FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Acme Packet 4500
Document Version 2.5
December 5, 2014
Prepared For: Prepared By:
Oracle Corporation
500 Oracle Parkway
Redwood Shores, CA 94065
www.oracle.com
SafeLogic Inc.
530 Lytton Ave, Suite 200
Palo Alto, CA 94301
www.safelogic.com
Copyright © 2014, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. This document is provided for information purposes only and
the contents hereof are subject to change without notice. This document is not warranted to be error-free, nor subject to any other
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or
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Oracle and Java are registered trademarks of Oracle and/or its affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
Document Version 2.5 © Oracle Communications Page 1 of 40
Table of Contents
1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 About FIPS 140-2 ................................................................................................................................................ 4
1.2 About this Document.......................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 External Resources.............................................................................................................................................. 4
1.4 Notices................................................................................................................................................................ 4
1.5 Acronyms............................................................................................................................................................ 5
2 Oracle Communications Acme Packet 4500.........................................................................................................6
2.1 Product Overview................................................................................................................................................ 6
2.2 Validation Level Detail........................................................................................................................................ 6
2.3 Algorithm Implementations................................................................................................................................ 7
2.3.1 FIPS-Approved Algorithms........................................................................................................................... 7
2.3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms .......................................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Cryptographic Module Specification................................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Module Interfaces............................................................................................................................................... 9
2.6 Roles, Services, and Authentication.................................................................................................................. 10
2.6.1 Operator Services and Descriptions.......................................................................................................... 11
2.6.2 Operator Authentication........................................................................................................................... 18
2.7 Physical Security ............................................................................................................................................... 18
2.8 Operational Environment ................................................................................................................................. 18
2.9 Cryptographic Key Management...................................................................................................................... 20
2.10 Self-Tests......................................................................................................................................................... 31
2.10.1 Power-On Self-Tests................................................................................................................................ 33
2.10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................. 34
2.11 Mitigation of Other Attacks............................................................................................................................ 35
3 Guidance and Secure Operation........................................................................................................................36
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance.................................................................................................................................... 36
3.1.1 Enabling FIPS Mode and General Guidance.............................................................................................. 36
3.1.2 Placement of Tamper Evidence Labels...................................................................................................... 37
3.2 User Guidance................................................................................................................................................... 40
3.2.1 General Guidance...................................................................................................................................... 40
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Table 2 – Validation Level by DTR Section........................................................................................................................ 7
Table 3 – Algorithm Certificates for FIPS-Approved Algorithms in the Hifn 8450 ........................................................... 7
Table 4 – Algorithm Certificates for FIPS-Approved Algorithms for the BCM5862 ......................................................... 7
Table 5 – Algorithm Certificates for FIPS-Approved Algorithms for Firmware................................................................ 8
Table 6 – Acme Packet 4500 Interface Descriptions ...................................................................................................... 10
Table 7 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping............................................................................................... 10
Table 8 – Role Mapping.................................................................................................................................................. 11
Table 9 – Operator Services and Descriptions ............................................................................................................... 17
Table 10 – Unauthenticated Operator Services and Descriptions................................................................................. 17
Table 11 – Key/CSP Management Details ...................................................................................................................... 32
Table 12 - Power-On Self-Tests ...................................................................................................................................... 33
Table 13 – Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................... 34
Table 14 – Conditional Self Tests and Module Remediation.......................................................................................... 35
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Physical Boundary for Acme Packet 4500 ....................................................................................................... 9
Figure 2 – Tamper Evidence Label Placement Rear........................................................................................................ 38
Figure 3 – Tamper Evidence Label Placement Front...................................................................................................... 38
Figure 4 – Tamper Evidence Label Placement Top/Front............................................................................................... 39
Figure 5 – Tamper Evidence Label Placement Rear Bottom........................................................................................... 40
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1 Introduction
1.1 About FIPS 140-2
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic products to be deployed in a Sensitive but
Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and
Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) jointly run the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program (CMVP). The NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredits
independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140-2 testing; the CMVP validates test reports for all
cryptographic modules pursuing FIPS 140-2 validation. Validation is the term given to a cryptographic
module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140-2 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
1.2 About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Acme Packet 4500 from Oracle
Communications provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the
security requirements of FIPS 140-2. This document also contains details on the cryptographic keys and
critical security parameters. This Security Policy concludes with instructions and guidance on running the
module in a FIPS mode of operation.
The Oracle Communications Acme Packet 4500 may also be referred to as the “module” in this
document.
1.3 External Resources
The Oracle Communications website (http://www.oracle.com) contains information on the full line of
products from Oracle Communications, including a detailed overview of the Acme Packet 4500 solution.
The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and
Oracle Communications contact information.
