© 2026 Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd. / atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.
HiCOS PKI Applet V4 on IDEMIA ID-
One Cosmo X
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.1
Last update: 2026-07-22
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
4516 Seton Center Parkway, Suite 250
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 General.................................................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels..............................................................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ....................................................................................................................................6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification...................................................................................7
2.3 Excluded Components..................................................................................................................................................8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................................................................8
2.5 Algorithms .....................................................................................................................................................................8
2.6 Security Function Implementations.............................................................................................................................10
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ....................................................................................................................................13
2.8 RBG and Entropy ........................................................................................................................................................14
2.9 Key Generation ...........................................................................................................................................................14
2.10 Key Establishment ....................................................................................................................................................14
2.11 Industry Protocols .....................................................................................................................................................14
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces .......................................................................................................................................15
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................................................................15
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification ....................................................................................................................................15
3.3 Control Interface Not Inhibited ....................................................................................................................................15
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ..................................................................................................................................16
4.1 Authentication Methods...............................................................................................................................................16
4.2 Roles ...........................................................................................................................................................................17
4.3 Approved Services ......................................................................................................................................................18
4.4 Non-Approved Services ..............................................................................................................................................26
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded...........................................................................................................................26
5 Software/Firmware Security...............................................................................................................................................27
5.1 Integrity Techniques....................................................................................................................................................27
5.2 Initiate on Demand ......................................................................................................................................................27
6 Operational Environment ...................................................................................................................................................28
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements.....................................................................................................28
7 Physical Security................................................................................................................................................................29
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required ............................................................................................................................29
7.2 EFP/EFT Information ..................................................................................................................................................29
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges.....................................................................................................................29
8 Non-Invasive Security ........................................................................................................................................................30
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management.....................................................................................................................31
9.1 Storage Areas .............................................................................................................................................................31
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods .........................................................................................................................................31
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................................................................32
9.4 SSPs ...........................................................................................................................................................................33
9.5 Transitions...................................................................................................................................................................38
10 Self-Tests .........................................................................................................................................................................39
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................................................................39
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................................39
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information...................................................................................................................................41
10.4 Error States ...............................................................................................................................................................43
11 Life-Cycle Assurance .......................................................................................................................................................44
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures....................................................................................................44
11.2 Administrator Guidance.............................................................................................................................................44
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance.....................................................................................................................................44
11.4 End of Life .................................................................................................................................................................44
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks...............................................................................................................................................45
12.1 Attack List..................................................................................................................................................................45
12.3 Guidance and Constraints.........................................................................................................................................45
References............................................................................................................................................................................46
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels..........................................................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware .................................................................................................................8
Table 3: Modes List and Description.......................................................................................................................................8
Table 4: Approved Algorithms...............................................................................................................................................10
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms....................................................................................................................................10
Table 6: Security Function Implementations.........................................................................................................................13
Table 7: Entropy Certificates.................................................................................................................................................14
Table 8: Entropy Sources......................................................................................................................................................14
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces................................................................................................................................................15
Table 10: Authentication Methods.........................................................................................................................................16
Table 11: Roles .....................................................................................................................................................................17
Table 12: Approved Services................................................................................................................................................26
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required ......................................................................................................................29
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information ............................................................................................................................................29
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures ..........................................................................................................................29
Table 16: Storage Areas .......................................................................................................................................................31
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods ...................................................................................................................................31
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods .....................................................................................................................................32
Table 19: SSP Table 1 ..........................................................................................................................................................35
Table 20: SSP Table 2 ..........................................................................................................................................................38
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ...................................................................................................................................39
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................................41
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information....................................................................................................................41
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information ...........................................................................................................................43
Table 25: Error States ...........................................................................................................................................................43
List of Figures
Figure 1: Depiction of Physical Form ......................................................................................................................................6
Figure 2: Block Diagram..........................................................................................................................................................7
Figure 3: Bottom View.............................................................................................................................................................8
Figure 4: Top View ..................................................................................................................................................................8
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document defines the Security Policy for the Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd. HiCOS PKI AppletV4 on IDEMIA ID-One
Cosmo X cryptographic module and hereafter denoted the module. The module, validated to FIPS 140-3 overall Security
Level 3, is a single chip module implementing the Global Platform operational environment, with Card Manager and
HiCOS PKI AppletV4.
1.2 Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the module are as follows:
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security N/A
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks 3
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The module, a single chip embodiment validated to FIPS 140-3 Overall Security Level 3, is the combination of the HiCOS
PKI Applet (denoted PKI Applet below) running on and bound to the IDEMIA ID-One Cosmo X (denoted platform below).
The platform provides an operational environment for the PKI Applet, all cryptographic algorithm implementations and
random number and key generation, card lifecycle management, and key storage and protection are provided by the
platform. The factory configuration of the module constrains the module to the set of services provided by the platform’s
Card Manager (implementing a standard set of GlobalPlatform services) and the PKI Applet.
The PKI Applet is a Java Card applet that provides security for stored user data and credentials and a set APDU
commands of PKI services (e.g., for strong authentication, encryption and digital signatures).
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Cryptographic Boundary:
The module is designed to be embedded into a plastic card body, with a contact plate and/or contactless antenna
connections, or in a USB token or other standard IC packaging, such as SOIC, QFN or MicroSD.
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure 1 below. The cryptographic boundary of the module is the surface
and edges of the die and associated bond pads for the module's interfaces, shown as circles in the figure. See Table 12:
Ports and Interfaces for the function of each interface.
Figure 1: Depiction of Physical Form
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Figure 2: Block Diagram
Section 4 describes applet functionality in greater detail. The JavaCard and Global Platform APIs are internal interfaces
available only to applets. Only applet services are available at the card edge (the interfaces that cross the cryptographic
boundary). In the figure above, the Security Domain Verifier prevents loading an unauthorized (unsigned) code package
into the module and does not provide separate services.
All code is executed from ROM and NVM.
The chip family provides accelerators for AES, RSA, ECC, CRC and an SP800-90B ESV. The communications options for
contact and contactless configurations are present in the physical circuitry of all members of the processor family but are
selectively enabled during module manufacturing.
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or Part Number Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
HiCOS PKI Applet v4 On
Cosmo X
09A4D1 0400020E 32-bit Arm® Contact-Only, Contactless-Only or Dual
Interface
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Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no components within the cryptographic boundary excluded from the FIPS 140-3 requirements.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
The module only
supports an
Approved mode of
operation.
Approved The indicator of mode of operations of a given HiCOS PKI Applet
instance can be retrieved at any time using the GET DATA (tag
'FE00') command (PKI Applet Info service). The module will return
'01', the value of tag "FE00" to indicate execution in "FIPS140-3
Level 3 Mode of Operations"
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The module is always in the Approved mode.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The module only implements approved algorithms and does not implement any non-approved algorithms. Therefore, the
module only has approved mode of operation.
