This non-proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Document Revision: 1.2 H/W version: MZILT800HBHQ-00AC9, MZILT960HBHQ-00AC9, MZILT1T6HBJR-00AC9, MZILT1T9HBJR-00AC9, MZILT3T2HBLS-00AC9, MZILT3T8HBLS-00AC9, MZILT7T6HALA-00AC9, MZILT15THALA-00AC9 and MZILT30THALA-00AC9 F/W version: EXA0, EZA0, EXA1, EZA1, EXA2, EZA2, EXA3, EZA3, EXA4 and EZA4 Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 2 of 24 Revision History Version Updates 1.0 Initial Version 1.1 Minor changes as updated module version 1.2 Added EXA4 and EZA4 FW Versions Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 3 of 24 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 4 1.1. Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.................................................5 1.2. Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary...................................................6 2. Acronym....................................................................................................................... 7 3. Security Level Specification.......................................................................................... 8 4. Cryptographic Functionality......................................................................................... 9 4.1. Approved algorithms ........................................................................................... 9 4.2. Non‐Approved Algorithm................................................................................... 10 4.3. Critical Security Parameters............................................................................... 11 4.4. Public Security Parameters ................................................................................ 12 5. Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces ......................................................................... 13 6. Roles, Services and Authentication............................................................................ 14 6.1. Roles .................................................................................................................. 14 6.2. Authentication ................................................................................................... 14 6.3. Services.............................................................................................................. 15 6.3.1.Authenticated Services.............................................................................. 15 6.3.2.Unauthenticated Services.......................................................................... 15 7. Physical security policy............................................................................................... 17 8. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)................20 9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy............................................................................. 21 10. Security rules........................................................................................................ 22 10.1. Secure Installation........................................................................................... 22 10.2. Operational description of Module.................................................................23 10.3. Power‐on Self‐Tests ........................................................................................ 24 Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 4 of 24 1. Introduction Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Samsung”) SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series, herein after referred to as a “cryptographic module” or “module”, SSD (Solid State Drive), satisfies all applicable FIPS 140‐2 Security Level 2 requirements, supporting TCG Opal SSC based SED (Self‐Encrypting Drive) features, designed to protect unauthorized access to the user data stored in its NAND Flash memories. The built‐in AES HW engines in the cryptographic module’s controller provide on‐the‐fly encryption and decryption of the user data without performance loss. The SED’s nature also provides instantaneous sanitization of the user data via cryptographic erase. Module Name Hardware Version Firmware Version Drive Capacity Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a MZILT960HBHQ‐00AC9 EXA0/EXA1/EXA2 /EXA3/EXA4 960GB MZILT1T9HBJR‐00AC9 1.9TB MZILT3T8HBLS‐00AC9 3.8TB MZILT7T6HALA‐00AC9 7.6TB MZILT15THALA‐00AC9 15.3TB MZILT30THALA‐00AC9 30.7TB Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1645a MZILT800HBHQ‐00AC9 EZA0/EZA1/EZA2 /EZA3/EZA4 800GB MZILT1T6HBJR‐00AC9 1.6TB MZILT3T2HBLS‐00AC9 3.2TB Exhibit 1 – Versions of Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 5 of 24 1.1. Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary The following photographs show the cryptographic module’s top and bottom views. The multiple‐ chip standalone cryptographic module consists of hardware and firmware components that are all enclosed in two aluminum alloy cases, which serve as the cryptographic boundary of the module. The top and bottom cases are assembled by screws and the tamper‐evident labels are applied for the detection of any opening of the cases. No security relevant component can be seen within the visible spectrum through the opaque enclosure. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140‐2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140‐2 validation. Exhibit 2 – Specification of the Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom, side). Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 6 of 24 1.2. Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary The PM1643a/PM1645a series use a single chip controller with a SAS interface on the system side and Samsung NAND flash internally. The following figure depicts the Module operational environment. Exhibit 3 – Block Diagram for Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 7 of 24 2. Acronym Acronym Description CTRL RFX Controller (SAMSUNG RFX SAS 12G TLC/MLC SSD Controller) SAS I/F Serial Attached SCSI Interface CPU Central Processing Unit (ARM‐based) DRAM I/F Dynamic Random Access Memory Interface ECC Error Correcting Code NAND I/F NAND Flash Interface PMIC Power Management Integrated Circuit ROM Read‐only Memory DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory NAND NAND Flash Memory LBA Logical Block Address MEK Media Encryption Key MSID Manufactured SID(Security Identifier) Exhibit 4 – Acronym and Descriptions for Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 8 of 24 3. Security Level Specification Security Requirements Area Level Cryptographic Module Specification 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 2 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 3 Self‐tests 2 Design Assurance 2 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Exhibit 5 – Security Level Table. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 9 of 24 4. Cryptographic Functionality 4.1. Approved algorithms The cryptographic module supports the following Approved algorithms for secure data storage: CAVP Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode / Method Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli Use #5240 AES FIPS 197 SP 800‐38E XTS 256‐bit Data Encryption / Decryption *Note1 Vendor Affirmed CKG SP800‐133 Cryptographic Key Generation #1948 DRBG SP 800‐90A Revision 1 Hash_ DRBG (SHA‐256) Deterministic Random Bit Generation #2785 RSA FIPS 186‐4 SigVer PSS‐2048 Digital Signature Verification #4178 #4179 SHS FIPS 180‐4 SHA‐256 Message Digest Exhibit 6 ‐ Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SED PM1643a/PM1645a Series Approved Algorithms. NOTE 1: AES‐ECB is the pre‐requisite for AES‐XTS; AES‐ECB alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module in FIPS Mode. NOTE 2: This module supports AES‐XTS which is only approved for storage applications. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 10 of 24 4.2. Non‐Approved Algorithm The cryptographic module supports the following non‐Approved but allowed algorithms: Algorithm Use NDRNG Non‐deterministic Random Number Generator (only used for generating seed materials for the Approved DRBG) Exhibit 7 ‐ Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series Non‐Approved but allowed algorithms. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 11 of 24 4.3. Critical Security Parameters The cryptographic module contains the following Keys and CSPs: CSPs Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods Size DRBG Internal State *Note3 Generation: SP 800‐90A HASH_DRBG (SHA‐256) Storage: Plaintext in DRAM Zeroization: “Initialization”, “Erase an LBA Range’s Data” and “Zeroize” service V: 440‐bits C : 440‐bits DRBG Seed Generation: via NDRNG Storage: Plaintext in DRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization”, “Erase an LBA Range’s Data” and “Zeroize” service Entropy input String: 440‐bits Nonce: 128‐bits Personalization String: 512‐bits DRBG Entropy Input String Generation: via NDRNG Storage: Plaintext in DRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization”, “Erase