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SafeNet Software Cryptographic Library
Version 1.0
FIPS 140-2 Level 1
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
DOCUMENT NUMBER: 002-010836-001
REVISION LEVEL: F
REVISION DATE: November 30, 2015
SECURITY LEVEL: Non-Proprietary
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PREFACE
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the SafeNet Software Cryptographic
Library in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More
information is available on SafeNet products from the following sources:
 The SafeNet internet site contains information on the full line of security products at
http://www.safenet-inc.com/products/data-protection/.
 For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed below
or on the SafeNet internet site at http://www.safenet-inc.com/company/contact.asp.
SafeNet Contact Information:
SafeNet, Inc. (Corporate Headquarters) 4690 Millennium Drive
Belcamp, MD 21017
Telephone: 410-931-7500
TTY Users: 800-735-2258
Fax: 410-931-7524
SafeNet Sales:
U.S. (800) 533-3958
International 1 (410) 931-7500
SafeNet Technical Support:
U.S. (800) 545-6608
International 1 (410) 931-7520
SafeNet Customer Service:
U.S. (866) 251-4269
EMEA +44 (0) 1276 60 80 00
APAC 852 3157 7111
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................4
2 Tested Configurations...................................................................................................................5
3 Ports and Interfaces......................................................................................................................6
4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality.................................................................6
4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys......................................................................10
5 Roles, Authentication and Services ............................................................................................ 12
6 Self-test.......................................................................................................................................14
7 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................15
8 Design Assurance........................................................................................................................15
8.1 Configuration Management................................................................................................ 15
8.2 Delivery and Operation .......................................................................................................15
9 Mitigation of other attacks.........................................................................................................16
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1 Introduction
This document comprises the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the SafeNet Software
Cryptographic Library v1.0, hereafter referred to as the Module.
Block Diagram
The Module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API) for use
by other processes that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified by FIPS 140-2
as a software module, multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The physical cryptographic
boundary is the general purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical
cryptographic boundary of the Module is the fipscanister object module, a single object module
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file named fipscanister.o. The Module performs no communications other than with the calling
application (the process that invokes the Module services).
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security NA
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks NA
Table 1 – Security Level of Security Requirements
The Module’s software version for this validation is v1.0.
2 Tested Configurations
Operational Environment Processor
Optimizations
(Target)
Hardware Device
1 Windows Server 2008R2 Intel Xeon E3-1220v2 (x86) AES-NI Dell PowerEdge
R210II
2 Windows Server 2008 Intel Xeon E3-1220v2 (x86) none Dell PowerEdge
R210II
3 Windows 7 (64-bit) Intel Core i5-2430M (x86) AES-NI Acer Aspire AS5750
4 Windows 7 (32-bit) Intel Core i5-2430M (x86) none Acer Aspire AS5750
5 NetBSD 4.0 under Intel Xeon E3-1220v2 (x86) AES-NI Dell PowerEdge
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VMware R210II
6 Android 4.0 OMAP3 (ARMv7) NEON Beagleboard xM
7 RHEL 6.2 Intel Xeon E3-1220v2 (x86) AES-NI Dell PowerEdge
R210II
8 CentOS 5.6 Intel Xeon 3050 (x86) none Dell PowerEdge
860
Table 2 - Supported Platforms
3 Ports and Interfaces
The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is executing.
The logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API).
Logical interface type Description
Control input API entry point and corresponding stack parameters
Data input API entry point data input stack parameters
Status output API entry point return values and status stack parameters
Data output API entry point data output stack parameters
Table 3 - Logical interfaces
As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the
module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output
interface is inhibited. The module is single-threaded and in error scenarios returns only an error
value (no data output is returned).
4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality
The Module supports only a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. Tables 4a and 4b list the Approved and
Non-approved but Allowed algorithms, respectively.
