Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client
Cryptographic Module v2.1
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Version 1.4
Last Update: 2012-10-16
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Contents
1 Cryptographic Module Specification...................................................................................................................3
1.1 Description of Module ................................................................................................................................3
1.2 Description of Approved Mode....................................................................................................................4
1.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary................................................................................................................5
1.3.1 Hardware Block Diagram ........................................................................................................................5
1.3.2 Software Block Diagram .........................................................................................................................6
1.4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 Cryptographic Modules and FIPS 140-2 Certification..................................6
1.4.1 Platforms.................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.4.2 FIPS Approved Mode................................................................................................................................7
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces .......................................................................................................8
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication ..................................................................................................................9
3.1 Roles.......................................................................................................................................................... 9
3.2 Services...................................................................................................................................................... 9
3.2.1 Non-Approved Allowed Services............................................................................................................10
3.3 Operator Authentication............................................................................................................................10
3.4 Mechanism and Strength of Authentication...............................................................................................10
4 Physical Security...............................................................................................................................................11
5 Operational Environment..................................................................................................................................12
5.1 Applicability...............................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Policies..................................................................................................................................................... 12
6 Cryptographic Key Management......................................................................................................................13
6.2 Key Zeroization.........................................................................................................................................14
6.3 Random Number Generation ...................................................................................................................14
7 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ........................................................15
8 Self Tests ......................................................................................................................................................... 16
8.1 Power-Up Tests........................................................................................................................................16
8.1.1 Software Integrity Test Details ..............................................................................................................16
9 Guidance.......................................................................................................................................................... 17
9.1 Crypto Officer Guidance...........................................................................................................................17
9.1.1 Configuration Changes and FIPS Approved Mode................................................................................18
9.2 User Guidance.......................................................................................................................................... 18
9.3 Handling Self Test Errors .........................................................................................................................18
10 Mitigation of Other Attacks..............................................................................................................................19
11 Glossary and Abbreviations............................................................................................................................21
12 References..................................................................................................................................................... 22
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
1 Cryptographic Module Specification
This document is the non-proprietary security policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client
Cryptographic Module, and was prepared as part of the requirements for conformance to Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Level 1.
The following section describes the module and how it complies with the FIPS 140-2 standard in each of the
required areas.
1.1 Description of Module
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module is a software only, security level 1
cryptographic module, running on a multi-chip standalone platform. The module supplies cryptographic support
the SSH protocol for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux user space. All components of the module will be provided
with the software outlined below.
The following table shows the overview of the security level for each of the eleven sections of the validation.
Security Component Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Table 1. Security Level of the Module
The module has been tested on the following multi-chip standalone platforms:
Manufacturer Model O/S & Ver.
HP ProLiant DL585 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 (Single User
Mode)
IBM HS22 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 (Single User
Mode)
Table 2. Tested Platforms
This cryptographic module combines a vertical stack of Linux components intended to limit the external interface
each separate component may provide. The list of components and the cryptographic boundary of the composite
module is defined as follows:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module with the version of the OpenSSH
server RPM file of 5.3p1-70.el6_2.2.
• The configuration of the FIPS mode is provided by the dracut-fips package with the version of the RPM
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
file of 004-284.el6_3.1. This RPM version is provided with RHBA:2012-1318 accessible on the Red Hat
Network.
• The contents of the fipscheck RPM package (version 1.2.0-7.el6).
• The contents of the fipscheck-lib RPM package (version 1.2.0-7.el6).
1.2 Description of Approved Mode
When in FIPS 140-2 approved mode, the contents of the file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled will be '1'.
In Approved mode, the module will support the following Approved and allowed functions/protocols:
● Triple-DES (Certs. #1226, #1227, #1231 and #1232)
● AES (Certs. #1887, #1888, #1889, #1893, #1894 and #1895), which is implemented in software and
also with AES-NI, but only one of these implementations is enabled when the module is loaded
● DSA (Certs. #592, #593, #597 and #598)
● RNG (ANSI X9.31) (Certs. #989, #990, #994 and #995)
● SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512: SHS (Certs. #1658, #1659, #1663, #1664)
● HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA224, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384, HMAC-SHA512: HMAC (Certs.
