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HPE Aruba Networking VIA Cryptographic
Module
Software Version 1.1
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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FIPS 140-3 Level 1
Document Version 1.0
June 2026
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Copyright
© 2026 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company trademarks include , HPE Wireless Networks, HPE
Networking, the registered HPE Networking the Mobile Edge Company logo, HPE Networking Mobility Management System®
, Mobile Edge Architecture®
,
People Move. Networks Must Follow®
, RFProtect®
, Green Island®
. All rights reserved. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. HPE
Networking is a Hewlett Packard Enterprise company.
The resource assets in this firmware may include abbreviated and/or legacy terminology for HPE Networking products. See
https://www.hpe.com/us/en/networking/ for current and complete HPE Networking product lines and names.
Open Source Code
Certain Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company products include Open Source software code developed by third parties, including software code subject to the
GNU General Public License (GPL), GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL), or other Open Source Licenses. The Open Source code used can be found at this
site:
https://myenterpriselicense.hpe.com/cwp-ui/software
Legal Notice
The use of Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company switching platforms and software or firmware, by all individuals or corporations, to terminate other vendors’
VPN client devices constitutes complete acceptance of liability by that individual or corporation for this action and indemnifies, in full, Hewlett Packard
Enterprise Company, from any and all legal actions that might be taken against it with respect to infringement of copyright on behalf of those vendors.
https://www.hpe.com/us/en/networking/
1701 E Mossy Oaks Rd,
Spring, TX, USA 77389
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Phone: 1-888-342-2156
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Table of Contents
1 General..........................................................................................................................................................10
1.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................................10
1.2 Security Levels............................................................................................................................................10
1.3 Additional Information...............................................................................................................................11
1.4 Acronyms and Abbreviations .....................................................................................................................11
2 Cryptographic Module Specification.............................................................................................................14
2.1 Description.................................................................................................................................................14
2.1.1 Purpose and Use ..................................................................................................................................................... 14
2.1.2 Cryptographic Boundary ......................................................................................................................................... 14
2.1.3 Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP)............................................................................. 14
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification..............................................................15
2.2.1 Executable Code Sets .............................................................................................................................................. 15
2.2.2 Tested Operational Environments .......................................................................................................................... 15
2.2.3 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments.......................................................................................................... 16
2.3 Excluded Components................................................................................................................................16
2.4 Modes of Operation...................................................................................................................................16
2.5 Algorithms..................................................................................................................................................17
2.5.1 Approved Algorithms .............................................................................................................................................. 17
2.5.2 Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms................................................................................................................................... 19
2.6 Security Function Implementations...........................................................................................................19
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ..................................................................................................................22
2.7.1 AES-GCM................................................................................................................................................................. 22
2.7.2 SHA-1 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 22
2.7.3 RSA.......................................................................................................................................................................... 22
2.7.4 ECDSA...................................................................................................................................................................... 22
2.8 RBG and Entropy........................................................................................................................................22
2.9 Key Generation...........................................................................................................................................22
2.10 Key Establishment......................................................................................................................................23
2.11 Industry Protocols......................................................................................................................................23
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces .................................................................................................................24
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................................................24
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication..............................................................................................................25
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4.1 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................................25
4.2 Roles...........................................................................................................................................................25
4.3 Approved Services......................................................................................................................................26
4.3.1 Show version........................................................................................................................................................... 29
4.3.2 Show status............................................................................................................................................................. 29
4.4 Non-Approved Services..............................................................................................................................29
4.5 External Software Loaded ..........................................................................................................................29
5 Software Security..........................................................................................................................................30
5.1 Integrity Techniques...................................................................................................................................30
5.2 Initiate on Demand ....................................................................................................................................30
6 Operational Environment .............................................................................................................................31
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ...................................................................................31
6.2 Configuration settings and restrictions......................................................................................................31
7 Physical Security............................................................................................................................................32
8 Non-Invasive Security....................................................................................................................................33
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ................................................................................................34
9.1 Storage Areas .............................................................................................................................................34
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ........................................................................................................................34
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................................................34
9.4 SSPs ............................................................................................................................................................35
9.5 Transitions..................................................................................................................................................38
10 Self-Tests.......................................................................................................................................................39
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests .........................................................................................................................39
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................40
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ...................................................................................................................41
10.4 Error States ................................................................................................................................................41
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests.................................................................................................................42
10.6 Additional Information...............................................................................................................................42
11 Life-Cycle Assurance......................................................................................................................................43
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures....................................................................................43
11.2 Administrator Guidance.............................................................................................................................43
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11.2.1 Zeroization .............................................................................................................................................................. 43
11.2.2 AES-GCM................................................................................................................................................................. 43
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance.....................................................................................................................43
11.6 End of Life...................................................................................................................................................45
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ..........................................................................................................................46
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................................................11
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)...................................15
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid..................................................................16
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................................16
Table 5: Modes List and Description ...........................................................................................................................16
Table 6: Approved Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................19
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms .........................................................................................................................19
Table 8: Security Function Implementations...............................................................................................................21
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................................................................................24
Table 10: Roles.............................................................................................................................................................25
Table 11: Approved Services .......................................................................................................................................28
Table 12: Storage Areas...............................................................................................................................................34
Table 13: SSP Input-Output Methods..........................................................................................................................34
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods .............................................................................................................................34
Table 15: SSP Table 1...................................................................................................................................................35
Table 16: SSP Table 2...................................................................................................................................................37
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................39
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................................40
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .........................................................................................................41
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information.................................................................................................................41
Table 21: Error States ..................................................................................................................................................41
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram...............................................................................................................................................15
Preface
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including the copyright notice. Products identified herein contain confidential
commercial firmware. Valid license required.
