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Thales Trusted Cyber Technologies
Luna T7
FIPS 140-3 Level3 Security Policy – Non-Proprietary
Page 2 of 89
Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software
© 2026 SafeNet Assured Technologies, LLC. All rights reserved. Thales and the Thales logo are
trademarks and service marks of Thales and/or its subsidiaries and are registered in certain countries. All
other trademarks and service marks, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the property of
their respective owners.
Disclaimer
All information herein is either public information or is the property of and owned solely by Thales and/or
its subsidiaries who shall have and keep the sole right to file patent applications or any other kind of
intellectual property protection in connection with such information.
Nothing herein shall be construed as implying or granting to you any rights, by license, grant or otherwise,
under any intellectual and/or industrial property rights of or concerning any of Thales’s information.
This document can be copied or distributed for informational, non-commercial, internal and personal use
only provided that:
• The copyright notice below, the confidentiality and proprietary legend and this full warning notice
appear in all copies.
• This document shall not be posted on any network computer or broadcast in any media other
than on the NIST CMVP validation list and no modification of any part of this document shall be
made.
Use for any other purpose is expressly prohibited and may result in severe civil and criminal liabilities.
The information contained in this document is provided "AS IS" without any warranty of any kind. Unless
otherwise expressly agreed in writing, Thales makes no warranty as to the value or accuracy of
information contained herein.
Thales hereby disclaims all warranties and conditions with regard to the information contained herein,
including all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non
infringement. In no event shall Thales be liable, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, for any indirect,
special or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever including but not limited to damages
resulting from loss of use, data, profits, revenues, or customers, arising out of or in connection with the
use or performance of information contained in this document.
Thales does not and shall not warrant that this product will be resistant to all possible attacks and shall
not incur, and disclaims, any liability in this respect. Even if each product is compliant with current security
standards in force on the date of their design, security mechanisms' resistance necessarily evolves
according to the state of the art in security and notably under the emergence of new attacks. Under no
circumstances, shall Thales be held liable for any third party actions and in particular in case of any
successful attack against systems or equipment incorporating Thales products. Thales disclaims any
liability with respect to security for direct, indirect, incidental or consequential damages that result from
any use of its products. It is further stressed that independent testing and verification by the person using
the product is particularly encouraged, especially in any application in which defective, incorrect or
insecure functioning could result in damage to persons or property, denial of service or loss of privacy.
Page 3 of 89
Document Information
Document Part Number 002-500027-001
Release Date May 1, 2026
Revision History
Revision Date Reason
A September 11, 2024 Document baseline.
B December 11, 2024 Update after first lab review.
C January 6, 2025 Added authentication objective.
Added meaning of characters G, R, W, E, Z used in the SSP
Access column of the Approved Services table.
D February 28, 2025 Removed Physical Trusted Path – Backup HSM section. It
is not used in this version of the module. General review and
update addressing reviewer comments
E April 21, 2025 Updates from certification lab. Received on April 14th
.
Updates include removing CU from the Import Public Key
service, changing “Audit User” to “Audit Officer”, Updating
the ACVP algorithm certs.
F January 14, 2026 Updates to include the supported PQC algorithms (ML-DSA
and ML-KEM). Updates to include HMAC algorithms for
Key-Based KDF security function. Corrected the Initialize
Remote PED Vector service.
G April 14, 2026 Updates to address CMVP comments. Removal of non-
approved mode and trusted channel.
Page 4 of 89
Table of Contents
Trademarks, Copyrights, and Third-Party Software ..............................................................................................2
Disclaimer .............................................................................................................................................................2
1 General................................................................................................................................... 8
1.1 Overview .............................................................................................................................................8
1.2 Security Levels....................................................................................................................................9
2 Cryptographic Module Specification.......................................................................................10
2.1 Description ........................................................................................................................................10
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification.......................................................11
2.3 Excluded Components ......................................................................................................................11
2.4 Modes of Operation...........................................................................................................................11
2.5 Algorithms .........................................................................................................................................12
2.5.1 Approved Algorithms..................................................................................................................................12
2.5.2 Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms .......................................................................................................................17
2.6 Security Function Implementations...................................................................................................18
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ..........................................................................................................24
2.7.1 AES-GCM IV Generation ...........................................................................................................................24
2.7.2 PBKDF .......................................................................................................................................................24
2.7.3 XTS-AES....................................................................................................................................................24
2.8 RBG and Entropy ..............................................................................................................................24
2.8.1 Thales Luna T7 Entropy Source.................................................................................................................24
2.8.2 IDQ Quantis IID QRNG ..............................................................................................................................25
2.8.3 Entropy buffer.............................................................................................................................................25
2.8.4 DRBG Seeding and reseeding ...................................................................................................................25
2.8.5 RBG Output................................................................................................................................................25
2.9 Key Generation .................................................................................................................................25
2.10 Key Establishment ..........................................................................................................................25
2.10.1 Key Import and Export..............................................................................................................................25
2.10.2 Key Cloning..............................................................................................................................................26
2.10.3 Key Transport...........................................................................................................................................26
2.10.4 Key Agreement.........................................................................................................................................26
2.10.5 Key establishment mechanisms...............................................................................................................26
2.11 Industry Protocols ...........................................................................................................................26
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................27
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ..........................................................................................................................27
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................29
4.1 Authentication Methods.....................................................................................................................29
4.1.1 Identity........................................................................................................................................................30
4.1.2 Activation....................................................................................................................................................30
4.1.3 M of N.........................................................................................................................................................30
4.1.4 PED Keys...................................................................................................................................................31
4.2 Roles .................................................................................................................................................31
4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................................32
4.3.1 HSM Set Policy service ..............................................................................................................................59
4.3.2 Partition Set Policy service.........................................................................................................................59
4.3.3 Configuration update service......................................................................................................................59
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4.3.4 Audit Config service ...................................................................................................................................59
4.4 Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................................59
4.5 External Firmware Loaded ................................................................................................................59
5 Firmware Security ..................................................................................................................60
5.1 Integrity Techniques..........................................................................................................................60
5.2 Initiate on Demand ............................................................................................................................60
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................61
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements...........................................................................61
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................62
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required...................................................................................................62
7.5 EFP/EFT Information ........................................................................................................................62
7.6 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges...........................................................................................62
7.7 Additional Information .......................................................................................................................63
7.7.1 Secure Transport Mode..............................................................................................................................63
7.7.2 Temperature ranges...................................................................................................................................63
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................64
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................65
9.1 Storage Areas ...................................................................................................................................65
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ...............................................................................................................65
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods .................................................................................................................65
9.4 SSPs .................................................................................................................................................67
9.5 Transitions.........................................................................................................................................76
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................77
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..............................................................................................................77
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .....................................................................................................................78
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information.........................................................................................................83
10.4 Error States .....................................................................................................................................85
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests ......................................................................................................85
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................86
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................................86
11.1.1 Installation ................................................................................................................................................86
11.1.2 Initialization...............................................................................................................................................86
11.2 Administrator Guidance...................................................................................................................87
11.2.1 PED Key management.............................................................................................................................87
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance...........................................................................................................87
11.6 End of Life .......................................................................................................................................88
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................89
12.1 Attack List........................................................................................................................................89
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels.................................................................................................................................................9
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware.......................................................................................................11
Table 3: Modes List and Description............................................................................................................................11
Table 4: Approved Algorithms - Firmware....................................................................................................................14
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Hybrid ........................................................................................................................17
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ...........................................................................................................................17
Table 7: Security Function Implementations ................................................................................................................23
Table 8: Entropy Certificates........................................................................................................................................24
Table 9: Entropy Sources.............................................................................................................................................24
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces .....................................................................................................................................27
Table 11: Authentication Methods................................................................................................................................29
Table 12: Roles............................................................................................................................................................31
Table 13: Approved Services .......................................................................................................................................58
Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required..............................................................................................................62
Table 15: EFP/EFT Information....................................................................................................................................62
Table 16: Hardness Testing Temperatures..................................................................................................................62
Table 17: Storage Areas ..............................................................................................................................................65
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods ..........................................................................................................................65
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods.............................................................................................................................66
Table 20: SSP Table 1.................................................................................................................................................71
Table 21: SSP Table 2.................................................................................................................................................75
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................77
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................................82
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ...........................................................................................................83
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information ..................................................................................................................84
Table 26: Error States..................................................................................................................................................85
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Luna PCIe HSM (T-Series) ..............................................................................................................................8
Figure 2 Luna Network HSM (T-Series) with Luna PCIe HSM (T-Series) Installed........................................................8
Figure 3 Luna T7 (872-500025-001) ............................................................................................................................11
Figure 4 Luna T7U (875-500025-002)..........................................................................................................................11
Figure 5 Luna T7 Physical Ports ..................................................................................................................................27
Figure 6 Luna T7 PCI Bracket View.............................................................................................................................28
Figure 7 PIN Entry Device (PED) and PED Keys.........................................................................................................30
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This non-proprietary document describes the security policies enforced by Thales Trusted Cyber
Technologies’ Luna T7 Cryptographic Module.
