## GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance by ## Gigamon Inc. FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Hardware Versions: GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 (Chassis) with SMT-HC3-C05 (GigaSMART), CTL-HC3-002 (Controller) and GVS-HC3- EXT; FIPS Tamper Label SKU: ACC-HC0-FIPS Firmware Version : 5.9.00.05 ### Multi-chip Standalone, Level 2 Validation February 5, 2021 Document Version 1.0 © 2019 Gigamon All rights reserved. https://www.gigamon.com This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. | 1 Introduction | _______________________________________________________________________ | 4 | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Table 1 - GigaVUE-HC3 Module Configurations ____________________________________________________________ | 4 | | | Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements __________________________________________________________ | 5 | | 1.1 | Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary | _____________________________________________ 6 | | | Figure 1 - GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 (Front of Module Chassis) | ______________________________________________ 6 | | Table 3 - Ports and | Interfaces __________________________________________________________________________ | 7 | | 1.2 | Mode of Operation ____________________________________________________________________ | 8 | | 1.3 | Zeroization | ___________________________________________________________________________ 9 | | 2 | Cryptographic Functionality _________________________________________________________ | 11 | | 2.1 | Approved Algorithms | __________________________________________________________________ 11 | | | Table 4 - Approved Algorithms - Gigamon Linux-Based Cryptographic Library | __________________________________ 11 | | | Table 4a - Vendor Affirmed Security Functions - Gigamon Linux-Based Cryptographic Library | ______________________ 17 | | | Table 5 - Approved Algorithms - Cavium Hardware Libraries (CN7890) | ________________________________________ 17 | | | Table 6 - Approved Algorithms - Cavium OpenSSL Library 1.1.1b (CN7890) | _____________________________________ 18 | | 2.2 | Allowed Algorithms | ___________________________________________________________________ 18 | | | Table 7 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions _______________________________________________________________ | 19 | | Table | 7a - Entropy Sources ____________________________________________________________________________ | 19 | | | Table 7b - other non-Approved algorithms | _______________________________________________________________ 19 | | 2.3 | Protocols____________________________________________________________________________ | 19 | | Table | 8 - Protocols Allowed and Disallowed in FIPS Mode | ___________________________________________________ 19 | | 2.4 | No Security Claimed but allowed protocols | ________________________________________________ 20 | | 2.5 | Disallowed Algorithms _________________________________________________________________ | 21 | | 2.6 | Critical Security Parameters | ____________________________________________________________ 22 | | Table | 9 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ______________________________________________________________ | 22 | | 3 | Roles, Authentication and Services ____________________________________________________ | 28 | | 3.1 | Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles ____________________________________________ | 28 | | 3.2 | Authentication Methods | _______________________________________________________________ 28 | | 3.3 | Services _____________________________________________________________________________ | 29 | | Table 10 - Approved Services __________________________________________________________________________ | Table 10 - Approved Services __________________________________________________________________________ | 29 | | 3.4 Non-Approved Services | 3.4 Non-Approved Services | ________________________________________________________________ 30 | | | Table 11 - non-Approved Services | ______________________________________________________________________ 30 | | Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services ______________________________________________________________ | Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services ______________________________________________________________ | 33 | | 4 | Self-tests _________________________________________________________________________ | 34 | | | Table 13 - Module Self-Tests __________________________________________________________________________ | 34 | | 5 | Physical Security Policy | _____________________________________________________________ 36 | | 5.1 | General Tamper Evident Label Placement and Application | 36 | | | Instructions | _________________________ | | 6 | Security Rules and Guidance | _________________________________________________________ 37 | | 7 | References and Definitions __________________________________________________________ Table 15 - References ________________________________________________________________________________ | 37 37 | | | Table 16 - Acronyms and Definitions | ____________________________________________________________________ 38 | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy - 8 Appendix A - Tamper Seal Preparation and Placement ___________________________________ 39 GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy #### 1 Introduction The GigaVUE-HC3 visibility appliance provides intelligent traffic visibility in a modular, mid-sized form factor, to address complex network visibility requirements for both enterprise and service provider networks. With a broad spectrum of traffic management capabilities and a versatile, high-performance, multi-purpose design, GigaVUE-HC3 helps to future-proof IT. There are two hardware models represented under this validation, which are specified by their respective unique hardware versions, stated below. Both hardware versions are validated with the same firmware version, share the same physical appearance, and only differ in terms of their power supplies. The firmware image applied to both hardware versions originates from the factory and the firmware status service identifies the module as version 5.9.00.05 The cryptographic module is defined as a multiple-chip standalone module with the following details: Table 1 - GigaVUE-HC3 Module Configurations | Model | Hardware Versions | Firmware | Tested Configuration | |---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1 | GVS-HC3A1 (Chassis) SMT-HC3-C05 (GigaSMART) CTL-HC3-002 (Controller) GVS-HC3-EXT | 5.9.00.05 | Slot 1: GigaSMART PN: SMT-HC3-C05 Slot 2: Blank (Faceplate Affixed) Slot 3: Blank (Faceplate Affixed) Slot 4: Blank (Faceplate Affixed) Lower Slot: GVS-HC3-EXT Internal: Controller PN: CTL-HC3-002 Power Supply: AC | | 2 | GVS-HC3A2 (Chassis) SMT-HC3-C05 (GigaSMART) CTL-HC3-002 (Controller) GVS-HC3-EXT | 5.9.00.05 | Slot 1: GigaSMART PN: SMT-HC3-C05 Slot 2: Blank (Faceplate Affixed) Slot 3: Blank (Faceplate Affixed) Slot 4: Blank (Faceplate Affixed) Lower Slot: GVS-HC3-EXT Internal: Controller PN: CTL-HC3-002 Power Supply: DC | | All | FIPS Tamper Labels SKU: ACC-HC0-FIPS | N/A | Tamper-Evident Seals | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 overall: Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements | Area | Description | Level | |--------|-----------------------------|---------| | 1 | Module Specification | 2 | | 2 | Ports and Interfaces | 2 | | 3 | Roles and Services | 3 | | 4 | Finite State Model | 2 | | 5 | Physical Security | 2 | | 6 | Operational Environment | N/A | | 7 | Key Management | 2 | | 8 | EMI/EMC | 2 | | 9 | Self-test | 2 | | 10 | Design Assurance | 3 | | 11 | Mitigation of Other Attacks | N/A | | | Overall | 2 | The modules have a non-modifiable operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definition. They include a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into these modules is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation. The modules do not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2. GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy ## 1.1 Hardware, Physical and Logical Cryptographic Boundary The physical forms of the two models are depicted in the figures below. For both models, the cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer edge of the chassis. The modules do not rely on external devices for input and output. The logical boundary is the same as the physical boundary. Figure 1 - GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 (Front of Module Chassis) Figure 2 - SMT-HC3-C05 (Populated in Slot 1 of Module Chassis) Figure 3 - GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 (Rear Chassis) GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces | Port | Device (# of ports) | Description | Logical Interface Type | |--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------| | Power Switch | SMT-HC3-C05  H/S (Hot Swap status) | On/Off Switch |  Control Input | | LEDs | GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 (GVS-HC3-EXT) RDY (HC3 status), PTP (Ethernet status), PPS (clock status), M/S (HC3 standalone or part of cluster), FAN, PWR SMT-HC3-C05 | Status LEDs |  Status Output | | RJ45 | GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 (GVS-HC3-EXT)  Management Port  PTP Port | Chassis Management Ports |  Data Input  Data Output  Control Input  Status Output | | Serial | GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 (GVS-HC3-EXT)  Console Port | Chassis Console Port |  Data Input  Data Output  Control Input  Status Output | | QSFP+ | SMT-HC3-C05  GigaSMART 5 x 40Gb (QSFP+) | LAN Communications |  Data Input  Data Output | | SFP+/SFP | GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 (GVS-HC3-EXT)  STACK, P/S 3 x 10Gb/1Gb (SFP+/SFP) | Chassis Ports |  Data Input  Data Output | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | USB | GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2  USB | Data Transfer |  Data Input  Data Output | |---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| | PPS(IN) | GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 | Pulse-per-second |  Data Input | | Power | GVS-HC3A1 and GVS-HC3A2 The chassis is powered by two separate power modules, providing redundant, load sharing power. The GVS-HC3A1 uses an AC power supply configuration with the following specification: 100-115V 200-240V 14A@100V 10A @200V 50/60Hz The GVS-HC3A2 uses a DC power supply configuration with the following specification: -40V to -72V 48A@-40V | Power Supply GVS-HC3A1 (AC) GVS-HC3A2 (DC) |  Power  Power Switch Control Input | ## 1.2 Mode of Operation The module implements both exclusive FIPS Approved and non-FIPS Approved modes, however an exception to this are some non-Approved security functions which are available in the exclusive FIPS Approved mode but will cause the module to operate in a non-Approved mode (by policy) if executed. These additional non-Approved security functions are listed accordingly in Table 9 of this security policy. The Crypto-Officer (admin) shall prepare the module for the FIPS Approved mode of operation by performing the following tasks: 1. The module will ship using a firmware other than the intended FIPS validated firmware version 5.9.00.05 . The firmware shall first be upgraded to this version by fetching firmware image 5.9.00.05 from Gigamon using either http(s) or ftp(s) as documented in the User Guide. GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy 2. The module firmware shall be loaded onto the module in the non-active partition using the 'image install <image name>' command. 3. The module firmware shall be loaded onto the module in the non-active partition. Once the load process is complete, it is imperative to ensure that the partition holding firmware version 5.9.00.05 is the one being initialized. Switching partitions to enable 5.9.00.05 may be accomplished by specifying 'image boot next' from the CLI (or may be selected at power-up from the menu). 4. To ensure that no authentication data is carried over from any previous session, the operator shall issue the command 'reset factory all' after the 'image boot next' command is issued. 5. The operator may then login using the default administrator account using the default credentials 'admin' with password 'admin123A!'. The operator will be presented with the option of executing the wizard. 6. Once the wizard executes, the operator shall change the default password. 7. Once the setup configuration is complete, the operator shall ensure that the module is running firmware version 5.9.00.05 by issuing the CLI command 'show version'. Failure to execute the firmware version 5.9.00.05 will result in a non-FIPS validated module . 8. To configure the module to use the FIPS Approved mode, the operator is required to perform ' system security fips' . Upon confirmation of this command, the module will automatically perform all necessary steps including reloading the module, which will then enter the Approved mode. For the selection of the non-Approved mode, the operator would use the command 'no system security fips' . This will result in complete key and CSP zeroization of those keys and CSPs which were generated in the FIPS Approved mode and will also leave the operator in a limited state of operation; whereby only a limited set of non-cryptographic services are available. (Switching from the non-Approved mode to the Approved mode will also zeroize all keys and CSPs.) Tables 11 and 12 of this security policy provides details about the available FIPS Approved and non-FIPS Approved services respectively. 9. The Crypto-Officer (CO) shall follow the instructions in Section 5 to apply the tamper seals to the module. The module may be configured to operate in an Approved mode of operation as specified in the instructions below. The module will be operating in the Approved mode once all instructions are completed and the module has successfully passed all power-on self-tests. ## 1.3 Zeroization The module has 6 specific methods of zeroizing keys/CSPs as follows: 1. System Power Cycle (All ephemeral keys are lost from RAM); 2. End of Protocol Session (All ephemeral keys are lost from RAM); 3. When operator deletes Key/CSP and saves configuration (persistent keys); 4. When FIPS Mode is enabled; 5. When FIPS Mode is disabled; and GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy 6. When Factory Reset of module is selected. There are no restrictions when plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs can be zeroized, and all keys are capable of being zeroized. The zeroization methods for each key are shown in Table 12. The time it takes to zeroize a key is approximately one second. Keys cannot be