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Document Revision History
Version Date Description
1.0 June 2026 Initial FIPS 140-3 release for Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module software version
1.1, a software library that provides cryptographic services required by the calling HPE Aruba Networking
application (e.g., the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) product).
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1 General
This section describes:
• The purpose of this document.
• Hewlett Packard Enterprise documents related to this document contents.
• Where to go for additional Hewlett Packard Enterprise product information.
• Acronyms and abbreviations.
• The assurance security levels for each of the areas described in the FIPS 140-3 Standard.
1.1 Overview
This release supplement provides information regarding the Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module software version 1.1 FIPS
140-3 Level 1 validation from Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE). Throughout this document, references to HPE Aruba Networking are to the Hewlett Packard
Enterprise division. The material in this supplement modifies the general Hewlett Packard Enterprise software documentation included with this product and
should be kept with your Hewlett Packard Enterprise product documentation.
This supplement primarily covers the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE Aruba Networking VIA
Crypto Module software version 1.1. This security policy describes how the module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3 Level 1 and how to place and
maintain the module in the secure Approved mode. This policy was prepared as part of the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 validation of the product.
FIPS 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government
requirements for cryptographic modules. FIPS 140-3 aligns with ISO/IEC 19790:2012(E) and includes modifications of the Annexes that are allowed to the
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), as a validation authority. The testing for these requirements will be in accordance with ISO/IEC
24759:2017(E), with the modifications, additions or deletions of vendor evidence and testing allowed as a validation authority under paragraph 5.2. More
information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) website at:
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
In addition, in this document, the Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module is referred to as the module, the cryptographic
module, and VIA crypto module.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
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Section Title Security Level
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
More information is available from the following sources:
• See the Hewlett Packard Enterprise web site for the full line of products from HPE Networking:
https://www.hpe.com/us/en/networking/
• The NIST Validated Modules web site contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the product:
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules/search
Enter Hewlett Packard Enterprise in the Vendor field then select Search to see a list of FIPS validated Hewlett Packard Enterprise cryptographic
modules.
Select the Certificate Number for the Module Name ‘HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module’.
1.4 Acronyms and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AP Access Point
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, a branch of CSE
CLI Command Line Interface
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CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CPSec Control Plane Security protected
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DF Derivation Function
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
ECO External Crypto Officer
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
ESV Entropy Source Validation
FE Fast Ethernet
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GHz Gigahertz
GPC General Purpose Computer
GPOS General Purpose Operating System
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
Hz Hertz
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPsec Internet Protocol security
KAT Known Answer Test
KEK Key Encryption Key
L2TP Layer-2 Tunnelling Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light Emitting Diode
NTP Network Time Protocol
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
PCT Pairwise Consistency Test
PSP Public Security Parameter
SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
SPOE Serial & Power Over Ethernet
TEL Tamper-Evident Label
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TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TOEPP Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter
TPM Trusted Platform Module
VIA Virtual Intranet Access
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
2.1.1 Purpose and Use
The Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module version 1.1 (also referred to as ‘the module’) is a software type cryptographic
module that was validated under FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements and meets the claims made in this document. The module provides cryptographic services to
HPE Aruba Networking applications (e.g., the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) product - out of scope of this validation) through an
Application Program Interface (API).
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
2.1.2 Cryptographic Boundary
The module’s cryptographic boundary is defined as the shared dynamic library file. All operations of the module occur via calls from HPE Aruba Networking
applications and their respective internal daemons/processes. The module is linked to the calling HPE Aruba Networking application and no interface is
provided to the end user, so only functions within the module can call the cryptographic functions. The HPE Aruba Networking applications that use the API
calls with the module are out of scope for this validation.
2.1.3 Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP)
The TOEPP is the production-grade enclosure of the hardware chassis of the General-Purpose Computer (GPC) where the module is installed (see Figure 1 block
diagram below).
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Figure 1: Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
2.2.1 Executable Code Sets
Package or File Name Software/ Firmware Version Features Integrity Test
libancrypto.so (android) 1.1 Android MAC verification
libancrypto.so (linux) 1.1 Linux MAC verification
ancrypto.dll 1.1 Windows MAC verification
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
2.2.2 Tested Operational Environments
Operating System Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor or Host OS Version(s)
Android 16 Samsung Galaxy S24 Samsung Exynos 2400 (ARMv9.2-A) No - 1.1
Ubuntu 22.04 LTS Dell Vostro 3500 Intel Core i3-1115G4 (Tiger Lake) No - 1.1
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Operating System Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor or Host OS Version(s)
Microsoft Windows 11 24 H2 HP EliteBook 840 G11 Intel Core Ultra 5 125U (Meteor Lake) No - 1.1
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
2.2.3 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments
Operating System Hardware Platform
Android versions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 64-bit ARM
iOS versions 13 and above 64-bit ARM
macOS versions 11 and above 64-bit ARM and x86_64
RHEL/CentOS versions 8 and above 64-bit x86_64
Ubuntu 20.04 LTS and later 64-bit x86_64
Windows 10, 11 64-bit x86_64
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational
environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no components within the cryptographic boundary that are excluded from the module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description
Mode Name Description Types of
Services
Status Indicator
Approved
Mode
Non-Approved logging messages are enabled when non-Approved services are
invoked.
