



Motorola Solutions Cryptographic DLL Software Module

Cryptographic module used in Motorola Solutions ASTRO IP Dispatch Console products

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Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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| Revision | Date | Change Summary |
|----------|-----------------------------|---|
| 0.1 | Apr 24 th , 2017 | Initial Creation |
| 1.0 | Aug 30 th , 2017 | Initial release version |
| 1.1 | Nov 7, 2017 | Updates per CMVP Comments |
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| 1.3 | May 1, 2018 | Added AES Cert. #5356 to Table 2 |
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1. Introduction

Motorola Solutions Cryptographic DLL Software Module (MSCDSM) is software based cryptographic module that runs on General Purpose Computer (GPC) hardware platform running Microsoft Windows operating system. The cryptographic module is delivered to the end customers as x86 based Dynamically Linked Library (DLL) module and named as “libalg.dll”. The module provides cryptographic functionality in Motorola Solutions ASTRO IP Dispatch Console products running on Microsoft Windows OS and supporting the APCO Project 25 standard. MSCDSM provides several FIPS Approved and non-Approved cryptographic algorithms.

1.1 Scope

This Security Policy (SP) document specifies the security rules under which MSCDSM must operate.

1.2 Acronyms and Definitions

| Acronyms | Description |
|----------|--|
| API | Application Programming Interface |
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining |
| CFB | Cipher Feedback |
| CSP | Critical Security Parameter |
| CST | Commercial Solutions Testing |
| DES | Data Encryption Standard |
| ECB | Electronic Code Book |
| EMC | Electromagnetic Compatibility |
| EMI | Electromagnetic Interface |
| FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standards |
| GCM | Galois/Counter Mode |
| GPC | General Purpose Computer |
| HMAC | Hash-Based Message Authentication Code |
| MSCDSM | Motorola Solutions Cryptographic DLL Software Module |
| NDRNG | Non-deterministic Random Number Generator |
| NVLAP | National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program |
| OFB | Output Feedback |
| RBG | Random Bit Generator |
| SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm |
| SP | Security Policy |

1.3 References

- [1] FIPS 140-1 Security Requirements for Security Modules
- [2] FIPS 140-2 Required Vendor Documentation
- [3] Project 25 Digital Radio Over-The-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) Messages and Procedures
- [4] Motorola Solutions MCC 7100 IP Dispatch Console

2. Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Cryptographic Module Name

Motorola Solutions Cryptographic DLL Software Module (MSCDSM).

2.2 Software Version Number

MSCDSM has the following FIPS 140-2 validated software version number.

Software Version Number: R01.03.00

2.3 Module Overview

The MSCDSM provides software based cryptographic solutions and is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module that runs on General Purpose Computer (GPC) hardware platform and Microsoft Windows operating system as x86 based Dynamically Linked Library (DLL) module. The MSCDSM provides FIPS 140-2 Approved and non-Approved cryptographic functionalities to different applications running on Microsoft Windows operating system through Application Programming Interfaces (API).

Following block diagram (Figure 1: Module Block Diagram) shows how application interacts with MSCDSM.




Figure 1: Module Block Diagram

2.4 Cryptographic Boundary

MSCDSM is delivered to the end customer as DLL, the DLL is the logical boundary of the cryptographic module. The physical boundary is defined as the outer perimeter of the general purpose computer on which the module is installed.

2.5 Mode of Operation

The MSCDSM operates in two different modes of operation.

- FIPS Approved mode: DES Voice/Data Encryption/Decryption are blocked. All other services listed in the Section 4.5 are available when the module is operating in FIPS Approved mode.
- FIPS non-Approved mode: All services listed in the Section 4.5 are available when the module is operating in FIPS Non-Approved mode.

2.6 Module Configuration

The MSCDSM always powers up in FIPS Approved mode and executes power up self-tests as mentioned in the Section 9.1. The user of the module may change the mode of operation to FIPS non-Approved mode by calling “Set FIPS Mode” Service listed in the Section 4.5.

2.7 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels

MSCDSM operates in an FIPS Approved and non-Approved modes. When running FIPS Approved mode, it operates at FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 1. The table below shows the FIPS 140-2 Level of security met for each of the eleven areas specified within the FIPS 140-2 security requirements.

Table 1: Security Level

| FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section | Security Level |
|---|-----------------------|
| Cryptographic Module Specification | 1 |
| Module Ports and Interfaces | 1 |
| Roles, Services, and Authentication | 1 |
| Finite State Model | 1 |
| Physical Security | N/A |
| Operational Environment | 1 |
| Cryptographic Key Management | 1 |
| EMI / EMC | 1 |
| Self-Tests | 1 |
| Design Assurance | 1 |
| Mitigation of Other Attacks | N/A |

2.8 FIPS Approved Algorithms

The MSCDSM supports the following approved algorithms when running in FIPS Approved mode.

