© 2024 Western Digital Corporation or its affiliates. Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Ultrastar®
He12
and Ultrastar®
DC HC520 TCG Enterprise HDD
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Protection of Data at Rest
Document Version: 1.7
2024-01-05
Ultrastar®
He12
and Ultrastar®
DC HC520 TCG Enterprise HDD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Western Digital Page 2 of 22
Table of Contents
1. Cryptographic Module Overview...........................................................................................................................4
1.1 Models.................................................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Level .....................................................................................................................................................................5
2. Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................................6
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation..............................................................................................................................6
2.2 Approved Algorithms.......................................................................................................................................................6
3. Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................................................................................8
4. Identification and Authentication Policy...............................................................................................................8
4.1 Crypto Officer....................................................................................................................................................................8
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority .......................................................................................................................................................8
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority ..............................................................................................................................................................8
4.2 BandMaster Authority (User) ..........................................................................................................................................8
4.3 Anybody..............................................................................................................................................................................8
4.4 Makers.................................................................................................................................................................................8
4.5 Maintenance .......................................................................................................................................................................9
5. Access Control Policy ............................................................................................................................................10
5.1 Roles and Services...........................................................................................................................................................10
5.2 Unauthenticated Services ...............................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)......................................................................................................12
5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters ....................................................................................................................12
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations ...................................................................................................13
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access ............................................................................................................................13
6. Operational Environment .....................................................................................................................................14
7. Security Rules ..........................................................................................................................................................15
7.1 Invariant Rules.................................................................................................................................................................15
7.2 Initialization Rules...........................................................................................................................................................16
7.3 Zeroization Rules.............................................................................................................................................................17
8. Physical Security Policy..........................................................................................................................................17
8.1 Mechanisms......................................................................................................................................................................17
8.2 Operator Responsibility..................................................................................................................................................17
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ......................................................................................................................18
10. Definitions ...............................................................................................................................................................18
11. Acronyms.................................................................................................................................................................19
12. References................................................................................................................................................................20
12.1 NIST Specifications ........................................................................................................................................................20
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications ..................................................................................................................21
12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee Standards.........21
12.4 Western Digital Documents ..........................................................................................................................................21
12.5 SCSI Commands..............................................................................................................................................................22
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Western Digital Page 3 of 22
Tables
Table 1 - Cryptographic Module Models .....................................................................................................................5
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification............................................................................................................5
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms ..........................................................................................................................7
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation.................................................7
Table 5 - FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces...................................................................................................................8
Table 6 – Roles, Required Identification, and Authentication..................................................................................9
Table 7 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths..........................................................................................................9
Table 8 - Authenticated CM Services (Approved and Non-Approved Mode)....................................................11
Table 9 - Unauthenticated Services.............................................................................................................................11
Table 10 - CSPs and Private Keys...............................................................................................................................12
Table 11 - Public Security Parameters........................................................................................................................13
Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services...........................................................................................14
Table 13 - SCSI Commands.........................................................................................................................................22
Figures
Figure 1: Ultrastar He12
Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 1.................................................................4
Figure 2: Ultrastar He12
Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 2.................................................................4
Figure 3: Ultrastar DC HC520 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 1 ....................................................4
Figure 4: Ultrastar DC HC520 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 2 ....................................................5
Figure 5: Tamper-Evident Seal....................................................................................................................................17
Figure 6: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seal.............................................................................................................18
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1. Cryptographic Module Overview
The self-encrypting Ultrastar® He12 TCG Enterprise HDD and Ultrastar® DC HC520 TCG Enterprise HDD, hereafter
referred to as “Ultrastar He12”, “Ultrastar DC HC520” or “the Cryptographic Module” is a multi-chip embedded
module that complies with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security. The Cryptographic Module complies with the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) SSC: Enterprise Specification. The drive enclosure defines the cryptographic boundary. The SIO
port pins outlined by the red boxes within the SAS connector view of Figure 2 and Figure 4 are disabled in FIPS
Approved Mode and non-Approved Mode. Except for the four-conductor motor control cable, shown in the yellow
box of the bottom view of Figures 1 through Figure 4, all components within the cryptographic boundary tested as
compliant with FIPS 140-2 requirements. The control cable is not security relevant and therefore excluded from FIPS
140-2 requirements. The Ultrastar DC HC520 complies with the Advanced Format (AF) standard. The logical
storage of user data is unaffected by the formatting method for drives that comply with the Advanced AF standard.
4Kn and 512e formatting organize user data on the physical media in the same manner. The emulation layer
employed in 512e drives only services to organize the data in 512-byte chunks for processing by the host. Format
method is not security relevant and therefore excluded from FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Top View SAS Connector View Bottom View
Figure 1: Ultrastar He12
Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 1
Top View SAS Connector View Bottom View
Figure 2: Ultrastar He12
Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 2
Top View SAS Connector View Bottom View
Figure 3: Ultrastar DC HC520 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 1
Ultrastar®
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and Ultrastar®
DC HC520 TCG Enterprise HDD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Western Digital Page 5 of 22
Top View SAS Connector View Bottom View
Figure 4: Ultrastar DC HC520 Cryptographic Boundary, Hardware Version 2
1.1 Models
The Cryptographic Module is available in several models that vary by storage capacity and block size. The
validated models listed below in Table 1 define the models, characteristics, hardware version, and firmware version
associated with each model.