recovered after zeroization, since the configuration is saved after the deletion, such that the persistent keys are removed from the disk and there is no means to recover them afterward. Ephemeral keys are lost when power to the module ceases. Using the factory reset service will wipe the entire configuration of the module, including all keys and CSPs. If invoked, an operator will have to begin the configuration process again and create new operator accounts. Note: The Cryptographic Officer shall retain control of the module while zeroization is in process. GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy #### 2 Cryptographic Functionality The module implements FIPS Approved, non-FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 below. Table 10 summarizes the high-level protocol algorithm support. ## 2.1 Approved Algorithms References to standards are given in square bracket [ ]; see the References table. Table 4 - Approved Algorithms - Gigamon Linux-Based Cryptographic Library | CAVP Cert. | Algorithm | Mode | Description | Functions | |--------------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------| | 5554 | AES [197] | CBC [38A] | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 5554 | AES [197] | ECB [38A] | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 5554 | AES [197] | OFB [38A] | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 5554 | AES [197] | CFB1 [38A] | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 5554 | AES [197] | CFB8 [38A] | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 5554 | AES [197] | CFB128 [38A] | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 5554 | AES [197] | CTR [38A] | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 5554 | AES [197] | CMAC [38B] | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | Generate, Verify | | 5554 | AES [197] | CCM [38C] | Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 3702 | HMAC [198] | SHA-1 | KS < BS KS = BS KS > BS MAC: 10 12 16 20 | Message Authentication | | 3702 | HMAC [198] | SHA-224 | KS < BS KS = BS KS > BS MAC: 14 16 20 24 28 | Message Authentication | | 3702 | HMAC [198] | SHA-256 | KS < BS KS = BS KS > BS MAC: 16 24 32 | Message Authentication | | 3702 | HMAC [198] | SHA-384 | KS < BS KS = BS KS > BS MAC: 24 32 40 48 | Message Authentication | | 3702 | HMAC [198] | SHA-512 | KS < BS KS = BS KS > BS MAC: 32 40 48 56 64 | Message Authentication | | 4457 | SHS [180] | SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- 512 (All Byte Oriented) | SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- 512 (All Byte Oriented) | Message Digest Generation | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | 2795 | Triple-DES [67] 1 | TCBC [38A] | Key Size: 192 | Encrypt, Decrypt | |--------|---------------------|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| | 2795 | Triple-DES [67] 1 | TCFB1 [38A] | Key Size: 192 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 2795 | Triple-DES [67] 1 | TCFB8 [38A] | Key Size: 192 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 2795 | Triple-DES [67] 1 | TCFB64 [38A] | Key Size: 192 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 2795 | Triple-DES [67] 1 | TOFB [38A] | Key Size: 192 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 2795 | Triple-DES [67] 1 | TECB [38A] | Key Size: 192 | Encrypt, Decrypt | | 2795 | Triple-DES [67] 1 | CMAC [38B] | Key Size: 192 | Verification Using 3-Key | | 1991 2 | CVL | [56A] | ECC CDH Primitive (Section 5.7.1.2) Component: Curves tested: P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571 KAS ECC: Domain Parameter Generation, Domain Parameter Validation, Full Public Key Validation, Key Pair Generation EC: Curve: P-256, SHA: SHA-256 ED: Curve: P-384, SHA: SHA-384 EE: Curve: P-521, SHA: SHA-512 | Key Agreement | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | C1325 | CVL | [800-135] | SSH | SSH Key Derivation Component | |---------|-------------|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------| | 2209 | DRBG [90A] | Hash | SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 | Random Number Generation Symmetric Key Generation | | 2209 | DRBG [90A] | HMAC | SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 | Random Number Generation Symmetric Key Generation | | 2209 | DRBG [90A] | CTR | AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 | Random Number Generation Symmetric Key Generation | | 1428 | DSA [186-4] | PQG Generation | L= 2048, 3072 N= 224, 256 SHA = 224, 256, 384 and 512 ( Note1 : N= 224 is only approved for L= 2048) ( Note2 : SHA-224 is only approved for L=2048 N=224.) | Digital Signature Operations | | 1428 | DSA [186-4] | PQG Verification | L= 1024, 2048, 3072 N= 160, 224, 256 SHA = 1,224, 256, 384 and 512 ( Note1 : SHA-1 is only approved for L= 1024) ( Note2 : SHA-224 is only approved for L= 1024 and L=2048) ( Note3: N=160 is only approved for L=1024, N=224 is only approved for L=2048, N=256 is only approved for L=2048 and 3072) | Digital Signature Operations | | 1428 | DSA [186-4] | Key Pair | L= 2048, 3072 N= 224, 256 ( Note: N=224 is only | Digital Signature Operations | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | | | | approved for L=2048) | | |------|------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | Signature Generation | L= 2048, 3072 N= 224, 256 SHA = 224, 256, 384 and 512 ( Note: N=224 is only approved for L=2048) | | | | | Signature Verification | L= 1024, 2048, 3072 SHA=1,224, 256, 384, 512 N= 160, 224 and 256 ( Note: N=160 is only approved for L=1024 and N=224 is only approved for L=2048) | | | 1497 | ECDSA [186- 4] 3 | Key Pair | Curves: B-233, B-283, B- 409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P- 256, P-384, P-521 | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Operations (The Module supports only NIST defined curves for use with ECDSA | | | | Public Key Validation | Curves: B-233, B-283, B- 409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K- 571, P-224, P- 256, P-384, P-521 | and ECDH.) | | | | Signature Generation | Curve/SHA pairs tested: P = 224, 256, 384 and 521 /w SHA-224, 256, 384 and 512. K = 233, 283, 409 and 571 /w SHA-224, 256, 384 and 512. B = 233, 283, 409 and 571 /w SHA-224, 256, 384 and 512. | | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | | | Signature Verification | Curve/SHA pairs tested: P = 224, 256, 384 and 521 /w SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512. K = 233, 283, 409 and 571 /w SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512. B = 233, 283, 409 and 571 /w SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512. | | |------|-------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------| | 2984 | RSA [186-2] | Signature Verification 9.31 | Modulus lengths: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096 SHAs: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 | RSA Digital Signature Operations | | 2984 | RSA [186-2] | Signature Verification PKCS1.5 | Modulus lengths: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096 SHAs: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- 512 | RSA Digital Signature Operations | | 2984 | RSA [186-2] | Signature Verification PSS | Modulus lengths: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096 SHAs: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- 512 | RSA Digital Signature Operations | | 2984 | RSA [186-4] | Signature Generation 9.31 | Mod 2048 SHA: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 