FIPS 140-2 Level 3
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family
Document Number: CNN35xx-NFBE-SPD-L3
Document Version: Version 1.2
Revision Date: 7/6/2022
© Copyright 2022 Marvell
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
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Revision History
Revision Date Author Description of Change
1.0 9/20/2021 Rajendar Kalwa Entropy updates and ACVP certs updates for
transition algorithms
1.1 6/7/2022 Rajendar Kalwa Addressed review comments from NIST
Updated build number with Diagnostics
enhancement
1.2 7/6/2022 Rajendar Kalwa Section 7.1 updated to explicitly state the
minEntropy value per 8-bit output.
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Table of Contents
1 Module Overview.................................................................................................................... 6
2 Security Level ........................................................................................................................ 10
3 Modes of Operation.............................................................................................................. 11
3.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation................................................................................................................11
3.2 Non-FIPS Mode of Operation.........................................................................................................................11
3.3 Partitions .......................................................................................................................................................11
3.3.1 HSM Master Partition ..........................................................................................................................11
3.3.2 HSM Partition.......................................................................................................................................12
4 Supported Cryptographic Algorithms................................................................................... 13
4.1 Approved and Allowed Algorithms................................................................................................................13
4.2 Non-Approved, Non-Allowed Algorithms ......................................................................................................15
4.3 LED Error Pattern for FIPS Failure..................................................................................................................16
4.4 TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 Cipher Suites.........................................................................................................................17
5 Ports and Interfaces.............................................................................................................. 19
6 Identification and Authentication Policy .............................................................................. 20
6.1 Assumption of Roles ......................................................................................................................................20
6.1.1 Manufacturer Role...............................................................................................................................20
6.1.2 Master Partition Roles .........................................................................................................................20
6.1.3 Non-Master Partition Roles .................................................................................................................20
6.1.4 Appliance User.....................................................................................................................................20
6.2 Strength of Authentication............................................................................................................................21
6.3 Roles, Services, and CSP Access .....................................................................................................................22
7 Keys and Certificates............................................................................................................. 30
7.1 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)...........................................................................................30
7.2 Definition of Public Keys ................................................................................................................................32
7.3 Definition of Session Keys..............................................................................................................................33
8 Operational Environment ..................................................................................................... 34
9 Security Rules........................................................................................................................ 34
10 Physical Security Policy......................................................................................................... 35
10.1 Physical Security Mechanisms ..................................................................................................................35
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy........................................................................................ 35
12 References ............................................................................................................................ 35
13 Definitions and Acronyms..................................................................................................... 36
14 Appendix A: Supported ECC curves for Sig-Verify ................................................................ 36
15 Appendix B: Supported ECC curves for Key-Gen and Sig-Gen.............................................. 36
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List of Tables
Table 1 – LED Description ...................................................................................................... 6
Table 2 – Hardware Part Numbers ......................................................................................... 7
Table 3 – Module Security Level Specification............................................................................ 10
Table 4 – FIPS Approved Algorithms Used in the Module.......................................................... 13
Table 5 – FIPS Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module ............................................................ 15
Table 6 – Non-Approved, Non-Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module.................................. 15
Table 7 – LED Flash Pattern for Errors......................................................................................... 16
Table 8 – Marvell HSM Ports and Interfaces............................................................................... 19
Table 9 – Roles and Required Identification and Authentication .............................................. 21
Table 10 – Strength of Authentication Mechanism.................................................................... 21
Table 11 – Roles, Services and CSPs ............................................................................................ 22
Table 12 – Private Keys and CSPs ................................................................................................ 30
Table 13 – Public Keys.................................................................................................................. 32
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List of Figures
Figure 1 – Top View of Cryptographic Module.............................................................................. 6
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1 Module Overview
The Marvell (formerly Cavium Inc.) NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family (hereafter
referred to as the module or HSM) is a high-performance purpose-built security solution for crypto
acceleration. The module provides a FIPS 140-2 overall Level 3 security solution. The module is
deployed in a PCIe slot to provide crypto and TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 acceleration in a secure manner to
the system host. It is typically deployed in a server or an appliance to provide crypto offload. The
module’s functions are accessed over the PCIe interface via an API defined by the module.
The module is a hardware/firmware multi-chip embedded cryptographic module. The module
provides cryptographic primitives to accelerate approved and allowed algorithms for TLS
1.0/1.1/1.2 and SSH. The cryptographic functionality includes modular exponentiation, random
number generation, and hash processing, along with protocol specific complex instructions to
support TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 security protocols using the embedded NITROXIII chip. The module
implements password based single factor authentication at FIPS 140-2 Level 3 security. The
physical boundary of the module is the outer perimeter of the card itself.
Figure 1 – Top View of Cryptographic Module
Table 1 – LED Description
LED Location LED Description
D6 – Red Power Fail indication
D6 – Green Power OK – All voltages rails are at nominal
D13 – Red See Table 7
D13 – Green See Table 7
D10 –Multicolor See Table 7
D12 - Multicolor See Table 7
D14 - Multicolor See Table 7
The configuration of hardware and firmware for this validation is:
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Table 2 – Hardware Part Numbers
Part Number LiquidSecurity
Appliance
Cores Enabled Key Store Size Max Partitions
CNL3560P-NFBE-G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560P-NFBE-2.0-G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560P-NFBE-3.0-G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560B-NFBE-2.0-G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560B-NFBE-3.0-G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560-NFBE-G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560-NFBE-2.0-G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560-NFBE-3.0-G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560A‐NFBE‐3.0‐G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560C‐NFBE‐3.0‐G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560D‐NFBE‐3.0‐G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560E‐NFBE‐3.0‐G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560F‐NFBE‐3.0‐G Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3530-NFBE-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530-NFBE-2.0-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530-NFBE-3.0-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530B-NFBE-2.0-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530B-NFBE-3.0-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530A‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530C‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530D‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530E‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530F‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3510-NFBE-G Yes 24 25K 24
CNL3510-NFBE-2.0-G Yes 24 25K 24
CNL3510-NFBE-3.0-G Yes 24 25K 24
CNL3510P-NFBE-G Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510P-NFBE-2.0-G Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510P-NFBE-3.0-G Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510A‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510C‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510D‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510E‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510F‐NFBE‐3.0-G Yes 32 50K 32
CNN3560P-NFBE-G No 64 100K 64
CNN3560P-NFBE-2.0-G No 64 100K 64
CNN3560P-NFBE-3.0-G No 64 100K 64
CNN3560-NFBE-G No 64 50K 32
CNN3560-NFBE-2.0-G No 64 50K 32
CNN3560-NFBE-3.0-G No 64 50K 32
CNN3560A‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 64 50K 32
CNN3560C‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 64 50K 32
CNN3560D‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 64 50K 32
CNN3560E‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 64 50K 32
CNN3560F‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 64 50K 32
CNN3530-NFBE-G No 32 25K 32
CNN3530-NFBE-2.0-G No 32 25K 32
CNN3530-NFBE-3.0-G No 32 25K 32
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CNN3530A‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 32 25K 32
CNN3530C‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 32 25K 32
CNN3530D‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 32 25K 32
CNN3530E‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 32 25K 32
CNN3530F‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 32 25K 32
CNN3510-NFBE-G No 24 25K 24
CNN3510-NFBE-2.0-G No 24 25K 24
CNN3510-NFBE-3.0-G No 24 25K 24
CNN3510A‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 24 25K 24
CNN3510C‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 24 25K 24
CNN3510D‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 24 25K 24
CNN3510E‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 24 25K 24
CNN3510F‐NFBE‐3.0‐G No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LP-NFBE-2.0-
G
No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LP-NFBE-3.0-
G
No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPB-NFBE-
2.0-G
No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPB-NFBE-
3.0-G
No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPA‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPC‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPD‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPE‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPF‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 24 25K 24
CNN3505LP-NFBE-2.0-
G
No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LP-NFBE-3.0-
G
No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPA‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPC‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPD‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPE‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPF‐NFBE‐
3.0‐G
No 16 10K 16
LP is low-frequency part, where N3 chip runs at 500MHz, otherwise it runs at 600MHz.