Approved Global mode indicator: FIPS_isNonApprovedLoggingEnabled() returns
true.
Table 5: Modes List and Description
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2.5 Algorithms
2.5.1 Approved Algorithms
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A7716 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A7716 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128
Supports Counter larger than maximum value - No
Incremental Counter - Yes
Counter Tests Performed - No
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A7716 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-264 Increment 8
AAD Length - AAD Length: 128-264 Increment 8
SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A7716 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Supports Reseed - Yes
Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No
Additional Input - Additional Input: 128-256 Increment 8, Additional Input: 192-256 Increment 8, Additional Input: 256-384 Increment 8
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 256, Entropy Input: 320, Entropy Input: 384
Nonce - Nonce: 0
Personalization String Length - Personalization String Length: 128-256 Increment 8, Personalization String Length: 192-320 Increment 8,
Personalization String Length: 256-384 Increment 8
Returned Bits - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A7716 L - 2048
N - 256
FIPS 186-4
DSA PQGGen (FIPS186-4) A7716 P/Q Generation Methods - Probable
G Generation Methods - Unverifiable
L - 2048
N - 256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7716 Curve - P-256, P-384
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7716 Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-
4)
A7716 Component - No
Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5)
A7716 Component - No
Curve - P-256, P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A7716 MAC - MAC: 160
Key Length - Key Length: 192
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A7716 MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 192, 256
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A7716 MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 256, 384
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A7716 MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 256, 384
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7716 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384
Hash Function Z - SHA2-384
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7716 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - FC, MODP-2048
Hash Function Z - SHA2-384
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A7716 Key Generation Mode - probable, probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048
Primality Tests - 2pow100, 2powSecStr
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Info Generated By Server - Yes
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A7716 Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Modulo - 2048
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A7716 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 1024, 2048
Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1
Public Exponent Mode - Fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A7716 Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Modulo - 2048
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A7716 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048 SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A7716 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Function - SHA1
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
A7716 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8
Function - SHA2
FIPS 180-4
Table 6: Approved Algorithms
2.5.2 Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key type:Symmetric and asymmetric N/A SP 800-133r2 section 4
Table 7: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Encrypt BC-UnAuthEncrypt Unauthenticated encryption AES-CBC: (A7716)
DIrection: Encrypt
AES-CTR: (A7716)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Direction: Encrypt
Decrypt BC-UnAuthDecrypt Unauthenticated decryption AES-CBC: (A7716)
Direction: Decrypt
AES-CTR: (A7716)
Direction: Decrypt
AuthEncrypt BC-AuthEncrypt Authenticated encryption AES-GCM: (A7716)
Direction: Encrypt
AuthDecrypt BC-AuthDecrypt Authenticated decryption AES-GCM: (A7716)
Direction: Decrypt
DRBG DRBG Random bit generation Counter DRBG: (A7716)
AES-CBC: (A7716)
SigGen DigSig-SigGen Signature generation ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A7716)
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A7716)
SHA2-256: (A7716)
SHA2-384: (A7716)
SHA2-512: (A7716)
SigVer DigSig-SigVer Signature verification ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A7716)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A7716)
SHA2-256: (A7716)
SHA2-384: (A7716)
SHA2-512: (A7716)
Legacy SigVer DigSig-SigVer Signature verification Modulo:1024
Hash:SHA-1
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A7716)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A7716)
SHA-1: (A7716)
SHA2-256: (A7716)
SHA2-384: (A7716)
SHA2-512: (A7716)
KeyGen AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Key pair generation DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A7716)
DSA PQGGen (FIPS186-4): (A7716)
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A7716)
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A7716)
Safe Primes Key Generation: (A7716)
MAC MAC Generating or verifying a message authentication code HMAC-SHA-1: (A7716)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A7716)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A7716)
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A7716)
SHA-1: (A7716)
SHA2-256: (A7716)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHA2-384: (A7716)
SHA2-512: (A7716)
KAS-ECC-SSC KAS-SSC Shared secret computation using elliptic curves IG D.F:Scenario 2, path (2) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A7716)
KAS-FFC-SSC KAS-SSC Shared secret computation using finite fields IG D.F:Scenario 2, path (2) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A7716)
Hash SHA Generate a message digest SHA2-256: (A7716)
SHA2-384: (A7716)
SHA2-512: (A7716)
CKG CKG Symmetric key generation and seeds for asymmetric keys CKG: ()
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
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2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The following algorithm specific information applies to algorithms used by the module in the Approved mode of
operation.
2.7.1 AES-GCM
The module supports random IV generation for AES-GCM compliant with IG C.H scenario 2. IVs are generated from
the output of the module's approved DRBG. At least 96 bits are requested by the cipher when initialized.
The Module does not persistently store AES-GCM keys or IVs. In the event that the module's power is lost, a new
handshake is required to establish new keys and IVs. This condition is not enforced by the module but is met
implicitly.
2.7.2 SHA-1
The module uses SHA-1 in an approved manner for digital signature verification and to effect the integrity test. The
module also uses SHA-1 (within HMAC-SHA-1) for the generation of message authentication codes (MACs). Refer
to section 9.5 for the transition timeframes related to SHA-1.
2.7.3 RSA
Verifying an RSA signature using a 1024-bit key, or computed over a SHA-1 hash, may only be performed on a
signature that was generated prior to the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M
2.7.4 ECDSA
Verifying an ECDSA signature computed over a SHA-1 hash may only be performed on a signature that was
generated prior to the Legacy Date specified in FIPS 140-3 IG C.M
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The module generates random bits from its internal implementation of CTR_DRBG. This DRBG has been CAVP-
tested and is compliant to SP 800-90Ar1. The DRBG is seeded and reseeded from an entropy source outside the
module, but within the tested operational environment (TOEPP) of the host platform.
As described in section 2.1.1, the module is only available as a component of the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual
Intranet Access (VIA) product. This product is responsible for obtaining entropy from the source within the host
hardware platform, generating the seed, and loading that seed into the module. The mechanics of this have not
been verified by the testing lab. However, it is believed that 384-bits of full entropy are loaded into the module.
This method of seeding is compliant to the March 26, 2024 version of IG 9.3.A Resolution 2(b). The following
entropy caveat is applicable:
No assurance of the minimum strength of generated SSPs (e.g., keys).
2.9 Key Generation
The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) in compliance with section 4 of SP 800-
133r2. Symmetric cryptographic keys and seeds for asymmetric keys are generated by the direct unmodified
output of the module’s approved DRBG.
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2.10 Key Establishment
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS). However, it does offer some
of the underlying KAS cryptographic functionality to be used by an external operator/application as part of an
approved KAS.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not support any industry protocols.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
As a software module, the module interfaces are defined as Software or Firmware Module Interfaces (SFMI), and
there are no physical ports. The logical interfaces are defined as the API of the cryptographic module. The
interfaces are listed in the table below.
Physical Port Logical Interface(s) Data That Passes
N/A Data Input API input parameters for data
N/A Data Output API output parameters for data
N/A Control Input API function calls
N/A Status Output API return codes, status information, error codes, non-approved service logs
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not implement a control output interface.
All data output via data output interface is inhibited when the module is performing pre-operational tests or
zeroization or when the module enters error state.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module does not provide any identification or
authentication methods of its own.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
CO Role Crypto Officer None
Table 10: Roles
The module only supports a Crypto Officer role, which is assumed implicitly. The module does not support multiple
concurrent operators, a user role, a maintenance role, nor bypass capability.
Page 26 of 46
4.3 Approved Services
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
DRBG Random bit generation API return
code
Command Random bits DRBG CO
- Entropy Input: W,E
- DRBG Seed: G,E
- DRBG Key: G,E
- DRBG V: G,E
- DRBG Output: G,R
Decrypt Data decryption API return
code
API return code Plaintext Decrypt
AuthDecrypt
CO
- AES Key: W,E
Encrypt Data encryption API return
code
Key, plaintext Ciphertext Encrypt
AuthEncrypt
CO
- AES Key: W,E
Hash Generate message digest API return
code
Message Hash Hash CO
Key generation Symmetric key generation API return
code
Command Key DRBG
CKG
CO
- DRBG Output: E
- Symmetric Key: G,R
Key pair generation Generation of key pairs API return
code
Command, domain
parameters
Key pairs DRBG
KeyGen
CKG
CO
- DRBG Output: E
- EC DH Private Key: G,R
- EC DH Public Key: G,R
- ECDSA Signature Private Key:
G,R
- ECDSA Signature Public Key:
G,R
- RSA Signature Private Key:
G,R
- RSA Signature Public Key: G,R
- DH Private Key: G,R
- DH Public Key: G,R
Key wrapping Key wrapping API return
code
Key, key to be wrapped Wrapped key AuthEncrypt CO
- Key Wrapping Key: W,E
Key unwrapping Key unwrapping API return
code
Key, wrapped key Unwrapped
key
AuthDecrypt CO
- Key Wrapping Key: W,E
MAC generation Message authentication code generation API return
code
Key, message MAC MAC CO
- HMAC Key: W,E
Page 27 of 46
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
MAC verification Message authentication code verification API return
code
Key, message, MAC Ruling MAC CO
- HMAC Key: W,E
Self-test Perform integrity and algorithm self-tests API return
code
Command Status None CO
Show status Display module status information - - - None CO
Show version Display module version information - - - None CO
Signature
generation
Digital signature generation API return
code
Key, message Key, message DRBG
SigGen
CO
- DRBG Output: E
- ECDSA Signature Private Key:
W,E
- RSA Signature Private Key:
W,E
Signature
verification
Digital signature verification API return
code
Key, message, signature Ruling SigVer
Legacy SigVer
CO
- ECDSA Signature Public Key:
W,E
- RSA Signature Public Key: W,E
SSC ECC Computation of shared secret based on elliptic
curves
API return
code
Keys Shared secret KAS-ECC-SSC CO
- EC DH Private Key: W,E
- EC DH Public Key: W,E
- EC DH Shared Secret: G,R
SSC FFC Shared secret computation based on finite
fields
API return
code
Keys Shared secret KAS-FFC-SSC CO
- DH Private Key: W,E
- DH Public Key: W,E
- DH Shared Secret: G,R
Key destruction Zeroise context API return
code
Command, Key handle Message None CO
- AES Key: Z
- DH Private Key: Z
- DH Public Key: Z
- EC DH Private Key: Z
- EC DH Public Key: Z
- DH Shared Secret: Z
- ECDSA Signature Private Key:
Z
- ECDSA Signature Public Key: Z
- RSA Signature Private Key: Z
- RSA Signature Public Key: Z
- HMAC Key: Z
Page 28 of 46
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- Key Wrapping Key: Z
- Symmetric Key: Z
- DRBG Key: Z
- DRBG V: Z
Table 11: Approved Services
The meaning of the letters used to describe the ‘SSP Access’ are:
• G – Generate The module generates or derives the Key/SSP.
