entropy per request.
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The following table describes the module’s security-relevant data items (SRDI’s) including asymmetric
and symmetric keys:
Table 8 - Module Security-Relevant Data Items
Key Type Bitsize Description Origin Stored Zeroized
RSA SGK RSA 2048 or
3072
RSA PKCS#1, ANSI
X9.31, or PSS signature
generation key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
RSA KDK RSA 2048-
16384
RSA key decryption
(private key transport) key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
DSA SGK DSA 2048 or
3072
DSA signature generation
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
DH Private DH 224-512 DH private key agreement
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
EC DH
Private
EC DH 224-521 EC DH private key
agreement key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
AES EDK AES 128-256 AES encrypt / decrypt key Entered RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
Triple-DES
EDK
Triple-
DES
192 Triple-DES encrypt /
decrypt key
Entered RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
HMAC Key HMAC 112+ Keyed hash key intended
for data integrity
Entered RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
CTR_DRBG
Key
AES 256 AES-256 CTR_DRBG
internal state Key
From
environment
RAM
/plaintext
Clear
method
CTR_DRBG
V (seed)
N/A 128 AES-256 CTR_DRBG
internal state V (seed)
From
environment
RAM
/plaintext
Clear
method
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The module also supports the following public/non-sensitive keys:
Table 9 - Module Public Keys
Key Type Bitsize Description Origin Stored Zeroized
RSA SVK RSA 2048 or
3072
RSA PKCS#1, ANSI X9.31,
or PSS signature
verification key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
RSA KEK RSA 2048-
16384
RSA key encryption (public
key transport) key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
DSA SVK DSA 2048 or
3072
DSA signature verification
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
DH Public DH 2048-
16384
DH public key agreement
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
EC DH
Public
EC DH 224-521 EC DH public key
agreement key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
Self-tests
KAT
Keys
All All Keys used for module
Power-Up Known Answer
Self-Test
Compiled
into the
module
Module
image
N/A
(see 140-2
IG 7.4)
Self-tests
Integrity
Keys
HMAC 256 bits HMAC-SHA-1 key used by
the module for it’s power up
integrity test
Compiled
into the
module
Module
image /
plaintext &
obfuscated
N/A
(see 140-2
IG 7.4)
Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility
The module meets Level 1 security for FIPS 140-2 EMI/EMC requirements as the Dell Crypto Library
for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M passed validation executing on a general-purpose
computing system that confirms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B (for example, for
home use).
Self-Tests
The module provides the self-tests listed in Table 7.
Table 10 – Self-tests
FIPS Cryptographic Module Self-Tests
Power-Up Self-Tests
Integrity test (HMAC-SHA-1)
DRBG KAT (CTR_DRBG - all applicable SP 800-90 Section 11 assurance tests)
SHA KATs (SHA-1, -224, -256, -384, -512)
HMAC-SHA KATs (SHA-1, -224, -256, -384, -512)
CMAC KATs (CMAC is non-compliant)
AES encrypt KAT and AES decrypt KAT
AES CCM KATs
AES GCM authenticated encryption KAT and AES GCM authenticated decryption KAT (GCM is non-
compliant)
AES XTS KATs (XTS is non-compliant)
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Triple-DES encrypt KAT and Triple-DES decrypt KAT
RSA sign KAT and RSA verify KAT
DSA sign KAT and DSA verify KAT
Conditional Self-tests:
DSA Key Generation Pairwise Consistency Test
RSA Key Generation Pairwise Consistency Test
AES-256 CTR_DRBG Continuous Random Number Generator Test
Seeding of CTR_DRBG Continuous Random Number Generator Test”
The module automatically performs the complete set of power-up self-tests during library load to ensure
proper operation, thus an operator has no access to cryptographic functionality unless the power-up self-
tests passes and the library load succeeds. The power-up self-tests include an integrity check of the
module’s software using an HMAC-SHA-1 value calculated over the object module’s in-memory image.
Should the module fail a self-test, the module enters an Error state where it prohibits cryptographic
services.
Additionally, the module performs both power-up and conditional self-tests for its cryptographic
algorithms. An operator may invoke the power-up self-tests at any time by calling the FIPS Mode
function.
Guidance and Secure Operation
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M meets overall Level 1
requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2. The following sections describe the Crypto-officer and User
guidance.
Crypto-officer Guidance
The Crypto-officer or operator responsible for configuring the operational environment on which the
module runs must ensure FIPS-compliant operation (as described in the section, FIPS Approved Mode of
Operation, of the Security Policy).
Additionally, the Crypto-officer is defined to be the operator responsible for loading the library, thus
when invoked by a calling application (either at library load or dynamically), the operating system loader
loads the module, causing it to automatically perform its power-up self-tests. If the module fails its
power-up self-tests, the module transitions into an Error state.
User Guidance
After the operating system has been properly configured by the Crypto-officer (if needed), the Dell
Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M requires the user to follow the rules of
section FIPS Approved Mode of Operation in order to operate in a FIPS-compliant manner.
Furthermore, the User must assume responsibility for managing all keys, as the module does not provide
any persistent key storage.
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Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and Dell OME-M does not claim to mitigate any
attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements for validation.