CNN3510-NFBE-G Firmware:
CNN35XX-NFBE-FW-1.1 build 02 and CNN35XX-NFBE-FW-1.1 build 05
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The module supports different performance options as listed above in the hardware identifier. The
physical hardware and firmware are identical across all options. The underlying hardware has
multiple identical cryptographic engines which are enabled or disabled using an option parameter
set at manufacturing time. Also, Manufacturer can configure the HSM adapter to work only with
Cavium’s Marvell’s LiquidSecurity HSM appliances, these parts are identified with CNL prefix.
CNN cards can work with non-Marvell (Cavium) appliances.
The major blocks of the module are: General purpose MIPS based control processor, crypto
processors, RAM memory, NOR and eMMC flash for persistent storage, USB interfaces, and PCIe
gen-2 x8 interfaces.
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2 Security Level
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 3 security of FIPS
140-2.
Table 3 – Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Power on Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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3 Modes of Operation
The module supports the following modes of operation:
1) Non-FIPS mode of operation
2) FIPS Approved Level 3 mode of operation
The module is initialized into one of the modes specified above during the module initialization
period. The value of the parameter fipsState passed into the call specifies the mode. The following
are the allowed values for fipsState parameters:
0 - Non-FIPS mode
2 - FIPS Approved mode with single factor authentication mechanism
3 - FIPS Approved mode with certificate based dual factor authentication mechanism
The indicator of Approved mode is obtained by using the Get Status service. The fipsState field of
Get Status service indicates the mode.
3.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The module provides a FIPS Approved mode of operation, comprising all services described in
Section 6.3 below. In this mode, the module allows only FIPS Approved or allowed algorithms.
Request for any non-Approved/allowed algorithm is rejected.
3.2 Non-FIPS Mode of Operation
The Module supports a Non-FIPS mode implementing the non-FIPS Approved algorithms listed
in Table 6.
3.3 Partitions
N3FIPS adapter is a sr-iov enabled intelligent PCIe adapter with 1 physical function and 128
virtual functions. In addition to the crypto offloads, this adapter can provide secure key storage
with up to 64 partitions, including master partition. Each partition will have its own users to
manage the partition and own configuration policies and hence each partition can be treated as a
virtual HSM. HSM always has one default partition called HSM Master partition and this contains
configuration of the complete HSM and default configuration of any additional partitions that are
created. Only one HSM partition can be assigned to one sr-iov virtual function of HSM adapter
and vice-versa. Keys belonging to one partition are not accessible from another partition, this is
achieved through a secure binding between partition and the PCIe virtual function.
3.3.1 HSM Master Partition
This is the default partition with only one user, called the Master Crypto Officer (MCO). This
partition represents the operating state of the whole HSM adapter. I.e. initialization of HSM is
nothing but initializing this partition with required configuration and MCO credentials. Zeroizing
this partition will erase all HSM partitions in the adapter. The HSM has to be initialized and the
MCO should already be logged in to create more partitions on the adapter. The MCO can backup
and restore complete partition including user data, partition configuration and user keys. All the
backup data is encrypted with Backup keys.
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3.3.2 HSM Partition
Each partition will have a different set of users to manage it and a dedicated key storage and crypto
resources associated. A partition will have a default configuration supplied by the master partition
and can be changed (within limits) during the partition initialization. When a partition is created
by the MCO, it will be in zeroized state and has to be initialized to do any keystore management
or crypto function offloads. Partition initialization will create the Partition Crypto Officer (PCO).
The PCO can later create up to 6 Partition Crypto Users (PCUs) on demand. Each user will have
a unique username to identify the users. The User has to login to the partition/vHSM to issue any
authorized commands. Users are authenticated using passwords submitted during the user creation.
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4 Supported Cryptographic Algorithms
This section provides the list of supported cryptographic algorithms segregated based on the
operating mode.
4.1 Approved and Allowed Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms.
Table 4 – FIPS Approved Algorithms Used in the Module
FIPS Approved Algorithm Usage Certificate
AES:
− ECB mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
− CTR mode: 128, 192 and 256-bit
Data encryption and decryption 2033
AES:
− ECB mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
− CBC mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
Data encryption and decryption 2034
AES:
− GCM: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
− 96-bit random IV; TLS record encryption
− GMAC is supported
− IG A.5 Notes:
− TLS 1.2 or other applications can offload GCM
operations.
− For TLS-1.2 protocol, IV constructed as described in RFC
5288.
− IV is generated internally to the cryptographic module.
− IV is not generated internally to the GCM algorithm
boundary.
− SP 800-38D §8.2.2 is used for GCM IV construction.
− IVs are generated randomly, and IG A.5 Requirement #2
applies.
− IV’s free field is a 4-byte counter.
− IV’s random field is a 96-bit random number.
− IV’s random field is incremented by 1. IV’s random field
wouldn’t overflow 96-bits in the lifetime of the module.
− Internal Approved RNG: SP 800-90A DRBG, AES_CTR
256-bit.
− Internal NDRNG used to seed the Approved RNG: Octeon
HW random number generator
Data encryption and decryption 2035
AES:
− ECB mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
− CTR mode: 256-bit
DRBG and Keywrap 3205
AES:
− SP 800-38F AES Key Wrap, AES 256-bit
Key backup/restore 3206 (AES)
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FIPS Approved Algorithm Usage Certificate
CKG
− IG D.12
− SP 800-133 Section 6.1 Asymmetric signature key
generation using unmodified DRBG output
− SP 800-133 Section 6.2 Asymmetric key establishment
key generation using unmodified DRBG output
− SP 800-133 Section 7.1 Direct symmetric key generation
using unmodified DRBG output
− SP 800-133 Section 7.3 Derivation of symmetric keys
from a key agreement shared secret.