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Function Algorithm Options Cert #
Random Number
Generation;
Symmetric key
generation
[SP 800-90A] DRBG1
Prediction resistance
supported for all variations
Hash DRBG
HMAC DRBG, no reseed
CTR DRBG (AES), no derivation function
283
Encryption,
Decryption and
CMAC
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES 3-Key TDES TECB, TCBC, TCFB, TOFB; CMAC
generate and verify
1434
[FIPS 197] AES 128/192/256 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB 1, CFB 8,
CFB 128, CTR; CCM; GCM; CMAC generate
and verify; 128/256 XTS
2286
[SP 800-38B] CMAC
[SP 800-38C] CCM
[SP 800-38D] GCM
[SP 800-38E] XTS
Message Digests [FIPS 180-4] SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 1967
Keyed Hash [FIPS 198-1] HMAC SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 1402
Digital Signature and
Asymmetric Key
Generation
[FIPS 186-2] RSA GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5,
SigGenPSS (2048/3072/4096)
SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, SigVerPSS
(1024/1536/2048/3072/4096 with all SHA sizes)
1176
[FIPS 186-2] DSA2
PQG Ver, Sig Ver (1024 with SHA-1 only) 714
[FIPS 186-4] DSA Key Pair Gen (2048/3072)
PQG Gen, Sig Gen (2048/3072 with all SHA-2
sizes)
PQG Ver, Sig Ver (1024/2048/3072 with all SHA
sizes)
[FIPS 186-2] ECDSA PKG: CURVES (P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-233 K-
283 K-409 K-571 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571)
PKV, SigVer: CURVES (P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384
P-521 K-163 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-163 B-
233 B-283 B-409 B-571)
370
1 For all DRBGs the "supported security strengths" is just the highest supported security strength per [SP800-90] and
[SP800-57].
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[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA PKG: CURVES (P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-233 K-
283 K-409 K-571 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571)
PKV: CURVES (ALL-P ALL-K ALL-B)
SigGen: CURVES (P-224: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) P-256: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-384:
(SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-1, 224,
256, 384, 512) K-233: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) K-283: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-409:
(SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-571: (SHA-1, 224,
256, 384, 512) B-233: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) B-283: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-409:
(SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-571: (SHA-1, 224,
256, 384, 512) )
SigVer: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) P-224: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-256:
(SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-1, 224,
256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-233:
(SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-1, 224,
256, 384, 512) K-409: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) K-571: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512 B-163:
(SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-233: (SHA-1, 224,
256, 384, 512) B-283: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) B-409: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-571:
(SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) )
ECC CDH (CVL)
[SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2) All NIST defined B, K and P curves except sizes
163 and 192
45
Table 4a – FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions
The Module supports only NIST defined curves for use with ECDSA and ECC CDH.
Category Algorithm Description
Key Agreement EC DH Non-compliant (untested) DH scheme using elliptic curve, supporting all
NIST defined B, K and P curves. Key agreement is a service provided for
calling process use, but is not used to establish keys into the Module.
Key Wrapping RSA The RSA algorithm may be used by the calling application for wrapping
of keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B compliance, and no CSPs are
established into or exported out of the module using these services.
Table 4b – Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions
EC DH Key Agreement provides 80 to 256 bits of security strength. RSA Key Wrapping provides 80
to 256 bits of security strength.
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The Module implements the following services which are Non-Approved per the NIST SP 800-131A
transitions:
Function Algorithm Options Cert #
Random Number
Generation;
Symmetric key
generation
[ANS X9.31] RNG AES 128/192/256 1137
[SP 800-90A] DRBG Dual EC DRBG2
: P-256, P-384, P-521 283
Digital Signature and
Asymmetric Key
Generation
[FIPS 186-2] RSA GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5,
SigGenPSS (1024/1536 with all SHA sizes,
2048/3072/4096 with SHA-1)
1176
[FIPS 186-2] DSA PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen (1024) 714
[FIPS 186-4] DSA Key Pair Gen (1024)
PQG Gen (1024 with all SHA sizes)
Sig Gen (1024 with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072
with SHA-1)
714
[FIPS 186-2] ECDSA PKG: CURVES (P-192 K-163 B-163)
SigGen: CURVES (P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384
P-521 K-163 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-163
B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571)
370
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA PKG: CURVES (P-192 K-163 B-163)
SigGen: CURVES (P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) P-224: (SHA-1) P-256: (SHA-1) P-384: (SHA-
1) P-521: (SHA-1) K-163 (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) K-233: (SHA-1) K-283: (SHA-1) K-409: (SHA-
1) K-571: (SHA-1) B-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384,
512) B-233: (SHA-1) B-283: (SHA-1) B-409: (SHA-
1) B-571: (SHA-1) )
370
ECC CDH (CVL) [SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2) CURVES: P-192 B-163 K-163 45
Table 4c – FIPS Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions
The Module supports only a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. These algorithms shall not be used when
operating in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.
The Module requires an initialization sequence (see IG 9.5): the calling application invokes
FIPS_mode_set()3
, which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. If FIPS_mode_set() fails then all
cryptographic services fail from then on. The application can test to see if FIPS mode has been
2 The Dual EC DRBG will not be available in any of SafeNet’s products.
3 The function call in the Module is FIPS_module_mode_set() which is typically used by an application via the
FIPS_mode_set() wrapper function.