an LBA Range’s Data” and “Zeroize” service 440‐bits CO Password Generation: N/A Storage: Plaintext in Flash Memory and used in SRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization” and “Zeroize” service 48‐256 bits User Password Generation: N/A Storage: Plaintext in Flash Memory and used in SRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization” and “Zeroize” service 48‐256 bits MEK Generation: SP 800‐90A Hash_DRBG (SHA‐256) As per SP 800‐133 Section 6.1, key generation is performed as per the "Direct Generation: of Symmetric Keys" which is an Approved key generation method Key Type: AES‐XTS 256 Storage: Plaintext in Flash Memory and used in SRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization”, “Lock an LBA Range”, “Erase an LBA Range’s Data” and “Zeroize” service 256‐bits Exhibit 8 ‐ CSPs and details on Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods. Note3: The values of V and C are the “secret values” of the internal state. NOTE 4: In accordance with FIPS 140‐2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) as per SP 800‐133 (Vendor Affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric key is the unmodified output from SP 800‐90A DRBG. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 12 of 24 4.4. Public Security Parameters Public Keys Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods FW Verification Key (RSA Public Key) Generation: N/A Key Type: RSA 2048‐PSS Storage: Plaintext in Flash Memory and used in SRAM Zeroization: N/A Exhibit 8 ‐ Public Keys and details on Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 13 of 24 5. Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces Physical Port Logical Interface SAS Connector Data Input/Output Control Input Status Output Power Input Exhibit 9 ‐ Specification of the Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series Cryptographic Module Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 14 of 24 6. Roles, Services and Authentication 6.1. Roles The following table defines the roles, type of authentication, and associated authenticated data types supported by the cryptographic module: Role Authentication Data CO Role Password User Role Password FW Loader RSA Exhibit 10 ‐ Roles and Required Identification and Authentication 6.2. Authentication The authentication mechanism allows 6‐byte length or longer (32‐byte) Password, where each byte can be any of 0x00 to 0xFF, for every Cryptographic Officer and User role supported by the module, which means a single random attempt can succeed with the probability of 1/248 or lower. Each authentication attempt takes at least 1ms and the number of attempts is limited to TryLimit, which is set to 33 in manufacturing time. Since the module takes at least 2 seconds to be ready after power‐on and 33 authentication failures require a power‐cycle, it takes 2033ms for every 33rd authentication attempt. Therefore, the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed in one minute is 990 / 248 , which is much less than the FIPS 140‐2 requirement 1/100,000. Even if the TryLimit is greater than 33, the probability of random attempts always satisfies the requirement. The authentication mechanism for FW Loader role is RSA PSS‐2048 with SHA256 digital signature verification, which means a single random attempt, can succeed with the probability of 1/2112 . Each RSA Signature Verification authentication attempt takes at least 50ms. So the number of attempts for one minute cannot exceed 1200((60*1000)/50). Therefore, the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed in one minute is 1200/2112 , which is much less than the FIPS 140‐2 requirement 1/100,000. Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism Password (Min: 6 bytes, Max: 32 bytes) Authentication - Probability of 1/248 in a single random attempt - Probability of 990/248 in multiple random attempts in a minute RSA Signature Verification - Probability of 1/2112 in a single random attempt - Probability of 1200/2112 in multiple random attempts in a minute Exhibit 11 ‐ Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 15 of 24 6.3. Services 6.3.1. Authenticated Services The following table lists roles, services, cryptographic keys, CSPs and Public Keys and the types of access that are available to each of the authorized roles via the corresponding services: * Type(s) of Access indicated using “O” marker. * R: READ; W: WRITE; G: GENERATE; Z: ZEROIZE Role Service Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Public Keys Security