− SP 800-133 Section 7.4 Derivation of symmetric keys
from a pre-shared key
Key Generation Vendor
Affirmed
CVL - SP 800-56A ECC CDH: P‐224 and P‐256 with SHA‐
256, P‐384 and P‐521 with SHA‐512
ECDH compute and SSL suite B
key exchange
563 (CVL)
CVL - SP 800-56B RSADP
− Modulus Length: 2048-bit
RSA decryption A1936 (CVL),
A1937 (CVL)
CVL - TLS-KDF ((v1.0/1.1, v1.2)) TLS handshake 167 (CVL)
DRBG SP 800-90A: AES-CTR 256-bit Key generation 680
DSA:
− PQG Gen: 2048 and 3072-bit (SHA-256)
− PQG Ver: 1024-bit (SHA-1); 2048 and 3072-bit (SHA-
256)
− Key Gen: 2048 and 3072-bit
− Sig Gen: 2048-bit (SHA-224, -256, -384, -512)
− SigVer: 1024, 2048 and 3072-bit (SHA-1, 224, -256, -384,
-512)
Key generation, Sign, Verify 916
ECDSA:
− PKG: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, and B-571
− PKV: All P, K and B curves
− Sig Gen: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-
409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, and B-571 (SHA-224, -
256, -384, -512)
− SigVer: All P, K and B curves (SHA-1, 224, -256, -384, -
512)
Key generation, Sign and Verify 589
ENT SP800-90B System entropy N/A
HMAC: SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512 MAC generation 1233
HMAC-SHA-1,224, 256, 384, 512 MAC generation and KAS 2019
KAS:
− KAS-ECC SP800-56Ar3
− Ephemeral Unified with no Key confirmation with
− P-521 with SHA-512
Cloning A1934
KAS-RSA:
− SP 800-56B RSA/IFC based KAS using 2048-bit key size
3072 and 4096-bit key size tested, but not used.
Key agreement A1935
KBKDF SP 800-108 HMAC-SHA-256 KDF KBK generation 65 (KBKDF)
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FIPS Approved Algorithm Usage Certificate
KTS
− AES KW
Key transport 3206
RSA:
− KeyGen: 2048 and 3072-bit
− PKCS #1 1.5 SigGen: 2048 and 3072-bit (SHA-224, -256,
-384, -512)
− PKCS #1 1.5 SigVer: 1024, 2048 and 3072-bit (SHA-1,
224, -256, -384, -512)
Key generation, Sign, Verify 1634
RSA:
− KeyGen: 4096-bit
− PKCS #1 1.5 SigGen: 4096-bit (SHA-224, -256, -384, -
512)
− PKCS #1 1.5 SigVer: 4096 (SHA-1, 224, -256, -384, -512)
PKCS PSS SigGen and SigVer tested, but not used.
Key generation, Sign, Verify A1936
SHA: 1, 224, 256, 384, and 512 Data hashing 1780
SHA: 1, 224, 256, 384, and 512 Signature generation,
verification, HMAC. SHA-1 in
only verify.
2652
Triple-DES:
− TECB mode; 3-key
− TCBC mode; 3-key
Data encryption and decryption
Module limits Triple-DES
encryptions to 2^16 64-bit
blocks per IG A.13.
1311
The cryptographic module supports the following non-FIPS Approved algorithms which are
allowed for use in FIPS mode.
Table 5 – FIPS Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module
Algorithm Usage
MD5 (no security claimed) Hashing within TLS
RSA (CVL Cert #A1936, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides
between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
Key Wrapping (Octeon)
KBK unwrap
The support of TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 protocol by the module is restricted to the TLS Key Derivation
Function and the crypto operation. This functionality of the module is used by the user of the
module as part of TLS protocol negotiation. The TLS protocol has not been reviewed or tested by
the CAVP or CMVP.
4.2 Non-Approved, Non-Allowed Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved algorithms available only in non-
FIPS mode.
Table 6 – Non-Approved, Non-Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module
Algorithm Usage Keys/CSPs
PBE Key generation Password
RC4 Encryption/Decryption RC4 key of 128 bits
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4.3 LED Error Pattern for FIPS Failure
On successful completion of the FIPS tests, the LED remains in the “ON” state. Blinking indicates
failures on the HSM. If the LED remains in the permanent glow, the card’s state is fine. All blinks
are 200ms ON and 200ms OFF. Blink delay time gap is 1000ms.
Table 7 – LED Flash Pattern for Errors
FIPS Test LED Pattern
LED No. Color Red Green Blue Blinks
N3 AES-CBC Encrypt/Decrypt D12 Red Y N N 1
N3 AES-ECB Encrypt/Decrypt D12 Blue N N Y 1
N3 AES-GCM Encrypt/Decrypt D12 Blue N N Y 6
N3 Triple-DES-CBC
Encrypt/Decrypt
D12 Red Y N N 2
N3 SHA D12 Red Y N N 3
N3 HMAC D12 Blue N N Y 2
N3 KDF D12 Blue N N Y 7
N3 RSA Enc and Dec D12 Blue N N Y 8
Octeon AES ECB Encrypt/Decrypt D12 Green N Y N 9
Octeon DRBG D12 Green N Y N 4
Octeon RSA Sign/Verify D12 Red Y N N 4
Octeon/N3 Key Gen D12 Red Y N N 5
Octeon DSA Sign Gen/Verify D12 Red Y N N 7
Octeon PQG Gen/Verify D12 Red Y N N 8
Octeon ECDSA Sig/Verify D12 Green N Y N 7
Octeon ECDSA PKV D12 Green N Y N 6
Octeon SHA D12 Green N Y N 2
Octeon HMAC D12 Green N Y N 3
Octeon KAS D12 Green N Y N 8
Octeon AES Key Wrap D12 Blue N N Y 10
ECDSA pair wise consistency test D12 Blue N N Y 4
RSA pair wise consistency test D12 Blue N N Y 5
DSA pair wise consistency test D12 Green N Y N 1
ECDH Test D12 Red Y N N 10
Octeon KDF D12 Red Y N N 11
Octeon RSA Enc and Dec D12 Red Y N N 6
ENT Health tests D12 Red Y N N 9
Firmware Power-on Tests
Nitrox device file creation D14 Red Y N N 1
Nitrox driver load fails D14 Red Y N N 2
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FIPS Test LED Pattern
LED No. Color Red Green Blue Blinks
Nitrox micro code load fails D14 Red Y N N 3
Nitrox pot test failures D14 Red Y N N 4
Database creation fails D14 Red Y N N 5
Mgmt daemon has not started
successfully
D14 Red Y N N 6
HW RNG for firmware D12 Blue N N Y 3
Other Firmware States
HSM Boot stage 1 D10 Red Y N N No blink
HSM Boot stage 2 D10 Red Y N N Blink (definite)
HSM Boot stage 3(SE-APP
initialized Linux handshake not
done)
D10 Violet Y N N No blink
HSM Linux handshake done, host
driver handshake not done
D10 Violet Y N N Infinite
HSM PF driver handshake complete D10 Blue Y N N Infinite
HSM admin driver handshake done D10 Green Y N No blink
FS recovery: - All fine D13 N N NA Does not flash
anything
FS recovery: - Log partn corrupted D13 Green N Y NA No blink
FS recovery: - main partn corrupted D13 Red Y N NA No blink
FS recovery: - more than 1 partn
corrupted/recovery fails
D13 Y Y NA No blink
FS recovery: NAND flash corrupted D13 Y Y NA Blink
4.4 TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 Cipher Suites
The module supports the following cipher suites using FIPS Approved and allowed algorithms
and key sizes:
• TLS_RSA_AES256-GCM-SHA384
• TLS_RSA_AES128-GCM-SHA256
• TLS_RSA_AES256-SHA256
• TLS_RSA_AES256-SHA
• TLS_RSA_DES-CBC3-SHA
• TLS_RSA_AES128-SHA256
• TLS_RSA_AES128-SHA
• TLS_ECDH_RSA_ AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDH_RSA_ AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDH_RSA_ AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDH_RSA_ AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_ AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_ AES_256_CBC_SHA384
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• TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_ AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_ AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_ AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_ AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_ AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_ AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_ AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_ AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_ AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_ AES_256_GCM_SHA384
For cipher suites using GCM, the IV is generated per RFC 5288. The module supports GCM
cipher suites compatible with SP 800-52.