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A4945 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC A4945 Direction - Generation
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-ECB A4945 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
Figure 3: Bottom View Figure 4: Top View
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
Counter DRBG A4945 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A4945 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A4945 Component - No, Yes
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A4945 Component - No, Yes
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
KAS-ECC CDH-Component (CVL) A4945 Function - Key Pair Generation
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 A7823 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-384
Function - Key Pair Generation
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - Responder
KDF Methods -
twoStepKdf -
Key Length - 256
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SP800-108 A4945 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 64,
256
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
RSA Decryption Primitive Sp800-
56Br2 (CVL)
A4945 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A4945 Key Generation Mode - B.3.6
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - Table C.3
Private Key Format - Chinese Remainder
Theorem
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A4945 Signature Type - PKCSPSS
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive (CVL) A4945 Private Key Format - crt FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A4945 Signature Type - PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
SHA2-256 A4945 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A4945 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A4945 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Type:Symmetric and
Asymmetric
N/A CKG for asymmetric keys as per SP 800-133Rev2 section 4
example 1 with no post processing on the U value
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES-ECB BC-UnAuth Symmetric encryption
and Decryption
Key Size:128, 192,
256 bits
Key Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-ECB: (A4945)
AES-CBC BC-UnAuth Symmetric encryption
and Decryption
Key Size:128, 192,
256 bits
Key Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CBC: (A4945)
AES-CMAC MAC Message
Authentication Code
Key Size:128, 192,
256 bits
AES-CMAC: (A4945)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Key Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
CTR DRBG DRBG CTR_DRBG using
AES-256
Derivation
Function:Enabled
Prediction
Resistance:No
Key Size:256 bits
Key Strength:256 bits
Counter DRBG:
(A4945)
ECDSA keyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
ECDSA key
generation using
Testing Candidates
Curves:P-256, P-384,
P-521
Strength:128, 192,
256 bits
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4): (A4945)
CKG: ()
ECDSA sigGen DigSig-SigGen ECDSA Digital
Signature Generation
Message
Digest:SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Curves:P-256, P-384,
P-521
Strength:128, 192,
256 bits
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4): (A4945)
ECDSA sigGen
component
DigSig-SigGen ECDSA Digital
Signature Generation
Component
Curves:P-256, P-384,
P-521
Strength:128, 192,
256 bits
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4): (A4945)
ECDSA sigVer DigSig-SigVer ECDSA Digital
Signature Verification
Message
Digest:SHA2-256
Curves:P-256, P-384,
P-521
Strength:128, 192,
256 bits
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4): (A4945)
KAS-ECC KAS-Full ECDH Key
Agreement Scheme
IG:IG D.F Scenario 2
path (2), <end-to-
end>
Key confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
(tested as part KAS
certificate)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
256 and 256 bits of
security strength
KAS-ECC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A7823)
KAS-ECC CDH
Component
KAS-SSC ECDH Component Curves:P-256, P-384,
P-521
KAS-ECC CDH-
Component: (A4945)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Strength:128, 192,
256 bits
RSA keyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
RSA Key Generation Generation
Method:A.1.6
Probable Primes with
conditions based on
Auxiliary Probable
Primes
Key Size:2048, 3072,
4096 bits
Key Strength:112,
128, 150 bits
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4): (A4945)
CKG: ()
RSA sigGen DigSig-SigGen RSA Digital Signature
Generation
Scheme:PSS
Key Size:2048, 3072,
4096 bits
Key Strength:112,
128, 150 bits
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4): (A4945)
RSA sigPrim DigSig-SigGen RSA Digital Signature
Generation primitive
Key Size:2048, 3072,
4096 bits
Key Strength:112,
128, 150 bits
RSA Signature
Primitive: (A4945)
RSA sigVer DigSig-SigVer RSA Digital Signature
Verification
Scheme:PSS using
SHA2-256
Key Size:2048 bits
Key Strength:112 bits
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4): (A4945)
RSA Decryption
Primitive
KTS-Wrap RSA decryption
primitive
Key Size:2048, 3072,
4096 bits
Key Strength:112,
128, 150 bits
RSA Decryption
Primitive Sp800-
56Br2: (A4945)
KBKDF SP 800-108 KBKDF Key Based Key
Derivation with
Counter
Fixed Data
Order:Middle Fixed
Data
Key Size:128, 192,
256 bits
Key Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
KDF SP800-108:
(A4945)
SHA SHA Message Digest
Generation using
SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
SHA2-256: (A4945)
SHA2-384: (A4945)
SHA2-512: (A4945)
KTS (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
SP 800-38F. KTS
(key wrapping and
unwrapping) per IG
D.G.
Standard:SP 800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
key-wrapping
technique
"combination"
AES-CBC: (A4945)
AES-CMAC: (A4945)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
method (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
256 and 256 bits of
security strength
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
IG C.K: The module includes CAVP certificates using FIPS 186-4 tests done prior to the IG C.K transition date of Feb 5th,
2024, and are mathematically identical to FIPS 186-5 CAVP tests, hence the module claim FIPS 186-5 compliance for
these tests.
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS). However, it does offer some or all
of the underlying KAS cryptographic functionality to be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved
KAS.
Compliance to SP 800-56ARev3 assurances
For KAS-ECC, the module satisfies IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2) (i.e., tested compliance with One Pass DH key agreement
schemes followed by the derivation of the key as shown in Section 5.8 of SP 800-56Arev3). The key derivation function
complies to SP 800-56C rev2 (i.e., One-Step KDF). Furthermore, the module obtained the appropriate assurances, as
required in Sections 5.6.2 of SP 800-56A rev3.
5.6.2.1 Assurances Required by a Key Pair Owner:
5.6.2.1.1 Owner Assurance of Correct Generation: The module performs key generation for ephemeral keys. Using the
key generation algorithm validated by the CAVP (ECDSA KeyGen Cert. #A4945). For static keys, a trusted third party
(TTP) generates the key pair and securely enters the module using SP800-38F key wrapping (AES + CMAC). The module
will perform a pairwise consistency check upon generating ECDH keys.
5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity: For ephemeral key pair, the module provides the assurance since the
module generates it. For static key pairs, after receiving the key pair, the module performs a separate check to determine
that the private key is in the correct interval.
5.6.2.1.3 Owner Assurance of Public-Key Validity: For both static and ephemeral key pairs, the module performs a full
public-key validation as a separate process from the key-pair generation process.
5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency: The module performs a pair-wise consistency test when the module
generates ephemeral key pairs and when static key-pairs are entered into the module.
5.6.2.1.5 Owner Assurance of Possession of the Private Key: For ephemeral key pairs, the owner generates the key pair
as specified in Section 5.6.1 and for static key pairs, the module performs a pair-wise consistency test when the key pairs
are entered.
5.6.2.2 Assurances Required by a Public Key Recipient
5.6.2.2.1 Recipient’s assurance Static Public-Key Validity: The module makes used of approved EC curves listed in
SP800-140D and performs a successful full public-key validation of the received public key i.e., ECC Full Public-Key
Validation Routine specified in SP800-56A rev3 section 5.6.2.3.3.
5.6.2.2.2 Recipient Assurance of Ephemeral Public-Key Validity: Not applicable. The module generates ephemeral keys
and does not ever receive them.
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5.6.2.2.3 Recipient’s assurance of owner’s possession of private key can be met via the use of a Trusted Third party that
requires the key confirmation procedure. Both of which are handled by the entity outside of the module that requested the
ECDH Key Agreement service from the module. That is, such checks are out of the module's scope.
5.6.2.2.4 Recipient Assurance of the Owner’s Possession of an Ephemeral Private Key: Not applicable. The module
generates ephemeral keys and does not ever receive them.
5.6.2.3 Public Key Validation Routines
The module performs the required public key validation before initiating the handshake following 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full
Public-Key Validation Routine.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E107 Infineon Technologies AG
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Infineon SLC37 32-bit Security
Controller V11 Entropy Source
Physical SLC37 32-bit Security
Controller V11
1 bits 0.418445
bits
non-vetted
conditioning function
Table 8: Entropy Sources
RNG Information: The module implements an approved SP 800-90Ar1 Deterministic Random Bit Generator in the form
of CTR_DRBG. The DRBG seed is generated from the SP 800-90B entropy source.
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements key generation services for RSA, ECDSA, EC Diffie-Hellman, and AES keys in compliance to
SP800-133rev2 Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed).
2.10 Key Establishment
The module provides an approved SP800-56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Scheme that is fully compliant with
IG D.F scenario 2 path (2).
The module provides an approved SP800-38F Key Transport that is fully compliant to IG D.G i.e., employing an approved
key-wrapping technique using a “combination” method: AES-CBC together with an approved authentication method AES-
CMAC.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The GP Secure Channel Protocol '03' establishment provides mutual authentication service as well as establishment of a
secure channel to protect confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data.
The ISO7816 Secure Messaging protocol is a Secure Channel Protocol based on ISO7816 Secure Messaging Format
which establishes a secure channel to protect confidentiality and integrity of transmitted information.
The ISO7816 Secure Messaging protocol conforms to SP800-56A for the establishment of a shared secret and key
derivation for session keys.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
RST [ISO 7816: Reset] Not available in
contactless-only configurations
Control
Input
Reset Signal
CLK [ISO 7816: Clock] Not available in
contactless-only configurations
Control
Input
Clock Signal
I/O [ISO 7816: Input/Output] Not available in
contactless-only configurations
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
APDU Command data field; ATR and APDU Response
data field; APDU Header (CLA INS P1-P2); Status Word
SW1-SW2
LA, LB [ISO 1443: Antenna] (Not available
in contact-only configurations)
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
APDU Command data field; ATR and APDU Response
data field; APDU Header (CLA INS P1-P2); Status Word
SW1-SW2
Vcc, GND [ISO 7816: Supply voltage] (Not
available in contactless-only configurations)
Power None
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not implement any control output interface.
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification
The module does not transmit unprotected CSPs over any interface.
The module does not implement a trusted channel.
3.3 Control Interface Not Inhibited
The control interface is inhibited while in the error state without any exceptions.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
GP Secure
Channel Protocol
Authentication
Identity-based authentication
using Global Platform Secure
Channel Protocol '03'
Authentication
AES-CMAC 1/2^128 = 2.9E39 (for
any of AES128/192/256
SD-DAK/SC-ENC,
assuming a 128bit
block)
9 /2^128 = 2.6E38 (for
any of AES128/192/256
SD-DAK/SC-ENC,
assuming a 128bit
block)
PKI Applet
Symmetric Key
Authentication
(External
Authentication)
It provides a challenge-
response-based proof of the
authenticity and the access
rights of a terminal.
AES-CBC 1/2^128 = 2.9E-39 5/2^128 = 1.4E-38
PKI Applet Secret
Value
Authentication
This authentication method
compares a PIN value sent to
the Module over an
encrypted channel to the
stored PKI-PIN value; if the
two values are equal, the
operator is authenticated.
N/A 3.97E-67 5.96E-66
Table 10: Authentication Methods
GP Secure Channel Protocol Authentication Method
The GP Secure Channel Protocol Authentication method is provided by the GP Secure Channel service, the PKI Applet
Secure Channel service. These services each invoke the same underlying library calls, but from the Card Manager and PKI
Applet respectively.
The SD-DAK and SD‐DMK keys are used to derive the SC‐ENC and SC‐C-MAC keys, respectively. The SC‐C-MAC key is
used to create a cryptogram; the external entity participating in the mutual authentication also creates this cryptogram. Each
participant compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram and if this succeeds, the two participants are
mutually authenticated (the external entity is authenticated to the module in the CO role).
The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:
• 1/2^128 = 2.9E‐39 (for any of AES‐128/192/256 SD‐DAK/SC‐ENC, assuming a 128‐bit block)
The module enforces a “slowdown mechanism” that increases the response time between two authentications attempts
following a failed authentication, such that no more than 9 attempts are possible in a one-minute period. The probability
that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute interval is:
• 9 /2^128 = 2.6E‐38 (for any of AES‐128/192/256 SD‐DAK/SC‐ENC, assuming a 128‐bit block)
GP Secure Channel Protocol establishment provides mutual authentication service as well as establishment of a secure
channel to protect confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data.
PIV Symmetric Key Authentication Method
The PKI Applet Symmetric Key Authentication method is provided by the PKI Applet Entity authentication with symmetric
key service. The external entity obtains an 16-byte challenge from the module, encrypts the challenge and sends the
cryptogram to the module. The module decrypts the cryptogram, and the external entity is authenticated if the decrypted
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value matches the challenge. This method is used by the PKI Applet Authentication and Administrator Authentication
services. The strength of authentication using this method is dependent on the algorithm, key size and challenge size
used: the minimum strength key used for this method is AES-128, using 16 bytes (a single AES block).
The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:
• 1/2^128 = 2.9E-39
The maximum number of consecutive failed authentication attempts is 5, so the probability that a random attempt will
succeed over a one minute interval is:
• 5/2^128 = 1.4E-38
PIV Secret Value Authentication Method
The PKI Applet Secret Value Authentication method is provided by the PKI Applet Entity authentication with password
service. The external entity submits an identifier and corresponding secret value. The module compares all 64 bytes to the
appropriate stored reference instance (e.g., Cardholder PIN). The enforcement of minimum number of characters before
padding is not the same as a fixed minimum length for the secret. For example, a minimum of 6 characters means secrets
can be created from 6 to 64 characters, determined by the user.
The worst-case scenario permitted by the module is a minimum length of 6 characters allowing only numeric ASCII
characters. The character space for the first 6 bytes in this scenario is 10 (the values ‘30’ through ‘39’ are permitted) and in
the last 58 characters is 11 (the values ‘30’ through ‘39’ and ‘FF’ are permitted). The probability that a random attempt will
succeed using this authentication method is:
• 1/(10^6 *11^58) = 3.97E-67
The applet implements a failed attempt counter, can be configured up to 15, blocking after 15 failed attempts. The probability
that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute interval is:
• 15/(10^6 * 11^58) =5.96E-66
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Identity CO GP Secure Channel Protocol
Authentication
User Identity User GP Secure Channel Protocol
Authentication
PKI Applet Symmetric Key
Authentication (External
Authentication)
PKI Applet Secret Value
Authentication
Table 11: Roles
The module supports the following roles:
• Cryptographic Officer (CO): Manages module content and configuration, including management of module data via
the Supplementary Security Domain (SSD).
• User (the device Holder (applet user): Performs Approved cryptographic operations.
Authentication of each operator and their access to roles and services is as described below.
The module:
• Does not support a maintenance role.
• Clears previous authentications on power cycle.
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• Supports Global Platform SCP logical channels, allowing concurrent operators in a limited fashion.
• Implement security conditions which must be satisfied to access specific features, not necessarily as a separate
role.
Authentication of each operator and their access to roles and services is as described below. Only one operator at a time
is permitted on a channel. Applet de-selection (including ISD/Card Manager), card reset, or power down terminates the
current authentication; re-authentication is required after any of these events for access to authenticated services.
Authentication data is encrypted during entry (by SC-ENC) and is only accessible by authenticated services.
4.3 Approved Services
The following convention is used to specify access rights to SSPs:
• Generate (G): The module generates or derives the SSP.
• Read (R): The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
• Write (W): The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• Execute (E): The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Zeroize (Z): The module zeroizes the SSP.
