Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual (FMCv) Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation
Document Version 1.0
October 5, 2020
© Copyright 2020 Cisco Systems, Inc. 2
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Cisco Firepower
Management Center Virtual (FMCv) Cryptographic Module (software version 6.4). This security
policy describes how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and
how to run the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. This Security Policy may be freely
distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at https://csrc.nist.gov/groups/computer-security-
division/security-testing-validation-and-measurement.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 1
Table 1 Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals with the specification of the security rules listed in Table 1 above, under
which the Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual (FMCv) Cryptographic Module will
operate, including the rules derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-2IG and
additional rules imposed by Cisco Systems, Inc. More information is available on the module
from the following sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems security.
Please refer to the following website:
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/firepower-management-center/index.html
For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at https://www.cisco.com/ .
© Copyright 2020 Cisco Systems, Inc. 3
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
The NIST Validated Modules https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/validated-modules contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related
questions for the module.
1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual (FMCv) Cryptographic
Module identified is referred to as Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual Cryptographic
Module, FMC virtual module, FMCv, Module, virtual or the System.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the module identified in section 1.1 above and explains
the secure layout, configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is
followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the appliance.
Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
© Copyright 2020 Cisco Systems, Inc. 4
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2 Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual (FMCv) Cryptographic
Module
The Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual (FMCv) Cryptographic Module is a virtualized
version of the Firepower Management Center which provides complete and unified management
over firewalls, application control, intrusion prevention, URL filtering, and advanced malware
protection, easily go from managing a firewall to controlling applications to investigating and
remediating malware outbreaks.
The module now becomes the centralized point for event and policy management as does the
Cisco Firepower Management Center for the following solutions:
● Cisco Firepower Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW)
● Cisco ASA with FirePOWER Services
● Cisco Firepower Next-Generation IPS (NGIPS)
● Cisco FirePOWER Threat Defense
● Cisco Advanced Malware Protection (AMP)
The module also controls the network management features on devices: switching, routing,
NAT, as well as TLSv1.2 and SSHv2 services.
For the purposes of this validation, the module was tested in the lab on the following operational
environments:
Guest OS Hypervisor Hardware Processor
FXOS version 2 VMware ESXi 6.0 Cisco C220 M5 Intel Xeon Silver 4110
FXOS version 2 VMware ESXi 6.5 Cisco C220 M5 Intel Xeon Silver 4110
Table 2 Testing Configuration
The following platforms are Vendor affirmed:
B200 M4 B200 M5 C220 M4 C220 M5 C240 M4
C240 M5 C460 M4 C480 M5 E140S M2 E160S M3
EN120E-208 EN120S M2 E180D M2 ENCS 5406 ENCS 5408
ENCS 5412
The following Hypervisors with varying versions work with the FMCv are Vendor affirmed:
KVM
AWS
Oracle VM
VMware ESXi 5.X
VMware ESXi 6.X
Additionally, the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the
security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not
listed on the validation certificate.
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2.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The module is defined as a multi-chip standalone software module (inside red dashed area), with
the physical boundary being defined as the hard case enclosure around which everything runs.
Then the cryptographic boundary is the FMC virtual module, including the Guest OS/FMC, API
and FOM. Please see Diagram 1 below for the details.
Diagram 1 Block Diagram
Note: Block Diagram above comprises the following components
 Processor: Chip handling all processes.
 API: Application programming interface between hypervisor and processor
 Hypervisor: VMWare ESXi 6.0 or 6.5
 Guest OS/FMC: FMC module running on FXOS version 2 (Guest OS)
 API: Application programming interface between the module and FOM library
 FOM: Cisco FIPS Object Module (a Cisco proprietary crypto library)
2.2 Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The module provides
no power to external devices and takes in its power through normal power input/cord. The
logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table:
Physical Port/Interface FMC Virtual FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Data Input Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Data Output Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000) Virtual Ethernet Ports, Control Input Interface
Physical boundary
Processor
Hypervisor
Guest OS / FMC
API
API
FOM
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Ports; Host System Serial Port Virtual Serial Port
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Status Output Interface
Table 3 Hardware/Physical Boundary Interfaces
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The appliances can be accessed in one of the following ways:
 SSHv2
 Serial Console
 HTTPS/TLSv1.2
Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated by the module upon initial access to
the module. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles in the security appliances that
operators may assume: Crypto Officer role and User role. The administrator of the security
appliances assumes the Crypto Officer role in order to configure and maintain the module using
Crypto Officer services, while the Users exercise only the basic User services.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all other shared secrets must each be at least eight
(8) characters long, including at least one six (6) alphabetic characters, (1) integer number and
one (1) special character in length (enforced procedurally). See the Secure Operation section for
more information. Given these restrictions, the probability of randomly guessing the correct
sequence is one (1) in 6,326,595,092,480 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the
typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic
characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total). The
calculation should be 52x52x52x52x52x52x32x10 = 6,326,595,092,480. Therefore, the
associated probability of a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in 6,326,595,092,480,
which is less than the 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
In addition, for multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-minute
period, under the optimal modern network condition, if an attacker would only get 60,000
guesses per minute. Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt during
a one-minute period is 60,000/ 6,326,595,092,480 = 1/105,443,251, which is less than 1 in
100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048
bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength, which means an attacker would have a 1 in 2^112
chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chances
required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key
guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65x10^31 (2^112
/60 = 8.65 x 10^31) attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the
module to support.
