© Neopost Technologies, S.A. | Version 8.0| Page 0 sur 17
Neopost
Postal Security Device (PSD)
Security Policy
Version 8.0
This document is non-proprietary. It may be reproduced or transmitted only in its entirety without revision.
Neopost Postal Security (PSD) Security Policy
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Contents
Contents ............................................................................................................................................1
Figures...............................................................................................................................................1
1 INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................2
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION...................................................................................2
3 SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETERS MANAGEMENT.......................................................................7
4 PORTS AND INTERFACES ............................................................................................................ 10
5 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION.................................................................................... 11
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT................................................................................................... 13
7 PHYSICAL SECURITY ................................................................................................................... 13
8 SELF-TESTS................................................................................................................................. 14
9 DESIGN ASSURANCE .................................................................................................................. 15
10 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS............................................................................................ 15
11 GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................. 15
Revision History ............................................................................................................................... 16
Figures
Figure 1 – Neopost Postal Security Device..................................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2 – Neopost PSD Configuration........................................................................................................................... 3
Figure 3 – FIPS 140-2 Security Level............................................................................................................................... 3
Figure 4 – FIPS Approved Algorithms............................................................................................................................. 5
Figure 5 – FIPS Allowed Security Functions.................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 6 – Non-Approved Security Functions................................................................................................................. 6
Figure 7 – Critical Security Parameters .......................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 8 – TLS v1.2 Handshake Protocol Critical Security Parameters........................................................................... 8
Figure 9 – TLS v1.2 Record Protocol Critical Security Parameters ................................................................................. 8
Figure 10 – Public Security Parameters.......................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 11 – Interface .................................................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 12 – Roles, Services, Operators......................................................................................................................... 12
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1 INTRODUCTION
This document forms a Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Neopost Technologies, S.A. (Neopost) Postal
Security Device (PSD) under the terms of the FIPS 140-2 validation. This document contains a statement of the
security rules under which the Neopost PSD operates.
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION
2.1 Neopost PSD Overview
The Neopost Technologies, S.A. (Neopost) Postal Security Device (PSD) is a cryptographic module embedded within
the postal franking machines. The Neopost PSD performs all franking machine’s cryptographic and postal security
functions and protects the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and Postal Relevant Data from unauthorized access.
The Neopost PSD (Figure 1) is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module enclosed within a hard, opaque, plastic
enclosure encapsulating the epoxy potted module which is wrapped in a tamper detection envelope with a tamper
response mechanism. This enclosure constitutes the cryptographic module’s physical boundary. The Neopost PSD
was designed to securely operate when voltage supplied to the module is between +5V and +17V and the
environmental temperature is between -30°C and 84°C.
Figure 1 – Neopost Postal Security Device
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2.2 Neopost PSD Configuration
Neopost PSD (Cryptographic Module) Description
Hardware P/N
A0014227-B and
A0014227-C
Firmware P/N
A0099591-A and
A0106652-A
Firmware Versions
a30.06 and
a30.07
NIST Approved
Security Functions
ECDSA (Cert. #517) A0038110A
AES (Cert. #2875) A0038111A
SHS (Cert. #2416) A0038112A
AES (Cert. #2874) A0038113A
CVL (Cert. #310) A0038114A
RSA (Cert. #1513) A0038115A
DRBG (Cert. #1835) A0038116B
HMAC (Cert. #1813) A0038118A
Figure 2 – Neopost PSD Configuration
2.3 FIPS Security Level Compliance
The Neopost PSD is designed to meet the overall requirements applicable for Level 3 of FIPS 140-2.