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Reset Power cycle or
reset the module
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
N/A Module ATR
(Contact) or
ATS
(Contactless)
that contains
configuration
information
None Unauthenticated
Select Select an
application
instance
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
AID of
Application to
Select
Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenticated
GP Secure
Channel
Establish
Establish a
Global Platform
secure
communications
channel
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Key Identifier,
Host
Challenge,
Security Level
Host
Cryptogram,
MAC
Card
Challenge,
Card
Cryptogram,
diversification
data, and key
information,
Status Word of
the command
AES-ECB
AES-CMAC
KBKDF SP
800-108
Crypto Officer
- SC-ENC: G,E
- SC-C-MAC:
G,E
- SC-R-MAC:
G,E
- SD-DAK: E
- SD-DMK: E
- SD-DEK: E
- OS-DRBG-
SEED: G,E
- OS-DRBG-
STATE: G,E
GP Get Data
(Cleartext)
Retrieve from the
Module data
objects
transmitted over
a plaintext
channel
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Tag of the
Data Object to
Retrieve
Data Object
Retrieved and
Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenticated
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Get Data (SC) Retrieve from the
Module data
objects
transmitted
through a Global
Platform Secure
Channel
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Tag of the
Data Object to
Retrieve for
which the AC
are satisfied
Data Object
Retrieved and
Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenticated
Global Platform
Lock / Unlock
Temporarily lock
& unlock the full
module or one of
its applications
using Global
Platform card life
cycle status
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Global
Platform card
life cycle status
to set, and AID
of the
application
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto Officer
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
Module
Termination
Set the card life
cycle status to
TERMINATED.
All the CSPs are
zeroized when
the life cycle
status is set to
TERMINATED
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
N/A Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto Officer
- SC-ENC: E,Z
- SC-C-MAC:
E,Z
- SC-R-MAC:
E,Z
- OS-DRBG-
SEED: Z
- OS-DRBG-
STATE: Z
- SD-DAK: Z
- SD-DMK: Z
- SD-DEK: Z
- DAP-AES: Z
- DAP-PUB
(including
intermediate
values): Z
- PKI-KPK: Z
- PKI-KXAUTH:
Z
- PKI-KIAUTH: Z
- PKI-KRSA-
PRI: Z
- PKI-KECC-
PRI: Z
- PKI-PIN: Z
- Shared-Secret-
Z: Z
- PKI-SENC: Z
- PKI-SMAC: Z
- PKI-KRSA-
PUB: Z
- PKI-KECC-
PUB: Z
- PKI-EPKECC-
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
PRI: Z
- SHARED-
SEC-SM: Z
- PKI-EPKECC-
PUB: Z
- IFD-EPKECC-
PUB: Z
Load FW with
RSA DAP
Load and install
application
packages (FW)
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Signed
Packages
(FW)
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
RSA sigVer
Crypto Officer
- DAP-PUB
(including
intermediate
values): E
Load FW with
AES DAP
Load and install
application
packages (FW)
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Signed
Packages
(FW)
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto Officer
- DAP-AES: E
Manage SD
Keys
Update SD keys Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
SD keys Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
KTS (AES-
CBC +
AES-
CMAC)
Crypto Officer
- DAP-PUB
(including
intermediate
values): W,E
- DAP-AES: W
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- SD-DAK: W
- SD-DMK: W
- SD-DEK: W
Manage SD
Data
Create or update
Security Domain
(SD) data
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
SD Data Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto Officer
- SD-DEK: E
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
Show Status Retrieve the
identification and
status of all
applications
present in the
module
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Level of details
to retrieve
Requested
application
status and
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto Officer
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
Remove an
application and
all its data and
keys from the
module
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
AID of the
application to
remove
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto Officer
- PKI-KPK: Z
- PKI-KXAUTH:
Z
- PKI-KIAUTH: Z
- PKI-KRSA-
PRI: Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- PKI-KECC-
PRI: Z
- PKI-PIN: Z
- Shared-Secret-
Z: Z
- PKI-SENC: Z
- PKI-SMAC: Z
- PKI-KRSA-
PUB: Z
- PKI-KECC-
PUB: Z
- PKI-EPKECC-
PRI: Z
- SHARED-
SEC-SM: Z
- PKI-EPKECC-
PUB: Z
- IFD-EPKECC-
PUB: Z
PKI Applet
Run Self-Tests
Run all pre-
operational and
conditional self-
tests
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
N/A Successful
execution
status
AES-ECB
CTR DRBG
ECDSA
sigGen
ECDSA
sigVer
KAS-ECC
RSA
sigGen
RSA sigVer
KBKDF SP
800-108
SHA
PKI Applet Run
Self-Tests
Run all pre-
operational and
conditional self-
tests
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
N/A Successful
execution
status
AES-ECB
CTR DRBG
ECDSA
sigGen
ECDSA
sigVer
KAS-ECC
RSA
sigGen
RSA sigVer
KBKDF SP
800-108
SHA
Unauthenticated
PKI Applet Get
DRBG
Retrieve random
numbers
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Number of
bytes
Requested
number of
bytes from the
CTR DRBG Unauthenticated
- OS-DRBG-
SEED: G,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
DRBG
generator
- OS-DRBG-
STATE: G,E
PKI Applet GP
Secure
Channel
Establish
Establish a
Global Platform
secure
communication
channel of PKI
Applet associated
Security Domain
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Key Identifier,
Host
Challenge,
Security Level
Host
Cryptogram,
MAC
Card
Challenge,
Card
Cryptogram,
diversification
data, and key
information,
Successful
execution
status
AES-ECB
AES-CMAC
KBKDF SP
800-108
User
- OS-DRBG-
SEED: G,E
- OS-DRBG-
STATE: G,E
- SC-ENC: G,E
- SC-C-MAC:
G,E
- SC-R-MAC:
G,E
- SD-DAK: E
- SD-DMK: E
- SD-DEK: E
PKI Applet
Configuration
Manage PKI
applet
authentication
data and PKI
Applet lifecycle. It
is only available
in PKI Applet life
cycle state
SELECTABLE
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Authentication
Key
Configuration
Data, PIN
Configuration
Data, Change
default periodic
counter
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- SD-DAK: E
- PKI-KXAUTH:
W
- PKI-KIAUTH:
W
- PKI-PIN: W
- PKI-KPK: W
PKI Applet Key
Management
(Symmetric
key)
Symmetric key
update
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Key ID,
Wrapped key
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
KTS (AES-
CBC +
AES-
CMAC)
User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KPK: W,E
- PKI-KXAUTH:
W
- PKI-KIAUTH:
W
PKI Applet Key
Management
(Asymmetric
key)
Asymmetric key
pair import
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Key ID,
Wrapped key
components
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
KTS (AES-
CBC +
AES-
CMAC)
User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KPK: E
- PKI-KRSA-
PRI: W
- PKI-KRSA-
PUB: W
- PKI-KECC-
PRI: W
- PKI-KECC-
PUB: W
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
PKI Applet
Asymmetric
Key Pair
Generation
RSA or ECC key
generation
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
KeyID,
Algorithm ID ,
Domain
parameters for
ECC
Successful
execution
status
ECDSA
keyGen
RSA
keyGen
PKI Applet
Asymmetric
key pair
Generation
RSA or ECC key
generation
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
KeyID,
Algorithm ID ,
Domain
parameters for
ECC
Successful
execution
status
ECDSA
keyGen
RSA
keyGen
User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KRSA-
PRI: G,W
- PKI-KECC-
PRI: G,W
- PKI-KRSA-
PUB: G,W
- PKI-KECC-
PUB: G,W
- OS-DRBG-
SEED: G,E
- OS-DRBG-
STATE: G,E
Preparing
Security
Operation
Environment
Specify the key to
be used by the
PSO command
and its operation
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Key ID, Hash
algorithm
Successful
execution
status
None User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
Perform
Security
Operation
(RSA digital
signature
generation)
RSA digital
signature
generation
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Input data
(message) or
/hashed
message)
Signature and
Successful
execution
status
RSA
sigGen
RSA
sigPrim
User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KRSA-
PRI: E
Perform
Security
Operation
(ECDSA
generation)
ECDSA
generation
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Input data
(message) or
/hashed
message)
Signature and
Successful
execution
status
ECDSA
sigGen
ECDSA
sigGen
component
User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KECC-
PRI: E
Perform
Security
Operation
(ECC CDH)
ECC CDH
Primitive Shared
Secret
Computation
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
algorithm,
Host ECC
public key
shared secret
and Successful
execution
status
KAS-ECC
CDH
Component
User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KECC-
PRI: E
- PKI-KECC-
PUB: R
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- Shared-Secret-
Z: G,R
Perform
Security
Operation
(Compute
Hash)
Compute the
hash value
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Message Hash and
Successful
execution
status
SHA User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
Perform
Security
Operation
(RSADP)
RSADP
operations