Table 2: List of Approved Algorithms

| CAVP Cert | Algorithm | Standard | Mode/Method | Key Length, Curves or Moduli | Use |
|-----------|-----------|----------------------------------|------------------|---|--|
| 4683 | AES | FIPS 197, SP 800-38A | ECB, OFB, CBC | 256 | Voice/Data Encryption/decryption |
| 4683 | AES | FIPS 197, SP 800-38D | GCM | 256 | Voice/Data Encryption/decryption |
| 5356 | AES | FIPS 197, SP 800-38F | AES-KW | 256 | Encryption/decryption |
| 4683 | KTS | FIPS 197, SP 800-38F | ECB, AES MAC | 256 | Key establishment |
| 4683 | KTS | FIPS 197, SP 800-38D, SP 800-38F | GCM | 256 | Key establishment |
| 5356 | KTS | SP 800-38F | KW | 256 | Key establishment |
| 1587 | DRBG | SP 800-90A | CTR_DRBG | 256 | Deterministic Random Bit Generation |
| 3099 | HMAC | FIPS 198-1 | HMAC-SHA-384 | (192 - 1024) (must be multiple of 8) | Message authentication, Code Integrity tests |
| 3834 | SHS | FIPS 180-4 | SHA-384, SHA-512 | N/A | Message Digest |

2.9 FIPS Allowed Algorithms

The following algorithms and protocols are allowed within the FIPS Approved mode of operation:

Table 3: List of FIPS Allowed Algorithms

| Algorithm | Caveat | Use |
|------------------------|--|---|
| AES MAC (Cert. #4683) | Project P25 AES OTAR, vendor affirmed. | Provide authentication within P25 APCO OTAR |

2.10 FIPS non-Approved Algorithms

The following FIPS non-Approved algorithms and protocols are allowed when the module is running in non-FIPS mode of operation:

Table 4: List of FIPS Non-Approved Algorithms

| Algorithm | Use |
|-----------|---|
| DES | DES Encryption/Decryption – ECB, OFB and CBC Mode |

3. Module Ports and Interfaces

Physical ports of the module are provided by the general purpose computer operating system on which the module is running. The logical interfaces are defined as the API of the cryptographic module. All supported APIs in the software module support logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output.

Table 5: Ports and Interfaces

| Logical interface type | Description |
|------------------------|---|
| Control input | API entry point and corresponding stack parameters |
| Data input | API entry point data input stack parameters |
| Status output | API entry point return values and status stack parameters |
| Data output | API entry point data output stack parameters |

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Administration of the Module in a Secure Manner (CO)

The software based cryptographic module requires no special administration for secure use and automatically loads in the Approved mode of operation.

4.2 Assumptions Regarding User Behavior

The module has been designed in such a way that no special assumptions regarding User Behavior have been made that are relevant to the secure operation of the unit.

4.3 Approved Security Functions, Ports, and Interfaces Available to Users

Services available to the User Role are listed in the Section 4.5.

4.4 User Responsibilities Necessary for Secure Operation

The module must be loaded successfully and passed power up code integrity, known answer tests.

4.5 Available Services

The following table shows different cryptographic and non-cryptographic services provided through APIs at different roles and mode of operations.

Table 6: List of Available Services

| Services | Role | | Mode Of Operation | |
|-----------------------------|------|-----------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | User | Cryptographic Officer | FIPS Mode | Non-FIPS Mode |
| Self-Tests | X | X | X | X |
| Initialize | X | X | X | X |
| Show Status | X | X | X | X |
| Initialization Status Query | X | X | X | X |
| Version Query | X | X | X | X |
| Utility | X | X | X | X |
| AES-256 Encryption Voice | X | X | X | X |
| AES-256 Decryption Voice | X | X | X | X |
| AES-256 Encryption Data | X | X | X | X |
| AES-256 Decryption Data | X | X | X | X |
| DES Encryption Voice | X | X | | X |
| DES Decryption Voice | X | X | | X |
| DES Encryption Data | X | X | | X |
| DES Decryption Data | X | X | | X |
| AES Key Wrapping | X | X | X | X |
| AES Key Unwrapping | X | X | X | X |
| Generate OTAR MAC | X | X | X | X |
| SHA384 | X | X | X | X |
| SHA512 | X | X | X | X |
| DRBG | X | X | X | X |
| HMAC-SHA384 | X | X | X | X |
| Set FIPS Mode | X | X | X | X |
| Get FIPS Mode | X | X | X | X |
| Zeroize | X | X | X | X |

5. Security Rules

The cryptographic software module enforces the following security rules. These rules are separated into those imposed by FIPS 140-2 and those imposed by Motorola Solutions.