#1129, #1130, #1134, #1135)
● RSA (Certs. #964, #965, #969 and #970)
In Approved mode the module will support the following Non-Approved functions:
● RSA (encrypt, decrypt) (see caveat below)
● Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology) (see caveat below)
Note: The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module will use the Red Hat Enterprise
Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module (FIPS 140-2 Validation #1758) for standard cryptographic operations and
will require that a copy of a FIPS 140-2 level 1 validated version of Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL
Cryptographic Module be installed on the system for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client
Cryptographic Module to operate in a validated mode.
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module itself implements the SSHv2 protocol.
The module should be used with SSHv2 protocol only, as SSHv1 protocol is not supported. The SSHv2 protocol
allows the user to specify the HMAC protecting the connection where the module uses HMAC-SHA1. However,
the protocol allows specifying the full HMAC SHA1 size of 160 bit as well as using the HMAC-SHA1 which is
truncated to the first 96 bits.
The integrity check is performed by the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL module utility fipscheck using
HMAC/SHA256 (Certs. #1129, #1130, #1134 and #1135). The version is 1.2.0-7.el6.
CAVEAT:
The Module will support the following non-approved functions:
1) RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 160 bits of encryption strength)
2)Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 160bits of
encryption strength)
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
1.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary
The physical module boundary is the surface of the case of the test platform. The logical module boundary is
depicted in the software block diagram and is embodied by the SSH client application found at /usr/bin/ssh and
the OpenSSL shared library module.
Note that during load time, libfipscheck and the fipscheck binary are used.
1.3.1 Hardware Block Diagram
Figure 1. Hardware Block Diagram
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
1.3.2 Software Block Diagram
Figure 2. Software Block Diagram
1.4 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 Cryptographic Modules and FIPS 140-2 Certification
A set of kernel cryptographic libraries, services and user level cryptographic applications are certified at FIPS
140-2 level 1, providing a secure foundation for vendor use in developing dependent services, applications, and
even purpose built appliances that may be FIPS 140-2 certified.
The certification is performed at FIPS level 1, a software-only certification that does not make any claims about
the hardware enclosure. This allows vendors to develop their own higher level FIPS-certified modules using
cryptographic modules.
The following cryptographic modules are included in the RHEL6.2 certification:
 Kernel Crypto API - a software only cryptographic module that provides general-purpose cryptographic
services to the remainder of the Linux kernel
 Disk Volume Encryption - provides disk management and transparent partial or full disk encryption.
Partial disk encryption encrypts only one or more partitions, leaving at least one partition as plaintext.
 Libgcrypt- supplies general cryptographic support for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux user space
 OpenSSL - a software library supporting FIPS 140-2-approved cryptographic algorithms for general use
by vendors
 OpenSSH-Server - supplies cryptographic support for the SSH protocol
 OpenSSH-Client - supplies cryptographic support for the SSH protocol
 Openswan - provides the IKE protocol version 1 key agreement services required for IPSec
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
1.4.1 Platforms
The certification was performed on a 64-bit system, which are capable of executing both 32 and 64-bit code
concurrently. Vendors can "transfer" the FIPS 140-2 certificate to the other similar platforms, provided the binary
is only recompiled without changing the code. This is called a vendor assertion.
1.4.2 FIPS Approved Mode
Any vendor-provided FIPS certified cryptographic modules and services that use the RHEL6.2 underlying
services to provide cryptographic functionality must use the RHEL6.2 services in their approved mode. The
approved mode ensures that FIPS required self tests are executed and that ciphers are restricted to those that
have been FIPS certified by independent testing.
The kernel services (Kernel Crypto API) must be in FIPS approved mode as many services rely on these
underlying services for their cryptographic capabilities. See the Kernel Crypto API Security Policy for instructions.
If dm-crypt is used to encrypt a disk or partition, particularly when other modules may store cryptographic keys or
other CSPs (critical security parameters) there, it must be in FIPS approved mode as described in dm-crypt
Security Policy.