Model Number Firmware Description
HUH721212AL5205 (1)
HUH721212AL5205 (2)
R925, R92C, R9C0, R9G0,
R9U0, R9Y0, RB01, NM08,
NM09, NM10
12TB, 512e, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s SAS
HUH721212AL4205 (1)
HUH721212AL4205 (2)
R925, R9G0, R9U0, R9Y0,
RB01
12TB, 4Kn, 3.5-inch HDD, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s SAS
Table 1 - Cryptographic Module Models
1.2 Security Level
The Cryptographic Module meets all requirements applicable to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security.
FIPS 140-2
Security Requirements Section
FIPS 140-2
Security Level Achieved
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification
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2. Modes of Operation
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
Configuration and policy determine the Cryptographic Module’s mode of operation. The Cryptographic Module
enters FIPS Approved Mode after successful completion of the Initialize Cryptographic service instructions provided
in Section 7.2. The operator can determine if the Cryptographic Module is operating in a FIPS approved mode by
invoking the Get FIPS mode service1. The Crypto Officer shall not enable the Makers Authority after the
cryptographic module enters FIPS Approved mode. The cryptographic module is in FIPS non-Approved mode
whenever a successful authentication to the Makers Authority occurs. If the Crypto Officer enables the Makers
Authority after the module enters FIPS Approved mode, the Crypto Officer must also execute the TCG Revert
Method to zeroize the cryptographic module. If the Crypto Officer, subsequently, executes the Initialize
Cryptographic service instructions provided in Section 7.2 with the intent of placing the cryptographic module in
FIPS Approved mode, the Crypto Officer must first execute the TCG Revert Method to zeroize the cryptographic
module. The Crypto Officer could enable the maintenance logical access after the cryptographic module enters FIPS
Approved mode. However, the security rule #11 of section 7.1 (e.g., CSPs zeroization) shall be followed; the Module
will temporarily enter in a non-Approved mode of operation.
The Ultrastar DC HC520 Product Specification provides information on how to execute the Initialize Cryptographic
service as well as the Zeroize (TCG Revert) service.
2.2 Approved Algorithms
The Cryptographic Module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms. All algorithms and key lengths
comply with NIST SP 800-131A.
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES Firmware
[FIPS 197, SP800 38A, SP 800 38F]
Functions: Encryption, decryption, and key wrapping to
protect an associated MEK in data storage
applications
Modes: ECB, KW
Key Size: 256
AES 3880
AES Hardware
[FIPS 197, SP800 38A]
Functions: Encryption and decryption
Mode: ECB2
Key Sizes: 128, 256
[FIPS 197, SP800 38A, SP800 38E]
Functions: Encryption and decryption in storage applications
only
Mode: XTS3
• XTS-AES Key1 does not equal XTS-AES Key2
• The length of the XTS-AES data unit does not exceed
220 blocks.
Key Sizes: 128, 256
AES 3881
DRBG Firmware
[SP800 90A]
Function: Deterministic random number generator that uses
an AES-256 block cipher derivation function.
Mode: CTR
Security Strength: 256 bits
DRBG 1108
1 A return value of 1 indicates that the cryptographic module is operating in FIPS Approved mode.
2
Tested AES ECB-128. However, the cryptographic module does not use this algorithm.
3
Tested AES XTS-128. However, the cryptographic module does not use this algorithm.
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Western Digital Page 7 of 22
Algorithm Description Cert #
HMAC Firmware
[FIPS 198-1]
Function: Key encrypting key (KEK) derivation used within
the PBKDF
SHA size: SHA-256
HMAC 2522
RSA Firmware
[FIPS 186-4, PSS]
Function: Digital signature verification with SHA-2564
Key size: 2048
RSA 1978
SHA Hardware/Firmware
[FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature verification
SHA size: SHA-256
SHS 3204
SHA Firmware
[FIPS 180-4]
Functions: AUTH Digest and KEK generation
SHA size:SHA-256
SHS 3203
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Description Rationale
CKG
[SP800 133] Cryptographic Key Generation
Functions: Generated from the DRBG without further
modification or post processing
Vendor Affirmed
[FIPS140] IG D.12.
[SP800 133] Sections 6.1 and 6.2.3
PBKDF
[SP800 132] Password Based Key Derivation Function
Functions: Key Encrypting Key
Modes: HMAC-SHA-256
Key Sizes: 256 bits
Vendor Affirmed
[FIPS140] IG D.6
[SP800 132] Section 5.4
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
The Cryptographic Module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithm:
• A hardware NDRNG seeds the Approved [SP800 90A] CTR_DRBG. Available entropy does not modify the
bit strength of cryptographic keys generated by the CTR_DRBG. Each 2-bit NDRNG sample contains at
least 1.1247-bit of min entropy. Each time the CTR_DRBG is instantiated or reseeded, one thousand
twenty-four (1024) 2-bit samples seed the CTR_DRBG. This equates to 2048 bits of entropy data and
translates to 1151 bits of min-entropy. A min-entropy of 1151 bits is sufficient to assert that the
CTR_DRBG has a bit security of 256 bits. A security strength of 256 bits exceeds the minimum requirement
of 112 bits of security strength established by NIST.