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5 Ports and Interfaces
The module ports and interfaces are described in the below table.
Table 8 – Marvell HSM Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Ports/Interfaces
Pins Used FIPS 140-2
Designation
Name and Description
USB Interface USB Interface
USB0_DP, USB0_DM
Power
No functionality
in FIPS mode
USB Interface
Not used in FIPS mode
Serial Interface 3 Pin serial interface - GND, Tx,
Rx
N/A
No functionality
in FIPS mode
Disabled at the hardware level
during the firmware load process.
PCIe Interface PCIE x8 Interface
Lane 0
Transmit Side B (14, 15)
Receive Side A (16, 17)
Lane 1
Transmit Side B (19, 20)
Receive Side A (21, 22)
Lane 2
Transmit Side B (23, 24)
Receive Side A (25, 26)
Lane 3
Transmit Side B (27, 28)
Receive Side A (29, 30)
Lane 4
Transmit Side B (33, 34)
Receive Side A (35, 36)
Lane 5
Transmit Side B (37, 38)
Receive Side A (39, 40)
Lane 6
Transmit Side B (41, 42)
Receive Side A (43, 44)
Lane 7
Transmit Side B (45, 46)
Receive Side A (47, 48)
Data Input
Control Input
Data Output
Status Output
Power
PCIe Interface
- Primary interface to
communicate with the module
- Provides APIs for the
software on the host to
communicate with the module
LED LED interface (7 LEDs, 13 pins) Status output Visual status indicator
Tamper PIN Tamper pin GPIO Control Input Tamper pin is used to zeroize the
card by zeroizing the master key
stored in EEPROM
Power Connector 6 PIN power connector Power In External power connector.
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
Marvell 20
6 Identification and Authentication Policy
6.1 Assumption of Roles
The Cryptographic Hardware Security Module enforces identity-based authentication. A role is
explicitly selected at authentication; the MCO role is associated with the Master Partition and the
PCO and PCU roles are associated with user partitions. The module allows one identity per role.
6.1.1 Manufacturer Role
During the manufacturing stage, each HSM goes through the following process:
• An RSA key pair called the HSM FIPS Master Authentication Key (FMAK) is generated
on HSM. CSR is requested out of HSM and signed by the Manufacturer Authentication
Root Certificate (MARC). The generated certificate is called the HSM FIPS Master
Authentication Certificate (FMAC).
• A 256-bit MKBK encrypted with the FMAK public key is loaded into the HSM.
• Program Performance settings and Appliance Compatibility mode
• Program Serial Number and Max Operating Temperature
The same above steps are followed by the manufacturer once the HSM is moved to manufacturer
reset after manufacturer zeroize.
6.1.2 Master Partition Roles
Master partition supports only Cryptographic Officer role, referred to as the Master Crypto Officer
(MCO). The Username and password are encrypted with an AES 256 bit key.
6.1.3 Non-Master Partition Roles
Each Non-Master Partition supports two distinct operator roles, Partition Crypto User (PCU) and
Partition Crypto Officer (PCO). The module enforces the separation of roles using identity-based
authentication. Re-authentication is required to change roles.
Concurrent operators are allowed; however, only one operator is allowed per login session.
The Username is used as the identification for identity-based authentication. The username and
password encrypted with an AES 256-bit key is passed during the Login service.
Each non-master partition will have one PCO and one PCU.
6.1.4 Appliance User
Authenticated using a username and password which is encrypted with an AES 256-bit key on
entry. For audit logs and offloading Appliance secure channel crypto operations.
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
Marvell 21
6.2 Strength of Authentication
Table 9 – Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
Manufacturer This role sets the identity,
serial number, performance
settings and max operating
temperature
Manufacturer License
certificate based
authentication
RSA 2048-bit signature on the
provided data.
MCO This role has access to
administrative services offered
by the module or HSM
Identity-based operator
authentication
Case In-Sensitive Username and
7 to 32 character encrypted
password.
PCO This role has access to
administrative services of the
partition
Identity-based operator
authentication
Case In-Sensitive Username and
7 to 32 character encrypted
password.
PCU This role has access to all
crypto services offered by the
partition
Identity-based operator
authentication
Case In-Sensitive Username and
7 to 32 character encrypted
password.
Appliance
User
This role has access to
partition audit logs and
Appliance secure channel key.
Identity-based operator
authentication
Case In-Sensitive Username and
7 to 32 character encrypted
password or RSA 2048 bit
signature on the provided data.
Table 10 – Strength of Authentication Mechanism
Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
Authentication using password
based scheme*
This mode provides a false acceptance rate of 1/78,364,164,096 less than
1/1,000,000), determined by the password. Password is minimum 7 characters,
alpha-numeric so it is (26+10)^7
To exceed 1 in 100,000 probability of a successful random attempt during a 1-
minute period, 7350919 (122515 per second) attempts would have to be
executed.
The module limits the number of Login tries to a user configured value
“login_fail_count” during module initialization. This configuration value cannot
exceed 20.
If the user exceeds the configured value for maximum consecutive failed login
attempts, then the corresponding user is blocked from login service. A PCO can
reset passwords and unblock PCU of his own partition.
Authentication using RSA
Signatures
Authentication is performed using SHA-256 based RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1-v1.5
signatures (provides 112 bits of strength). Corresponding public key is part of
FW image. The probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false
acceptance will occur is approximately 1/2^112.The fastest the module can
process signature verifications is 4,000 per second. Based on this maximum
rate, the probability that a random attempt will succeed in a one-minute period
is approximately 4,000/2^112.
*Note: The Module supports dual factor authentication where the first factor is a user name and password as described
above and the second factor is a digital signature.
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
Marvell 22
6.3 Roles, Services, and CSP Access
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
R = Read: The module reads the CSP out of the module.
W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the module, or the module generates a CSP, or the module overwrites an existing
CSP.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
E = Execute: The module executes or uses the CSP.
Table 11 – Roles, Services and CSPs
MCO
PCO
PCU
Manufacturer
Appliance
User
Unauthenticated
Service Description Commands
Cryptographic
Keys/CSPs
X X X X X X HSM Zeroize Zeroize: All non-
Mfr specific
keys/data
CN_ZEROIZE G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: Partial
X X X X X X Partition
Zeroize
Zeroize: All non
Mfr specific
keys/data of
partition
CN_ZEROIZE G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: Partial
X Vendor/
Manufacture
Zeroize HSM
Zeroize: all data CN_VENDOR_
ZEROIZE
G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: All
X X X X X X Session
Management
Management
services for open,
status of sessions.
CN_APP_INITIALIZE
CN_APP_FINALIZE
CN_OPEN_SESSION
CN_CLOSE_SESSION
CN_GET_SESSION_
NFO
G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X X X X X X Session
Management -
Close
Management
services for closing
all sessions.
CN_CLOSE_ALL_
SESSIONS
G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
Marvell 23
MCO
PCO
PCU
Manufacturer
Appliance
User
Unauthenticated
Service Description Commands
Cryptographic
Keys/CSPs
X X Partition
Application
Session Close
(All)
Close sessions of all
Applications tied to
a Partition
CN_CLOSE_
PARTITION_
SESSIONS
G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X X X X X X Basic HSM
Info
Obtain basic
information of the
HSM.
CN_TOKEN_INFO
CN_PARTITION_INFO
CN_GET_HSM_LABEL
CN_ALL_PARTITION_
INFO
CN_GET_HSM_DIAG_INF
O
G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X X X Read
Firmware
Version String
Obtain firmware
version
CN_GET_VERSION G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X X X X X X Login to a
Session
Allows login to a
session. Public key
is used to verify user
signatures,
optionally in 2-
factor
authentication.
CN_LOGIN G: N/A
E: PswdEncKey
R: Password and Two-
Factor Authentication
Public Key
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X X X X Logout of a
Session
Allows logout of a
session
CN_LOGOUT G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X X X X Change User
Password
Requires user to be
logged in. Updates
Passwords and
Public key for 2-
factor authentication
CN_CHANGE_PSWD G: N/A
E: PswdEncKey
R: N/A
W: new password, new
public key
Z: Old password
X X Manufacturer
Settings
Manufacturer
Controlled Settings
run by manufacturer
for the first time and
MCO can do it later.
CN_MASTER_CONFIG
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT_REQ
CN_CERT_AUTH_
STORE_CERT
CN_STORE_VENDOR_PR
E_SHARED_
KEY
G: FMAK, MFDEK
E: Manufacturer License
Validation Key
R: CSR of FMAK
W: MARC, FMAC,
MFKBK
Z: N/A
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
Marvell 24
MCO
PCO
PCU
Manufacturer
Appliance
User
Unauthenticated
Service Description Commands
Cryptographic
Keys/CSPs
X Initialize HSM Commands and
services to initialize
the module.
CN_INIT_TOKEN
CN_GEN_PSWD_
ENC_KEY
CN_CREATE_CO
CN_INIT_DONE
CN_CERT_AUTH_
STORE_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT_REQ
CN_CERT_AUTH_
STORE_CERT
CN_STORE_USER_
PRE_SHARED_
KEY
G: HSM PswdEncKey
RSA key pair,
PswdEncKey,
E: PswdEncKey, MFDEK
R: CSR for FMAK
W: Host PswdEncKey
Public Key, AOAC,
Password, Two-Factor
Authentication Public
key, AOTAC
Z: N/A
X Secure Boot Commands to
identify the hosts are
of Marvell
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
RECV_PEER_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
SECURE_BOOT
G: N/A
E: MARC to validate
HOST_ID Certificate,
HOST_ID Certificate
to validate signature
on challenge
R: FMAC
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X Firmware
Update
Updates adapter
with Marvell signed
firmware images.
Adapter has to be
rebooted to use the
new firmware.
CN_FW_UPDATE_
BEGIN
CN_FW_UPDATE
CN_FW_UPDATE_
END
G: N/A
E: Manufacturer Firmware
Validation Key
R: N/A
W: Manufacturer Firmware
Validation Key,
Manufacturer License
Validation Key
Z: N/A
X Other MCO
Operations
Misc. MCO
Operations
CN_SLAVE_CONFIG
CN_INVOKE_FIPS
G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X Partition
Management
Commands and
services to manage
partitions
CN_CREATE_
PARTITION
CN_DELETE_
PARTITION
CN_RESIZE_
PARTITION
CN_GET_PARTITION_
COUNT
CN_ALL_PARTITION_
INFO
G: PAK key pair, PMEK
E: FMAK
R: N/A
W: PAC
Z: All partition keys
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
Marvell 25
MCO
PCO
PCU
Manufacturer
Appliance
User
Unauthenticated
Service Description Commands
Cryptographic
Keys/CSPs
X MCO Backup
and Restore
Allows MCO to take
back up using KBK
derived from pre-
loaded MKBK,
OKBK. MCO uses
find key in to get the
key handles in a
partition
CN_BACKUP_BEGIN
CN_BACKUP_CONFIG
CN_BACKUP_USERS
CN_BACKUP_KEY
CN_BACKUP_END
CN_RESTORE_BEGIN
CN_RESTORE_CONFIG
CN_RESTORE_USERS
CN_RESTORE_KEY
CN_RESTORE_END
G: KBK, User passwords
and Two-Factor
Authentication Public
Keys, All user keys
E: MFKBK, OKBK, KBK
R: POTAC, All keys NIST
AES wrapped with
KBK
W: All keys NIST AES
wrapped with KBK,
new POTAC verify the
owner ship
Z: N/A
X PCO Backup
and Restore
PCO uses find key
in to get the key
handles in a
partition
CN_BACKUP_BEGIN
CN_CREATE_OBJECT
CN_WRAP_KBK (Modes:
KBK_WRAP_WITH_K
EK,
KBK_WRAP_WITH_C
ERT_AUTH_DERIVE
D_KEY,
KBK_WRAP_WITH_R
SA)
CN_BACKUP_CONFIG
CN_BACKUP_USERS
CN_BACKUP_KEY
CN_BACKUP_END
CN_RESTORE_BEGIN
CN_GENERATE_KEY_
PAIR
CN_UNWRAP_KBK
(Modes:
KBK_WRAP_WITH_K
EK,
KBK_WRAP_WITH_C
ERT_AUTH_DERIVE
D_KEY,
KBK_WRAP_WITH_R
SA)
CN_RESTORE_CONFIG
CN_RESTORE_USERS
CN_RESTORE_KEY
CN_RESTORE_END
G: User passwords and
Two-Factor
Authentication Public
Keys, All user keys,
KBK Wrapping RSA
key pair, POKBK
E: KLK or KBK Wrap
RSA public key or
CertAuthTokenKey,
Partition KBK,
R: wrapped Partition KBK,
W: KBK wrap public key,
All keys NIST AES
wrapped with KBK
Z: N/A
X MCO Partition
Data
Management
Commands to
manage Unclassified
data storage mainly
used to maintain
network IP
addresses
CN_PARTN_
STORAGE_
UPDATE
CN_PARTN_
STORAGE_GET
CN_PARTN_
STORAGE_
DELETE
G: N/A
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
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MCO
PCO
PCU
Manufacturer
Appliance
User
Unauthenticated
Service Description Commands
Cryptographic
Keys/CSPs
X Partition
Initialization
Commands to
initialize the
partition and claim
ownership of the
partition
CN_INIT_TOKEN
CN_GEN_PSWD_
ENC_KEY
CN_CREATE_CO
CN_INIT_DONE
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT_REQ
CN_CERT_AUTH_
STORE_CERT
CN_STORE_USER_
PRE_SHARED_
KEY
G: Partition PswdEncKey
key pair,
PswdEncKey,
E: PswdEncKey, FMAK
R: CSR for PAK
W: Host PswdEncKey
Public Key, Password,
Two-Factor
Authentication Public
key, POAC, POTAC,
POKBK
Z: N/A
X PCO User
Management
Commands to
manage users in the
partition
CN_CREATE_USER
CN_DELETE_USER
CN_LIST_USERS
CN_GET_LOGIN_
FAILURE_CNT
G: N/A
E: PswdEncKey to decrypt
and store, PMEK to
encrypt the password
and store it in database
R: N/A
W: password and new
Public key
Z: all session keys
X X SecureAuth
based on
Certificates
Commands used for
mutual
authentication and
key agreement
between two
partitions/entities of
same Partition
owner on Cavium
HSM.
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_SOURCE_
RANDOM
CN_CERT_AUTH_
VALIDATE_PEER_
CERTS
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
VALIDATE_PEER_
CERTS
CN_CERT_AUTH_
SOURCE_KEY_
EXCHANGE
G: N/A
E: POTAC to verify peer
POAC, MARC to
verify peer PAC and
FMAC, peer PAC to
verify peer signature,
local PAK to sign
responder's challenge,
local PAK to sign
initiator's challenge
R: FMAC, PAC, POAC,
W: Peers FMAC, PAC,
POAC,
Z: N/A
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
Marvell 27
MCO
PCO
PCU
Manufacturer
Appliance
User
Unauthenticated
Service Description Commands
Cryptographic
Keys/CSPs
X Cloning
Protocol
Cloning: Clone
Masking of a
Partition to a
different Partition of
the same owner.
CN_CLONE_SOURCE_
INIT
CN_CLONE_SOURCE_
STAGE1
CN_CLONE_TARGET_
INIT
CN_CLONE_TARGET_
STAGE1
G: Partition’s Masking
Key, KAS key pair, Z
and KAS keying
material, Partition’s
Cloning Private Key
E: KAS keying material for
masking key
encryption and mac
tag generation and
peer mac tag
verification, KAS
keying material for
presumed data
encryption and mac
tag generation, KAS
keying material to
decrypt the masking
key, validate MAC
tag.
R: Partition Cloning/KLK
Initiator Public Key,
Partition Cloning/KLK
Responder Public Key
W: Partition Cloning/KLK
Initiator Public Key,
Partition Cloning/KLK
Responder Public Key
Z: Z and KAS keying
material
X Key
Transportation
A SP 800-56 A/B
protocol to generate
a shared KLK on
host and Partition.
CN_GEN_KEY_ENC_
KEY
G: Partition KLK
RSA/ECC key pair,
KLK
E: N/A
R: N/A
W: Host RSA/ECC KLK
Public Key
Z: N/A
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
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MCO
PCO
PCU
Manufacturer
Appliance
User
Unauthenticated
Service Description Commands
Cryptographic
Keys/CSPs
X PCU Key
Management
CN_EXTRACT_
MASKED_OBJECT
CN_INSERT_
MASKED_OBJECT
CN_DESTROY_OBJECT
CN_GET_ATTRIBUTE_
VALUE
CN_GET_ATTRIBUTE_
SIZE
CN_MODIFY_OBJECT
CN_FIND_OBJECTS
CN_FIND_OBJECTS_
FROM_INDEX
CN_GENERATE_KEY
CN_GENERATE_KEY_
PAIR
CN_GENERATE_PBE_
KEY
CN_EXPORT_PUB_
KEY
G: General Purpose User
CSPs, General Purpose
User Public Keys
E: Masking Key, KLK or
user provided
wrapping Key, PEK
specified user key, all
user keys,
R: General Purpose User
CSPs, General Purpose
User Public Keys
W: Imported keys
Z: General Purpose User
CSPs, General Purpose
User Public
X X X X Find Key
handles
Users can find key
handles based on
search criteria like
key type or label.
MCO/PCO use it as
part of backup
service
CN_FIND_OBJECTS
CN_FIND_OBJECTS_
FROM_INDEX
G: N/A
E: N/A
R: All user keys
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X PCU Key
Management –
Special
Unwrap only RSA
Key CN_UNWRAP_KEY
CN_FIND_OBJECT
CN_DELETE_OBJECT
G: N/A
E: KLK
R: Asymmetric Private
Key (RSA only)
W: Asymmetric Private
Key (RSA only)
Z: Asymmetric Private Key
(RSA only)
X X PCU Crypto
Offload
CN_ME_PKCS and
CN_ME_PKCS_LA
RGE are RSA 2K
and 3K operations.
Appliance user is
allowed to use the
imported RSA key.
CN_SIGN
CN_VERIFY
CN_ECC_DH
CN_NIST_AES_WRAP
CN_ALLOC_SSL_CTX
CN_FREE_SSL_CTX
CN_GEN_PMK
CN_FIPS_RAND
CN_ME_PKCS_LARGE
CN_ME_PKCS
CN_FECC
CN_HASH
CN_HMAC
CN_ENCRYPT_DECRYPT
G: N/A
E: specified user key
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
Marvell 29
MCO
PCO
PCU
Manufacturer
Appliance
User
Unauthenticated
Service Description Commands
Cryptographic
Keys/CSPs
X X Audit Logs –
PCO /
Appliance
CN_PARTN_GET_
AUDIT_DETAILS
CN_PARTN_GET_
AUDIT_LOGS
CN_PARTN_GET_
AUDIT_SIGN
G: N/A
E: PAK, FMAK
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X Audit Logs –
MCO
CN_ADMIN_GET_
PARTN_AUDIT_
DETAILS
CN_ADMIN_GET_
PARTN_AUDIT_
LOGS
CN_ADMIN_GET_
PARTN_AUDIT_
SIGN
G: N/A
E: FMAK
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
X SSL Protocol
Packet
Processing
These API can
understand the
SSL/TLS protocol
semantics and
optimized to do
multiple sequential
crypto operations on
the given input data.
For example:
Encrypt/decrypt
record will do
HMAC comparison
in addition to the
symmetric crypto
operation.
MAJOR_OP_RSASERVER
_LARGE
MAJOR_OP_RSASERVER
MAJOR_OP_HANDSHAK
E
MAJOR_OP_OTHER
MAJOR_OP_FINISHED
MAJOR_OP_RESUME
MAJOR_OP_ENCRYPT_D
ECRYPT_RECORD
MAJOR_OP_ECDH
G: N/A
E: TLS Session Symmetric
Key Set and TLS
Session HMAC key
part of SSL Context
R: N/A
W: N/A
Z: N/A
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
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7 Keys and Certificates
7.1 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The Manufacturer FIPS Data Encryption Key (MFDEK) and HSM Master Partition Master
Encryption Key are stored in plaintext form in the EEPROM. The Partition Master Encryption
Key (PMEK) is stored encrypted under the HSM Master Partition Master Encryption Key. All
other keys and CSPs stored in the persistent memory are encrypted by the MFDEK, HSM Master
Partition Master Encryption Key, or PMEK.
Table 12 – Private Keys and CSPs
Name Description and Usage
HSM CSPs
DRBG Entropy The entropy material for the FIPS Approved DRBG. Instantiates the DRBG
with 256-bits of security strength.
CTR_DRBG Internal State The internal state for the FIPS Approved DRBG.
Manufacturer FIPS Data Encryption
Key (MFDEK)
AES 256-bit key used to encrypt manufacturer keys stored in persistent storage
of the HSM.
HSM Master Partition Master
Encryption Key
AES 256-bit key used to encrypt Master Partition CSPs and authentication
data stored in persistent storage of the HSM.
Partition Master Encryption Key
(PMEK)
AES 256-bit key used to encrypt partition CSPs and authentication data stored
in persistent storage of the HSM.
HSM FIPS Master Authentication
Key (FMAK)
A unique 2048-bit RSA private key. Used to identify the HSM when in the
FIPS operating mode
Partition Authentication Key (PAK) A unique 2048-bit RSA private key used to identify the HSM Partition
Authentication CSP
HSM PswdEncKey RSA Private
Key
2048-bit RSA Private Key, used in SP 800-56B KAS to generate PswdEncKey
PswdEncKey AES-256 key, for encrypting User passwords during user creation and
authentication
Login Passwords String of 7 to 32 alphanumeric characters
Key Loading CSPs
Partition’s KeyLoading Private Key ECC 512-bit or RSA 2048-bit key used in SP 800-56A C (0,2, ECC DH) or SP
800-56B KAS2 to agree on Z during key loading
Partition’s KeyLoading Shared
Secret (Z)
Shared secret Z for SP 800-56A C (0,2, ECC DH) or SP 800-56B KAS2
Partition’s Key Loading Key (KLK) A 256-bit AES key derived from Z, used to decrypt the imported CSPs
Backup and Restore Keys
Manufacturer FIPS Key Backup Key
(MFKBK)
AES 256-bit key used to derive KBK
HSM Owner KBK (OKBK) AES 256-bit key used to derive KBK
Partition Owner KBK (POKBK) AES 256-bit key used to derive KBK
HSM Key Backup Key (KBK) Key used to encrypt/decrypt the Backup Session Key
Backup Session Key Key used to backup and restore partition data
Cloning Keys
Partition’s Cloning Private Key ECC 512-bit or RSA 2048-bit Static Private Key used in SP 800-56A
C(0,2,ECC DH) or SP 800 -56B KAS2 -bilateral -confirmation key agreement
to generate shared secret Z. At HSM Partition level, used to establish secure
channel for cloning process (to export Masking Key).
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 1.2 Security Policy
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Name Description and Usage
Partition’s Cloning Shared Secret (Z) Shared secret Z for SP 800-56A C (0, 2, ECC DH) or SP 800-56B KAS2 -
bilateral -confirmation scheme.
Partition’s Cloning Session Key AES 256 key for encryption and decryption of Masking Key.
Partition’s Cloning Session MAC
Key
HMAC SHA256 key used for key confirmation during SP 800-56A key
agreement
Partition’s Masking Key AES-256 key, for key wrapping. Used to import/export CSPs and masked
objects.
General Purpose User CSPs
Asymmetric Private Keys RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ECDH general purpose keys
Asymmetric Private Session Keys RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ECDH general purpose session keys
Symmetric Keys Triple-DES or AES general purpose keys
Symmetric Session Keys Triple-DES or AES general purpose session keys
HMAC Keys HMAC general purpose keys (minimum key size of 160 bits)
HMAC Session Keys HMAC session general purpose keys (minimum key size of 160 bits)
TLS Session Symmetric Key Set AES 128, 192, 256 or Triple-DES keys used for encrypting TLS sessions
TLS Session HMAC key HMAC key used in SSL session (minimum key size of 160 bits)
EAP-FAST-PAC EAP-FAST authentication Info
Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
Entropy Sources Minimum Number of Bits of Entropy Details
Octeon HW RBG Entropy source provides the DRBG with
sufficient entropy to claim a security
strength of 256 bits.
The Octeon II HW unit generates random bits from the
8-free running oscillators from a total of 128-free
running oscillators. And the generated random bits are
run through software/firmware health tests (APT and
RCT). The entropy source supplies the DRBG with
3161 bytes for the entropy input and another 3161
bytes for the nonce. With a minimum entropy
assessment of 0.081 bits per byte, this is sufficient to
claim a DRBG security strength of 256
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7.2 Definition of Public Keys
The module contains the following public keys:
Table 13 – Public Keys
Name Description and Usage
HSM Keys
Manufacturer Firmware
Validation Key
RSA 2048-bit public key used to authenticate SW images loaded into the module. The
SW image is signed by the manufacturer using an RSA private key and the signature is
verified before upgrading to the new image using the public key.
Manufacturer License
Validation Key
RSA 2048-bit public key used to authenticate the manufacturer role
Manufacturer Authentication
Root Cert. (MARC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate, used to issue FMAC certificates
HSM FIPS Master
Authentication Certificate
(FMAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate of FMAK. Used to identify the HSM FIPS
operating mode.
SecureBootAuth Public Key RSA 2048-bit public key used to verify authenticity of the host system
Administrative Keys
HSM/Adapter Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate (AOTAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate used as trust anchor of MCO
HSM/Adapter Owner
Authentication Certificate
(AOAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate of FMAK. Used to identify the HSM owner.