If the kernel is in the approved mode, the remaining RHEL6.2 FIPS services (libgcrypt, OpenSSL, Openswan,
OpenSSH) start up in the approved mode by default. (Note that Openswan uses NSS for its cryptographic
operations and NSS must explicitly be put into the approved mode with the modutil command.)
The approved mode for a module becomes effective as soon as the module power on self tests complete
successfully and the module loads into memory. Self tests and integrity tests triggered in RHEL6 at startup or on
the first invocation of the crypto module:
 kernel: during boot, before dm-crypt becomes available via dracut
 user space: before the user space module is available to the caller (i.e., for libraries during the
initialization call, for applications: at load time)
See each module security policy for descriptions of self tests performed by each module and descriptions of how
self test errors are reported for each module.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
Function Port
Command In Keyboard, Network, Configuration File ~/.ssh/config, /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled,
environment variable SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG, Command Line Options
Status Out Display and Network
Data In Keyboard, Configuration File ~/.ssh/known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, Network
(data via SSHv2 channel, data via local or remote port-forwarding port, data via TUN
device), Key Files ~/.ssh/id_dsa* ~/ssh/id_rsa*
Data Out Display, Network (data via SSHv2 channel, data via local or remote port-forwarding port,
data via TUN device)
Table 3. Ports and Interfaces
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
This section defines the roles, services, and authentication mechanisms and methods with respect to the
applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.
3.1 Roles
Role Services (see list below)
User Configure SSH Client
Establish & Maintain SSH Session
Close SSH Session (Zeroize)
Terminate SSH Application
Self Tests
Show Status
Crypto Officer Configure SSH Client
Establish & Maintain SSH Session
Close SSH Session (Zeroize)
Terminate SSH Application
Self Tests
Show Status
Installation
Table 4. Roles
3.2 Services
The module supports services that are available to users in the various roles. All of the services are described in
detail in the module’s user documentation. The following table shows the services available to the various roles
and the access to cryptographic keys and CSPs resulting from services.
R – The item is read or referenced by the service.
W – The item is written or updated by the service.
Z – The persistent item is zeroized by the service.
All of the ciphers are from the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module validated cryptographic
module. The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module performs SSH v2 functions
only, and passes all cryptographic operations to Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module.
Service Category Function Role Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs Accessed
Access Type
(RWZ)
Establish &
Maintain SSH
Session
Symmetric
Ciphers
Encrypt/Decrypt,
Keyed-Hash,
Key Exchange,
Sign/Verify,
Zeroize of private
DSA/RSA client
keys
User, crypto
officer
RSA or DSA Client
private key/public key
Server Public Key
DH private and public
parameters, Session
Encryption and Data
Authentication Keys
DRNG Seed and Seed
Key
RWZ
RW
RW
RW
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Service Category Function Role Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs Accessed
Access Type
(RWZ)
Close SSH
Session
None Zeroize User, crypto
officer
DH private and public
parameters, Session
Encryption and Data
Authentication Keys
DRNG Seed and Seed
Key
Z
Terminate SSH
Application
None Zeroize User, crypto
officer
DH private and public
parameters, Session
Encryption and Data
Authentication Keys
DRNG Seed and Seed
Key
Z
Self Tests Self Test
(includes
Integrity and
known answer
tests)
Invoked by
restarting the
module
User, crypto
officer
Software Integrity Key R
Show Status Status Via verbose
mode and exit
codes
User, crypto
officer
None N/A
Installation None None Crypto officer None N/A
Table 5. Services
3.2.1 Non-Approved Allowed Services
In Approved mode, the module will support the following Non-Approved services:
● RSA (encrypt, decrypt)
● Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology)
3.3 Operator Authentication
There is no operator authentication. The assumption of a role is implicit by the action taken.
3.4 Mechanism and Strength of Authentication
At security level 1, authentication is not required.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
4 Physical Security
This Module is a security level 1 software module and offers no physical security.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
5 Operational Environment
5.1 Applicability
This module will operate in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-2 definition.
