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Juniper Networks MX240, MX480, MX960 3D Universal Edge
Routers with RE-S-X6-64G Routing Engine and Multiservices
MPC
Firmware: Junos OS 19.1R2
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Version: 1.0
Date: May 22, 2020
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
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Contents
1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Hardware and Physical CryptographicBoundary..........................................................................7
1.2 Modes of Operation......................................................................................................................8
1.2.1 FIPS ApprovedModes ..................................................................................................................8
1.2.2 Non-ApprovedMode ...................................................................................................................9
1.3 Zeroization .........................................................................................................................................9
2 CryptographicFunctionality................................................................................................................11
2.1 Allowed Algorithms and Protocols..............................................................................................11
2.2 DisallowedAlgorithms and Protocols .........................................................................................15
2.3 Critical Security Parameters........................................................................................................16
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .....................................................................................................18
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles .........................................................................18
3.2 Authentication Methods .............................................................................................................18
3.3 Approved and Allowed Services..................................................................................................19
3.4 Non-Approved Services...............................................................................................................21
4 Self-tests..............................................................................................................................................23
5 Physical Security Policy........................................................................................................................25
6 Security Rules and Guidance...............................................................................................................20
6.1 Cryptographic-Officer Guidance .......................................................................................................21
6.1.1 Installing the FIPS-Approved firmware image ...........................................................................21
6.1.2 Enabling FIPS-Approved Mode of Operation.............................................................................21
6.1.3 Placing the Module in a Non-Approved Mode of Operation.....................................................23
6.2 User Guidance...................................................................................................................................23
7 References and Definitions .................................................................................................................25
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations .......................................................................5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements .....................................................................................6
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces .....................................................................................................................8
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions................................................................................11
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions................................................................................11
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions............................................................................11
Table 7 – QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions ...........................................................................13
Table 8 – XLP (MS-MPC) Approved Cryptographic Functions...................................................................14
Table 9 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions..............................................................................................14
Table 10 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode..............................................................................................14
Table 11 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)..........................................................................................16
Table 12 – Public Keys................................................................................................................................17
Table 13 – Authenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes..........................19
Table 14 – Authenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode......................................................................19
Table 15 – Unauthenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes .....................19
Table 16 – Unauthenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode..................................................................20
Table 17 – CSP Access Rights within Services............................................................................................20
Table 18 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes 21
Table 19 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode.............................................21
Table 20 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated traffic in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes 22
Table 21 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode ........................................22
Table 22 – References ................................................................................................................................25
Table 23 – Acronyms and Definitions........................................................................................................25
Table 24 – Datasheets ................................................................................................................................26
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (Left to Right: MX240, MX480, MX960) ..............................7
Figure 2 – Multiservices MPC (MS-MPC).....................................................................................................7
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1 Introduction
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Juniper Networks MX240, MX480,
MX960 3D Universal Edge Routers with RE-S-X6-64G Routing Engine and Multiservices MPC. The MX series
provides dedicated high-performance processing for flows and sessions and integrates advanced security
capabilities that protect the network infrastructure as well as user data.
This FIPS 140-2 validation includes the following MX series router models: the MX240, MX480 and MX960,
each loaded with the MS-MPC, which provides hardware acceleration for an array of packet processing-
intensive services such as Session Border Control functions, stateful firewall, NAT, flow monitoring, and
anomaly detection. This integration allows customers to eliminate external firewalls that consume router
ports and additional management resources. The FIPS validated version of firmware is Junos OS 19.1R2.
The cryptographic boundary for the MX Series is defined as follows for the validation:
• The outer edge of the chassis and including the Routing Engine (RE), the MS-MPC, Router Control
Board/Router Fabric Board (SCB)/(SFB) and slot covers in the following configurations:
o For MX240 (2 available RE slots, 2 additional slots): 1 SCB, 1 RE (RE-S-X6-64G), and at least 1
MS-MPC. All empty module bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air
circulation.
o For MX480 (2 available RE slots, 6 additional slots): 1 SCB, 1 RE (RE-S-X6-64G), at least 1 MS-
MPC. All empty module bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air
circulation.
o For MX960 (2 available RE slots, 12 additional slots): 1 SCB, 1 RE (RE-S-X6-64G), at least 1
MS-MPC. All empty module bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air
circulation.