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Input data
(ciphertext)
decryption data
(plaintext) and
Successful
execution
status
RSA
Decryption
Primitive
User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KRSA-
PRI: E
RSA Raw
Operation
RSADP
operations for
RSA 2048 bits
key only
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Key ID, Input
data
(ciphertext)
First 128 bytes
of decryption
data (plaintext)
and Successful
execution
status
RSA
Decryption
Primitive
User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KRSA-
PRI: E
Get RSA Raw
Operation
Result
Retrieves the
remaining 128
bytes RSA
computation
response of a
prior RSA Raw
Operation service
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
the Offset of
the buffer to be
retrieved
The remaining
128 bytes
decryption data
(plaintext) and
Successful
execution
status
None User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
Change PIN Allows the User
to change their
PIN
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
PIN ID, old PIN
value, new PIN
value
Successful
execution
status
None User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-PIN: W
Unblock PIN Mechanism to
reset the retry
counter when the
card is blocked
after too many
failed PIN verify
attempts
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
PIN ID, new
PIN value
Successful
execution
status
None User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-PIN: W
Read File
Content
(Cleartext)
Provides file
content
management
(read)
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
File ID, offset,
length
Binary data
and Successful
execution
status
None User
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Read File
Content
(Transparent
EF)
Provides file
content
management
(read)
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
File ID, offset,
length
Binary data
and Successful
execution
status
None User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
Read File
Content (Public
Key EF)
Provides file
content
management
(read)
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
KeyID, Key
Component
index
Public Key
Component
data and
Successful
execution
status
None User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KRSA-
PUB: R
- PKI-KECC-
PUB: R
Write File
Content
Provides file
content
management
(update)
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
File ID, offset,
length, data
Successful
execution
status
None User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
Entity
authentication
with PIN
PKI Applet Secret
Value
Authentication
Method for User
role
Authentication
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
PIN ID, PIN
value
Successful
execution
status
None User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-PIN: E
Entity
authentication
with symmetric
key (EXT-
AUTH)
PKI Applet
Symmetric Key
Authentication
Method for User
role
Authentication
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Key ID, data
(host
cryptogram)
Card challenge
and Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KXAUTH:
E
Entity
authentication
with symmetric
key (INTER-
AUTH)
Internal
Authentication for
a device
authentication
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Key ID, host
challenge
Card
cryptogram
and Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
- PKI-KIAUTH: E
GP Security
Domain Secure
Messaging
Unwraps
command APDU
or Wraps
Response APDU
by using GP
Secure Channel
Protocol
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Protected
Command
APDU or plain
text Response
APDU
Unprotected
Command
APDU or
Protected
Response
APDU
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
User
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC: E
- SC-R-MAC: E
ISO7816
Secure
Messaging
Unwraps
command APDU
or Wraps
Response APDU
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Protected
Command
APDU or plain
Unprotected
Command
APDU or
Protected
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
User
- PKI-SENC: E
- PKI-SMAC: E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
by using PKI
Applet ISO7816
Secure
Messaging
Protocol
text Response
APDU
Response
APDU
PKI Applet Info
(Show Version)
Read
unprivileged PKI
applet data
objects
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
Command
parameters
PKI applet
version or Data
Object
Retrieved and
Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenticated
File Selecting Select a File by
supplying its file
ID
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
File ID Empty or File
Control
Information of
selected file
and Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenticated
ISO7816
Secure
Messaging
Establish
Establish a
secure
communication
channel
according to
ISO7816-4
Secure Message
format
Successful
Execution
Status
'9000'
IFD Ephemeral
Public Key,
IFD Nonce
ICC Ephemeral
Public Key,
ICC
Authentication
Token and
Successful
execution
status
KAS-ECC Unauthenticated
- PKI-EPKECC-
PRI: G,E
- PKI-EPKECC-
PUB: G,R
- SHARED-
SEC-SM: G,E
- PKI-SENC: G
- PKI-SMAC:
G,E
Table 12: Approved Services
The module supports unauthenticated services which perform cryptographic operations which are compliant to exceptions
provided in IG 4.1.A.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module includes a firmware load process (Manage Content service) to support necessary updates. New firmware
versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded
into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
When new firmware is loaded into the module using the "Load FW with RSA DAP" and "Load FW with AES DAP"
services, the Module verifies the SHA-256 digest computed over the all firmware, and the AES-CMAC authentication code
computed with SD-SMAC on each block of the firmware and the SHA-256 digest. In addition to the previous method, the
firmware load process verifies an RSA PSS signature computed with DAP-PUB or an AES-CMAC authentication code
computed with DAP-AES key on the firmware SHA-256 digest.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module performs an integrity test over the executable firmware loaded in non-volatile memory (NVM) (i.e. Javacard
Packages) and over the ROM Code (i.e. Operating System). The integrity test uses a 16-bit CRC.
The module does not provide any services via the HMI, SFMI, HFMI, or HSMI interface that allow the operator to examine
the executable code.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The pre-operational integrity test can be performed on demand by power cycling or resetting the module. The module may
perform conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests on demand through the "Run Self-Tests" service.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable
The module is classified as a single chip hardware module running on limited modifiable firmware, the requirements of this
section are not applicable.
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance
Hard tamper-evident
coating
Determined by the
operator
Observe the coating surroundings of the chip for any signs of
damage
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 EFP/EFT Information
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature
or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -25C EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
HighTemperature 112C EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
LowVoltage 1.5V EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
HighVoltage 6.6V EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -25°C
HighTemperature 115°C
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures
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8 Non-Invasive Security
This module implements non-invasive security techniques that are not listed in SP800-140F. These techniques are
mentioned in Section 12.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Volatile memory is used to temporarily store Generated or Established SSPs. Dynamic
NVM Non-Volatile memory (FLASH) Static
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or Algorithm
Global Platform Secure
Channel (SC) [Import]
Outside
entity
NVM Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
Global Platform Secure
Channel (SC) [Export]
NVM Outside
entity
Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
OU_PUB NVM Outside
entity
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
OU_APDU01 RAM Outside
entity
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
OU_APDU02 RAM Outside
entity
Plaintext Automated Electronic
IN_SSP01 Outside
entity
NVM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
IN_SSP02 Outside
entity
NVM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
IN_SSP03 Outside
entity
NVM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
IN_SSP04 Outside
entity
NVM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS (AES-CBC +
AES-CMAC)
IN_SSP05 Outside
entity
RAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
OU_PUB: Output to outside through Read File content service for public key components with Secure Messaging
protection.
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OU_APDU01: Output to outside through Perform Security Operation (ECC CDH) service Response APDU within Secure
Messaging.
OU_APDU02: Output to outside through PKI Applet ISO7816 Secure Messaging Establish service.