• R – Read The Key/SSP is read from the module (e.g. the Key/SSP is output).
• W – Write The Key/SSP is imported, or written to the module.
• E – Execute The module uses the Key/SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z – Zeroize The module zeroizes the Key/SSP.
The Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module is interfaced by the HPE Aruba Networking applications using API calls (the calling
applications that run on the host GPC are out of scope for this validation). Successful completion of a security service (via API return code for success) when
the module is in Approved mode denotes use of approved security service.
Page 29 of 46
4.3.1 Show version
The module does not support an invocable show version service. The module name and version are output each
time the HPE Aruba Networking application instantiated. The system log will include the following entries:
Product Name: HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module
Product Version: 1.1
4.3.2 Show status
The module does not support an invocable show status service. Current module status is output as part of each
cryptographic service invocation. The completion of a service indicates that the module is operational.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not support a non-approved mode and does not offer any non-approved services.
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software Loaded
The module does not support software loading.
Page 30 of 46
5 Software Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module performs a software integrity test when powered on (refer to Self-Tests for details). All cryptographic
algorithm self-tests are run at power-up, prior to the first operational use of the cryptographic algorithm. The
software integrity test verifies the integrity of the module by comparing a calculated HMAC-SHA-1 value against
the stored HMAC value.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator can initiate the software integrity test on demand by reloading the module into memory on the host
or by calling FIPS_powerupSelfTest(). All data output via the data output interface is inhibited until the software
integrity test has completed successfully. If the software integrity test fails, the module enters the error state
(while in this state, the module provides no functionality). The temporary values generated during the software
integrity test are zeroized upon completion of the integrity test. After the module is (re)loaded into memory, the
operator can determine the version of the loaded module through reviewing the host log.
Page 31 of 46
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
How Requirements are Satisfied
The module operates on a general-purpose computer (GPC) running Microsoft Windows, Android, Linux, MacOS,
or iOS as a general-purpose operating system (GPOS). The module’s interfaces are logical and are provided through
the Application Programming Interface (API) that a calling program can access. The logical interfaces expose
services that applications directly call, and the API provides functions that may be called by a referencing
application. The module distinguishes between the logical interfaces by logically separating the information
according to the defined API. The module APIs are restricted command sets. These operating control mechanisms
protect against unauthorized execution, unauthorized modification, and unauthorized reading of SSPs, control and
status data.
6.2 Configuration settings and restrictions
The module is only used in conjunction with the calling HPE Aruba Networking application on a host general-
purpose computer (GPC) running a single‐user mode general purpose operating system (GPOS).
See section 11.1 for guidance on configuring the host device and installing the module.
Page 32 of 46
7 Physical Security
The module is a multiple-chip standalone software module and does not include any physical components. No
physical security mechanisms or protections are implemented, and the FIPS 140-3 section 7 requirements do not
apply to the module.
Page 33 of 46
8 Non-Invasive Security
Since the module has not been purposely designed, built and publicly documented to include non-invasive
mitigation techniques, the Non-Invasive Security requirements are not applicable.
Page 34 of 46
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type
RAM All SSPs are stored in volatile RAM memory Dynamic
Table 12: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format Type Distribution Type Entry Type SFI or Algorithm
API Import Calling application RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic
API Export RAM Calling application Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 13: SSP Input-Output Methods
The SSPs are provided to the module in plaintext form via input API parameters, to and from the calling application
running in the same operational environment.
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Service The calling application calls the Key
Destruction service APIs to zeroize
the SSP.
The application program generates the SSP external to the
module and is responsible for zeroizing the SSP by calling
the Key Destruction service API.
Call to
destruction API
Auto The service using the SSP
automatically zeroizes the SSP after
use.
The SSP is single use and so is zeroized after use. N/A
Reboot Reboot the host device. All RAM is zeroised by a power-cycle. Power-cycling the
host device
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods
Page 35 of 46
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By
AES Key Key used for AES operations 128, 192, 256 - 128, 192, 256 Symmetric - CSP Encrypt
Decrypt
AuthEncrypt
AuthDecrypt
Entropy Input Externally generated entropy 384 - 384 Entropy - CSP DRBG
DRBG Seed Internal state for DRBG 384 - 384 DRBG state - CSP DRBG DRBG
DRBG Key Internal state for DRBG 256 - - DRBG state - CSP DRBG DRBG
DRBG V DRBG V 128 - - DRBG state - CSP DRBG DRBG
DRBG Output Random numbers used in cryptographic algorithms 128, 192, 256 - 128, 192, 256 DRBG state - CSP DRBG SigGen
KeyGen
CKG
DH Private Key DH Private Key 256, 2048 - 112 Asymmetric - CSP KeyGen KAS-FFC-SSC
DH Public Key DH Public Key 2048 - 112 Asymmetric - PSP KeyGen KAS-FFC-SSC
DH Shared Secret DH Shared Secret 2048 - 112 Shared secret - CSP KAS-FFC-SSC
EC DH Private Key EC DH Private Key P-256, P-384 - 128, 192 Asymmetric - CSP KeyGen KAS-ECC-SSC
EC DH Public Key EC DH Public Key P-256, P-384 - 128, 192 Asymmetric - PSP KeyGen KAS-ECC-SSC
EC DH Shared Secret EC DH Shared Secret 128, 192 - 128, 192 Shared secret - CSP KAS-ECC-SSC
ECDSA Signature Private Key Key used for ECDSA Signature Generation P-256, P-384 - 128, 192 Asymmetric - CSP KeyGen SigGen
ECDSA Signature Public Key Key used for ECDSA Signature Verification P-256, P-384 - 128, 192 Asymmetric - PSP KeyGen SigVer
RSA Signature Private Key Key used for RSA Signature Generation 2048 - 112 Asymmetric - CSP KeyGen SigGen
RSA Signature Public Key Key used for RSA Signature Verification 1024, 2048 - 80, 112 Asymmetric - PSP KeyGen SigVer
Legacy SigVer
HMAC Key Key used for HMAC Operations 192, 256, 384 - 192, 256, 384 Symmetric - CSP MAC
Key Wrapping Key Key used for key wrapping and unwrapping operations 128, 192, 256 - 128, 192, 256 Symmetric - CSP AuthEncrypt
AuthDecrypt
Symmetric Key Symmetric key generated by the module 128, 192, 256 - 128, 192, 256 Symmetric - CSP CKG
Table 15: SSP Table 1
Page 36 of 46
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
AES Key API Import RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
Entropy Input API Import RAM:Plaintext Auto
DRBG Seed RAM:Plaintext Auto Entropy Input:Derived From
DRBG Key RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
DRBG Seed:Derived From
DRBG V RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
DRBG Seed:Derived From
DRBG Output API Export RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
DRBG Key:Derived From
DRBG V:Derived From
DH Private Key API Import
API Export
RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
DH Public Key:Paired With
DH Public Key API Import
API Export
RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
DH Private Key:Paired With
DH Shared Secret API Export RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
DH Private Key:Derived From
DH Public Key:Derived From
EC DH Private Key API Import
API Export
RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
EC DH Public Key:Paired With
EC DH Public Key API Import
API Export
RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
EC DH Private Key:Paired With
EC DH Shared Secret API Export RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
EC DH Private Key:Derived From
EC DH Public Key:Derived From
ECDSA Signature Private Key API Import
API Export
RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
ECDSA Signature Public Key:Paired With
ECDSA Signature Public Key API Import
API Export
RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
ECDSA Signature Public Key:Paired With
RSA Signature Private Key API Import
API Export
RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
RSA Signature Public Key:Paired With
RSA Signature Public Key API Import
API Export
RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
RSA Signature Public Key:Paired With
HMAC Key API Import RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
Page 37 of 46
Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
Key Wrapping Key API Import RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
Symmetric Key API Export RAM:Plaintext Service
Reboot
Table 16: SSP Table 2
Page 38 of 46
9.5 Transitions
The module implements the following security methods that are forecasted to transition to non-approved over the
lifetime of the validation:
Algorithm Use
SHA-1 In HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-1 For MAC Generation
SHA-1 becomes disallowed for applying cryptographic protection in January 2031.
Page 39 of 46
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
Integrity Test HMAC-SHA-1 with 117-byte
key
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Successful module
initialization
MAC
verification
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Pre-operational self-tests are performed automatically when the module is loaded into memory. While the module
is executing the pre-operational self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited because
the module will not return to the calling application until the self-tests are complete.
Page 40 of 46
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES encrypt 256 bit keys, 128 bit message KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Encrypt On load
AES decrypt 256 bit keys, 128 bit message KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Decrypt On load
AES-GCM
encrypt
256 bits KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Encrypt On load
AES-GCM
decrypt
256 bits KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Decrypt On load
DRBG 256-bit, with DF KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Instantiate, Generate and
Reseed
On load
ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256, P-384 with SHA2-384,
fixed k
KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Sign & Verify On load
HMAC SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Generate On load
ECC-SSC P-384 KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Compute On load
FFC-SSC L=2048, N=256 KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Compute On load
RSA 2048-bit, PKCS#1-v1.5, SHA2-256 KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Sign & Verify On load
SHA SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 KAT CAST Successful module
initialization
Generate On load
ECC key pairs - PCT PCT No error Sign & Verify On key pair generation
FFC key pairs - PCT PCT No error Sign & Verify Shared secret
computation
RSA key pairs SHA2-256 PCT PCT No error Sign & Verify On key pair generation
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests
All CASTs are performed automatically when the module is loaded into memory, prior to executing the pre-operational self-tests.
Page 41 of 46
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
The following self-tests can be invoked by the Crypto Officer as described in section 10.5 below. The module
cannot invoke these tests automatically.
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Integrity Test KAT SW/FW Integrity On demand Manually
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES encrypt KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES decrypt KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-GCM encrypt KAT CAST On demand Manually
AES-GCM decrypt KAT CAST On demand Manually
DRBG KAT CAST On demand Manually
ECDSA KAT CAST On demand Manually
HMAC KAT CAST On demand Manually
ECC-SSC KAT CAST On demand Manually
FFC-SSC KAT CAST On demand Manually
RSA KAT CAST On demand Manually
SHA KAT CAST On demand Manually
ECC key pairs PCT PCT - -
FFC key pairs PCT PCT - -
RSA key pairs PCT PCT - -
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Critical
Error
Critical Error state, the module provides no functionality Failed integrity
test
Failed CAST
Reload
module
Nonzero value for
gFIPS_powerupStatus
PCT Error An error state that is entered when a pairwise
consistency test fails on asymmetric keypair generation.
Failed PCT Automatic Keypair generation function
returns error
Table 21: Error States
When a cryptographic algorithm self-test or pre-operational self-test fails, the module enters the Critical Error
state. While in this state, the module provides no functionality and inhibits data output, logs the error, and halts -
subsequent calls to the module will also fail, thus no further cryptographic operations are possible. To recover
from a self-test failure, the module should be reloaded into memory.
When a conditional pairwise consistency test fails on asymmetric keypair generation, the module returns an error.
Page 42 of 46
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The operator may initiate self-tests on-demand by reloading the module into memory on the host or by calling
FIPS_powerupSelfTest().
10.6 Additional Information
Upon successful completion of the self-tests when the module is loaded into memory, the module displays results
on the host GPC console:
Windows: FIPS_powerupSelfTest Success
iOS: FIPS powerup self test success
Android: Finished Mocana initialization...
Linux: Power up self test passed...
In the event any self-test fails, the module will enter a Critical Error state (while in this state, the module provides
no functionality and inhibits data output), logs the error, and halts - subsequent calls to the module will also fail,
thus no further cryptographic operations are possible. To recover from a self-test failure, the module should be
reloaded into memory. After a self-test failure, the module displays results on the host GPC console:
Windows: FIPS_powerupSelfTest() failed error <code>
iOS: FIPS powerup self test failed with error <code>
Android: Mocana initialization error <code>
Linux: !!ERROR!! :Power up self test failed:<code>
When the software integrity test fails when the module is loaded into memory, the module enters the Critical Error
state and sets gFIPS_powerupStatus to ERR_FIPS_INTEGRITY_FAILED.
Page 43 of 46
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Software Installation
The module is distributed as part of an HPE Aruba Networking application.
Start-up Procedures
Once the module starts up successfully, after passing all Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CASTs) and Pre-
Operational Self-Tests (POSTs), the calling application must call
FIPS_enableNonApprovedLogging()
To verify that the module is operating in a compliant manner, the calling application can call:
FIPS_isNonApprovedLoggingEnabled()
A response of True indicates that the module has been configure to operated in a
compliant manner. Any other response indicates that the module is operating in a
non-compliant state.11.2 Administrator Guidance
11.2.1 Zeroization
In the module, there is a context structure associated with every available cryptographic algorithm. Context
structures hold sensitive information such as cryptographic keys. These context structures must be destroyed via
respective key destruction service API calls when the calling HPE Aruba Networking application software no longer
needs to use a specific algorithm. The key destruction service API call will zeroize all sensitive information,
including cryptographic keys, before freeing the dynamically allocated memory.
11.2.2 AES-GCM
The Module's implementation of AES-GCM shall be used together with one or more applications outside the
module's cryptographic boundary that implement the IPSec, TLS or SSH protocol. The keys and IVs for AES-GCM
shall be obtained from the protocol's corresponding KDF.
For general-purpose encryption, to ensure compliance with IG C.H, either the key or the IV for AES-GCM must be
randomly generated from the module's approved DRBG. Obtaining both from outside the module is non-
compliant.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The module is not distributed as a standalone library for direct download and is only used in conjunction with the
calling HPE Aruba Networking application when a trusted and verified HPE Aruba Networking application product
is downloaded in electronic form from the HPE Networking Support Portal (NSP) by authenticated licensed
customer personnel and installed on a host general-purpose computer (GPC) using a general purpose operating
system (GPOS) platform specified in section 2.2, Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification, or
one where portability is maintained.
Documentation for any Hewlett Packard Enterprise product can be found on the HPE Networking Support Portal
(NSP). Filters can be used to limit the displayed results by Product(s), Product Series, Version(s), and File Category.
For example,
• The HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) version 4.x product uses the HPE Aruba
Networking VIA Crypto Module. Full HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) documentation
for VIA 4.x can be found at the link provided below after authentication.
Page 44 of 46
https://networkingsupport.hpe.com/downloads;pageSize=100;fileTypes=DOCUMENT;softwareGroups=VI
A;softwareMajorVersions=4
• The HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) version 4.x product uses HPE Aruba Networking
Gateways, including Mobility Conductors and Mobility Controllers, for setting FIPS mode within the VIA
Connection profiles. Full Hewlett Packard Enterprise AOS-8 Gateway documentation for Mobility
Conductors and Mobility Controllers can be found at the link provided below after authentication.
https://networkingsupport.hpe.com/downloads;pageSize=100;fileTypes=DOCUMENT;softwareGroups=
AOS-8%20GW
The following Hewlett Packard Enterprise documents can be referenced to ensure that the HPE Aruba Networking
VIA Crypto Module and the calling HPE Aruba Networking application product software are installed and operated
correctly in the Approved mode:
• HPE Aruba Networking VIA 4.x User Guide
• ArubaOS 8.12.0.0 User Guide
• ArubaOS 8.x CLI Reference Guide
The Crypto Officer shall perform the following steps to set-up the HPE Aruba Networking calling application
product software to support the HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module in Approved mode:
1. The Crypto Officer shall work with their Hewlett Packard Enterprise representative to obtain appropriate
software licenses for the HPE Aruba Networking calling application product software.
2. Since the HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module software is used in conjunction with the calling HPE
Aruba Networking application product software, the Crypto Officer shall download the calling HPE Aruba
Networking application product software in electronic form from the HPE Networking Support Portal (NSP)
after authenticating as a licensed HPE customer. The module was tested on the platforms listed above in
section 2.2, Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification.
3. Since the calling HPE Aruba Networking application product software can use HPE Aruba Networking
Gateways, including Mobility Conductors and Mobility Controllers, running a trusted and verified Hewlett
Packard Enterprise AOS software image, for setting the module’s FIPS mode within the managed Connection
profiles, the Crypto Officer (CO) shall review the reference documents listed below in section 11.2,
Administrator Guidance. Select the host device deployment scenario that best fits your installation and follow
the scenario’s deployment procedures.
4. Install the calling HPE Aruba Networking application on a host general-purpose computer (GPC) running a
single‐user mode general purpose operating system (GPOS) platform specified in section 2.3, Operating
Environments, or one where portability is maintained.
5. Configure the HPE Aruba Networking Gateway, including a Mobility Conductor or Mobility Controller, running
a trusted and verified Hewlett Packard Enterprise AOS software image, for the calling HPE Aruba Networking
application software deployment.
a. Add and enable the appropriate software licenses for the HPE Aruba Networking calling application
product software.
b. Follow the configuration guidance in the reference documents listed below in section 11.2,
Administrator Guidance to configure the HPE Aruba Networking Gateway running Hewlett Packard
Enterprise AOS software for the calling HPE Aruba Networking application software deployment.
c. Within the configured Connection Profile created, the Crypto Officer (CO) shall enable the FIPS
module such that the calling HPE Aruba Networking application software checks for FIPS compliance
during startup.
i. If using the AOS WebUI for configuration:
1. Navigate to Configuration ➔ Authentication ➔ L3 Authentication ➔ Connection
2. Under Connection Profile: New Profile, click + to add a new profile
3. Enter a new profile name
Page 45 of 46
4. Select ‘Enable FIPS Module’
5. Click Submit
6. Select Deploy Changes in the Pending Changes window.
ii. If using the AOS CLI for configuration, enter:
#aaa authentication via connection-profile <profile name>
#enable-fips
#exit
#write memory
Saving Configuration...
Configuration Saved.
iii. To show that FIPS has been enabled in the connection profile, enter:
#show aaa authentication via connection-profile <profile name>
…
Enable FIPS Module Enabled
…
iv. To refresh the calling HPE Aruba Networking application’s Connection Profile on the host
general-purpose computer (GPC):
1. Disconnect the device.
2. Exit the calling software.
3. Immediately relaunch the calling software.
4. Repeat steps 1-3 a second time to refresh the profile.
5. Invoke the show version service to verify the name and version of the Hewlett
Packard Enterprise HPE Aruba Networking VIA Crypto Module matches that on the
CMVP certificate.
6. Monitor the calling HPE Aruba Networking application software messages displayed on the host GPC console
during startup.
If any of the checks fail, error messages will be displayed on the host GPC console. If the errors persist after the
calling HPE Aruba Networking application software has been reloaded into memory, contact Hewlett Packard
Enterprise.
11.6 End of Life
As a software library, the module itself does not have any special end of life procedures. All module SSPs can be
zeroized by unloading the module from memory.
To determine if an Hewlett Packard Enterprise product is considered end of life, refer to the Hewlett Packard
Enterprise end-of life information at https://networkingsupport.hpe.com/end-of-life. If a Hewlett Packard
Enterprise product is deemed end-of-life, the CO should work with their Hewlett Packard Enterprise representative
to determine the appropriate Hewlett Packard Enterprise product upgrade path to use a newer Approved version.
For secure sanitization and zeroization of SSP values, follow the guidance in the Key Destruction service entry
above in section 9.3, SSP Zeroization Methods. Since the module is not distributed as a standalone library for direct
download and is only used in conjunction with the calling HPE Aruba Networking application, if the module is
deprecated, the module will be upgraded to a newer Approved validated version by loading the newer module
version into memory on the GPC host. Loading the newer module into memory on the GPC host zeroizes all SSPs
stored in volatile RAM memory and then all self-tests including the software integrity test will be run on the GPC
host. Installation of the calling HPE Aruba Networking application product software on the GPC host can be
supported with the help of a Hewlett Packard Enterprise-Certified Mobility Professional (ACMP).
Page 46 of 46
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module has not been purposely designed, built and publicly documented to mitigate one or more specific
attacks. The Mitigation of Other Attacks requirements are not applicable, per FIPS 140-3 IG 12.A.