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Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller
FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Validation
Software Version: IOS-XE 17.3
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation
Version 1.1
February 1, 2023
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 3
1.3 FIPS 140-2 SUBMISSION PACKAGE ..................................................................................... 3
1.4 TERMINOLOGY.................................................................................................................... 4
2 MODULE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................... 4
2.1 CISCO CATALYST 9800-CLWIRELESS CONTROLLER.......................................................... 4
2.2 CISCO SERVERS .................................................................................................................. 4
2.3 FIPS AND NON-FIPS MODES OF OPERATION ........................................................................ 4
2.4 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................. 4
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOUNDARY............................................................................... 5
4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES ........................................................... 6
5 ROLES,SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION ........................................................................... 6
5.1 USER SERVICES................................................................................................................... 7
5.2 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES ................................................................................................ 7
6 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES............................................................................................ 9
7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS......................................................................................... 10
7.1 APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS....................................................................... 10
7.2 NON-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS BUT ALLOWED IN FIPS MODE................ 14
7.3 NON-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS .............................................................. 14
7.4 NON-FIPS APPROVED SERVICES....................................................................................... 15
8 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT............................................................................... 15
9 SELF-TESTS....................................................................................................................... 21
10 PHYSICAL SECURITY......................................................................................................... 23
11 SECURE OPERATION.......................................................................................................... 23
11.1 SYSTEM INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION................................................................. 23
11.2 PROTOCOL CONFIGURATION ............................................................................................. 24
12 RELATED DOCUMENTATION.............................................................................................. 25
13 OBTAINING DOCUMENTATION .......................................................................................... 26
13.1 CISCO.COM...................................................................................................................................................... 26
13.2 PRODUCT DOCUMENTATION DVD.................................................................................... 26
13.3 ORDERING DOCUMENTATION............................................................................................ 26
14 DOCUMENTATION FEEDBACK ........................................................................................... 27
15 CISCO PRODUCT SECURITY OVERVIEW............................................................................. 27
15.1 REPORTING SECURITY PROBLEMS IN CISCO PRODUCTS..................................................... 27
16 OBTAINING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE................................................................................ 28
16.1 CISCO TECHNICAL SUPPORT & DOCUMENTATION WEBSITE.............................................. 28
16.2 SUBMITTING A SERVICE REQUEST..................................................................................... 29
16.3 DEFINITIONS OF SERVICE REQUEST SEVERITY .................................................................. 29
17 OBTAINING ADDITIONAL PUBLICATIONS AND INFORMATION............................................ 29
DEFINITIONS LIST .................................................................................................................. 31
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL
Wireless Controller; referred to in this document as controllers or the module. This security policy
describes how the modules meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and how to run
the modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely distributed.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL
Wireless Controller, in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security
policy.
For answers to technical or sales related questions, please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at www.cisco.com.
The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html)
contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 FIPS 140-2 Submission Package
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller and
explains the secure configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is
followed by Section 2 through Section 10, which details the general features and functionality of
the appliances. Section 11 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of
operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission
Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure
agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
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1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller is referred to as controller or
the module.
2 Module Description
2.1 Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller
The Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller is built on the three pillars of network excellence-
always on, secure, and deployed anywhere-which strengthen the network by providing the best
wireless experience without compromise, while saving time and money.
The Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller is the next generation of enterprise-class wireless
controllers for cloud, with seamless software updates for distributed branches and midsize
campuses to large enterprises and service providers.
2.2 Cisco Servers
The cryptographic module is defined as multiple-chip standalone software module. The module
executes IOS-XE 17.3 software on a VMware ESXi Hypervisor on the hardware platforms
identified in Table 1.
Platform Hypervisor Processor
UCS C220 M5 VMware ESXi 6.0 Intel Xeon Platinum 8160M
Table 1: Tested Configuration
2.3 FIPS and non-FIPS modes of operation
The Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller supports a FIPS and non-FIPS mode of
operation. The non-FIPS mode of operation is not a recommended operational mode but because
the module allows for non-approved algorithms and non-approved key sizes, a non-approved
mode of operation exists. The services that are available in both a FIPS and a non-FIPS mode of
operation are SSH, TLS, DTLS, IPSec and SNMPv3
2.4 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
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IC2M
FOM
API
Guest OS / FTD
Host Application Hypervisor
Host Operating System API
Host Hardware Processor
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 1
Table 2: Module Validation Level
3 Cryptographic Module Boundary
The Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller is a virtual module and is defined as a multi-
chip standalone software module (inside red dashed area), with the physical boundary being
defined as the hard case enclosure around which everything runs. Then the Cryptographic
boundary is the WLC virtual software, hypervisor, API and processor.
The logical cryptographic boundary of the module consists of the OVA image called “C9800-CL-
universalk9.17.3.02s.ova” version IOS-XE 17.3.
Physical boundary
Control Input Data I/O Status Output
Physical boundary
Logical Boundary
Figure 1 Module’s Cryptographic Boundary
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4 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces
and their mapping are described in the following tables:
Physical Port/ Interface Logical Port/Interface FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interface
(2) Host System 10G Ethernet
Ports
(2) Host System USB Ports
Virtual Ethernet Ports
Virtual USB Ports
Data Input Interface
(2) Host System 10G Ethernet
Ports
(2) Host System USB Ports
Virtual Ethernet Ports
Virtual USB Ports
Data Output Interface
(2) 10G Ethernet Ports,
Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet Ports
Virtual Serial Port
Control Input Interface
(2) Host System 10G Ethernet
Ports
Host System Serial Port
Virtual Ethernet/Serial Ports
Virtual Serial Port
Status Output Interface
Host System Power
Connector
N/A Power Interface
Table 3: Cisco Catalyst 9800-CL Wireless Controller Physical Interface/Logical Interface Mapping
5 Roles, Services and Authentication
The module supports identity-based authentication. There are two roles in the module that the
operators may assume in the FIPS mode:
• User Role -This role performs general security services including cryptographic
operations and other approved security functions. The product documentation refers to
this role as a management user with level 1 privilege.
