



Cisco Systems, Inc

Cisco Firepower Threat Defense Virtual Cryptographic Module

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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# 1 General

## 1.1 Overview

This is Cisco Systems, Inc. non-proprietary security policy for the Cisco Firepower Threat Defense Virtual Cryptographic Module (hereinafter referred to as FTDv or the Module), firmware version 7.4.2. The following details how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 1 firmware hybrid cryptographic module.

The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; software/firmware security; operational environment; physical security; non-invasive security; sensitive security parameter management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; and mitigation of other attacks. The following table indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module.

## 1.2 Security Levels

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic module specification	1
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	1
4	Roles, services, and authentication	1
5	Software/Firmware security	1
6	Operational environment	1
7	Physical security	1
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	1
10	Self-tests	1
11	Life-cycle assurance	1
12	Mitigation of other attacks	N/A
	Overall Level	1

Table 1: Security Levels

# 2 Cryptographic Module Specification

## 2.1 Description

### Purpose and Use:

This module is a multi-chip standalone firmware hybrid cryptographic module deployed as the virtualized version of the Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) which houses ASA and Firepower solutions with underlying operating system identified as Linux 4 (also referred to as Firepower eXtensible Operating System or FX-OS throughout this document). The Module's operational environment is non-modifiable.

FTD delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses, improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. This solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of

next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content security and secure unified communications, SSHv2, HTTPS/TLSv1.2, IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B.

**Module Type:** Firmware-hybrid

**Module Embodiment:** MultiChipStand

**Module Characteristics:**

**Cryptographic Boundary:**

The cryptographic module (red dash box) is a non-modifiable, multi-chip standalone firmware hybrid cryptographic module providing cryptographic support which takes data in and out from the host application via the API.

The block diagram below shows the boundary of the Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) being defined as the physical perimeter of the tested platform enclosure around which everything runs. The cryptographic boundary is the module (red dash box) and its interfaces with the operational environment.




Figure 1 Block Diagram

The Block Diagram above comprises the following components

- Processor: Chip on the tested platforms handle all processes.
- API: Host API between hypervisor and processor
- Hypervisor: VMWare ESXi 7.0
- API: Host API between hypervisor and the FTD Module
- FTD: Firepower Threat Defense
- API: Guest API between the FTD Module and FOM Crypto library
- FOM: Cisco FIPS Object Module (FOM)

## 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

### Tested Module Identification – Hardware:

N/A for this module.

### Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):

Package or File Name	Software/ Firmware Version	Features	Integrity Test
Cisco_Firepower_Threat_Defense_Virtual-7.4.2.vmdk	7.4.2		RSA 2048 SigVer with SHA2-512

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)

### Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:

Model and/or Part Number	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Processors	Features
UCS C220 M5S SFF Server	1.0	VMware ESXi 7.0	Intel Xeon Platinum 8160 (Skylake)	

Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware

### Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
Linux 4 (FX- OS)	UCS C220 M5S SFF Server	Intel Xeon Platinum 8160 (Skylake)	Yes	VMware ESXi 7.0	7.4.2

Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid

### Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

Operating System	Hardware Platform
Linux 4 (FX-OS)	UCS C220 M6 SFF Server w/ESXi 7.0
Linux 4 (FX-OS)	UCS C220 M7 SFF Server w/ESXi 7.0
Linux 4 (FX-OS)	UCS C225 M6 SFF Server w/ESXi 7.0
Linux 4 (FX-OS)	UCS C240 M5 SFF Server w/ESXi 7.0
Linux 4 (FX-OS)	UCS C240 M6 SFF Server w/ESXi 7.0
Linux 4 (FX-OS)	UCS C480 M5 SFF Server w/ESXi 7.0
Linux 4 (FX-OS)	UCS-E1100D M6 SFF Server w/ESXi 7.0

Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid

## 2.3 Excluded Components

N/A for this module.

## 2.4 Modes of Operation

### Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved	The module is always in the approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed.	Approved	Approved mode indicator: "FIPS is currently enabled."

Table 6: Modes List and Description

The module has one Approved mode of operation and does not implement a Non-Approved mode of operation. Once the module is configured in the Approved mode of operation by following the steps in section 11 of this document, the module will only operate in the Approved mode of operation. The module doesn't claim the implementation of a degraded mode operation.

## 2.5 Algorithms

### Approved Algorithms:

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A4595	Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A4595	Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG	A4595	Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	A4595	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	A4595	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A4595	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA-1	A4595	Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A4595	Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A4595	Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A4595	Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A4595	Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A4595	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521	SP 800-56A Rev. 3

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A4595	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-4096	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDF IKEv2 (CVL)	A4595	Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 2048 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 3072 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF SNMP (CVL)	A4595	Password Length - Password Length: 256, 64	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL)	A4595	Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	A4595	Modulo - 2048, 3072	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	A4595	Modulo - 2048, 3072	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A4595	Modulo - 2048, 3072	FIPS 186-4
Safe Primes Key Generation	A4595	Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-4096	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
SHA-1	A4595	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A4595	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A4595	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A4595	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A4595	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL)	A4595	Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1

Table 7: Approved Algorithms

### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
CKG	Key Type:Asymmetric	N/A	The Module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as detailed by example 1 in section 4 and section 5 of SP800-133r2

Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms

### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

**Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:**

N/A for this module.

**Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:**

N/A for this module.

**2.6 Security Function Implementations**

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
KAS-FFC (SSHv2)	CKG KAS-Full	Full KAS-FFC Key Agreement used for SSHv2 service	Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 152 bits of security strength IG : IG D.F Path 2, Scenario 2, Split Key Confirmation : No Key Derivation : IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4595) Domain Parameter Generation: MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4595) KDF SSH: (A4595) Counter DRBG: (A4595) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric
KAS-ECC (SSHv2)	CKG KAS-Full	Full KAS-ECC Key Agreement used for SSHv2 service	Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of security strength IG : IG D.F Scenario 2, Path 2, Split Key Confirmation : No Key Derivation : IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4595) Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 KDF SSH: (A4595) Counter DRBG: (A4595) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric
KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)	CKG KAS-Full	Full KAS-FFC Key Agreement used for TLSv1.2 service	Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between	KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4595) Domain

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			112 and 152 bits of security strength IG : IG D.F Path 2, Scenario 2, Split Key Confirmation : No Key Derivation : IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	Parameter Generation: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4595) TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A4595) Counter DRBG: (A4595) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric
KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)	CKG KAS-Full	Full KAS-ECC Key Agreement used for TLSv1.2 service	Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of security strength IG : IG D.F Scenario 2, Path 2, Split Key Confirmation : No Key Derivation : IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4595) Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A4595) Counter DRBG: (A4595) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric
KAS-FFC (IKEv2)	CKG KAS-Full	Full KAS-FFC Key Agreement used for IKEv2 service	Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 152 bits of security strength IG : IG D.F Path 2, Scenario 2, Split Key Confirmation : No Key Derivation : IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4595) Domain Parameter Generation: MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4595) KDF IKEv2: (A4595) Counter DRBG: (A4595) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
KAS-ECC (IKEv2)	CKG KAS-Full	Full KAS-ECC Key Agreement used for IKEv2 service	Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of security strength IG : IG D.F Scenario 2, Path 2, Split Key Confirmation : No Key Derivation : IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4595) Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 KDF IKEv2: (A4595) Counter DRBG: (A4595) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric
KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC)	KTS-Unwrap KTS-Wrap	KTS via SSHv2 service by using AES and HMAC	Caveat: Key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of security strength Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G:"combination" method: use any approved symmetric encryption mode together with an approved authentication method	AES-CBC: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256 HMAC-SHA-1: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4595) SHA-1: (A4595) SHA2-256: (A4595) SHA2-384: (A4595)
KTS (SSHv2 with AES-GCM)	KTS-Unwrap KTS-Wrap	KTS via SSHv2 service by using AES-GCM	Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of security strength Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G:method: use of any approved authenticated symmetric encryption mode	AES-GCM: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256
KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC)	KTS-Unwrap KTS-Wrap	KTS via TLSv1.2 service by using AES and HMAC	Caveat: Key establishment methodology provides 128 or	AES-CBC: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			256 bits of security strength Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G: "combination" method: use any approved symmetric encryption mode together with an approved authentication method	HMAC-SHA-1: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4595) SHA-1: (A4595) SHA2-256: (A4595) SHA2-384: (A4595)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-GCM)	KTS-Unwrap KTS-Wrap	KTS via TLSv1.2 service by using AES-GCM	Caveat: Key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of security strength Standard:SP 800-38F IG D.G: method: use of any approved authenticated symmetric encryption mode	AES-GCM: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256
RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	AsymKeyPair- KeyGen CKG	RSA KeyGen for IKEv2, SSHv2 and TLSv1.2 services		RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A4595) Modulus: 2048, 3072 bits Counter DRBG: (A4595) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric
RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	DigSig-SigGen	RSA SigGen for IKEv2, SSHv2 and TLSv1.2 services		RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A4595) Modulus: 2048, 3072 bits
RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	DigSig-SigVer	RSA SigVer for IKEv2, SSHv2 and TLSv1.2 services		RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A4595) Modulus: 2048, 3072 bits

