Juniper Networks PTX1000 Packet Transport Router

Firmware: Junos OS 22.4R2.8

Document Version: 1.0

Date: December 28, 2023

Prepared by:



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1. General

Introduction

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140-3 program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140-3 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140-3 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-3 criteria.

More information is available on the CMVP website at: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.

About this Document

This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Juniper Networks, Inc. Juniper Networks PTX1000 Packet Transport Router provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the overall Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-3.

The Juniper Networks PTX1000 Packet Transport Router may also be referred to as the "module" in this document.

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This document describes the cryptographic module security policy for the Juniper Networks, Inc. Juniper Networks PTX1000 Packet Transport Router (Hardware version: PTX1000) cryptographic module (also referred to as the "module" hereafter) with firmware version Junos OS 22.4R2.8. The module has a multichip standalone embodiment. It contains specification of the security rules, under which the cryptographic module operates, including the security rules derived from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard.

ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6. [Number Below]	FIPS 140-3 Section Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic module specification	1
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	1
4	Roles, services, and authentication	3
5	Software/Firmware security	1
6	Operational environment	1
7	Physical security	1
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	1
10	Self-tests	1
11	Life-cycle assurance	1
12	Mitigation of other attacks	N/A

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-3:

Table 1 - Security Levels

The module claims an overall Security Level 1.

2. Cryptographic Module Specification

The versions of the module are as follows:

	Model	Hardware [Part Number and Version]	Firmware Version	Distinguishing Features
F	7X1000	PTX1000	Junos OS 22.4R2.8	N/A

Table 2 – Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration

Module Usage and Cryptographic Boundary

The cryptographic module provides for an encrypted connection, using SSH, between the management station and the module.

The cryptographic module's operational environment is a limited operational environment. The images below depict the cryptographic boundary of the hardware module (the entirety of the module/chassis). This includes the Routing Engine (RE). No components have been excluded from the cryptographic boundary of the module.



Figure 1 – PTX1000

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


Figure 2 – High-level PTX1000 Block Diagram

The module claims an overall Security Level of 1 with all individual sections at a Security Level 1 with the exceptions of Roles, Services and Authentication (claimed at Security Level 3). The module does not implement any non-invasive security mitigations or mitigations of other attacks and thus the requirements per these sections are inapplicable.

Modes Of Operation

The module supports one Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The module must always be zeroised when switching between the Approved mode of operation and the non-Approved mode of operation and vice versa.

Approved Mode

The hardware versions contained in Table 2, with Junos OS 22.4R2.8 installed, contain one Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The Junos OS 22.4R2.8 firmware image must be installed on the module. The module is configured during initialization by the Crypto Officer to operate in the Approved mode or the non-Approved mode. The Crypto Officer can place the module in

the Approved mode of operation by following the instructions specified in Section 11 Life-Cyle Assurance in this document (Crypto Officer guidance).

The Crypto Officer can verify that the cryptographic module is in the Approved mode by observing the console prompt and running the "show version" command. When operating in the Approved mode, the prompt will read "<operator>@<device name>:fips#" (e.g. crypto-officer@ptx1000fips#). The "show version" command will allow the Crypto Officer to verify that the validated firmware version is running on the module. The Crypto Officer can also use the "show system fips chassis level" command (returns "level 1") to determine if the module is operating in the Approved mode.

The Approved mode is entered when the module is configured for it and successfully passes all self-tests (both pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs)).

Non-Approved Mode

The cryptographic module supports a non-Approved mode of operation. When operated in the non-Approved mode of operation, the module supports non-Approved algorithms identified below in this section as well as the algorithms supported in the Approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer can place the module into the non-Approved mode of operation by following the instructions in the Section 11 Life-Cyle Assurance in this document (Crypto Officer guidance).

Degraded Operation

The module does not support a degraded mode of operation.

Overall Security Rules of Operation

The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term *shall* in this context specifically refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements indicate a security rule implemented by the module.

- 1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
- 2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services.
- 3. Self-tests do not require any operator action.
- 4. Data output is inhibited during SSP generation, self-test execution, zeroisation, and error states.
- 5. Status information does not contain SSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
- 6. There are no restrictions on which SSPs are zeroised by the zeroisation service.
- 7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.

- 8. The module does not output intermediate key values.
- 9. The module does not output plaintext CSPs.
- The Crypto officer shall verify that the firmware image to be loaded on the module is a FIPS 140-3 validated image. If any non-validated firmware image is loaded the module will no longer be a validated module.
- 11. The Crypto Officer shall retain control of the module while zeroisation is in process.
- 12. The virtual chassis feature is not supported in Approved mode and shall not be configured on the module.
- 13. The module shall not be configured to use a radius server and the radius server capability shall be disabled.
- 14. No parts of the SSH protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

CAVP $Cert^1$	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size/Key Strength	Use/Function
A4301	AES-CBC	CBC	Key sizes 128, 192, 256 with 128 to 256 bits of key strength	Encrypt, Decrypt
A4301	AES-CTR	CTR	Key sizes 128, 192, 256 with 128 to 256 bits of key strength	Encrypt, Decrypt
A4301	AES-ECB	ECB	Key sizes 128, 192, 256 with 128 to 256 bits of key strength	Encrypt, Decrypt
A4301	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	ECDSA KeyGen	Curve sizes P-256, P-384, P-521 with 128 to 256 bits of strength	Key Generation
A4301	ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4)	ECDSA KeyVer	Curve sizes P-256, P-384, P-521 with 128 to 256 bits of strength	Key Verification
A4301	ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	ECDSA SigGen	Curve sizes P-256 (SHA2-256), P-384 (SHA2-384), P-521 (SHA2-512) with 128 to 256 bits of strength	Signature Generation

¹ There are algorithms, modes, and key/moduli sizes that have been CAVP-tested but are not used by any approved service of the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are used by an approved service of the module.