• Includes the inverse three-dimensional space where non-crypto-relevant line cards fit, with the
backplane port serving as the physical interface.
• Excluding the power distribution module on the rear of the device.
The cryptographic modules provide for an encrypted connection, using SSH, between the management
station and the module. The cryptographic modules also provide for an encrypted connection, using IPSec.
All other data input or output from the modules are considered plaintext for this FIPS 140-2 validation.
The cryptographic modules are defined as multiple-chip standalone modules that execute Junos OS
19.1R2 firmware on any of the Juniper Networks MX 3D Universal Edge Routers listed in Table 1 below.
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Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations
Chassis PN Power PN SCB PN RE PN MS PN
MX240
PWR-MX480-2400-DC
PWR-MX480-2520-AC
SCBE2-MX RE-S-X6-64G
MS-MPC
MX480
PWR-MX480-2400-DC
PWR-MX480-2520-AC
SCBE2-MX RE-S-X6-64G
MS-MPC
MX960
PWR-MX960-4100-DC
PWR-MX960-DC
PWR-MX960-4100-AC
PWR-MX960-AC
SCBE2-MX RE-S-X6-64G
MS-MPC
The parts tested for this FIPS 140-2 validation are identified in Table 1.
Juniper also offers an enhanced routing engine that can be used in the MX series routers (RE-S-X6-
128G). The enhanced routing engine offers SSDs with more storage capacity (2x100G), and RAM with
more memory (128G) than the routing engines tested.
Juniper affirms that the enhanced routing engines use the same cryptographic functions that are
available in the routing engines listed in Table 1. However, the RE-S-X6-128G routing engine was not
tested for this FIPS 140-2 validation. No claim can be made as to the conformance of the MX series
routers with the enhanced routing engine for they were not tested by a CSTL or reviewed by the
CMVP.
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The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 overall:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 1
2 Ports and Interfaces 1
3
Roles, Services, and
Authentication
3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-test 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 1
The modules have a limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. They include a
firmware load service to support necessary updates. Any firmware versions other than Junos OS
19.1R2, loaded into the modules are out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS
140-2 validation.
The modules do not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
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1.1 Hardware and Physical CryptographicBoundary
The cryptographic modules’ operational environment is a limited operational environment.
The image below depicts the physical boundary of the modules. The boundary includes the Routing
Engine, MS-MPC, and SCB/SFB. The boundary excludes the non-crypto-relevant line cards included in the
figure. The modules exclude the power supplies from the requirements of FIPS 140-2. The power supplies
do not contain any security relevant components and cannot affect the security of the module.
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (Left to Right: MX240, MX480, MX960)
Figure 2 – Multiservices MPC (MS-MPC)
1 — OK/Fail LED 4 — Link/Act and Enable LEDs
2 — MSPU Status and APP LEDs 5 — Control 0 and Control 1 ports
3 — IC LED
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Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Device (# of ports) Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet
MX240/MX480/MX960:
Management port (1)
LAN
Communications/Remote
management
Control in, Data in, Data out,
Status out
Serial
MX240 (1), MX480 (1),
MX960 (1)
Console serial port
Control in, Data in, Data out
Status out
USB
MX240 (2), MX480 (2),
MX960 (2)
USB port - load Junos
image
Control in, Data in
Power
MX240 (4), MX480 (4),
MX960 (4)
Power connector, Power
over Ethernet
Power
LEDs
MX240 (2), MX480 (2),
MX960 (2), MS-MPC (14)
Status indicator lighting Status out
Online/Offline
Indicator
MX240 (3), MX480 (3),
MX960 (3)
Status indicator lighting Status out
Master/Slave
Indicator
MX240 (3), MX480 (3),
MX960 (3)
Status indicator lighting Status out
Reset Button
MX240 (1), MX480 (1),
MX960 (1)
Reset Control in
Online/Offline
Button
MX240 (1), MX480 (1),
MX960 (1)
Online/Offline
Control in
Chassis
Cluster
Control
MX240/MX480/MX960/MS
-MPC Disabled N/A
Aux
MX240 (1), MX480 (1),
MX960 (1)
Disabled N/A
Backplane
MX240 (1), MX480 (1),
MX960 (1)
Line card backplane
interface
Control in, Data in, Status
out, Data out
1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports three FIPS Approved modes of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation.
