Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual (FMCv) Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation
Version 0.3
May 3, 2017
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3
1.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 4
2 CISCO FIREPOWER MANAGEMENT CENTER VIRTUAL ....................................... 5
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY............................................................................................. 6
2.2 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 6
2.3 ROLES AND SERVICES......................................................................................................... 7
2.4 USER SERVICES .................................................................................................................. 8
2.5 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES................................................................................................ 8
2.6 NON-FIPS MODE SERVICES ................................................................................................ 9
2.7 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICE ............................................................................................. 9
2.8 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT........................................................................ 9
2.9 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 12
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................................................................ 12
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ................................................................................................. 13
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 13
2.10 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 14
3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 14
3.1 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM INITIALIZATION/CONFIGURATION....................... 15
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 3
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is the non-proprietary Security Policy for Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual
(FMCv) Cryptographic Module running software version 6.1, referred to in this document as
Firepower Management Center Cryptographic Module. This security policy describes how this
module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and how to run the module in a
FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. This Security Policy may be freely distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 1
Table 1 Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals with the specification of the security rules listed in Table 1 above, under
which the Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual Cryptographic Module will operate,
including the rules derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-2IG and additional
rules imposed by Cisco Systems, Inc. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems security.
Please refer to the following website:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/firesight-management-center/index.html
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 4
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For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at www.cisco.com.
The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html)
contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual Cryptographic Module
identified is referred to as Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual Cryptographic Module,
FMC virtual module, FMCv, Module, virtual or the System.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual
Cryptographic Module identified in section 1.1 above and explains the secure layout,
configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2,
which details the general features and functionality of the appliance. Section 3 specifically
addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 5
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2 Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual
The Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual (FMCv) is a virtualized version of the
Firepower Management Center which provides complete and unified management over firewalls,
application control, intrusion prevention, URL filtering, and advanced malware protection, easily
go from managing a firewall to controlling applications to investigating and remediating
malware outbreaks.
The Cisco Firepower Management Center Virtual (FMCv now becomes the centralized point for
event and policy management as does the Cisco Firepower Management Center for the following
solutions:
● Cisco Firepower Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW)
● Cisco ASA with FirePOWER Services
● Cisco Firepower Next-Generation IPS (NGIPS)
● Cisco FirePOWER Threat Defense for ISR
● Cisco Advanced Malware Protection (AMP)
The FMCv also controls the network management features on devices: switching, routing and
NAT. While Firepower Management Center Virtual Cryptographic Module provides
cryptographic functionality and services to TLSv1.2 and SSHv2.
For the purposes of this validation, the module was tested in the lab on the following operational
environments:
Platform Hypervisor Processor
Cisco C220 M3 VMware ESXi 5.5 Intel Xeon
Table 2 Testing Configuration
The following Cisco UCS platforms are Vendor affirmed:
B22 M3 B420 M3 C22 M3 C260 M2 E140S M1 E140DP M1
B200 M3 B440 M2 C24 M3 C420 M3 E140S M2 E160DP M1
B200 M4 B260 M4 C220 M4 C460 M2 E140D M1 EN120E
B230 M2 B460 M4 C240 M3 C460 M4 E160D M2 EN120SM2
C240 M4 E160D M1
The following Hypervisors with varying versions work with the FMCv and are Vendor affirmed:
KVM
AWS
Oracle VM
VMware ESXi
ENCS/NFVIS
Additionally, the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the
security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not
listed on the validation certificate.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 6
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2.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic module is defined as a multi-chip standalone software module, FMC virtual
module (red dash box), while the physical boundary is defined as the hard case enclosure around
the Server on which everything runs. Then the logical boundary is the FMC virtual module,
hypervisor, API and processor (red box).