4 SHA-256 Cert. # 3204
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Western Digital Page 8 of 22
3. Ports and Interfaces
The drive uses the standard 29-pin Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) connector that conforms to the mechanical requirements
of SFF 8680. Table 5 below identifies the Cryptographic Module’s ports and interfaces. The Cryptographic Module
does not provide a maintenance access interface.
FIPS 140-2 Interface Cryptographic Module Ports
Power Power connector [SAS]
Control Input SAS connector [SAS]
Status Output SAS connector [SAS]
Data Input SAS connector [SAS]
Data Output SAS connector [SAS]
Table 5 - FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces
4. Identification and Authentication Policy
The Cryptographic Module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and an authentication credential
(Personal Identification Number or PIN). The Cryptographic Module enforces the following FIPS140-2 operator
roles.
4.1 Crypto Officer
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority
This TCG authority initializes the Cryptographic Module. Section 11.3.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem
Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role.
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority
This TCG authority can selectively zeroize bands within the Cryptographic Module. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG
Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role. The TCG EraseMaster authority can
disable Users and erase LBA bands (user data regions).
4.2 BandMaster Authority (User)
User roles correspond to Bandmaster Authorities. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class:
Enterprise Specification provides a definition. Users have the authority to lock, unlock, and configure LBA bands
(user data regions) and to issue read and write commands to the SED. The TCG EraseMaster authority can disable a
Bandmaster.
4.3 Anybody
Services are provided that do not require authentication. With one exception, these do not disclose, modify, or
substitute Critical Security Parameters, use an Approved security function, or otherwise affect the security of the
Cryptographic Module. The excepted service is the Generate Random service, which provides output from an
instance of the SP800-90A DRBG.
4.4 Makers
For failure analysis purposes, the vendor can enable a logical diagnostic port to perform diagnostics and gather data
on the failure. A power cycle automatically disables the logical diagnostic port. An operator must authenticate to the
SID authority and the Makers authority to enable the logical diagnostic port. The Cryptographic Module is in FIPS
non-Approved mode whenever the Crypto Officer enables the Makers authority. The vendor performs failure
analysis within the vendor’s facility. Makers authentication data shall not leave the vendor’s facilities. During normal
operation, the Crypto Officer disables the Makers authority when invoking the Initialize Cryptographic Module
service.
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Western Digital Page 9 of 22
4.5 Maintenance
For failure analysis purposes, the vendor can enable a privilege mode to perform diagnostics and gather drive health
and failure data. Power cycling the module automatically negates the Maintenance role authentication. After
authentication, Vendor Unique Commands (VUC) support diagnostic functions for testing the drive media and the
SCSI bus integrity. Operators authenticated to the maintenance role cannot modify the operational environment.
The following table maps TCG authorities to FIPS 140-2 roles.
TCG Authority Description
Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
SID Authority
The SID Authority is a Crypto Officer
role that initializes the Cryptographic
Module and authorizes Firmware
downloads.
Role-based
CO Identity (TCG SID
Authority) and PIN (TCG SID
Authority PIN)
EraseMaster
Authority
The EraseMaster Authority is a Crypto
Officer role that zeroizes Media
Encryption keys and disables Users.
Role-based
CO Identity (TCG EraseMaster
Authority) and PIN (TCG
EraseMaster PIN)
BandMaster N
(N = 0 to 15)
BandMaster is a User role that controls
read/write access to LBA Bands. Role-based
User Identity (TCG BandMaster
Authority) and PIN (TCG
BandMaster PIN)
Anybody
Anybody is a role that does not require
authentication.
Unauthenticated N/A
Makers
(Disabled)
Completion of the Initialize
Cryptographic Module service disables
the Makers Authority
Role-based
User Identity (TCG Makers
Authority) and PIN (Makers
PIN)
Maintenance
Maintenance role for Diagnostics
commands
Role-based 32-bit EDC
Table 6 – Roles, Required Identification, and Authentication
Authentication Mechanism Mechanism Strength
TCG Credential (PIN)
TCG Credentials are 256 bits, which provides 2256 possible values. The
probability that a random attempt succeeds is 1 chance in 2256 (approximately
(8.64 x 10-78) which is significantly less than 1/1,000,000 (1x 10-6).
Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only occur sequentially (one at
a time) and only when the failed authentication Tries count value does not
exceed the associated TriesLimit value.
Each authentication attempt consumes approximately 1.603 milliseconds.
Hence, at most, approximately 37,421 authentication attempts are possible in
one minute. Thus, the probability that a false acceptance occurs within a one-
minute interval is approximately 3.2 x 10-73, which is significantly less than 1
chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5).
Maintenance Role Credential
The maintenance role credential embedded within the VUC that enables the
maintenance role is a 32-bit EDC, which provides 232 possible values. The
probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false acceptance will occur
is at least 1 chance in 232 (2.33 x10-10), which is significantly less than
1/1,000,000 (1x 10-6).
Authentication attempts consume approximately 7.9 milliseconds. Therefore,
at most, 7,559 authentication attempts are possible within a one-minute
interval. Thus, the probability that a false acceptance occurs within a one-
minute interval is 1.76 x 10-6, which is less than 1 chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5).