2.4 User Services
A User enters the system by accessing the console port using either Serial Console, SSHv2 or
HTTPS/TLSv1.2. The User role can be authenticated via either User Name/Password or RSA
based authentication method. The module prompts the User for username and password. If the
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password is correct, the User is allowed entry to the module management functionality. The
other means of accessing the console is via an HTTPS/TLS session. This session is authenticated
using RSA digital signature authentication mechanism. The services available to the User role
accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which
role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services Description Keys/CSPs Access
Status Functions View the module configuration, routing tables,
active sessions health, and view physical interface
status.
Operator password (r, w, d)
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal,
adjust flow control).
Operator password (r, w, d)
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory. Operator password (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
SSHv2 Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSH. Operator password, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
Seed, DRBG V and DRBG key, SSHv2 RSA
private key, SSHv2 RSA public key, SSHv2
integrity key and SSHv2 session key (r, w, d)
HTTPS/TLS
(TLSv1.2) Functions
Negotiation and encrypted data transport via HTTPS Operator password, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
Seed, DRBG V, DRBG C, ECDSA private key,
ECDSA public key, TLS RSA private key, TLS
RSA public key, TLS pre-master secret, TLS
master secret, TLS session key and TLS integrity
key (r, w, d)
Table 4 User Services
2.5 Crypto Officer Services
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the module. A Crypto Officer
enters the system by accessing the Console port, SSHv2, or HTTPS/TLSv1.2. The CO role can
be authenticated via either User Name/Password or RSA based authentication method. The
services available to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r),
write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services Description Keys/CSPs Access
Configure the
Security
Define network interfaces and settings, create command
aliases, set the protocols the router will support, enable
interfaces and network services, set system date and time,
change factory default user name/password and load
authentication information.
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V,
DRBG key, DRBG C, Diffie-Hellman private
key, Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-
Hellman shared secret, EC Diffie-Hellman
private key, EC Diffie-Hellman public key,
EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret, SSHv2
private key, SSHv2 public key, SSHv2
integrity key, SSHv2 session key, ECDSA
private key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA
private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-
master secret, TLS master secret, TLS session
key, TLS integrity key, ISAKMP preshared,
skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session
encryption key, IKE session authentication
key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, IPSec encryption
key and IPSec authentication key (r, w, d)
Software
Initialization
Conduct the software initialization. Integrity test key (r, w, d)
Define Rules and
Filters
Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams on each
interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which define a set of
packets to permit or deny based on characteristics such as protocol ID,
addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or packet direction.
Operator password, Crypto Officer (CO) password
(r, w, d)
View Status View the module configuration, routing tables, active sessions health, Operator password, Crypto Officer (CO)password (r,
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Functions temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics, review
accounting logs, and view physical interface status.
w, d)
HTTPS/TLS
(TLSv1.2) Functions
Configure HTTPS/TLSv1.2 parameters, provide entry and output of
CSPs.
TLS RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS
pre-master secret, TLS master secret, TLS
encryption key, TLS integrity key, DRBG entropy
input, DRBG seed, DRBG V and DRBG key (r, w,
d)
SSHv2 Functions Configure SSHv2 parameter, provide entry and output of CSPs. DH private key, DH public key, DH shared secret,
ECDH private key, ECDH public key, ECDH shared
secret, SSHv2 RSA private key, SSHv2 RSA public
key, SSHv2 session key, SSHv2 integrity key,
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V and
DRBG key (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. Operator password (r, w, d)
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the zeroization methods
classified in table 7, Zeroization column.
All CSPs (d)
Table 5 Crypto Officer Services
2.6 Non-FIPS mode Services
The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in
a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the
associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-
approved key sizes, a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with
their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved
algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior
to using any of the Non-Approved algorithms with the listed services in Section 2.6, the Crypto
Officer must zeroize all CSPs. The use of any of the non-approved algorithms constitutes
placing the module into a non-FIPS mode of operation.
Services 1
Non-Approved Algorithms
SSH
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Table 6 Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in
FIPS mode of operation.
