Trellix FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Trellix FIPS Provider
Version: 3.0.0a
Date: 30 March 2023
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Modification History
Version Description Release Date
1.0 Initial Draft 30 March, 2023
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Table of Contents
FIPS 140-2 Overview ................................................................................................................................... 5
1. Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 6
1.1 Scope........................................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Module Overview........................................................................................................................ 6
1.3 Module Boundary ....................................................................................................................... 7
2. Security Level...................................................................................................................................... 8
3. Tested Configurations......................................................................................................................... 9
4. Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................................................................... 10
5. Roles, Services and Authentication................................................................................................... 11
5.1 Roles.......................................................................................................................................... 11
5.2 Services ..................................................................................................................................... 11
6. Physical Security ............................................................................................................................... 14
7. Operational Environment ................................................................................................................. 15
8. Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management ............................................................................. 16
8.1 Cryptographic Algorithms ......................................................................................................... 16
8.2 Critical Security Parameters (CSP’s) and Public Keys................................................................. 23
8.3 Key Generation and Entropy ..................................................................................................... 25
9. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ....................................... 26
10. Self-tests ........................................................................................................................................... 27
10.1 Power-On Self-Tests.................................................................................................................. 27
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests................................................................................................................ 28
10.3 Assurances ................................................................................................................................ 28
10.4 Critical Function Tests ............................................................................................................... 28
11. Mitigation of Other Attacks .............................................................................................................. 29
12. Crypto Officer and User Guidance .................................................................................................... 30
12.1 AES-GCM Usage ........................................................................................................................ 30
12.2 Triple-DES Usage....................................................................................................................... 30
12.3 Miscellaneous ........................................................................................................................... 30
Appendix A: Installation and Usage Guidance .......................................................................................... 31
Appendix B: Compilers.............................................................................................................................. 33
Appendix C: Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 34
Appendix D: Table of References.............................................................................................................. 36
Appendix E: Trademarks ........................................................................................................................... 38
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Security Levels for each FIPS 140-2 Area..................................................................................... 8
Table 2 – Tested Configurations ................................................................................................................. 9
Table 3 – Physical Port and Logical Interface Mapping............................................................................. 10
Table 4 – Approved Services and Role Allocation ..................................................................................... 13
Table 5 – FIPS Approved Algorithms......................................................................................................... 22
Table 6 – Allowed Algorithms ................................................................................................................... 23
Table 7 – Critical Security Parameters ...................................................................................................... 24
Table 8 – Public Keys................................................................................................................................. 24
Table 9 – Power On Self-Tests .................................................................................................................. 28
Table 10 – Conditional Tests..................................................................................................................... 28
Table 11 – Assurances............................................................................................................................... 28
Table 12 – Compilers Used for Each Operational Environment ................................................................ 33
Table 13 – Glossary of Terms.................................................................................................................... 35
Table 14 – Standards and Publications Referenced within this Security Policy......................................... 37
Table 15 – Trademarks Referenced within this Security Policy................................................................. 38
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Module Block Diagram ............................................................................................................... 7
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FIPS 140-2 Overview
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified
environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140 program. NVLAP
accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140-2 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting
FIPS 140-2 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the
FIPS 140-2 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html
About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Trellix FIPS Provider module from Trellix
provides an overview and a high-level description of how it meets the overall Level 1 security
requirements of FIPS 140-2.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Scope
This document describes the non-proprietary cryptographic module security policy for the Trellix FIPS
Provider module, hereafter referred to as “the Module.” It contains specification of the security rules,
under which the cryptographic module operates, including the security rules derived from the
requirements of the FIPS 140-2 standard.
1.2 Module Overview
The Trellix FIPS Provider is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API)
for use by applications using OpenSSL that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified
under FIPS 140-2 as a software module, with a multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The physical
cryptographic boundary is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.
The logical cryptographic boundary of the Module is the FIPS Provider, a dynamically loadable library. The
Module performs no communication other than with the calling application via APIs that invoke the
Module.
The module implements both an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. Use of the Approved
algorithms listed in table 7 and allowed algorithms listed in table 8 will place the module in the Approved
mode of operation. Use of the non-Approved algorithms listed in table 9 will place the module in the non-
Approved mode of operation.
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1.3 Module Boundary
The following block diagram details the Module’s physical and logical boundaries.