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successfully performed.
The Module is a cryptographic engine library, which can be used only in conjunction with
additional software. Aside from the use of the NIST defined elliptic curves as trusted third party
domain parameters, all other FIPS 186-4 assurances are outside the scope of the Module, and are
the responsibility of the calling process.
4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module
services are described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter
data structures.
CSP Name Description
RSA SGK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature generation key
RSA KDK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key decryption (private key transport) key
DSA SGK [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature generation key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA
(1024) signature generation key
ECDSA SGK ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) signature generation key
EC DH Private EC DH (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves) private key agreement key.
AES EDK AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key
AES CMAC AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key
AES XTS AES (256/512) XTS cipher key
TDES EDK TDES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key
TDES CMAC TDES (3-Key) CMAC generate / verify key
HMAC Key Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512)
RNG CSPs Seed (128 bit), AES 128/192/256 seed key and associated state variables for ANSI
X9.31 AES based RNG4
Hash_DRBG CSPs V (440/880 bits) and C (440/880 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security
strength)
HMAC_DRBG CSPs V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input
(length dependent on security strength)
CTR_DRBG CSPs V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security
strength)
Dual_EC_DRBG CSPs S (P-256, P-384, P-521), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
Table 4.1a – Critical Security Parameters
The module does not output intermediate key generation values.
4 There is an explicit test for equality of the seed and seed key inputs
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CSP Name Description
RSA SVK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key
RSA KEK RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key encryption (public key transport) key
DSA SVK [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA
(1024) signature verification key
ECDSA SVK ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) signature verification key
EC DH Public EC DH (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) public key agreement key.
Table 4.1b – Public Keys
For all CSPs and Public Keys:
Storage: RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores RNG and DRBG
state values for the lifetime of the RNG or DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by
the calling application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond
the lifetime of an API call), with the exception of RNG and DRBG state values used for the
Modules' default key generation service.
Generation: The Module implements ANSI X9.31 compliant RNG and SP 800-90 compliant
DRBG services for creation of symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA, elliptic curve, and
RSA keys as shown in Table 4a. The calling application is responsible for storage of generated
keys returned by the module.
Entry: All CSPs enter the Module’s logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated
by memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary.
Output: The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key generation
services. However, none cross the physical boundary.
Destruction: Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for
temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to explicitly destroy CSPs
related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for
parameters passed in and out of the module.
Private and secret keys as well as seeds and entropy input are provided to the Module by the
calling application, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys
residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be
accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process
space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use
or export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non-
overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. An authorized
application as user (Crypto-Officer and User) has access to all key data generated during the
operation of the Module.
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In the event Module power is lost and restored the calling application must ensure that any AES
GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
Module users (the calling applications) shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength
required for the random number generation mechanism: 128 bits for the [ANS X9.31] RNG
mechanism, and as shown in [SP 800-90] Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG), Table 3 (CTR_DRBG)
and Table 4 (Dual_EC_DRBG). This entropy is supplied by means of callback functions. Those
functions must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met.
5 Roles, Authentication and Services
The Module meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing both
Crypto-User and Crypto-Officer roles. As allowed by FIPS 140-2, the Module does not support user
authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module does not
allow concurrent operators.
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services
implemented by the Module. The Crypto Officer can install and initialize the Module. The Crypto
Officer role is implicitly entered when installing the Module or performing system administration
functions on the host operating system.
• User Role: Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions. This role has access to all of
the services provided by the Module.
• Crypto-Officer Role: Installation of the Module on the host computer system. This role is
assumed implicitly when the system administrator installs the Module library file.
All services implemented by the Module are listed below, along with a description of service CSP
access. If the module is not initialized as per Section 4 of the Security Policy, non-conformant
versions of the services in Table 5 are made available to the calling application.
Service Role Description
Initialize User, CO
Module initialization, inclusive of all POST tests (FIPS_module_mode_set). Does not
access CSPs.
Self-test User, CO Perform all POST tests (FIPS_selftest). Does not access CSPs.
Show status User, CO
Functions that provide module status information:
 Version (as unsigned long or const char *)
 FIPS Mode (Boolean)
Does not access CSPs.
Zeroize User, CO
Functions that destroy CSPs:
 fips_rand_prng_reset: destroys RNG CSPs.
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Service Role Description
 fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for a given DRBG context, overwrites DRBG CSPs
(Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs, Dual_EC_DRBG CSPs.)