1.4 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
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1.5 Acronyms
The following table defines acronyms found in this document:
Acronym Term
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CSEC Communications Security
Establishment of Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DTR Derived Testing Requirement
FIPS Federal Information Processing
Standard
GPC General Purpose Computer
GPOS General Purpose Operating System
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
NIST National Institute of Standards and
Technology
RSA Rivest Shamir Adelman
SHA Secure Hashing Algorithm
Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms
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2 Oracle Communications Acme Packet 4500
2.1 Product Overview
Oracle Communications session border controllers (SBC) provide critical control functions to deliver
trusted, first-class interactive communications—voice, video and multimedia sessions—across IP
network borders. They support multiple applications in government, service provider, enterprise and
contact center networks—from VoIP trunking to hosted enterprise and residential services to fixed-
mobile convergence. Oracle Communications’ SBC is configured on Acme Packet OS, which operates on
both the Acme Packet 4500 and 3820 platforms.
The Acme Packet 4500 is a carrier-class platform supporting up to 32,000 simultaneous signaled
sessions, delivering unmatched capabilities and performance in a 1U form factor. It offers extremely
rich functionality, architectural flexibility and signaling protocol breadth, and satisfies all of the
performance, capacity, availability and manageability requirements of defense and security–focused
government organizations, service providers, enterprises and contact centers.
In government, enterprise and contact center environments, the Acme Packet 4500 secure SIP/H.323
trunking borders to service provider and other 3rd
party IP networks and the Internet border to remote
offices, teleworkers and mobile employees. In extremely security-conscious organizations, they secure
the border to the private VPN connecting other sites. SIP and H.323 interworking capabilities ensure
interoperability with and between legacy IP PBX equipment and next-generation unified
communications platforms. They control session admission, IP PBX or UC server loads and overloads, IP
network transport and SIP/H.323 session routing to assure SLAs and minimize costs. Regulatory
compliance requirements are also satisfied with encryption ensuring session privacy and call/session
replication for recording.
2.2 Validation Level Detail
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
Self-Tests 2
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FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 – Validation Level by DTR Section
2.3 Algorithm Implementations
2.3.1 FIPS-Approved Algorithms
The module contains the following algorithm implementations:
• Hifn 8450: bump-in-the-wire, bulk IPSec processing (HMAC-SHA1, AES, TRIPLE-DES)
• Broadcom 5862 (BCM5862): DH, SHA-1, HMAC-SHA1, AES and Triple-DES for SSH and TLS
• Firmware running on Intel Core Duo T2500: random number generation, SHA-1, SHA-256, RSA,
HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, Hash_DRBG
These cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers from
the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program:
Algorithm Type Algorithm Standard CAVP Certificate Use
Keyed Hash HMAC-SHA1 FIPS 198-1 519 Message verification
Hashing SHA-1 FIPS 180-4 912 Message digest
Symmetric Key Three key Triple-DES
(CBC mode)
NIST SP 800-67 745 Data encryption /
decryption
AES 128 and
256(CBC, CTR
modes)
FIPS 197 928 Data encryption /
decryption
Table 3 – Algorithm Certificates for FIPS-Approved Algorithms in the Hifn 8450
Algorithm Type Algorithm Standard CAVP Certificate Use
Hashing SHA-1 FIPS 180-4 1378 Message digest
Keyed Hash HMAC-SHA1 FIPS 198-1 907 Message verification
Symmetric Key Three key Triple-DES
(CBC mode)
NIST SP 800-67 1019 Data encryption /
decryption
AES 128 and
256(CBC, CTR
modes)
FIPS 197 1555 Data encryption /
decryption
Table 4 – Algorithm Certificates for FIPS-Approved Algorithms for the BCM5862
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Algorithm Type Algorithm Standard
CAVP Certificate
for Intel Core Duo
T2500
Use
Hashing SHA-1
SHA-256
FIPS 180-4 1373 Message digest
Keyed Hash HMAC-SHA1
HMAC-SHA256
FIPS 198-1 900 Message verification
and module integrity
(via HMAC-SHA256)
Asymmetric
Key
RSA FIPS 186-2 753 Verify operations
Random
Number
Generation
Hash_DRBG SP800-90A
(hash based)
68 Random Number
Generation
Table 5 – Algorithm Certificates for FIPS-Approved Algorithms for Firmware
2.3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms
The module implements the following non-approved algorithms:
• DES
• ARC4
• HMAC-MD5
• RSA (allowed for use in FIPS mode of operation)
o Used in FIPS mode for TLS sessions key establishment in and provides 112-bits of
encryption strength
• Diffie-Hellman
o Used for key agreement in SSH and IPSEC sessions; key establishment methodology
provides 112-bits of encryption strength (allowed for use in FIPS Mode of operation).
o Used for key agreement in SSH and IPSEC sessions; key establishment methodology
provides less than 112-bits of encryption strength (non-compliant).
• Hardware-based random number generator
o This RNG is used in FIPS mode only to generate entropy_input to the firmware-based
FIPS-approved Hash_DRBG.
Unless otherwise noted, Non-approved algorithms are not used in FIPS mode.
2.4 Cryptographic Module Specification
The module is the Oracle Communications Acme Packet 4500 running firmware version C6.3 on
hardware version A1. The module is classified as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The
physical cryptographic boundary is defined as the module case and all components within the case. No
firmware is excluded from validation.
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The specific model included in the validation is as follows:
• Acme Packet 4500
o Running network processor AMCC NP3750 @700 Mhz and host processor Intel Core
Duo T2500
o Running Hifn 8450 and Broadcom 5862 for dedicated, hardware-based cryptographic
processing
The physical boundary is pictured in the image below:
Figure 1 – Physical Boundary for Acme Packet 4500
2.5 Module Interfaces
The table below describes the main interfaces on the Acme Packet 4500:
Physical Interface Description / Use
LCD Reports real-time status, alarms, and general system information
LEDs Indicates if any alarms are active on the module. The LED can be three
different colors to indicate the severity of the alarms.
• Unlit—system is fully functional without any faults
• Amber—major alarm has been generated
• Red—critical alarm has been generated.
Console Ports Provides console access to the module. The module supports only one
active serial console connection at a time. The rear console port is useful
for customers who want permanent console access; the front console port
provides easy access to the module for a temporary connection.
Console port communication is used for administration and maintenance
purposes from a central office (CO) location. Tasks conducted over a
console port include:
• Creating the initial connection to the module
• Accessing and using all functionality available via the ACLI
• Performing in-lab system maintenance (services described below)
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Physical Interface Description / Use
Alarm Port Closes a circuit when a specific alarm level becomes active. The module
features an alarm control signal interface that can be used in a CO location
to indicate when internal alarms are generated. The appliances use alarm
levels that correspond to three levels of service-disrupting incidents.
USB Ports Provides access to external Flash based memory
Network Management
Ports
Used for EMS control, RADIUS accounting, CLI management, SNMP queries
and traps, and other management functions
Signaling and Media
Interfaces
Provide network connectivity for signaling and media traffic.
Table 6 – Acme Packet 4500 Interface Descriptions
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input,
data output, control input, and status output. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in
the following table:
FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interface
Module Physical Interface Information Input/Output
Data Input Network Management Ports
Signaling and Media Interfaces
Ciphertext (IPSec, SSH, and TLS
packets)
Data Output Network Management Ports
Signaling and Media Interfaces
Ciphertext (IPSec, SSH, and TLS
packets)
Control Input Console Port Plaintext control input
(configuration commands,
operator passwords)
Status Output Network Management Ports
Console Ports
LEDs
Plaintext status output.
Plaintext key output during
manual key generation and
configuration.
Power Power Plug
On/Off Switch
N/A
Table 7 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping
2.6 Roles, Services, and Authentication
As required by FIPS 140-2 Level 2, there are two roles (a Crypto Officer role and User role) in the module
that operators may assume. The module supports role-based authentication, and the respective services
for each role are described in the following sections.
The table below provides a mapping of default roles in the module to the roles defined by FIPS 140-2:
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Operator Role Summary of Services FIPS 140-2 Role
User • View configuration versions and a large amount if
statistical data for the system’s performance
• Handle certificate information for IPSec and TLS
functions
• Test pattern rules, local policies, and session translations
• Display system alarms.
• Set the display dimensions for the terminal
Crypto Officer
Superuser Allowed access to all system commands and configuration
privileges
Crypto Officer
LI Admin Allowed access to all system commands and configuration
privileges, including LI features (if available)
Crypto Officer
Remote IT system Connect to module for data transmission User
Unauthenticated user Allowed access to view status and perform self test Crypto Officer-2
Table 8 – Role Mapping
2.6.1 Operator Services and Descriptions
The services available to the User and Crypto Officer roles in the module are as follows:
Service and
Description
Service Input Service Output Key/CSP Access Roles
Configure
Initializes the module
for FIPS mode of
operation, configure
manual keys
FIPS License,
Image integrity
(HMAC) value
Manual key value.