5.2 Policies
The operating system shall be restricted to a single operator mode of operation (i.e., concurrent operators are
explicitly excluded).
The operator that makes use of the cryptographic module is the single user.
In the FIPS approved mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)) and strace(1) shall not be used. In
addition, other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment, such as ftrace or systemtap shall not be
used.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
6 Cryptographic Key Management
The following table identifies the Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) used within the
module. Cryptographic keys and CSPs are never output from the module in plaintext. An Approved key
generation method is used to generate keys that are generated by the module via OpenSSL.
6.1 Key life cycle table:
Key Type Generation Establishment Access by
Service
Entry
and
Output
method
Storage Zeroization
Client Private
Keys
DSA or RSA
keys
N/A N/A Establish &
Maintain SSH
Session
N/A Plaintext Immediately
after use
Client Public
Keys (not a
CSP)
DSA or RSA
keys
N/A N/A Establish &
Maintain SSH
Session
Exported Plaintext N/A
Server Public
Key
DSA or RSA
key
N/A N/A Establish &
Maintain SSH
Session
Imported Plaintext N/A
Session Data
Authentication
Keys
HMAC
SHA-1
N/A Established
during the SSH
handshake
through DH
Establish &
Maintain SSH
Session
N/A Ephemeral Close SSH
Session or
Terminate
SSH
Application
Session
Encryption
Keys
AES or
Triple-DES
N/A Established
during the SSH
handshake
through DH
Establish &
Maintain SSH
Session
N/A Ephemeral Close SSH
Session or
Terminate
SSH
Application
Software
Integrity Key
HMAC-SHA
256
N/A N/A Self Tests N/A Plaintext
within the
OpenSSL
and
fipscheck
libraries
Close SSH
Session or
Terminate
SSH
Application
Diffie-Hellman
Private and
Public
Parameters
DH ANSI X9.31
RNG
N/A Establish &
Maintain SSH
Session
N/A Ephemeral Close SSH
Session or
Terminate
SSH
Application
DRNG Seed 128-bit
value
N/A N/A Establish &
Maintain SSH
Session
N/A (see
section
6.3),
provided
by
/dev/uran
dom
Ephemeral N/A
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Key Type Generation Establishment Access by
Service
Entry
and
Output
method
Storage Zeroization
DRNG Seed
Key
128-bit
value
N/A N/A Establish &
Maintain SSH
Session
N/A (see
section
6.3),
provided /
dev/urand
om
Ephemeral N/A
Table 6, Key Life Cycle
Notes:
The module ships without containing any keys and CSPs. When the module is configured, the crypto officer
generates a DSA or RSA private/public key pair that is stored in plaintext form in keystore files in the filesystem.
A crypto officer or user adds server public keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file using the ssh-keyscan utility or by
manually adding the public keys. If the ssh_keyscan utility is used, the crypto officer or user must verify the keys
are correct to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack.
The public key is associated with the correct entity as each key is associated with its relevant hostname, or IPv4
address as a lookup index. Moreover, using an incorrect key results in failure to establish a valid session as the
corresponding private key cannot correctly authenticate against an incorrect public key.
The only key management operations during initial configuration include generating the client public-private key
pair and storing client public keys in the ~/.ssh/, which are out of scope for this validation. At runtime, public keys
may be added, removed, or updated from the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file or a new client public-private key pair may
be generated and deployed as needed.
Diffie-Hellman key agreement transpires at the beginning of a session and with sessions after each 1 GB of data
transfer or 1 hour of operation, whichever occurs first.
Persistently stored secret and private keys are out of scope, but may be zeroized using the a FIPS140-2
approved mechanism to clear data on hard disks.
6.2 Key Zeroization
For volatile memory, memset is included in deallocation operations. There are no restrictions when zeroizing any
cryptographic keys and CSPs.
6.3 Random Number Generation
A FIPS 140-2, ANSI X9.31 approved pseudo random number generation mechanism will be used in the module,
called from OpenSSL, which is seeded by the kernel.
The kernel uses /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers for RNG seeds. The Linux kernel initializes this
pseudo device at system startup. Please note that when setting the environment variable of
SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG to a value greater or equal to 6, the specified number of bytes will be pulled from
/dev/random and mixed into the seed.
The kernel performs continual tests on the random numbers it uses to ensure that the seed and seed key input
to the Approved RNG do not have the same value. The kernel also performs continual tests on the output of the
approved RNG to ensure that consecutive random numbers do not repeat.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
7 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
Product Name and Model: HP ProLiant Server DL585 Series
Regulatory Model Number: HSTNS-1025
Product Options: All
EMC: Class A
Product Name and Model: IBM BladeCenter HS22 Series
Regulatory Model Number: 09-EMCRTP-0008
Product Options: All
EMC: Class A
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
8 Self Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the correctness
of the cryptographic functionality at startup. In addition, some functions require continuous verification of
function, such as the random number generator. All of these tests are listed and described in this section.
8.1 Power-Up Tests
Software Integrity Test: all cryptographic function tests are performed by the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL
module before it will perform cryptographic operations for the OpenSSH Client module.
8.1.1 Software Integrity Test Details
OpenSSH userspace modules have their integrity verified at startup by the software integrity test.
The integrity check is performed by the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL module utility fipscheck using
HMAC-SHA256.
When the module starts, it exercises the power-on self test, including the software integrity test. The software
integrity test (HMAC-SHA256) constitutes a known answer test for the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm.
The user space integrity verification is performed as follows:
The OpenSSH client application links with the library libfipscheck.so which is intended to execute fipscheck
to verify the integrity of the calling application file using HMAC-SHA256. Upon calling the
FIPSCHECK_verify() function provided with libfipscheck.so, the fipscheck application is loaded and
executed, and the following steps are performed:
 OpenSSL, as loaded by fipscheck, performs the integrity check of the OpenSSL library files using
HMAC-SHA256.
 The application fipscheck performs the integrity check of its application file using HMAC-SHA256
provided by OpenSSL.
 The fipscheck application performs the integrity check of the calling application. The fipscheck computes
the HMAC-SHA256 checksum of the file from the command line and compares the computed value to
the value stored inside the /path/to/application/.<applicationfilename>.hmac checksum file. The
fipscheck application returns the appropriate exit value based on the comparison result (zero if the
checksum is OK – which is enforced by the libfipscheck.so library). The fipscheck application also
automatically verifies the integrity of libfipscheck when loaded.
No operator intervention is required during the running of the self tests.
See section 9.3 for descriptions of possible self test errors and recovery procedures.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
9 Guidance
Password-based encryption and password-based key generation do not provide sufficient strength to satisfy
FIPS 140-2 requirements. As a result, data processed with password-based encryption methods are considered
to be unprotected.
NOTE: All cryptographic functions for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module
will be provided by a copy of a FIPS 140-2 validated version of the Red Hat OpenSSL cryptographic module.
9.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
The version of the RPM containing the validated module is stated in section 1 above. The integrity of the RPM is
automatically verified during the installation and the crypto officer shall not install the RPM file if the RPM tool
indicates an integrity error. In addition, the OpenSSL FIPS 140-2 module referenced in section 1 must be
installed according to its Security Policy.
The RPM package of the module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the installation of RPM
packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm, and the RHN remote management
tool).
For proper operation of the in-module integrity verification, the prelink has to be disabled. This can be done by
setting PRELINKING=no in the /etc/sysconfig/prelink configuration file. Existing prelinking, if any, should be
undone on all the system files using the 'prelink -u -a' command.
To bring the module into FIPS approved mode, perform the following:
1. Install the dracut-fips package:
# yum install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image:
# dracut -f
After regenerating the initrd, the crypto officer has to append the following string to the kernel command line by
changing the setting in the boot loader:
fips=1
If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition of /boot or /boot/efi>
must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command "df /boot" or "df /boot/efi"
respectively. For example:
$ df /boot
Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot
The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string needs to be
appended to the kernel command line:
"boot=/dev/sda1"
Reboot to apply these settings.