Mod 3072 SHA: SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512 | RSA Digital Signature Operations | | 2984 | RSA [186-4] | Signature Generation PKCS1.5 | Mod 2048 SHA: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- 512 Mod 3072 SHA: SHA- 224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 | RSA Digital Signature Operations | | 2984 | RSA [186-4] | Signature Generation PSS | Mod 2048: SHA-224: Salt Length: 0 SHA-256: Salt Length: 0 SHA-384: Salt Length: 0 SHA-512: Salt Length: 0 Mod 3072: SHA-224: Salt Length: 0 SHA-256: Salt Length: 0 SHA-384: Salt Length: 0 SHA-512: Salt Length: 0 | RSA Digital Signature Operations | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | Signature Verification 9.31 | Mod 1024 SHA: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- 512 Mod 2048 SHA: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- 512 Mod 3072 SHA: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA- | |--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Signature Verification PKCS1.5 | 512 Mod 1024 SHA: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512 Mod 2048 SHA: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512 Mod 3072 SHA: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512 | | Signature Verification PSS | Mod 1024: SHA-1: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-224: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-256: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-384: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-512: Salt Length: 0 (bits) Mod 2048: SHA-1: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-224: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-256: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-384: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-512: Salt Length: 0 (bits) Mod 3072: SHA-1: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-224: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-256: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-384: Salt Length: 0 (bits) SHA-512: Salt Length: 0 (bits) | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Table 4a - Vendor Affirmed Security Functions - Gigamon Linux-Based Cryptographic Library | CAVP Cert. | Algorithm | Mode | Description | Functions | |--------------|-------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------| | N/A | CKG | NIST SP 800-133 | Key generation using unmodified DRBG output | Symmetric & Asymmetric Key Generation (RSA key generation non-Approved) | ###### Table 5 - Approved Algorithms - Cavium Hardware Libraries (CN7890) | CAVP Cert. | Algorithm | Mode | Description | Functions | |--------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| | 819 | DRBG [90A] 4 | Counter | AES-256 | Random Bit Generation | | 3301 | AES [197] 5 | CBC, ECB | 128, 192, 256 | Encrypt/Decrypt | | 2095 | HMAC [198] | SHA-1 | HMAC-SHA-1 Key Size = Block Size | Message Authentication, KDF Primitive | | 2095 | HMAC [198] | SHA-224 | HMAC-SHA-224 Key Size = Block Size | Message Authentication, KDF Primitive | | 2095 | HMAC [198] | SHA-256 | HMAC-SHA-256 Key Size = Block Size | Message Authentication, KDF Primitive | | 2095 | HMAC [198] | SHA-384 | HMAC-SHA-384 Key Size = Block Size | Message Authentication, KDF Primitive | | 2095 | HMAC [198] | SHA-512 | HMAC-SHA-512 Key Size = Block Size | Message Authentication, KDF Primitive | | 2737 | SHS [180] | SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 | SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 | Message Digest Generation | | 1745 | RSA [186-4] | Signature Generation PKCS1.5 | Mod 2048 SHA: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512 Mod 3072 SHA: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512 | RSA Digital Signature Operations | | 1745 | RSA [186-4] | Signature Verification PKCS1.5 | Mod 1024 SHA: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512 Mod 2048 SHA: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512 Mod 3072 SHA: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512 | RSA Digital Signature Operations | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Table 6 - Approved Algorithms - Cavium OpenSSL Library 1.1.1b (CN7890) | CAVP Cert. | Algorithm | Mode | Description | Functions | |--------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | C1666 | CVL | [800-56A] | ECC CDH: Primitive Curves: P-224, P-256, P- 384, P-521 | ECC CDH Primitive Component | | C1666 | CVL | [800-135] | TLS: Supports TLS 1.0/1.1 Supports TLS 1.2: SHA Functions: SHA-256 | TLS Key Derivation Component | | C1666 | ECDSA 6 [186- 4] | Key Pair | Curves: P-224, P- 256, P- 384, P-521 | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Operations | | C1666 | ECDSA 6 [186- 4] | Public Key Validation | Curves: P-224, P-256, P- 384, P-521 | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Operations | | C1666 | ECDSA 6 [186- 4] | Signature Generation | Curve/SHA pairs tested: P = 224, 256, 384 and 521 /w SHA-224, 256, 384 and 512. | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Operations | | C1666 | ECDSA 6 [186- 4] | Signature Verification | Curve/SHA pairs tested: P = 224, 256, 384 and 521 /w SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512. | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Operations | ## 2.2 Allowed Algorithms 6 ECDSA, P-192 is non-Approved because the security strength it provides is less than the required 112 bits. SHA-1 is not to be used for signature generation. GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Table 7 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions | Algorithm | Caveat | Use | Library | CAVP Cert. # | |-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------| | Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman [IG] D.8 | Provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength. | key agreement; key establishment | Gigamon Linux Crypto Library 1.0 | Cert. #1991 Cert. #C1325 | | Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman [IG] D.8 | Provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength. | key agreement; key establishment | Cavium OpenSSL 1.1.1b | Cert. #C1666 | Table 7a - Entropy Sources | Algorithm | Use | |-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | NDRNG1 | Underlying OS based NDRNG (Allowed in the Approved mode) provides at least 256 bits of entropy per second | | NDRNG2 | Internal Hardware Cavium based NDRNG (Allowed in the Approved mode) provides full entropy per call (if x bits are requested then the x bits have x bits of entropy) | Table 7b - other non-Approved algorithms | Algorithm | Use | |---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | AES-GCM 128,192,256 | Only used in non-Approved mode for encryption/decryption of data | | AES-XTS | Only used in non-Approved mode for encryption/decryption of data for storage applications only | | 128,256 | | The algorithms in Table 7b are not to be use in the Approved mode by policy. These two algorithms are not disabled when the module is in the Approved mode. ## 2.3 Protocols Table 8 - Protocols Allowed and Disallowed in FIPS Mode | Protocol | Key Exchange | Auth | Ciphers | Integrity | |------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------| | SSH | EC Diffie-Hellman: P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 (Allowed in the Approved mode) SSH KDF: CMVP Cert. #C1325 | ECDSA | AES-128-CBC AES-256-CBC Triple-DES-CBC AES-128-CTR AES-256-CTR