5.1 FIPS 140-2 Imposed Security Rules

1. The module does not provide any operator authentication.
2. The module encrypts/decrypts message traffic using AES-256 and DES¹ cryptographic algorithms.
3. At any time, the application is capable of commanding the module to perform the power-up self-tests by reloading the cryptographic module into memory.
4. The module is available to perform services only after successfully completing the power-up self-tests.
5. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests, and error states.
6. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
7. The module shall not support a concurrent operator.
8. The module enters the Uninitialized state if any Power-up Self-Tests and Conditional Self-Tests fail. The Uninitialized state can be exited by restarting the module.
9. The module does not perform any cryptographic functions while in the Uninitialized state.
10. The module returns the results of power-up and integrity Self-Tests to the user.
11. The module may be power cycled to zeroize all CSPs.
12. The module is to be installed on Motorola Solutions ASTRO IP Dispatch Console products, which employs APCO OTAR functionality.

6. Operational Environment

The MSCDSM operates on commercially available general purpose computing (GPC) hardware platform running on Microsoft Windows Operating system. The general purpose operating environment is a modifiable environment. Hence the FIPS 140-2 area 6 Operational Environment requirements are applicable to the MSCDSM. The cryptographic module is compiled on Microsoft Windows Operating System as DLL for x86 solution platform. For FIPS 140-2 validation purposes, the cryptographic module was tested on the following operational environments:

Table 7: FIPS Validated Operating Environment

| Format | Operating System | Hardware Platform |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 7 Professional | HP ZBook 15 G3 Mobile Workstation, Intel Core i7 |

¹ Available only when module is running as non-FIPS approved mode

| | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 Professional | HP ZBook 15 G3 Mobile Workstation, Intel Core i7 |
|--|--------------------------------------|---|

The cryptographic module also runs on the following operating systems when compiled with compatible cross compiler, however no target testing was performed for FIPS 140-2 validation with the software version number mentioned in the Section 2.2. The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation certificate.

Table 8: FIPS Non-Validated Operating Environment

| Format | Operating System | Hardware Platform |
|--|--|---|
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSB 2016 64bit | HP ZBook 15u G4 Mobile Workstation, Intel® Core i7 CPU |
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSC 2019 64bit | HP ZBook 15u G5 Mobile Workstation, Intel® Xeon® E- 2186M CPU |
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSC 2019 64bit | HP ZBook 15u G6 Mobile Workstation, Intel® Xeon® E- 2286M CPU |
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSC 2019 64bit | HP ZBook Fury 15 G7 Mobile Workstation, Intel® Xeon® W- 10885M CPU |
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSB 2016 64bit | HP Z440 Workstation, Intel Xeon E5-1603v3 CPU |
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSC 2019 64bit | HP Z440 Workstation, Intel Xeon E5-1603v3 CPU |
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSB 2016 64bit | HP Z2 Mini G3 Workstation, Intel Xeon E3-1225v5 CPU |
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSC 2019 64bit | HP Z2 Mini G4 Workstation, Intel Xeon E-2144G CPU |
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSC 2019 64bit | HP Z2 Mini G5 Workstation, Intel Xeon W-1250 CPU |
| Microsoft Windows DLL (x86 Solution Platform) | Microsoft Windows 10 IoT Enterprise LTSC 2021 | Command Central HUB (AIMB- 276G2), Intel(R) Core(TM) i7- 8700T CPU @ 2.40GHz, 2400MHz, 6 Core(s), 12 Logical Processor(s) |
| Static library (.lib) | Mentor Graphics Nucleus 3.0 (version 2013.08.1) | ARM926EJ-S core of Texas Instrument (TI) OMAP-L138 C6000 DSP+ARM |

| | | |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| Static library (.lib) | Texas Instrument (TI) DSP/BIOS 5.41.04.18 | TMS320C674x DSP core of Texas Instrument (TI) OMAP-L138 C6000 DSP+ARM |
| Shared object (.so) | Linux 2.6.32-358.23.2.el6.x86_64 GNU/Linux | General Purpose Computing (GPC) Hardware Platform |
| Shared object (.so) | TI Embedded Linux | OMAP C6000 DSP+ARM Processor |

7. Cryptographic Key Management

7.1 Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

All CSPs used by the cryptographic module are described in this section and the list of CSPs and public keys are listed in the following table.