To put the module back into the FIPS mode from the non-FIPS mode, the CO must zeroize all
Keys/CSPs used in non-FIPS mode, and then strictly follow up the steps in section 3 of this
document to put the module into the FIPS mode.
All services available can be found at Firepower Management Center Configuration Guide,
Version 6.4 (Last Modified: 2020-08-03), which lists the configuration guidance.
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/640/configuration/guide/fpmc-config-
guide-v64.html.
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or
curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
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2.7 Unauthenticated Service
The only service available to someone without an authorized role is to cycle the power.
2.8 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the Crypto Officer
and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory that
stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory.
All keys are associated with the Crypto Officer that created the keys, and the Crypto Officer is
protected by a password. The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. Only an
authenticated Crypto Officer can view the keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH)/ECDH keys agreed
upon for individual tunnels are directly associated with that specific tunnel. RSA public keys are
entered into the modules using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name
of the public key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are
associated with the User that entered them. The module is a software module that contains an
approved DRBG that is seeded exclusively from one known entropy source located within the
operational environment inside the module’s physical boundary but the outside the logical
boundary, which is complaint with FIPS 140-2 IG 7.14 #1 (b). The module provides at least 256
bits entropy to instantiate the DRBG.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG entropy
input
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bits This is the entropy for SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG, used to construct seed.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
DRBG seed SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bits Input to the DRBG that determines
the internal state of the DRBG.
Generated using DRBG derivation
function that includes the entropy
input from the entropy source.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
DRBG V SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
128-bits The DRBG V is one of the critical
values of the internal state upon
which the security of this DRBG
mechanism depends. Generated first
during DRBG instantiation and then
subsequently updated using the
DRBG update function.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
DRBG key SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits Internal critical value used as part of
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.
Established per SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
Diffie-Hellman
shared secret
DH 2048 - 4096
bits
The shared secret used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. Established
per the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
Diffie Hellman
private key
DH 224 -384 bits The private key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key is
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
generated by calling SP800-90A
DRBG.
Diffie Hellman
public key
DH 2048 - 4096
bits
The public key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key is
derived per the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement. Note that the public key
is a cryptographic key, but not
considered a CSP.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared secret
EC DH Curves:
P-256, P-384,
P-521
The shared secret used in Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
exchange. Established per the Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
EC Diffie
Hellman
private key
EC DH Curves:
P-256, P-384,
P-521
The private key used in EC Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key is
generated by calling SP800-90A
DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
EC Diffie
Hellman public
key
EC DH Curves:
P-256, P-384,
P-521
The public key used in Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange.
This key is established per the EC
Diffie-Hellman key agreement. Note
that the public key is a cryptographic
key, but not considered a CSP.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
the device
Operator
password
Password 8 plus
characters
The password of the User role. This
CSP is entered by the User.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Procedurally
erase the
password
Crypto Officer
(CO) password
Password 8 plus
characters
The password of the CO role. This
CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Procedurally
erase the
password
SSHv2 private
Key
RSA 2048 bits The SSHv2 private key used in
SSHv2 connection. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
SSHv2 public
Key
RSA 2048 bits The SSHv2 public key used in
SSHv2 connection. This key is
derived in compliance with FIPS
186-4 RSA key pair generation
method in the module. Note that the
public key is a cryptographic key, but
not considered a CSP.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
SSHv2 session
key
Triple-DES/AES Triple-DES
192 bits or
AES
128/192/256
This is the SSHv2 session key. It is
used to encrypt all SSHv2 data
traffics traversing between the
SSHv2 Client and SSHv2 Server.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH
session is
terminated
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
bits This key is derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135 KDF
(SSH).
SSHv2
integrity key
HMAC-SHA-1 160 bits Used for SSH connections integrity
to assure the traffic integrity. This
key was derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH
session is
terminated
TLS RSA
private key
RSA 2048 bits Used for RSA signature signing in
TLS connection This key was
generated by calling FIPS approved
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plain text)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
TLS RSA
public key
RSA 2048 bits Used for RSA signature verification
in TLS connection. This key is
derived in compliance with FIPS
186-4 RSA key pair generation
method in the module. Note that the
public key is a cryptographic key, but
not considered a CSP.
NVRAM
(plain text)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
ECDSA
private key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256, 384,
521
Signature generation used in TLS.
This key is generated by calling SP
800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA
keypair
deletion
command
ECDSA public
key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256, 384,
521
Signature verification used in TLS.
This key is derived in compliance
with FIPS 186-4 ECDSA key pair
generation method in the module.
Note that the public key is a
cryptographic key, but not considered
a CSP.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA
keypair
deletion
command
TLS pre-
master secret
keying material 8 plus
characters
Keying material used to derive TLS
master key during the TLS session
establishment. This key entered into
the module in cipher text form,
encrypted by RSA public key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated.