Diagram 1 Block Diagram
2.2 Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The module provides
Physical Boundary
Firepower
Management
Center
Virtual
API
FOM
API Hypervisor
Processor
Host
Applications
Comm Ports
Host OS
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no power to external devices and takes in its power through normal power input/cord. The
logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table:
Physical Port/Interface ASA Virtual FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Data Input Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Data Output Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Control Input Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000)
Ports; Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports,
Virtual Serial Port
Status Output Interface
Table 2 Hardware/Physical Boundary Interfaces
2.3 Roles and Services
The appliances can be accessed in one of the following ways:
• SSH v2
• HTTPS/TLS
Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated by the module upon initial access to
the module. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles in the security appliances that
operators may assume: Crypto Officer role and User role. The administrator of the security
appliances assumes the Crypto Officer role in order to configure and maintain the module using
Crypto Officer services, while the Users exercise only the basic User services.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at a minimum eight
(8) characters long. There must be at least one special character and at least one number
character (enforced procedurally) along with six additional characters taken from the 26 upper
case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special characters. See the Secure Operation section for
more information. If six (6) special/alpha/number characters, one (1) special character and one
(1) number are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit value, the probability of randomly
guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 187,595,543,116,800. This is calculated by
performing 94 x 93 x 92 x 91 x 90 x 89 x 32 x 10. In order to successfully guess the sequence in
one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280 guesses per second, which
far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module.
Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048 bits,
thus providing 112 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, an attacker would have a
1 in 2112
chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million
chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random
key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65x1031
attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module to support.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 8
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2.4 User Services
A User enters the system by accessing the console port using either Serial Console, SSH or
HTTPS/TLS. The module prompts the User for username and password. If the password is
correct, the User is allowed entry to the module management functionality. The other means of
accessing the console is via an HTTPS/TLS session. This session is authenticated using RSA
digital signature authentication mechanism. The services available to the User role accessing the
CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses
the CSPs are listed below:
Services Description Keys/CSPs Access
Status Functions View state of interfaces and protocols, version of FMCv Operator password (r, w, d)
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal,
adjust flow control).
Operator password (r, w, d)
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory. Operator password (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
SSH Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSH. Operator password, DH private DH public key, DH
Shared Secret, ECDH private ECDH public key,
ECDH Shared Secret, SSH RSA private key, SSH
RSA public key, SSH session key, DRBG Seed,
DRBG entropy input, DRBG V, DRBG Key (r, w, d)
HTTPS Functions (TLS) Negotiation and encrypted data transport via HTTPS ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA
private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master
secret, TLS traffic keys DRBG entropy input, DRBG
Seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key (r, w, d)
Table 3 User Services
2.5 Crypto Officer Services
The Crypto Officer (CO) role is responsible for the configuration and maintenance of the
security. The services available to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access
– read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services Description Keys/CSPs Access
Configure the Security Define network interfaces and settings, create command aliases, set
the protocols the module will support, enable interfaces and network
services, set system date and time, and load authentication
information.
ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS
RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS
pre-master secret, TLS traffic keys, DRBG
Seed, DRBG entropy input, DRBG V, DRBG
Key (r, w, d)
Define Rules and Filters Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams on each
interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which define a set of
packets to permit or deny based on characteristics such as protocol
ID, addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or packet
direction.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
View Status Functions View the module configuration, routing tables, active sessions
health, temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics, review
accounting logs, and view physical interface status.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
HTTPS/TLS (TLS v1.2) Configure HTTPS/TLS parameters, provide entry and output of
CSPs.
ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS
RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS
pre-master secret, TLS traffic keys, DRBG
entropy input, DRBG Seed, DRBG V, DRBG
Key (r, w, d)
SSH v2 Configure SSH v2 parameter, provide entry and output of CSPs. DH private DH public key, DH Shared Secret,
ECDH private ECDH public key, ECDH Shared
Secret, SSH RSA private key, SSH RSA public
key, SSH session key, DRBG entropy input,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand
N/A
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User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services.
Operator password (r, w, d)
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the zeroization
methods classified in table 7, Zeroization column. All CSPs (d)
Table 4 Crypto Officer Services
2.6 Non-FIPS mode Services
The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in
a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the
associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-
approved key sizes, a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with
their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved
algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior
to using any of the Non-Approved services in Section 2.7, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all
CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.
Services 1
Non-Approved Algorithms
SSH
Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Table 5 Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in
FIPS mode of operation.
All services available can be found at
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/60/configuration/guide/fpmc-config-
guide-v60.pdf. This site lists all configuration guides.
2.7 Unauthenticated Service
The only service available to someone without an authorized role is to cycle the power.
2.8 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the
Crypto Officer role login, and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of
overwriting the memory that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory. Keys are both
manually and electronically distributed but entered electronically. Persistent keys with manual
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or
curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 10
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distribution are used for pre-shared keys whereas protocols such as TLS and SSH are used for
electronic distribution.
All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is
protected by a password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the password. The
Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. Only an authenticated Crypto Officer can
view the keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH)/ECDH keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are
directly associated with that specific tunnel. RSA public keys are entered into the modules using
digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name of the public key's owner, which
associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are associated with the user/role that
entered them. The /dev/urandom device extracts bits from the urandom pool. This output is used
directly to seed the NIST SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG entropy
input
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bits This is the entropy for SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG. Software based
entropy source used to construct
seed.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Seed SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bits Input to the DRBG that determines
the internal state of the DRBG.
Generated using DRBG derivation
function that includes the entropy
input from software-based entropy
source.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG V SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
128-bits The DRBG V is one of the critical
values of the internal state upon
which the security of this DRBG
mechanism depends. Generated
first during DRBG instantiation
and then subsequently updated
using the DRBG update function.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Key SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits Internal critical value used as part
of SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.
Established per SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
DH 2048, 3072,
4096 bits
The shared secret used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange.
Established per the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
private key
DH 224, 256, or
379 bits
The private key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key
is generated by calling SP800-90A
DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
public key
DH 2048, 3072,
4096 bits
The public key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
is derived per the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement.
EC Diffie-
Hellman Shared
Secret
EC DH Curves:
P-256, P-384,
P-521
The shared secret used in Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
exchange. Established per the
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie
Hellman private
key
EC DH Curves:
P-256, P-384,
P-521
The private key used in EC Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key
is generated by calling SP800-90A
DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie
Hellman public
key
EC DH Curves:
P-256, P-384,
P-521
The public key used in Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
exchange. This key is established
per the EC Diffie-Hellman key
agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Operator
password
Password 8 plus
characters
The password of the User role.
This CSP is entered by the User.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
Enable
password
Password 8 plus
characters
The password of the CO role. This
CSP is entered by the Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
SSHv2 RSA
Private Key
RSA 2048 bits The SSHv2 private key used in
SSHv2 connection. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-90A
DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH session
is terminated
SSHv2 RSA
Public Key
RSA 2048 bits The SSHv2 public key used in
SSHv2 connection. This key is
internally generated by the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH session
is terminated
SSHv2 Session
Key
Triple-DES/AES 192 bits
Triple-DES
or
128/192/256
bits AES
This is the SSHv2 session key. It is
used to encrypt all SSHv2 data
traffics traversing between the
SSHv2 Client and SSHv2 Server.
This key is derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (SSH).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH session
is terminated
ECDSA private
key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256, P-384,
P-521
Key pair generation, signature
generation/Verification. Used in
HTTPS connections. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-90A
DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
ECDSA public ECDSA Curves: Key pair generation, signature DRAM Automatically
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 12
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
key P-256, P-384,
P-521
generation/Verification. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-90A
DRBG.
(plaintext) when TLS session
is terminated
TLS RSA
private key
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the security
appliance itself and also used in
TLS negotiations. This key was
generated by calling FIPS
approved DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
TLS RSA
public key
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the security
appliance itself and also used in
TLS negotiations. This key was
generated by calling FIPS
approved DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
TLS pre-master
secret
Shared Secret At least eight
characters
Shared secret created/derived using
asymmetric cryptography from
which new HTTPS session keys
can be created. This key entered
into the module in cipher text form,
encrypted by RSA public key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
TLS traffic keys Triple-
DES/AES/AES-
GCM128/192/256
HMAC-
SHA1/256/384/512
192 bits
Triple-DES
or
128/192/256
bits AES
Used in HTTPS connections.