Partition Authentication
Certificate (PAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate of PAK. Used to identify the Partition.
Partition Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate (POTAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate used as trust anchor of PCO.
Partition Owner
Authentication Certificate
(POAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate of PAK. Used to identify the Partition owner.
HOST_ID Certificate RSA 2048-bit public key certificate used to authenticate HSM users trusted by Vendor
Key Backup/Cloning Keys
Partition Cloning/KLK
Initiator Public Key
ECC 512-bit static public key used in SP 800-56A C (0, 2, ECC DH) key agreement or
RSA 2048-bit static public key used in SP 800-56B KAS2 -bilateral -confirmation key
agreement to generate shared secret Z.
Partition Cloning/KLK
Responder Public Key
ECC 512-bit static public key used in SP 800-56A C (0, 2, ECC DH) key agreement or
RSA 2048-bit static public key used in SP 800-56B KAS2 -bilateral -confirmation key
agreement to generate shared secret Z.
Partition Cloning ECC
Domain Parameter Set
Set EE per SP 800-56A Table 2
Authentication Keys
Partition PswdEncKey
Public Key
RSA 2048-bit public key generated by the partition to be used in SP 800-56B key
agreement to generate PswdEncKey.
Host PswdEncKey Public
Key
RSA 2048-bit public key loaded by the host to be used SP 800-56B key agreement to
generate PswdEncKey.
Two-Factor Authentication
Public Key
RSA 2048-bit public key used to verify signature on encrypted passwords during user
creation and login
General Purpose Keys
User Public Keys RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ECDH public keys
User Public Session Keys RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ECDH public session keys
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7.3 Definition of Session Keys
The cryptographic module supports the generation/import/export of user keys which are bound to
a session and are termed as session keys. Following points apply to the session keys:
• Session keys are stored in RAM and are lost across reboots.
• Session key access is restricted to an application in which it is created.
• Every session in an application will have access to the keys created by every other session
in the same application.
• When a session is closed, the session keys created by that session get destroyed.
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8 Operational Environment
The module implements a limited operational environment. FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational
Environment requirements do not apply to the module in this validation.
9 Security Rules
This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the
security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level-3 module.
1. The cryptographic module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to
any cryptographic services.
3. The cryptographic module shall perform the following power up, continuous and
conditional self-tests:
A. Power-Up Tests
- AES (CBC and ECB) Encrypt & Decrypt KATs (NitroxIII, Cert. #2034)
- AES (GCM) Encrypt & Decrypt KATs (NitroxIII, Cert. #2035)
- AES (ECB) Encrypt & Decrypt KATs (NitroxIII, Cert. #2033)
- HMAC SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512b KATs (NitroxIII, Cert. #1233)
- TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 KDF KAT (NitroxIII, CVL Cert. #167)
- SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512 KATs (NitroxIII, Cert. #1780)
- Triple-DES (TCBC) Encrypt & Decrypt KATs (NitroxIII, Cert. #1311)
- AES (ECB) Encrypt & Decrypt KATs for DRBG, Key wrap (Firmware, Cert.
#3205)
- AES Key Wrap Encrypt & Decrypt KATs (Firmware, Cert. #3206)
- SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT (Firmware, Cert. #680)
- DSA Sig Gen, Sig Ver, PQG Gen, PQG Ver, and Key Gen KATs (Firmware, Cert.
#916)
- ECDSA Sig Gen and Sig Ver KATs (Firmware, Cert. #589)
- HMAC-SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512 KATs (Firmware, Cert. #2019)
- KAS (Shared Secret Calculation and KDF) KAT (Cert. #A1934)
- RSA Sig Gen, Sig Ver KATs (Firmware, Cert. #1634)
- SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512 KATs (Firmware, Cert. #2652)
- RSA Encrypt & Decrypt KAT (Firmware, Cert. #A1935 and #A1936)
- ECC CDH KAT (NitroxIII, CVL Cert. #563)
- RSA Encrypt & Decrypt KAT (NitroxIII, Cert. #A1937)
- OCTEON SP800-108 KBKDF KAT (Firmware, Cert #65)
- Firmware integrity test (CRC-16)
B. Conditional Self-Tests
- ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- DSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG Continuous number test
- SP 800-56Ar3, Section 5.6.2 Assurances per IG D.8
- SP 800-56Br2, Section 6.4 Assurances per IG D.8
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- HW RNG Continuous Number Test
- Firmware load test (RSA Signature Verification)
- DRBG, SP800-90A health tests (Instantiate, Generate and Reseed).
- SP800-90B entropy health tests (RCT, APT).
4. Critical Functions Tests: The module runs the following Critical Functions Tests which are
required to ensure the correct functioning of the device.
a. Power On Memory Test
b. EEPROM Test
c. NOR Flash Test
d. Nitrox Chips Tests
5. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power up self-test
by cycling power or resetting the module.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
11. The module does not support bypass capabilities.
12. The module does not support manual key entry.
13. The module has no CSP feedback to operators.
14. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs
15. The module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The module shall be configured for FIPS operation by following the first-time initialization
procedure described in User Manual and C-API Specification (CN16xx-NFBE-API-0.9).
10 Physical Security Policy
10.1 Physical Security Mechanisms
The module’s cryptographic boundary is defined to be the outer perimeter of the hard epoxy
enclosure containing the hardware and firmware components. The module is opaque and
completely conceals the internal components of the cryptographic module. The epoxy enclosure
of the module prevents physical access to any of the internal components without having to destroy
the module. There are no operator required actions.
Note: The module’s hardness testing was only performed at ambient temperature (23°C); no
assurance is provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any other temperature.
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
No mitigation of other attacks is implemented by the module.
12 References
1. NIST AES Key Wrap Specification, SP 800-38F, December 2012
2. NIST Special Publication 800-56A Rev. 3, April 2018.
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3. NIST Special Publication 800-56B Rev. 2, March 2019.
4. NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part-5, May 2020.
5. FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013
6. FIPS PUB 140-2, FIPS Publication 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules
7. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
8. NIST Special Publication 800-131A Rev. 2, March 2019.
13 Definitions and Acronyms
MCO – Master Crypto Officer
PCO – Partition Crypto Officer
PCU – Partition Crypto User
HSM – Hardware Security Module
KBK – Key Backup Key
KLK – Key Loading Key
KAT – Known Answer Test
KAS – Key Agreement Scheme
14 Appendix A: Supported ECC curves for Sig-Verify
Curves over prime number fields: P-192, P-224, P-256, P384, P-521.
Koblitz curves over 2^m fields: K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571.
Curves over 2^m fields: B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571.
15 Appendix B: Supported ECC curves for Key-Gen and Sig-Gen
Curves over prime number fields: P-224, P-256, P384, P-521.
Koblitz curves over 2^m fields: K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571.
Curves over 2^m fields: B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571.