IN_SSP01: Input from outside through PKI Applet Configuration service with Secure Messaging protection.
IN_SSP02: Input from outside through PKI Applet Key Management service with Secure Messaging protection (When
PKI-KPK does not exist).
IN_SSP03: Input from outside through PKI Applet Key Management service with Secure Messaging protection (When
PKI-KPK exists).
IN_SSP04: Input from outside through PKI Applet Change PIN service with Secure Messaging protection.
IN_SSP05: Input from outside through PKI Applet ISO7816 Secure Messaging Establish service.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization Method Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Securely zeroizes all stored SSPs
within the module. Zeroisation
operation takes less than 1 second
to erase all plaintext SSPs
All stored keys zeroized By setting the module in
the GLOBAL PLATFORM
TERMINATED STATE
Global Platform
DELETE KEY
Securely zeroizes global platform
keys
Key values are zeroized,
this is also followed by
garbage collection to clear
any values in memory
Global Platform DELETE
KEY Command
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
Remove an application and all its
data and keys from the module
Key values are zeroized,
this is also followed by
garbage collection to clear
any values in memory
Global Platform DELETE
APPLICATION Command
M_CLEAR_APDU Zeroizes the APDU buffer memory
which is used as temporary
memory buffer
Values in memory
overwritten with zeros
Automatically upon
completing the processing
of a service
SELECT Context Clears global platform session
keys from memory
Values in memory
overwritten with zeros
SELECT Context
Command
New key generation Overwrites the previous key before
replacing with newly generated
value
Previous key overwritten
with zeros prior to
generating the new key
Automatically upon
generation of a new key
Error handling Secure messaging keys are
zeroized once an error occurs
Values in memory are
overwritten with zeros
Automatically upon error
detection
Module Reset Power cycles the module The module resets clearing
the contents of SSPs stored
in RAM memory
By invoking Module Reset
service, or by removing
power from the module
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
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9.4 SSPs
The table below summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services
implemented in the module.
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
OS-DRBG-
SEED
Entropy input and
nonce provided by the
Entropy Source used to
seed the Approved
DRBG
256 - 256 CSP - CSP CTR DRBG
OS-DRBG-
STATE
The current AES-128
CTR_DRBG Internal
State (V, Key)
128 - 128 CSP - CSP CTR DRBG CTR DRBG
SD-DAK Security Domain Data
Authentication Key
(DAK) used to generate
SC-ENC
256 - 256 CSP - CSP AES-CMAC
KBKDF SP
800-108
SD-DMK Security Domain Data
MAC Key (DMK) used
to generate SC-C-
MAC/SC-R-MAC
256 - 256 CSP - CSP AES-CMAC
KBKDF SP
800-108
SD-DEK Security Domain Data
Encryption Key (DEK)
used to decrypt CSPs
256 - 256 CSP - CSP AES-CBC
SC-ENC Session key used to
encrypt / decrypt
Secure Channel (SC)
data once Mutual
Authentication is
successful
256 - 256 CSP - CSP KBKDF SP
800-108
AES-CBC
SC-C-MAC Session key used to
verify inbound
(Command) Secure
Channel (SC) data
integrity
256 - 256 CSP - CSP KBKDF SP
800-108
AES-CMAC
SC-R-MAC Session key used to
verify outbound
(Response) Secure
Channel (SC) data
integrity
256 - 256 CSP - CSP KBKDF SP
800-108
AES-CMAC
DAP-AES Data Authentication
Pattern AES Key. New
256 - 256 CSP - CSP AES-CMAC
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
firmware signature
verification key
DAP-PUB
(including
intermediate
values)
RSA 2048 new
firmware signature
verification key.
2048 - 112 CSP - PSP RSA sigVer
PKI-KPK PKI Applet KEY
Protection Key
256 - 256 CSP
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES-CBC
PKI-KXAUTH PKI applet External
Authentication key
128, 192,
256 - 128,
192, 256
CSP
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES-CBC
PKI-KIAUTH PKI applet Internal
Authentication key
128, 192,
256 - 128,
192, 256
CSP
Symmetric
Key - CSP
AES-CBC
PKI-KRSA-PRI PKI applet signature
generation private keys
2048,
3072, 4096
- 112, 128,
150
CSP Private
Key - CSP
RSA
keyGen
RSA sigGen
RSA sigPrim
RSA
Decryption
Primitive
PKI-KECC-PRI PKI applet ECDSA
private keys for digital
signature generation or
ECCDH share secret
establishment.
P256,
P384,
P521 - 128,
192, 256
CSP Private
Key - CSP
ECDSA
keyGen
ECDSA
sigGen
ECDSA
sigGen
component
KAS-ECC
CDH
Component
PKI-PIN User Credential for PKI
Applet Secret Value
Authentication.
N/A - N/A CSP
Plaintext -
CSP
Shared-Secret-
Z
Shared Secret
generated with ECC
CDH
256, 384,
521 - 128,
192, 256
CSP
Plaintext -
CSP
KAS-ECC
CDH
Component
PKI-SENC ISO 7816 Secure
Messaging (SM)
session encryption key
256 - 256 CSP Derived
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS-ECC
PKI-SMAC ISO 7816 Secure
Messaging (SM)
session encryption key
256 - 256 CSP Derived
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS-ECC
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
PKI-KRSA-
PUB
RSA public keys held in
the module for retrieval
by external users
through the PKI applet.
2048,
3072, 4096
- 112, 128,
150
PSP Public
Key - PSP
RSA keyGen
PKI-KECC-
PUB
ECC public keys held in
the module for retrieval
by external users
through the PKI applet.
P256,
P384,
P521 - 128,
192, 256
PSP Public
Key - PSP
PKI-EPKECC-
PRI
Ephemeral key
generated by the
module, used for
shared secret
(SHARED-SEC-SM)
calculation
P384 - 192 CSP Private
Key - CSP
ECDSA
keyGen
KAS-ECC
CDH
Component
SHARED-
SEC-SM
Used to derive ISO
7816 Secure
Messaging session
keys
384 - 192 CSP
Plaintext -
CSP
KAS-ECC
CDH-
Component
(A4945)
KAS-ECC
PKI-EPKECC-
PUB
Ephemeral key
generated by the
module
P384 - 192 PSP Public
Key - PSP
ECDSA
keyGen
IFD-EPKECC-
PUB
External users's
Ephemeral Public Key
P384 - 192 PSP Public
Key - PSP
KAS-ECC
KAS-ECC
CDH
Component
Table 19: SSP Table 1
The following table continues to summarize the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic
services implemented in the module.