Figure 1 – Module Block Diagram
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2. Security Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirement Areas Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Overall Level 1
Table 1 – Security Levels for each FIPS 140-2 Area
The Module meets the overall security level requirements of Level 1. The Module’s software version for
this validation is 3.0.0a.
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3. Tested Configurations
The Module has been tested on the platforms listed below in Table 2.
# Operating System/Hypervisor Hardware
Platform
Processor Optimizations
(Target)
1 Photon OS 4.0 on ESXi 7.0 Dell PowerEdge
R740
Intel Xeon Gold
6230R (x64)
PAA (AES-NI)
2 Windows Server 2019 on ESXi 7.0 Dell PowerEdge
R740
Intel Xeon Gold
6230R (x64)
PAA (AES-NI)
3 Oracle Solaris 11.4 Oracle SPARC
T8-1
Oracle SPARC
M8-1 (x64)
PAA (SPARC)
4 Ubuntu Linux 20.04.1 Server Dell Inspiron
7573
Intel i7 (x64) PAA (AES-NI)
5 Windows 10 Dell Inspiron
7591
Intel i7 (x64) PAA (AES-NI)
6 FreeBSD stable/13 NetApp HCI
H700E
Intel Xeon E5-
2695v4
(Broadwell)
(x64)
PAA (AES-NI)
7 Debian 10 Fujitsu CX400
Blade
Intel Xeon Silver
4116 (Cascade
Lake) (x64)
PAA (AES-NI)
8 Custom Ubuntu Linux 18.04 Akamai X8
system
Intel Xeon
D1541 (x64)
PAA (AES-NI)
9 macOS 11.5.2 Apple M1 Mac
Mini
M1 None
10 macOS 11.5.2 Apple M1 Mac
Mini
M1 PAA (AES-NI)
11 macOS 11.5.2 Apple i5 Mac
Mini
Intel i7 None
12 macOS 11.5.2 Apple i5 Mac
Mini
Intel i7 PAA (AES-NI)
Table 2 – Tested Configurations
See Appendix A for additional information on installation. See Appendix B for a list of the specific compilers
used to generate the Module for the respective operational environments.
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4. Ports and Interfaces
The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is executing. The logical
interface is a C-language application program interface (API), the mapping of which is described in the
following table:
Logical Interface Type Description
Data Input API entry point data input stack parameters
Data Output API entry point data output stack parameters
Control Input API entry point and corresponding stack parameters
Status Output API entry point return values and status stack parameters
Table 3 – Physical Port and Logical Interface Mapping
As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the module
is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output interface is inhibited.
In error scenarios, the module returns only an error value (no data output is returned).
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5. Roles, Services and Authentication
5.1 Roles
The Module implements both a User Role (User) as well as the Crypto Officer (CO) role. The Module does
not support authentication and does not allow concurrent operators. The User and Crypto Officer roles
are implicitly assumed by the application accessing services implemented by the Module.
5.2 Services
All the services provided by the module can be accessed by both the User and the Crypto Officer roles.
The User Role (User) can load the Module and call any of the API functions. The Crypto Officer Role (CO)
is responsible for installation of the Module on the host computer system and calling of any API
functions. The module provides the following Approved services which utilize algorithms listed in Tables
6 and 7:
Service
Roles
(User/CO)
Description
Initialize X Module initialization. Does not access CSPs.
Self-Test X
Perform POST self-tests (SELF_TEST_post( )) on demand.
Does not access CSPs.
Show Status X
• The Module’s status can be verified by querying the “status”
parameter.
Does not access CSPs.
CSP/Key Zeroization X
All services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory.
Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application.
Random Number
Generation
X
Used for random number and symmetric key generation.
• Seed or reseed a DRBG instance
• Determine security strength of a DRBG instance
• Obtain random data
Uses and updates Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG
CSPs
Asymmetric Key
Generation
X
Used to generate DSA, ECDSA, RSA, DH, ECDH, X25519 and X448 keys:
• RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK; DH
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Service
Roles
(User/CO)
Description
Private, DH Public, ECDH Private, ECDH Public; X25519 Private,
X25519 Public, X448 Private and X448 Public keys
There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism and
algorithm type, the maximum specified in SP 800-90Ar1
Key Derivation X
Used to derive keys using KBKDF, PBKDF2, HKDF, SP 800-56Cr2 One-
Step KDF (KDA), SP 800-135 TLS 1.2, SSHv2, ANSI X9.6-2001, ANSI
X9.42-2001 KDFs and TLS 1.3 KDF.
Symmetric
Encrypt/Decrypt
X
Used to encrypt or decrypt data. Executes using AES EDK, TDES EDK
(passed in by the calling application).
Symmetric Digest X
Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC. Executes using
AES CMAC Key (passed in by the calling application).
Message Digest X
Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 message digest.
Does not access CSPs
Keyed Hash X
Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC or KMAC.
Executes using HMAC or KMAC Key (passed in by the calling
application)
Key Transport X
Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling
application (does not establish keys into the module).
Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling application).
Key Wrapping X
Used to encrypt a key value on behalf of the calling application
Executes using AES Key Wrapping Key (passed in by the calling
application).
Key Agreement X
Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling
application (does not establish keys into the module).
Executes using DH Private, DH Public, EC DH Private, EC DH Public,
X25519 Private, X25519 Public, X448 Private and X448 Public, RSA SGK,
RSA SVK (passed in by the calling application).
Digital Signature X Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA, ECDSA digital signatures.
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Service
Roles
(User/CO)
Description
Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK,
ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling application).
Utility X
Miscellaneous helper functions.
Does not access CSPs.
Table 4 – Approved Services and Role Allocation
The module provides the following non-Approved services which utilize algorithms listed in Table 5:
Service
Roles
(User/CO)
Description
Digital Signature X
Used to generate or verify Ed25519 or Ed448 digital signatures.
Table 5 - Non-Approved Services and Role Allocation
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6. Physical Security
The physical boundary of the Module is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.
The Module meets all physical security requirements of a Security Level 1 software module under FIPS
140-2 requirements.
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7. Operational Environment
The tested operating systems, listed in Table 2, segregate applications into separate spaces. Each
application space is logically separated from all other applications by the operating system software and
hardware. The Module functions entirely within the operating system provided space for the calling
application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single-user mode of operation.
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8. Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management
8.1 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements the following Approved algorithms:
CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Sizes/Curves Mode/Method Use
A1938 AES
[FIPS 197]
SP 800-38A
128, 192, 256 bits
ECB, CBC,CBC-CS1,
CS2, CS3, OFB, CFB 1,
CFB 8, CFB 128, CTR
Encryption,
Decryption and
CMAC
Generate/Verify
SP 800-38B CMAC
SP 800-38C CCM
SP 800-38D GCM, GMAC
SP 800-38F KW, KWP (cipher,
inverse)
SP 800-38E 128, 256 bits XTS
A1938 Triple-DES SP 800-
67r2
3-Key TDES ECB, CBC Encryption,
Decryption
A1938 DSA FIPS 186-4 L = 2048, N = 224
L = 2048, N = 256
L = 3072, N = 256
Key Pair Gen Digital Signature
and Asymmetric Key
Generation
L = 2048, N = 224
L = 2048, N = 256
L = 3072, N = 256
PQG Gen
Sig Gen
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CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Sizes/Curves Mode/Method Use
with all SHA-2 sizes
L = 1024, N = 160
L = 2048, N = 224
L = 2048, N = 256
L = 3072, N = 256
with all SHA sizes
PQG Ver
Sig Ver
A1938 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 P-224, 256, 384, 521
K-233, 283, 409, 571
B-233, 283, 409, 571
Testing Candidates
Key Gen Digital Signature
and Asymmetric Key
Generation
P-192, P-224, 256, 384, 521
K-163, 233, 283, 409, 571
B-163, 233, 283, 409, 571
PKV
P-224, 256,
384, 521
SHA2-224,
256, 384,
512,
512/224,
512/256
SigGen
K-233, 283,
409, 571
B-233, 283,
409, 571
P-192, 224,
256, 384,
521
SHA-1,
SHA2-224,
256, 384,
512,
512/224,
512/256
SigVer
K-163, 233,
283, 409,
571
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CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Sizes/Curves Mode/Method Use
B-163, 233,
283, 409,
571
A1938 CVL FIPS 186-4 ECDSA SigGen Component SHA2-224, 256, 384,
512, 512/224,
512/256 with P-224,
256, 384, 521, K-233,
283, 409, 571, B-233,
283, 409, 571
Digital Signature
Generation
A1938 RSA FIPS 186-4 2048, 3072, 4096 Gen Key 9.31 Digital Signature
and Asymmetric Key
Generation
1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
(SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512,
512/224, 512/256)
Sig Ver 9.31
2048, 3072, 4096
(SHA-1, 256, 384, 512)
Sig Gen 9.31
2048, 3072, 4096
(SHA-224, 256, 384, 512)
Sig Gen PKCS 1.5
1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
(SHA-1, SHA-224, 256, 384,
512, 512/224, 512/256)
Sig Ver PKCS 1.5
2048, 3072
(SHA-224, 256, 384, 512,
512/224, 512/256)
Sig Gen PSS
4096
(SHA-224, 256, 384, 512)
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CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Sizes/Curves Mode/Method Use
1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
(SHA-1, SHA-224, 256, 384,
512, 512/224, 512/256)
Sig Ver PSS
A1938 CVL FIPS 186-4 RSASP1 (mod 2048) Signature
Generation
Primitive
A1938 KAS-FFC-SSC SP 800-
56Ar3
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144,
ffdhe8192 safe prime
groups per SP 800-56Ar3
dhEphem
Domain Parameter
Generation
Domain Parameter
Validation
Key Pair Generation
Full Public Key
Validation
Partial Public Key
Validation
Key Agreement
KAS-ECC-SSC All P, B, K curves (per
Appendix D of SP 800-
56Ar3) with all SHA sizes
Ephemeral Unified
Domain Parameter
Generation
Domain Parameter
Validation
Key Pair Generation
Full Public Key
Validation
A1938 KAS-RSA-SSC SP 800-
56Br2
2048, 3072, 4096, 6144,
8192 with SHA2-224, 256,
384, 512, 512/224,
512/256, SHA-3-224, 256,
384, 512
KAS1, KAS2
Key Generation
Methods:
rsakpg1-crt,
rsakpg2-crt,
rsakpg1-basic,
Key Agreement
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CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Sizes/Curves Mode/Method Use
rsakpg2-basic,
rsakpg1-prime-factor,
rsakpg2-prime-factor
A1938 CVL SP 800-
56Ar3
KAS ECC CDH with P-224, 256, 384, 521 , K-233, 283,
409, 571, B-233, 283, 409, 571
Section 5.7.1.2 ECC
CDH Primitive used
in Shared Secret
Computation
N/A KTS SP 800-38F KTS (AES Cert. # A1938; key
establishment methodology
provides between 128 and
256 bits of encryption
strength)
AES KW, KWP
AES CCM
AES GCM
Key Transport
KTS (AES Cert. #A1938 and
HMAC Cert. #A1938; key
establishment methodology
provides between 128 and
256 bits of encryption
strength)
AES (any mode) and
HMAC
KTS (AES Cert. #A1938 and
AES Cert. #A1938; key
establishment methodology
provides between 128 and
256 bits of encryption
strength)
AES (any mode) and
CMAC, GMAC
KTS (Triple-DES Cert.
#A1938 and HMAC Cert.
#A1938; key establishment
methodology provides 112
bits of encryption strength)
Triple-DES (ECB, CBC)
and HMAC
A1938 KTS-RSA SP 800-
56Br2
2048, 3072, 4096
KTS-RSA (#A1938; key
establishment methodology
provides between 112 and
128 bits of encryption
strength)
RSA-OAEP,
RSADP,
RSAEP
Key Transport
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CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Sizes/Curves Mode/Method Use
A1938 KDA SP 800-
56Cr2
One-Step KDF (Section 4), Two Step KDF (Section 5) Key Derivation
Function
A1938 HKDF SP 800-
56Cr2
HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
Function
Key Derivation
Function
A1938 PBKDF2 SP 800-132 HMAC-SHA-1, SHA2-224,
256, 384, 512, 512/224,
512/256
(C = 1 – 10,000, sLen = 16 -
512 bytes)
Option 1a Password Based Key
Derivation
A1938 KBKDF SP 800-108 CMAC AES128, CMAC
AES192, CMAC AES256,
HMAC-SHA-1, SHA2-224,
256, 384, 512
Counter, Feedback Key-Based Key
Derivation Function
A1938 CVL SP 800-135 TLS 1.2 KDF (SHA2-256, 384, 512), SSHv2 KDF (SHA-1,
SHA2-224, 256, 384, 512), ANSI X9.63-2001 KDF
(SHA2-224, 256, 384, 512), ANSI X9.42-2001 KDF
(SHA-1, SHA2-224, 256, 384, 512, 512/224, 512/256,
SHA3-224, 256, 384, 512)
Key Derivation
Function
A1938 CVL RFC 8446
(Section
7.1)
TLS 1.3 KDF (SHA2-256, 384) Key Derivation
Function
A1938 SHA-3,
SHAKE
FIPS 202 SHA3-224, 256, 384, 512
SHAKE-128, 256
SHA-3 Message Digests
A1938 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1
SHA2- 224, 256, 384, 512,
512/224, 512/256
SHA-1
SHA-2
Message Digests
A1938 HMAC FIPS 198-1 SHA-1
SHA2-224, 256, 384, 512,
512/224, 512/256
SHA-1
SHA-2
Keyed Hash
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CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Sizes/Curves Mode/Method Use
SHA3-224, 256, 384, 512 SHA-3
A1938 KMAC SP 800-185 KMAC-128
KMAC-256
Keyed Hash
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG SP 800-
133r2
Cryptographic Key Generation Key Generation
Section 4 (Using the
Output of a Random
Bit Generator),
Section 6.1 (Direct
Generation of
Symmetric Keys)
and
Section 6.2
(Derivation of
Symmetric Keys)
A1938 DRBG SP 800-90A SHA-1
SHA2-224, 256, 384, 512,
512/224, 512/256
SHA3-224, 256, 384, 512
Hash DRBG Random Number
Generation;
Symmetric Key
Generation
SHA-1
SHA2-224, 256, 384, 512,
512/224, 512/256
SHA3-224, 256, 384, 512
HMAC DRBG
AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 CTR DRBG
Table 6 – FIPS Approved Algorithms
The Module is designed with a default entry point (DEP) which ensures that the power-up tests are
initiated automatically when the Module is loaded per requirements in IG 9.10. The power-on self-tests
run during the call to the Module’s OSSL_provider_init() entry point.
The Module is a cryptographic library, which can be used only in conjunction with additional software.
The module implements the following Allowed algorithms:
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Algorithm Use
X25519
(curve25519 with 128 bits of
security strength)
Key Agreement
X448
(curve448 with 224 bits of
security strength)
Key Agreement
Table 7 – Allowed Algorithms
The module implements the following non-Approved algorithms:
Algorithm Use
Ed448 Digital Signature Generation
Ed25519 Digital Signature Generation
Table 8 – Non-Approved Algorithms
These algorithms shall not be used when operating in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. Use of the non-
Approved algorithms listed in the table above will place the module in the non-Approved mode of operation.
8.2 Critical Security Parameters (CSP’s) and Public Keys
The Module supports the following CSPs listed below in Table 7. The CSP access policy is denoted in
Table 4 above.
Keys or CSP Name Description
RSA SGK RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature generation key
RSA KDK RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key decryption (private key transport) key
DSA SGK DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key
ECDSA SGK ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) signature generation key
DH Private DH (256-512 bits) private key agreement key
EC DH Private EC DH (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) private key agreement key
X25519 Private X25519 private key agreement key
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Keys or CSP Name Description
X448 Private X448 private key agreement key
AES EDK AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key
AES CMAC AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key
AES GCM AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key
AES XTS AES (128/256) XTS encrypt / decrypt key
AES Key Wrapping AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key
TDES EDK TDES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key
HMAC Key Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512)
KMAC Key Keyed hash key (128-1024 bits)
Hash_DRBG CSPs V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
HMAC_DRBG CSPs V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input (length
dependent on security strength)
CTR_DRBG CSPs V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
KDF Secret The secret value used for constructing the key for the PRF used for key derivation (SP 800-108
KBKDF, SP 800-132 PBKDF, HKDF, KDA, SP 800-135 KDFs, TLS 1.3 KDF).
Table 6 – Critical Security Parameters
The Module does not output intermediate key generation values. The Module supports the following
Public Keys listed below in Table 8.
Key/Parameter
Name
Description
RSA SVK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key
RSA KEK RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key encryption (public key transport) key
DSA SVK DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key
ECDSA SVK ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) signature verification key
EC DH Public EC DH (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) public key agreement key
DH Public DH (2048/3072/4096/6144/8192) public key agreement key
X25519 Public X25519 public key agreement key
X448 Public X448 public key agreement key
Table 7 – Public Keys
For all CSPs and Public Keys:
• Storage: RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores DRBG state values
for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling application
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on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond the lifetime of an API
call), except for DRBG state values used for the Module’s default key generation service.
• Generation: The Module implements SP 800-90 compliant DRBG services for creation of
symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA, elliptic curve, and RSA keys as shown in Table 4. The
calling application is responsible for storage of generated keys returned by the module.
• Entry: All CSPs enter the Module’s logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated by
memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary.
• Output: The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key generation
services or keys passed into the module by the calling application. However, none cross the
physical boundary.
• Destruction: Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for
temporarily stored CSPs. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out
of the module.
8.3 Key Generation and Entropy
Private and secret keys as well as seeds and entropy input are provided to the Module by the calling
application and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys residing in
internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed using the
Module defined API. The operating system protects application space from unauthorized access. Only
the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or export such keys. All API functions
(Module Services) are executed by the calling application invoking an API. Each API either succeeds or
fails and is logically non-interruptible from the point of view of the calling application.
The module supports generation of ECDSA, RSA, DSA, EC Diffie-Hellman and Diffie-Hellman key pairs per
Section 5 in NIST SP 800-133. A NIST SP 800-90Ar1 random bit generator is used for generating the seed
used in asymmetric key generation.
Applications shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random number
generation mechanism as shown in [SP 800-90Ar1] Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG). A
minimum of 112-bits of entropy must be supplied. This entropy is supplied by means of callback
functions. Those functions must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met.
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9. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
(EMI/EMC)
The tested platforms listed in Table 2, on which the Module operates, are compliant with 47 code of
Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators.
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10. Self-tests
FIPS 140-2 requires self-tests to test the integrity of the operational environment at start-up. Some
functions also require additional conditional tests during operation of the module.
The Module performs the self-tests listed below upon invocation of Initialize or on-demand Self-test.
10.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are run upon the initialization of the module and do not require operator intervention
to run. If any of the tests fail, the module will not initialize, and all data output is inhibited.
The module implements the following power-on self-tests:
Algorithm Type Test Attributes
Software Integrity KAT HMAC-SHA-256
SHS KAT SHA-1, SHA2-512, SHA-3-256
AES KAT Decrypt, ECB mode, 128-bit key
AES GCM KAT Encrypt, Decrypt, 256-bit key
Triple-DES KAT Encrypt, Decrypt, 3-Key, CBC mode
RSA KAT Sign, Verify using 2048-bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1
DSA PCT Sign, Verify using 2048-bit key, SHA-256
DRBG KAT CTR_DRBG: AES, 128-bit with derivation function
HASH_DRBG: SHA-256
HMAC_DRBG: SHA-1 Generate, Reseed, Instantiate functions (per Section
11.3 of SP 800-90Ar1)
ECDSA PCT Sign, Verify using P-224, K-233
KBKDF KAT Counter Mode (HMAC-SHA-256)
PBKDF2 KAT Derivation of the Master Key (MK) (per Section 5.3 of SP 800-132).
SP 800-135 KDFs KAT TLS 1.2, SSHv2, ANSI X9.63-2001 and ANSI X9.42-2001 KDFs.
TLS v1.3 KDF KAT TLS v1.3 KDF (per Section 7.1 of RFC 8446)
KAS FFC-SSC KAT dhEphem Shared Secret (Z) Computation (per Section 6 of SP 800-56Ar3)
KAS ECC-SSC KAT Ephemeral Unified Shared Secret (Z) Computation (per Section 6 of SP 800-
56Ar3), P-256
KAS-RSA-SSC KAT RSA Primitive Computation (per Scenario 2 of IG D.8 and Section 8.2.2 in SP
800-56Br2)
KDA KAT One-step KDF (per Section 4 of SP 800-56Cr2) and Two-Step KDF (per
Section 5 of SP 800-56Cr2
KTS-RSA KAT Encrypt and Decrypt for Basic, Decrypt for CRT (per IG D.9 and SP 800-
56Br2)
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Table 8 – Power On Self-Tests
The Module is installed using one of the set of instructions in Appendix A, as appropriate for the
operational environment.
The SELF_TEST_post() function performs all power-up self-tests listed above with no operator
intervention required when the module loads, returning a “1” if all power-up self-tests succeed, and a
“0” otherwise. The power-up self-tests may also be performed on-demand by calling this function and
interpretation of the return code is the responsibility of the calling application.
If any component of the power-up self-test fails, an internal flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation
of any cryptographic function calls. The module will only enter the FIPS Approved mode if the module is
reloaded and the call to SELF_TEST_post() succeeds.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are run under specific conditions, such as during key generation. The Module
implements the following conditional tests:
Algorithm Test
Entropy Source FIPS 140-2 continuous test for stuck fault
DSA Pairwise consistency test on generation of a key pair
ECDSA Pairwise consistency test on generation of a key pair
RSA Pairwise consistency test on generation of a key pair
Table 9 – Conditional Tests
In the event of a DRBG self-test failure, the calling application must uninstantiate and reinstantiate the
DRBG per the requirements of [SP 800-90]; this is not something the Module can do itself.
10.3 Assurances
The Module obtains the following assurances per SP 800-56Ar3 and SP 800-56Br2:
Standard Assurances
SP 800-56Ar3 Per Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56Ar3, required per IG D.8
SP 800-56Br2 Per Section 6.4 of SP 800-56Br2, required per IG D.8
Table 10 – Assurances
10.4 Critical Function Tests
The module does not implement any specific critical function tests.
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11. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Module implements two mitigations against timing-based side-channel attacks, namely Constant-
time Implementations and Blinding.
Constant-time Implementations protect cryptographic implementations in the Module against timing
analysis since such attacks exploit differences in execution time depending on the cryptographic
operation, and constant-time implementations ensure that the variations in execution time cannot be
traced back to the key, CSP or secret data.
Numeric Blinding protects the RSA, DSA and ECDSA algorithms from timing attacks. These algorithms are
vulnerable to such attacks since attackers can measure the time of signature operations or RSA
decryption. To mitigate this the Module generates a random blinding factor which is provided as an
input to the decryption/signature operation and is discarded once the operation has completed and
resulted in an output. This makes it difficult for attackers to attempt timing attacks on such operations
without the knowledge of the blinding factor and therefore the execution time cannot be correlated to
the RSA/DSA/ECDSA key.
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12. Crypto Officer and User Guidance
Please see Appendix A for installation and usage guidance for module operators.
12.1 AES-GCM Usage
The Module does not implement the TLS protocol itself, however, it provides the cryptographic
functions required for implementing the protocol. AES GCM encryption is used in the context of
the TLS protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3 (per Scenario 1 and Scenario 5 in FIPS 140-2 A.5
respectively). For TLS v1.2, the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288. The
counter portion of the IV is strictly increasing. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of
possible values for a given session key, this results in a failure in encryption and a handshake to
establish a new encryption key will be required. It is the responsibility of the user of the module
i.e., the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition, to trigger this handshake in
accordance with RFC 5246. For TLS v1.3, the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC
8446.
The Module also supports internal IV generation using the module’s Approved DRBG. The IV is at
least 96-bits in length per NIST SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.2. Per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 Scenario 2 and
NIST SP 800-38D, the approved DRBG generates outputs such that the (key, IV) pair collision
probability is less than 2-32
.
In the event that the Module power is lost and restored the user must ensure that the AES-GCM
encryption/decryption keys are re-distributed.
The Module also supports importing of GCM IVs when an IV is not generated within the Module.
In the FIPS approved mode, an IV must not be imported for encryption from outside the
cryptographic boundary of the Module as this will result in a non-conformance.
12.2 Triple-DES Usage
The calling application shall ensure that a given Triple-DES key is used to encrypt no more than 216
64-bit blocks of data.
12.3 Miscellaneous
• The module performs run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters such
as the minimum-security strength of keys, valid key sizes, and usage of approved curves.
These checks shall not be disabled (by using OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS or any
other method).
• Validation of domain parameters prior to generating keys using functions provided by the
module is the responsibility of the Cryptographic Officer and not enforced by the module
itself.
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Appendix A: Installation and Usage Guidance
The Module is installed as part of the OpenSSL 3.0.0 library. The source distribution package is located at
https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-3.0.0.tar.gz.
The FIPS Provider can be installed on the Tested Configurations listed in Table 2 by performing the
following steps:
1. Build and install OpenSSL 3.0.0 to the default location:
The FIPS provider i.e., the Module does not get built and installed automatically. To install the module
automatically during the normal OpenSSL 3.0.0 installation process it must be enabled by configuring
OpenSSL using the ‘enable-fips’ option.
Unix/Linux/macOS:
$ ./Configure enable-fips
$ make
$ make install
Windows:
$ perl Configure enable-fips
$ nmake
$ nmake install
The ‘install_fips’ make target can also be invoked explicitly to install the FIPS provider independently,
without installing the rest of OpenSSL:
$ make install_fips
Note: The instructions for building and installing OpenSSL 3.0.0 on other platforms can be found in the
platform-specific guidance provided in INSTALL.md and README-FIPS.md in the OpenSSL 3.0.0
distribution package. Please see Appendix B for further information on porting the Module to platforms
apart from the Tested Configurations in Table 2.
2. Verify the version:
$ openssl version -v
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The Installation of the FIPS provider that occurs as a result of Step 1 above essentially consists of two
steps. In the first step, the shared library is copied to its installed location. In the second step, the
‘openssl fipsinstall’ command is executed, which completes the installation by doing the following two
things:
• Runs the Module’s self-tests.
• Generates the Module config file output containing information about the Module (such as the
self-test status, and the Module checksum).
To install the FIPS configuration file to a non-default location, this can be achieved by running the
‘fipsinstall’ command line application manually:
$ openssl fipsinstall
Please see the manual page for options supported for the ‘openssl fipsinstall’ command.
Note: The Module shall have the self-tests run, and the Module config file output generated on each
platform where it is intended to be used. The Module config file output data shall not be copied from
one machine to another.
Note: Two integrity checks are performed, the software integrity check (per Section 10.1 of this
document) during the installation and an additional integrity check post installation of the Module. The
software integrity check is performed using HMAC-SHA-256 on the Module file to validate that the
Module has not been modified. The integrity value is compared to a value written to the config file
during installation.
The other integrity check is performed once the Module has been installed using HMAC-SHA-256 on a
fixed string to validate that the installation process has already been performed and that the self-tests
have been executed. The integrity value is compared to a value written to the config file after
successfully running the self-tests during installation.
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Appendix B: Compilers
This appendix lists the specific compilers used to generate the Module for the respective operational
environments. Note this list does not imply that use of the Module is restricted to only the listed
compiler versions And operational environments, as per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5,
compliance is maintained for other versions of the respective operational environments and compilers
provided the module source code is unchanged. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct
operation of the module when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the
validation certificate.
# Operational Environment
(Operating System)
Compilers
1 Photon OS 4.0 gcc 7.3.0
2 Windows Server 2019 Visual
Studio
2017
3 Oracle Solaris 11.4 gcc 7.3.0
4 Ubuntu Linux 20.04.1 Server gcc 9.3.0
5 Windows 10 Visual
Studio
2019
6 FreeBSD stable/13 clang
11.0.1
7 Debian 10 gcc 8.3.0
8 Custom Ubuntu Linux 18.04 gcc 8.2
9 macOS 11.5.2 clang
12.0.5
Table 11 – Compilers Used for Each Operational Environment
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Appendix C: Glossary
Term Description
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Program Interface
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CMAC Cipher-based message authentication code
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DRBG Deterministic Random Number Generator
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EdDSA Edwards Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EDK Encrypt/Decrypt Key
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
GPC General Purpose Computer
HKDF HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
IG Implementation Guidance
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known answer test
KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation Function
KDA Key Derivation Algorithm
KDK Key Derivation Key
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KDF Key Derivation Function
KEK Key Encryption Key
KMAC KECCAK Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PBKDF2 Password Based Key Derivation Function
PCT Pairwise Consistency Test
PKG Private Key Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHA-3 Secure Hash Algorithm 3
SHAKE Secure Hash Algorithm Keccak
SGK Signature Generation Key
SVK Signature Verification Key
TDES Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
Table 12 – Glossary of Terms
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Appendix D: Table of References
Reference Full Specification Name
[ANSI X9.42-
2001]
Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: Agreement Of
Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
[ANSI X9.63-
2001]
Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry, Key Agreement And
Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography
[FIPS 140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
[FIPS 180-4] Secure Hash Standard
[FIPS 202] SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
[FIPS 186-4] Digital Signature Standard
[FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard
[FIPS 198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
[PKCS#1]
Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
[RFC 5288] AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS
[RFC 8446]
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3
[SP 800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques
[SP 800-38B]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
[SP 800-38C]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
[SP 800-38D]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
[SP 800-56Ar3]
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
[SP 800-56Br2]
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization
Cryptography
[SP 800-56Cr2] Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes
[SP 800-
67r2]
Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
[SP 800-90Ar1]
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
Bit Generators
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Reference Full Specification Name
[SP 800-
132]
Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
[SP 800-133r2] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
[SP 800-135r1] Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions
Table 13 – Standards and Publications Referenced within this Security Policy
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Appendix E: Trademarks
Trademark Description
Linux® Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries
Unix® UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group
Microsoft
Windows®
Windows is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation in the United States
and other countries
Table 14 – Trademarks Referenced within this Security Policy