None HMAC 256-bit key,
IPSec Session Keys
(TRIPLE-DES)
IPSec Session Keys
(AES128)
IPSec Session Keys
(AES256)
HMAC 160-bit key
1
Crypto
Officer
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Service and
Description
Service Input Service Output Key/CSP Access Roles
Decrypt
Decrypts a block of
data Using AES or
TRIPLE-DES in FIPS
Mode
Decrypts a block of
data using DES or ARC4
in Non-FIPS mode
Key
Encrypted byte
stream
Byte stream TLS Session Keys
(TRIPLE-DES)
TLS Session Keys
(AES128)
TLS Session Keys
(AES256)
TLS Session Keys
(DES, ARC4 in
Non-FIPS Mode)
IPSec Session
Keys (TRIPLE-
DES)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES128)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key
(TRIPLE-DES)
SSH Session Key
(AES128)
SSH Session Key
(AES256)
SSH Session Keys
(DES, ARC4 in
Non-FIPS mode)
Private Key 2
User
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Service and
Description
Service Input Service Output Key/CSP Access Roles
Encrypt
Encrypts a block of data
Using AES or TRIPLE-
DES in FIPS Mode
Encrypts a block of data
using DES or ARC-4 in
Non-FIPS mode
Key
Byte stream
Encrypted byte
stream
TLS Session Keys
(TRIPLE-DES)
TLS Session Keys
(AES128)
TLS Session Keys
(AES256)
TLS Session Keys
(DES, ARC4 in
Non-FIPS Mode)
IPSec Session
Keys (TRIPLE-
DES)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES128)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key
(TRIPLE-DES)
SSH Session Key
(AES128)
SSH Session Key
(AES256)
SSH Session Keys
(DES, ARC4 in
Non-FIPS mode)
Public Key 2
User
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Service and
Description
Service Input Service Output Key/CSP Access Roles
Generate Keys
Generates AES or
TRIPLE-DES keys for
encrypt/decrypt
operations in FIPS
Mode
Generates DES or
ARC4 keys for
encrypt/decrypt
operations in non-FIPS
Mode
Key Size AES-Key
TRIPLE-DES-Key in
FIPS Mode
DES-Key
ARC4 Key in Non-
FIPS mode
TLS Session Keys
(TRIPLE-DES)
TLS Session Keys
(AES128)
TLS Session Keys
(AES256)
TLS Session Keys
(DES, ARC4 in
non-FIPS mode)
IPSec Session
Keys (TRIPLE-
DES)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES128)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key
(TRIPLE-DES)
SSH Session Key
(AES128)
SSH Session Key
(AES256)
SSH Session Keys
(DES, ARC4 in
Non-FIPS mode)
Public Key 2
User
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Key Establishment
DH public key
for establishing AES
or TRIPLE-DES
session keys in FIPS
mode
DH public key
for establishing DES or
ARC4 session keys in
Non-FIPS mode
Key Size AES-Key
TRIPLE-DES-Key in
FIPS mode
DES key and ARC4
Key in Non-FIPS
mode
IPSec Session
Keys (TRIPLE-
DES)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES128)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key
(TRIPLE-DES)
SSH Session Key
(AES128)
SSH Session Key
(AES256)
SSH Session Keys
(DES, ARC4 in
Non-FIPS mode)
Public Key 2
User
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Key Establishment
DH private key
for establishing AES
or TRIPLE-DES
session keys in FIPS
mode
DH private key
for establishing DES or
ARC4 session keys in
Non-FIPS mode
Key Size AES-Key
TRIPLE-DES-Key in
FIPS mode
DES key and ARC4
Key in Non-FIPS
mode
IPSec Session
Keys (TRIPLE-
DES)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES128)
IPSec Session
Keys (AES256)
SSH Session Key
(TRIPLE-DES)
SSH Session Key
(AES128)
SSH Session Key
(AES256)
SSH Session Keys
(DES, ARC4 in
Non-FIPS
mode) Public
Key 2
User
Sign
Signs a block with RSA
Data block to sign
RSA Private key
RSA Signed data
block
Private Key 1
Private Key 2
Public Key 2
User
Verify
Verifies the signature
of a RSA-signed block
RSA Signed data
block
RSA Public key
Verification
success/failure
Public Key 1
Public Key 2
User
Hash_Drbg seed
Generate a
entropy_input for
Hash_Drbg
HWRNG generated
random bits.
entropy_input entropy_input
Public Key 2
User
Hash_Drbg
Generate random
number.
Working state
C and V
Random number Hash_DRBG V
Hash_DRBG
Public Key 2
User
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Service and
Description
Service Input Service Output Key/CSP Access Roles
HMAC
HMAC-SHA Hash-based
Message
Authentication Code in
FIPS mode
HMAC-MD5 Hash-
based Message
Authentication Code in
non-FIPS mode
Key, data block HMAC value HMAC 160-bit
key 1
HMAC 160-bit
key 2
HMAC 160-bit
key 3
HMAC 256-bit
key
Public Key 2
HMAC-MD5 Key
(non-FIPS mode)
User
Zeroize CSPs
Clears CSPs from
memory
Key, Key pair,
entropy_input,
password
Invalidated CSP All CSPs Crypto
Officer
Table 9 – Operator Services and Descriptions
The module provides for the following unauthenticated services, which do not require authentication as
they are not security relevant functions. These services do not affect the security of the module; these
services do not create, disclose, or substitute cryptographic keys or CSPs, nor do they utilize any
Approved security functions.
Service and
Description
Service Input Service Output Key/CSP Access Roles
Show Status
Shows status of the
module
None Module status
enabled/disabled
None Crypto
Officer-2
Initiate self-tests
Restarting the module
provides a way to run
the self-tests on-
demand
None Console display of
success/failure.
Log entry of
success/failure.
None Crypto
Officer-2
Table 10 – Unauthenticated Operator Services and Descriptions
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2.6.2 Operator Authentication
2.6.2.1 Crypto-Officer: Password-Based Authentication
In FIPS mode of operation, the module is accessed via Command Line Interface over the Console ports
or via SSH or SNMP over the Network Management Ports. Other than status functions available by
viewing LEDs and the LCD panel, the services described in Table 9 – Operator Services and Descriptions
are available only to authenticated operators.
Passwords must be a minimum of 6 characters (see Guidance and Secure Operation section of this
document). The password can consist of alphanumeric values, {a-zA-Z0-9], yielding 62 choices per
character. The probability of a successful random attempt is 1/626
, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Assuming 10 attempts per second via a scripted or automatic attack, the probability of a success with
multiple attempts in a one-minute period is 600/626
, which is less than 1/100,000.
The module will lock an account after 3 failed authentication attempts; thus, the maximum number of
attempts in one minute is 3. Therefore, the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts
in a one-minute period is 3/626
which is less than 1/100,000.
The module will permit an operator to change roles provided the operator knows both the User
password and the Crypto Officer password.
2.6.2.2 Certificate-Based Authentication
The module also supports authentication via digital certificates for the User Role as implemented by the
TLS, SSH, and IPSec protocols. The module supports a public key based authentication with 2048-bit RSA
keys. A 2048-bit RSA key has at least 112-bits of equivalent strength. The probability of a successful
random attempt is 1/2112
, which is less than 1/1,000,000. Assuming the module can support 60
authentication attempts in one minute, the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts
in a one-minute period is 60/2112
, which is less than 1/100,000.
2.7 Physical Security
The module is a multiple-chip standalone module and conforms to Level 2 requirements for physical
security. For details on tamper evidence, please see Section 3.1.2 – Placement of Tamper Evidence
Labels.
2.8 Operational Environment
The module operates in a limited operational model and does not implement a General Purpose
Operating System.
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The module meets Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)
and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined by 47 Code of
Federal Regulations, Part15, Subpart B.
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2.9 Cryptographic Key Management
The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module:
Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
TLS Session
Keys (TRIPLE-
DES)
TRIPLE-DES CBC
168-bit key
For encryption /
decryption of TLS
session traffic
Source:
Broadcom
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Resetting / rebooting the
module or power cycling
Crypto Officer
R W D
TLS Session
Keys (AES128)
AES CBC 128-bit
key
For encryption /
decryption of TLS
session traffic
Source:
Broadcom
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Resetting / rebooting the
module or power cycling
Crypto Officer
R W D
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
TLS Session
Keys (AES256)
AES CBC 256-bit
key
For encryption /
decryption of TLS
session traffic
Source:
Broadcom
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Resetting / rebooting the
module or power cycling
Crypto Officer
R W D
IPSec Session
Keys (TRIPLE-
DES)
TRIPLE-DES CBC
168-bit key
Source: HIFN
Manually
entered
Storage: Non-Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: Manual
Output: None
Manually entering a new
value and overwriting the
old value
Crypto Officer
R W D
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
IPSec Session
Keys (AES128)
AES CBC, CTR
128-bit key
Source: HIFN
Manually
entered
Storage: Non-Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: Manual
Output: None
Manually entering a new
value and overwriting the
old value
Crypto Officer
R W D
IPSec Session
Keys (AES256)
AES CBC, CTR
256-bit key
Source: HIFN
Manually
entered
Storage: Non-Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: Manual
Output: None
Manually entering a new
value and overwriting the
old value
Crypto Officer
R W D
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
SSH Session
Key (TRIPLE-
DES)
TRIPLE-DES CBC
168-bit key
For encryption /
decryption of SSH
session traffic
Source:
Broadcom
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Resetting / rebooting the
module or power cycling
Crypto Officer
R W D
SSH Session
Key (AES128)
AES CBC 128-bit
For encryption /
decryption of SSH
session traffic
Source:
Broadcom
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Resetting / rebooting the
module or power cycling
Crypto Officer
R W D
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
SSH Session
Key (AES256)
AES CBC 256-bit
key
For encryption /
decryption of SSH
session traffic
Source:
Broadcom
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Resetting / rebooting the
module or power cycling
Crypto Officer
R W D
Diffie Hellman
Public Key
y=g^x mod p
component;
Generator g is 2
and p is 1024 bits
(group-2), 1536
(group-5) and
2048 (group-14)
Source: Host
Processor
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: y is ephemeral / p is
static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Resetting / rebooting the
module or power cycling
Crypto Officer
R W D
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
Diffie Hellman
Private Key
x component of
DH; x is 1024 bits
(group-2), 1536
(group-5) and
2048 (group-14)
Source: Host
Processor
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Resetting / rebooting the
module or power cycling
Crypto Officer
R W D
HMAC 160-bit
key 1
160-bit HMAC-
SHA1 for
message
verification
Source: HIFN
Manually
entered
Storage: Flash RAM in
plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: Manual
Output: None
Re-formatting flash
memory
Crypto Officer
R W D
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
HMAC 160-bit
key 2
160-bit HMAC-
SHA1 for
message
verification
Source:
Broadcom
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Flash RAM in
plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Re-formatting flash
memory
Crypto Officer
R W D
HMAC 160-bit
key 3
160-bit HMAC-
SHA1 for
message
verification
Source: Host
Processor
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Flash RAM in
plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Re-formatting flash
memory
Crypto Officer
R W D
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
HMAC 256-bit
key
80-bit HMAC-
SHA256 for
integrity check
Source: Host
Processor
Hard coded Storage: RAM plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory for the
respective session.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: None
Update firmware Crypto Officer
R W D
Operator
passwords
Alphanumeric
passwords
externally
generated by a
human user for
authentication to
the module.
Source: Host
Processor
Not generated
by the
module;
defined by the
human user of
the module
Storage: Non-Volatile RAM in
plaintext
Type: Static
Association: controlled by the
operating system
Agreement: NA
Entry: Manual entry via
console or SSH
management session
Output: In encrypted
form only if using
RADIUS authentication
Issue command
secure_pwd_reset()
Crypto Officer
R W D
User
R W D
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
Premaster RSA-Encrypted Internal Storage: Volatile RAM in Agreement: NA Resetting / rebooting the Crypto Officer
Secret (48 Premaster Secret generation by plaintext module or power cycling None
Bytes) Message FIPS-approved Entry: Input during TLS
Source: Host
Processor
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Type: Ephemeral
Association: The system is the
negotiation
Output: Output to peer
User
None
one and only owner. encrypted by Public Key
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Master Secret Used for Internal Storage: Volatile RAM in Agreement: NA Resetting / rebooting the Crypto Officer
(48 Bytes) computing the generation by plaintext module or power cycling None
Session Key FIPS-approved Entry: NA
Source: Host
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Type: Ephemeral
Output: NA
User
None
Processor Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
Hash_DRBG V 440 bits long Generated as Storage: Volatile RAM in Agreement: NA Resetting / rebooting the Crypto Officer
value V used for per section plaintext module or power cycling None
generating 10.1.1.2 of SP Entry: NA
Hash_DRBG 800-90 Type: Ephemeral User
Output: NA None
Source: Host Association: The system is the
Processor one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Hash_DRBG C 440 bits long Generated as Storage: Volatile RAM in Agreement: NA Resetting / rebooting the Crypto Officer
constant C used per section plaintext module or power cycling None
for generating 10.1.1.2 of SP Entry: NA
Hash_DRBG 800-90 Type: Ephemeral User
Source: Host Association: The operating
Output: NA
None
Processor environment is the one and
only owner. Relationship is
maintained by the operating
environment via protected
memory.
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
Hash_DRBG Input string for Generated as Storage: Volatile RAM in Agreement: NA Resetting / rebooting the Crypto Officer
Entropy Input DRBG per section plaintext module or power cycling None
String
Source: Host
10.1.1.2 of SP
800-90 Type: Ephemeral
Entry: NA
User
Processor
Association: The operating
Output: NA
None
environment is the one and
only owner. Relationship is
maintained by the operating
environment via protected
memory.
Hash_DRBG Seed value for Generated as Storage: Volatile RAM in Agreement: NA Resetting / rebooting the Crypto Officer
Seed Value DRBG per section plaintext module or power cycling None
10.1.1.2 of SP Entry: NA
Source: Host 800-90 Type: Ephemeral User
Processor
Association: The operating
Output: NA
None
environment is the one and
only owner. Relationship is
maintained by the operating
environment via protected
memory.
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
Public Key 1 RSA Public 2048-
bit for verify
operations.
Source: Host
Processor
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Flash in plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
certificates.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: NA
As this key is public, it does
not need to be destroyed
Crypto Officer
R W D
User
R
Public Key 2 RSA Public 2048-
bit for
key
establishment for
TLS sessions.
Source: Host
Processor
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Flash in plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
certificates.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: NA
As this key is public, it does
not need to be destroyed.
Crypto Officer
R W D
User
R
Private Key 1 RSA Private 2048-
bit for sign
operations.
Source: Host
Processor
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Flash in plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: NA
Re-formatting flash
memory
Crypto Officer
R W D
User
R
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Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges
Private Key 2 RSA Private 2048-
bit for
key
establishment
1
for TLS sessions
Source: Host
Processor
Internal
generation by
FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG
in firmware
Storage: Flash in plaintext
Type: Static
Association: The system is the
one and only owner.
Relationship is maintained by
the operating system via
protected memory.
Agreement: NA
Entry: NA
Output: NA
Re-formatting flash
memory
Crypto Officer
R W D
User
R
R = Read W = Write D = Delete
Table 11 – Key/CSP Management Details
Public keys are protected from unauthorized modification and substitution. The module ensures only authenticated operators have access to
keys and functions that can generate keys. Unauthenticated operators do not have write access to modify, change, or delete a public key. For
the session certificate, the module generates a PKCS10 certificate request (PKCS 10), and a standard Certificate Authority (CA) generates the
certificate.
All keys can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer using the Zeroize CSPs service. The Crypto Officer can also return the module to Oracle
Communications, where it can be reimaged. The reimaging process at Oracle also zeroizes all CSPs but is a different feature than the Zeroize CSPs
service that is available to the Crypto Officer.
1
Key establishment methodology provides at least 112-bits of encryption strength
Document Version 2.5 © Oracle Communications Page 32 of 40
2.10 Self-Tests
The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations
to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are functioning correctly.
In the event of any self-test failure, the module will output an error dialog and will shutdown. When the
module is in an error state, no keys or CSPs will be output and the module will not perform
cryptographic functions.
The module does not support a bypass function.
The following sections discuss the module’s self-tests in more detail.
2.10.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are run upon every initialization of the module and if any of the tests fail, the
module will not initialize. The module will enter an error state and no services can be accessed by the
users. The module implements the following power-on self-tests:
Implementation Self Tests Run
Hifn 8450 • TRIPLE-DES known answer test
• AES known answer test
• HMAC-SHA1 known answer test2
BCM5862 • TRIPLE-DES known answer test
• AES known answer test
• SHA1 known answer test
• HMAC-SHA1 known answer test
Intel Core Duo T2500 • SHA1 and SHA256 known answer test
• HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA256 known answer test
• Hash_DRBG test
• DRBG Health Test as specified in SP 800-90 Section 11.3
• Module integrity check using HMAC-SHA256
• RSA known answer test
Table 12 - Power-On Self-Tests
The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the module is initialized. All power-on
self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The Power-on self-tests can
be run on demand by rebooting the module in FIPS Mode of Operation.
2.10.1.1 Status Output
An operator can discern that all power-on self-tests have passed via normal operation of the module
and the following log message.
2
Note: According to the CMVPFAQ p.57 “If a KAT is implemented for the HMAC-SHA-1, a KAT is not needed for the
underlying SHA-1.”
Document Version 2.5 © Oracle Communications Page 33 of 40
FIPS: KAT self test completed successfully.
FIPS: System is currently operating in FIPS 140-2
compatible mode.
In the event a POST fails, the module will output the following log message:
FIPS: ERROR - System is not in FIPS 140-2 compatible mode
FIPS: ERROR - <Test Name> failed.
For example:
FIPS: ERROR - RSA pair wise consistency test failed.
Note that data output will be inhibited while the module is in an error state (i.e., when a POST fails). No
keys or CSPs will be output when the module is in an error state.
2.10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are test that run continuously during operation of the module. If any of these
tests fail, the module will enter an error state. The module can be re-initialized to clear the error and
resume FIPS mode of operation. No services can be accessed by the operators. The module performs
the following conditional self-tests:
Implementation Self Tests Run
Hifn 8450 • None (not applicable)
BCM5862 • Continuous HWRNG test
Intel Core Duo
T2500
• Manual key entry test on manually-entered IPSec hash
authentication and data encryption keys via duplicate entry
verification
• Continuous Hash_DRBG test
• Continuous test on output of seed mechanism
• RSA pairwise consistency test for sign/verify and encrypt/decrypt
Table 13 – Conditional Self-Tests
The module does not perform a firmware load test because no additional firmware can be loaded in the
module while operating in FIPS mode.
2.10.2.1 Status Output
In the event a conditional self-test fails, the module will output the following log message:
FIPS: ERROR - System is not in FIPS 140-2 compatible mode
FIPS: ERROR - <Conditional Test Name> failed.
For example:
FIPS: ERROR - Continuous RNG test failed.
Document Version 2.5 © Oracle Communications Page 34 of 40
Note that data output will be inhibited while the module is in this error state. The module will self-
correct this use case as follows:
Test Remediation
Pairwise consistency test for RSA implementations Generate a new RSA keypair and rerun test
Continuous test run on output of FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG in firmware
Generate a new value and rerun test
Continuous test on output of FIPS-approved
Hash_DRBG in firmware seed mechanism
Generate a new value and rerun test
Manual key entry test on manually-entered IPSec hash
authentication and data encryption keys
Prompt operator to re-enter value
Table 14 – Conditional Self Tests and Module Remediation
No keys or CSPs will be output when the module is in an error state.
2.11 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate attacks.
Document Version 2.5 © Oracle Communications Page 35 of 40
3 Guidance and Secure Operation
This section describes how to configure the module for FIPS mode of operation. Operating the module
without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
3.1.1 Enabling FIPS Mode and General Guidance
FIPS Mode is enabled by a license key installed by Oracle, which will open/lock down features where
appropriate.
Additionally, the Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization procedures in
order to operate in FIPS mode of operation3
:
• Verify that the firmware version of the module is Version C6.3. No other version can be loaded
or used in FIPS mode of operation.
• Ensure all media traffic is encapsulated in an IPSec or TLS tunnel as appropriate.
• Ensure all management traffic is encapsulated within an SSH session (i.e., Telnet should not be
used in FIPS mode of operation).
• Ensure USB ports are not used in FIPS mode of operation.
• Ensure that the tamper evidence labels are applied by Oracle as specified in Section 3.1.2 –
Placement of Tamper Evidence Labels. The tamper evident labels shall be installed for the
module to operate in a FIPS mode of operation.
• Inspect the tamper evident labels periodically to verify they are intact and the serial numbers on
the applied tamper evident labels match the records in the security log.
• All operator passwords must be a minimum of 6 characters in length.
• When using RADIUS for authentication, ensure a secure tunnel (via IPSec or TLS) is established
between the module and the RADIUS server.
• Booting from an external device is not allowed in FIPS mode of operation. The image must be
booted from flash memory, which is configured with the following command:
3
The licensing may ensure most of these are met. The Crypto Officer should verify all details prior to operation in
FIPS mode.
Document Version 2.5 © Oracle Communications Page 36 of 40
ACMEPACKET# configure terminal
ACMEPACKET# bootparam
• Ensure use of FIPS-approved algorithms for TLS v1.0:
TLS_RSA_WITH_Triple-DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_Triple-DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• Ensure RSA keys are at least 2048-bit keys. No 512-bit or 1024-bit keys can be used in FIPS mode
of operation.
• Ensure only FIPS-approved algorithms are used for IPSec sessions:
Triple-DES
AES128CBC
AES256CBC
AES128CTR
AES256CTR
HMAC-SHA1
• Ensure the console windows used while manually entering keys are closed immediately after the
configuration is complete.
• Do not disclose passwords and store passwords in a safe location and according to his/her
organization’s systems security policies for password storage.
3.1.2 Placement of Tamper Evidence Labels
To meet Physical Security Requirements for Level 2, the module enclosure must be protected with
tamper evidence labels. The tamper evident labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS
mode of operation. Oracle Communications applies the labels at time of manufacture; the Crypto
Officer is responsible for ensuring the labels are applied as shown below. Once applied, the Crypto
Officer shall not remove or replace the labels unless the module has shown signs of tampering. In the
event of tampering or wear and tear on the labels, the Crypto Officer shall return the module to Oracle
Communications, where it will be reimaged and returned with a new set of labels.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for
• Verifying the five labels are attached to the appliance as shown in the diagrams below,
Document Version 2.5 © Oracle Communications Page 37 of 40
• Maintaining the direct control and observation of any changes to the module such as
reconfigurations to ensure the security of the module is maintained during such changes.
Figure 2 – Tamper Evidence Label Placement Rear
Figure 3 – Tamper Evidence Label Placement Front
Document Version 2.5 © Oracle Communications Page 38 of 40
Figure 4 – Tamper Evidence Label Placement Top/Front
Document Version 2.5 © Oracle Communications Page 39 of 40
Figure 5 – Tamper Evidence Label Placement Rear Bottom
Note that Oracle Communications does offer the purchase of additional labels. If labels need to be
replaced, please contact Oracle Communications to return the module for reimaging, and Oracle
Communications will reimage the module and provide additional label (internal part number LBL-0140-
60). To apply replacement labels, see instructions at the beginning of this section.
3.2 User Guidance
3.2.1 General Guidance
The User must not disclose passwords and must store passwords in a safe location and according to
his/her organization’s systems security policies for password storage.
End of Document
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