Function Type(s) of Access R W G Z Cryptographic Officer Initialization DRBG Internal State Hash_ DRBG (SHA‐256) O O O DRBG Seed O O O DRBG Entropy Input String O O O CO Password O O MEK O O Drive Extended Status N/A N/A N/A Admin/User Authority Enable/Disable N/A N/A N/A Lock an LBA Range MEK N/A O Unlock an LBA Range MEK AES‐XTS O Configure an LBA Range N/A N/A N/A Erase an LBA Range’s Data DRBG Internal State Hash_ DRBG (SHA‐256) O O O DRBG Seed O O O DRBG Entropy Input String O O O MEK O O User Password O O Zeroize DRBG Internal State Hash_ DRBG (SHA‐256) O DRBG Seed O DRBG Entropy Input String O CO Password O User Password O MEK O User Unlock an LBA Range MEK AES‐XTS O Set User Password User Password N/A O Lock an LBA Range MEK N/A O Configure an LBA Range N/A N/A N/A FW Loader Update the firmware FW Verification Key RSA SigVer, SHA‐256 O Exhibit 12 ‐ Services Authorized for Roles, Access Rights within Services 6.3.2. Unauthenticated Services The following table lists the unauthenticated services: Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 16 of 24 * Type(s) of Access indicated using “O” marker. * R: READ; W: WRITE; G: GENERATE; Z: ZEROIZE Unauthenticated Service Cryptographic Keys & CSPs Security Function Type(s) of Access R W G Z Zeroize DRBG Internal State Hash_ DRBG (SHA‐256) O DRBG Seed O DRBG Entropy Input String O CO Password O User Password O MEK O Get Random Number DRBG Internal State Hash_ DRBG (SHA‐256) O O O DRBG Seed O O O DRBG Entropy Input String O O O Get MSID N/A N/A N/A Show Status N/A N/A N/A Self‐test N/A N/A N/A Exhibit 13 – Unauthenticated Service, Cryptographic Keys & CSPs and Type(s) of Access. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 17 of 24 7. Physical security policy The following physical security mechanisms are implemented in a cryptographic module: ᆞ The Module consists of production‐grade components enclosed in an aluminum alloy enclosure, which is opaque within the visible spectrum. The top panel of the enclosure can be removed by unscrewing screws. However, the module is sealed with tamper‐evident labels in accordance with FIPS 140‐2 Level 2 Physical Security requirements so that tampering is easily detected when the top and bottom cases are detached. ᆞ 2 tamper‐evident labels are applied over both top and bottom cases of the module at the factory. The tamper‐evident labels are not removed and reapplied without tamper evidence. The following table summarizes the actions required by the Cryptographic Officer Role to ensure that physical security is maintained: Physical Security Mechanisms Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Inspection/Test Guidance Details Production grade cases As often as feasible Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks, gouges, lack of screw(s) and other signs of tampering. Remove from service if tampering found. Tamper‐evident Sealing Labels Inspect the sealing labels for scratches, gouges, cuts and other signs of tampering. Remove from service if tampering found. Exhibit 14 ‐ Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 18 of 24 Exhibit 15 ‐ Signs of Tamper Label 1 Label 2 Label 2 Label 2 Label 2 Label 2 Label 1 Label 1 Label 1 Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 19 of 24 NOTE 5: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd has excluded the following components as per AS01.09: Items BOM Code Applicable to Hardware Version(s) Capacitor 2203‐009659 MZILT800HBHQ‐00AC9, MZILT960HBHQ‐00AC9, MZILT1T6HBJR‐00AC9, MZILT1T9HBJR‐00AC9, MZILT3T2HBLS‐00AC9, MZILT3T8HBLS‐00AC9, MZILT7T6HALA‐00AC9, MZILT15THALA‐00AC9, MZILT30THALA‐00AC9 Capacitor 2203‐008953 MZILT800HBHQ–00AC9, MZILT960HBHQ–00AC9, MZILT1T6HBJR‐00AC9, MZILT1T9HBJR‐00AC9, MZILT3T2HBLS‐00AC9, MZILT3T8HBLS‐00AC9, MZILT7T6HALA‐00AC9, MZILT15THALA‐00AC9, MZILT30THALA‐00AC9 Capacitor 2203‐006885 MZILT15THALA‐00AC9, MZILT30THALA‐00AC9 Capacitor 2203‐007544 MZILT15THALA‐00AC9, MZILT30THALA‐00AC9 IC‐Switch 1205‐005411 MZILT800HBHQ–00AC9, MZILT960HBHQ–00AC9, MZILT1T6HBJR‐00AC9, MZILT1T9HBJR‐00AC9, MZILT3T2HBLS‐00AC9, MZILT3T8HBLS‐00AC9, MZILT7T6HALA‐00AC9, MZILT15THALA‐00AC9, MZILT30THALA‐00AC9 FET‐Silicon 0505‐002381 MZILT15THALA‐00AC9, MZILT30THALA‐00AC9 Diode 0406‐001824 MZILT800HBHQ–00AC9, MZILT960HBHQ–00AC9, MZILT1T6HBJR‐00AC9, MZILT1T9HBJR‐00AC9, MZILT3T2HBLS‐00AC9, MZILT3T8HBLS‐00AC9, MZILT7T6HALA‐00AC9, MZILT15THALA‐00AC9, MZILT30THALA‐00AC9 Storage IC K9DVGB8J1A‐1### MZILT15THALA‐00AC9, MZILT30THALA‐00AC9 Exhibit 16 ‐ Excluded components The above power electronics are used for MLCC power and do not process any CSPs, Plaintext data, or other information that if misused could lead to compromise. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 20 of 24 8. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) The cryptographic module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 21 of 24 9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The cryptographic module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140‐2. Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations N/A N/A N/A Exhibit 17 ‐ Mitigation of Other Attacks Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 22 of 24 10. Security rules The following specifies the security rules under which the cryptographic module shall operate in accordance with FIPS 140‐2: ᆞ The cryptographic module operates always in FIPS Mode once shipped from the vendor's manufacturing site. ᆞ The steps necessary for the secure installation, initialization and start‐up of the cryptographic module as per FIPS 140‐2 VE10.03.01 are as follows: 10.1. Secure Installation  [Step1] User should examine the tamper evidence ᆞ Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks, gouges, lack of screw(s) and other signs of tampering including the tamper evident sealing label. ᆞ If there is any sign of tampering, do not use the product and contact Samsung.  [Step2] Identify the firmware version in the device ᆞ Confirm that the firmware version is equivalent to the version(s) listed in this document via SCSI Inquiry command.  [Step3] Take the drive’s ownership ᆞ Change SID’s PIN by setting a new PIN ᆞ Change EraseMaster’s PIN by setting a new PIN ᆞ Erase Method on each LBA Range to rekey the encryption key ᆞ Change BandMaster0~7’s PIN by setting new PINs ᆞ Configure the LBA Range(s) by setting ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled columns to True ᆞ Don’t change LockOnReset column in Locking Table so that the drive always gets locked after a power cycle  [Step4] Configure FW download and Diagnostic features ᆞ Disable Makers Class using SID Authority to disable FW download and Diagnostic features ᆞ Enable Makers Class only when FW download and Diagnostic features are needed  [Step5] Periodically examine the tamper evidence ᆞ If there is any sign of tampering, stop using the product to avoid a potential security hazard or information leakage. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 23 of 24 10.2. Operational description of Module ᆞ The cryptographic module shall maintain logical separation of data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. ᆞ The cryptographic module shall not output CSPs in any form. ᆞ The cryptographic module shall use the Approved DRBG for generating all cryptographic keys. ᆞ The cryptographic module shall enforce role‐based authentication for security relevant services. ᆞ The cryptographic module shall enforce a limited operational environment by the secure firmware load test using RSA PSS‐2048 with SHA‐256. ᆞ The cryptographic module shall provide a production‐grade, opaque, and tamper‐evident cryptographic boundary. ᆞ The cryptographic module enters the error state upon failure of Self‐tests. All commands from the Host (General Purpose Computer (GPC) outside the cryptographic boundary) are rejected in the error state and the cryptographic module returns a sense key (0x4) via the status output. Cryptographic services and data output are explicitly inhibited when in the error state. ᆞ The cryptographic module satisfies the requirements of FIPS 140‐2 IG A.9 (i.e. key_1 ≠ key_2) ᆞ The module generates at a minimum 256 bits of entropy for use in key generation. Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PM1643a/PM1645a Series This non‐proprietary Security Policy may only be copied in its entirety without alterations including this statement. Samsung copyright 2021 Page 24 of 24 10.3. Power‐on Self‐Tests Algorithm Test AES Encrypt KAT and Decrypt KAT for AES‐256‐XTS at power‐on SHS (Cert. #4178) KAT for SHA‐256 at power‐on SHS (Cert. #4179) KAT for SHA‐256 at power‐on DRBG KAT for Hash_DRBG (SHA‐256) at power‐on RSA Firmware integrity check using RSA PSS‐2048 SHA‐256 signature verification at power‐on Exhibit 18 – Power‐on Self‐tests.  Conditional Self‐test ᆞ Pairwise consistency: N/A ᆞ Bypass Test: N/A ᆞ Manual key entry test: N/A ᆞ F/W load test - F/W load test is performed by using RSA algorithm with PSS‐2048 and SHA‐256 ᆞ Continuous random number generator test on Approved DRBG ᆞ Continuous random number generator test on NDRNG