• Crypto Officer (CO) Role -This role performs the cryptographic initialization and
management operations. In particular, it performs the loading of optional certificates and
key-pairs and the zeroization of the module. The product documentation refers to this role
as a management user with level 15 privilege.
The Module does not support a Maintenance Role.
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5.1 User Services
The services available to the User role consist of the following:
Services & Access Description Keys & CSPs
System Status • The command line “status commands”
that outputs system status (Example:
“show fips status” command would
result in indicating whether the
module is in FIPS mode or not).
N/A
Random Number
Generation
• Key generation and seeds for
asymmetric key generation
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed,
DRBG v, DRBG Key – r, w, d
Key Exchange • Key exchange over Diffie-Hellman
and EC Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-
Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman
shared secret, EC Diffie-Hellman Public
Key, EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key, EC
Diffie-Hellman shared secret – w, d
Module Read-only
Configuration
• Viewing of configuration settings N/A
Table 4: User Services (r = read, w = write, d = delete)
5.2 Crypto Officer Services
The Crypto Officer services consist of the following:
Services & Access Description Keys & CSPs
Self Test and Initialization • Cryptographic algorithm tests,
software integrity tests, module
initialization.
N/A (No keys are accessible)
System Status • The command line “status
commands” that outputs system
status (Example: “show fips status”
command would result in indicating
whether the module is in FIPS mode
or not).
N/A (No keys are accessible)
Random Number
Generation
• Key generation and seeds for
asymmetric key generation
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed,
DRBG v, DRBG Key – r, w, d
Key Exchange • Key exchange over Diffie-Hellman
and EC Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-
Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman
shared secret, EC Diffie-Hellman
Public Key, EC Diffie-Hellman
Private Key, EC Diffie-Hellman
shared secret – w, d
IPSec • Secure communications between
module and a client.
skeyid, skeyid_d, IKE session
encryption key, IKE session
authentication key, IKE RSA private
key, IKE RSA public key, IPSec
session encryption key, IPSec session
authentication key, IPSec
authentication key, IPSec encryption
key, ISAKMP preshared – r, w,d
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Zeroization • Zeroize CSPs and cryptographic
keys by cycling power to zeroize all
cryptographic keys stored in Volatile
RAM. The CSPs (password, secret,
engineID) stored in Flash can be
zeroized by overwriting with a new
value.
All Keys and CSPs will be destroyed
– d
Module Configuration • Selection of non-cryptographic
configuration settings
N/A
SNMPv3 • Non-security related monitoring by
the CO using SNMPv3
snmpEngineID, SNMPv3 Password,
SNMP session key – w, d
SSH • Establishment and subsequent data
transfer of a SSH session for use
between the module and the CO.
SSH encryption key, SSH integrity
key, SSH RSA private key – w, d
HTTPS/TLS • Establishment and subsequent data
transfer of a TLS session for use
between the module and the CO.
• Protection of syslog messages
HTTPS/TLS Pre-Master secret,
HTTPS/TLS Master secret,
HTTPS/TLS Encryption Key,
HTTPS/TLS Integrity Key,
HTTPS/TLS RSA/ECDSA private
key – w, d
DTLS Data Encrypt • Enabling optional DTLS data path
encryption for Office Extended AP’s
DTLS Pre-Master Secret, DTLS Master
Secret, DTLS Encryption/Decryption
Key (CAPWAP session keys), DTLS
Integrity Keys, DTLS RSA/ECDSA
private key – w, d
Table 5: Crypto Officer Services (r = read, w = write, d = delete)
User and CO Authentication
The Crypto Officer role is assumed by an authorized CO connecting to the module via CLI, SSH
and GUI. The OS prompts the CO for their username and password, if the password is validated
against the CO’s password in memory, the operator is allowed entry to execute CO services.
Each username is unique and configurable by Crypto-Officer. The password feedback
mechanism does not provide information that could be used to determine the authentication data.
The User role monitors the module via CLI, SSH and GUI.
The Crypto Officer and User passwords and all shared secrets must each be at least eight (8)
characters long, including at least one (1) special character and at least one (1) number, in length
(enforced procedurally by policy) along with six additional characters taken from the 26 Upper
case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special characters. See the Secure Operation section for
more information. If six (6) special/alpha/number characters, one (1) special character and one
(1) alphabet are used without repetition for an eight (8) character long, the probability of
randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 164,290,949,222,400 (this calculation is
based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has
10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to
choose from in total. Since it is claimed to be for 8 digits with no repetition, then the calculation
should be 32x10x92x91x90x89x88x87). Therefore, for each attempt to use the authentication
mechanism, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in
164,290,949,222,400, which is less than the 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
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The maximum number of possible attempts per minute is 5 for Password Authentication via
console. Therefore, the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-
minute period is 5/164,290,949,222,400 which is less than the 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS
140-2.
The module only supports sixteen (16) concurrent SSH sessions and maximum number of possible
attempts per minute is 8 for each SSH session. Therefore, the probability of a success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is (8*16)/ 164,290,949,222,400 which is less than the
1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
SSH Public-key Authentication: The CO and User role also supports public key authentication
for remotely accessing the module via SSH. RSA has modulus size of 2048 bit, thus providing
112 bits of strength. An attacker would have a 1 in 2112
chance of randomly obtaining the key,
which is much stronger than the one in a million-chance required by FIPS 140-2. The fastest
network connection supported by the modules over management interfaces are 10 Gb/s. Hence,
at most 10 ×109
× 60s = 6 × 1011
= 600,000,000,000 bits of data can be transmitted in one
minute. Therefore, the probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false acceptance will
occur in one minute is:
1:( 2112
possible keys/(6 × 1011
bits per minute)/112 bits per key))
1:( 2112
possible keys/5,357,142,857 keys per minute)
1:9.7×1023
Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt for a minute is
approximately 1 in 9.7×1023
, which is less than the 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
6 Unauthenticated Services
The following are the list of services for Unauthenticated Operator:
System Status: An Unauthenticated operator can view boot up/power on self-tests logs via CLI
which does not disclose any security relevant information.
Power Cycle: This operator can power cycle the module.
The module does not support a bypass capability.
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7 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
7.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
This Software module supports many different cryptographic algorithms. However, only FIPS
approved algorithms may be used while in the FIPS mode of operation. The following table
identifies the approved algorithms included in the module for use in the FIPS mode of operation.
The modules support the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations, CiscoSSL
FOM 7.0a, IOS Common Cryptographic Module Rel 5a.
Algorithm Supported Mode Cert. #
CiscoSSL FOM 7.0a
AES ECB (128, 192, 256); CBC (128,
192, 256); CFB128 (128, 192, 256), A1874
CTR (128, 192, 256), GCM (128,
192, 256)
SHS SHA-1, -256, -384, and -512 (Byte
Oriented)
HMAC SHS SHA-1, -256, -384, and -512
DRBG CTR (using AES-256)
ECDSA Key Generation (P-256, P-384 and P-
521)
Key Verification (P-256, P-384 and
P-521)
Signature Generation (P-256 with
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
P-384 with SHA2-384, SHA2-512
and P-521 with SHA2-521)
Signature Verification (P-256 with
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
P-384 with SHA2-384, SHA2-512
and P-521 with SHA2-521)
RSA FIPS186-4
RSA Key Generation: MOD 2048
with SHA2-256, MOD 3072 with
SHA2-256
PKCS#1 v.1.5, 2048-3072 bit key
SigGen, MOD: 2048, 3072
SigVer, MOD 2048 – 3072.
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Algorithm Supported Mode Cert. #
CVL (SP800-135) TLS KDF, IKEv2 KDF, SSH KDF,
SNMP KDF
Note: The TLS, IKEv2, SSH, and
SNMP protocols have not been
reviewed or tested by the CAVP and
CMVP.
KAS-SSC (SP800-56a
rev3)
KAS FFC SSC:
Mod Sizes: FB, FC, ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144,
ffdhe8192, modp-2048, modp-3072,
modp-4096, modp-6144, modp-8192
Scheme: dhEphem
KAS ECC SSC:
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme: Ephemeral Unified
CKG (SP800-133rev2) Vendor Affirmed
KAS (SP800-56a rev3) KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A1874, CVL
Cert. #A1874) supporting below
modes:
KAS FFC SSC:
Mod Sizes: FB, FC, ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144,
ffdhe8192, modp-2048, modp-3072,
modp-4096, modp-6144, modp-8192
Scheme: dhEphem
KAS ECC SSC:
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme: Ephemeral Unified
KDFs: TLS KDF, IKEv2 KDF, SSH
KDF, SNMP KDF
IOS Common Cryptographic Module Rel 5a
AES ECB (128, 192, 256); CBC (128, 192, A3244
256); CFB128 (128, 192, 256), GCM
(128, 192, 256), CMAC (128, 256).
SP800-135 (CVL) IKEv2 KDF, SSH KDF, SNMP KDF
Note: The IKEv2, SSH, and SNMP
protocols have not been reviewed or
tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
DRBG CTR (using AES-256)
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Algorithm Supported Mode Cert. #
ECDSA Key Generation (P-256, P-384)
Key Verification (P-256, P-384)
Signature Generation (P-256 with
SHA2-256)
Signature Verification (P-256 with
SHA2-256)
HMAC SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
RSA RSA Key Generation (2048 w/SHA2-
256, 3072 w/SHA2-256 and 4096
w/SHA2-256)
PKCS 1.5: 2048-4096 bit key
RSA Signature Generation 2048 w/
SHA2-256/384/512, 3072 w/SHA2-
256/384/512 and 4096 w/SHA2-
256/384/512)
RSA Signature Verification (2048 w/
SHA1, SHA2-256/384/512, 3072 w/
SHA1, SHA2-256/384/512 and 4096
w/ SHA1, SHA2-256/384/512)
SHS SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Triple-DES TCBC (KO 1)
KAS-SSC (SP800- KAS FFC SSC:
56Arev3) Mod Sizes: FB, FC, modp-2048,
modp-3072, modp-4096
Scheme: dhEphem
KAS ECC SSC:
Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme: Ephemeral Unified
CKG (SP800-133rev2) Vendor Affirmed
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Algorithm Supported Mode Cert. #
KAS (SP800-56A rev3) KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A3244, CVL
Cert. #A3244) supporting below
modes:
KAS FFC SSC:
Mod Sizes: FB, FC, modp-2048,
modp-3072, modp-4096
Scheme: dhEphem
KAS ECC SSC:
Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme: Ephemeral Unified
KDFs: IKEv2 KDF, SSH KDF,
SNMP KDF
Table 6: Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
• KTS (AES-CBC Cert. #A1874 and HMAC Cert. #A1874; key establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
• KTS (AES-GCM Cert. #A3244; key establishment methodology provides between 128
and 256 bits of encryption strength)
• KTS (AES-CBC Cert. #A3244 and HMAC Cert. #A3244; key establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
• KTS (Triple-DES-CBC Cert. #A3244 and HMAC Cert. #A3244; key establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
• KAS-SSC (Certs. #A1874 and #A3244; key establishment methodology provides between
112 and 256 bits of encryption strength for KAS-ECC-SSC and 112 and 200 bits of
encryption strength for KAS-FFC-SSC)
• Please note that the Triple-DES algorithm (Cert. #A3244) has a key size of 168 bits
and provides 112 bits of encryption strength.
Note 1: In accordance with CMVP IG A.13, when operating in a FIPS approved mode of
operation, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 220
64-bit data blocks.
The SSH protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES keys. Please refer to
IETF RFC 4253 (SSH) for details relevant to the generation of the individual Triple-DES
encryption keys. IKEv2 generates the SKEYSEED according to RFC 7296, from which all keys
are derived to include Triple-DES keys. The user is responsible for ensuring that the module
limits the number of encrypted blocks with the same key to no more than 220
when utilized as
part of the recognized IETF protocols (SSH and IKEv2).
Note 2: The module’s AES-GCM implementations conforms to IG A.5 Provision #1 following
RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the
acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. Method ii) was used by the
tester to demonstrate the module’s compliance with the TLS provision for the AES GCM IV
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generation in IG A.5. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic
boundary. The restoration of the IV is in accordance with scenario 3 in IG A.5 in that a new AES
GCM key is established. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a
given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a
handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then
restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established which
is in accordance with scenario 3 in IG A.5.
Note 3: The module’s AES-GCM implementations conforms to IG A.5 Provision #1 following
RFC 7296 for IPSec/IKEv2. The AES GCM IV is generated according to RFC5282 and
RFC4106 and is used only in the context of the IPSec/IKEv2 protocol as allowed in IG A.5. The
module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which
the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. Method ii) was used by the tester to demonstrate the
module’s compliance with the IPSec provision for the AES GCM IV generation in IG A.5. The
restoration of the IV is in accordance with scenario 3 in IG A.5 in that a new AES GCM key is
established. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session
key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to
establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key
for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established which is in accordance
with scenario 3 in IG A.5.
Note 4: CVL Certs. #A1874 and #A3244 support the KDF (key derivation function) used in each
of IKEv2, TLS, SSH and SNMPv3 protocols. IKEv2, TLS, SSH and SNMPv3 protocols have
not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Please refer IG D.11, bullet 2 for more
information.
Note 5: CKG (vendor affirmed) Cryptographic Key Generation; SP 800-133rev2. In accordance
with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation as
per scenario 1 of section 4 in SP800-133 rev2. The resulting generated symmetric key and the
seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
Note 6: There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVP tested but not implemented
by the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in
this table are implemented by the module.
7.2 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms but Allowed in FIPS mode
The module supports the following non-approved, but allowed cryptographic algorithms:
• RSA1
(key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of
encryption strength. RSA with less than 112-bit of security strength is non-compliant and
may not be used).
7.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The cryptographic module implements the following non-approved algorithms that are not
permitted for use in FIPS 140-2 mode of operations:
1
As per IG D.9, the RSA Key Wrapping uses RSA modulus of 2048 and 3072 bit long that uses PKCS#1-v1.5
scheme and is not complaint with any revision of SP800-56B.
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Service2
Non-Approved Algorithm
SSH
(non-compliant)
Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES,
Asymmetric: 512-bit RSA,1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS
(non-compliant)
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 512-bit RSA, 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
IPsec
(non-compliant)
Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 512-bit RSA, 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
SNMP
(non-compliant)
Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 512-bit RSA, 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Initialization SHA-1 (non-compliant)
7.4 Non-FIPS Approved Services
• SSHv1 with RC4 and HMAC-MD5,
• SNMP v1 and v2,
• IPSec/IKEv2 with Diffie-Hellman 768-bit/1024-bit modulus, EC Diffie-Hellman 163/192
curves,
• IKEv1,
• Telnet.
8 Cryptographic Key Management
Cryptographic keys are stored in plaintext form, in flash for long-term storage and in DRAM for
active keys. The module securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security
parameters such as passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the
Crypto Officer role login and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of
2
These non-approved algorithms are not to be used in FIPS mode.
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 16
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
overwriting the memory that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory. Keys are exchanged
and entered electronically or via Internet Key Exchange (IKE).
Key generation and seeds for asymmetric key generation is performed as per SP 800-133 rev2
Scenario 1. The DRBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy strength prior to key
generation.
Key/CSP Name Algorithm Description
Key
Size Storage zeroization
DRBG entropy input SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
HW-based entropy source
output used to construct
seed.
256-bits Volatile
RAM
Power cycle
DRBG seed SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Input to the DRBG that
determines the internal
state of the DRBG.
Generated using DRBG
derivation function that
includes the entropy input
from a hardware-based
entropy source.
384 bits Volatile
RAM
Power cycle
DRBG V SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Internal V value used as
part of SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG.
128 bits Volatile
RAM
Power cycle
DRBG Key SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
This is the 256-bit DRBG
key used for SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG.
256 bits Volatile
RAM
Power cycle
cscoCCDefaultMfgCaCert rsa-pkcs1-sha2 Verification certificate,
used with CAPWAP to
validate the certificate that
the access point presents
when joining.
2048 Flash Complete
uninstall of the
software/VM.
Diffie-Hellman public key Diffie-Hellman
The public key used in
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
exchange
2048-
8192 bits
Volatile
RAM
Power cycle
Diffie-Hellman private key Diffie-Hellman The private key used in
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
exchange
224-384
bits
Volatile
RAM
Power cycle
Diffie-Hellman shared
secret
Diffie-Hellman The shared key used in
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Exchange. Created per the
Diffie-Hellman protocol.
2048-
8192 bits
Volatile
RAM
Power cycle
EC Diffie-Hellman public
key
Diffie-Hellman
(Groups 19 and
20)
P-256 and P-384 public key
used in EC Diffie-Hellman
exchange. This key is
derived per the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
P-256 and
P-384
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 17
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Key/CSP Name Algorithm Description
Key
Size Storage zeroization
EC Diffie-Hellman private
key
Diffie-Hellman
(Groups 19 and
20)
P-256 and P-384 private
key used in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange.
Generated by calling the SP
800-90A CTR-DRBG.
P-256 and
P-384
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
EC Diffie-Hellman shared
secret
Diffie-Hellman
(Groups 19 and
20)
P-256 and P-384 shared
secret derived in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange.
P-256 and
P-384
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
Operator Password Shared Secret,
at least eight
characters
The password of the
operator. This CSP is
entered by the
Cryptographic Officer.
Variable
(8+
characters
)
Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
Enable Password Shared Secret,
at least eight
characters
The password of the
operator. This CSP is
entered by the
Cryptographic Officer.
Variable
(8+
characters
)
Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
Enable secret Secret, at least
eight characters
The obfuscated password
of the CO role. However,
the algorithm used to
obfuscate this password is
not FIPS approved.
Therefore, this password is
considered plaintext for
FIPS purposes. This
password is zeroized by
overwriting it with a new
password. The
Cryptographic Operator
optionally configures the
module to obfuscate the
Enable password.
This CSP is entered by the
Cryptographic Officer.
Variable
(8+
characters
)
Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
SKEYSEED HMAC Shared secret known only
to IKE peers. Used to
derive IKE session keys.
Derived by using key
derivation function defined
in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2).
160-384
bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
skeyid HMAC It was derived by using
‘ISAKMP pre-shared’ and
other non-secret values
through the key derivation
function defined in
SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2).
160-384
bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 18
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Key/CSP Name Algorithm Description
Key
Size Storage zeroization
skeyid_d HMAC It was derived by using
skeyid, Diffie-Hellman
shared secret and other
non-secret values through
key derivation function
defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
160-384
bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
IKE session encryption key AES-CBC,
AES-GCM,
TDES-CBC.
The IKE session encrypt
key is derived by using key
derivation functions
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2). Used for IKE
payload protection.
AES-CBC
(128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit)
AES-
GCM
(128-bit,
256-bit)
TDES-
CBC
(168-bit)
providing
112 bits of
encryption
strength
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
IKE session authentication
key
HMAC The IKE session
authentication key is
derived by using key
derivation functions
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2). Used for payload
integrity verification.
160-512
bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
IKE public key RSA This key generated by
calling the SP 800-90A
CTR-DRBG.
2048/3072
bits
Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new key or use
“crypto key
zeroize rsa”
command
IKE private key RSA This key generated by
calling the SP 800-90A
CTR-DRBG.
2048/3072
bits
Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new key or use
“crypto key
zeroize rsa”
command
ISAKMP pre-shared Shared secret This shared secret was
entered by CO for IKE pre-
shared key-based
authentication mechanism.
8 chars Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret or
“no crypto
isakmp key”
command
zeroizes it.
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 19
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IPSec authentication key HMAC The IPsec authentication
key is derived via using the
KDF defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2). Used to
authenticate the IPSec peer.
160 – 512
bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPsec
session
terminated or
during Power
Cycle.
Key/CSP Name Algorithm Description
Key
Size Storage zeroization
IPSec encryption key AES-CBC,
AES-GCM,
TDES-CBC.
The IPsec encryption key is
derived via a key derivation
function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv2).Used to
Secure IPSec traffic.
AES-CBC
(128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit)
AES-
GCM
(128-bit,
256-bit)
TDES-
CBC
(168-bit)
providing
112 bits of
encryption
strength
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPsec
session
terminated or
during Power
Cycle.
DTLS Pre-Master Secret Shared Secret Generated by approved
DRBG for generating the
DTLS Master Secret.
48 bytes Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
DTLS Master Secret Shared Secret Derived from DTLS Pre-
Master Secret. Used to
create the DTLS encryption
and integrity keys.
48 bytes Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
DTLS
Encryption/Decryption Key
(CAPWAP session keys)
AES-CBC,
AES-GCM
Session Keys used to e/d
CAPWAP control
messages
128-256
bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
DTLS Integrity Keys HMAC- Session keys used for
integrity checks on
CAPWAP control
messages
160-384
bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
DTLS public/private key RSA and
ECDSA
PKCS#1 v.1.5, P-256 and
P-384 generated by calling
the SP 800-90A CTR-
DRBG.
ECDSA
(P-256
and P-
384)
RSA
(MOD
2048/3072
)
Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new key or use
“crypto key
zeroize rsa” or
“crypto key
zeroize ec
“command to
zeroize rsa and
ecdsa keys
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 20
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
snmpEngineID Shared secret Unique string to identify
the SNMP engine.
32-bits Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new engine ID
SNMPv3 Password Shared Secret This secret is used to derive
HMAC-SHA1 key for
SNMPv3 Authentication.
32 bytes Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
SNMPv3 session key AES-CFB Encrypts SNMPv3 traffic. 128-bit Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
Key/CSP Name Algorithm Description
Key
Size Storage zeroization
HTTPS/TLS Pre-Master
secret
Shared secret Internal generation by
FIPS-approved DRBG.
Used to establish
HTTPS/TLS Master Secret
.
48 bytes Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
HTTPS/TLS Master secret Shared secret Derived from the
HTTPS/TLS Pre-Master
Secret. Used for computing
the Encryption and
Integrity Keys.
48 bytes Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
HTTPS/TLS Encryption
Key
AES-CBC,
AES-GCM.
AES key used to encrypt
TLS data.
128 and
256 bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
HTTPS/TLS Integrity Key HMAC HMAC key used for
HTTPS integrity
protection.
160-384
bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
HTTPS/TLS public/private
key
ECDSA, RSA PKCS#1 v.1.5, P-256 and
P-384 generated by calling
the SP 800-90A CTR-
DRBG.
ECDSA
(P-256
and P-
384)
RSA
(MOD
2048/3072
)
Flash
(plaintext)
HTTPS/TLS
Server RSA
private/public
key is zeroized
by either
deletion (via #
crypto key
zeroize rsa or
crypto key
zeroize ec) or
by overwriting
with new value
of the key.
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 21
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Infrastructure MFP MIC
Key
AES-CMAC,
AES-GMAC
This key is generated in the
module by calling FIPS
approved DRBG and then
is transported to the Access
Point (AP) protected by
DTLS
Encryption/Decryption
Key. The Access Point
(AP) uses this key with
sign management frames
when infrastructure MFP is
enabled.
128 and
256 bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
SSH Encryption Key AES-CBC and
AES-CTR
Symmetric AES key for
encrypting SSH.
128-256
bits AES
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
SSH Integrity Key HMAC Used for SSH integrity
protection.
160-512
bits
Volatile
RAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
Key/CSP Name Algorithm Description
Key
Size Storage zeroization
SSH Public/Private Key
Pair
RSA PKCS#1 v.1.5 MOD
2048/3072
/4096
Flash
(plaintext)
SSH
private/public
key is zeroized
by either
deletion (via #
crypto key
zeroize rsa) or
by overwriting
with a new
value of the
key
Table 7: Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
Note 1 to table: The KDF infrastructure used in DTLS v1.2 is identical to the ones used in TLS
v1.2, which was certified by CVL Cert. #A1874.
Note 2 to table: No parts of the SSH, TLS and IPSec protocols, other than the KDFs, have been
tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
Entropy Source Sample size Entropy per sample
Intel Digital Random Number
Generator
256-bit 256-bit
Table 8: Entropy Source
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 22
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9 Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are
functioning correctly.
Power On Self-Tests Performed:
• Software Integrity Test RSA 2048 with SHA-512
CiscoSSL FOM algorithm implementation
• AES ECB (128-bit) encryption KAT
• AES ECB (128-bit) decryption KAT
• AES GCM (256-bit) encryption KAT
• AES GCM (256-bit) decryption KAT
• HMAC SHA-1 KAT
• HMAC SHA2-256 KAT
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 23
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
• HMAC SHA2-384 KAT
• HMAC SHA2-512 KAT
• Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation KAT (SP800-56a rev3)
• EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation KAT (SP800-56a rev3)
• ECDSA P-256 sign and verify KATs
• RSA 2048 sign and verify KATs
• SP800-135 KDF KATs: IKEv2 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, SSH KDF, SNMP KDF
• SP 800-90A AES-CTR DRBG KAT
• SP 800-90A Section 11 Health Tests
IOS Common Cryptographic Module
• AES CBC (128-bit) encryption KAT
• AES CBC (128-bit) decryption KAT
• AES GCM (256-bit) encryption KAT
• AES GCM (256-bit) decryption KAT
• TripleDES-CBC Encryption KAT
• TripleDES-CBC Decryption KAT
• Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation KAT (SP800-56a rev3)
• EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation KAT (SP800-56a rev3)
• ECDSA (P-256 and P-384) Sign and Verify PCT
• SHA-1 KAT
• SHA2-256 KAT
• SHA2-384 KAT
• SHA2-512 KAT
• HMAC SHA-1 KAT
• HMAC SHA2-256 KAT
• HMAC SHA2-384 KAT
• HMAC SHA2-512 KAT
• RSA 2048 Sign and Verify KATs
• SP800-135 KDF KATs: IKEv2 KDF, SSH KDF, SNMP KDF
• SP 800-90A AES-CTR DRBG KAT
• SP 800-90A Section 11 Health Tests
The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-tests must
be passed before a role can perform services. The power-on self-tests are performed after the
cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this
prevents the module from passing any data during a power-on self-test failure.
Conditional Tests Performed:
• Continuous Random Number Generator Test for the FIPS-approved DRBG
• ECDSA pairwise consistency test
• RSA pairwise consistency test
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 24
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
• Software Load test using a 2048-bit/SHA-512 RSA-Based integrity test to verify firmware to
be loaded into the module.
10 Physical Security
The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
11 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to
authorized operators by the vendor, and the modules are shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco
adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Use the following link for detailed steps
on deploying the OVA file within VMware ESXi v6, and use the instructions in section 11.1
below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode.
(https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/wireless/controller/technotes/8-
8/b_c9800_wireless_controller_virtual_dg.html#id_90231)
Only after a successful completion of all required FIPS POSTs in the FIPS compliant state, will
the module be considered to be in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.
The module was validated with IOS-XE software version 17.3 with Cisco FOM 7.0a and IOS
Common Cryptographic Module (This is the only allowable image for FIPS-approved mode of
operation.). Any software versions other than IOS-XE 17.3 are out of the scope of this validation
and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation. Follow the setting instructions provided below to
place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating the module without maintaining the
following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps:
11.1 System Initialization and Configuration
Step1 - The value of the boot field must be 0x2102. This setting disables break from the console
to the ROM monitor and automatically boots. From the “configure terminal” command line, the
Crypto Officer enters the following syntax:
>config-register 0x2102
Step 2 - The Crypto Officer must set up the operators of the module. Procedurally, the password
must be at least 8 characters (enforced by policy), including at least one (1) special character and
at least one (1) number, and is entered when the Crypto Officer first engages the “configure
terminal” command. The Crypto Officer enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt:
>configure terminal
>username [USERNAME] privilege 15 password [PASSWORD]
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 25
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Step 3 – For the created operators, identification and authentication on the console/auxiliary port
is required for Users. From the “configure terminal” command line, the Crypto Officer enters the
following syntax:
>line con 0
>login local
Step 4 - Enable FIPS Mode of Operations
The following CLI command places the controller in FIPS mode of operations, enabling all
necessary self-tests and algorithm restriction
>configure terminal
>fips-authorization key <32-bit Hex Value>
>platform ipsec fips-mode
>write memory
Save the configuration then reload. At the next boot, FIPS Mode will be set.
Note: 3-key Triple-DES has been implemented in the module and is FIPS approved until
December 31, 2023. Should the CMVP disallow the usage of Triple-DES post-December 31,
2023, then users must not configure Triple-DES.
11.2 Protocol Configuration
1. Enable CAPWAP data encryption
>sh ap sum
>config terminal
> ap profile default-ap-profile
> link-encryption
Enabling link-encryption globally will reboot the APs with no link-encryption.
Are you sure you want to continue? (y/n)[y]: y
2. Enable SSH
>config t
>ip ssh version 2
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 26
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
>ip ssh server aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr aes128-cbc aes192-cbc aes256-cbc
>ip ssh server algorithm mac <hmac-algorithm>
>ip ssh server algorithm hostkey <ssh-rsa>
>show ip ssh
(replace “server” with “client” to configure the client protocols.
3. Enable HTTPS
>config t
>ip http secure-server
>ip http secure-trustpoint CA-trust-local
>ip https tls-version tlsv1.2
>show ip http server secure status
4. Add SNMPv3 Config
>snmp-server group SnmpAuthPrivGroup v3 priv
>snmp-server group SnmpAuthNoPrivGroup v3 auth
>snmp-server group SnmpNoAuthNoPrivGroup v3 noauth
>snmp-server community snmp RO
>snmp-server host <IPaddress> snmp
12 Related Documentation
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the security appliances in the
technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic device security policy. More information is
available on the security appliances from the sources listed in this section and from the following
source:
• The NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information for
answers to technical or sales-related questions for the security appliances.
• Software Configuration Guide (https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/wireless/catalyst-
9800-cl-wireless-controller-cloud/model.html)
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 27
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
• Data Sheet 9800-CL
(https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/catalyst-9800-cl-wireless-
controller-cloud/nb-06-cat9800-cl-cloud-wirel-data-sheet-ctp-en.html)
• Data Sheet UCS C220 M5
(https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/servers-unified-computing/ucs-c-
series-rack-servers/datasheet-c78-739281.html#ProductSpecifications)
13 Obtaining Documentation
Cisco documentation and additional literature are available on Cisco.com. Cisco also provides
several ways to obtain technical assistance and other technical resources. These sections explain
how to obtain technical information from Cisco Systems.
13.1 Cisco.com
You can access the most current Cisco documentation at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
You can access the Cisco website at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com
You can access international Cisco websites at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/public/countries_languages.shtml
13.2 Product Documentation DVD
Cisco documentation and additional literature are available in the Product Documentation DVD
package, which may have shipped with your product. The Product Documentation DVD is updated
regularly and may be more current than printed documentation.
The Product Documentation DVD is a comprehensive library of technical product documentation
on portable media. The DVD enables you to access multiple versions of hardware and software
installation, configuration, and command guides for Cisco products and to view technical
documentation in HTML. With the DVD, you have access to the same documentation that is found
on the Cisco website without being connected to the Internet. Certain products also have .pdf
versions of the documentation available.
The Product Documentation DVD is available as a single unit or as a subscription. Registered
Cisco.com users (Cisco direct customers) can order a Product Documentation DVD (product
number DOC-DOCDVD=) from Cisco Marketplace at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/
13.3 Ordering Documentation
Beginning June 30, 2005, registered Cisco.com users may order Cisco documentation at the
Product Documentation Store in the Cisco Marketplace at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/
Nonregistered Cisco.com users can order technical documentation from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
(0800 to 1700) PDT by calling 1 866 463-3487 in the United States and Canada, or elsewhere by
calling 011 408 519-5055. You can also order documentation by e-mail at tech-doc-store-
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 28
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
mkpl@external.cisco.com or by fax at 1 408 519-5001 in the United States and Canada, or
elsewhere at 011 408 519-5001.
14 Documentation Feedback
You can rate and provide feedback about Cisco technical documents by completing the online
feedback form that appears with the technical documents on Cisco.com. You can send comments
about Cisco documentation to bug-doc@cisco.com. You can submit comments by using the
response card (if present) behind the front cover of your document or by writing to the following
address:
Cisco Systems
Attn: Customer Document Ordering
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134-9883
We appreciate your comments.
15 Cisco Product Security Overview
Cisco provides a free online Security Vulnerability Policy portal at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
From this site, you can perform these tasks:
• Report security vulnerabilities in Cisco products.
• Obtain assistance with security incidents that involve Cisco products.
• Register to receive security information from Cisco.
A current list of security advisories and notices for Cisco products is available at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
If you prefer to see advisories and notices as they are updated in real time, you can access a
Product Security Incident Response Team Really Simple Syndication (PSIRT RSS) feed from
this URL:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/rss.x?i=44
15.1 Reporting Security Problems in Cisco Products
Cisco is committed to delivering secure products. We test our products internally before we
release them, and we strive to correct all vulnerabilities quickly. If you think that you might have
identified vulnerability in a Cisco product, contact PSIRT:
• Emergencies — security-alert@cisco.com
An emergency is either a condition in which a system is under active attack or a condition for
which a severe and urgent security vulnerability should be reported. All other conditions are
considered nonemergencies.
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 29
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
• Nonemergencies — psirt@cisco.com
In an emergency, you can also reach PSIRT by telephone:
• 1 877 228-7302
• 1 408 525-6532
Tip
We encourage you to use Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) or a compatible product to encrypt any
sensitive information that you send to Cisco. PSIRT can work from encrypted information that is
compatible with PGP versions 2.x through 8.x. Never use a revoked or an expired encryption
key. The correct public key to use in your correspondence with PSIRT is the one linked in the
Contact Summary section of the Security Vulnerability Policy page at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
The link on this page has the current PGP key ID in use.
16 Obtaining Technical Assistance
Cisco Technical Support provides 24-hour-a-day award-winning technical assistance. The Cisco
Technical Support & Documentation website on Cisco.com features extensive online support
resources. In addition, if you have a valid Cisco service contract, Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC) engineers provide telephone support. If you do not have a valid Cisco service
contract, contact your reseller.
16.1 Cisco Technical Support & Documentation Website
The Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website provides online documents and tools for
troubleshooting and resolving technical issues with Cisco products and technologies. The website
is available 24 hours a day, at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Access to all tools on the Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website requires a Cisco.com
user ID and password. If you have a valid service contract but do not have a user ID or password,
you can register at this URL:
http://tools.cisco.com/RPF/register/register.do
Note
Use the Cisco Product Identification (CPI) tool to locate your product serial number before
submitting a web or phone request for service. You can access the CPI tool from the Cisco
Technical Support & Documentation website by clicking the Tools & Resources link under
Documentation & Tools. Choose Cisco Product Identification Tool from the Alphabetical Index
drop-down list, or click the Cisco Product Identification Tool link under Alerts & RMAs. The
CPI tool offers three search options: by product ID or model name; by tree view; or for certain
products, by copying and pasting show command output. Search results show an illustration of
your product with the serial number label location highlighted. Locate the serial number label on
your product and record the information before placing a service call.
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 30
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16.2 Submitting a Service Request
Using the online TAC Service Request Tool is the fastest way to open S3 and S4 service requests.
(S3 and S4 service requests are those in which your network is minimally impaired or for which
you require product information.) After you describe your situation, the TAC Service Request Tool
provides recommended solutions. If your issue is not resolved using the recommended resources,
your service request is assigned to a Cisco engineer. The TAC Service Request Tool is located at
this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/techsupport/servicerequest
For S1 or S2 service requests or if you do not have Internet access, contact the Cisco TAC by
telephone. (S1 or S2 service requests are those in which your production network is down or
severely degraded.) Cisco engineers are assigned immediately to S1 and S2 service requests to
help keep your business operations running smoothly.
To open a service request by telephone, use one of the following numbers:
Asia-Pacific: +61 2 8446 7411
Australia: 1 800 805 227
EMEA: +32 2 704 55 55
USA: 1 800 553-2447
For a complete list of Cisco TAC contacts, go to this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/techsupport/contacts
16.3 Definitions of Service Request Severity
To ensure that all service requests are reported in a standard format, Cisco has established
severity definitions.
Severity 1 (S1) – Your network is “down,” or there is a critical impact to your business
operations. You and Cisco will commit all necessary resources around the clock to resolve the
situation.
Severity 2 (S2) – Operation of an existing network is severely degraded, or significant aspects of
your business operation are negatively affected by inadequate performance of Cisco products.
You and Cisco will commit full-time resources during normal business hours to resolve the
situation.
Severity 3 (S3) – Operational performance of your network is impaired, but most business
operations remain functional. You and Cisco will commit resources during normal business
hours to restore service to satisfactory levels.
Severity 4 (S4) – You require information or assistance with Cisco product capabilities,
installation, or configuration. There is little or no effect on your business operations.
17 Obtaining Additional Publications and Information
Information about Cisco products, technologies, and network solutions is available from various
online and printed sources.
• Cisco Marketplace provides a variety of Cisco books, reference guides, documentation,
and logo merchandise. Visit Cisco Marketplace, the company store, at this URL:
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 31
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http://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/
• Cisco Press publishes a wide range of general networking, training and certification
titles. Both new and experienced users will benefit from these publications. For current
Cisco Press titles and other information, go to Cisco Press at this URL:
http://www.ciscopress.com
• Packet magazine is the Cisco Systems technical user magazine for maximizing Internet
and networking investments. Each quarter, Packet delivers coverage of the latest industry
trends, technology breakthroughs, and Cisco products and solutions, as well as network
deployment and troubleshooting tips, configuration examples, customer case studies,
certification and training information, and links to scores of in-depth online resources.
You can access Packet magazine at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/packet
• Internet Protocol Journal is a quarterly journal published by Cisco Systems for
engineering professionals involved in designing, developing, and operating public and
private internets and intranets. You can access the Internet Protocol Journal at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/ipj
• Networking products offered by Cisco Systems, as well as customer support services, can
be obtained at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/index.html
• Networking Professionals Connection is an interactive website for networking
professionals to share questions, suggestions, and information about networking products
and technologies with Cisco experts and other networking professionals. Join a
discussion at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/discuss/networking
• World-class networking training is available from Cisco. You can view current offerings
at this URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/learning/index.html
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 32
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Definitions List
ACL Access Control List
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DRAM Dynamic RAM
DRBG Deterministic random bit generator
ESP Embedded Services Processor
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
Gbps Gigabits per second
GigE Gigabit Ethernet
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVRAM Non-Volatile Random Access Memory
PIN Personal Identification Number
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman method for asymmetric encryption
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc. 33
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TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
VPN Virtual Private Network