This document applies to Luna T7 Cryptographic Module. Hereafter referred to as the Luna T7.
The Luna T7 is available as a stand-alone product, the Luna PCIe HSM (T-Series) (Figure 1), to install in
a user’s Windows or Linux host or embedded within other products. Examples of other products include:
• The Luna Network HSM (T-Series) (Figure 2)
• The CipherTrust Manager k570
Figure 1 Luna PCIe HSM (T-Series)
Figure 2 Luna Network HSM (T-Series) with Luna PCIe HSM (T-Series) Installed
The security policies described in this document apply to the Luna T7 only and not to any products using
the module.
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1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks 3
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Luna T7 is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic module in the form of a PCI-Express card
that typically resides within a custom computing or secure communications appliance (i.e. Luna Network
HSM T-Series appliance).
A Luna T7 provides secure key generation and storage for symmetric keys and asymmetric key pairs
along with support for a broad range of symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic services. Access to key
material and cryptographic services for users and user application software is provided through the PKCS
#11 programming API, which is implemented over the module’s proprietary command interface (ICD).
A Luna T7 must be configured to operate in the approved mode per section 11.1.2. Failure to configure
the Luna T7 in this manner means the module will be providing services using non-approved
cryptography, and is not confirming to the capabilities described in this document.
A Luna T7 may host multiple user partitions to store symmetric keys and asymmetric key-pairs. User
partitions are cryptographically isolated from one another. Authentication is unique to a user partition and
the contents of a partition is only available to the authenticated user.
A module is accessed directly (i.e., electrically) over the PCI-Express communications interface. If
configured, the PIN Entry Device (PED) can be connected to the module’s Serial PED port for
authentication.
For configuring the mode of operation of the Luna T7 installed within a user’s Windows or Linux host, a
software application, lunacm, is provided. lunacm uses the module’s proprietary command interface
(ICD) to configure the module’s mode of operation. To configure the mode of operation of a Luna T7
installed within a Luna Network HSM T-Series, Luna Shell (lunash) is provided. Using SSH, lunash is
available to the administrator of the Luna Network HSM (T-Series). Internal to the Luna Network HSM (T-
Series), the module’s proprietary command interface (ICD) is used to configure the module’s mode of
operation.
The module is contained in its own secure enclosure that provides physical resistance to tampering.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: MultiChipEmbed
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Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire PCIe card as shown below.
Figure 3 Luna T7 (872-500025-001)
Figure 4 Luna T7U (875-500025-002)
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors Features
Luna T-Series
Cryptographic Module
(T7)
872-
500025-001
Firmware: 7.15.1,
Bootloader: 2.0.1
NXP C292 PowerPC
e500v2 Core-based
SoC
Half-height PCIe card
with factory installed
heatsinks
Luna T-Series
Cryptographic Module
(T7U)
875-
500025-002
Firmware: 7.15.1,
Bootloader: 2.0.2
NXP C293 PowerPC
e500v2 Core-based
SoC
Half-height PCIe card
with factory installed
heatsinks
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
The Luna T7 excludes the following components from the cryptographic boundary:
• Physical ports
• Cable sockets
• USB host controller
• Power inductors
• Power capacitors
• Step-down switching regulator
2.4 Modes of Operation
The Luna T7 supports the modes of operation listed below.
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved Approved mode Approved 'The HSM is in FIPS 140-3 approved
operation mode'
STM Secure transport mode, most cryptographic
service are not available
Approved 'HSM was successfully configured for
transport.'
Table 3: Modes List and Description
Important: the Luna T7 must be configured per section 11.1.2 of this security policy to operate in the
modes listed above.
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2.5 Algorithms
2.5.1 Approved Algorithms
The following cryptographic library and associated CAVP certificates are used by the cryptographic module:
 Firmware Cryptographic Library (A7879);
 Hybrid (FW/HW) Cryptographic Library (A7880).
Firmware
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A7879 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A7879 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8 A7879 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC A7879 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-CTR A7879 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A7879 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-OFB A7879 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
DSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A7879 L - 1024, 2048, 3072
N - 160, 224, 256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7879 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7879 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A7879 Component - No
Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7879 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A7879 Key Length - Key Length: 128-2048 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224 A7879 Key Length - Key Length: 192-640 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA2-256 A7879 Key Length - Key Length: 192-640 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A7879 Key Length - Key Length: 192-1216 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A7879 Key Length - Key Length: 192-1152 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-224 A7879 Key Length - Key Length: 192-640 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-256 A7879 Key Length - Key Length: 192-640 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-384 A7879 Key Length - Key Length: 192-1216 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-512 A7879 Key Length - Key Length: 192-1152 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A7879 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-384
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-IFC-SSC A7879 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg2-basic
Scheme -
KAS2 -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDA TwoStep
SP800-56Cr2
A7879 MAC Salting Methods - default
KDF Mode - counter
Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDF SP800-108 A7879 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 128-512 Increment 64
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KTS-IFC A7879 Modulo - 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Key Length - 512
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
LMS KeyGen A7879 LMS Modes - LMS_SHA256_M24_H10, LMS_SHA256_M24_H15, LMS_SHA256_M24_H5,
LMS_SHA256_M32_H10, LMS_SHA256_M32_H15, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5
SP 800-208
LMS SigGen A7879 LMS Modes - LMS_SHA256_M24_H10, LMS_SHA256_M24_H15, LMS_SHA256_M24_H5,
LMS_SHA256_M32_H10, LMS_SHA256_M32_H15, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5
SP 800-208
LMS SigVer A7879 LMS Modes - LMS_SHA256_M24_H10, LMS_SHA256_M24_H15, LMS_SHA256_M24_H20,
LMS_SHA256_M24_H25, LMS_SHA256_M24_H5, LMS_SHA256_M32_H10, LMS_SHA256_M32_H15,
LMS_SHA256_M32_H20, LMS_SHA256_M32_H25, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5
SP 800-208
ML-DSA KeyGen A7879 Parameter Sets - ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87 FIPS 204
ML-DSA SigGen A7879 Deterministic - No, Yes FIPS 204
ML-DSA SigVer A7879 - FIPS 204
ML-KEM
EncapDecap
A7879 Parameter Sets - ML-KEM-1024, ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768
Functions - Decapsulation, Encapsulation
FIPS 203
ML-KEM KeyGen A7879 Parameter Sets - ML-KEM-1024, ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 FIPS 203
Page 14 of 89
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
PBKDF A7879 Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 10-1000 Increment 1
Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 1
SP 800-132
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7879 Key Generation Mode - probable, probableWithProbableAux
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2pow100
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7879 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A7879 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7879 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
SHA-1 A7879 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A7879 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A7879 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7879 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65336 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A7879 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65336 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA3-224 A7879 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHA3-256 A7879 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A7879 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A7879 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHAKE-128 A7879 - FIPS 202
SHAKE-256 A7879 - FIPS 202
TDES-CBC A7879 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67
Rev. 2
Table 4: Approved Algorithms - Firmware
Hybrid
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8 A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC A7880 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-CTR A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
Page 15 of 89
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-ECB A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-KW A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
AES-KWP A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
AES-OFB A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
A7880 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38E
DSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A7880 L - 1024, 2048, 3072
N - 160, 224, 256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7880 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7880 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A7880 Component - No
Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7880 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG A7880 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - SHA2-256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA-1 A7880 Key Length - Key Length: 128-2048 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224 A7880 Key Length - Key Length: 192-640 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A7880 Key Length - Key Length: 192-640 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A7880 Key Length - Key Length: 192-1216 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A7880 Key Length - Key Length: 192-1152 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-224 A7880 Key Length - Key Length: 192-640 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
Page 16 of 89
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA3-256 A7880 Key Length - Key Length: 192-640 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-384 A7880 Key Length - Key Length: 192-1216 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-512 A7880 Key Length - Key Length: 192-1152 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A7880 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-384