Table 9: List of Critical Security Parameters

| CSP Name | Description |
|--|---|
| AES-256 Encrypt Key | AES-256 key used for voice and data encryption |
| AES-256 Decrypt Key | AES-256 key used for voice and data decryption |
| Keyed Hash Key (384) | Key used for generating HMAC SHA384 Message Authentication Code |
| SP800-90A Seed | 384-bit seed value used within the SP800-90A DRBG. |
| SP800-90A Internal State ("V" and "Key") | Internal state of the SP800-90A DRBG during initialization. |
| AES Key Encrypt Key | Key used for AES Key Wrapping |
| AES Key Decrypt Key | Key used for AES Key Unwrapping |
| OTAR MAC Key | Key used for APCO OTAR MAC Generation |

7.2 Random Number Generation

The MSCDSM implements an Approved SP 800-90A DRBG for creation of random numbers. The entropy for seeding the SP 800-90A DRBG is determined by the user of the module which is outside of the module. The assurance of the minimum strength of the generated random bits from the module depends on the strength of the 384 bits seed provided to the module. The target applications shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random number generation mechanism as shown in [SP 800-90A] Table 3 (CTR_DRBG) and set 384 bits of seed into the Module by calling module defined API function.

7.3 Key Generation

The MSCDSM does not provide any key generation service or perform key generation for any of its supported algorithms. The keys/CSPs listed in Table 8 are not generated within the module and are instead passed into the module from the user application via module provided APIs. Seeds for random number generation are set into the module via module provided API.

7.4 Key Entry and Output

The MSCDSM does not support manual key entry or key output. Keys or other CSPs can only be exchanged between the module and the calling application using appropriate API calls.

7.5 Key Storage

Keys are not stored in the non-volatile storage by the cryptographic module; however, the module stores it in the volatile memory for temporary usages.

7.6 Zeroization Procedure

The zeroization mechanism for all of the CSPs is to replace 0s in the volatile memory which originally store the CSPs. It is the calling application's responsibility to zeroize CSPs as part of normal Encrypt/Decrypt services. All CSPs are zeroized by power cycling the module, which is referenced as the "Zeroize" service in Table 6.

7.7 CSP Access Type

Table 10: CSP Access Type

| Access Type | Description |
|-----------------|--|
| S - Store CSP | Stores CSP in the volatile memory. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling application on the stack. |
| U - Use CSP | Uses CSP internally for encryption/decryption services. |
| Z - Zeroize CSP | Zeroize CSP in volatile memory. |

The target operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Keys residing in the module's internally allocated data structure during the lifetime of the services defined in the Section 7.1 can only be accessed through APIs provided by the module. The keys can be destroyed in the Module's volatile memory by calling appropriate API function calls.



Table 11: CSP-Services Access Matrix (Approved Mode Only)

| CSP Services | AES-256 Encrypt Key | AES-256 Decrypt Key | Keyed Hash Key (384) | SP800-90A Seed | SP800-90A Internal State (“ V” and “ Key”) | AES Key Encrypt Key | AES Key Decrypt Key | OTAR MAC Key |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------|--|---------------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Self-Tests | | | | | | | | |
| Initialize | | | | | | | | |
| Show Status | | | | | | | | |
| Initialization Status Query | | | | | | | | |
| Version Query | | | | | | | | |
| Utility | | | | | | | | |
| Set FIPS Mode | | | | | | | | |
| Get FIPS Mode | | | | | | | | |
| AES-256 Encryption Voice | U,S,Z | | | | U | | | |
| AES-256 Decryption Voice | | U,S,Z | | | | | | |
| AES-256 Encryption Data | U,S,Z | | | | U | | | |
| AES-256 Decryption Data | | U,S,Z | | | | | | |
| DES Encrypt Voice | | | | | | | | |
| DES Decrypt Voice | | | | | | | | |
| DES Encrypt Data | | | | | | | | |
| DES Decrypt Data | | | | | | | | |
| AES Key Wrapping | | | | | U | U,S,Z | | |
| AES Key Unwrapping | | | | | | | U,S,Z | |
| Generate OTAR MAC | | | | | | | | U,S, Z |
| DRBG | | | | U,S | U,S | | | |
| SHA384 | | | | | | | | |
| SHA512 | | | | | | | | |
| HMAC-SHA384 | | | U,S | | | | | |
| Zeroize | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z |

8. Electromagnetic Interfaces/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

The MSCDSM is a software only module that runs on GPC hardware platform. It inherits EMI/EMC validation of the operating hardware platform that it operates on.

9. Self-Tests

9.1 Power Up Self-Tests

The MSCDSM shall perform the following power-up self-tests:

- Cryptographic algorithm tests
 - AES-256 Encrypt/Decrypt(ECB, OFB, CBC, GCM) KAT
 - SHA-384 KAT
 - SHA-512 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA384 KAT
 - DRBG KAT (Instantiate and Generate)
- Software Integrity Test: HMAC-SHA-384
- Critical Functions Tests: N/A
- Random Number Generation Tests

9.2 Conditional Self-Test

The MSCDSM shall perform following conditional self-test,

Random bit generation tests:

- DRBG Continuous Tests
- SP800-90A Health Tests (Instantiate and Generate)

10. Mitigation of Other Attacks

The software module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside of those required by FIPS 140-2, including but not limited to power consumption, timing, fault induction, or TEMPEST attacks.