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen CKG	ECDSA KeyGen for IKEv2, SSHv2 and TLSv1.2 services		ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A4595) Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 Counter DRBG: (A4595) CKG: () Key Type: Asymmetric
ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	DigSig-SigGen	ECDSA SigGen for IKEv2, SSHv2 and TLSv1.2 services		ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A4595) Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521
ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	DigSig-SigVer	ECDSA SigVer for IKEv2, SSHv2 and TLSv1.2 services		ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A4595) Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521
SSHv2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt	BC-Auth BC-UnAuth	SSHv2 session protection.		AES-CBC: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256 AES-GCM: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256
SSHv2 Session Authentication	MAC	SSHv2 Session Authentication.		SHA-1: (A4595) SHA2-256: (A4595) HMAC-SHA-1: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4595)
SSHv2 Keying Materials Development	KAS-135KDF	SSHv2 session keying materials, used to derive SSHv2 session keys.		KDF SSH: (A4595)
TLSv1.2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt	BC-Auth BC-UnAuth	TLSv1.2 session protection.		AES-CBC: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256 AES-GCM: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
TLSv1.2 Session Authentication	MAC	TLSv1.2 session authentication.		SHA-1: (A4595) SHA2-256: (A4595) SHA2-384: (A4595) HMAC-SHA-1: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4595)
TLSv1.2 Keying Materials Development	KAS-135KDF	TLSv1.2 session keying materials, used to derive TLS session keys.		TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A4595)
IPsec/IKEv2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt	BC-Auth BC-UnAuth	IPsec/IKEv2 session protection.		AES-CBC: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256 AES-GCM: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256
IPsec/IKEv2 Session Authentication	MAC	IPsec/IKEv2 session authentication.		SHA2-256: (A4595) SHA2-384: (A4595) SHA2-512: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A4595)
IPsec/IKEv2 Keying Materials Development	KAS-135KDF	IPsec/IKEv2 session keying materials, used to derive IPsec/IKEv2 session keys.		KDF IKEv2: (A4595)
SNMPv3 Session Encrypt/Decrypt	BC-UnAuth	SNMPv3 session protection.		AES-CBC: (A4595) Key Length: 128, 256
SNMPv3 Session Authentication	MAC	SNMPv3 session authentication.		SHA-1: (A4595) SHA2-224: (A4595)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				SHA2-256: (A4595) SHA2-384: (A4595) HMAC-SHA-1: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2- 224: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2- 256: (A4595) HMAC-SHA2- 384: (A4595)
SNMPv3 Keying Materials Development	KAS-135KDF	SNMPv3 session keying materials, used to derive SNMPv3 session keys.		KDF SNMP: (A4595)
DRBG Function	DRBG	Used for DRBG generation		Counter DRBG: (A4595)

Table 9: Security Function Implementations

## 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

- The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2 handshake process (client\_write\_key and server\_write\_key) are compared and the module aborts the session if the key values are identical. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
- The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. Two keys established by IKEv2 for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.

- In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation as per section 5 in SP800-133rev2. The resulting generated seed used in the asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.
- The module was algorithm tested based on the FIPS 186-4 standard Digital Signatures. According to IG C.K, this module is 186-5 compliant as all 186-4 CAVP tests performed are mathematically identical to the 186-5 CAVP tests. The Module does not support 186-4 DSA or RSA X9.31 for Signature Generation or Signature Verification.

## 2.8 RBG and Entropy

Cert Number	Vendor Name
E3	Cisco

Table 10: Entropy Certificates

Name	Type	Operational Environment	Sample Size	Entropy per Sample	Conditioning Component
Cisco Jitter Entropy Source	Non-Physical	Intel Xeon Platinum 8160 (Skylake)	256 bits	Full entropy	A2810 (SHA3-256)

Table 11: Entropy Sources

The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) implementation based on SP800-90Arev1. This DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions).

The DRBG implemented is an AES-256 Counter DRBG, seeded by the entropy source described in the table above. The Counter DRBG utilizes the Derivation Function and employs prediction resistance.

The DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 384 bits of entropy). Additionally, the DRBG is reseeded with a 256-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 256 bits of entropy).

## 2.9 Key Generation

The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant with SP 800-133r2. When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP 800-90Ar1 approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2. The following methods are implemented:

- Direct generation of symmetric keys: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 6.1.
- Safe primes key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 5.2, which maps to SP 800-56Arev3. The method described in Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3 (“Testing Candidates”) is used.

- RSA key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-4. The method described in Appendix B.3 of FIPS 186-4 (“Probable Primes”) is used.
- ECC (ECDH and ECDSA) key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-4. The method described in Appendix B.4 of FIPS 186-4 (“Testing Candidates”) is used. Note that this generation method is also used to generate ECDH key pairs.

Additionally, the module implements the following key derivation methods:

- SNMPv3, SSHv2 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, IKEv2 KDF: compliant with SP 800-135r1. These implementations shall only be used to generate secret keys in the context of the SNMPv3, SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2 KDF protocols, respectively.

Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized after processing the service

## 2.10 Key Establishment

The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation:

### **KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation:**

- The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength.
- The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 4419 (SSH), RFC 7919 (TLS) and RFC 3526 (IKE). Note that the module only implements domain parameter generation, key pair generation and verification, and shared secret computation.
  - SSH (RFC 4419):
    - MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
    - MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
    - MODP-4096 (ID = 16)
  - TLS (RFC 7919):
    - ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)
    - ffdhe3072 (ID = 257)
    - ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)
  - IKE (RFC 3526):
    - MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
    - MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
    - MODP-4096 (ID = 16)

### **KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation:**

- The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

The module also provides the following key transport mechanisms:

- Key wrapping using AES-GCM with a security strength of 128 or 256 bits.

- Key wrapping using AES-CBC with a security strength of 128 or 256 bits with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256 or HMAC-SHA2-384.

## 2.11 Industry Protocols

The module supports SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IPsec/IKEv2 and SNMPv3 industrial protocols. No parts of SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IPsec/IKEv2 or SNMPv3 protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Please refer to SSPs Table for more information.

## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
N/A	Data Input	Arguments for an API that provide the data to be used for processed by the module.
N/A	Data Output	Arguments output from an API call.
N/A	Control Input	Arguments for an API call used to control and configure module operation.
N/A	Control Output	N/A
N/A	Status Output	Return values, and/or log messages.
N/A	Power	Provide the Power Supply to the module.

Table 12: Ports and Interfaces

The module's physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in Table 2. The module provides its logical interfaces via Application Programming Interface (API) calls. The logical interfaces provided by the module are mapped onto the FIPS 140-3 interfaces (data input, data output, control input, control output and status output) as follows.

## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

### 4.1 Authentication Methods

N/A for this module.

### 4.2 Roles

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer	Role	Crypto Officer	None

Table 13: Roles

The module supports Crypto Officer (CO) role. The module does not allow concurrent operators. The Crypto Officer is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.

### 4.3 Approved Services

The following tables detail the types of approved services available to each role in approved mode of operation, the types of access for each role and the Keys or SSPs they affect.

- Generate G
- Read Access R
- Write Access W
- Execute Access E
- Zeroize Z

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Show Status	Provide Module's current status	None	API command to show status.	Module's current status.	None	Crypto Officer
Show Version	Provide Module's name/ID and versioning information.	None	API command "show version"	Module's name "Cisco Firepower Threat Defense for VMware" and versioning information	None	Crypto Officer
Perform Self-Tests	Perform Self-Tests (Pre-operational self-tests and Conditional Self-Tests)	None	API commands to conduct on-demand Self-Tests.	Status of the self-tests results.	None	Crypto Officer
Perform Zeroization	Perform Zeroization.	None	API commands to conduct Zeroization operation or Power down the tested platform.	Status of the SSPs zeroization.	None	Crypto Officer - DRBG Entropy Input: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - DRBG Internal State Value: Z - DRBG Key: Z - SSH DH

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Private Key: Z - SSH DH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: Z - SSH RSA Private Key: Z - SSH RSA Public Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: Z - SSH Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH Session Authenticati

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						on Key: Z - TLS DH Private Key: Z - TLS DH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: Z - TLS RSA Private Key: Z - TLS RSA Public Key: Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authentication Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 DH Private Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 DH Public Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 Peer DH Public Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 DH Shared Secret: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Private Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Public Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Shared Secret: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Private Key: Z -

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Public Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Private Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Public Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 Pre-Shared Key: Z - SKEYSEED : Z - IPsec/IKEv2 Session Encryption Key: Z - IPsec/IKEv2 Authentication Key: Z - SNMPv3 Authentication/ Privacy Password: Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: Z - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: Z
Configure Network	Sets configuration of the systems.	None	API commands to configure the module.	Status of the completion of network related configuration.	None	Crypto Officer

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Configure SSHv2 Function	Configure SSHv2 Function	Global Indicator and SSHv2 configuration success status message.	API commands to configure SSHv2.	Status of the completion of SSHv2 configuration.	KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (SSHv2 with AES-GCM) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) DRBG Function	Crypto Officer - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E - SSH RSA Public Key: G,R,W - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E
Configure HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function	Configure HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function.	Global Indicator and HTTPS over TLSv1.2 configuration success status message.	API commands to configure HTTPS over TLSv1.2	Status of the completion of HTTPS over TLSv1.2 configuration.	KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-GCM) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	Crypto Officer - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E - TLS RSA Public Key: G,R,W - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W - DRBG Entropy

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					DRBG Function	Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E
Configure IPsec/IKE v2 Functions	Configure IPsec/IKE v2 Functions	Global Indicator with IPsec/IKE v2 configuration success status message.	API commands to configure IPsec/IKE v2.	Status of the completion of IPsec/IKE v2 secure tunnel configuration.	KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-GCM) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) DRBG Function	Crypto Officer - IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Public Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 Pre-Shared Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- DRBG Key: G,W,E
Configure SNMPv3 Function	Configure SNMPv3 Function	Global Indicator and SNMPv3 configuration success status message.	API commands to configure SNMPv3.	Status of the completion of SNMPv3 configuration.	KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-GCM) SNMPv3 Keying Materials Development	Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Authentication/ Privacy Password: W,E - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: G,W,E
Run SSHv2 Function	Execute SSHv2 Function	Global Indicator and Successful SSHv2 log message.	API commands to execute SSHv2 service.	Status of SSHv2 secure tunnel establishment.	KAS-FFC (SSHv2) KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (SSHv2 with AES-GCM) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) SSHv2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt	Crypto Officer - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH DH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					SSHv2 Session Authentication SSHv2 Keying Materials Development DRBG Function	- SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E - SSH RSA Public Key: G,R,W - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - SSH Session Authentication Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State Value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E
Run HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function	Execute HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function.	Global Indicator and Successful HTTPS over TLSv1.2 log message.	API command to execute HTTPS over TLSv1.2 service.	Status of HTTPS over TLSv1.2 establishment.	KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-	Crypto Officer - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E - TLS DH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer DH Public Key: W,E



Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State Value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E
Run IPsec/IKE v2 Functions	Execute IPsec/IKE v2 Functions	Global Indicator and Successful IPsec/IKE v2 log message.	API command to execute IPsec/IKE v2	Status of IPsec/IKE v2 secure tunnel establishment	KAS-FFC (IKEv2) KAS-ECC (IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) IPsec/IKEv2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt IPsec/IKEv2 Session Authentication IPsec/IKEv2 Keying Materials Development	Crypto Officer - IPsec/IKEv2 DH Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 DH Public Key: G,R,W - IPsec/IKEv2 Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - IPsec/IKEv2 Peer ECDH Public Key:

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					DRBG Function	W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Public Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Public Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 Pre-Shared Key: G,W,E - SKEYSEED : G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKEv2 Authentication Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed:

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E
Run SNMPv3 Functions	Execute SNMPv3 Function.	Global Indicator and Successful SNMPv3 log message.	API command to execute SNMPv3 service.	Status of SNMPv3 service.	SNMPv3 Session Encrypt/Decrypt SNMPv3 Session Authentication SNMPv3 Keying Materials Development	Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Authentication/ Privacy Password: W,E - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: G,W,E

Table 14: Approved Services

#### 4.4 Non-Approved Services

N/A for this module.

#### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

N/A for this module

#### 4.6 Bypass Actions and Status

N/A for this module

#### 4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status

The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error.

## 5 Software/Firmware Security

### 5.1 Integrity Techniques

The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the library is protected by RSA 2048 SigVer with SHA-512 (RSA and SHA-512 Cert. #A4595) signature calculated at build time. At crypto module library initialization, the signature is recalculated and compared to the hardcoded build-time generated signature value. If at load time the signature does not match, the crypto module library exits with error. If failure occurs during self-test, all crypto functionality is disabled.

### 5.2 Initiate on Demand

Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the integrity test on-demand.

## 6 Operational Environment

### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

**Type of Operational Environment:** Non-Modifiable

The module is a firmware hybrid module, which is operated in a non-modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The module's firmware version running on each tested platform 7.4.2.

The module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality of the host device's OS prevent unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys, intermediate key generation values and other SSPs by external processes during module execution. The module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined API. The operational environments provide the capability to separate individual application processes from each other by preventing uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage within the operational environment. Processes that are spawned by the module are owned by the module and are not owned by external processes/operators.

## 7 Physical Security

The module is running on the multi-chip standalone production grade platform to meet physical security requirements from FIPS 140-3 level 1. The module's Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) is drawn at the casing of the tested platforms in Table 3. The module's tested platforms consist of production-grade components.

## 8 Non-Invasive Security

N/A for this module.

## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

### 9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
DRAM	Volatile memory provided by the ESXi host for the module temporary.	Dynamic
Flash	Non-Volatile memory provided by the ESXi host for the module to retain memory across power-cycles.	Static

Table 15: Storage Areas

### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
Peer Public Key Input	External (Outside of the TOEPP)	TOEPP	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	
Module Public Key Output	TOEPP	External (Outside of the TOEPP)	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	
Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM	External (Outside of the TOEPP)	TOEPP	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS (SSHv2 with AES-GCM)
Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC	External (Outside of the TOEPP)	TOEPP	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC)
Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM	External (Outside of the TOEPP)	TOEPP	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-GCM)
Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC	External (Outside of the TOEPP)	TOEPP	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC)

Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods

### 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Zeroization Command	CO issues zeroization service	The zeroization command will erase all SSPs stored in the DRAM and Flash of the module.	Delete the virtual machine from the VMware ESXi host.
Session Termination	Zeroization upon session termination	Session termination will automatically zeroize all session based temporary SSPs	Terminate session
Reboot	Zeroization upon rebooting the module	Reboot to zeroize all temporary SSPs stored in volatile memory	Reboot

Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods

## 9.4 SSPs

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
DRBG Entropy Input	Used to seed the DRBG	384 bits - at least 256 bits	Entropy Input - CSP			DRBG Function
DRBG Seed	Used in DRBG Generation	256 bits - 256 bits	DRBG Seed - CSP			DRBG Function
DRBG Internal State V value	Used in DRBG Generation	256 bits - 256 bits	DRBG Internal State V value - CSP			DRBG Function
DRBG Key	Used in DRBG Generation	256 bits - 256 bits	DRBG Key - CSP			DRBG Function
SSH DH Private Key	Used to derive the SSH DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-FFC (SSHv2)		KAS-FFC (SSHv2)
SSH DH Public Key	Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-FFC (SSHv2)	

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
SSH Peer DH Public Key	Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-FFC (SSHv2)
SSH DH Shared Secret	Used to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authentication Keys	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-FFC (SSHv2)	KAS-FFC (SSHv2)
SSH ECDH Private Key	Used to derive the SSH ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-ECC (SSHv2)		KAS-ECC (SSHv2)
SSH ECDH Public Key	Used to derive the SSH ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-ECC (SSHv2)	
SSH Peer ECDH Public Key	Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-ECC (SSHv2)
SSH ECDH Shared Secret	Used to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authentication Keys	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-ECC (SSHv2)	KAS-ECC (SSHv2)
SSH RSA Private Key	Used for SSH session authentication	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits -	Private Key - CSP	RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)		RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
		112 to 128 bits				
SSH RSA Public Key	Used for SSH session authentication	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112 to 128 bits	Public Key - PSP		RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	
SSH ECDSA Private Key	Used for SSH session authentication	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)		ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
SSH ECDSA Public Key	Used for SSH session authentication	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	
SSH Session Encryption Key	Used for SSH session confidentiality protection	128, 256 bits - 128, 256 bits	Symmetric Key - CSP		SSHv2 Keying Materials Development	SSHv2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt
SSH Session Authentication Key	Used for SSH Session integrity protection	At least 160 bits - At least 160 bits	Session Key - CSP		SSHv2 Keying Materials Development	SSHv2 Session Authentication
TLS DH Private Key	Used to Derive TLS DH Shared Secret	ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)		KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)
TLS DH Public Key	Used to Derive TLS DH Shared Secret	ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 - 112	Public Key - PSP		KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)	