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-IFC-SSC A7880 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg2-basic
Scheme -
KAS2 -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDA TwoStep
SP800-56Cr2
A7880 MAC Salting Methods - default
KDF Mode - counter
Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDF SP800-108 A7880 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 128-512 Increment 64
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KTS-IFC A7880 Modulo - 4096
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
Key Transport Method -
Key Length - 512
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
LMS KeyGen A7880 LMS Modes - LMS_SHA256_M24_H10, LMS_SHA256_M24_H15, LMS_SHA256_M24_H5,
LMS_SHA256_M32_H10, LMS_SHA256_M32_H15, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5
SP 800-208
LMS SigGen A7880 LMS Modes - LMS_SHA256_M24_H10, LMS_SHA256_M24_H15, LMS_SHA256_M24_H5,
LMS_SHA256_M32_H10, LMS_SHA256_M32_H15, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5
SP 800-208
LMS SigVer A7880 LMS Modes - LMS_SHA256_M24_H10, LMS_SHA256_M24_H15, LMS_SHA256_M24_H20,
LMS_SHA256_M24_H25, LMS_SHA256_M24_H5, LMS_SHA256_M32_H10, LMS_SHA256_M32_H15,
LMS_SHA256_M32_H20, LMS_SHA256_M32_H25, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5
SP 800-208
ML-DSA KeyGen A7880 Parameter Sets - ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87 FIPS 204
ML-DSA SigGen A7880 Deterministic - No, Yes FIPS 204
ML-DSA SigVer A7880 - FIPS 204
ML-KEM
EncapDecap
A7880 Parameter Sets - ML-KEM-1024, ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768
Functions - Decapsulation, Encapsulation
FIPS 203
ML-KEM KeyGen A7880 Parameter Sets - ML-KEM-1024, ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 FIPS 203
PBKDF A7880 Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 10-1000 Increment 1
Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 1
SP 800-132
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7880 Key Generation Mode - probable, probableWithProbableAux
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-5
Page 17 of 89
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2pow100
Private Key Format - standard
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7880 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A7880 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7880 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
SHA-1 A7880 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A7880 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A7880 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7880 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65336 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A7880 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65336 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA3-224 A7880 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHA3-256 A7880 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A7880 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A7880 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 FIPS 202
TDES-CBC A7880 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67
Rev. 2
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Hybrid
2.5.2 Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key type:Symmetric Luna T7 Firmware Cryptographic Library SP 800-133r2, Section 4
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Page 18 of 89
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Authenticated Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
BC-Auth Block Cipher, Authenticated AES-GCM: (A7880)
Cryptographic Message
Authentication
MAC Message Authentication AES-CMAC: (A7879, A7880)
AES-GMAC: (A7880)
DSA Signature Verification DigSig-SigVer Signature Verification, DSA DSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):
(A7879, A7880)
SHA-1: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
ECDSA Key Generation AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Asymmetric key pair
generation, ECDSA
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5): (A7879, A7880)
ECDSA Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen Signature Generation,
ECDSA
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5):
(A7879, A7880)
SHA2-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
ECDSA Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer Signature Verification,
ECDSA
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):
(A7879, A7880)
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A7879, A7880)
SHA-1: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
Generate Entropy ENT-ESV Generate random data used
as seed for Generate
Random Data.
Generate Random Data DRBG Deterministic random bit
generator
Hash DRBG: (A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7880)
Page 19 of 89
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Hash Message
Authentication
MAC Message Authentication HMAC-SHA-1: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA3-224: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA3-256: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA3-384: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA3-512: (A7879,
A7880)
KAS-ECC KAS-Full ECC Key Agreement IG D.F:Scenario 2 path 2
Key confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
Caveat:Provides 192 bits of
security strength
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5): (A7879, A7880)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A7879, A7880)
KDA TwoStep SP800-56Cr2:
(A7879, A7880)
AES-CMAC: (A7879, A7880)
KAS-RSA KAS-Full RSA Key Agreement IG D.F:Scenario 1 path 2
Key confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
Caveat:Provides 128 or 192
bits of security strength
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A7879, A7880)
KAS-IFC-SSC: (A7879,
A7880)
KDA TwoStep SP800-56Cr2:
(A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
AES-CMAC: (A7879, A7880)
KEM Decaps KEM-Decap Decapsulate and derive
shared secret key
IG D.S:Scenario 1 ML-KEM EncapDecap:
(A7879, A7880)
Function: Decapsulate
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHAKE-128: (A7879)
SHAKE-256: (A7879)
KEM Encaps KEM-Encap Derive and encapsulate
shared secret
IG D.S:Scenario 1 ML-KEM EncapDecap:
(A7879, A7880)
Function: Encapsulate
Page 20 of 89
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHAKE-128: (A7879)
SHAKE-256: (A7879)
KEM KeyGen AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Generate ML-KEM
public/private key pair
ML-KEM KeyGen: (A7879,
A7880)
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHAKE-128: (A7879)
KTS-AES KTS-Wrap Wraps / Unwraps key data IG D.G:Approved method
Caveat:Provides 128, 192 or
256 bits of security strength
AES-KW: (A7880)
AES-KWP: (A7880)
KTS-HMAC KTS-Wrap Wraps/Unwraps key data,
HMAC Authenticated
IG D.G:Approved method
Caveat:Provides 256 bits of
security strength
AES-CBC: (A7879, A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A7879,
A7880)
KTS-RSA KTS-Decap
PBKDF
Decrypts received
authentication data when
using password
authentication
IG D.G:Approved method
Key confirmation:No
Caveat:Provides 128 bits of
security strength
KTS-IFC: (A7879, A7880)
PBKDF: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
Key-Based KDF KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation KDF SP800-108: (A7879,
A7880)
AES-CMAC: (A7879, A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-224: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-384: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-512: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA3-224: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA3-256: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA3-384: (A7879,
A7880)
HMAC-SHA3-512: (A7879,
A7880)
LMS Key Pair Generation AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Key generation, LMS LMS KeyGen: (A7879,
A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
Page 21 of 89
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
LMS Signature Generation DigSig-SigGen Signature Generation, LMS LMS SigGen: (A7879,
A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
LMS Signature Verification DigSig-SigVer Signature Verification, LMS LMS SigVer: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
Login with PED key BC-UnAuthDecrypt
MAC
Login with PED key AES-CBC: (A7879, A7880)
HMAC-SHA2-256: (A7879,
A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
ML-DSA Key Generation AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Generate public/private key
pair
ML-DSA KeyGen: (A7879,
A7880)
SHAKE-128: (A7879)
SHAKE-256: (A7879)
ML-DSA PreHasSigVer DigSig-SigVer Verify signature of data using
public key
ML-DSA SigVer: (A7879,
A7880)
SHAKE-128: (A7879)
SHAKE-256: (A7879)
SHA2-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
ML-DSA PreHashSigGen DigSig-SigGen Generate a signature of data
using private key
ML-DSA SigGen: (A7879,
A7880)
SHAKE-128: (A7879)
SHAKE-256: (A7879)
SHA2-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
ML-DSA PureSigGen DigSig-SigGen Generate a signature of data
using private key
ML-DSA SigGen: (A7879,
A7880)
SHAKE-128: (A7879)
SHAKE-256: (A7879)
ML-DSA PureSigVer DigSig-SigVer Verify signature of data using
public key
ML-DSA SigVer: (A7879,
A7880)
Page 22 of 89
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHAKE-128: (A7879)
SHAKE-256: (A7879)
RSA Key Pair Generation AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Asymmetric key pair
generation, RSA
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5):
(A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
RSA Signature Generation DigSig-SigGen Signature Generation, RSA RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5):
(A7879, A7880)
SHA2-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
RSA Signature Verification DigSig-SigVer Signature Verification, RSA RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4):
(A7879, A7880)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):
(A7879, A7880)
SHA-1: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
Secure Hash SHA Secure Hash SHA-1: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA2-512: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-224: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-256: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-384: (A7879, A7880)
SHA3-512: (A7879, A7880)
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
BC-UnAuth Block Cipher,
Unauthenticated
AES-CBC: (A7879, A7880)
AES-CFB128: (A7879,
A7880)
AES-CFB8: (A7879, A7880)
AES-CTR: (A7879, A7880)
AES-ECB: (A7879, A7880)
Page 23 of 89
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES-OFB: (A7879, A7880)
AES-XTS Testing Revision
2.0: (A7880)
TDES-CBC: (A7879, A7880)
Symmetric Key Generation CKG Generation of symmetric
keys and seeds for
asymmetric keys
CKG: ()
Key type: Symmetric
Two-Step KDF KAS-56CKDF Two-step key derivation KDA TwoStep SP800-56Cr2:
(A7879, A7880)
AES-CMAC: (A7879, A7880)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
Page 24 of 89
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
2.7.1 AES-GCM IV Generation
The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG:C.H Scenario 2. The IV is generated internally by
the module using approved Hash_DRBG (SHA2-256). The IV generation supported is fixed 96-bit size
that is generated with the SP800 90A Hash_DRBG (SHA2-256) output.