AES-192-CTR | HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-256 HMAC-SHA-512 | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | TLS HTTPS, FTPS, SMTP/S POP3/S | EC Diffie-Hellman: P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 (Allowed in the Approved mode) TLS KDF: CMVP Cert. #C1666 | ECDSA RSA | Triple-DES AES 128 AES 256 | SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 | |----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------| | SCP | EC Diffie-Hellman: P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 (Allowed in the Approved mode) | ECDSA RSA | Triple-DES AES 128 AES 256 | SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 | | SFTP | EC Diffie-Hellman: P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 (Allowed in the Approved mode) | ECDSA RSA | Triple-DES AES 128 AES 256 | SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 | | TACACS+ | Use of this TACACS+ protocol will cause the module to operate in a non-Approved mode , due to its use of MD5. | HMAC- MD5 | N/A | N/A | | SNMP | Use of this SNMP protocol will cause the module to operate in a non-Approved mode , due to its use of MD5 and DES. | MD5 SHA-1 DES AES | N/A | N/A | | LDAP | Use of this SNMP protocol will cause the module to operate in a non-Approved mode , due to its use of MD5. | HMAC- MD5 | N/A | N/A | | RADIUS | Use of this RADIUS protocol will cause the module to operate in a non-Approved mode , due to its use of MD5. | MD5 | N/A | N/A | No part of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The SSH algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In reference to the Protocols in Table 8 above: each column of options for a given protocol is independent and may be used in any viable combination. ## 2.4 No Security Claimed but allowed protocols The module supports the following non-Approved but allowed protocols with no security claimed: ARP, CDP, DHCP, DHCPv6, FTP, GRE (disabled in FIPS Mode), GTP (disabled in FIPS Mode), HTTP, IGMP, ICMP, ISL, IPv4, IPv6, LLDP, MPLS (disabled in FIPS Mode), NTP, PDP, SNMP, TCP, Telnet, TFTP and UDP GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy ## 2.5 Disallowed Algorithms These algorithms are non-Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is operated in an Approved mode of operation. They are all available when the module is not configured to operate in the Approved mode. -  DES; -  IDEA; -  RC2; -  RC4; -  MD5; -  CAMELLIA128; -  CAMELLIA256; -  PSK; -  SEED; -  KRB5; and -  RSA (KeyGen) not compliant to FIPS 184-4 GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy ## 2.6 Critical Security Parameters All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section. The access type for each is specified as: R=Read, W=Write or D=Delete . Table 9 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) | Keys / CSPs | Storage | Origin | Method | Input | Output | Zeroization (RAM) | Zeroization (Disk) | Access | |-----------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|-----------|----------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | AES Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | API Call | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | Triple-DES Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | API Call | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | RSA Public Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Non- compliant | Plaintext | API Call | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | RSA Private Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Non- compliant | Plaintext | API Call | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | DSA Public Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | API Call | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | |-------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------|------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| | DSA Private Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | API Call | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | HMAC Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | API Call | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | NDRNG1 entropy | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | API Call | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | NDRNG2 entropy | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | API Call | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | ECDSA Private Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | ECDSA Public Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | |--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| | EC Diffie-Hellman Public Components | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated using FIPS 186-4 methods, Established | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | EC Diffie-Hellman Private Components | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated using FIPS 186-4 methods | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | HMAC DRBG Entropy | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | HMAC DRBG V Value (Seed Length) | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | HMAC DRBG Key | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode | CO: RWD U: RWD | | | | | | | | Mode  Factory Reset |  Factory Reset | | |---------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|-----------|------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | HMAC DRBG init_seed | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | Hash DRBG Entropy | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | Hash DRBG V Value (Seed Length) | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | Hash DRBG C Value | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | Hash DRBG init_seed | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | CTR DRBG Entropy | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | | | | | | |  Factory Reset | | | |--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------|----------|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | CTR DRBG V Value (Seed Length) | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | CTR DRBG Key Value | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | CTR DRBG init_seed | RAM (Active) Disk (Persistent) | Internally Generated | Plaintext | None | None |  Reboot  Session End  User Deletes Key  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset |  User Deletes Key/Saves Config  Disable/Enable FIPS Mode  Factory Reset | CO: RWD U: RWD | | TLS premaster secret | RAM (Active) | Internally Generated/ Established | Plaintext | None | None |  Destroyed after master secret is calculated. | N/A | CO: RWD U: RWD | | TLS master secret | RAM | Internally Generated/ Established | Plaintext | None | None |  Destroyed when SSL session keys are derived or stored in session cache which will be power cycle cleansed later. | N/A | CO: RWD U: RWD | | TLS session keys | RAM | Internally Generated/ Established | Plaintext | None | None |  Destroyed when SSL session is closed. | N/A | CO: RWD U: RWD | | Crypto-Officer Password | Disk (Persistent) | Entered | Plaintext | API Call | None |  N/A |  Destroyed upon deletion of account or factory reset. | CO: RWD U: RWD | | User Password | Disk (Persistent) | Entered | Plaintext | API Call | None |  N/A |  Destroyed upon deletion of account or factory reset. | CO: RWD U: RWD | |-----------------|---------------------|-----------|-------------|------------|--------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------| #### 3 Roles, Authentication and Services ## 3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent operators but does not support a maintenance role or bypass capability. The module enforces the separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication. The Crypto-Officer can create additional operators which have either 'regular' or 'monitor' capabilities, and thus the roles in the module are Admin (Crypto-Officer), Regular User (User) and Monitor User (User). ## 3.2 Authentication Methods The module implements two methods of authentication. The first method involves Identity-Based authentication, in the form of username and password. The Crypto-Officer can change the password lengths of the module, however the lower threshold enforced by the module is 8-characters. The password length can go as high as 30 characters. Additionally, the module enforces the following password requirements: -  At least 1 numeric character; -  At least 1 upper case character; -  At least 1 lower case character; and -  At least 1 special character. The chance of a random password attempt succeeding is 94 8 which is consistent with the number (94) of keyboard selections on a standard US keyboard, as applied to an 8-character password, which is the minimum allowed. The odds of randomly guessing the password supersedes the FIPS 140-2 requirement of 1 in 1,000,000. The module also ensures that the probability is less than 1 in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed, or a false acceptance will occur within one minute. The module locks out the login process for 15 seconds after 5 incorrect login attempts. Assuming the attacker could make one attempt per second, they would reach the lockout threshold after 5 seconds, resulting in a 15 second delay. This process could only be repeated 3 times within 60 seconds; therefore, the attacker could realistically only make 15 attempts within one minute. This equates to 15 in 94 8 attempts. When a user logs in, the feedback mechanism does not provide information that could be used to guess or determine the authentication data and the strength of the authentication is not weakened. For the SSH session, the module uses ECDSA public/private key authentication. The odds of guessing the value of the private key would well exceed the threshold of 1 in 1,000,000 or 1 in 100,000 within a minute, since guessing the value of the key would be equivalent to guessing a value of 2 112. .The user creates an ECDSA public/private key pair using one of the Approved elliptic curves. The smallest size of the elliptic curves is p-224 which has a security strength of 112 bits. Assuming 512 attempts per second could be made (an overestimate by a wide margin) the probability of guessing the key pair in a 1 minute period is 1 in 60*512/2^112 which is smaller than 1 in 64*512/2^112 = 1 in 2^(112-9-6) = 1 in 2^97 which easily exceeds the requirement of 1 in 100,000. The implemented ECDSA uses the NIST recommended curves (specified in Table 4); which effectively provide encryption strengths in the range of 112, 128, 192 and >256 respectively. Please see [NIST 186-4, Table D-1] for more information. GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy ## 3.3 Services All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 15 lists the access to CSPs by each service. Table 10 - Approved Services | Service | Description | CO (admin) | User (regular) | User (monitor) | |-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------------|------------------| | Status | Show status | X | X | X | | Module Self-Tests | Self-Tests performed automatically | X | | | | Zeroize | Destroy all CSPs | X | | | | SSH Connect | Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI) | X | X | | | Console Access | Console monitoring and control (CLI) | X | X | | | Factory Reset | Reset module to factory defaults | X | | | | Backup/Restore Configuration File | Write Mem/Config Switch-to | X | X | | | Firmware Upgrade | Install Firmware Image | X | | | | Logging controls | Show Log/Log File Rotation | X | X | X (View Only) | | Configure | Configure module parameters | X | | | | Account Controls | Creation and Administration of users and roles | X | | | | Traffic Operation | Creating traffic through data path | X | | | | Run On-Demand Self-Tests | Execute self-test on demand (power cycle) | X | | | | Configure Security | Configure Security Related Parameters Including Key Chain Password | X | | | | Group Controls | (RBAC/AAA Control) | X | | | | Establish Keys | Key establishment methodology (EC Diffie-Hellman) | X | | | | Encrypt/Decrypt | Encrypt/Decrypt operation (invoked as part of protocols) | X | | | | Generate Keys | Key generation service DRBG | X | | | | Signature Generation | Signature generation service (RSA) | X | | | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | Signature Verification | Verification signature service (DSA, RSA, ECDSA) | X | | |--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----| | TLS Connect | Connecting to the module (CC) over TLS | X | | | SCP Connect | Copy image and log configuration files through secure channel | X | X | | SFTP Connect | Copy image and log configuration files through secure channel | X | X | ## 3.4 Non-Approved Services The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. These services are generally the same as the Approved services, with the exception that they may utilize cryptography which the module disallows in the Approved mode. Table 11 - non-Approved Services | Service | Description | CO (admin) | User (regular) | User (monitor) | |-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------------|------------------| | Status | Show status | X | X | X | | Zeroize | Destroy all CSPs | X | | | | SSH Connect | Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI) | X | X | | | Console Access | Console monitoring and control (CLI) | X | X | | | Factory Reset | Reset module to factory defaults | X | | | | Backup/Restore Configuration File | Write Mem/Config Switch-to | X | X | | | Firmware Upgrade | Install Firmware Image | X | | | | Logging controls | Show Log/Log File Rotation | X | X | X (View Only) | | Configure | Configure modules parameters | X | | | | Account Controls | Creation and Administration of users and roles | X | | | | Traffic Operation | Creating traffic through data path | X | | | | Run On-Demand Self-Tests | Execute self-test on demand (power cycle) | X | | | | Configure Security | Configure Security Related Parameters Including Key Chain Password | X | | | | Group Controls | (RBAC/AAA Control) | X | | | | Establish Keys | Key establishment methodology (EC Diffie-Hellman , RSA) | X | | | | Encrypt/Decrypt | Encrypt/Decrypt operation | X | | | | Generate Keys | Key generation service DRBG | X | | | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | Signature Generation | Signature generation service (RSA) | X | | | |--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----|----| | Signature Verification | Verification signature service (DSA, RSA, ECDSA) | X | | | | Traffic Operation | Creating traffic through data path | X | | | | Run On-Demand Self-Tests | Execute self-test on demand (power cycle) | X | | | | Configure Security | Configure Security Related Parameters Including Key Chain Password | X | | | | TACACS+ | Authentication Server to all roles | X | X | X | | SNMP | Configuring SNMP to all roles | X | X | | | LDAP | Authentication Server to all roles | X | X | X | | RADIUS | Authentication Server to all roles | X | X | X | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | Service | AES Key | Triple-DES Key | RSA Public Key | RSA Private Key | DSA Public Key | DSA Private Key | HMAC Key | NDRNG1 entropy | NDRNG2 entropy | ECDSA Private Key | ECDSA Public Key | EC Diffie-Hellman Public Components | EC Diffie-Hellman Private Components | DRBG Entropy | DRBG V Value (HMAC & CTR DRBG) | DRBG Key Value (HMAC & CTR DRBG) | DRBG init_seed (All DRBG types) | DRBG C Value (Hash DRBG) | TLS premaster secret | TLS master secret | TLS session keys | CO-Password | User-Password | |-----------------------------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------| | Traffic Operation | -- | -- RW | G GR | | - - | -- | GR | GZR | GZR | GR | GW R | GR | GR | GR | -- | GR | GR | -- | GR | GR | GR | -- | -- | | Configure Security | RE W G | -- | GW R | GW | - - | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | Configure | -- | -- | -- -- | | - - | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | GW | GW | | Status | -- | -- | R | -- | - - | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | R | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | Zeroize | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | | | | SSH Connect | -- | -- | -- | -- | - - | -- | -- | -- | -- | RWG | RWG | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | RE | RE | | Console Access | -- | -- | -- | -- | - - | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | RE | RE | | Factory Reset | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZ | WZG | WZ | | Backup/Restore Configuration File | R W | -- | RW | RW | - - | -- | -- | -- | -- | RW | RW | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | RW | RW | | Firmware Upgrade | -- | -- | -- | -- | - - | -- | R -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | |------------------------------------|------|------|-------|------|-------|------|--------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|---------| | Logging controls | -- | -- | -- -- | - - | -- | R | -- | -- | -- | R -- | -- | | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | | -- | -- | | Group Controls | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | | -- | -- | | Establish Keys | R W | -- | RW RW | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | RW | RW | RW | RW RW | RW | RW | RW | RW RW | RW | -- | | -- | -- | | Encrypt/Decrypt | R W | R W | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | Generate Keys | G | G | G G | -- | -- | G | G | G | G | G | G | G | G G | G | G | G | G | G | G | -- | -- | | Signature Generation | -- | -- | -- W | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | W | -- | -- | W | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | | -- | -- | | Signature Verification | -- | -- | R -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | R | R -- | | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | | -- | -- | -- | | Module Self-Tests (Automatic POST) | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | Run On-Demand Self-Tests | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | TLS Connect | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- RW | RW | RW | RW | | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | RW RW | | RW | -- | -- | | SCP Connect | -- | -- | RW RW | RW | RW | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | | -- | -- | -- | | SFTP Connect | -- | -- | RW RW | RW | RW | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | Account Controls | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | RW | RW | ###### Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services ####### Legend G = Generate: The module generates the CSP R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output) E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP. #### 4 Self-tests Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly, and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the module. When power is applied to the module, it requires no operator intervention to execute the power-up self-tests. The firmware integrity test located on the CC card side, verifies all firmware components used within the module. This includes all files on both the CC card and the GS card. If no error message is displayed on the console after the FIPS Approved mode has been invoked and after self-tests have successfully executed, the status of the module is considered to be operating in the FIPS Approved mode. On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All self-tests must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the tests fails, the module enters the Critical Failure error state. An operator may attempt to clear a self-test error by powercycling the module, however a persistent error in the firmware integrity test or known answer tests will likely require the operator to contact Gigamon for service. The module performs the following power-up self-tests: Table 13 - Module Self-Tests | Algorithm | Card | CAVP Library | CAVP Cert. # | Test Type | |-------------------|--------|--------------------|----------------|-------------------------| | DRBG Health | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #819 | Power-Up - Critical | | CTR_DRBG | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #819 | Power-Up KAT | | Entropy Check | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #819 | Conditional - CRNGT | | AES | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #3301 | Power-Up KAT (E/D) | | SHA-1 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2737 | Power-Up KAT | | SHA-224 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2737 | Power-Up KAT | | SHA-256 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2737 | Power-Up KAT | | SHA-384 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2737 | Power-Up KAT | | SHA-512 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2737 | Power-Up KAT | | HMAC-SHA-1 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2095 | Power-Up KAT | | HMAC-SHA-224 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2095 | Power-Up KAT | | HMAC-SHA-256 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2095 | Power-Up KAT | | HMAC-SHA-384 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2095 | Power-Up KAT | | HMAC-SHA-512 | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #2095 | Power-Up KAT | | RSA | GS | Cavium Hardware | Cert. #1745 | Power-Up KAT | | ECDSA | GS | Cavium SSL Library | Cert. #C1666 | Power-Up KAT | | ECDSA | GS | Cavium SSL Library | Cert. #C1666 | Conditional - PWCT | | EC Diffie-Hellman | GS | Cavium SSL Library | Cert. #C1666 | Power-Up KAT | | SHA-256 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #4457 | Power-Up - FW Integrity | | SHA-1 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #4457 | Power-Up KAT | | SHA-224 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #4457 | Power-Up KAT | | SHA-256 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #4457 | Power-Up KAT | | SHA-384 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #4457 | Power-Up KAT | | SHA-512 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #4457 | Power-Up KAT | | HMAC-SHA-1 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #3702 | Power-Up KAT | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | HMAC-SHA-224 