Security Requirements Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
Physical Security 3 + EFP/EFT
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks 3
Figure 3 – FIPS 140-2 Security Level
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2.4 Security Industry Protocols
The cryptographic module implements the TLS v1.2 protocol and uses only one cipher suite (TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-
AES-128-CBC-SHA256). The TLS protocol is composed of TLS Handshake protocol (used for mutual authentication
and TLS pre-master secret establishment) and TLS Record protocol (used for application data confidentiality and
integrity). No parts of this protocol, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
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2.5 Modes of Operation
The module supports both Approved and non-Approved modes of operation. When initialized for countries that
utilize only Approved security functions, e.g. the US or Belgium, the module is said to be in an Approved mode of
operation. The module returns an explicit indicator showing whether the module is in an Approved mode or non-
Approved mode via the Get Status command (Read Status Data). This returns either a 1 or 0 for Approved mode or
non-Approved mode respectively.
In order to change modes of operation the module must be initialized for a specific country. Therefore, it is impossible
to share CSPs between modes of operation.
The Neopost PSD supports the following FIPS Approved security functions in Approved Mode of Operation:
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Modes/Methods Key Length,
Curves or
Moduli
Usage
2874 AES (CBC) FIPS 197 CBC 128 Encryption/Decryption of:
 CSPs for storage within the module
 Data encryption/decryption using
TLS v1.2
2875 AES CMAC FIPS 197
SP 800-38B
AES 128 Indicia Authentication
Vendor
affirmed
CKG SP 800-133 The unmodified output of the DRBG is
used for symmetric and asymmetric key
generation
1835 CTR-DRBG SP 800-90A AES 128 Key generation
310 KDF (CVL) SP 800-135 SHA-256 TLS KDF function
517 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256 P-224  Digital Signature Generation
(Indicia Authentication)
1813 HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256
FIPS 198-1 (Key Sizes Ranges
Tested: KS<BS)
160, 256 TLS messages authentication, Indicia
Authentication
2416 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256 N/A Hashing algorithm used for:
 HMAC Generation
 Digital signatures
1513 RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256
PKCS1 v1.5
2048 Key Generation
Signature generation/ Signature
verification of X509 certificates used by
TLS Handshake protocol,
Signature verification of signed files
imported into the module
1513 RSA FIPS 186-2 SHA-1
PKCS1_V1_5
1536 Digital Signature Verification
(Legacy Use Only)
Figure 4 – FIPS Approved Algorithms
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The Neopost PSD supports the following FIPS Allowed security functions in Approved Mode of Operation:
Algorithms Caveat Use
Diffie-Hellman Provides 112 bits of encryption strength Key Establishment
RSA Key Wrapping Provides 112bits of encryption strength Key Establishment
NDRNG Seeding for the DRBG
Figure 5 – FIPS Allowed Security Functions
Some Postal Authorities/Standards may require implementation of non-FIPS Approved security functions. For these
specific firmware configurations, the Neopost PSD supports the following non-FIPS Approved security functions:
Algorithms Use
SHS (SHA-1)
Hashing algorithm used for digital signature generation process: ECDSA P192 SigGen – non-
compliant, cryptographic strength less than 112-bits (Postal Indicia Service – Canada Only)
ECDSA (P-192)
Digital Signature Generation – non-compliant, cryptographic strength less than 112-bits (Postal
Indicia Service – Canada Only)
RSA (1024)
PKCS1 v1.5
Key Wrapping – non-compliant, cryptographic strength less than 112-bits
(Postal Core Services – Germany Only)
Figure 6 – Non-Approved Security Functions
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3 SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETERS MANAGEMENT
3.1 Critical Security Parameters
Name Algorithm/Size Description
Generatio
n
Storage Distribution Zeroization
Master Secret
Key
AES CBC
128 bits
Internally encrypt
& decrypt PSDs
critical security
parameters
Internally:
DRBG
Plaintext in
volatile memory
protected by
tamper response
mechanism
N/A - Invocation of
“Zeroize CSPs”
service;
- Breach of flex circuit
triggers “Zeroize
CSPs” service;
- PSD temperature
over 84C triggers
“Zeroize CSPs” service
(EFP measure);
- Failure of a self-test
triggers “Zeroize
CSPs” service;
DRBG - Key CTR DRBG using
AES 128
Internal state of
DRBG.