2.7.2 PBKDF
Password Length and Probability – Refer to Section 4.1 for a description of the minimum password length
and the upper bound of the probability of having this parameter guessed at random.
Iteration Count and Justification – The PBKDF is only used for internal operations, with a SP800-132
compliant iteration count fixed at a value of 1000. Larger iteration counts were measured to take as long
as 5 minutes to derive the key.
Storage Only Statement – PBKDF, used when configured to use Password Authentication, is used to
derive a key, from a user’s password. The module uses method 1a from SP800-132 where the derived
key is used to protect the data. The data protected is the user’s user storage key (USK).
2.7.3 XTS-AES
XTS-AES may only be used for storage applications.
For XTS-AES keys that are entered into the module, the operator must ensure that the two halves of the
key (payload and tweak) have been generated and/or established independently of each other, according
to the rules for component symmetric keys from NIST SP 800-133rev2, section 6.3.
For XTS-AES keys generated by the module, this independence requirement is implicitly met.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The Luna T7 contains two separate and distinct entropy sources. A module policy configuration under
the control of the Security Officer determines which entropy source is used to Instantiate and Reseed the
DRBG.
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E252 Thales
E63 ID Quantique SA
Table 8: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
IDQ Quantis IID QRNG Physical IDQ6MC1 2048 1792 N/A
Thales Luna T7 Entropy Source Physical NXP C29X SoC 384 332.69 N/A
Table 9: Entropy Sources
2.8.1 Thales Luna T7 Entropy Source
The Thales Luna T7 Entropy Source is a physical entropy source based on a ring oscillator. It is
contained within the NXP PowerPC SoC (System-On-Chip) - the CPU of the Luna T7.
Page 25 of 89
To generate entropy, this source generate blocks of 2500 1-bit noise samples. These are subjected to 15
statistical tests. For blocks that pass these tests, the first 384 bits are inserted into the entropy buffer. The
remainder are discarded.
2.8.2 IDQ Quantis IID QRNG
The IDQ Quantis IID QRNG is a physical entropy source based on photon source and CMOS sensor.
This source is provided as alternative should the operator require a quantum-based entropy source.
To generate entropy, the source generates a 2048-bit block comprised of 1024 2-bit noise samples.
These are subjected to the RCT and APT health tests (described in section 10.2 below). For blocks that
pass these tests, the entire block is inserted into the entropy buffer.
2.8.3 Entropy buffer
The module maintains a 2048-bit entropy buffer. This buffer is drawn down by the seeding and reseeding
of the DRBG. When empty, the buffer is replenished from the selected entropy source.
2.8.4 DRBG Seeding and reseeding
The module's DRBG is hosted in the NXP PowerPC SoC. To initially seed the DRBG, 640 bits are drawn
from the entropy buffer. If the Luna T7 (NXP) entropy source is being used, this seed will contain 554 bits
of entropy. If using the IDQ source, the seed will contain 560 bits of entropy.
During reseeding, 512 bits are drawn from the entropy buffer. If the Luna T7 (NXP) entropy source is
being used, this seed will contain 443 bits of entropy. If using the IDQ source, the seed will contain 448
bits of entropy.
These both exceed the 440 bits required to instantiate or reseed the entropy source to a security strength
of 256 bits.
2.8.5 RBG Output
The output of the DRBG is used for Generate Random Data and for Symmetric Key Generation SFIs.
2.9 Key Generation
In accordance with FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance (IG) D.H, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) in compliance with section 4 of SP 800-133r2. Symmetric
cryptographic keys are generated by the direct unmodified output of the module’s approved DRBG. The
DRBG output is also used as a seed for asymmetric key generation.
User passwords for authentication are provided by the operator. PED key authentication data is
generated by the module.
2.10 Key Establishment
2.10.1 Key Import and Export
The ICD communication path to the host is used for entry/output of: certificates, user password and
Secure Audit Logging Key (SALK).
If the module has been configured to use the PED, the direct connection to the PED is used for
entry/output of: PED Authentication Data, Cloning Domain Vector/Key Cloning Vector (KCV), Remote
PED Vector (RPV), and Secure Recovery Vector (SRV).
The remaining keys and SSPs are not input to or output from the module.
Page 26 of 89
Depending on the configuration of the module, the following methods of key import and export may be
available as a service:
2.10.2 Key Cloning
Key cloning uses, the Cloning Key Encryption Vector (CKEV), to wrap, using KWP, objects transferred
from one cryptographic module to another. Objects transferred using the cloning protocol may be keys,
user data, or module data. The CKEV is only valid for the Key Cloning session.
The key derivation method is a Two-Step Key Derivation Function with Randomness Extraction per
SP800-56Cr2 and SP800-108. FixedInfo consists of the concatenated KCV, the target’s TWC length and
TWC and the source’s TWC length and TWC.
2.10.3 Key Transport
The module implements the following approved key transport methods (per 140-3 IG D.G):
• Using AES-KW and AES-KWP compliant to SP 800-38F - providing between 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
• Using RSA-OAEP compliant to SP 800-56Brev2 - providing 128 bits of encryption strength
• Using AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA2-256 compliant to SP 800-38A and FIPS 198 - providing 256
bits of encryption strength
2.10.4 Key Agreement
The module implements the following approved key agreement methods (per 140-3 IG D.F):
Establishing an EC DH shared secret compliant to SP 800-56Arev3 - providing 192 bits of encryption
strength based on the support of only the P-384 curve
Establishing an IFC shared secret compliant to SP 800-56Brev2 - providing 128 to 192 bits of encryption
strength based on the modulus sizes supported
2.10.5 Key establishment mechanisms
The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). However,
it does offer some or all of the underlying KEM cryptographic functionality to be used by an external
operator/application as part of an approved KEM.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not claim to support any industry protocols.
Page 27 of 89
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
PCIe Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Cryptographic data, keys, authentication data, ICD commands
USB Host Data Input
Data Output
Cryptographic data, keys, authentication data
Serial PED Data Input
Data Output
Authentication data
External Event
(Tamper)
Control Input External Event Alarm
Decommission Control Input Decommission Alarm
LED Status
Output
System status
Power Power 12V main supply to generate internal module supply rails and USB Host
port 5V power
Battery Power 3.6V battery supply
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
The following figures (Figure 5 and Figure 6) show the location of the physical ports of the cryptographic
module:
Figure 5 Luna T7 Physical Ports
PCIe Interface
Serial PED
USB Host
External Event
(Tamper) Input
Decommission
Input
Battery LED
Page 28 of 89
Figure 6 Luna T7 PCI Bracket View
In Figure 6. Port 1 is the Micro-DB9 for the Serial PED cable and Port 2 is the Type A USB 2.0 port for the
Backup HSM.
Page 29 of 89
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength
per
Minute
MFA 48-byte random authentication data plus 16-byte
Challenge Secret generated when a role is initialized and
stored on PED Key.
Login with
PED key
1 in
10^115
1 in
10^114
PED Key 48-byte random authentication data generated when a
role is initialized and stored on PED Key.
Login with
PED key
1 in
10^115
1 in
10^114
Password User provided byte array (minimum 8 bytes). KTS-RSA 1 in
10^19
1 in
10^18
Table 11: Authentication Methods
The authentication objective is to ensure that only authorized users or applications can:
• manage or supervise the module
• access cryptographic functions of the module
• access sensitive cryptographic keys stored within the module
The strength of the available authentication mechanisms shall conform to the following:
• For each attempt to use the authentication mechanism, the probability shall be less than 1 in
1,000,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur.
• For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-minute period, the
probability shall be less than 1 in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false
acceptance will occur.
The Luna T7 can be configured for either Password-based or PED-based authentication. The default
setting is Password-based authentication. A user with proper authority can change the authentication
method between Password and PED.
All roles except for the Public User must authenticate to the module by providing their authentication data.
The table above explains the type and strength of the authentication supported for each role.
If configured to use PED authentication, all roles must authenticate using a PED Key. When a role is
initialized under this configuration, the module generates the authentication data as a 48-byte random
value and writes it to a PED Key. The PED key is used to authenticate the user.
In addition to providing PED Key, the Crypto User, in order to authenticate, must also provide a Challenge
Secret. The Challenge Secret is a random number generated by the module and displayed on the PED
when creating the user. It is a memorized secret shared between the user and the module. To
authenticate, the user provides the PED Key and enters, on the PED, the Challenge Secret.
The Challenge Secret is an option for the Crypto Officer.
Figure 7 shows the PIN Entry Device (PED), with PED Keys, used for PED-authentication.