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #3702 | Power-Up KAT | |-----------------------------------|------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------------| | HMAC-SHA-256 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #3702 | Power-Up KAT | | HMAC-SHA-384 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #3702 | Power-Up KAT | | HMAC-SHA-512 | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #3702 | Power-Up KAT | | AES | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #5554 | Power-Up KAT (E/D) | | AES-CCM | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #5554 | Power-Up KAT | | AES-CMAC | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #5554 | Power-Up KAT | | Triple-DES | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #2795 | Power-Up KAT (E/D) | | Triple-DES CMAC | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #2785 | Power-Up KAT | | RSA | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #2984 | Power-Up KAT | | RSA | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #2984 | Conditional - PWCT | | DSA | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #1428 | Power-Up KAT | | DSA | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #1428 | Conditional - PWCT | | CTR_DRBG | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #2209 | Power-Up KAT | | HASH_DRBG | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #2209 | Power-Up KAT | | HMAC_DRBG | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #2209 | Power-Up KAT | | Entropy Check | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #2209 | Conditional - CRNGT | | DRBG Health | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #2209 | Power-Up - Critical | | ECDSA | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #1497 | Power-Up KAT | | ECDSA | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #1497 | Conditional - PWCT | | EC Diffie-Hellman | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #1991 | Power-Up KAT | | Firmware Load Test (HMAC-SHA-256) | CC | Gigamon Linux Lib | Cert. #3702 | Conditional Load Test | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy #### 5 Physical Security Policy The module's physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 2 Physical Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a hard metal enclosure and maintains opacity. The tamper-evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS mode of operation. Tamper-evident seals allow the operator to tell if the enclosure has been breached. These seals are not factory-installed and must be applied by the Cryptographic Officer. Extra seals are provided with the original kit to replace any damaged seals. Additional kits can be ordered directly from Gigamon using SKU: ACC-HC0-FIPS. Inquiries for procurement of additional tamper seals should be sent to sales@gigamon.com. The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals and the direct control and observation of any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the tamper-evident seals or security appliances are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to a FIPS Approved state. Table 14 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines | Physical Security Mechanism | Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test | Inspection/Test Guidance Details | |---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------| | Tamper seals, opaque metal enclosure. | Periodic inspection schedule to be determined by Crypto- Officer. | Seals should be free of any tamper evidence. | If the Cryptographic Officer observes tamper evidence, it shall be assumed that the device has been compromised. The Cryptographic Officer shall retain control of the module and perform Zeroization of the module's CSPs by following the steps in Section 1.3 of the Security Policy and then follow the steps in Section 1.2 to place the module back into a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. ## 5.1 General Tamper Evident Label Placement and Application Instructions For instructions regarding the placement of the tamper seals and the requisite preparation requirements, please see Appendix A of this document. GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy #### 6 Security Rules and Guidance The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context specifically refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements indicate a security rule implemented by the module. 1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle. 2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services. 3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action. 4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. 5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service. 7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role. 8. The module does not support manual key entry. 9. The module does not output intermediate key values. 10. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process. 11. Per SP800-67 rev1, the User is responsible for ensuring the module's limit to 2 20 encryptions with the same Triple-DES key. 12. Gigamon uses a bonded courier for the shipment of the hardware module to the customer. Their trusted couriers include Fedex, Expeditors and MainFreight. The latest firmware can be downloaded from the Gigamon website. 13. Using AES-XTS will put the module into the non-Approved mode 14. Using AES_GCM will put the module into the non-Approved mode #### 7 References and Definitions The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy. ###### Table 15 - References | Abbreviation | Full Specification Name | |----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [FIPS140-2] | Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules , May 25, 2001 | | [IG] | Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program | | [135] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011. | | [186] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013. | | [197] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001 | | [38A] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001 | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy | [38D] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800- 38D, November 2007 | |---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [198] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198- 1, July, 2008 | | [180] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015 | | [67] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, May 2004 | | [90A] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, June 2015. | ###### Table 16 - Acronyms and Definitions | Acronym | Definition | |------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| | AES | Advanced Encryption Standard | | DSA | Digital Signature Algorithm | | ECDH | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman | | ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm | | E/D | Encrypt/Decrypt | | FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standard | | HMAC | Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code | | MD5 | Message Digest 5 | | RE | Routing Engine | | RSA | Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc. | | SHA | Secure Hash Algorithms | | SSH | Secure Shell | | Triple-DES | Triple - Data Encryption Standard | GigaVUE-HC3 Visibility Appliance - Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy #### 8 Appendix A - Tamper Seal Preparation and Placement