Table 7 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths
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5. Access Control Policy
5.1 Roles and Services
Service Description Role(s)
Approved
Mode
Non-
Approved
Mode
Initialize Cryptographic
Module5
Crypto Officer provisions the Cryptographic
Module from organizational policies
CO
(SID Authority)
X X
Authenticate Input a TCG Credential for authentication
CO (SID
Authority,
EraseMaster),
Users,
(BandMasters)
X X
Lock/Unlock Firmware
Download Control
Deny/Permit access to Firmware Download
service
CO
(SID Authority)
X X
Firmware Download
Load and utilize RSA2048 PSS and SHA-256
to verify the entire firmware image. After a
successfully verifying the firmware image the
SED executes the new firmware object code.
Unlocking the Firmware Download Control
enables the downloading of firmware.
CO
(SID Authority)
X X
Zeroize (TCG Revert)
The TCG Revert method zeroizes a drive and
return the Cryptographic Module to its original
manufactured state.
CO
(SID Authority)
X X
Set
Write data structures; access control
enforcement occurs per data structure field.
This service can change PINs.
CO (SID
Authority,
EraseMaster),
Users,
(BandMasters)
X X
Set LBA Band
Set the starting location, size, and attributes of
a set of contiguous Logical Blocks
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Lock/Unlock
LBA Band
Deny/Permit access to a LBA Band
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Write Data
Transform plaintext user data to ciphertext
and write in a LBA band
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Read Data
Read ciphertext from a LBA band and output
user plaintext data
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Set Data Store Write a stream of bytes to unstructured storage
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Erase LBA Band
Band cryptographic-erasure by changing LBA
band encryption keys to new values. Erasing
an LBA band with EraseMaster sets the TCG
Credential to the default value.
CO
(EraseMaster)
X X
Set Vendor Data
(Diagnostics)
A Non-Approved service that is unavailable
after the Initialize Cryptographic Module
service completes. For failure analysis
purposes, the vendor can enable a logical
diagnostic port to perform diagnostics and
gather data on the failure.
Makers X
5
See Cryptographic Module Acceptance and Provisioning within the Ultrastar DC HC520 Product Specification.
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Service Description Role(s)
Approved
Mode
Non-
Approved
Mode
Diagnostics
For failure analysis purposes, the vendor can
enable a maintenance role to perform
diagnostics, gather failure data, and drive
health data. Vendor Unique Commands
(VUC) support diagnostic functions for testing
the drive media and the SCSI bus integrity.
Maintenance X
Table 8 - Authenticated CM Services (Approved and Non-Approved Mode)
5.2 Unauthenticated Services
Table 9 - Unauthenticated Services lists the unauthenticated services the Cryptographic Module provides.
Service Description
Reset Module Power on Reset
Self-Test The Cryptographic Module performs self-tests when it powers up
Status Output TCG (IF-RECV) protocol
Zeroize (TCG Revert)
The TCG Revert method zeroizes a drive and return the Cryptographic Module to
its original manufactured state.
Get FIPS Mode TCG ‘Level 0 Discovery’ method outputs the FIPS mode of the Cryptographic
Module.
Start Session Start TCG session
End Session End a TCG session by clearing all session state
Generate Random TCG Random method generates a random number from the SP800-90A DRBG
Get Reads data structure; access control enforcement occurs per data structure field
Get Data Store Read a stream of bytes from unstructured storage
SCSI [SCSI Core] and [SCSI Block] commands to function as a standardized storage
device. See Table 13 - SCSI Commands
FIPS 140 Compliance
Descriptor6
This service reports the FIPS 140 revision as well as the cryptographic module’s
overall security level, hardware revision, firmware revision and module name.
Table 9 - Unauthenticated Services
6 See FIPS140 Compliance Descriptor within the Ultrastar He12 SAS OEM Product Specification or [SFSC] Security Features for
SCSI Commands.
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5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The Cryptographic Module contains the CSPs listed in Table 10 - CSPs and Private Keys. Zeroization of CSPs
complies with the purge requirements for SCSI hard disk drives within [SP800 88], Guidelines for Media Sanitization.
Name Type Description
AUTH Digest 256-bit authentication data SHA-256 digest of a PIN and a PIN salt
Crypto Officer PIN - TCG
Credential
(2 total)
256-bit authentication data The PBKDF uses this PIN to authenticate a
Crypto Officer’s credentials.
DRBG Internal CTR_DRBG state
(384 bits)
All properties and states associated with the
[SP800 90A] Deterministic Random Bit
Generator. The internal state includes
values “V” and “Key”
KEK – Key Encrypting Key (16
total)
SP 800-132 PBKDF (256 bits) Ephemeral keys derived from BandMaster
PINs and 256-bit KDF salts that wrap the
MEKs using an [SP 800-38F] AES Key
Wrap.
Note: Keys protected by this [SP 800-132]
PBKDF derived key shall not leave the
module.
Maintenance Role Credential 32-bit authentication
A 32-bit EDC authenticates the credentials
of the VUC that enables the maintenance
role.
MEK - Media Encryption Key7
(16 total - 1 per LBA band)
XTS-AES-256 (512 bits) Encrypts and decrypts LBA Bands. Each
key is only associated with one LBA band.
The DRBG within the Cryptographic
Module generates MEKs without
modification.
NDRNG 256-byte Entropy output Entropy source for DRBG
User PIN –TCG Credential
(16 total)
256-bit authentication data The PBKDF uses this PIN to authenticate a
User’s credentials.