Generated using TLS protocol.
This key was derived in the
module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS session
is terminated
Integrity test
key
HMAC SHA-512 512 bits A hard coded key used for
software power-up/load integrity
verification.
Hard coded for
software
integrity
testing
Zeroized by erase
flash (or replacing),
write to startup
config, followed by
a module reboot
Table 6 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
2.9 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Algorithms Algorithm Implementations
FMC FOM Virtual
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 4411
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2377
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3637
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) 2932
RSA (PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; 2048 bits) 2397
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ECDSA (KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; P-256, P-384, P-521) 1063
DRBG (AES256_CTR) 1425
CVL Component (TLS, SSH) 1117
Table 7 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
Note:
 The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS. The module uses basically a 96-bit IV, which is comprised of a 4 byte salt
unique to the crypto session and 8 byte monotonically increasing counter. The module
generates new AES-GCM keys if the module loses power.
 There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module.
Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown
in this table.
 The SSH and TLS protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112
and 150 bits of encryption strength)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 128
and 256 bits of encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 of encryption strength)
 NDRNG
 HMAC MD5 is allowed in FIPS mode strictly for TLS
 MD5 is allowed in FIPS mode strictly for TLS
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
 DES
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 HMAC MD5
 HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
 MD5
 RC4
 RSA (key wrapping; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
Note: The non-approved algorithms HMAC MD5 and MD5 are not allowed in FIPS mode when
not used with TLS.
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2.10 Self-Tests
The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are
functioning correctly.
Self-tests performed
 POST tests
o AES Known Answer Tests (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o AES-GCM Known Answer Tests (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o DRBG Known Answer Test (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-
90A Section 11.3 are performed)
o FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Sign/Verify Test
o HMAC Known Answer Tests
 HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA256 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA384 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA512 Known Answer Test
o FIPS 186-4 RSA Known Answer Tests (Separate KAT for signing; Separate KAT
for verification)
o SHA-1 Known Answer Test
o Software Integrity Test (HMAC-SHA512)
o Triple-DES Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
 Conditional tests
 RSA pairwise consistency test
 ECDSA pairwise consistency test
 CRNGT for SP800-90A DRBG
 CRNGT for NDRNG
The security appliances perform all power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied.
All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The
power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the
initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the security module from passing any data
during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error
message is displayed on the console followed by a security module reboot.
3 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to
authorized operators by the vendor, and the module is shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco
adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting instructions provided
below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining
the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 15
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3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization/Configuration
The Cisco Firepower Cryptographic Module version 6.1 was validated with Cisco Firepower
Management Center. The software installation version 6.1.0. with the patch file Patch-6.1.0.1-
53.sh were used in FIPS validation testing.
The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following steps:
Step 1: For all Management Centers, the setup process must be completed by logging into the
Management Center’s web interface and specifying initial configuration options on a setup page.
The administrator password must be changed, specifying network settings if not already
completed, and accepting the EULA.
Log in using admin as the username and Admin123 as the password. Change the password - use
a strong password that is at least eight alphanumeric characters of mixed case and includes at
least one numeric character. Avoid using words that appear in a dictionary.
After completing the initial setup, the only user on the system is the admin user, which has the
Administrator role and access.
Step 2: Choose System > Configuration (Choose SSH or HTTPS or a combination of these options to
specify which ports you want to enable for these IP addresses). For more details, see
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/620/configuration/guide/fpmc-config-
guide-v62/system_configuration.html#ID-2241-00000370
Step 3: System>Licenses>Smart Licenses, add and verify licenses (Firepower Management
Center Configuration Guide provides more detailed information)
Install Triple-DES/AES SMART license to use Triple-DES and AES (for data traffic and SSH).
Step 4: System > Configuration; Devices > Platform Settings; STIG Compliance, choose Enable
STIG Compliance; Click on save.
Step 5: Reboot the security appliances.