Internally:
NDRNG
Plaintext in
volatile memory
protected by
tamper response
mechanism
N/A
DRBG -V CTR DRBG using
AES 128
Internal state of
DRBG.
Internally:
NDRNG
Plaintext in
volatile memory
protected by
tamper response
mechanism
N/A
TLS
Communicatio
n Private Key
RSA
PKCS #1 v1.5
2048 bits
Authenticates
messages and data
output from the
PSD during TLS
Handshake
protocol.
Internally:
FIPS186-4
KEYGEN
Encrypted
(w/Master
Secret)
N/A Rendered unusable by
zeroization of “Master
Secret”
Indicia
Authentication
Secret Key
HMAC-SHA-1
(160 bits key) or
HMAC-SHA-256
(256 bits key) or
CMAC AES 128
Indicia
authentication
(dependant on
country
configuration)
Internally:
DRBG
Encrypted
(w/Master
Secret)
RSA
Wrapping
(w/ Key
Encapsulati
on Public
Key)
Rendered unusable by
zeroization of “Master
Secret”
Indicia
Authentication
Private Key
ECDSA P224 or
ECDSA P1921
Indicia
authentication
(dependant on
country
configuration)
Internally:
DRBG
Encrypted
(w/Master
Secret)
N/A Rendered unusable by
zeroization of “Master
Secret”
m-secret2 N/A DPAG secret
information
Externally Encrypted
(w/Master
Secret)
RSA
Wrapping
(w/ m-
secret
Encapsulati
on Public
Key)
Rendered unusable by
zeroization of “Master
Secret”
m-secret
Encapsulation
Key
RSA
PKCS #1 v1.5
1024 bits3
Encapsulation of
m-secret from
DPAG to PSD
Internally:
DRBG
Encrypted
(w/Master
Secret)
N/A Rendered unusable by
zeroization of “Master
Secret”
Figure 7 – Critical Security Parameters
1
This key is non-compliant because it offers less than 112 bits of security strength and is not used in the approved mode of operation
2
This CSP provides less than 112 bits of security strength and is not used in approved mode of operation
3
This key is non-compliant because it offers less than 112 bits of security strength and is not used in the approved mode of operation
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Name Algorithm/Size Description Generation Storage Distribution Zeroization
DH private key
(TLS
Handshake)
Diffie-Hellman
224 bits
Diffie-Hellman
private key used to
agree TLS pre-
master
Internally:
DRBG
N/A N/A Immediately after
use (i.e. TLS-pre-
master key
establishment)
TLS pre-master
key
256 bytes Pre-master secret DH Key
Agreement
N/A N/A Immediately after
use
TLS master key 48 bytes Used to derive the
keys used by TLS
Record Protocol
(TLS
Communication
Secret Keyset)
Approved
TLS KDF
N/A N/A TLS session closure
Figure 8 – TLS v1.2 Handshake Protocol Critical Security Parameters
Name Algorithm/Size Description Generation Storage Distribution Zeroization
TLS
Communication
Secret Keyset
(TLS Record
Protocol Keys)
AES CBC:
2 x 128 bits;
HMAC-SHA-256:
2 x 256 bits
Encrypt & Decrypt
& Integrity TLS
Communication
Approved
TLS KDF
N/A N/A TLS session closure
Figure 9 – TLS v1.2 Record Protocol Critical Security Parameters
The CSPs are protected from unauthorized disclosure, modification and substitution.
The plaintext CSPs are stored in the tamper protected memory. All other CSPs are stored encrypted by the Master
Secret Key.
The Neopost PSD detects data corruption of the value held for any particular CSP by the incorporation of 16-bit error
detection code. Any CSPs access failure causes the zeroization of tamper protected memory.
The Neopost PSD never output the CSPs in plaintext.