Table 10 - CSPs and Private Keys
5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters
The Cryptographic Module contains two public keys. The cryptographic module uses the public keys to verify the
digital signature of a firmware download image. If the digital signature verification process fails when utilizing the
primary public key, the cryptographic module attempts to use the secondary public key to verify the digital signature.
The cryptographic module rejects the downloaded firmware image if both attempts to verify the digital signature fail.
Key Name Type Description
RSAPublicKey[0] RSA 2048 public key Primary public key used to verify the digital signature of a
firmware image.
RSAPublicKey[1] RSA 2048 public key Secondary public key used to verify the digital signature of a
firmware image.
MSID Twenty-character alpha-
numeric string
A unique value derived from the modules serial number. The
value is written to nonvolatile memory within the
Cryptographic Module during manufacturing. It serves as the
default PIN for all TCG credentials.
7
A concatenation of XTS-AES Key1 (256 bits) and XTS-AES Key2 (256 bits)
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Key Name Type Description
PSID Twenty-character alpha-
numeric string
A unique value generated in the factory and printed on the
Cryptographic Module’s label. The PSID serves as
authentication data and proof of physical presence for the
Zeroize service.
PIN Salt
(16 total)
256-bit key The DRBG within the Module generates PIN salts without
modification.
KDF Salt
(16 total)
256-bit key The DRBG within the Module generates KDF salts without
modification.
Table 11 - Public Security Parameters
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations
The Cryptographic Module deploys a [SP800-132] Password Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF).
• The cryptographic module complies with Option 2a within SP800-132.
• The Cryptographic Module tracks TCG Credentials (PINs) by hashing a 256-bit Salt and PIN. The
Cryptographic Module stores the SHA256 digest and associated salt in the Reserved Area.
• Security policy rules set the minimum PIN length at 32 bytes. The cryptographic module allows values from
0x00 to 0xFF for each byte of a PIN
• The upper bound for the probability of guessing a PIN is 2-256. The difficulty of guessing the PIN is
equivalent to a brute force attack.
• KEKs ([SP800 132] Master Keys) derive from passing a TCG Credential PIN ([SP800 132] Password) and a
256-bit KDF salt though an [SP800 132] PBKDF. The Cryptographic Module creates a unique KEK for
each LBA Band. The KEK generation process utilizes the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm. Each KEK has a
security strength of 128-bits against a collision attack
• Each 256-bit Salt is a random number generated using the [SP800-90A] DRBG.
• The sole use of a KEK is to wrap and unwrap its associated Media Encryption Key (MEK), which is utilize
by storage applications.
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access
Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services defines the relationship between access to Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs) and the different Cryptographic Module services. The definitions provided below define the
access modes listed in Table 12.
• G = Generate: The Cryptographic Module generates a CSP from the [SP800-90A] DRBG, derives a CSP
with the Key Derivation Function or hashes authentication data with SHA-256.
• I = Input: The Cryptographic Module imports a CSP or PSP from outside the cryptographic boundary.
• O = Output: The Cryptographic Module does not support the output of CSPs outside the cryptographic
boundary. The Cryptographic module outputs the value of selective PSPs.
• E = Execute: The module executes a service that uses the CSP or PSP.
• S = Store: The Cryptographic Module stores a CSP or PSP persistently on media within the cryptographic
module.
Z = Zeroize: The Cryptographic Module zeroizes a CSP or PSP that is stored in volatile or non-volatile
memory.
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Service
CSP PSP
AUTH
Digest
CO
PIN
DRBG
NDRNG
KEK
MEK
User
PIN
Maintenance
Role
Credential
RSAPublicKey[0.1]
MSID
PSID
PIN
salt
KDF
Salt
Initialize Cryptographic
Module
GS IE GE GE G GS IE OIE GS GS
Authenticate E IE GE E IE E E
Lock/Unlock Firmware
Download Control
Firmware Download IE
Set
Set LBA Band
Lock/Unlock LBA Band
Write Data E
Read Data E
Set Data Store
Set Vendor Data
(Diagnostics)
Diagnostics IE
Erase LBA Band GSZ
Self-Test
Reset Module GE GE
Status Output
Get FIPS mode
Start Session
End Session
Generate Random GE E
Get Data Store
Get
Zeroize (TCG Revert) Z Z GE Z G GSZ Z E I GSZ GSZ
SCSI
FIPS 140 Compliance
Descriptor
Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
6. Operational Environment
The Cryptographic Module operating environment is non-modifiable. Therefore, the FIPS 140-2 operational
environment requirements are not applicable to this module. While operational, the code working set cannot be
added, deleted, or modified. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic Module uses an authenticated download
service to upgrade its firmware in its entirety. If the download operation is successful, authorized, and verified, the
Cryptographic Module will begin operating with the new code working set. Firmware loaded into the module that is
not on the FIPS 140-2 certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
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7. Security Rules
The Cryptographic Module enforces applicable FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security requirements. This section documents the
security rules that the Cryptographic Module enforces.
7.1 Invariant Rules
1. The Cryptographic Module supports two distinct types of operator roles: Crypto Officer and User. The module
also supports an additional role, the Makers role. Initialization disables the Makers role.