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
OS-DRBG-
SEED
RAM:Plaintext Until
zeroized
Module Reset OS-DRBG-
STATE:Derives
OS-DRBG-
STATE
RAM:Plaintext Until
zeroized
Module Reset OS-DRBG-
SEED:Derived
From
SD-DAK Global Platform
Secure Channel
(SC) [Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
SC-ENC:Derives
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SD-DMK Global Platform
Secure Channel
(SC) [Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
SC-C-MAC:Derives
SC-R-MAC:Derives
SD-DEK Global Platform
Secure Channel
(SC) [Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
SC-ENC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Channel
closed
SELECT Context
Module Reset
SD-DAK:Derived
From
SC-C-MAC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Channel
closed
SELECT Context
Module Reset
SD-DMK:Derived
From
SC-R-MAC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Channel
closed
SELECT Context
Module Reset
SD-DMK:Derived
From
DAP-AES Global Platform
Secure Channel
(SC) [Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE KEY
DAP-PUB
(including
intermediate
values)
Global Platform
Secure Channel
(SC) [Import]
Global Platform
Secure Channel
(SC) [Export]
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
New key generation
PKI-KPK IN_SSP01
IN_SSP02
IN_SSP03
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
SD-DEK:Decrypts
SC-ENC:Wrapped
By
PKI-
SENC:Wrapped By
PKI-KXAUTH IN_SSP01
IN_SSP02
IN_SSP03
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
SD-DEK:Decrypts
SC-ENC:Wrapped
By
PKI-
SENC:Wrapped By
PKI-KIAUTH IN_SSP01
IN_SSP02
IN_SSP03
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
SD-DEK:Decrypts
SC-ENC:Wrapped
By
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PKI-
SENC:Wrapped By
PKI-KRSA-PRI IN_SSP02
IN_SSP03
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PKI-KRSA-
PUB:Paired With
SC-ENC:Wrapped
By
PKI-
SENC:Wrapped By
SD-DAK:Decrypts
PKI-KPK:Decrypts
PKI-KECC-PRI IN_SSP02
IN_SSP03
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PKI-KECC-
PUB:Paired With
SC-ENC:Wrapped
By
PKI-
SENC:Wrapped By
SD-DEK:Decrypts
PKI-KPK:Decrypts
PKI-PIN IN_SSP01
IN_SSP04
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
SC-ENC:Wrapped
By
PKI-
SENC:Wrapped By
Shared-Secret-Z OU_APDU01 RAM:Plaintext Until end of
command
life cycle
M_CLEAR_APDU PKI-KECC-
PRI:Derived From
IFD-EPKECC-
PUB:Derived From
PKI-
SENC:Wrapped By
SC-ENC:Wrapped
By
PKI-SENC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Channel
closed
SELECT Context
Module Reset
SHARED-SEC-
SM:Derived From
PKI-SMAC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Channel
closed
SELECT Context
Module Reset
SHARED-SEC-
SM:Derived From
PKI-KRSA-PUB OU_PUB
IN_SSP02
IN_SSP03
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
PKI-KRSA-
PRI:Paired With
SC-ENC:Wrapped
By
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DELETE
APPLICATION
PKI-
SENC:Wrapped By
PKI-KECC-PUB OU_PUB
IN_SSP02
IN_SSP03
NVM:Obfuscated Until
zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PKI-KECC-
PRI:Paired With
SC-ENC:Wrapped
By
PKI-
SENC:Wrapped By
PKI-EPKECC-
PRI
RAM:Plaintext Until end of
command
life cycle
M_CLEAR_APDU
Module Reset
PKI-EPKECC-
PUB:Paired With
SHARED-SEC-
SM
RAM:Plaintext Until end of
command
life cycle
M_CLEAR_APDU
Module Reset
PKI-EPKECC-
PRI:Established By
IFD-EPKECC-
PUB:Established
By
PKI-SENC:Derives
PKI-SMAC:Derives
PKI-EPKECC-
PUB
OU_APDU02 RAM:Plaintext Until end of
command
life cycle
M_CLEAR_APDU
Module Reset
PKI-EPKECC-
PRI:Paired With
SHARED-SEC-
SM:Establishes
IFD-EPKECC-
PUB
IN_SSP05 RAM:Plaintext Until end of
command
life cycle
M_CLEAR_APDU
Module Reset
PKI-EPKECC-
PRI:Paired With
SHARED-SEC-
SM:Establishes
Table 20: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
The use of cryptographic keys with a security strength ≥112 but <128 bits for key generation, RSA digital signature
generation, RSA digital signature verification, and RSA Decryption Primitive are deprecated after December 31, 2030.
The use of HMAC Generation using keys ≥112 but <128 bits is acceptable through December 31, 2030, and disallowed
thereafter.
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10 Self-Tests
The module has the capability to perform pre-operational and conditional self-tests periodically by an internal counter and
an associated maximum value. The periodic counter is set to its maximum value on power on and it is decremented when
receiving an APDU. When the counter reaches zero, triggers a Periodic Self-Tests.
The periodic counter depends on the factory configuration (default is 32767) and can be adjusted from 1 to 32767 at PKI
Applet Personalization.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs pre-operational firmware integrity test automatically as a first action at power on. The module first
performs a CAST on the cryptographic algorithm test used to perform the approved integrity technique. The module will
enter the error state if either the conditional CAST or integrity test fails or proceed to test the conditional CASTs listed in
Table 25 if both passes.
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
CRC (ROM) 16-bit CRC EDC SW/FW Integrity 1 Performed over all ROM code
CRC (NVM) 16-bit CRC EDC SW/FW Integrity 1 Performed over all executable code in NVM
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs conditional CAST prior to the algorithm’s first use. The module performs Conditional Pair-wise
Consistency Tests upon generating RSA, ECDSA or ECDH asymmetric key pairs. The test is implemented by calculating
a signature on predetermined data and subsequently performing a verification of the signature. If the signature cannot be
verified, the generated key-pair is discarded. The module performs a conditional firmware load test when the module
loads new firmware.
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
CRC 16-bit CRC KAT CAST 1 CAST performed
prior to use of
algorithm for
firmware integrity
test
Device power-
on or reset
AES-ECB
(A4945)
128-bit key KAT CAST 1 Decrypt Boot Up or
"Context"
service
KDF SP800-108
(A4945)
CTR mode KDF
using AES-CMAC
with 128-bit key
KAT CAST 1 Key Derivation Boot Up or
"Context"
service
Counter DRBG
(A4945)
256-bit key KAT CAST 1 Instantiate,
Generate, Reseed
Boot Up or
"Context"
service
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
signature generation
followed by signature
verification using
curve P-256
PCT CAST 1 Sign/Verify On ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
ECDSA Signature
Generation using
curve P-256
KAT CAST 1 Sign generation
comparison
First Use or
"Context"
service
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
ECDSA Signature
Generation using
curve P-256
KAT CAST 1 Sign verification
comparison
First Use or
"Context"
service
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A7823)
KAS-ECC using
curve P-384 followed
by Two-step KDF
KAT CAST 1 KAS comparison First Use or
"Context"
service
SHA2-256
(A4945)
N/A KAT CAST 1 SHA2 Boot Up or
"Context"
service
SHA2-512
(A4945)
N/A KAT CAST 1 SHA2 Boot Up or
"Context"
service
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
N/A PCT CAST 1 Using both
Sign/Verify
operations
On RSA Key
Generation
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
N/A KAT CAST 1 Sign Boot Up or
"Context"
service
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
Signature Verification
using PKCS1-PSS
with 2048-bit key
KAT CAST 1 Verify First Use or
"Context"
service
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
SW/FW Load
test
Verification using
PKCS1-PSS with
2048-bit key
Firmware
load test
SW/FW
Load
1 Using RSA
signature
verification
Firmware
integrity test
AES-CMAC
(A4945) SW/FW
Load test
AES-CMAC
message
authentication code
using 128 bit key
Integrity
Test
SW/FW
Load
1 Using CMAC Firmware
integrity test
SHA2-256
(A4945) SW/FW
Load test
SHA-256 performed
over loaded firmware
Integrity
Test
SW/FW
Load
1 Message Digest Firmware
integrity test
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Entropy -
Adaptive
Proportion Test
(Continuous)
Cutoff value = 451 APT Critical
Function
1 Entropy Health
Test
Upon seeding or
reseeding the
SP 800-90A
DRBG
Entropy -
Adaptive
Proportion Test
(Startup)
Startup test with
1024 samples; Cutoff
value = 451
APT Critical
Function
1 Entropy Health
Test
Boot Up
Entropy -
Repetition Count
Test
(Continuous)
Cutoff value = 64 RCT Critical
Function
1 Entropy Health
Test
Upon seeding or
reseeding the
SP 800-90A
DRBG
Entropy -
Repetition Count
Test (Startup)
Startup test with
1024 samples; Cutoff
value = 64
RCT Critical
Function
1 Entropy Health
Test
Boot Up
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
The module has the capability to perform the pre-operational and conditional self-tests periodically. This may occur after a
predefined number of -minutes passes, or, depending on the factory configuration, after invoking a predefined number of
commands (APDUs).