In addition to the configuration of the kernel, the OpenSSH client configuration ~/.ssh/config should contain:
 Either no "Ciphers" option or the option with a subset out of "aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr, aes256-ctr,
aes128-cbc, 3des-cbc, aes192-cbc, aes256-cbc"
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
 Either no "MACs" option or the option with "hmac-sha1" and/or “hmac-sha1-96”
 "Protocol 2" must be specified
Reboot to apply these settings.
To operate the crypto module, the operating system must be restricted to a single operator mode of operation,
and the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)) and the strace(1) utility must not be used. In addition, other
tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment, such as ftrace or systemtap shall not be used.
A client public/private key pair that can be used for non-interactive authentication of a user to a server can be
generated using 'ssh-keygen'. See the ssh-keygen(1) man page for documentation and setup instructions.
The OpenSSH client maintains a list of known servers and their public keys, globally in
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and per-user in ~/.ssh/known_hosts, which the crypto officer can install keys of
known servers from. If any of these files is pre-populated using ssh-keyscan, the list of known public keys must
be verified against a trusted source.
9.1.1 Configuration Changes and FIPS Approved Mode
Use care whenever making configuration changes that could potentially prevent access to the
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled flag (fips=1) in the file/proc. If the module does not detect this flag during
initialization, it does not enable the FIPS approved mode.
All user space modules depend on this file for transitioning into FIPS approved mode.
9.2 User Guidance
See the ssh(1) man page for general usage documentation of the ssh client.
When connecting to a previously unknown server, the user will be prompted to verify a fingerprint of the server's
public key. This must be done by consulting a trusted source.
9.3 Handling Self Test Errors
OpenSSL self test failures may prevent OpenSSH from operating. See the Guidance section in the OpenSSL
Security Policy for instructions on handling OpenSSL self test failures.
The OpenSSH self test consists of the software integrity test. If the integrity test fails, OpenSSH enters an error
state. The only recovery from this type of failure is to reinstall the OpenSSH module. If you downloaded the
software, verify the package hash to confirm a proper download.
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10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA decryption or
signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack.
The API function of RSA_blinding_on turns blinding on for key rsa and generates a random blinding factor. The
random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_blinding_on.
Weak Triple-DES keys are detected as follows:
/* Weak and semi week keys as taken from
* %A D.W. Davies
* %A W.L. Price
* %T Security for Computer Networks
* %I John Wiley & Sons
* %D 1984
* Many thanks to smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) for the reference
* (and actual cblock values).
*/
#define NUM_WEAK_KEY 16
static const DES_cblock weak_keys[NUM_WEAK_KEY]={
/* weak keys */
{0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01},
{0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE},
{0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E},
{0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1},
/* semi-weak keys */
{0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01},
{0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E},
{0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1,0x01},
{0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E},
{0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E},
{0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E,0x01},
{0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE},
{0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1}};
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Please note that there is no weak key detection by default. The caller can explicitely set the DES_check_key to 1
or call DES_check_key_parity() and/or DES_is_weak_key() functions on its own.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
11 Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Specification
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cypher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message
Authentication Code
CFB Cypher Feedback
CMT Cryptographic Module Testing
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CVT Component Verification Testing
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB Electronic Code Book
FSM Finite State Model
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
LDAP Lightweight Directory Application Protocol
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OFB Output Feedback
O/S Operating System
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SAP Service Access Points
SDK Software Development Kit
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SOF Strength of Function
SSH Secure Shell
TDES Triple DES
UI User Interface
Table 7, Abbreviations
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 2.1 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
12 References
[1] OpenSSH Client user guide (provided with installation RPM, see section 1.1 Description of Module for
version)
[2] FIPS 140-2 Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[3] FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[4] FIPS 140-2 Derived Test Requirements, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/standards.html
[5] FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[6] FIPS 180-3 Secure Hash Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[7] FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC),
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[8] FIPS 186-3 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
[9] ANSI X9.52:1998 Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation,
http://webstore.ansi.org/FindStandards.aspx?Action=displaydept&DeptID=80&Acro=X9&DpName=X9,%20Inc.
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