CAVP Cert ¹	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size/Key Strength	Use/Function
A4301	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	ECDSA SigVer	Curve sizes P-256 (SHA2-256), P-384 (SHA2-384), P-521 (SHA2-512) with 128 to 256 bits of strength	Signature Verification
A4301	HMAC DRBG	HMAC-SHA2- 256	Key size 256-bits with 256-bits of key strength	Random Bit Generation
A4301	HMAC-SHA-1	SHA-1	SHA-1: Key size 160 bits with 160 bits of key strength	Message Authentication, DRBG Primitive
A4301	HMAC-SHA2-256	SHA2-256	SHA2-256: Key size: 256 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Authentication, DRBG Primitive
A4301	HMAC-SHA2-512	SHA2-512	SHA2-512: Key size: 512 bits with 512-bits of key strength	Message Authentication, DRBG Primitive
A4301	KAS-ECC-SSC SP800-56Ar3	Ephemeral Unified	Curve sizes P-256, P-384, P-521 with 128 bits to 256 bits of strength	Key Agreement Shared Secret Computation
A4301	KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Ar3	dhEphemeral	Domain Parameter Generation Method: MODP- 2048 with 2048 bits of strength	Key Agreement Shared Secret Computation
A4301	KDF SSH	SSH	Key sizes 128, 192, 256 with 128 to 256 bits of key strength	Key Derivation Function
A4301	RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	RSA KeyGen	Moduli 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits with 112, 128 and 152 bits of strength	Key Generation
A4301	RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	RSA SigGen	Moduli 2048 (SHA2-256, SHA2- 512), 3072 (SHA2- 256, SHA2-512) and 4096 (SHA2- 256, SHA2-512) bits with 112, 128 and 152 bits of strength	Signature Generation

CAVP Cert ¹	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size/Key Strength	Use/Function
A4301	RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	RSA SigVer	Moduli 2048 (SHA2-256, SHA2- 512), 3072 (SHA2- 256, SHA2-512) and 4096 (SHA2- 256, SHA2-512) bits with 112, 128 and 152 bits of strength	Signature Verification
A4301	SHA-1	SHA-1	SHA-1: Key size 160 bits with 160 bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
A4301	SHA2-256	SHA2-256	SHA2-256: Key size 256 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
A4301	SHA2-384	SHA2-384	SHA2-384: Key size 384 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
A4301	SHA2-512	SHA2-512	SHA2-512: Key size 512 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
A4303	HMAC DRBG	HMAC-SHA2- 256	Key size 256-bits with 256-bits of key strength	Random Bit Generation
A4303	HMAC-SHA-1	SHA-1	SHA-1: Key size 160 bits with 160 bits of key strength	Message Authentication, DRBG primitive
A4303	HMAC-SHA2-256	SHA2-256	SHA2-256: Key size: 256 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Authentication, DRBG primitive
A4303	SHA-1	SHA-1	SHA-1: Key size 160 bits with 160 bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
A4303	SHA2-256	SHA2-256	SHA2-256: Key size 256 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation

CAVP Cert ¹	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size/Key Strength	Use/Function
A4303	SHA2-384	SHA2-384	SHA2-384: Key size 384 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
A4303	SHA2-512	SHA2-512	SHA2-512: Key size 512 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
A4306	HMAC-SHA-1	SHA-1	SHA-1: Key size 160 bits with 160 bits of key strength	Message Authentication, DRBG primitive
A4306	HMAC-SHA2-256	SHA2-256	SHA2-256: Key size: 256 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Authentication, DRBG primitive
A4306	SHA-1	SHA-1	SHA-1: Key size 160 bits with 160 bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
A4306	SHA2-256	SHA2-256	SHA2-256: Key size 256 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
A4306	SHA2-512	SHA2-512	SHA2-512: Key size 512 bits with 256-bits of key strength	Message Digest Generation
Vendor Affirmed	CKG NIST SP 800-133r2	Section 4 Section 5.1 Section 5.2 Section 6.2.1	Section 4: Asymmetric seed generation using an unmodified output from an Approved DRBG; Section 5.1: Key Pairs for Digital Signature Schemes; Section 5.2: Key Pairs for Key Establishment; Section 6.2.1: Derivation of symmetric keys	Cryptographic Key Generation

$CAVP\ Cert^1$	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size/Key Strength	Use/Function
KAS-ECC-SSC SP800- 56Ar3/A4301 KDF SSH/A4301	KAS-1	SP 800-56Arev3 KAS-ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2)	P-256, P-384, P- 521 curves	Key Agreement for SSHv2
KAS-FFC-SSC SP800- 56Ar3/A4301 KDF SSH/A4301	KAS-2	SP 800-56Arev3 KAS-FFC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2)	MODP-2048	Key Agreement for SSHv2
AES- CBC/A4301 AES- CTR/A4301 HMAC-SHA- 1/A4301 HMAC-SHA2- 256/A4301 HMAC-SHA2- 512/A4301	KTS-1	SP 800-38A AES CBC, CTR and HMAC 198 per IG D.G	128, 192, and 256- bit keys providing 128, 192, or 256 bits of encryption strength	Key Transport for SSHv2

Table 3 – Approved Algorithms

The following protocol is supported by the module in the Approved mode:

 SSHv2 (EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, P-521; Diffie-Hellman MODP2048; RSA 2048, 4096; ECDSA P-256; AES CBC 128, 192, 256 bits; AES CTR 128, 192, 256 bits, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-512)

The SSH protocol allows independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity algorithms.