2. Cryptographic Module power cycles clear all existing authentications.
3. After the Cryptographic Module has successfully completed all self-tests and initialized according to the
instructions provided in Section 7.2, it is in FIPS Approved mode. The Crypto Officer shall not enable the
Makers Authority after the cryptographic module enters FIPS Approved mode.
4. When the Cryptographic Module is unable to authenticate TCG Credentials, operators do not have access to
any cryptographic service other than the unauthenticated Generate Random service.
5. The Cryptographic Module performs the following tests. Upon failure of any test, the Cryptographic Module
enters a soft error state. The Cryptographic module reports the error condition by transmitting an UEC via
the [SCSI] protocol. After entering the soft error state, the cryptographic module does not process functional
commands unless a power cycle occurs.
A. Power up Self-Tests
1) Firmware Integrity 32-bit EDC
2) Firmware AES-ECB Encrypt KAT, AES Cert. #3880
3) Firmware AES-ECB Decrypt KAT, AES Cert. #3880
4) RSA 2048 PSS Verify KAT, RSA Cert. #1978
5) DRBG KAT8, DRBG Cert. #1108
6) SHA-256 KAT, SHS Cert. #3203
7) HMAC-SHA-256 KAT, HMAC Cert. #2522
8) Hardware AES-ECB Encrypt KAT, AES Cert. #3881
9) Hardware AES-ECB Decrypt KAT, AES Cert. #3881
10) HW/FW SHA-256 KAT, SHS Cert. #3204
11) Firmware Key Wrap KAT, KW-AE, AES Cert. #3880
12) Firmware Key Wrap KAT, KW-AD, AES Cert. #3880
B. Conditional Tests
1) The Cryptographic Module performs a Continuous Random Number Generator test on the DRBG.
2) The Cryptographic Module performs a Continuous Random Number Generator test on the hardware
NDRNG entropy source.
3) The Cryptographic Module performs an Adaptive Proportion test and a Repetition Count test on the
hardware NDRNG entropy source that complies with SP800-90B.
4) The Cryptographic Module performs a key comparison test on XTS-AES Key1 and XTS-AES Key2 that
satisfies IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements.
5) Firmware Download Test, RSA 2048 PSS (Cert. RSA 1978), SHA-256 (Cert. SHS 3204)
6. An operator can command the Cryptographic Module to perform the power-up self-test by power cycling the
device.
7. Power-up self-tests do not require operator action.
8. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused, could compromise the
Cryptographic Module.
8 The DRBG KAT is inclusive of the instantiate, generate and reseed function health tests required in SP 800-90A rev 1
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10. The zeroization service deletes all plaintext keys and CSPs.
11. The Cryptographic Module supports a maintenance role. The operator must execute the TCG Revert
Method to zeroize the cryptographic module before entering the maintenance role. The operator must also
execute the TCG Revert Method to zeroize the cryptographic module after exiting the maintenance role.
12. The Cryptographic Module does not support manual key entry.
13. The Cryptographic Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
14. The Cryptographic Module does not output plaintext CSPs.
15. The Cryptographic Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators.
17. The End Session service deletes the current operator authentication. The Cryptographic Module requires
operators to re-authenticate upon execution of the End Session service.
18. The host shall authenticate to LBA Bands after a power cycle.
19. The Crypto Officer shall not enable the Makers Authority after the cryptographic module enters FIPS
Approved mode.
20. The Crypto Officer shall assure that all host issued User PINs are 32-bytes in length.
21. After a Firmware Download, the CO shall disable the firmware download port by executing “Set
‘Firmware_Dload_Port.PortLocked = True’”.
7.2 Initialization Rules
The Crypto Officer shall follow the instructions provided in the FIPS 140 Crypto Officer Instructions section of the
Ultrastar DC HC520 Product Specification and the Delivery & Operation (Crypto Officer’s) Manual for acceptance
and end of life procedures.
The Crypto Officer shall initialize the modules cryptographic services by executing the TCG methods listed below.
1. StartSession and SyncSession using the ‘Admin SP’
2. Get MSID
3. Use the MSID to authenticate to the SID
a. An authentication failure indicates that a tamper event has occurred for the Cryptographic Module
4. Set ‘SID PIN’ to an organizational value
5. Set ‘Makers.Enabled = FALSE’
6. Set ‘Firmware_Dload_Port.PortLocked = True
7. Set ‘Firmware_Dload_Port.LockOnReset = PowerCycle’
8. EndSession
9. StartSession and SyncSession using the ‘Locking SP’
10. Use the MSID to authenticate to the EraseMaster
a. An authentication failure indicates that a tamper event has occurred for the Cryptographic Module
11. Set ‘EraseMaster PIN’ to a new value
12. Erase Band0
13. Use the MSID to authenticate to the BandMaster0
a. An authentication failure indicates that a tamper event has occurred for the Cryptographic Module.
14. Set ‘BandMaster0 PIN’ to a new value
15. As required by organizational policy, repeat steps 13 to 14 for each LBA band
16. EndSession
17. Power cycle or reset the Cryptographic Module
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The instructions provided above accomplish the following.
• Establish authentication data for the TCG Authorities by replacing the MSID (default PIN value).
• Erase the LBA Bands. When the Cryptographic Module erases LBA bands it also cryptographically erases
the Media Encryption Keys associate with each LBA band.