Page 30 of 89
Figure 7 PIN Entry Device (PED) and PED Keys
If configured to use Password authentication, all roles must authenticate using a password. When a role
is initialized under this configuration, the operator enters the initial password for the role. In Approved
mode, the password is delivered to the module encrypted with the module’s Password Encryption
Certificate (PEC) using an RSA-OAEP and a random nonce to prevent replay attacks.
For Password Authentication, the PIN Storage Key (PSK) is derived from the delivered password using
SP800-132 PBKDF. For PED Authentication, the PSK is delivered from the PED. The PSK is used to
uncover the encrypted partition authentication data (i.e. checkword). If the decrypted checkword is valid,
the user role is authenticated; otherwise, a login error is returned and logged.
4.1.1 Identity
NOTE: All methods of authentication supported by the module (memorized secret or multi-factor PED key
+ memorized secret), incorporate the use of an ID alongside the presentation of the authentication data
and are identity-based.
4.1.2 Activation
If the module is configured to use PED authentication, the Crypto Officer and Crypto User can be
configured to use a two-step authentication process. The first stage is termed "Activation" and is
performed using a PED Key. Once activated, access to key material and cryptographic services is not
allowed until the second stage of authentication, "User Login", has been performed using the role’s
Challenge Secret password.
Once activated, it remains activated until explicitly deactivated, deleted or the module is reset.
4.1.3 M of N
If the module is configured to use PED authentication, the cryptographic module supports the use of an M
of N secret sharing authentication scheme for each of the module roles. M of N authentication provides
the capability to enforce multi-person integrity over the functions associated with each role.
The M of N capability is based on Shamir’s threshold scheme. The cryptographic module splits the
randomly generated authentication data into N pieces, known as splits, and stores each split on a
different PED Key. Any M of these N splits must be transmitted to the cryptographic module by inserting
the corresponding PED Keys into the Luna PED in order to reconstruct the randomly generated
authentication data.
Page 31 of 89
4.1.4 PED Keys
If configured, the Luna T7 can use a Luna PED as an external data input/output device. The Luna PED
connects to the module’s Serial PED port and is used to pass authentication data and CSPs to and from
the module via a physical path. CSPs and authentication data that are output to the Luna PED are stored
in PED Keys. A PED Key is a USB device connected to the Luna PED.
The following types of PED Keys are used with the Luna PED:
• Orange (RPV) PED Key – for the storage of the Remote PED Vector (RPV)
• Blue (SO) PED Key – for the storage of Security Officer and Administrator authentication data
• Black (CU) PED Key – for the storage of Cryptographic Officer (Partition Owner) authentication
data
• Gray (CU) PED Key – for the storage of Cryptographic User (Partition User) authentication data
• Red (Domain) PED Key – for the storage of the cloning domain data, used to control the ability to
clone to another cryptographic module or to a backup module
• Purple (MTK Recovery) PED Key – for the storage of an external split that allows the MTK to be
recovered after a tamper event
• White (Audit Officer) PED Key – for the storage of Audit Officer authentication data
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Audit Officer (AO) Identity Crypto Officer Password
PED Key
Crypto Officer (CO) Identity User Password
PED Key
MFA
Crypto User (CU) Identity User Password
MFA
HSM Security Officer (SO) Identity Crypto Officer Password
PED Key
Table 12: Roles
Page 32 of 89
4.3 Approved Services
The services listed here use Security Function Implementations listed in Section 2.6.
The SSP Access column, for each approved service, lists the SSPs used by and how the service uses the SSP. The following is the key for how
the service uses the SSP:
• G = Generate: The service generates or derives the SSP;
• R = Read: The service outputs the SSP (e.g. read from the module);
• W = Write: The service imports the SSP (e.g. written to the module);
• E = Execute: The service uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation; and
• Z = Zeroize: The service zeroizes the SSP.
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Audit Config Configure the audit log and
mechanism
Implicit Session, log
configuration
parameter and
value
- Hash Message
Authentication
Audit Officer
(AO)
- SALK: E
Audit Log Secret
Export
Wrap and export the SALK. Implicit Session Wrapped log secret KTS-AES
Two-Step KDF
Audit Officer
(AO)
- KCV: E
- SADK: G,E
- SALK: R
- U2K: E
Audit Log Secret
Import
Import and unwrap the SALK. Implicit Session,
wrapped log
secret
- KTS-AES
Two-Step KDF
Audit Officer
(AO)
- KCV: E
- SADK: E
- SALK: W
- U2K: E
Audit Log Verify Checks the authenticity of extracted
sections of the audit log.
Implicit Command - Hash Message
Authentication
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- SALK: E
Audit Officer
(AO)
- SALK: E
Audit Role Init Create the Audit Officer role Implicit AO Auth Data
(Pwd Auth),
Domain
AO Auth Data (PED
Auth)
Generate Random
Data
KTS-HMAC
KTS-RSA
Unauthenticated
- PED Key
Authentication
Data: R,W,E
- User Password:
W,E
- GSK: E
Page 33 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- KCV: G,E
- PEC: R
- PSK: G,E
- RDEK: E
- RMAC: E
- RPV: E
- USK: G,E
- DRBG output:
G
Cloning Tunnel Establishes a secure connection to
another module (Cannot be invoked
by operator, automatically invoked
by module when cloning service is
invoked)
Implicit - - Generate Random
Data
KAS-RSA
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- RSA Shared
secret: G
- TWC: R,W,E
- KCV: E
- CKEV: G
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- RSA Shared
secret: G
- TWC: R,W,E
- KCV: E
- CKEV: G
Configuration
Update
Verify the signature of a
configuration update file
Implicit Session, CUF
(Signed
Configuration
Update File)
- RSA Signature
Verification
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- LSC: W
- ROOT: E
Crypto User
Role Init
Creates the Crypto User role on a
partition
Implicit Session Challenge Secret Generate Random
Data
KTS-HMAC
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- Challenge
Secret: G,R
- RDEK: E
- RMAC: E
- RPV: E
- SGSK: E
- DRBG output:
G
Crypto User (CU)
- Challenge
Secret: G,R
- RDEK: E
- RMAC: E
- RPV: E
Page 34 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- SGSK: E
- DRBG output:
G
Delete key Delete a key in a user's partition - Session, key
handle
- None HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
Page 35 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
Derive Key Derive new keys from existing keys
on a user's partition.
Implicit Session,
algorithm,
algorithm
parameters,
derivation key
handles
Derived key handle Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Key-Based KDF
KEM Encaps
KEM Decaps
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- MTK: E
- SMK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
G,E
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
E
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
E
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- MTK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Page 36 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
G,E
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
E
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
E
Enable / Disable
STM
Enables or disables Secure
Transport Mode functionality
- Session, SRV
(disable)
SRV (enable) None HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- RPV: E
- SRV: R,W
- DRBG output: E
Enter STM Enters Secure Transport mode Implicit - SRV KTS-HMAC Unauthenticated
- MTK: Z
- RDEK: E
- RMAC: E
- RPV: E
- SRV: R
- DRBG output: E
Exit STM Exits Secure Transport mode Implicit SRV - KTS-HMAC Unauthenticated
- MTK: G
- RDEK: E
- RMAC: E
- RPV: E
- SRV: W
Firmware
Update
Verify then load a new firmware
image
Implicit Session, FUF
(Signed
Firmware Update
File)
- RSA Signature
Verification
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- FSC: W
- GSK: E
- ROOT: E
- U2K: E
Generate Key Generate keys or key pairs on
user's partition.
Implicit Session,
generation
algorithm,
algorithm
parameter, key
attributes
Key handles Generate Random
Data
Symmetric Key
Generation
RSA Key Pair
Generation
ECDSA Key
Generation
LMS Key Pair
Generation
ML-DSA Key
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- MTK: E
- SMK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
G
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: G
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Page 37 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Generation
KEM KeyGen
Key: G
- Partition LMS
Private Key: G
- Partition RSA
Public Key: G
- Partition RSA
Private Key: G
- DRBG output: E
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
G
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
G
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
G
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
G
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- MTK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
G
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: G
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: G
- Partition LMS
Private Key: G
- Partition RSA
Public Key: G
- Partition RSA
Private Key: G
- DRBG output: E
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
G
- Partition ML-
Page 38 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
DSA Private Key:
G
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
G
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
G
Generate
Random Data
Generate a random number from
the DRBG
Implicit Request size Requested random
data
Generate Random
Data
Unauthenticated
- DRBG_C: E
- DRBG_V: E
- DRBG output:
G
HSM Initialize This service is used to initialize the
HSM on first use or following
zeroization. Actions performed by
this service include: - resets the
admin partition; - deletes all user
partitions; - generates the KEK; -
initializes the HSM SO role; -
creates / selects KCV to be used
with the admin partition; - generates
PEC, PEK, and SMK keys for the
admin partition; and - encrypts keys
for storage
Implicit SO
Authentication
data, Cloning
Domain
SO Auth data (PED
Auth)
Generate Random
Data
RSA Key Pair
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
KTS-RSA
KTS-HMAC
Unauthenticated
- PED Key
Authentication
Data: R,W,E
- User Password:
W,E
- CITS-DAK: G
- CITS-DAC: G
- GSK: E
- HOK: E
- KCV: G,R,W,Z
- KEK: G,E
- PEK: G,E
- PEC: G,R
- PSK: G,E
- RDEK: E
- RMAC: E
- RPV: G,R,E
- SGSK: G,E
- SMK: G,W,E
- TUK: G
- TVK: Z
- TWC: G
- USK: Z
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
Page 39 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
HSM Set Policy Set HSM policy. - Session, HSM
Policy Number,
Value
- None HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- Challenge
Secret: Z
- GSK: Z
- KCV: Z
- SGSK: Z
- USK: Z
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
Page 40 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
Hash Digest Generate a hash over a block of
supplied data.