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
		to 152 bits				
TLS Peer DH Public Key	Used to derive TLS DH Shared Secret	ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)
TLS DH Shared Secret	Used to Derive TLS Session Encryption Key and TLS Session Authentication Key	ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)	KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)
TLS ECDH Private Key	Used to Derive TLS ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)		KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)
TLS ECDH Public Key	Used to Derive TLS ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)	
TLS Peer ECDH Public Key	Used to derive TLS ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)
TLS ECDH Shared Secret	Used to Derive TLS Session Encryption Key and TLS Session Authentication Key	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)	KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
TLS RSA Private Key	Used to support CO HTTPS interfaces	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112 to 128 bits	Private Key - CSP	RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)		RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
TLS RSA Public Key	Used to support CO HTTPS interfaces	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112 to 128 bits	Public Key - PSP		RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	
TLS ECDSA Private Key	Used to support CO HTTPS interfaces	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)		ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
TLS ECDSA Public Key	Used to support CO HTTPS interfaces	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	
TLS Master Secret	Used to protect HTTPS Session	384 bits - 384 bits	Master Secret - CSP		TLSv1.2 Keying Materials Development	TLSv1.2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt TLSv1.2 Session Authentication
TLS Session Encryption Key	Used to protect HTTPS Session	128, 256 bits - 128, 256 bits	Symmetric Key - CSP		TLSv1.2 Keying Materials Development	TLSv1.2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt
TLS Session Authentication Key	Used to authenticate HTTPS Session	160, 256, 384 bits - 160, 256, 384 bits	Message Authentication Key - CSP		TLSv1.2 Keying Materials Development	TLSv1.2 Session Authentication

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
IPsec/IKEv2 DH Private Key	Used to derive IPsec/IKEv2 DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-FFC (IKEv2)		KAS-FFC (IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2 DH Public Key	Used to derive IPsec/IKEv2 DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-FFC (IKEv2)	
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer DH Public Key	Used to derive IPsec/IKEv2 DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-FFC (IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2 DH Shared Secret	Used to derive IPsec/IKEv2 Session Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112 to 152 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-FFC (IKEv2)	KAS-FFC (IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Private Key	Used to derive IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Private key - CSP	KAS-ECC (IKEv2)		KAS-ECC (IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Public Key	Used to derive IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-ECC (IKEv2)	
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer ECDH Public Key	Used to derive IPsec/IKEv2 Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384,	Public Key - PSP			KAS-ECC (IKEv2)

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
	2 ECDH Shared Secret	P-521 - 128 to 256 bits				
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Shared Secret	Used to derive IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-ECC (IKEv2)	KAS-ECC (IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Private Key	Used for IPsec/IKEv2 authentication	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112 to 128 bits	Private Key - CSP	RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)		RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Public Key	Used for IPsec/IKEv2 authentication	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112 to 128 bits	Public Key - PSP		RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Private Key	Used for IPsec/IKEv2 authentication	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)		ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Public Key	Used for IPsec/IKEv2 authentication	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	
IPsec/IKEv2 Pre-Shared Key	Used for IPsec/IKEv2 authentication	16-32 characters - 128 to 256 bits	Shared Secret - CSP			
SKEYSEED	Keying material used to derive the IPsec/IKE Session Encryption	160 bits - 160 bits	Keying Material - CSP		IPsec/IKEv2 Keying Materials Development	IPsec/IKEv2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt IPsec/IKEv2 Session

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
	Key and IPsec/IKE Authentication Key					Authentication
IPsec/IKEv2 Session Encryption Key	Used to secure IPsec/IKEv2 session confidentiality	128, 192, 256 bits - 128, 192, 256 bits	Symmetric Key - CSP		IPsec/IKEv2 Keying Materials Development	IPsec/IKEv2 Session Encrypt/Decrypt
IPsec/IKEv2 Authentication Key	Used to secure IPsec/IKEv2 session authentication	at least 160 bits - at least 160 bits	Message Authentication Key - CSP		IPsec/IKEv2 Keying Materials Development	IPsec/IKEv2 Session Authentication
SNMPv3 Authentication/ Privacy Password	Used for SNMPv3 user authentication	8-32 characters - 64 to 256 bits	Authentication Password - CSP			
SNMPv3 Encryption Key	Used for SNMPv3 confidentiality	128 bits - 128 bits	Symmetric Key - CSP		SNMPv3 Keying Materials Development	SNMPv3 Session Encrypt/Decrypt
SNMPv3 Authentication Key	Used for SNMPv3 authentication	At least 112 bits - At least 112 bits	Authentication Key - CSP		SNMPv3 Keying Materials Development	SNMPv3 Session Authentication