• Establish the LBA Bands. When the Cryptographic Module establishes LBA bands it also generates a unique
Media Encryption Key for each LBA band.
• Disable the Makers Authority
• Lock the Firmware Download service and set the Firmware Download service to lock automatically after a
power cycle.
At the end of the initialization process, the Cryptographic Module will be in FIPS Approved mode. While in FIPS
Approved mode, only an authenticated Crypto Officer can change the state of the firmware download service.
7.3 Zeroization Rules
The Crypto Officer shall use the TCG Revert Method to perform the zeroization service. After successfully executing
TCG Revert the Crypto Officer shall power cycle the module. Power cycling the module assures the erasure of all
CSPs stored in volatile memory. Reverting and power cycling the cryptographic module zeroizes all Critical Security
Parameters.
8. Physical Security Policy
8.1 Mechanisms
The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2.
• All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation.
• The enclosure is opaque.
• Engineering design supports opacity requirements.
• Western Digital applies one (1) tamper-evident security seal during manufacturing.
• The tamper-evident security seal cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without evidence of
tampering. In addition, the tamper-evident security seal is difficult to replicate.
Figure 5: Tamper-Evident Seal
8.2 Operator Responsibility
The Crypto Officer shall inspect the Cryptographic Module enclosure for evidence of tampering at least once a year.
If the inspection reveals evidence of tampering, the Crypto Officer should return the module to Western Digital.
1
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Figure 6: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seal
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The cryptographic module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of the requirements
within FIPS 140-2.
10. Definitions
• Allowed: NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or acceptable, i.e., no known
security risk as opposed to deprecated, restricted and legacy-use. [SP800-131A] for terms
• Anybody: A formal TCG term for an unauthenticated role. [TCG Core]
• Approved: [FIPS140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication.
• Approved mode of operation: A mode of the cryptographic module that employs only approved security
functions. [FIPS140]
• Authenticate: Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object.
• Authorize: Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object.
• Ciphertext: Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function.
• Confidentiality: A cryptographic property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties.
• Credential: A formal TCG term for data used to authenticate an Operator. [TCG Core]
• Critical Security Parameter (CSP): Security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys,
and authentication data such as credentials and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the
security of a cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic Boundary: An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds
of a cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a
cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic key (Key): An input parameter to an Approved cryptographic algorithm
• Cryptographic Module: The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware used to implement approved
security functions contained within the cryptographic boundary. [FIPS140]
• Crypto Officer: An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management functions. [FIPS140]
• Data at Rest: User data residing on the storage device media when the storage device is powered off.
• Discovery: A TCG method that provides the properties of the TCG device. [TCG Enterprise]
• Integrity: A cryptographic property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorized
and undetected manner.
• Interface: A logical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the cryptographic
module for logical information flows. [FIPS140]
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• Key Derivation Function (KDF): An Approved cryptographic algorithm by which one or more keys are
derived from a shared secret and other information.
• Key Encrypting Key (KEK): A cryptographic key that is used to encrypt or decrypt other keys.
• Key management: The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security
parameters (e.g., authentication data) during the entire life cycle of the Cryptographic Module.
• Key Wrap: An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide Confidentiality and Integrity.
• LBA Band: A formal [TCG Core] term that defines a contiguous logical block range (sequential LBAs) to
store encrypted User Data; bands do not overlap, and each has its own unique encryption key and other
settable properties.
• Manufactured SID (MSID): A unique default value that vendors assign to each SED during manufacturing.
An externally visible MSID value is not required if the user can derive the MSID from other information
printed on the drive. The MSID is readable with the TCG protocol. It is the initial and default value for all
TCG credentials. [TCG Core]
• Method: A TCG command or message. [TCG Core]
• Operator: A consumer, either human or automation, of cryptographic services that is external to the
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS140]
• Personal Identification Number (PIN): A formal TCG term designating a string of octets used to
authenticate an identity. [TCG Core]
• Plaintext: Unencrypted data.
• Port: A physical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the Cryptographic
Module for physical signals. [FIPS140]
• PSID (Physical Security Identifier): a SED unique value that is printed on the Cryptographic Module’s
label and is used as authentication data and proof of physical presence for the Zeroize service.
• Public Security Parameters (PSP): Public information whose modification can compromise the security of
the cryptographic module (e.g., a public key).
• Read Data: An external request to transfer User Data from the SED. [SCSI Block]
• Reserved Area: Private data on the Storage Medium that is not accessible outside the Cryptographic
Boundary.
• Security Identifier (SID): A TCG authority used by the Crypto Officer. [TCG Core]
• Self-Encrypting Drive (SED): A storage device that provides data storage services, which automatically
encrypts all user data written to the device and automatically decrypts all user data read from the device.
• Session: A formal TCG term that envelops the lifetime of an Operator’s authentication. [TCG Core]
• Storage Medium: The non-volatile, persistent storage location of a SED; it is partitioned into two disjoint
sets, a User Data area and a Reserved Area.