Implicit Session,
algorithm, data to
hash
Hash digest Secure Hash Unauthenticated
Import Public
Key
Import objects into a user partition. Implicit Public key,
certificate,
domain objects,
data objects
Imported object
handle
KTS-AES HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- Partition DSA
Public Key: W
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: W
- Partition LMS
Public Key: W
- Partition RSA
Public Key: W
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
W
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
W
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- Partition DSA
Page 41 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Public Key: W
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: W
- Partition LMS
Public Key: W
- Partition RSA
Public Key: W
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
W
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
W
Initialize Remote
PED Vector
Creates the Remote PED Vector
(RPV). Stores the RPV locally in
HSM Flash and remotely on the
RPV PED Key device.
Implicit Session, RPV
PED Index
Remote PED Vector Generate Random
Data
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- DRBG output: E
- RPV: G,R,W
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- DRBG output: E
- RPV: G,R,W
Key export Export user partition secret or
private key objects
Implicit Session,
wrapping key
handle, key to
wrap handle
Wrapped key blob Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
KTS-AES
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- MTK: E
- SMK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
R
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: R
- Partition RSA
Private Key: R
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
R
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
R
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- MTK: E
Page 42 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
R
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: R
- Partition RSA
Private Key: R
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
R
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
R
Key import Import user partition secret or
private key objects.
Implicit Session,
wrapping key
handle,, wrapped
key blob, key
attributes
Unwrapped key
handle
KTS-AES HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- MTK: E
- SMK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
W
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: W
- Partition RSA
Private Key: W
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
W
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
W
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- MTK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
W
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: W
- Partition RSA
Page 43 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Private Key: W
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
W
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
W
Login using MFA Login to the module using multi-
factor authentication. If an SO Login
fails and exceeds the threshold
count, a SO zeroization occurs. If a
CO Login fails and exceeds the
threshold count, a CO zeroization
occurs
Implicit Role PED Auth
Data, Challenge
Response
Random Challenge,
response
Generate Random
Data
Login with PED key
Unauthenticated
- Challenge
Response: W,Z
- PED Key
Authentication
Data: W,E
- CITS-DAK: G
- CITS-DAC: G
- GSK: E,Z
- HOK: E
- KCV: G,E,Z
- PEK: G,E
- PEC: G,R
- PSK: G,E
- RDEK: E
- RMAC: E
- RPV: E
- SGSK: G,E,Z
- SMK: E,Z
- TUK: G
- TWC: G
- TVK: Z
- USK: E,Z
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Page 44 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Random
Challenge: R
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
Login using PED
key
Login to the module using PIN entry
device
Implicit Role PED Auth
Data, Challenge
Response
Random Challenge,
response
Generate Random
Data
KTS-HMAC
Login with PED key
Unauthenticated
- PED Key
Authentication
Data: W,E
- CITS-DAK: G
- CITS-DAC: G
- GSK: E,Z
- HOK: E
- KCV: G,E,Z
- PEK: G,E
- PEC: G,R
- PSK: G,E
- RDEK: E
- RMAC: E
- SGSK: G,E,Z
- TUK: G
- TWC: G
- SMK: E,Z
- RPV: E
- TVK: Z
- USK: E,Z
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Page 45 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Challenge
Response: W
- Random
Challenge: R
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
Login with
password
Login to the module using a
password
Implicit Role, password - Generate Random
Data
KTS-RSA
Unauthenticated
- User Password:
W,E
- CITS-DAK: G
- CITS-DAC: G
- GSK: E,Z
- HOK: E
- KCV: G,E,Z
- PEK: G,E
- PEC: G,R
- PSK: G,E
- RPV: E
- SGSK: G,E,Z
Page 46 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- SMK: E,Z
- TUK: G
- TWC: G
- TVK: Z
- USK: E,Z
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
Logout Log out of the module - Session - None HSM Security
Officer (SO)
Audit Officer
(AO)
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Page 47 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
Crypto User (CU)
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Page 48 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
MAC Gen Generate a MAC over a block of
user supplied data.
Implicit Session,
algorithm,
algorithm
parameter, data
to sign
MAC Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Cryptographic
Message
Authentication
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- MTK: E
- SMK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
E
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- MTK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
E
Crypto User (CU)
- MTK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
E
MAC Ver Verify a MAC over a block of user-
supplied data.
Implicit Session,
algorithm,
algorithm
parameter, data
to verify
Ruling Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Cryptographic
Message
Authentication
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- SMK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
E
Page 49 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
E
Crypto User (CU)
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
E
PED Tunnel Establishes a secure connection to
a local or remote PED (Cannot be
invoked by operator, automatically
invoked by module when
initialization or login services
invoked)
Implicit - - Generate Random
Data
KAS-ECC
Unauthenticated
- EC Private key:
G,E
- EC Public key:
G,R
- EC Peer public
key: W,E
- EC Shared
secret: G
- RDEK: G
- RMAC: G
- DRBG output:
G
Partition Backup
/ Restore
(Clone)
This service exports (Backup) or
imports (Restore) data objects for a
Crypto Officer partition as part of
the Cloning protocol.
Implicit Session, object
handle (Backup),
wrapped key
object (Restore)
Object handle
(Restore), wrapped
key object Backup)
RSA Signature
Verification
KTS-AES
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- CKEV: E
- HOC: E
- KCV: E
- MTK: E
- MIC: E
- ROOT: E
- TUK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
R,W
- Partition DSA
Public Key: R,W
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: R,W
- Partition
Page 50 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
ECDSA Private
Key: R,W
- Partition LMS
Public Key: R,W
- Partition RSA
Public Key: R,W
- Partition RSA
Private Key: R,W
- DRBG output: E
- RSA Shared
secret: G
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
R,W
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
R,W
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
R,W
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
R,W
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- CKEV: E
- HOC: E
- KCV: E
- MIC: E
- MTK: E
- ROOT: E
- TUK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
R,W
- Partition DSA
Public Key: R,W
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: R,W
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: R,W
Page 51 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- Partition LMS
Public Key: R,W
- Partition RSA
Public Key: R,W
- Partition RSA
Private Key: R,W
- DRBG output: E
- RSA Shared
secret: G
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
R,W
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
R,W
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
R,W
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
R,W
Partition Set
Policy
Set partition policy - Partition Policy
Number, Value
- None HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Page 52 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
Query Audit Log
Status
Display general status information
of the audit log.
- Session, log
configuration
parameter and
value
Audit log status None Unauthenticated
Query HSM
Configuration
Display configuration information - HSM Policy
Number
HSM Policy Status None Unauthenticated
Query HSM Self-
Test Status
Display self-test information - Command Self-Test
configuration, time
period, last result,
last failed test result
None Unauthenticated
Query Partition
Configuration
Display partition configuration
information.
- Partition Policy Partition Policy
Status
None Unauthenticated
Query Partition
Status
Display general information for a
partition.
- Status
information type
Partition label, serial
number, state (user
initialized, login
required), number of
objects, and storage
space
None Unauthenticated
Request HSM
Self-Test
This service allows the self-test to
be triggered on demand. The
service supports the CAST and
RNG test
- Self-Test mask - None Unauthenticated
Reseed DRBG Reseed the DRBG with entropy Implicit Session,
additional input
string
- Generate Entropy HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- DRBG Seed :
G,E
- DRBG_C: E
- DRBG_V: E
- Entropy: G,E
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- DRBG Seed :
G,E
Page 53 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- DRBG_C: E
- DRBG_V: E
- Entropy: G,E
Show Status Display general status information - Command Module status
(zeroized,
initialized),
authenticated roles
for active session,
number of
configured partitions,
general error
messages, and logs.