The default configuration triggers a Periodic Self-Tests every 2 weeks of uninterrupted power. That time can be adjusted
by the Application Administrator from 1 to 32767 minutes.
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
CRC (ROM) EDC SW/FW Integrity After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
CRC (NVM) EDC SW/FW Integrity After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
CRC KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
AES-ECB (A4945) KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
KDF SP800-108
(A4945)
KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Counter DRBG
(A4945)
KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) (A4945)
PCT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4) (A4945)
KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A4945)
KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
KAS-ECC Sp800-
56Ar3 (A7823)
KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
SHA2-256 (A4945) KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
SHA2-512 (A4945) KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) (A4945)
PCT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4) (A4945)
KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A4945)
KAT CAST After invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Counter
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) SW/FW
Load test
Firmware load test SW/FW Load Upon loading of new
firmware
N/A
AES-CMAC (A4945)
SW/FW Load test
Integrity Test SW/FW Load Upon loading of new
firmware
N/A
SHA2-256 (A4945)
SW/FW Load test
Integrity Test SW/FW Load Upon loading of new
firmware
N/A
Entropy - Adaptive
Proportion Test
(Continuous)
APT Critical Function Prior to entropy
generation
Automatically
Entropy - Adaptive
Proportion Test
(Startup)
APT Critical Function Prior to entropy
generation
Automatically
Entropy - Repetition
Count Test
(Continuous)
RCT Critical Function Prior to entropy
generation
Automatically
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Entropy - Repetition
Count Test (Startup)
RCT Critical Function Prior to entropy
generation
Automatically
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
The module enters an error state upon failing any self-test. When the test fails, a special memory zone called the “Kill
Card Zone” records the reason for the failure. All cryptographic functions are inhibited while the module is in an error
state. The table below describes the error states in detail:
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Kill
Card
State
No further
communication is
possible with the
module until the
module is reset.
Pre-operational firmware integrity test fail
Any conditional self-test failure
Resetting the
module
An error code
is provided
through the
status
interface
BAD
APDU
Entered when an
incorrectly formatted
or unknown
command is received.
The module outputs a status word indicating the
error condition and returns to the Idle state,
clearing the error. This state includes Manage
Content service firmware load attempts that fail
the firmware load test; i.e., an attempt to load
new firmware that fails the firmware load test will
result in rejection of the command, and the new
firmware will not be accepted by the module.
Recovers
automatically
after reporting
the error
An error code
is provided
through the
status
interface
Table 25: Error States
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The Platform and the PKI Applet are configured at factory, to comply with and maintain the FIPS 140-3 validation, it would
be the CO’s responsibility to enable the Approved mode of operation as Administrator Guidance.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
To comply with and maintain the FIPS 140-3 validation, it would be the Crypto Officer’s responsibility for PKI Applet
installation and initialization to enable the Approved mode of operation as follows procedures.
1. Creating and Personalization a Security Domain for PKI Applet GP Secure Messaging.
2. Installation of the PKI Applet to the created Security Domain as associated Security Domain.
3. Personalization (initialization) of the PKI Applet.
4. Replace the default ISD keys with customer specific keys.
5. Change Card Life Cycle State to SECURED.
Detailed information about steps is described in document [GPC_SPE_014] for Security Domain operation and
[PKI_APP_PM01] for PKI Applet Personalization.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The approved and non-approved security functions, physical ports, and logical interfaces available to the users are
defined in this SP section 3.
Only approved mode of operation is available for users. In this mode of operation, only approved services in section 4.3.2
are available for users.
11.4 End of Life
The Module Termination service can be used to set the module's status to TERMINATED. All SSPs will be zeroized upon
module reset.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
The Module implements defenses against:
• Light attacks: The chip includes sensors to detect light attacks. A hardware attack event triggers the Kill Card
behavior described below.
• Invasive fault attacks: The chip includes sensors for fault attacks. A hardware attack event triggers the Kill Card
behavior described below.
• Side-channel attacks (SPA/DPA, timing analysis): The chip implements hardware countermeasures, such as
induced clock jitter. The operating system enables the hardware counter measures and implements independent
countermeasures in code, such as constant time execution.
• Electromagnetic attacks: This includes the defenses against side-channel attacks described above, where the
detection mechanism is monitoring chip emissions rather than physical power connections. In addition, the
hardware includes sensors to detect electromagnetic attacks, invoking Kill Card behavior if detected.
• Differential fault analysis (DFA): The operating system provides checks of expected conditions in areas of code
deemed sensitive. If the check detects an error, the Kill Card behavior is initiated.
• Card tearing attacks: The operating system implements methods to assure protective measures are completed in
the next cycle if the module loses power (i.e., is removed from the reader) before completion of the protective
function.
12.3 Guidance and Constraints
The Kill Card function logs the detected attack type in a table. The table has a preset limit; when the limit is reached, the
module initiates card termination, including overwrite of the CSPs, and the module is no longer operable.
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References
ANS X9.63-2001 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement and Key
Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography
2001
https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/ascx9/ansix9632001
ANSI X9.62 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
September 1999
https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/ascx9/ansix9621998
ANSI 504-1 Information Technology - Generic Identity Command Set - Part 1: Card Application
Command Set - Amendment 1
May 2016
https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/incits/incits5042013am12016
FIPS 140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
November 2023
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf
FIPS 140-3 IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-140-3-ig-
announcements
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
FIPS 201-3 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors
January 2022
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.201-3.pdf
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FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
August 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
GPC_SPE_014 GlobalPlatform Card Technology Secure Channel Protocol '03' Card Specification v2.2 –
Amendment D Version 1.1.1
July 2014
https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/GPC_2.2_D_SCP03_v1.1.1.pdf
GPC_SPE_034 GlobalPlatform Card Technology - Card Specification v2.3.1
March 2018
https://globalplatform.org/specs-library/card-specification-v2-3-1/
PKI_APP_PM01 HiCOS PKI Applet V4 Personalization Manual, version 1.1
October 2025
ISO 7816 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards
2004
ISO 14443 Identification cards — Contactless integrated circuit cards
2016
JavaCard JAVA CARD CLASSIC PLATFORM SPECIFICATION 3.1 CE
February 2021
https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/javacard-downloads.html
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version
2.1
February 2003
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
May 2005
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 2012
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
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SP 800-56Ar3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
April 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
SP800-56B Rev2 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br2.pdf
SP 800-56Cr2 Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes
August 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf
SP 800-73-4 Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification – Part 1: PIV Card Application Namespace, Data
Model and Representation
May 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-73-4.pdf
SP 800-78-4 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification
May 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-78-4.pdf
SP 800-85A-4 PIV Card Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines (SP 800-73-4 Compliance)
April 2016
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-85A-4.pdf
SP 800-90Ar1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators
June 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
SP 800-90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation
January 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
SP 800-108r1 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions
August 2022
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-108r1.pdf
SP 800-131Ar2 Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
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SP 800-133r2 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
June 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
SP 800-140Br1 CMVP Security Policy Requirements
October 2022
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140Br1.2pd.pdf