The module does not support any non-Approved algorithms in the Approved mode, i.e., it does not support *Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation and Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed.*

In addition to all Approved algorithms supported in the Approved mode of operation, the following *non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation* are supported only in the non-Approved mode:

Algorithm/Function	Use/Function
RSA with key size less than 2048	SSH
ECDSA with ed25519 curve	SSH
EC Diffie-Hellman with ed25519 curve	SSH
ARCFOUR	SSH
Blowfish	SSH
CAST	SSH
DSA (SignGen, SigVer, non-compliant)	SSH
HMAC-MD5	SSH
HMAC-RIPEMD160	SSH
UMAC	SSH

Table 4 – Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation

3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces

Physical port	Logical interface	Data that passes over port/interface
Ethernet	Control input interface, Data input interface, Data output interface, Status output interface	LAN, Communications/remote management
Serial	Control input interface, Data input interface, Data output interface, Status output interface	Console Serial Port
USB	Control input interface, Data input interface	USB port, load Junos Image
Power	Power interface	Power connector
LEDs	Status output interface	Status indicator lighting
Reset Button	Control input interface	Reset

Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces

The module does not support control output.

There are additional ethernet interfaces, 10 Hz pulses-per-second (PPS) Sub-Miniature B (SMB) connector and 10 MHz SMB timing connector (10MHz) which are reserved for future use (disabled).

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication

The module supports two roles: Crypto Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent operators but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication. The module implements two forms of identity-based authentication, username, and password over the console and SSH connections, as well as username and an ECDSA or RSA public key-based authentication over SSH.

The Crypto Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As root or super-user, the Crypto Officer has permission to view and configure passwords and public keys within the module. The User role monitors the module via the console or SSH. The User role does not have the permission to modify the configuration.

Role	Service	Input	Output
Crypto Officer	Configure security	Commands (SSU configuration)	Traffic
	(security relevant)	(SSH configuration: set system services ssh	
		root-login allow	
)	
		,	
	Configure	Commands	Traffic
	(non-security relevant)	(miscellaneous	
		commands e.g., for IP	
		address configuration,	
		routing protocols, etc.)	
	Show status	Command	CLI output
		(show)	
	Show status (LED)	N/A	LED
	Show module's	Command	CLI output
	versioning information	(show version)	
	Perform zeroisation	Command	N/A
		(request vmhost zeroise)	
	Perform approved	Command	SSH session
	security functions	(set system services ssh	
	(SSH connection)	root-login allow)	
	Console access	Username, password	N/A
		(set system login user	
		<username> class</username>	
		<crypto-officer td="" user<=""><td></td></crypto-officer>	
		class> operator	
		authentication plaintext-	
		password)	
	Perform self-tests	Control input/reset signal	N/A
	(remote reset)	(request vmhost reboot)	
	Perform self-tests	Control input/reset signal	N/A
	(local reset)	_	
	Load image	Image, commands	N/A
User	Show status	Command	CLI Output

Role	Service	Input	Output
		(show)	
	Show status (LED)	N/A	LED
	Show module's	Command	CLI output
	versioning information	(show version)	
	Perform approved	Commands	SSH session
	security functions (SSH	(set system services ssh	
	connection)	root-login allow)	
	Console access	Username, password	N/A
		(set system login user	
		<username> class</username>	
		<crypto-officer td="" user<=""><td></td></crypto-officer>	
		class> operator	
		authentication plaintext-	
		password)	
	Perform self-tests	Control input/reset signal	N/A
	(remote reset)	(request vmhost reboot)	
	Perform self-tests	Control input/reset signal	N/A
	(local reset)		

Table 6 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output

Role	Authentication Method	Authentication Strength
Crypto Officer (CO), User	1. Username and password	1. For Password
	over the console and SSH	Authentication: The
	2. Username and ECDSA	module enforces 10-
	public key over SSH	character passwords (at
	3. Username and RSA public	minimum) chosen from
	key over SSH	the 96 human readable
		ASCII characters;
		The maximum password
		length is 20-characters;
		Thus, the probability of a
		successful random
		attempt is 1/(96^10),
		which is less than
		1/1,000,000 (million)
		The module enforces a
		timed access mechanism
		as follows: For the first
		two failed attempts
		(assuming 0 time to
		process), no timed access
		is enforced;
		Upon the third attempt,
		the module enforces a 5-
		second delay;
		Each failed attempt
		thereafter results in an

Role	Authentication Method	Authentication Strength
		additional 5-second delay
		above the previous (e.g.,
		4th failed attempt = 10-
		second delay, 5th failed
		attempt = 15-second
		delay, 6th failed attempt =
		20- second delay, 7th
		failed attempt = 25-
		second delay);
		This leads to a maximum
		of 7 possible attempts in a
		one-minute period for
		each getty;
		The best approach for the
		attacker would be to
		disconnect after 4 failed
		attempts and wait for a
		new getty to be spawned;
		This would allow the
		attacker to perform
		roughly 9.6 attempts per
		minute (576 attempts per
		hour/60 mins); this would
		be rounded down to 9 per
		minute, because there is
		no such thing as 0.6
		attempts;
		The probability of a
		success with multiple
		consecutive attempts in a
		one-minute period is
		9/(96^10), which is less
		than 1/100,000
		2. ECDSA signature
		verification: SSH public-
		key authentication;
		The module supports
		ECDSA (P-256, P-384, and
		P-521), which has a
		minimum equivalent
		computational resistance
		to attack of either 2 ¹²⁸ ,
		2^{192} or 2^{256} depending on
		the curve;
		Thus, the probability of a
		successful random
		attempt is $1/(2^{128})$, which
		is less than 1/1,000,000
		(million)

Role	Authentication Method	Authentication Strength
		Configurable SSH
		connection establishment
		rate limits the number of
		connection attempts, and
		thus failed authentication
		attempts in a one-minute
		period to a maximum of
		15,000 attempts;
		The probability of a
		success with multiple
		consecutive attempts in a
		one-minute period is
		15,000/(2 ¹²⁸), which is less
		than 1/100,000
		3. RSA signature verification:
		SSH public-key
		authentication;
		The module supports RSA
		(2048, 4096 bits), which
		has a minimum equivalent
		computational resistance
		to attack of 2 ¹¹² (2048
		bits);
		Thus, the probability of a
		successful random
		attempt is 1/ (2 ¹¹²), which
		is less than 1/1,000,000
		(million)
		Configurable SSH
		connection establishment
		rate limits the number of
		connection attempts, and
		thus failed authentication
		attempts in a one-minute
		period to a maximum of
		15,000 attempts;
		The probability of a
		success with multiple
		consecutive attempts in a
		one-minute period is
		15,000/(2 ¹¹²), which is less
		than 1/100,000

Table 7 – Roles and Authentication

Service	Description	Approved	Keys and/or SSP's	Roles	Access rights to	Indicator
		Security Functions			Keys and/or SSP's	
Configure security (security relevant)	Security relevant configuration	All (per Table 3)	SSH Private Host Key SSH ECDH Private Key SSH DH Private Key SSH Session Key User Password CO Password HMAC_DRBG Key Value HMAC_DRBG V value HMAC_DRBG entropy input HMAC_DRBG seed HMAC_DRBG output ECDH Shared Secret DH Shared Secret HMAC Key SSH Public Host Key User Authentication Public Keys CO Authentication Public Keys JuniperRootCA PackageCA SSH ECDH Public Key SSH DH Public Key	Crypto Officer (CO)	(G, E) (G, E) (G, E) (W, E) (W, E) (W, E) (G, E) (G, E) (G, E) (G, E) (G, E) (G, E) (G, E) (G, E) (G, E) (W, E) (W, E) (W, E) (W, E) (G, E) (G, E)	Global Approved Mode indicator "fips" at the CLI combined with successful completion of each service
Configure (non- security relevant)	Non-security relevant configuration	N/A	N/A	Crypto Officer (CO)	N/A	Global Approved Mode indicator "fips" at the CLI combined with successful

Service	Description	Approved Security	Keys and/or SSP's	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or	Indicator
		Functions			SSP's	
						completion of each service
Show status	Query the module status	N/A	N/A	Crypto Officer (CO), User	N/A	Global Approved Mode indicator "fips" at the CLI combined with successful completion of each service
Show status (LED)	LEDs on the module provide physical status output	N/A	N/A	Crypto Officer (CO), User, Unauth orised	N/A	LED(s) on the chassis turned on
Show module's versioning informatio n	Query the module's versioning information	N/A	N/A	Crypto Officer (CO), User	N/A	Global Approved Mode indicator "fips" at the CLI combined with successful completion of each service
Perform zeroisation	Destroy all SSPs	N/A	SSH Private Host Key SSH ECDH Private Key SSH DH Private Key SSH Session Key User Password CO Password HMAC_DRBG Key Value HMAC_DRBG V value HMAC_DRBG entropy input HMAC_DRBG seed	Crypto Officer (CO)	(Z)	Global Approved Mode indicator "fips" at the CLI combined with successful completion of each service

Service	Description	Approved Security	Keys and/or SSP's	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or	Indicator
		-			SSP's	
		Functions	HMAC_DRBG output ECDH Shared Secret DH Shared Secret HMAC Key SSH Public Host Key User Authentication Public Keys CO Authentication Public Keys JuniperRootCA PackageCA SSH ECDH Public Key SSH DH Public Key		SSP's	
Perform approved security functions (SSH connection)	Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI)	ECDSA (P-256, SHA2-256, KeyGen, SlgVer, Cert. #A4301), RSA (2048 bits, SHA2-256, SHA2- 512, KeyGen, SlgVer, Cert. #A4301), KAS- ECC-SSC (P-256, P- 384, P-512, Cert. #A4301), KAS-FFC- SSC (MODP 2048, Cert. #A4301), AES (CBC, CTR 128, 192, 256 bits, Cert. #A4301), KDF SSH (Cert. #A4301), HMAC_DRBG (HMAC-SHA2-256, CAVP Certs. A4303, A4301), HMAC (SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2- 512, CAVP Certs. #A4303, #A4301, #A4306; SHA2- 384, CAVP Certs. #A4303); SHA (SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-512, CAVP	SSH Private Host Key SSH ECDH Private Key SSH DH Private Key SSH Session Key HMAC_DRBG Key Value HMAC_DRBG V value HMAC_DRBG entropy input HMAC_DRBG entropy input HMAC_DRBG seed HMAC_DRBG output ECDH Shared Secret DH Shared Secret HMAC Key SSH Public Host Key User SSH ECDH Public Key SSH DH Public Key	Crypto Officer (CO), User	(G, E)	Global Approved Mode indicator "fips" at the CLI combined with successful completion of each service

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSP's	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSP's	Indicator
		Functions Certs. #A4303, #A4301, #A4306; SHA2-384, CAVP Certs. #A4303), CKG			SSP's	
Console Access	Console monitoring and control (CLI)	N/A	N/A	Crypto Officer (CO), User	N/A	Global Approved Mode indicator "fips" at the CLI combined with successful completion of each service
Perform self-tests (remote reset)	Software initiated reset, performs self- tests on demand	All (per Table 3)	SSH ECDH Private Key, SSH DH Private Key, SSH Session Key, HMAC_DRBG Key Value	Crypto Officer (CO), User	(Z) (Z) (G, Z, E) (G, Z, E)	Global Approved Mode indicator "fips" at the CLI combined

Service	Description	Approved	Keys and/or SSP's	Roles	Access rights to	Indicator
		Security Functions			Keys and/or SSP's	
		Functions	HMAC_DRBG V		55F 3	with
			value		(G, Z, E)	successful
			HMAC_DRBG			completion
			entropy input		(G, Z, E)	of each
			HMAC_DRBG seed		(G, Z, E)	service
			HMAC_DRBG			
			output		(Z)	
			ECDH Shared Secret		(Z)	
			DH Shared Secret		(G, Z, E)	
			HMAC Key		(G, E)	
			SSH ECDH Public			
			Кеу		(G <i>,</i> E)	
			SSH DH Public Key			
Perform	Hardware	All (per Table 3)	SSH ECDH Private	Crypto	(Z)	Global
self-tests	reset or		Key,	Officer	(-)	Approved
(local	power cycle		SSH DH Private Key,	(CO),	(Z)	Mode
reset)			SSH Session Key,	User,	(Z)	indicator
			HMAC_DRBG Key	Unauth	(G, Z, E)	"fips" at the
				orised		CLI combined
			HMAC_DRBG V value		(G, Z, E)	with
			HMAC_DRBG		(G, Z, E)	successful
			entropy input		(0, 2, 1)	completion
			HMAC_DRBG seed		(G, Z, E)	of each
			HMAC_DRBG		(G, Z, E)	service
			output		(=)=)=)	
			ECDH Shared Secret		(Z)	
			DH Shared Secret		(Z)	
			HMAC Key		(G, Z, E)	
			SSH ECDH Public		(G <i>,</i> E)	
			Кеу			
			SSH DH Public Key		(G, E)	
Load	Verification	ECDSA (P-256,	N/A	Crypto	N/A	Global
Image	and loading of	SHA2-256, SigVer,		Officer		Approved
	a validated	CAVP Cert.		(CO)		Mode
	firmware	#A4301)				indicator
	image into					"fips" at the
	the					CLI
	router/switch.					combined
						with
						successful completion
						of each
						service

Table 8 – Approved Services

G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.

R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).

W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.

E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.

Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.

Service	Description	Algorithms Accessed	Role	Indicator
Configure	Security relevant	All (per Table 3)	Crypto	Lack of the global
security (security	configuration		Officer (CO)	Approved Mode
relevant)				indicator "fips" at
				the CLI combined
				with successful
				completion of the
				service
Configure (non-	Non-security relevant	N/A	Crypto	Lack of the global
security relevant)	configuration		Officer (CO)	Approved Mode
				indicator "fips" at
				the CLI combined
				with successful
				completion of the
				service
Show status	Query the module	N/A	Crypto	Lack of the global
	status		Officer (CO),	Approved Mode
			User	indicator "fips" at
				the CLI combined
				with successful
				completion of the
				service
Show status	LEDs on the module	N/A	Crypto	LED(s) on the
(LED)	provide physical		Officer (CO),	chassis turned on
	status output		User,	
			Unauthorised	
Show module's	Query the module's	N/A	Crypto	Lack of the global
versioning	versioning		Officer (CO),	Approved Mode
information	information		User	indicator "fips" at
				the CLI combined
				with successful
				completion of the
				service
Perform	Destroy all SSPs	N/A	Crypto	Lack of the global
zeroisation			Officer (CO)	Approved Mode
				indicator "fips" at
				the CLI combined
				with successful
				completion of the
				service
Perform	Initiate SSH	AES	Crypto	Lack of the global
approved	connection for SSH	(CBC, CTR, 128, 192 and 256	Officer (CO),	Approved Mode
security	monitoring and	bits);	User	indicator "fips" at
functions (SSH	control (CLI)	KAS-ECC-SSC		the CLI combined
connection)		(P-256, P-384, P-521);		with successful
		KAS-FFC-SSC		

Service	Description	Algorithms Accessed	Role	Indicator
		(MODP 2048)		completion of the
		RSA		service
		(2048 <i>,</i> 4096 bits);		
		ECDSA		
		(P-256);		
		HMAC		
		(SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-		
		512);		
		SHA		
		(SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-		
		512);		
		SSH KDF;		
		RSA (key size <= 2048);		
		ECDSA (ed25519 curve);		
		EC DH (ed25519 curve);		
		ARCFOUR ;		
		Blowfish;		
		CAST;		
		DSA (SignGen, SigVer, non-		
		compliant);		
		HMAC-MD5;		
		HMAC-RIPEMD160;		
		UMAC		
Console Access	Console monitoring	N/A	Crypto	Lack of the global
	and control (CLI)		Officer (CO),	Approved Mode
			User	indicator "fips" at
				the CLI combined
				with successful
				completion of the
				service
Perform self-	Software initiated	All (per Table 3)	Crypto	Lack of the global
tests (remote	reset, performs self-		Officer (CO),	Approved Mode
reset)	tests on demand		User	indicator "fips" at
				the CLI combined
				with successful
				completion of the
				service
Perform self-	Hardware reset or	All (per Table 3)	Crypto	Lack of the global
tests	power cycle		Officer (CO),	Approved Mode
(local reset)			User,	indicator "fips" at
			Unauthorised	the CLI combined
				with successful
				completion of the
				service

Service	Description	Algorithms Accessed	Role	Indicator
Load Image	Verification and loading of a validated firmware image into the router/switch.	ECDSA (P-256, SHA2-256)	Crypto Officer (CO)	Lack of the global Approved Mode indicator "fips" at the CLI combined with successful completion of the service

Table 9 – Non-Approved Services

5. Software/Firmware Security

The module performs the firmware integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256. The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by rebooting the module. The module firmware image is delivered in the form of a pre-compiled tarball (.tgz). The module supports loading of firmware from an external source and a firmware load test using ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 is performed in support of the load.

6. Operational Environment

The module contains a limited operational environment. The Junos OS 22.4R2.8 operating system is contained within the module, i.e., the tested configurations listed in Table 2 of this document. Security rules and restrictions for configuration of the operational environment have been specified in Section 2 (Overall Security Rules of Operation) and Section 11 (Installing The Firmware Image and Enabling the Approved Mode of Operation) of this document.

7. Physical Security

The module's physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone meeting Level 1 Physical Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated, cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. The module enclosure is made of production grade materials. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained within the cryptographic boundary. No actions are required by the operator to ensure that physical security is maintained.

8. Non-invasive Security

The module does not implement any non-invasive security mitigations and thus the requirements per this section do not apply to the module.

9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management

Key/SSP Name/ Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish - ment	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related keys
SSH Private Host Key CSP	128 bits for ECDSA, 112 bits for RSA	ECDSA (P-256, SHA2- 256, KeyGen, Cert. #A4301), RSA (2048 bits, SHA2- 256, SHA2- 512, KeyGen, Cert. #A4301), HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) HMAC (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) HMAC (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA	Generated internally using NIST SP 800- 90Ar1 HMAC_DR BG	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: Persistent	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding)	Host keypairs generated, used to identify the host
SSH ECDH Private Key CSP	128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits	KAS-ECC- SSC (P-256, P-384,	Generated internally using NIST SP 800- 90Ar1	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: RAM	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no-	Ephemeral EC Diffie- Hellman private key used in SSH

Key/SSP Name/ Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish - ment	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related keys
		P-512, Cert. #A4301), HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) HMAC (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, SHA2- 256, SHA2- 512, Cert. #A4301), CKG	HMAC_DR BG				forwarding), power- cycle	
SSH DH Private Key CSP	112 bits	KAS-FFC- SSC (MODP 2048, Cert. #A4301), HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) HMAC (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256,	Generated internally using NIST SP 800- 90Ar1 HMAC_DR BG	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: RAM	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding), power- cycle	Ephemeral Diffie- Hellman private key used in SSH

Key/SSP Name/ Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish - ment	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related keys
		SHA2- 512, Cert. #A4301), CKG						
SSH Session Key CSP	128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits	AES (CBC, CTR 128, 192, 256 bits, Cert. #A4301), KAS-ECC- SSC (P-256, P-384, P-512, Cert. #A4301), KAS-FFC- SSC (MODP 2048, Cert. #A4301), KDF SSH (Cert. #A4301), HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301), HMAC SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301), HMAC SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301), HMAC SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301), HMAC SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301), HMAC	N/A	Import: N/A Export: N/A	Key Agreeme nt Scheme (KAS), Derived using KDF SSH	Plaintext: RAM	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding), power- cycle, session terminatio n	SSH Session keys

Key/SSP Name/ Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish - ment	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related keys
		(SHA-1, SHA2- 256, SHA2- 512, Cert. #A4301), CKG						
User Password CSP	256 bits, 512 bits	SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4306, SHA2- 512, Cert. #A4306)	Password hash generated internally (Password is configured by the Crypto Officer)	Import: Manual entry via CLI, manual SSP entry test perfor med Export: N/A	N/A	Non- Plaintext: Persistent (Password Hash)	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding) and explicit delete command	Used to authentica te users to the module
CO Password CSP	256 bits, 512 bits	SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4306, SHA2- 512, Cert. #A4306)	Password hash generated internally (Password is configured by the Crypto Officer)	Import: Manual entry via CLI, manual SSP entry test perfor med Export: N/A	N/A	Non- plaintext: Persistent (Password Hash)	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding) and explicit delete command	Used to authentica te COs to the module
HMAC_DR BG V value CSP	256 bits	HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256), HMAC (SHA2- 256), SHA	Generated internally using NIST SP 800- 90Ar1 HMAC_DR BG	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: RAM	Power cycle	A critical value of the internal state of DRBG

Key/SSP Name/ Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish - ment	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related keys
		(SHA2- 256, CAVP Certs. A4303, A4301)						
HMAC_DR BG Key value CSP	256 bits	HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256), HMAC (SHA2- 256), SHA (SHA2- 256, CAVP Certs. A4303, A4301)	Generated internally using NIST SP 800- 90Ar1 HMAC_DR BG	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: RAM	Power cycle	A critical value of the internal state of DRBG
HMAC_DR BG entropy input CSP	256 bits	HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256), HMAC (SHA2- 256), SHA (SHA2- 256, CAVP Certs. A4303, A4301)	NIST SP 800-90B ENT (NP) entropy source	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: RAM	Power cycle	Entropy input to the HMAC_DR BG
HMAC_DR BG seed CSP	256 bits	HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256), HMAC (SHA2- 256), SHA	NIST SP 800-90B ENT (NP) entropy source	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: RAM	Power cycle	Seed provided to the HMAC_DR BG

Key/SSP Name/ Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish - ment	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related keys
HMAC_DR BG output CSP	256 bits	(SHA2- 256, CAVP Certs. A4303, A4301) HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256), HMAC (SHA2- 256), SHA (SHA2- 256), SHA (SHA2- 256, CAVP	Generated internally using NIST SP 800- 90Ar1 HMAC_DR BG	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: RAM	Power cycle	Unmodifie d output of the HMAC_DR BG used in SSP generation
ECDH Shared Secret CSP	128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits	Certs. A4303, A4301) KAS-ECC- SSC (P-256, P-384, P-521, Cert. #A4301)	N/A	Import: N/A Export: N/A	KAS-ECC- SSC Ephemer al Unified scheme	Plaintext: RAM	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding), power- cycle, session terminatio n	Used in EC Diffie- Hellman (ECDH) exchange
DH Shared Secret CSP	112 bits	KAS-FFC- SSC (MODP 2048, Cert. #A4301)	N/A	Import: N/A Export: N/A	KAS-FCC- SSC dhEphe meral scheme	Plaintext: RAM	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding), power- cycle,	Used in Diffie- Hellman (DH) exchange

Key/SSP Name/	Strength	Security Function	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish -	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related
Туре		and Cert. Number			ment			keys
							session	
							terminatio n	
HMAC Key	160 bits,	HMAC_D	Generated	Import:	N/A	Plaintext:	Zeroisation	HMAC Key
CSP	256 bits,	RBG	internally	N/A	,,,,	RAM	command	
	384 bits,	(HMAC-	using NIST				(request	
	512 bits	SHA2-	SP 800-				vmhost	
		256,	90Ar1	Export:			zeroise no-	
		CAVP Certs.	HMAC_DR BG	N/A			forwarding	
		A4303,	ЪG), power-	
		A4301),					cycle	
		HMAC					cycic	
		(SHA-1,						
		SHA2-						
		256,						
		SHA2-						
		512,						
		CAVP						
		Certs. #A4303,						
		#A4303, #A4301,						
		#A4306;						
		SHA2-						
		384,						
		CAVP						
		Certs.						
		#A4303);						
		SHA (SHA-1,						
		SHA-1,						
		256,						
		SHA2-						
		512,						
		CAVP						
		Certs.						
		#A4303,						
		#A4301,						
		#A4306; SHA2-						
		384,						
		CAVP						

Key/SSP Name/	Strength	Security Function	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish -	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related
Туре		and Cert. Number	ation	/ Export	ment		Isation	keys
		Certs. #A4303)						
SSH Public Host Key PSP	128 bits for ECDSA, 112 bits for RSA	ECDSA (P-256, SHA2- 256, KeyGen, Cert. #A4301), RSA (2048 bits, SHA2- 256, SHA2- 512, KeyGen, Cert. #A4301), HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) HMAC (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301)	Generated internally using NIST SP 800- 90Ar1 HMAC_DR BG	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: Persistent	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding)	Host keypairs generated, used to identify the host
User Authentica	128 bits,	ECDSA	N/A	Import:	N/A	Plaintext:	Zeroisation	Used to
tion Public Keys	192 bits, 256 bits	SigVer (P-256, P-384, P-		Entere d by the		Persistent	command (request vmhost	authentica te users to

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Key/SSP Name/ Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish - ment	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related keys
PSP	for ECDSA, 112 bits, 152 bits for RSA	521, Cert. #A4301); RSA SigVer (2048, 4096 bits, Cert. #A4301)		Crypto Officer Export: N/A			zeroise no- forwarding)	the module
CO Authentica tion Public Keys PSP	128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits for ECDSA, 112 bits, 152 bits for RSA	ECDSA SigVer (P-256, P-384, P- 521, Cert. #A4301); RSA SigVer (2048, 4096 bits, Cert. #A4301)	N/A	Import: Entere d by the Crypto Officer Export: N/A	NA	Plaintext: Persistent	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding)	Used to authentica te the CO to the module
JuniperRo otCA PSP	128 bits	ECDSA (P-256, Cert. #A4301)	N/A	Import: Loaded at manufa cture time Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: Persistent	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding)	ECDSA prime256v 1 X.509 V3 Certificate Used to verify the validity of the PackagCA
PackageCA PSP	128 bits	ECDSA (P-256, Cert. #A4301)	N/A	Import: Loaded at manufa cture time Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: Persistent	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding)	ECDSA prime256v 1 X.509 V3 Certificate that holds the public key for the signing key used to generate

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Key/SSP Name/ Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish - ment	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related keys
								all the signatures used on the packages and signature lists
SSH ECDH Public Key PSP	128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits	KAS-ECC- SSC (P-256, P-384, P-512, Cert. #A4301), HMAC_D RBG (HMAC- SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) HMAC (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301), CKG	Generated internally using NIST SP 800- 90Ar1 HMAC_DR BG	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: RAM	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding), power- cycle	Ephemeral EC Diffie- Hellman public key used in SSH
SSH DH Public Key PSP	112 bits	KAS-FFC- SSC (MODP 2048, Cert. #A4301),	Generated internally using NIST SP 800- 90Ar1 HMAC_DR	Import: N/A Export: N/A	N/A	Plaintext: RAM	Zeroisation command (request vmhost zeroise no- forwarding	Ephemeral Diffie- Hellman public key used in SSH
		HMAC_D RBG	BG), power- cycle	

Key/SSP Strength Name/ Type	Security Function and Cert. Number	Gener- ation	Import /Export	Establish - ment	Storage	Zero- isation	Use & related keys
	(HMAC- SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) HMAC (SHA2- 256, Cert. #A4301) SHA (SHA2- 256, SHA2- 256, SHA2- 512, Cert. #A4301), CKG						

Table 10 – SSPs

Entropy sources	Minimum number of bits of entropy	Details
SP 800-90B ENT (NP) ESV Cert. #E104	The module generates a minimum of 448 bits of overall entropy per 512-bit output sample, 0.875 bits of entropy per bit for SSP generation	Entropy input for seeding the approved NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBGs

Table 11 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

10. Self-tests

The module performs the following self-tests:

- <u>Pre-operational Self-Tests:</u>
 - Firmware Integrity Test: using ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256

• <u>Conditional Self-Tests:</u>

- Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CAST):
 - Kernel KATs (CAVP Cert. #A4303)
 - HMAC-SHA2-256 DRBG KAT
 - Generate, Instantiate and Reseed
 - HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
 - SHA2-384 KAT
 - SHA2-512 KAT
 - OpenSSL KATs (CAVP Cert. #A4301)
 - AES CBC 128 bits Encrypt KAT
 - AES CBC 192 bits Encrypt KAT
 - AES CBC 256 bits Encrypt KAT
 - AES CBC 128 bits Decrypt KAT
 - AES CBC 192 bits Decrypt KAT
 - AES CBC 256 bits Decrypt KAT
 - HMAC-SHA2-256 DRBG KAT
 - Generate, Instantiate and Reseed
 - HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
 - KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 KAT
 - KAS-ECC-SCC P-384 KAT
 - KAS-FFC-SSC MODP-2048 KAT
 - KDF SSH KAT
 - RSA 2048 bits SHA2-256 Sign KAT
 - RSA 2048 bits SHA2-256 Verify KAT
 - ECDSA P-256 Sig Gen KAT
 - ECDSA P-256 Sig Ver KAT
 - ECDSA P-384 Sig Gen KAT
 - ECDSA P-384 Sig Ver KAT
 - SHA2-384 KAT
 - LibMD KATs (CAVP Cert. #A4306)
 - HMAC-SHA-1
 - HMAC-SHA2-256
 - SHA2-512

- NIST SP 800-90B Repetitive Count Test (RCT)
- NIST SP 800-90B Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)
- Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA key pairs (for signature generation/verification and KAS-ECC SSP agreement)
- Pairwise consistency test when generating RSA key pairs (for signature generation/verification)
- Pairwise consistency test when generating DSA key pairs (for KAS-FFC SSP agreement)
- Firmware Load Test (ECDSA P-256 SHA2-256 signature verification)

Each time the module is powered up it tests that all the cryptographic algorithms operate correctly, and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Pre-operational as well as Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CAST) are performed on each power up/boot of the module and on demand by power cycling the module (Perform self-tests (remote reset) service). The module performs a CAST for ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 prior to executing the firmware integrity check on each boot.

The pre-operational firmware integrity test as well as all CASTs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module in the Approved mode of operation. These tests can also be performed periodically by rebooting the module. If the pre-operation firmware integrity test or if any of the CASTs fail, then the module returns the error indicator "FIPS error: self-test failure", inhibits all data output and enters the hard error state.

Conditional Self-Tests are performed by the module when the corresponding condition is met. The pairwise consistency tests are performed on key pair generation for use in signature generation/verification (ECDSA and/or RSA tests) and/or for use in KAS-ECC SSP agreement (ECDSA tests). The firmware load test is performed when a firmware image is loaded onto the module from an external source. If the conditional self-tests fail, the module enters the soft error state, i.e., it rejects the generated keypair/loaded image, returns an error indicator and resumes normal operation. The error indicator is the return code -1 in case of a pairwise consistency test failure and "ERROR: Failed signature check" for the firmware load test failure.

11. Life-cycle Assurance

The Crypto Officer must follow the procedures defined below for secure installation, initialization, startup and operation of the module.

Crypto Officer Guidance

The Crypto Officer must check to verify the firmware image being loaded on the module is the FIPS 140-3 validated version/image. If the image is the FIPS 140-3 validated image, then proceed with installation of the image.

Installing The Firmware Image

Download the validated firmware image from https://www.juniper.net/support/downloads/junos.html. Log in to the Juniper Networks authentication system using the username (generally your e-mail address) and password supplied by Juniper Networks representatives. Select the validated firmware image. Download the firmware image to a local host or to an internal software distribution site.

Connect to the console port on the device from your management device and log in to the Junos OS CLI. Copy the firmware package to the device to the /var/tmp/ directory. Install the new package on the device using the following command: operator@device> request vmhost software add /var/tmp/<package>.tgz.

NOTE: If you need to terminate the installation, do not reboot your device; instead, finish the installation and then issue the request system software delete *package*.tgz command, where *package*.tgz is, for example, junos-vmhost-install-ptx-x86-64-22.4R2.8.tgz.This is your last chance to stop the installation.

Reboot the device to complete the load and start the installation: operator@device> request vmhost reboot

After the reboot has completed, log in and use the show version command to verify that the new version of the firmware is successfully installed.

Also install the built-in fips-mode.tgz package needed for enabling the Approved-mode and the jpfe-fips package needed for execution of the CASTs. Please note that this is a one-time installation post which the module remains in the Approved mode once enabled and automatically executes the CASTs on each boot without requiring any operator or external intervention. The following are the commands used for installing these packages:

operator@device >request system software add optional://fips-mode.tgz

operator@device >request system software add optional://jpfe-fips.tgz

Enabling Approved Mode of Operation

The Crypto Officer is responsible for initializing the module in the Approved mode of operation. The Approved mode of operation is not automatically enabled. The Crypto Officer shall place the module in the Approved mode by first zeroising it to ensure no SSPs are present. Next, the cryptographic officer shall follow the steps found in the Junos OS FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for PTX1000, Release 22.4R2 document Chapter 2 to place the module into an Approved mode of operation. The steps from the aforementioned document have been reiterated below.

To enable the Approved mode in Junos OS on the module:

 Zeroise the module using the "request vmhost zeroize" command. Once the module comes up in the "amnesiac mode" post zeroisation, connect to it using the console port with username "root", enter the configuration mode and configure the root-authentication password (i.e., Crypto Officer credentials) as follows:

root@device> edit Entering configuration mode

[edit]

root@device# set system root-authentication plain-text-password New password:

Retype new password:

[edit]

root@device# commit configuration check succeeds commit complete

2. Enable Approved mode on the device by setting the Approved level to 1, and verify the level:

[edit]

root@device# set system fips level 1

[edit]

root@device# show system fips level
level 1;

4. Commit the configuration

[edit]

root@device# commit

configuration check succeeds

Generating RSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_key

Generating RSA2 key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_rsa_key

Generating ECDSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_ecdsa_key

'system' reboot is required to transition to fips level 1 commit complete

5. Reboot the device:

[edit]

root@device# run request system reboot

Reboot the system ? [yes,no] (no) yes

During the reboot, the device runs the pre-operational firmware integrity test and all CASTs. It returns a login prompt as follows: root@device:fips>

6. After the reboot has completed, log in and use the show version command to verify the firmware version is the validated version:

root@device:fips > show version

Placing the Module in the Non-Approved Mode of Operation

As Crypto Officer, the operator needs to disable the Approved mode of operation on the device to return it to the non-Approved mode of operation. To disable the Approved mode on the device, the module must be zeroised (step 1 defined above).

No other maintenance requirements apply for operation of the module in the Approved/non-Approved modes as defined above. For further information and for the Administrator and non-Administrator guidance, please see the Junos OS FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for PTX1000, Release 22.4R2 document.

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module does not implement any mitigation of other attacks and thus the requirements per this section do not apply to the module.