None Unauthenticated
Show Version Display versioning information - Command Hardware,
bootloader and
firmware versions,
and module serial
number
None Unauthenticated
Sign Generate a signature over a block
of user supplied data.
Implicit Session,
algorithm,
algorithm
parameter, data
to sign
Signature Generate Random
Data
RSA Signature
Generation
ECDSA Signature
Generation
LMS Signature
Generation
ML-DSA PureSigGen
ML-DSA
PreHashSigGen
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- MTK: E
- SMK: E
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: E
- Partition LMS
Private Key: E
- Partition RSA
Private Key: E
- DRBG output: E
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
E
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- MTK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: E
- Partition LMS
Private Key: E
- Partition RSA
Private Key: E
Page 54 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- DRBG output: E
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
E
Crypto User (CU)
- MTK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: E
- Partition LMS
Private Key: E
- Partition RSA
Private Key: E
- DRBG output: E
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
E
Symmetric
Encrypt/Decrypt
Encrypt or decrypt a block of user-
supplied data
Implicit Session,
algorithm,
algorithm
parameters, key
handle, data to
en/decrypt
En/decrypted data Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Authenticated
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- MTK: E
- SMK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
E
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- MTK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
E
Crypto User (CU)
- MTK: E
- USK: E
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
E
User Partition
Create
Creates a user account and
partition, and the SSPs required to
use both.
Implicit Session, partition
label, CO Auth
data (Pwd Auth),
Domain
CO Auth data (PED
Auth)
Generate Random
Data
KTS-HMAC
KTS-RSA
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- PED Key
Authentication
Data: R,W,E
Page 55 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- User Password:
W,E
- GSK: E
- KCV: G,W,E
- PEC: R
- PEK: E
- PSK: G
- RDEK: E
- RMAC: E
- RPV: E
- SGSK: E
- USK: G,E
- DRBG output: E
- Challenge
Secret: G,R
User Partition
Delete
Deletes user partition and zeroizes
all objects associated with the
partition
- Session - None HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- Challenge
Secret: Z
- GSK: Z
- KCV: Z
- SGSK: Z
- USK: Z
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Page 56 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Private Key:
Z
Verify Verify a signature over a block of
user supplied data.
Implicit Session,
algorithm,
algorithm
parameter, data
to verify,
signature
Ruling RSA Signature
Verification
ECDSA Signature
Verification
DSA Signature
Verification
LMS Signature
Verification
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
ML-DSA PureSigVer
ML-DSA PreHasSigVer
HSM Security
Officer (SO)
- SMK: E
- Partition DSA
Public Key: E
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: E
- Partition LMS
Public Key: E
- Partition RSA
Public Key: E
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
E
Crypto Officer
(CO)
- USK: E
- Partition DSA
Public Key: E
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: E
- Partition LMS
Public Key: E
- Partition RSA
Public Key: E
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
E
Crypto User (CU)
- USK: E
- Partition DSA
Public Key: E
Page 57 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: E
- Partition LMS
Public Key: E
- Partition RSA
Public Key: E
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
E
Zeroize (HSM
Factory Reset)
Deletes all roles, all users and
objects and sets all HSM settings
and policy to values defined in pre-
loaded configuration files.
- Command Status None Unauthenticated
- KCV: Z
- SMK: Z
- TVK: Z
- USK: Z
- Partition
Symmetric Key:
Z
- Partition DSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Public
Key: Z
- Partition
ECDSA Private
Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Public Key: Z
- Partition LMS
Private Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Public Key: Z
- Partition RSA
Private Key: Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
DSA Private Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
KEM Public Key:
Z
- Partition ML-
Page 58 of 89
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access
KEM Private Key:
Z
Table 13: Approved Services
Page 59 of 89
4.3.1 HSM Set Policy service
HSM policy can only be configured if the corresponding configuration item is enabled which is defined
based on loaded configuration update files. If a given policy being set is a ‘destructive policy’ – changing
the setting will trigger zeroization of all User data objects and User partition.
4.3.2 Partition Set Policy service
Partition policy can only be configured if dependencies at the HSM level of configurations and policy are
met. If a given policy being set is a destructive policy – changing the setting will trigger zeroization of all
User data objects stored in the User partition. This service is not possible for the Backup configuration.
4.3.3 Configuration update service
The configuration update file defines the default settings for one or a number of HSM or Partition level
configuration and policy settings. Configuration update files are signed using RSA PKCS #1-v1.5
signature using SHA2-384 and 4096-bit modulus.
4.3.4 Audit Config service
This service is used to specify:
• which events are to be recorded in the audit log, and
• the location of the logging daemon used to extract log sections from the module.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not support a non-approved mode and does not offer any non-approved services.
4.5 External Firmware Loaded
The Luna T7 contains two firmware components: the Firmware and the Bootloader. The module only
supports the loading of new Firmware components.
The Firmware component is digitally signed using a Thales TCT Manufacturing signature key using RSA
(4096 bits) PKCS #1 V1.5 with SHA2-384. Once a firmware update is invoked, the module checks the
authenticity of the new firmware. A successful verification will trigger an automatic reset of the module
resulting in the zeroisation of all users and user objects.
Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of
this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
Page 60 of 89
5 Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Bootloader performs a SHA-1 integrity check of itself and a SHA2-256 integrity check of the
Firmware it loads on each power-on and reset cycle. The module will halt if either integrity check fails.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
Using lunacm (provided with the LUNA client)
The default install location of lunacm on a Linux host is "/usr/safenet/lunaclient/bin" and on a Windows
host is "C:\Program Files\SafeNet\LunaClient".
To initiate the integrity test
Using the slot command, ensure that the appropriate Luna T7 is selected. First, list the installed Luna
Cryptographic Modules. Enter the following at the "lunacm:>" prompt:
• slot list
If more than one module is installed, select the appropriate Luna T7. Enter the following at the "lunacm:>"
prompt replacing <slot> with the actual slot number:
• slot set –s <slot>
Initiate the integrity test. Enter the following at the "lunacm:>" prompt:
• hsm reset
This command runs other tests (i.e. algorithm self-tests) in addition to the integrity test. The command
will return a result of "No Error" only if all of the tests pass.
Using lunash (requires SSH on the host)
Using SSH, log into the appliance as the appliance administrator. From a command prompt, enter the
following, replacing <ip> with the ip address of Luna Network HSM (T-Series):
• ssh admin@<ip>
To initiate the integrity test
Enter the following at the lunash:> prompt:
• sysconf appliance reboot
Confirm the operation by entering "proceed" at the prompt.
This will reboot the Luna Network HSM (T-Series) resetting the installed Luna T7. During the reboot the
SSH connection will be closed.
Page 61 of 89
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
The Luna T7 has been validated to security level 3. This section is not applicable.
Page 62 of 89
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance
Tamper-evident
enclosure
On receipt of module following transport.
At any point following any un-authorized
access to the environment hosting the
module.
Following any extended periods of
unattended storage for the module
After the module has been dropped or
physically or environmentally stressed.
The outer cover of the module is embedded in the
epoxy that encapsulates everything within the
cryptographic boundary.
Examine the aluminum shell for bends and look for
broken or missing pieces of epoxy.
Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required
The Luna T7 is a multi-chip embedded module as defined by FIPS 140-3 standard ISO/IEC 19790:2012
section 7.7.1. The module is encased in a rigid metal enclosure that is bound to the module's circuitry by
potting epoxy. Any tampering that might compromise a module’s security is detectable by visual
inspection of the module. The HSM Security Officer (SO) should perform a visual inspection of the
module at regular intervals. Attempts to remove the enclosure will cause sufficient damage to the
cryptographic module so that it is rendered inoperable.
7.5 EFP/EFT Information
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature
or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
HighTemperature 95 C EFP External Tamper Event: NVRAM Memory is wiped, processor
exception occurs and the module halts operation and must be reset.
HighVoltage 13.5V EFP Processor exception occurs and the module halts operation and must
be reset.
LowTemperature -10 C EFP External Tamper Event: NVRAM Memory is wiped, processor
exception occurs and the module halts operation and must be reset.
LowVoltage 10.5V EFP Processor exception occurs and the module halts operation and must
be reset.
Table 15: EFP/EFT Information
The module is designed to sense and respond to out-of-range temperature conditions as well as out-of-
range voltage conditions. The temperature and voltage conditions are monitored in the power on state.
In the event that the module senses an out-of-range temperature or over/under voltage, the module will
reset itself and clear all working memory.
The module is FCC Part 15 Class B Compliant for Conducted and Radiated Emissions.