Table 18: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
DRBG Entropy Input		DRAM:Plaintext	Until Reboot	Zeroization Command Reboot	DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Seed		DRAM:Plaintext	Until Reboot	Zeroization Command Reboot	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
					With DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Internal State V value		DRAM:Plaintext	Until Reboot	Zeroization Command Reboot	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Key		DRAM:Plaintext	Until Reboot	Zeroization Command Reboot	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With
SSH DH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH DH Public Key:Paired With SSH Peer DH Public Key:Used With
SSH DH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH DH Private Key:Paired With
SSH Peer DH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH DH Private Key:Used With
SSH DH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH DH Private Key:Derived From SSH Peer DH Public Key:Derived From
SSH ECDH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH ECDH Public Key:Paired With SSH Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
SSH ECDH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH ECDH Private Key:Paired With
SSH Peer ECDH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH ECDH Private Key:Used With
SSH ECDH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH ECDH Private Key:Derived From SSH Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From
SSH RSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SSH RSA Public Key:Paired With
SSH RSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SSH RSA Private Key:Paired With
SSH ECDSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SSH ECDSA Public Key:Paired With
SSH ECDSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SSH ECDSA Private Key:Paired With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	GCM Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC				
SSH Session Encryption Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH Session Authentication Key:Used With
SSH Session Authentication Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SSH Session Encryption Key:Used With
TLS DH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS DH Public Key:Paired With TLS Peer DH Public Key:Used With
TLS DH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS DH Private Key:Paired With
TLS Peer DH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS DH Private Key:Used With
TLS DH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS DH Private Key:Derived From TLS Peer DH Public Key:Derived From
TLS ECDH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination	TLS ECDH Public Key:Paired With TLS Peer ECDH

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
				n Reboot	Public Key:Used With
TLS ECDH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS ECDH Private Key:Paired With
TLS Peer ECDH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS ECDH Private Key:Used With
TLS ECDH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS ECDH Private Key:Derived From TLS Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From
TLS RSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	TLS RSA Public Key:Paired With
TLS RSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	TLS RSA Private Key:Paired With
TLS ECDSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	TLS ECDSA Public Key:Paired With
TLS ECDSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output Secret Input via TLS	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	TLS ECDSA Private Key:Paired With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	encrypted by GCM Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC				
TLS Master Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS DH Shared Secret:Derived From TLS ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From
TLS Session Encryption Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS Session Authentication Key:Used With TLS Master Secret:Derived From
TLS Session Authentication Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS session is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	TLS Session Encryption Key:Used With TLS Master Secret:Derived From
IPsec/IKEv2 DH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	IPsec/IKEv2 DH Public Key:Paired With IPsec/IKEv2 Peer DH Public Key:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2 DH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	IPsec/IKEv2 DH Private Key:Paired With
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer DH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	IPsec/IKEv2 DH Private Key:Used With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
IPsec/IKEv2 DH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SKEYSEED:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Public Key:Paired With IPsec/IKEv2 Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Private Key:Paired With
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer ECDH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Private Key:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Private Key:Derived From IPsec/IKEv2 Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From SKEYSEED:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Public Key:Paired With
IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Secret Input via TLS	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	IPsec/IKEv2 RSA Private Key:Paired With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	encrypted by AES and HMAC				
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Public Key:Paired With
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	IPsec/IKEv2 ECDSA Private Key:Paired With
IPsec/IKEv2 Pre-Shared Key	Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SKEYSEED:Derived to
SKEYSEED		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	IPsec/IKEv2 DH Shared Secret:Derived From IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From IPsec/IKEv2 Pre-Shared Key:Derived From

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
IPsec/IKEv2 Session Encryption Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SKEYSEED:Derived From
IPsec/IKEv2 Authentication Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SKEYSEED:Derived From
SNMPv3 Authentication / Privacy Password	Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SNMPv3 Encryption Key:Derived to SNMPv3 Authentication Key:Derived to
SNMPv3 Encryption Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SNMPv3 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SNMPv3 Authentication/ Privacy Password:Derived From SNMPv3 Authentication Key:Used With
SNMPv3 Authentication Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SNMPv3 tunnel is active	Zeroization Command Session Termination Reboot	SNMPv3 Authentication/ Privacy Password:Derived From SNMPv3 Encryption Key:Used With

Table 19: SSP Table 2

## 9.5 Transitions

### SHA-1

The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031

## FIPS 186-4/186-5

As of February 5, 2024, the CMVP does not accept module submissions that implement DSA or RSA X9.31 in the approved mode, other than for signature verification which is approved for legacy use. This module does not implement DSA or RSA X9.31 for signature generation and therefore is unaffected by the current transition from 186-4 to 186-5. As detailed in section 2.7, the CAVP testing performed on the 186-4 algorithms is mathematically similar to the testing performed on the 186-5 algorithms and therefore this module claims compliance with 186-5. This means that no timeline exists in which any of the implemented algorithms will transition from approved to non-approved.

## 10 Self-Tests

### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4595)	RSA 2048 SigVer with SHA2-512	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	Module is in normal state	RSA SigVer

Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The module performs the following self-tests, including Pre-operational and Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). The self-test success or failure results are an output of the return value of the library load API call, which is functioning as the self-test status indicator. If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module's status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the operational state.

### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-CBC encrypt KAT (A4595)	256 bits	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Encrypt	Power up
AES-CBC decrypt KAT (A4595)	256 bits	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Decrypt	Power up

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-GCM authenticated encrypt KAT (A4595)	256 bits	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	Authenticated Encrypt	Power up
AES-GCM authenticated decrypt KAT (A4595)	256 bits	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	Authenticated Decrypt	Power up
Counter DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed KAT (A4595)	AES-128	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	Instantiate, Generate, and Reseed KATs	Power up
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4595)	Curve P-256 with SHA2-256	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	ECDSA SigGen KAT	Power up
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4595)	Curve P-256 with SHA2-256	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	ECDSA SigVer KAT	Power up
Entropy Source RCT Start-up Health Tests	Repetition Count Test (RCT)	RCT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power up
Entropy Source APT Start-up Health Tests	Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)	APT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power up
Entropy Source RCT Continuous Health Tests	Repetition Count Test (RCT)	RCT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Performed continuously as entropy source is active
Entropy Source APT Continuous Health Tests	Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)	APT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Performed continuously as entropy source is active
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A4595)	SHA-1	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power up
HMAC-SHA2-224 KAT (A4595)	SHA2-224	KAT	CAS T	Module is in	N/A	Power up

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				normal state		
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4595)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power up
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT (A4595)	SHA2-384	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power up
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A4595)	SHA2-512	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power up
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4595)	Curve P-256	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	Primitive Z KAT	Power up
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4595)	MODP-2048	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	Primitive Z KAT	Power up
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4595)	N/A	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power up
KDF SNMP KAT (A4595)	N/A	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power up
KDF SSH KAT (A4595)	N/A	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power up
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4595)	2048 bit modulus with SHA2-256	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	RSA SigGen KAT	Power up
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4595)	2048 bit modulus with SHA2-256	KAT	CAS T	Module is in normal state	RSA SigVer KAT	Power up
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A4595)	N/A	KAT	CAS T	Module is in	N/A	Power up

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				normal state		
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4595)	Curve P-256 with SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Module is in normal state	ECDSA	Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operational use.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4595)	Curve P-256 with SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Module is in normal state	N/A	Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operational use.
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4595)	MODP-2048	PCT	PCT	Module is in normal state	N/A	Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operational use.
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4595)	2048 bit modulus	PCT	PCT	Module is in normal state	RSA	Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
						first operational use.

Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests

The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.

### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4595)	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot

Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-CBC encrypt KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
AES-CBC decrypt KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
AES-GCM authenticated encrypt KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
AES-GCM authenticated decrypt KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
Counter DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
Entropy Source RCT Start-up Health Tests	RCT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
Entropy Source APT Start-up Health Tests	APT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
Entropy Source RCT Continuous Health Tests	RCT	CAST	N/A	N/A
Entropy Source APT Continuous Health Tests	APT	CAST	N/A	N/A
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-224 KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KDF SNMP KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KDF SSH KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A4595)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4595)	PCT	PCT	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4595)	PCT	PCT	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4595)	PCT	PCT	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4595)	PCT	PCT	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot

Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information

The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.

## 10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Error State	If self-test tests fail, the module is put into an error state.	Self-test failure	Reboot the module	System halt

Table 24: Error States

If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the self-tests, including the pre-operational integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational integrity test and the conditional CASTs.

## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance

### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-3. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings will put the module into a non-compliant state.

**Step 1:** Log in with the default username **admin** and the password **Admin123**.

**Step 2:** The first time you log in to the Module, you are prompted to accept the End User License Agreement (EULA) and to change the admin password. You will be prompted with the CLI setup wizard.

See the following guidelines:

- **Do you want to configure IPv4?** and/or **Do you want to configure IPv6?**  
Enter **y** for at least one of these types of addresses.
- **Enter the IPv4 default gateway for the management interface** and/or **Enter the IPv6 gateway for the management interface**  
Set a gateway IP address for Management 1/1 on the management network.
- **Manage the device locally?** Enter **no** to use the Firepower Management Center (FMC).

**Step 3:** Register the module into Firepower Management Center (FMC) for the further configuration.

```
> configure manager add {hostname | IPv4 address | IPv6 address}  
{registration key}
```

**Step 4:** From the Firepower Management Center (FMC), navigate to **Devices > Device Management** and from the “Add” drop-down, choose **Device**.

Set the following parameters:

- **Host:** Enter the IP address or hostname of the Firewall Threat Defense you want to add.
- **Display Name:** Enter the name for the Firewall Threat Defense as you want it to display in the Firewall Management Center.
- **Registration Key:** Enter the same registration key that you specified in the Firewall Threat Defense initial configuration in step 4 above.

- **Domain:** Assign the device to a leaf domain if you have a multidomain environment.
- **Group:** Assign it to a device group if you are using groups.
- **Access Control Policy:** Choose an initial policy.

Click **Register**, and confirm successful registration. If the registration succeeds, the device is added to the list. If it fails, you will see an error message.

**Step 5:** From the Firepower Management Center (FMC), navigate to **Device > Platform**, select **New Policy** and choose **Threat Defense Settings**. Name the new Policy, and select the FTD from the “Available Devices” list and click **Add to Policy**.

Then from the sidebar select **UCAPL/CC Compliance** in the dropdown choose **CC** option and save. This sets the mode of operation to the Approved Mode.

**Step 6:** Reboot the module.

**> reboot**

**Step 7:** Check the Module’s name, version and approved service status by using the following commands:

Output the modules name/version:

**> show version**

Output the modules approved mode of operation status:

**> show fips**

## 11.2 Administrator Guidance

No specific Administrator guidance.

## 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

No specific Non-Administrator guidance.

## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

N/A for this module.