The module must always be zeroized when routering between any FIPS Approved mode of operation
and the non-Approved mode of operation and vice versa.
1.2.1 FIPS Approved Modes
The hardware versions contained in Table 1, with Junos OS 19.1R2 installed, contain three FIPS-
Approved modes of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The Junos OS 19.1R2 firmware
image must be installed on the device. The module is configured during initialization to operate in an
approved mode or a non-approved mode.
The Crypto-Officer places the module in an Approved mode of operation by following the instructions in
the crypto-officer guidance (section 6.1).
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The Crypto-Officer can verify that the cryptographic module is in an Approved mode by observing the
console prompt and running the “show version” command. When operating in FIPS mode, the prompt will
read “<user>@<device name>: fips#” (e.g. crypto-officer@mx240: fips#). The “show version” command
will allow the Crypto-Officer to verify that the validated firmware version is running on the module. The
Crypto-Officer can also use the “show system fips chassis level” command to determine if the module is
operating in FIPS mode.
The module supports three Approved modes of operation. The three modes are identified as “FIPS
Standard Mode”, “FIPS Reduced Throughput Mode” and “FIPS Recovery Mode.”
The FIPS Standard Mode is entered when the module is configured for FIPS mode and successfully passes
all the power on self-tests (POST) in both the routing engine (RE) and in each PIC of each of the MS-MPC
line cards installed in the chassis of the module (the maximum number of MS-MPC line cards that can be
installed in the module chassis is 2 in case of the MX240, 6 in case of the MX480 and 12 in case of the
MX960 modules). In the Standard and Reduced Throughput Approved modes, the module supports the
Approved and allowed algorithms, functions and protocols identified in Tables 4 - 8. The services available
in these modes are described in Table 13 and Table 17.
The Reduced Throughput mode is automatically selected by the module at power-up when the RE self-
tests pass, at least one PIC (each MS-MPC contains 4 PICs) in at least one of the MS-MPC line cards inserted
in the chassis passes its self-tests, and at least one PIC in at least one of the MS-MPC line cards fails its
self-tests. In this mode, the module offers reduced throughput VPN services.
In the Recovery Approved mode, the module supports the algorithms in Tables 4-6. The Recovery mode
is automatically selected by the module at power-up if at least one PIC in each of the MS-MPC cards fails
its power-up self-tests but the RE self-tests pass. In this mode, the module does not offer VPN services.
The services available in the Recovery mode are described in Table 14 and Table 18.
1.2.2 Non-Approved Mode
The cryptographic module supports a non-Approved mode of operation. When operated in the non-
Approved mode of operation, the module supports the algorithms identified in Section 2.2 as well as the
algorithms supported in the Approved mode of operation.
The Crypto-Officer can place the module into a non-approved mode of operation by following the
instructions in the crypto-officer guidance (section 6.1).
1.3 Zeroization
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-Approved
cryptographic algorithms are supported. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of
operation and the FIPS-Approved mode of operation, or vice-versa, the Crypto Officer shall zeroize all
keys and CSPs.
Zeroization completely erases all configuration information on the Router. The Crypto Officer initiates
the zeroization process by entering the “request vmhost zeroize no-forwarding” operational command
from the CLI after enabling FIPS mode. Use of this command is restricted to the Crypto Officer. (To
zeroize the system before enabling FIPS mode, use the “request vmhost zeroize no-forwarding
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command.)
Use of the zeroize command is restricted to the Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer shall perform
zeroization in the following situations:
1. Before FIPS Operation: To prepare the device for operation as a FIPS cryptographic module by
erasing all CSPs and other user-created data on a device before its operation as a FIPS
cryptographic module.
2. Before non-FIPS Operation: To conduct erasure of all CSPs and other user-created data on a
device in preparation for repurposing the device for non-FIPS operation.
CAUTION: Perform system zeroization with care. After the zeroization process is complete, no data is left
on the Routing Engine. The device is returned to the factory default state, without any configured users
or configuration files.