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3.2 Public Security Parameters
Name Algorithm/Size Description Generation Storage
Root Public Key
(Neopost Root
Certificate)
RSA PKCS #1 v1.5
2048 bits
Signed X509 Certificate of the current Root Public
key used for the verification of authenticated
messages input from the Neopost server
N/A Plaintext
Previous Root
Public Key
(Neopost Previous
Root Certificate)
RSA PKCS #1 v1.5
2048 bits
Signed X509 Certificate of the next Root Public key
used for the verification of authenticated
messages input from the Neopost server.
N/A Plaintext
Region Public Key
(Neopost Region
Certificate)
RSA PKCS #1 v1.5
2048 bits
Signed X509 Certificate of the current Region
Public key used for the verification of
authenticated messages input from the Neopost
server.
N/A Plaintext
TLS
Communication
Public Key
(Neopost PSD
Certificate)
RSA PKCS #1 v1.5
2048 bits
Used to authenticate messages and data output
from the Neopost PSD (TLS Handshake protocol).
The key resides in a signed X509 certificate used
for authentication the cryptographic module to the
Neopost server.
FIPS186-4
RSA
KEYGEN
Plaintext
TLS Diffie-Hellman
Public Parameters
Diffie-Hellman
2048 bits
Diffie-Hellman parameters (p, g, Y) used during TLS
handshake to agree upon a TLS premaster secret.
N/A Plaintext
Indicia
Authentication
Public Key
ECDSA P224 or
ECDSA P1924
Indicia authentication Internal
DRBG
Plaintext
Key Encapsulation
Public Key
RSA PKCS #1 v1.5
2048 bits
Encrypts the Neopost PSD Indicia Secret Keys
before sending to the Neopost server
N/A Plaintext
m-secret
Encapsulation
Public Key 5
RSA PKCS #1 v1.5
1024 bits
Encrypts the “m-secret” before sending it to the
PSD
N/A Plaintext
Figure 10 – Public Security Parameters
All public keys are protected from unauthorized modification and substitution.
3.3 Status Indicator
A status indicator will be output by the Neopost PSD via the status output interface. It consists of a unique text
message which will be displayed on the franking machine User Interface.
The following module states are indicated:
 CSPs zeroed
 Private/Public key pairs invalid (module not initialized)
 Tamper mechanism tampered
 Power Up tests error
 DRBG error
 High temperature detected error
 Conditional test error
o ECDSA Pairwise Consistency
4
This key is non-compliant because it offers less than 112-bit of security strength and is not used in the approved mode of operation
5
This key is non-compliant because it offers less than 112-bit of security strength and is not used in the approved mode of operation
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o RSA Pairwise Consistency
o DH Pairwise Consistency Tests
 FIPS Approved Mode
The absence of one of these messages indicates that the module is in a ‘ready’ state.
4 PORTS AND INTERFACES
To communicate with the franking machine’s base the module provides a physical 10-pin serial connector with five
logical interfaces:
 power interface
 data input interface
 data output interface
 control input interface
 status output interface
PIN Description Interface Type
1 Ground
2 Ground
3 RX Data Input/Control Input
4 RX Data Input/Control Input
5 TX Data Output/Status Output
6 TX Data Output/Status Output
7 Power (5V – 17V) Power
8 Power (5V – 17V) Power
9 Ground
10 Ground
Figure 11 – Interface
The data output interface and cryptographic operations are inhibited during zeroization, key generation, self-tests
and error states.
No plaintext CSPs are input or output from the module through this serial interface.
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5 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION
The Neopost PSD supports authorized roles for operators and corresponding services within each role. In order to
control access to the module the Neopost PSD employs identity-based authentication mechanism.
The Neopost PSD supports the following operators:
 Neopost Administrator (Field Server): The Crypto-Officer can assume the following Crypto-Officer roles:
o Postal User
o Field Crypto-Officer
o Postal Crypto-Officer
o Root
o Region
The Neopost Administrator authenticates to the module via digitally signed X509 certificates using the TLS
v1.2 Handshake protocol.
 Customer (Base): is the end user of the cryptographic module and can assume one User Role: the Printing
Base role. The Neopost Administrator authenticates to the module via digitally signed X509 certificates
using the TLS v1.2 Handshake protocol.
 R&D File Signer Tool: assumes the R&D Signer role and is authenticated via signed X509 certificates. This
role allows the Neopost PSD to authenticate and use additional external files.
 Expertise Tool: assumes an unauthenticated User Role.
OPERATOR ROLES SERVICES CSP ACCESS MODE
Neopost
Administrator
Postal User Postal Core Services6 (Read) m-secret Encapsulation Key
(Germany only)
NA (All other configurations)
Read Status Data NA
Read Part Number NA
Field Crypto-Officer Generate PKI Key (Write/Read) Master Secret Key, DRBG
parameters (V, Key), TLS Communication
private key & secret key
Get/Set PKI Certificate (Write) TLS Communication private key
Read Status Data NA
Read Part Number NA
Postal Crypto-Officer Generate Stamp Key7 (Write) Indicia Authentication Key(s)
(Secret or Private)
Set Stamp Info NA
Root Verify Region Certificate NA
Verify Root Certificate NA
Region Verify Device Certificate NA
Customer Printing Base
(User)
Initiate/End Postal Core
Connection
(Write) TLS Communication private key
(Write) TLS Communication secret keys
6
Non-Approved when configured for Germany.
7
This service is considered non-Approved if Indicia Authentication Key is of type ECDSA P192 (non-compliant). This service is not available when
configured for Germany.
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Initiate/End Rekey
Connection
(Write) TLS Communication private key
(Write) TLS Communication secret keys
Postal Indicia8 (Read) Indicia Authentication Key
Other Base Services NA
Read Status Data NA
Read Part Number NA
File Signer Tool R&D Signer Verify Files NA
Expertise Tool Unauthenticated User
role
Read Status Data NA
Read Part Number NA
Zeroize CSP (Zeroize) Master Secret Key and DRBG
internal status (V, Key)
All All Invoke Tests NA
Figure 12 – Roles, Services, Operators
8 This service is considered non-Approved if Indicia Authentication Key is of type ECDSA P192 (non-compliant).
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5.1 Operator Authentication
The mutual authentication between the Customer / Neopost Administrator and the Neopost PSD is based on the
TLS v1.2 Handshake Protocol using the "TLS-DHE-RSA" cryptographic suite, with 2048 RSA key length for
authentication.
 The RSA key is 2048 bits and is considered to have 112-bits of strength. For any attempt to use the authentication
mechanism, the probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur will be at least 1
in 2112
(equivalent to less than 2 x 10-34
). This is considerably more difficult to break than the 1 in 1,000,000
requirement.
 The time necessary to generate an authentication is 100ms; therefore 600 attempts could occur in a one minute
period. For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one minute period the probability
that a random attempt will be accepted or that a false acceptance will occur will be 1 in 2112
multiplied by 600 -
maximum number of attempts in one minute (equivalent to 1 x 10-31
). This is considerably more difficult to break
than the 1 in 100,000 requirement.
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The cryptographic module’s operational environment is non-modifiable.
7 PHYSICAL SECURITY
The Neopost PSD is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 3 + EFP/EFT Physical Security requirements.
The Neopost PSD defined as a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module includes a non-removable enclosure that
comprises a hard epoxy resin with an outer plastic casing. The non-removable enclosure and epoxy resin was tested
and verified to be effective within the environmental operational range of the module (environmental temperature
between -30°C and 84°C). No assurance is provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any temperature outside
this range.
The Neopost PSD employs a tamper detection envelope designed to detect penetration attempts, and a response
mechanism that will zeroize all plaintext Critical Security Parameters.