TLS master
secret
keying material 48 Bytes Keying material used to derive other
TLS keys. This key was derived from
TLS pre-master secret during the
TLS session establishment.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated.
TLS session
key
Triple-
DES/AES/AES-
GCM
Triple-DES
192 bits or
AES
Used in TLS connections to protect
the session traffic. This key was
derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
128/192/256
bits
terminated
TLS integrity
key
HMAC-SHA-
256/384
256-384 bits Used for TLS connections integrity
to assure the traffic integrity. This
key was derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
Integrity test
key
RSA 2048 bits A hard coded key used for software
power-up integrity verification.
Hard coded
for software
integrity
testing
Uninstall the
module
Table 7 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
2.9 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Algorithms Algorithm Implementation
Cisco Security Crypto Virtual
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 5008
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2584
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 4074
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3329
RSA (KeyGen; PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; 2048 bits) 2703
ECDSA (KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; P-256, P-384, P-521) 1277
DRBG (AES-256_CTR) 1828
CVL Component (TLSv1.2, SSHv2) 1561
CKG (vendor affirmed)
Table 8 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
Notes:
 There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this table.
 The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the
acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of
the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely
within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the
IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server,
to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In
case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM
encryption/decryption shall be established.
 Each of TLS and SSH protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES keys.
Refer to RFC 5246 (TLS) and RFC 4253 (SSH) for details relevant to the generation of the
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individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is responsible for ensuring the module
limits the number of encryptions with the same key to 220
.
 No parts of SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP
and CMVP.
 In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic
Key Generation as per scenario 1 of section 5 in SP800-133. The resulting generated seed
used in the asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
 Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1561, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides
between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1561, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 of encryption strength)
 NDRNG
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
 DES
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 HMAC MD5
 HMAC-SHA-1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
 MD5
 RC4
 RSA (key wrapping; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
2.10 Self-Tests
The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are
functioning correctly.
Self-tests performed
 POST tests
o AES-CBC Known Answer Tests (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o AES-GCM Known Answer Tests (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o DRBG Known Answer Test (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-
90A Section 11.3 are performed)
o ECDSA pairwise-consistency test (Sign and Verify)
o HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) Known Answer Tests
o RSA Known Answer Tests (Separate KAT for signing; Separate KAT for
verification)
o SHA (SHA-1/256/384/512) Known Answer Test
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o Software Integrity Test (RSA 2048 bits)
o Triple-DES-CBC Known Answer Tests (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
 Conditional tests
o RSA pairwise consistency test
o ECDSA pairwise consistency test
o CRNGT for SP800-90A DRBG
o CRNGT for NDRNG
Note: DRBGs will not be available should the NDRNG become unavailable. This will in turn
make the associated security service/CSP outlined above in Table 7 non-available.
The security appliances perform all power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied.
All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The
power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the
initialization of the VLAN’s interfaces; this prevents the security module from passing any data
during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error
message is displayed on the console followed by a security module reboot.
3 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to
authorized operators by the vendor, and the module is shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco
adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting instructions provided
below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining
the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization/Configuration
This module was validated with FMCv version 6.4 (Software Images:
Cisco_Firepower_Mgmt_Center_Virtual_VMware-6.4.0-102.tar.gz and
Cisco_Firepower_Mgmt_Center_Patch-6.4.0.1-17.sh.REL.tar). Those are the only allowable
software images for the current FIPS-approved mode of operation.
The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps:
Step 1: For all Management Centers, the setup process must be completed by logging into the
Management Center’s web interface and specifying initial configuration options on a setup page.
Step 2: Choose System > Configuration (Choose SSH or HTTPS or a combination of these options to
specify which ports you want to enable for these IP addresses).
Step 3: You must change the password for the admin account. This account has Administrator
privileges and cannot be deleted.
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Note: It is required to use a strong password that is at least eight alphanumeric characters of
mixed case and includes at least one numeric character. Avoid using words that appear in a
dictionary.
Step 4: System>Licenses>Smart Licenses, add and verify licenses (Firepower Management
Center Configuration Guide provides more detailed information)
Install Triple-DES/AES SMART license to use Triple-DES and AES (for data traffic and SSH).
Step 5: System > Configuration; Devices > Platform Settings; STIG Compliance, choose Enable
STIG Compliance; Click on save. The CO shall only use FIPS approved/Allowed cryptographic
algorithms listed above.
Step 6: Reboot the security appliances.
In addition, more configuration information for Cisco FMCv (v6.4) can be found at Firepower
Management Center Configuration Guide, Version 6.4 (Last Modified: 2020-08-03).
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/640/configuration/guide/fpmc-config-
guide-v64.html