• User: An Operator that consumes cryptographic services. [FIPS140]
• User Data: Data transferred from/to a SED using the Read Data and Write Data commands. [SCSI Block]
• Write Data: An external request to transfer User Data to a SED. [SCSI Block]
• Zeroize: Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS140]
11. Acronyms
• CO: Cryptographic Office [FIPS140]
• CRC: Cyclic Redundancy Check
• CSP: Critical Security Parameter [FIPS140]
• DRAM: Dynamic Random Access Memory
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• DRBG: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
• EDC: Error Detection Code
• EMI: Electromagnetic Interference
• FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard
• HDD: Hard Disk Drive
• KAT: Known Answer Test
• KDF: Key Derivation Function
• LBA: Logical Block Address
• MEK: Media Encryption Key
• MSID: Manufactured Security Identifier
• NDRNG: Non-deterministic Random Number Generator
• NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
• PIN: Personal Identification Number
• PSID: Physical Security Identifier
• PSP: Public Security Parameter
• SAS: Serial Attached SCSI
• SCSI: Small Computer System Interface
• SED: Self encrypting Drive
• SID: TCG Security Identifier, the authority representing the Cryptographic Module owner
• SSD: Solid-state Drive
• TCG: Trusted Computing Group
• UEC: Universal Error Code
• VUC: Vendor Unique Command
• XTS: A mode of AES that utilizes "Tweakable" block ciphers
12. References
12.1 NIST Specifications
• [AES] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, November 2001
• [DSS] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-4, NIST, July 2013
• [FIPS140] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, December 2002
• [HMAC] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008
• [SHA] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST, August 2015
• [SP800-38E] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, SP800-38E, NIST, January 2010
• [SP800-38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, NIST,
December 2012
• [SP800-57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 4), NIST, January 2016
• [SP800 88] Guidelines for Media Sanitization, NIST, December 2014
• [SP800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators (Revision 1), NIST, June 2015
• [SP800-90B] Recommendation for Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, NIST, January 2018
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• [SP800 131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths (Revision 2), NIST, March 2019
• [SP800-132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, December 2010
• [SP800 133] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, NIST (Revision 2), June 2020
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications
• [TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Version 2.0 Revision 1.0 (April 20, 2009)
• [TCG Enterprise] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 3.00
(January 10, 2011)
• [TCG App Note] TCG Storage Application Note: Encrypting Storage Devices Compliant with SSC: Enterprise, Version
1.00 Revision 1.00 Final
• [TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.00 Final Revision 1.00 (February
24, 2012)
• TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version 1.02, (2011)
12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee
Standards
• [SCSI Core] SCSI Primary Commands (SPC-5)
• [SCSI Block] SCSI Block Commands (SBC-3)
• [SAS] Serial Attached SCSI (SAS-4)
• [SFSC] Security Features for SCSI Commands
12.4 Western Digital Documents
• [Product Specification] Ultrastar DC HC520 (He12) SAS OEM Specification, Version 1.3, January 2020,
https://shop.westerndigital.com/c/data-center-drives
• [Datasheet] Ultrastar DC HC520 Datasheet, (August 2019), https://shop.westerndigital.com/c/data-center-
drives
• [D&O] Delivery & Operation (Crypto Officer) Manual, Version: 0.12, January 7, 2017
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12.5 SCSI Commands
Description Code Description Code
FORMAT UNIT 04h RESERVE 16h
INQUIRY 12h RESERVE 56h
LOG SELECT 4Ch REZERO UNIT 01h
LOG SENSE 4Dh SANITIZE 48h
MODE SELECT 15h SEEK (6) 0Bh
MODE SELECT 55h SEEK (10) 2Bh
MODE SENSE 1Ah SEND DIAGNOSTIC 1Dh
MODE SENSE 5Ah SET DEVICE IDENTIFIER A4h/06h
PERSISTENT RESERVE IN 5Eh START STOP UNIT 1Bh
PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT 5Fh SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (10) 35h
PRE-FETCH (16) 90h SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (16) 91h
PRE-FETCH (10) 34h TEST UNIT READY 00h
READ (6) 08h UNMAP 42h
READ (10) 28h VERIFY (10) 2Fh
READ (12) A8h VERIFY (12) AFh
READ (16) 88h VERIFY (16) 8Fh
READ (32) 7Fh/09h VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ah
READ BUFFER 3Ch WRITE (6) 0Ah
READ CAPACITY (10) 25h WRITE (10) 2Ah
READ CAPACITY (16) 9Eh/10h WRITE (12) AAh
READ DEFECT DATA 37h WRITE (16) 8Ah
READ DEFECT DATA B7h WRITE (32) 7Fh/0Bh
READ LONG (16) 9Eh/11h WRITE AND VERIFY (10) 2Eh
READ LONG 3Eh WRITE AND VERIFY (12) AEh
REASSIGN BLOCKS 07h WRITE AND VERIFY (16) 8Eh
RECEIVE DIAGNOSTICS RESULTS 1Ch WRITE AND VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ch
RELEASE 17h WRITE BUFFER 3Bh
RELEASE 57h WRITE LONG (10) 3Fh
REPORT DEVICE IDENTIFIER A3h/05h WRITE LONG (16) 9Fh/11h
REPORT LUNS A0h WRITE SAME (10) 41h
REPORT SUPPORTED OPERATION
CODES
A3h/0Ch WRITE SAME (16) 93h
REPORT SUPPORTED TASK
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
A3h/0Dh WRITE SAME (32) 7Fh/0Dh
REQUEST SENSE 03h
Table 13 - SCSI Commands