The outer plastic casing is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the cryptographic module. It is inspected for
tampering each time the module is returned to Neopost manufacturing or for servicing.
The module mitigates environmental attacks by employing a high temperature fuse for the EFP circuitry such that
when the module temperature exceeds 84°C, the module will zeroize all plaintext CSPs.
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8 SELF-TESTS
The Neopost PSD performs power up and conditional self-tests. The Neopost PSD inhibits the data output interface
during the self-tests. The module can exercise the power-up self-tests, from within any role, at any time by power-
cycling the module.
8.1 Power Up Self-Tests
8.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
Upon power-up the Neopost PSD performs the following cryptographic algorithms self-tests without operator
intervention:
 SHA-1 KAT
 SHA-256 KAT
 RSA encrypt KAT
 RSA decrypt KAT
 RSA sign KAT
 RSA signature verify KAT
 ECDSA sign KAT
 ECDSA signature verification KAT
 AES Encrypt KAT
 AES Decrypt KAT
 AES CMAC KAT
 HMAC (SHA-1) KAT
 HMAC (SHA-256) KAT
 Diffie-Hellman KAT
 DRBG KATs (Instantiate, Generate, Reseed)
 TLS-KDF KAT
If a cryptographic algorithms self-test fails, the Neopost PSD enters in error state and zeroizes all plaintext CSPs.
8.1.2 Firmware Integrity Tests
The Neopost PSD tests the contents of its program memory area at power up by calculating the hash (SHA-256) of
the contents and comparing the result with a known answer. If the test fails, the Neopost PSD enters an error state
and zeroizes all plaintext CSPs.
8.1.3 CSP Integrity Tests (Critical Function Test)
The Neopost PSD tests the accessibility and validity of all keys and CSP values in non-volatile memory at power up. If
any are not accessible (i.e. device failure) or contain erroneous data (16 bit EDC fails) then the Neopost PSD enters
an error state and zeroizes all plaintext CSPs.
8.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The PSD performs the following conditional self-tests:
 RSA Pairwise Consistency Tests
 ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Tests
 DH Pairwise Consistency Tests
 NDRNG Continuous Test
o Repetition Count Test (ref. SP 800-90B)
o Adaptive Proportion Test (ref. SP 800-90B)
 DRBG Continuous test
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8.3 Other-Tests
The Neopost PSD also performs the following tests:
 RAM Integrity test
 Tamper Detection test
9 DESIGN ASSURANCE
Neopost Technologies is using the Windchill configuration management system to manage product configurations
(including the cryptographic module).
All firmware implemented within the cryptographic module has been implemented using a high-level language (C),
except for the limited use of assembly language where it was essential for performance.
10 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
The module employs a tamper detection envelope designed to detect penetration attempts and a response
mechanism that zeroizes all plaintext CSPs.
11 GLOSSARY
Abbreviation Description
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CMAC Message Authentication Code
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DH Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHE Diffie Hellman Ephemeral)
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDSA Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EFP/EFT Environmental Failure Protection /Testing
EMI/EMC Electromagnetic Interference/Compatibility
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NDRNG Non-deterministic Random Number Generator
PSD Postal Security Device
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
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Revision History
Version Date Revision Description
0.1 11/04/2014 Original document
1.0 22/08/2014 Update after review with Penumbra Security
2.0 28/08/2014 [Penumbra]Added additional tests performed (Ram integrity, Tamper test)
3.0 16/03/2015 [Penumbra]Added clarifications per CMVP comments
4.0 07/09/2017 [Neopost]Updated document template (new brand)
5.0 10/10/2017 [Neopost] Added new hardware and firmware version; increased RSA Key size to
2048 (Key Wrapping) for Belgium; added approved FIPS mode
6.0 14/12/2017 [Penumbra] Updated DRBG certificate; added clarifications
7.0 22/03/2018 [Penumbra] Specified CKG; added minor clarifications
8.0 23/05/2018 [Penumbra] Specified additional firmware version