All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory. Stack
cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application.
Random
number
generation
User, CO
Used for random number and symmetric key generation.
 Seed or reseed an RNG or DRBG instance
 Determine security strength of an RNG or DRBG instance
 Obtain random data
Uses and updates RNG CSPs, Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG
CSPs, Dual_EC_DRBG CSPs.
Asymmetric key
generation
User, CO
Used to generate DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys:
RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK
There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism and algorithm type,
the maximum specified in SP800-90
Symmetric
encrypt/decrypt
User, CO
Used to encrypt or decrypt data.
Executes using AES EDK, TDES EDK (passed in by the calling process).
Symmetric
digest
User, CO
Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC.
Executes using AES CMAC, TDES, CMAC (passed in by the calling process).
Message digest User, CO
Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest.
Does not access CSPs.
Keyed Hash User, CO
Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC.
Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process).
Key transport5
User, CO
Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does not
establish keys into the module).
Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process).
Key agreement User, CO
Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process (does
not establish keys into the module).
Executes using EC DH Private, EC DH Public (passed in by the calling process).
Digital
signature
User, CO
Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures.
Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK
(passed in by the calling process).
Utility User, CO Miscellaneous helper functions. Does not access CSPs.
Table 5 - Services and CSP Access
5 "Key transport" can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external
application. The latter definition is the one that applies to this Module.
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6 Self-test
The Module performs the self-tests listed below on invocation of Initialize or Self-test.
Algorithm Type Test Attributes
Software integrity KAT HMAC-SHA1
HMAC KAT One KAT per SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512
Per IG 9.3, this testing covers SHA POST requirements.
AES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128 bit key length
AES CCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192 key length
AES GCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256 key length
XTS-AES KAT 128, 256 bit key sizes to support either the 256-bit key size (for XTS-AES-128) or
the 512-bit key size (for XTS-AES-256)
AES CMAC KAT Sign and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key lengths
TDES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 3-Key
TDES CMAC KAT CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode, 3-Key
RSA KAT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1
DSA PCT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-384
DRBG KAT CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bit with and without derivation function
HASH_DRBG: SHA256
HMAC_DRBG: SHA256
Dual_EC_DRBG: P-256 and SHA256
ECDSA PCT Keygen, sign, verify using P-224, K-233 and SHA512. The K-233 self-test is not
performed for operational environments that support prime curve only (see
Table 2).
ECC CDH KAT Shared secret calculation per SP 800-56A §5.7.1.2, IG 9.6
X9.31 RNG KAT 128, 192, 256 bit AES keys
Table 6a - Power On Self Tests (KAT = Known answer test; PCT = Pairwise consistency test)
The FIPS_mode_set()6
function performs all power-up self-tests listed above with no operator
intervention required, returning a “1” if all power-up self-tests succeed, and a “0” otherwise. If
any component of the power-up self-test fails an internal flag is set to prevent subsequent
invocation of any cryptographic function calls. The module will only enter the FIPS Approved
mode if the module is reloaded and the call to FIPS_mode_set() succeeds.
6 FIPS_mode_set() calls Module function FIPS_module_mode_set()
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The power-up self-tests may also be performed on-demand by calling FIPS_selftest(), which returns a
“1” for success and “0” for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the responsibility of the
calling application.
The Module also implements the following conditional tests:
Algorithm Test
DRBG Tested as required by [SP800-90] Section 11
DRBG FIPS 140-2 continuous test for stuck fault
DSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
ECDSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
RSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
ANSI X9.31 RNG Continuous test for stuck fault
Table 6b - Conditional Tests
In the event of a DRBG self-test failure the calling application must uninstantiate and re-instantiate
the DRBG per the requirements of [SP 800-90]; this is not something the Module can do itself.
Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and
Encrypt/Decrypt.
7 Operational Environment
The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each
process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and
hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and
implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation.
8 Design Assurance
8.1 Configuration Management
SafeNet uses a configuration management system called Agile that controls versioning control for
documents within the company and a software configuration management tool called Github for
managing software.
8.2 Delivery and Operation
The SafeNet Software Cryptographic Library is never released outside of SafeNet as a source code
distribution. It is contained within our source code management repository that can be accessed
by engineering to download a copy of the code. It is not possible to make changes to the code and
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replace it within this repository. When a developer downloads code for integration into a SafeNet
product, the code gets integrated into the configuration management structure for that product.
The module code is then linked as part of an application build process that is configured to operate
in FIPS Approved Mode.
9 Mitigation of other attacks
The Module does not claim any attack mitigation beyond FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements.