Hypersecu HYP2003 MFA Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Version: 1.0
Date: March 5, 2024
HYPERSECU INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction.................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary.............................................. 5
1.2 Mode of Operation....................................................................................... 6
1.2.1 HOTP/TOTP FIPS Approved/Non-Approved mode configuration ........................ 6
1.2.2 FIDO2&U2F FIPS Approved/Non-Approved mode configuration ........................ 6
2 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................ 6
2.1 Critical Security Parameters.......................................................................... 8
2.2 Public Keys............................................................................................... 11
3 Roles, Authentication and Services ............................................................... 12
3.1 Assumption of Roles .................................................................................. 12
3.2 Authentication Methods.............................................................................. 13
3.3 Services................................................................................................... 14
4 Self-tests....................................................................................................... 22
5 Physical Security Policy................................................................................. 23
6 Operational Environment .............................................................................. 23
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ................................................................. 23
8 Security Rules and Guidance ......................................................................... 23
9 References and Definitions............................................................................ 25
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations ..................................................... 4
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements ................................................. 4
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................ 5
Table 4 – Approved Algorithms ........................................................................... 6
Table 5 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)........................................................ 8
Table 6 – Public Keys....................................................................................... 11
Table 7 – Authenticated Roles Description .......................................................... 12
Table 8 – Unauthenticated Role Description ........................................................ 13
Table 9 – Authentication Description .................................................................. 13
Table 10 – FIDO2&U2F Authenticated Services .................................................... 14
Table 11 – PIV Authenticated Services ............................................................... 15
Table 12 – HOTP Authenticated Services ............................................................ 15
Table 13 – TOTP Authenticated Services............................................................. 16
Table 14 – OpenPGP Authenticated Services ....................................................... 16
Table 15 – FIDO2&U2F Unauthenticated Services ................................................ 17
Table 16 – PIV Unauthenticated Services............................................................ 17
Table 17 – HOTP Unauthenticated Services......................................................... 17
Table 18 – TOTP Unauthenticated Services ......................................................... 17
Table 19 – OpenPGP Unauthenticated Services.................................................... 18
Table 20 – Additional Unauthenticated Services................................................... 18
Table 21 – FIDO2&U2F Security Parameters Access by Service .............................. 19
Table 22 – FIDO2&U2F Security Parameters Access by Service Continued ............... 19
Table 23 – PIV Security Parameters Access by Service ......................................... 20
Table 24 – HOTP CSP Access by Service ............................................................. 20
Table 25 – TOTP CSP Access by Service ............................................................. 21
Table 26 – OpenPGP CSP Access by Service ........................................................ 21
Table 27 – Power Up Self-tests ......................................................................... 22
Table 28 – Conditional Self-tests ....................................................................... 23
Table 29 – References ..................................................................................... 25
Table 30 – Acronyms and Definitions ................................................................. 26
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Module ............................................................................................. 5
Figure 2 – The Module Cryptographic Boundary ..................................................... 5
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Hypersecu HYP2003 MFA Cryptographic Module, hereafter
denoted the Module. The Module is a single chip embodiment implementing the JavaCard and Global
Platform operational environment with a Card Manager, that is also considered an Issuer Security Domain
(ISD), and five Applets. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 2 requirements.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Module HW P/N and Version FW Version
1 Hypersecu HYP2003 MFA
Cryptographic Module
SLE78CLUFX5000PH 7.04
The Module is intended for use by customers that require FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography modules.
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 2
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1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary
The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. The Module is a single-chip embodiment. The
cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire device.
Figure 1 – Module
Figure 2 depicts the Module logical cryptographic boundary outlined in red rectangle.
Figure 2 – The Module Cryptographic Boundary
The module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed in Table 3.
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
USB(D+/D-) 2 Pins Primary physical interface (USB) Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Power Supply 3 Pins Vcc Vdd 1.62-5.5V Power
I2C (SDA/SCL) 2 Pins Primary physical interface (I2C) Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Touch Button 1 Pin Physical input Control in
LED 1 Pin Status LED Status out
Contactless 2 Pins Primary physical interface
(contactless) antenna.
Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
FIDO2&U2F
Card Manager
Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE)
DRBG
Dual
Power
Manage
GPIO USB RFI
Symmetric
ENT
Asymmetric
Coprocessor
RAM
NVM
Asymmetric
Crypto library
Symmetric
Crypto library
Physical Abstract Layer
Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
TOTP
Applet
HOTP
Applet
OpenPGP
Applet
PIV
Applet
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1.2 Mode of Operation
Each applet provides its own mode of operation, which is independent from the other applets.
The applets include: FIDO2&U2F, PIV, HOTP, TOTP, and OpenPGP. PIV only supports an Approved mode of
operation, while the other applets support both an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. To
place a specific applet into the Approved or non-Approved mode of operation, follow the instructions
provided below and adhere to the procedural controls outlined in Section 8 of this Security Policy. If no
instructions are provided below, then only the procedural controls outlined in Section 8 of this Security
Policy must be followed.
Applets do not share any keys, certificates, or CSPs between each other or between modes of operation.
1.2.1 HOTP/TOTP FIPS Approved/Non-Approved mode configuration
HOTP/TOTP can be toggled between the Approved and non-Approved mode using the “Switch Mode”
service. In the non-Approved mode, this applet does not support authentication. To verify the HOTP/TOTP
is in the Approved Mode, perform the ”Get FIPS mode state” service, which will return “01” for Approved
mode and “00” for non-Approved mode.
Switching between modes of operation will zeroize all HOTP/TOTP Applet related CSPs by default.
In the Approved mode, no commands are available until the “SetCode” service is performed.
1.2.2 FIDO2&U2F FIPS Approved/Non-Approved mode configuration
FIDO2&U2F can be toggled between the Approved and non-Approved mode using the “Switch Mode”
service with subcommand = 1 with non-Approved mode (param = 00 ) or Approved mode (param = 01). In
the Approved mode, only FIDO2 functions are available and CTAP Pin Protocol 1 is disabled, as it uses a non-
Approved KDA. In the non-Approved mode, U2F functions are supported, as well as CTAP PIN Protocol 1.
The following U2F services are additionally available in the non-Approved mode:
- U2F Registration
- U2F Authentication
“Switch Mode” service with subcommand = 2, which will return “01” for Approved mode and “00” for non-
Approved mode.
2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in the table(s) below.
Table 4 – Approved Algorithms
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
A2406
AES[197]
ECB[38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CBC[38A] Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CMAC[38B]
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256
Mac Len: 32 – 128
Message Authentication
VA CKG[IG D.12]
[133] Section 5.1 and 5.2 Asymmetric key generation
using unmodified DRBG output Key Generation
[133] Section 6.1 Direct generation of Symmetric Key
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Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
[133] Section 6.2.1 Derivation of symmetric keys from
a key agreement scheme
A2406 CVL
EC CDH
Primitive
Curves/Key sizes:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Tested, but not used
apart from KAS-SSC
A2406 DRBG[90A] CTR Use DF, AES-128
Deterministic Random
Bit. Generation Security
Strength = 128
A2406 ECDSA[186-4]
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
P-192 KeyVer Only
KeyGen, KeyVer
P-224 SHA(224,256,384,512)
P-256 SHA(224,256,384,512)
P-384 SHA(224,256,384,512)
P-521 SHA(224,256,384,512)
SigGen, SigGen
Component
SigVer, SigVer
Component
N/A ENT (P) [90B] Entropy
A2406 HMAC [198]
SHA-1
Key Size: 128 bit minimum Message Authentication
SHA-224
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
KAS
ECDH and
HKDF
KAS-SSC and KDA
KAS-SSC Cert. #A2406,
KDA Cert. #A2406; key
establishment
methodology provides
128 bits of encryption
strength.
A2406
KAS-SSC
[56Ar3]
Ephemeral
Unified
Curves/Key sizes: P-256
Key agreement for
CTAP PIN Protocol 2
A2406 KDA[56Cr2] HKDF HMAC-SHA-256
HKDF for CTAP PIN
Protocol 2
KTS
AES-CBC
and HMAC
128-bit AES and 128-bit HMAC-SHA-1
or
256-bit AES and 256-bit HMAC-SHA-
256
Key establishment
methodology provides
128 or 256-bits of
encryption strength.
A2406,
A2408
RSA [186-4]
FIPS186-4
n = 2048/3072/4096
Note: n = 3072/4096 only CRT mode
Cert. #A2406 only tests 2048.
KeyGen
n = 2048
RSA Decryption [SP800-
56B]
Tested, but not used
PKCS1_v1.5
n = 2048/3072/4096 SHA(224, 256,
384, 512)
Note: n = 3072/4096 only CRT mode
Cert. #A2406 only tests 2048.
SigGen
n = 2048/3072/4096 SHA(224, 256,
384, 512)
SigVer
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Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
Cert. #A2406 only tests 2048.
A2406 SHS [180]
SHA-1
SHA-224
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation, Password
Obfuscation
2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module (including
all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 4.
Table 5 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description Generation Entry Output Storage Zeroization
Java Card Platform CSPs
DRBG-EI
The input entropy and nonce for
DRBG instantiation. The size of
the entropy string is 51 bytes
and the nonce is 26 bytes.
Internally generated
using the NDRNG
N/A N/A Plaintext in RAM Zeroized after reset
DRBG-
State
CTR_DRBG (AES 128-bit): V (128-
bit) and Key (128-bit) are the
critical values of the internal
state
Internally generated
per SP800-90A
N/A N/A Plaintext in RAM Zeroized after reset
Kos
128-bit AES key used to
obfuscate all secret and private
key data stored in NVM
Internally using the
DRBG
N/A N/A Plaintext in Flash No. The key is used for
data obfuscation and
cannot be destroyed.
FIDO2&U2F Applet CSPs
FIDO2
Device
ECDSA
Private
Key
256-bit ECC private key used to
generate signature for FIDO2
registration.
N/A. Installed during
production.
N/A N/A Encrypted by
Managing Key in
Flash
N/A. Encrypted by
Managing Key
FIDO2
User
ECDSA
Private
Key
256-bit ECC private key used to
generate the credentialID
Internally using the
DRBG during
MakeCredential
KTS using
Init_Keyenc and
Init_Keymac
during Get
Assertion if
RK=FALSE
KTS using
Init_Keyenc
and
Init_Keymac
If Resident
(RK=True), then
stored in Flash
encrypted by
Init_Keyenc and
Init_Keymac.
Plaintext in RAM
only if Transient
(RK=False)
Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
Init
Keyenc
128-bit AES CBC key used to
encrypt the key handle or
credentialID
Internally using the
DRBG during
production, Switch
Mode, or Reset
N/A N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
Init
Keymac
128-bit HMAC SHA-1 key used to
generate signature of the cipher
key handle or credentialID
Internally using the
DRBG during
production, Switch
Mode, or Reset
N/A N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
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CSP Description Generation Entry Output Storage Zeroization
Managing
Key 128-bit AES-ECB key, used to
encrypt CSPs and keys
Generated during
production using the
DRBG, Switch Mode, or
Reset
N/A N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
Agreement
ECC
Private
Key
256-bit ECC private key used to
perform key agreement with
client public ECC key to get
sharedSecret
Internally, using the
DRBG during power on
or Reset
N/A N/A Plaintext in RAM Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
SharedSec
ret
Key
256-bit AES CBC key used for
encryption and HMAC SHA-256
calculation of pin related
operations
KAS-SSC and KDA (CTAP
PIN Protocol 2) during
Set Pin, Change PIN, or
Get pinToken
N/A N/A Plaintext in RAM Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
User
pinToken
256-bit HMAC SHA-256 Key used
to authorize operator after PIN
authentication
Internally using the
DRBG during
AuthenticatorClientPIN
N/A KTS using
SharedSecret
key
Plaintext in RAM Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
CO
pinToken
256-bit HMAC SHA-256 Key used
to authorize operator after PIN
authentication
Internally using the
DRBG during
AuthenticatorAdminPIN
N/A KTS using
SharedSecret
key
Plaintext in RAM Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
PIN
Authenticate the User,4 to 63-
byte PIN value
N/A KTS using
SharedSecret key
N/A Flash, SHA-256
hash of PIN
encrypted by
Managing Key
Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
CO
PIN
Authenticate the CO, 4 to 63-
byte PIN value
N/A KTS using
SharedSecret key
N/A Flash, SHA-256
hash of PIN
encrypted by
Managing Key
Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
hmacsaltKey
32-byte random value
associated with the credential.
Internally using the
DRBG during
GetAssertion
(supported hmac-
secret)
N/A N/A Plaintext in RAM Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
PIV Applet CSPs
PIV
Symmetric
Key
128-bit AES ECB key, used for
authentication of PIV CO. It is set
with default value after
personalization
N/A. Default value set
during production
Plaintext during
Set Management
Key
N/A Plaintext in Flash The default value is
restored after Reset
PIV
Asymmetric
Private
Key
2048-4096 bit RSA or 256/384-
bit ECC private key, used for
cryptographic operations in
conjunction with an external
system
Internally using the
DRBG during Generate
Asymmetric Key
Plaintext during
ImportKey
N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by Reset
PIV
Attestation
Private
Key
2048-4096 bit RSA or 256-bit
ECC private key, used to attest
internally generated public key
using PKCS#1 signature
N/A. Installed during
production
N/A N/A Plaintext in Flash N/A
PIV
User
PIN
6 to 8-byte pin, used for
authenticating the PIV user for
Asymmetric services
N/A. Default value set
during production
Plaintext during
VerifyPIN,
ChangePIN,
GeneralAuth
N/A Plaintext in Flash The default value is
restored after Reset
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CSP Description Generation Entry Output Storage Zeroization
PIV
PUK
PIN 8-byte pin, used for unblocking
the PIV user pin
N/A. Default value set
during production
Plaintext during
VerifyPUK,
ChangePUK,
UnlockPIN
N/A Plaintext in Flash The default value is
restored after Reset
HOTP Applet CSPs
HOTP
OATH
Seed
Key
16 to 64-byte HMAC SHA-1/-256
key used to calculate OTP values
for the User. Up to five may
exist.
N/A. Plaintext during
“Put”
N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
HOTP
OATH
Auth
Key
16 to 64-byte HMAC SHA-256
key used to authenticate
operator through verification of
HMAC calculated over a module
generated challenge during the
“Validate” service.
N/A. Plaintext during
“Set Code”
N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
TOTP Applet CSPs
TOTP
OATH
Seed
Key
16 to 64-byte HMAC SHA-1/-256
key, used to calculate OTP
values for the User (“Calculate”,
“Calculate Default” services). Up
to five may exist.
N/A. Plaintext during
“Put”
N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
TOTP
OATH
Auth
Key
16 to 64-byte HMAC SHA-256
key, used to authenticate
operator through verification of
HMAC calculated over a module
generated challenge during the
“Validate” service.
N/A. Plaintext during
“Set Code”
N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by Switch
Mode or Reset
OpenPGP Applet CSPs
OpenPGP
Symmetri
c
Key
AES-ECB 128-bit and AES-CMAC
128-bit keys (SMKey-ENC, SM-
Key-MAC) for secure messaging.
N/A. Imported. Plaintext during
putData
N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by
“TERMINATE APPLET”
followed by “ACTIVATE
APPLET”
OpenPGP
Admin
PIN(PW3)
8 to 127-byte, used for
authentication of the OpenPGP
CO.
N/A. Default value is set
by the manufacturer.
Plaintext for
each Admin
command
N/A Plaintext in Flash Reset to default by
“TERMINATE APPLET”
followed by “ACTIVATE
APPLET”
OpenPGP
User
PIN(PW1)
6 to 127-byte, used for
authenticating the OpenPGP
user for Asymmetric services.
N/A. Default value is set
by the manufacturer.
Plaintext for
each User
command
N/A Plaintext in Flash Reset to default by
“TERMINATE APPLET”
followed by “ACTIVATE
APPLET”
OpenPGP
Signature
Private
Key
2048-4096 bit RSA private key,
used for PKCS#1 v1.5 signing
operation
Internally using the
DRBG during Generate
Asymmetric Key
Plaintext during
Import Key
N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by
“TERMINATE APPLET”
followed by “ACTIVATE
APPLET”
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2.2 Public Keys
Table 6 – Public Keys
Key Description Generation Entry Output Storage
FIDO2&U2F Applet Public Keys
FIDO2
Device
ECDSA
Public
Key
256-bit ECC FIDO2 public key, it is
returned to the server via the certificate
to verify the signature generated after
FIDO2 registration
N/A. Installed during
production
N/A Plaintext during
MakeCredential
Plaintext In
Flash
Agreement
ECC
Public
Key
256-bit ECC public key used to perform
key agreement, the Module returns it to
server to derive sharedSecret
Internally, using the
DRBG during power
on or Reset
N/A Plaintext during
KAS-SSC
Plaintext in
RAM
Client
ECC
Public
Key
256-bit ECC Client public key for key
agreement, the client sends it to applet
to generate sharedSecret
N/A Plaintext
during KAS-
SSC
N/A Plaintext in
RAM
FIDO2
User
ECDSA
Public
Key
256-bit ECC FIDO2 public key, it is
transmitted to the server for verifying
signature generated after FIDO2
authentication
Internally using the
DRBG during
MakeCredential
N/A Plaintext during
MakeCredential
Plaintext in
RAM
PIV Applet Public Keys
PIV
Asymmetric
Public
Key
2048 – 4096-bit RSA or 256/384-bit ECC
public key, used for cryptographic
operations in conjunction with an
external system
Internally, using the
DRBG during Generate
Asymmetric Key
Plaintext by
Import Key
Plaintext during
Generate
Asymmetric Key
Plaintext in
Flash
OpenPGP Applet Public Keys
OpenPGP
Signature
Public
Key
2048-4096 bit RSA public key, used for
verification specified in PKCS#1 v1.5
Internally, using the
DRBG during Generate
Asymmetric Key
Plaintext by
Import Key
Plaintext during
Generate
Asymmetric Key
Plaintext in
Flash
CSP Description Generation Entry Output Storage Zeroization
OpenPGP
Authentication
Private
Key 2048-4096 bit RSA private key,
used for authentication specified
in PKCS#1 v1.5 signing operation
Internally using the
DRBG during Generate
Asymmetric Key
Plaintext during
Import Key
N/A Plaintext in Flash Zeroized by
“TERMINATE APPLET”
followed by “ACTIVATE
APPLET”
OpenPGP
Resetting
Code
8 to 127-byte. Used for resetting
the User PIN
N/A Plaintext during
putData and
“Reset Retry
Counter”
N/A Plaintext in Flash Reset
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Key Description Generation Entry Output Storage
OpenPGP
Authentication
Public
Key 2048-4096 bit RSA public key, used for
authentication specified in PKCS#1 v1.5
Internally, using the
DRBG during Generate
Asymmetric Key
Plaintext by
Import Key
Plaintext during
Generate
Asymmetric Key
Plaintext in
Flash
HOTP Applet Public Keys
None
TOTP Applet Public Keys
None
3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The Module contains five functional units (i.e., applets), each with its own distinct roles and services. The
listed functional units are PIV, OpenPGP, TOTP, HOTP, FIDO2&U2F. Each functional unit operates
independently of the others. They do not share roles, but CSPs maintained by Java Card platform (i.e., CSPs
related to DRBG).
Table 7 – Authenticated Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
FIDO2&U2F
Crypto
Officer
Thisroleisresponsibleforswitchmodeand
changingtheCOPIN
Role-based 4to63-bytePIN
FIDO2&U2F
User
ThisroleisallowedtoperformFIDO2&U2F
RegistrationAuthenticationwiththePIN
(FIDO2&U2Fkeyhandles)
Role-based 4to63-bytePIN
PIV Crypto
Officer
Thisroleisresponsibleforconfiguringthe
PIVCSPsandresetting the user PIN using
PUK.
Role-based 16-byte KEY (AES)
or 8-byte PUK
PIV User Thisroleisallowedtoperform
cryptographicoperationusingPIV keys,
andupdateuserPIN.
Role-based 6 to 8-byte PIN
HOTP Crypto
Officer
Thisroleisresponsibleforcreatingand
usingCSPs.
Role-based 16 to 64-byte
HMAC-SHA256
HOTP OATH Auth Key
TOTP Crypto
Officer
Thisroleisresponsibleforcreatingand
usingCSPs.
Role-based 16 to 64-byte
HMAC-SHA256
TOTP OATH Auth Key
OpenPGP
Crypto
Officer
This role is responsible for configuring
CSPs and resetting PW1 (userPIN)using
thePW3.
Role-based 8to127-byte
administratorPIN or
Resetting Code PIN
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Role ID Role Description Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
OpenPGP
User
Thisroleisallowedtoperformcryptographic
operations(encryption, signature
generation and authentication) and
update PW1 (user PIN).
Role-based 6to127-byteuserPIN
Table 8 – Unauthenticated Role Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication
Data
Unauthenticated
User
This role can reset all applets to factory default settings and
may also read non-read-protected objects.
This role can reset the PIV to factory default settings and can
read all non‐read‐protected objects.
This role can reset the HOTP, TOTP to factory default settings.
Unauthenticated
– N/A
3.2 Authentication Methods
Table lists all details regarding the authentication mechanism.
Table 9 – Authentication Description
Authentication
Method
Probability Justification
User PIN 4 to
63-byte PIN
(FIDO2&U2F)
The PIN is at least 4-bytes (32-bit)
binary string with no restrictions on
character space. The probability that
a random attempt will succeed, or a
false acceptance will occur is at most
1
232 , which is less than
1
1,000,000
.
The Module is limited by retry counter of 8
tries after which the module requires a reset.
Therefore, the probability of successfully
authenticating to the Module within one
minute through random attempts is
8
232 ,
which is less than
1
100,000
.
Admin PIN 4 to
63 bytes
(FIDO2&U2F)
The PIN is at least 4-bytes (32-bit)
binary string with no restrictions on
character space. The probability that
a random attempt will succeed, or a
false acceptance will occur is at most
1
232 , which is less than
1
1,000,000
.
The Module is limited by retry counter of 8
tries after which the module requires a reset.
Therefore, the probability of successfully
authenticating to the Module within one
minute through random attempts is
8
232 ,
which is less than
1
100,000
.
128-bit key AES
mutual
challenge
response (PIV)
This is an AES Key which has 128 bits
of security strength. The probability
that a random attempt will succeed,
or a false acceptance will occur is
1
2128 which is less than
1
1,000,000
.
Authentication attempts are limited to 150
per minute. Therefore, the probability of
successfully authenticating to the Module
within one minute through random attempts
is
150
2128 , which is less than
1
100,000
.
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Authentication
Method
Probability Justification
6 to 8-byte digit
PIN or 8-byte
digit PUK (PIV)
The PIN is at least a 6-byte (48-bit)
binary string with no restrictions on
character space. The probability that
a random attempt will succeed, or a
false acceptance will occur is at most
1
248 which is less than
1
1,000,000
.
The authentication is limited by the retry
counter of up to 10 tries (3 by default, but 10
maximum). Therefore, the probability of
successfully authenticating to the Module
within one minute through random attempts
is at most
10
248 , which is less than
1
100,000
.
Auth Key 16 to
64-byte HMAC
SHA-256 key
(HOTP/TOTP)
The authentication key is a at least
16-byte (128-bit) binary string with
no restrictions on character space.
The probability that a random
attempt will succeed, or a false
acceptance will occur is at most
1
2128
which is less than
1
1,000,000
.
Each authentication attempt takes
approximately 12 ms which allows a
maximum of 5000 attempts per minute.
Therefore, the probability of successfully
authenticating to the Module within one
minute through random attempts is at most
5000
2128 , which is less than
1
100,000
.
User PIN 6 to
127-byte
(OpenPGP)
The PIN is at least a 6-byte (48-bit)
binary string with no restrictions on
character space. The probability that
a random attempt will succeed, or a
false acceptance will occur is at most
1
248 which is less than
1
1,000,000
.
The authentication is limited by the retry
counter of up to 10 tries (3 by default, but 10
maximum).. Therefore, the probability of
successfully authenticating to the Module
within one minute through random attempts
is at most
3
248 , which is less than
1
100,000
.
Admin PIN or
Resetting Code
8 to 127-byte
(OpenPGP)
The PIN and Resetting Code are at
least 8-byte (48-bit) binary strings
with no restrictions on character
space. The probability that a random
attempt will succeed, or a false
acceptance will occur is at most
1
248
which is less than
1
1,000,000
.
The authentication Is limited by the retry
counter of up to 10 tries (3 by default, but 10
maximum).. Therefore, the probability of
successfully authenticating to the Module
within one minute through random attempts
is at most
3
248 , which is less than
1
100,000
.
3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the table(s) below.
Table 10 – FIDO2&U2F Authenticated Services
Service Description CO U
Make
Credential
This service is used to generate a new credential in the module. If the Make
Credential request contains “"hmac-secre”":true}, the mac-secret:true field
will be included in the Make Credential response.
X
Get Assertion This service is used to verify the FIDO2 cryptographic proof by the
credentialID of user authentication. If the GetAssertion authentication
request contains an hmac-secret extension, the authenticator generates a 32-
byte random number as hmacsaltkey and associates it with the Credential.
X
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Service Description CO U
Get Next
Assertion
The client calls this service when the GetAssertion response contains the
number of credentials member and the number of credentials exceeds 1.
X
Authenticator
Client PIN
This service is used by the platform to establish the sharedSecret key, setting
a new user PIN, changing existing user PIN, and getting User pinToken from
the module
X
Credential
Management
This service is used to manage resident credentials on the applet, such as
retrieving or deleting.
X
Authenticator
Admin PIN
This service is used by the platform to establish the sharedSecret key, setting
a new CO PIN, changing existing CO PIN, and getting CO pinToken from the
module.
X
Switch Mode This service is used to switch between FIPS and non-FIPS mode and zeroizes
all plaintext CSPs and get current mode state.
X
Table 11 – PIV Authenticated Services
Service Description CO U
Set Management Key This service is used to change management key (PIV Symmetric
Key).
X
Change PUK This service is used to change PUK. X
Change PIN This service is used to change PIN. X
Unblock PIN (Reset retry
counter)
This service is used to reset retry counter and set new user PIN
with known PUK.
X
Set PIN Retries This service is used to set retry limit for PIN, PUK. The minimum
is 3 and the maximum is 10.
X X
Generate Asymmetric Key This service is used to generate an asymmetric key. X
GeneralAuth (RSA/ECDSA) This service is used to authenticate the applet with RSA/ECC key. X
Put Data This service is used to write data (certificate, ID and etc.). X
Import Key This service is used to import asymmetric key. X
Note: PIV services are not supported over NFC, these services must be performed over USB only.
Table 12 – HOTP Authenticated Services
Service Description CO
Set Code Set or update an authentication key, it is a required step for FIPS Mode. X
Put Add a new entry and initialize its seed key. X
Delete Destroy the selected HOTP OATH Seed Key. X
List List all the names of the entries. X
Calculate Calculate the HOTP value for an entry. X
Calculate Default Calculate the HOTP for the default entry. X
Set Default Set default entry. X
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Service Description CO
Get Default Get default entry. X
Switch Mode This service is used to switch the applet from FIPS mode to non-FIPS mode
and vice versa.
X
Table 13 – TOTP Authenticated Services
Service Description CO
Set Code Set or update an authentication key, a required step for FIPS Mode. X
Put Add a new entry and initialize its seed key. X
Delete Remove an entry and its seed key. X
List List all the names of the entries. X
List Detail Info List detail info of the entry. X
Calculate Calculate the TOTP value for an entry. X
Calculate Default Calculate the TOTP for the default entry. X
Calculate All Calculate the TOTP value for all entries. X
Set Default Set default entry. X
Get Default Get default entry. X
Switch Mode This service is used to switch the applet from FIPS mode to non-FIPS mode
and vice versa.
X
Table 14 – OpenPGP Authenticated Services
Service Description CO U
Change PW1 Change user PW1. X
Change PW3 Change administrator PW3. X
Reset Retry Counter Reset user PW1 using PW3 or Resetting Code. X
Set PIN Retries Set retries limit for PW1 and PW3. X
Generate Asymmetric Key Pair Generate asymmetric key pair. X
Perform Security Operation Compute digital signature X
Internal Authenticate Perform internal authentication. X
Read Protected Data For User Read data objects only available to user. X
Read Protected Data For Admin Read data objects only available to administrator. X
Put Data Write data objects except user writable data objects. X
Import Key This service is used to import asymmetric key. X
Write User Protected Data Write user writable data objects. X
Get Challenge Generate a random number with the given length. X
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Note: OpenPGP services are not supported over NFC, these services must be performed over USB only.
Table 15 – FIDO2&U2F Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Get Information This service is used to get a list of all supported protocol versions, supported
extensions, PIN retry count, and the mode of operation.
Select Applet This service is used to select FIDO2&U2F.
FIDO2 Reset This service is used by the client to zeroize all plaintext CSPs, reset the module to
a factory default state, invalidating all generated credentials and key handles, and
regenerating the Managing Key.
Table 16 – PIV Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Verify PIN This service is used to verify the PIN.
Read Data Object This service is used to read data.
Select Applet This service is used to select PIV.
Reset This service is used to reset the applet back to manufacturer default settings
and invalidates all generated keys.
Note: This command is also considered as the Zeroization service.
GeneralAuth
(management auth)
This service is used to authenticate the applet with PIV Symmetric Key.
Attest This service is used to attest and sign a generated key.
Note: PIV services are not supported over NFC, these services must be performed over USB only.
Table 17 – HOTP Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Select Applet Selects HOTP for usage and returns version, ID and a challenge if the Module is
in Approved mode.
Validate Verify HOTP OATH Auth key.
Reset Reset the applet to manufactory default settings.
Note: This command is also considered as the Zeroization service.
Get FIPS mode state This service is used to get the applet FIPS mode state.
Table 18 – TOTP Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Select Applet Selects TOTP for usage and returns version, ID and a challenge if the Module is in
Approved mode.
Validate Verify TOTP OATH Auth key.
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Service Description
Reset Reset the applet to manufactory default settings.
Note: This command is also considered as the Zeroization service.
Get FIPS mode state This service is used to get the applet FIPS mode state.
Table 19 – OpenPGP Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Select Applet Select OpenPGP.
Verify PW1 Verify using user PW1.
Verify PW3 Verify using administrator PW3.
Read Unprotected Data Object Read all unprotected data.
Terminate DF Terminate OpenPGP and delete all stored data.
Activate File Initialize to the manufactory default settings.
Note: This command is also considered as the Zeroization service.
Note: OpenPGP services are not supported over NFC. These services must be performed over USB only.
Table 20 – Additional Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
SELF-TEST (RESET) After the module is reset, the power up self-tests are performed.
Get FW Version Retrieves the firmware version. Bytes 08 and 09 bytes indicate the major version,
while bytes 10 and 11 indicate the minor version.
Example: “00 07 00 04” equates to “7.04”.
Show Status Status information provided by return codes and optionally through the attached
LED
The following defines the relationship between access to Security Parameters and the different module
services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The service generates the CSP.
• O = Output: The service outputs the CSP.
• E = Execute: The service uses the CSP in an algorithm.
• I = Input: The service inputs the CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The service zeroizes the CSP.
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Table 21 – FIDO2&U2F Security Parameters Access by Service
Service
CSPs and Public Keys
DRBG
EI
DRBG-state
FIDO2
Device
ECDSA
Certificate
FIDO2
Device
ECDSA
Private
Key
FIOD2
User
ECDSA
Private
Key
Init
Keyenc
Init
Keymac
Managing
Key
Agreement
ECC
Private
Key
Select Applet
Get Information
FIDO2 Make Credential G, E G, E O E G, O E E
FIDO2 GetAssertion G, E G, E E E E
FIDO2 GetNext Assertion G, E G, E E
FIDO2 Reset G, E G, E Z, G Z, G Z Z, G Z, G Z, G Z, G
FIDO2 Credential Management
FIDO2 Authenticator ClientPIN G, E G, E G, E
Authenticator AdminPIN G, E G, E G, E
Switch mode G, E G, E Z, G Z, G Z Z, G Z, G Z, G Z, G
Table 22 – FIDO2&U2F Security Parameters Access by Service Continued
Service
CSPs and Public Keys
SharedSecret
Key
User
pinToken
CO
pinToken
PIN
CO
PIN
hmacsaltkey
FIDO2
Device
ECDSA
Public
Key
Agreement
ECC
Public
Key
Client
ECC
Public
Key
FIDO2
User
ECDSA
Public
Key
Select Applet
Get Information
FIDO2 Make Credential E I, E E O G, O
FIDO2 GetAssertion E I, E E G, E I, E
FIDO2 GetNext Assertion
FIDO2 Reset Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z, G Z Z
FIDO2 Credential Management E E
FIDO2 Authenticator ClientPIN G, E G, O E G, O I, E
Authenticator AdminPIN G, E G, O E G, O I, E
Switch mode Z Z I, E Z E Z Z Z, G Z Z
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Table 23 – PIV Security Parameters Access by Service
Service
CSPs and Public Keys
DRBG
EI
DRBG-State
PIV
Symmetric
Key
PIV
Asymmetric
Private
Key
PIV
Attestation
Private
Key
PIV
User
PIN
PIV
PUK
PIN
PIV
Asymmetric
Public
Key
Select Applet
Verify PIN I, E
General Auth (management auth) E, G E
General Auth (RSA/ECDSA) E, G E
Read Data Object O
Reset Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Attest E
Set Management Key I, E, G G, O
Change PUK I, E, G
Change PIN I E, G
Unblock PIN (reset retry counter) G I, E
Set PIN Retries G G
Generate Asymmetric Key E, G G G, O
Put Data
Import Key I, G I, G, Z
Table 24 – HOTP CSP Access by Service
Service
CSPs and Public Keys
DRBG EI DRBG-State HOTP OATH Auth Key
HOTP OATH Seed
Key
Select Applet G, E E
List
Put I, G
Calculate Default E
Calculate E
Reset Z Z Z Z
Get Default
Set Default
Delete Z
Set Code I, E, G
Validate E
Switch mode Z Z Z Z
Get FIPS mode
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Table 25 – TOTP CSP Access by Service
Service
CSPs and Public Keys
DRBG EI DRBG-State TOTP OATH Auth Key TOTP OATH Seed Key
Select Applet G, E E
Set Code I, E, G
Validate
Put I, G
Delete Z Z
Reset Z Z Z Z
List
Calculate E
Calculate All E
Calculate Default E
List Detail Info
Get Default
Set Default
Switch mode Z Z Z Z
Get FIPS mode
Table 26 – OpenPGP CSP Access by Service
Service
CSPs and Public Keys
DRBG
EI
DRBG-State
Symmetric
Key
OpenPGP
Admin
PIN
(PW3)
OpenPGP
Signature
Private
Key
OpenPGP
Authentication
Private
Key
OpenPGP
User
PIN
(PW1)
OpenPGP
Signature
Public
Key
OpenPGP
Authentication
Public
Key
Resetting
Code
Select Applet
Verify PW1 I, E
Verify PW3 I, E
Change PW1 I, E, G
Change PW3 I, E, G
Reset Retry Counter I, E G I, E
Set Pin Retries I, E, Z Z Z
Generate Asymmetric Key Pair E, G I, E G G G, O G, O
Perform Security Operation E
Internal Authenticate E I, E
Get Challenge E, G E
Read Unprotected Data Object
Read Protected Data For User I, E
Read Protected Data For Admin I, E
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Service
CSPs and Public Keys
DRBG
EI
DRBG-State
Symmetric
Key
OpenPGP
Admin
PIN
(PW3)
OpenPGP
Signature
Private
Key
OpenPGP
Authentication
Private
Key
OpenPGP
User
PIN
(PW1)
OpenPGP
Signature
Public
Key
OpenPGP
Authentication
Public
Key
Resetting
Code
Put Data I I, E I, E I
Write User Protected Data
Import Key I, E I I I I
Terminate DF Z
Activate File Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
4 Self-Tests
The module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the module. Per FIPS 140-2 these are
categorized as either power-up self-tests or conditional self-tests. Power up self–tests are available on
demand by power cycling the module.
If one of the KATs fails, the Module is reset.
The Module performs the following algorithm KATs on power-up.
Table 27 – Power Up Self-tests
Test Target Description
Firmware Integrity CRC-16 over all firmware
AES KATS: Encryption, Decryption Modes: ECB, CBC
Key Size: 256-bits
CMAC Algorithm: AES
Key Size: 256-bits
DRBG KATs: CTR_DRBG SP800-90A Section 11.3 Health Tests (covers AES Encrypt KAT)
Security Strengths: 128-bits
ECDSA PCT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Curves/Key sizes: P-256
HMAC KATs: Generation
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256
KAS-SSC KATs: Primitive “Z” Computation KAT per IG 9.6
Curves/Key sizes: P-256
KDA KATs: SP800-56C HKDF
RSA-2048 KATs: PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Generation, Signature Verification. Per IG D.9, this
also satisfies the self-test requirements for RSA Decryption Primitive
Key size: 2048-bits
SHA-1, SHA-256,
and SHA-512
KATs: Generation
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Table 28 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG
SP800-90A Health Tests
ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every ECDSA key pair generation using
sign/verify
ECDH SP800-56A-rev3 Pairwise Consistency Tests
ENT SP800-90A APT and RCT
RSA RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation using
sign/verify
5 Physical Security Policy
The Module is opaque and meets Level 3 for tamper resistance and evidence. The Module is encased in a
removal-resistant IC packaging material. The physical security mechanism is a hard, opaque tamper-evident
coating. The Module should be inspected for tamper before each use. Tamper will be indicated by scratches
or other damage to the coating.
6 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The Module does not support firmware updates.
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
Hypersecu HYP2003 MFA Cryptographic Module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside of
those required by FIPS 140-2.
8 Security Rules and Guidance
This section documents the security rules for the secure operation of the cryptographic module to
implement the security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module provides role-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentication on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting the
Module.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
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7. Data outputs are inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The Module does not support manual key entry.
13. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
14. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
15. The following procedural controls apply in order to operate in the Approved mode of operation:
a. FIDO2&U2F:
i. Operator shall set a PIN.
ii. Operator shall ensure Credential Protection Level is set to 2.
b. HOTP and TOTP:
i. Operator shall set a Manager Key through the “Set Code” service.
ii. Operator shall not perform “Set Code” or “Put” services over NFC.
c. PIV and OpenPGP:
i. PIV and OpenPGP services are not supported over NFC. These services are only available
over the USB interface.
ii. The OpenPGP service, “Perform Security Operation” must not be used to perform
PKCS#1 RSA Encrypt or Decrypt.
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9 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 29 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, February 14, 2022
[108] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions (Revised), October 2009
[131Ar2] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths, March 2019
[132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, Part
1: Storage Applications, December 2010
[133r2] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, June
2020
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-
Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011.
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July, 2013.
[186-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2, January 2000.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[202] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, SHA-3 Standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, FIPS PUB 202, August 2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001
[38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005
[38C] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Special Publication 800-
38C, May 2004
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D, November
2007
[38E] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, Special Publication
800-38E, January 2010
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December 2012
[56A] NIST Special Publication 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007
[56Ar2] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, May 2013
[56Ar3] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography. April 2018
[56Br1] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 1, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, September 2014
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, June
2015.
[90B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources
Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.
Table 30 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CTR Counter
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
FIPS Federal Information processing Standard
VCC Voltage (at the) Common Collector
PW1 User PIN
PW3 Administrator PIN
CO Crypto Officer
PUK PIN Unblocking Key