To zeroize the device:
1. From the CLI, enter
crypto-officer@device> request vmhost zeroize no-forwarding
VMHost Zeroization : Erase all data, including configuration and log files ? [yes,no] (no)
2. To initiate the zeroization process, type “yes” at the prompt:
VMHost Zeroization : Erase all data, including configuration and log files ? [yes,no] (no) yes
3. When the system finishes rebooting the system will be in a factory default state.
Note: The Crypto Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
2.1 Allowed Algorithms and Protocols
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 below. The Allowed Protocols in Table 10 summarizes the high-level protocol
algorithm support. There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the
module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in
this/these table(s).
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
C1784 DRBG SP800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
C1784 HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication,
DRBG Primitive
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits, λ =
128, 256
C1784 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
C1785 HMAC
PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits,
λ = 128, 256
C1785 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
C1786 AES1
PUB 197-38A
CBC, CTR,
ECB
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A2
CKG
SP 800-
133rev2
Section 5.1
Section 5.2
A generated seed
used in asymmetric
key generation using
1
The AES-ECB mode was used for testing the AES-CTR mode.
2
Vendor Affirmed
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CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
an unmodified DRBG
output
Section 6.2.1 Derivation of
symmetric keys
N/A3
KAS-SSC
SP 800-
56Arev3
ECC DH
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
Key Agreement
Scheme
C1786 CVL SP 800-135 SSH SHA 1, 256, 384, 512 Key Derivation
C1786 DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256
Random Number
Generation
C1786 ECDSA PUB 186-4
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
SigGen, KeyGen,
SigVer, PKV
C1786 HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 160
Message
Authentication
SHA-224 Key size: 224 bits, λ = 192
SHA-512 Key size: 512 bits, λ = 512
SHA-256
Key size: 256, bits, λ =
256
Message
Authentication,
DRBG Primitive
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #C1786 and HMAC Cert.
#C1786
key establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Triple-DES Cert. #C1786 and HMAC Cert.
#C1786
key establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits of
encryption strength
C1786 RSA PUB 186-4
n=2048 (SHA 256, 512)
n=3072 (SHA 256, 512)
n=4096 (SHA 256, 512)
KeyGen, SigGen4
,
SigVer5
C1786 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Digest
Generation,
3
Vendor Affirmed per IG D.1rev3
4
186-4 RSA 4096 SigGen was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance, because
186-2 RSA 4096 SigGen was tested and testing for 186-4 RSA 4096 SigGen is not available.
5
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance, because RSA
2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
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CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
SHA-384
SHA-512
KDF Primitive
SHA-224
Message Digest
Generation
C1786 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 7 – QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
C1787 AES PUB 197-38A CBC Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
C1787 DRBG
SP 800-90A
HMAC SHA-256
Random Bit
Generation
N/A6
CKG
SP 800-
133rev2
Section 5.1
Section 5.2
Asymmetric key
generation using
unmodified DRBG
output
Section 6.2.1
Derivation of
symmetric keys
C1787 CVL
SP 800-135 IKEv1 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384
Key Derivation
IKEv2 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384
C1787 HMAC
PUB 198 SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
Key size: 160 bits, λ = 160
Message
authentication
Key size: 256 bits, λ = 256
Key size: 384 bits,
λ = 192, 384
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #C1787 and HMAC Cert.
#C1787
Key establishment
methodology
provides between 128
and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Triple-DES Cert. #C1787 and HMAC Cert.
#C1787
Key establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits of
encryption strength
C1787 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
Message Digest
Generation, KDF
Primitive
C1787 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
6
Vendor Affirmed
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Table 8 – XLP (MS-MPC) Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
C1788 AES
PUB 197-38A CBC Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
SP 800-38D GCM Key Sizes: 128,192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A7
KAS-SSC
SP 800-
56Arev3
FFC DH 2048 (SHA 256)
Key Agreement
Scheme
ECC DH
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
Key Agreement
Scheme
C1788 ECDSA PUB 186-4
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
SigGen, SigVer
C1788 HMAC
PUB 198
SHA-256 Key size: 256, λ = 128
Message
authentication.
C1788 RSA
PUB 186-4
n=2048 (SHA 256)
n=3072 (SHA 256)
n=4096 (SHA 256)
SigGen, SigVer8
C1788 SHS PUB 180-4 SHA-256
Message Digest ESP
Generation
C1788 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 9 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
NDRNG [IG] 7.14
Scenario 1a
The module generates a minimum of 256
bits of entropy for key generation.
Seeding the DRBG
Table 10 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
IKEv19
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 256)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared
Secret
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
3 Key Triple-DES CBC
AES CBC
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
IKEv210
Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 256)
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
RSA 2048
RSA 4096
Pre-Shared
Secret
3 Key Triple-DES CBC
AES CBC
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
7
Vendor Affirmed per IG D.1rev3
8
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance, because RSA
2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
9
RFC 2409 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the IKEv1 protocol
10
IKEv2 generates the SKEYSEED according to RFC7296, from which all keys are derived to include Triple-DES keys.
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Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
ECDSA P-256
ECDSA P-384
IPsec ESP
IKEv1 with optional:
• Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 256)
• EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
IKEv1
3 Key Triple-DES CBC
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM11
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-256
IKEv2 with optional:
• Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 256)
• EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384
IKEv2
3 Key Triple-DES CBC
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM12
128/192/256
SSHv213
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, P-
521
RSA 2048
ECDSA P-256
3 Key Triple-DES CBC
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES CTR
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-512
No part of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The IKE and SSH
algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In Table 10
above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent and may be used in any viable
combination.
2.2 Disallowed Algorithms and Protocols
These algorithms and protocols are non-Approved algorithms and protocols that are disabled when the
module is operated in an Approved mode of operation. The algorithms are available as part of the SSH
connect service when the module is operated in the non-Approved mode.
Algorithms
• RSA with key size less than 2048
• ECDSA with ed25519 curve
• ECDH with ed25519 curve
• ARCFOUR
• Blowfish
• CAST
11
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol as
allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
12
The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC4106 and is used only in the context of the IPSec protocol as
allowed in IG A.5. Rekeying is triggered after 232
AES GCM transformations.
13
RFC 4253 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the SSHv2 protocol
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• DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant)
• HMAC-MD5
• HMAC-RIPEMD160
• UMAC
Protocols
• Finger
• ftp
• rlogin
• telnet
• tftp
• xnm-clear-text
2.3 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section. The CSPs in Table 11 are used
in the FIPS Standard and FIPS Reduced Throughput Modes. The FIPS Recovery Mode uses a subset of the
CSPs found in Table 11. The IPsec CSPs are not available for use in FIPS Recovery Mode of operation.
Table 11 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG
DRBG_State Values V and Key which comprise the HMAC_DRBG state
Entropy Input
String
256 bits entropy (min) input used to instantiate the DRBG
DH Shared
Secret
The shared secret used in Diffie Hellman (DH) key exchange. 256 bits. Established per
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
ECDH Shared
Secret
The shared secret used in Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) key exchange. 256, 384
or 521 bits. Established per the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st
time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. ECDSA P-256.
RSA2048
Used to identify the host.
SSH ECDH Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman private key used in SSH. ECDH P-256, P-384, or P-521
SSH-SEK
SSH Session Keys: SSH Session Encryption Key: 3-Key Triple-DES or AES (128,192,256);
SSH Session Integrity Key: HMAC.
ESP-SEK IPSec ESP Session Keys: ESP Session Encryption Key: 3-Key Triple-DES or AES (128,
192, 256); Session Integrity Key: HMAC. ESP Session Integrity Key: HMAC
IKE-PSK Pre-Shared Key used to authenticate IKE connections.
IKE-Priv IKE Private Key. RSA 2048.
IKE-SKEYID IKE SKEYID. IKE secret used to derive IKE and IPsec ESP session keys.
IKE-SEK
IKE Session Keys: IKE Session Encryption Key: 3-Key Triple-DES or AES (128,192,256);
IKE Session Integrity Key: HMAC
IKE-DH-PRI
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman private key used in IKE. DH (L = 2048,
N = 256), ECDH P-256, or ECDH P-384
HMAC key The libMD HMAC keys: message digest for hashing password and critical function test.
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Name Description and usage
User Password Passwords used to authenticate Users to the module.
CO Password Passwords used to authenticate COs to the module.
Table 12 – Public Keys
Name
D
Description and usage
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P-256, RSA 2048, RSA 3072, or RSA 4096
SSH-ECDH-PUB
Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman public key used in SSH key establishment. ECDH P-256, P-384, or
P-521
IKE-PUB IKE Public Key ECDSA P-256, ECDSA P-384, RSA 2048.
IKE-DH-PUB
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman public key used in IKE key establishment. DH
2048 modp, ECDH P-256, or ECDH P-384
Auth-User Pub
User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-
384, P-521, RSA 2048, RSA 4096
Auth-CO Pub
CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-384,
P-521, RSA 2048, RSA 4096
Root CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at software
load and also at runtime for integrity.
Package CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate;Used to verify the validity the Juniper Image at software load and
also at runtime for integrity.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Crypto Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent operators,
but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the separation
of roles using identity-based operator authentication.
The Crypto Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As root or
super-user, the Crypto Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module and establish
VPN tunnels.
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The User role cannot change the configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-Based authentication, Username and password over the
Console and SSH as well as Username and ECDSA or RSA public key over SSH.
Password authentication: The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the
96 human readable ASCII characters. The maximum passwordlength is 20-characters. Thus, the probability
of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming 0
time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-second
delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous (e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-second
delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of 7 possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best approach
for the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be spawned.
This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per hour/60
mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6 attempts. The
probability of a success with multiple consecutiveattempts in a one-minute period is 9/ (9610
), which is less
than 1/100,000.
ECDSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. The module supports ECDSA (P-256, P-384,
and P-521), which has a minimum equivalent computational resistance to attack of either 2128
, 2192
or
2256
depending on the curve. Thus, the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/ (2128
), which is
less than 1/1,000,000. Configurable SSH connection establishment rate limits the number of connection
attempts, and thus failed authentication attempts in a one-minute period to a maximum of 15,000
attempts. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period
is 15,000/(2128
), which is less than 1/100,000.
RSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. The module supports RSA (2048, 4096), which
has a minimum equivalent computational resistance to attack of 2112
(2048). Thus, the probability of a
successful random attempt is 1/ (2112
), which is less than 1/1,000,000. Configurable SSH connection
establishment rate limits the number of connection attempts, and thus failed authentication attempts in
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a one-minute period to a maximum of 15,000 attempts. The probability of a success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 15,000/ (2112
), which is less than 1/100,000.
3.3 Approved and Allowed Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 16 lists the access to CSPs by
each service.
Table 13 – Authenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes
Service Description CO User
Configure security
Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic IPsec protected routing x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
IPsec connect Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset, Performs self-tests on demand x
Load image Verification and loading of a validated firmware image into
the router.
x
Table 14 – Authenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode
Service
D
Description CO
U
ser
Configure security
Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset, Performs self-tests on demand x
Load image Verification and loading of a validated firmware image into
the router.
x
Table 15 – Unauthenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes
Service
D
Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services (e.g. OSPF, BGP)
LED status Basic
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Table 16 – Unauthenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode
Service
D
Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
LED status Basic
Table 17 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
Entropy
Input
String
DH
Shared
Secret
ECDH
Shared
Secret
SSH
PHK
SSH
ECDH
SSH-SEK
ESP-SEK
IKE-PSK
IKE-Priv
IKE-SKEYID
IKE-SEK
IKE-DH-PRI
HMAC
Key
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure
security
-- E --
GW
R
GW
R
GW
R
-- -- --
W
R
GW
R
-- -- -- G W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure
traffic
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- -- E -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
SSH
connect
-- E -- -- E E GE GE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
IPsec
connect
-- E -- E E -- -- -- G E E GE G GE -- -- --
Console
access
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote
reset
GEZ GZ GZ Z Z -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z Z -- --
Load Image -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Local reset GEZ GZ GZ Z Z -- Z Z Z -- -- Z Z Z -- -- --
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module (persistent storage)
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
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3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions
provided by the non-Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of
SSH Connect (non-compliant) and IPSec Connect (non-compliant). SSH Connect (non-compliant)
supports the security functions identified in Section 2.2 and the SSHv2 row of Table 10. The IPsec (non-
compliant) supports the DSA in Section 2.2 and the IKEv1, IKEv2 and IPSec rows of Table 10.
Table 18 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes
Service Description CO User
Configure security
(non-compliant)
Security relevant configuration x
Configure (non-
compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic (non-
compliant)
IPsec protected routing x
Status (non-
compliant)
Show status x x
Zeroize
(non-compliant)
Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
(non-compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
IPsec connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) x
Console access (non-
compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset
(non-compliant)
Software initiated reset, Performs self-tests on demand x
Load image (non-
compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware image into the
router.
x
Table 19 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode
Service
D
Description CO
U
User
Configure security
(non-compliant)
Security relevant configuration x
Configure (non-
compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration x
Status (non-
compliant)
Show status x x
Zeroize (non-
compliant)
Destroy all CSPs x
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Service
D
Description CO
U
User
SSH connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
Console access (non-
compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset (non-
compliant)
Software initiated reset, Performs self-tests on demand x
Load image (non-
compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware image into the
router.
x
Table 20 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated traffic in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
LED Status Basic
Table 21 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode
Service
D
Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
LED status Basic
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4Self-tests
Each time the module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling
the module (Remote reset service).
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs for the selected
Approvedmode of operationmust be completedsuccessfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the
module. If one of the Routing Engine KATs fails, the module enters the Error state. If one or more of the
Multiservices MPC KATs fails, the module selects the Reduced Throughput or Recovery Approved mode of
operation.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
Routing Engine (RE):
• Firmware Integrity check: using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
• Kernel KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
• QuickSec KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
o KDF-IKE-V1 KAT
o KDF-IKE-V2 KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
• OpenSSL KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-224 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o KAS-ECC KAT
o KDF-SSH KAT
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o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
• LibMD KATs
o HMAC SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
MS-MPC
• XLP (MS MPC) KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-GCM (128/256) Decrypt KAT
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
• Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational environment,
and verification of optional non-critical packages.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous RNG Test on the OpenSSL and QuickSec SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG.
• Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG.
• Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA and RSA key pairs.
• Firmware Load Test (ECDSA signature verification).
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5 Physical Security Policy
The modules physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 1 Physical
Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated, cold
rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. The module enclosure is made of production
grade materials. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for
any sort of observation of any component contained within the cryptographic boundary.
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6 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design correspondsto the security rules below. The term must in this contextspecifically refers
to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements indicate a
security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting plaintext
CSPs.
11. The Crypto Officer must verify that the firmware image to be loaded on the module is a FIPS validated
image. If any other non-validated image is loaded the module will no longer be a FIPS validated
module.
12. The Crypto Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. If the module loses power and then it is restored, then a new key shall be established for use with the
AES GCM encryption/decryption processes.
14. The operator is required to ensure that Triple-DES keys used in IPsec and SSH do not perform more
than 2^20 encryptions.
15. Virtual Chassis is not supported in FIPS mode and shall not be configured on the modules.
16. RSA key generated shall only be 2048 bits or greater.
17. The module shall not be configured to use a radius server and the radius server capability shall be
disabled.
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6.1 Cryptographic-Officer Guidance
The Crypto Officer must check to verify the firmware image on the Router is the FIPS 140-2 validated
image. If the image is the FIPS 140-2 validated image, then proceed to section 6.1.2.
6.1.1 Installing the FIPS-Approved firmware image
Download the validated firmware image from the
https://www.juniper.net/support/downloads/junos.html. Log in to the Juniper Networks authentication
system using the username (generally your e-mail address) and password supplied by Juniper Networks
representatives. Select the validated firmware image. Download the firmware image to a local host or to
an internal software distribution site.
Connect to the console port on the device from your management device and log in to the Junos OS CLI.
Copy the firmware package to the deviceto the /var/tmp/ directory. Install the new package on the
device:
user@device> request vmhost software add /var/tmp/package.tgz.
NOTE: If you need to terminate the installation, do not reboot your device; instead, finish the
installation and then issue the request system software delete package.tgz command, where
package.tgz is, for example, junos-vmhost-install-mx-x86-64-19.1R2.8.tgz. This is your last chance to
stop the installation.
Reboot the device to load the installation and start the new firmware image:
user@device> request vmhost reboot
After the reboot has completed, log in and use the show version command to verify that the new
version of the firmware is successfully installed.
Also install the fips-mode package and jpfe-fips package needed for Routing Engine KATS and for Line
card KATS. The following are the commands used for installing these packages:
user@device >request system software add optional://fips-mode.tgz
user@device >request system software add optional://jpfe-fips.tgz
6.1.2 Enabling FIPS-Approved Mode of Operation
The Crypto Officer is responsible for initializing the module in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The
FIPS-Approved mode of operation is not automatically enabled. The Crypto Officer shall place the
module in the FIPS-Approved mode by first zeroizing the device to delete all keys and CSPs. The
zeroizing instructions are in section 1.3 of this document. Next, the Crypto Officer shall follow the steps
found in the Junos OS FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX240, MX480, MX960 Devices, Release
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19.1R2 document Chapters 3 & 7 to place the module into a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The
steps from the aforementioned document are repeated below:
The FIPS Modes are not automatically enabled once the firmware image is installed on the platform.
These steps are for putting the module into the FIPS Standard Mode, FIPS Reduced Throughput Mode or
FIPS Recovery Mode.
The FIPS Standard Mode will be selected automatically if all power-on self-tests pass successfully during
the reboot after committing the module to FIPS mode. The FIPS Reduced Throughput Mode of operation
is selected automatically if all the RE KATs pass and at least one MS-MPC in the module chassis passes all
of its self-tests, and at least one MS-MPC in the module chassis fails one or more of its self-tests. The
FIPS Recovery Mode is selected automatically if all the RE KATs pass and if each of the MS-MPC line
cards fails one or more of its KATs. To enable FIPS mode in Junos OS on the device:
1. Zeroize the device as explained in Section 1.3. Once device comes up in amnesiac mode post
zeroize, connect to device using console port with username “root”, enter the configuration
mode and configure the root-authentication password, then configure crypto-officer
credentials. The root authentication password can be configured as follows:
root@device> edit
Entering configuration mode
[edit]
root@device# set system root-authentication plain-text-password
New password:
Retype new password:
[edit]
root@device# commit
configuration check succeeds
commit complete
2. Login to the device with crypto-officer credentials and enter configuration mode:
crypto-officer@device> edit
Entering configuration mode
[edit]
crypto-officer@device#
3. Enable FIPS mode on the device by setting the FIPS level to 1, and verify the level:
[edit]
crypto-officer@device # set system fips chassis level 1
[edit]
crypto-officer@device # show system fips chassis level
level 1;
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4. Commit the configuration
[edit ]
crypto-officer@device# commit
configuration check succeeds
Generating RSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_key
Generating RSA2 key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_rsa_key
Generating ECDSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_ecdsa_key
[edit]
'system'
reboot is required to transition to FIPS level 1
commit complete
5. Reboot the device:
[edit]
crypto-officer@device# run request vmhost reboot
Reboot the system ? [yes,no] (no) yes
During the reboot, the device runs Known Answer Tests (KATS). It returns a login
prompt:
crypto-officer@device:fips>
6. After the reboot has completed, log in and use the show version l command to verify the
firmware version is the validated version.
crypto-officer@device:fips> show version
6.1.3 Placing the Module in a Non-Approved Mode of Operation
As Crypto Officer, the operator needs to disable the FIPS-Approved mode of operation on the device to
return it to a non-Approved mode of operation. To disable FIPS-Approved mode on the device, the
router must be zeroized. Follow the steps found in section 1.3 to zeroize the router.
6.2 User Guidance
The user should verify that the module is operating in the desired mode of operation (FIPS-Approved
mode or non-Approved mode) by observing the command prompt when logged into the device. If the
string “:fips” is present then the device is operating in a FIPS-Approved mode. Otherwise it is operating
in a non-Approved mode.
All FIPS users, including the Crypto Officer, must observe security guidelines at all times.
All FIPS users must:
• Keep all passwords confidential.
• Store devices and documentation in a secure area.
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• Deploy devices in secure areas.
• Check audit files periodically.
• Conform to all other FIPS 140-2 security rules.
• Follow below guidelines:
• Users are trusted.
• Users abide by all security guidelines.
• Users do not deliberately compromise security.
• Users behave responsibly at all times.
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7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 22 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
Table 23 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
MD5 Message Digest 5
MIC Modular Interface Card
MPC Modular PIC Concentrator
MS Multiservices
PIC Port Interface Card
RE Routing Engine
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SCB Router Control Board
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
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Table 24 – Datasheets
Model Title URL
MX240
MX480
MX960
MX240, MX480, MX960 3D
Universal Edge Routers
https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datasheet
s/1000597-en.pdf
MS-MPC
MX Series MS-MPC and MS-MIC
Service Cards
http://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos15.
1/topics/concept/ms-mic-and-mpc-overview.html