7.6 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature
Type
Temperature
HighTemperature +95.9 C
LowTemperature -10 C
Table 16: Hardness Testing Temperatures
As disclosed above, the rigidity (hardness) of the module enclosure has been tested at the actual
operational temperature range rather than the intended operational temperature range.
Page 63 of 89
7.7 Additional Information
7.7.1 Secure Transport Mode
When configured to use PED-Authentication, the Luna T7 supports placing the device in Secure
Transport Mode (STM). Placing the module in STM zeroizes the Master Tamper Key (MTK). The MTK
wraps Partition Asymmetric Private Keys and Partition Symmetric Keys stored in the module. These keys
are unavailable when in STM. The MTK, when created, is also stored as 2 splits. One split is internally
stored. The other split (SRV) is stored on the Secure Recovery (Purple) PED Key. To exit STM the 2
splits, one internally supplied and the other supplied by the owner of the Secure Recovery PED Key, are
used to reconstitute the MTK. Once reconstituted, the wrapped Partition Asymmetric Private Keys and
Partition Symmetric Keys are available for use.
To enter secure transport mode in LunaSH, run the command "hsm srk transportmode enter". If the
module is installed in a PCIe slot of a customer’s workstation, to enter STM, use LunaCM. Using
LunaCM, run the command "srk transport".
Refer to user documentation for more information on STM.
7.7.2 Temperature ranges
The Luna T7 has been designed to operate between 0 and 50°C, and to be stored between -20 and
60°C.
Page 64 of 89
8 Non-Invasive Security
The Luna T7 does not implement any non-invasive mitigation techniques.
Page 65 of 89
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
Firmware Firmware image Static
Flash 256MB Flash Static
NVRAM Battery backed NVRAM Static
RAM 2GB DDR3L RAM Dynamic
Table 17: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
ICD_I PCIe RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic
ICD_O RAM PCIe Plaintext Manual Electronic
MFR_I - Firmware Plaintext Manual Electronic
PIN_I PCIe RAM Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS-RSA
RPED_I PCIe RAM Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS-HMAC
RPED_O RAM PCIe Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS-HMAC
TPED_I PED Serial RAM Plaintext Manual Electronic
TPED_O RAM PED Serial Plaintext Manual Electronic
WICD_I PCIe RAM Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS-AES
WICD_O RAM PCIe Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS-AES
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Auto Zeroize following use RAM memory used to store an
SSP is zeroized when SSP is no
longer needed. SSPs are
replaced with zeros.
N/A
CO Deletes CO/CU keys
used for authentication,
user partition(s), and
partition keys.
From the perspective of a CO
user, resets the HSM back to its
state first initialized by the SO.
SO and Audit Officer are not
zeroized. SSPs are replaced with
zeros.
Changing setting of a destructive
policy will delete all user partitions.
Three Ten consecutive failed CO
login attempts will delete that
user's partition if not set to allow
SO to re-enable user
Decom Decommission the
module by zeroizing
KEK, TVK, and MTK
Zeroizing KEK and MTK disables
access to all partition asymmetric
and symmetric keys. Zeroizing
KEK and TVK disables login for
all users. The KEK, TVK, and
MTK are replaced with zeros.
Short the two pins of the
Decommission port
HSM Deletes all keys used for
authentication (SO,
Audit, CO/CU), all user
partitions, partition keys,
and TVK.
Resets the HSM back to its state
when received from the factory.
SSPs are replaced with zeros.
ICD Command
Reboot Zeroizes all RAM SSPs stored in RAM prior to the
reboot are zeroized. SSPs are
replaced with random data.
Reboot the module
SO Deletes SO and CO/CU
keys used for
authentication, all user
Resets the HSM back to its state
when received from the factory
except that the Audit Officer is
Three consecutive failed SO login
attempts
Page 66 of 89
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
partitions, partition keys,
and TVK.
maintained. SSPs are replaced
with zeros.
Tamper Zeroizes the MTK. All partition keys are encrypted
by the MTK and become
unusable when the MTK has
been zeroized. The MTK itself is
replaced with zeros.
Enter secure transport mode or
short the two pins of the Tamper
port
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods
Page 67 of 89
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
CITS-DAC Device Authentication Certificate. Used for a
specific PKI implementation requiring
assurance that a key or a specific action
originated within the HSM
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
PSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
CITS-DAK Device Authentication Key. Used for a
specific PKI implementation requiring
assurance that a key or a specific action
originated within the HSM.
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
CSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
CKEV Cloning Key Encryption Vector. Protects
partition cryptographic objects during cloning
256 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
KAS-RSA KTS-AES
Challenge
Response
A value used for authentication in the
challenge response scheme. It is generated
using the challenge secret and the one-time
random challenge value.
256 - 75 Authentication
- CSP
Login with
PED key
Challenge
Secret
Used with MFA. A random string generated
by the cryptographic module, masked to
printable characters, and output via the PED
display when the user is created.
128 - 75 Authentication
- CSP
Generate
Random
Data
DRBG Seed Seed material obtained from the entropy
source. For seeding: entropy input, nonce
and personalization string. For reseeding:
entropy input and additional input.
512 or 640 - 443
to 560
DRBG Seed -
CSP
Generate
Random
Data
Generate Random Data
DRBG output Random numbers used in cryptographic
algorithms
256 - 256 DRBG - CSP Generate
Random
Data
DRBG_C DRBG internal state value 440 - 440 DRBG State -
CSP
Generate
Random
Data
Generate Random Data
DRBG_V DRBG internal state value 440 - 440 DRBG State -
CSP
Generate
Random
Data
Generate Random Data
EC Peer public
key
Imported public key used in KAS-ECC to
establish a secure tunnel with a remote PED
P-384 - 192 Asymmetric -
PSP
KAS-ECC
EC Private key Local private key used in KAS-ECC to
establish a secure tunnel with a remote PED
P-384 - 192 Asymmetric -
CSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
KAS-ECC
EC Public key Local public key used in KAS-ECC to
establish a secure tunnel with a remote PED
P-384 - 192 Asymmetric -
PSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
KAS-ECC
EC Shared
secret
Shared secret established by KAS-ECC 192 - 192 Shared secret
- CSP
KAS-ECC Two-Step KDF
Page 68 of 89
Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
Entropy Entropy buffer populated from entropy source
and consumed by DRBG
2048 - 1773 or
1792
Entropy - CSP Generate
Entropy
Generate Random Data
FSC Firmware Signing Certificate. Used to verify
Firmware images on initial load.
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
PSP
RSA Signature
Verification
GSK Global Storage Key. Protects static module
parameters.
256 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
HOC Hardware Origin Certificate. 4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
PSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
HOK Hardware Origin Key. Used to sign
certificates for other device messaging key
pairs.
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
CSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
KCV Key Cloning Vector. Used to restrict a
module's ability to participate in the cloning
protocol as part of the OtherInfo for the KAS
used to establish CKEV and SADK. It is
either generated by the module or imprinted
onto the module at the time the module is
initialized. The value is output from the
original module in the domain onto a PED
Key to enable initializing additional modules
into the same domain.
384 - 384 Secret - CSP Generate
Random
Data
KAS-RSA
KEK Key Encryption Key. Encrypts login sensitive
values.
384 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
LSC License Signing Certificate. Used to verify
Configuration Update images on initial load.
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
PSP
RSA Signature
Verification
MIC Manufacturer's Integrity Certificate. Used in
verifying Hardware Origin Certificates
(HOCs).
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
PSP
RSA Signature
Verification
MTK Master Tamper Key. Protects partition
asymmetric private keys and symmetric keys
stored in Flash.
256 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
PEC Password Encryption Certificate. Used for
secure transport of password data.
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
PSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
KTS-RSA
PED Key
Authentication
Data
Used with PED Key and MFA authentication.
A random value that is generated by the
module when a SO, AO or CO is created. It is
written to the role user's PED Key. It is input
from the role user's PED Key as part of Login
command.
384 - 384 Authentication
- CSP
Generate
Random
Data
Page 69 of 89
Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
PEK Password Encryption Key. Protects user
passwords provided to the module.
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
CSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
KTS-RSA
PSK PIN Storage Key. Encrypts the SMK and
partition USKs.
384 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
KTS-RSA Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Partition DSA
Public Key
Public Key for a User partition 2048-3072 - 112-
128
Asymmetric -
PSP
KTS-AES DSA Signature
Verification
Partition
ECDSA Private
Key
Private Key for a User partition P-224/P-384/P-
521 - 112-256
Asymmetric -
CSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
KTS-AES ECDSA Signature
Generation
Partition
ECDSA Public
Key
Public Key for a User partition P-224/P-384/P-
521 - 112-256
Asymmetric -
PSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
KTS-AES ECDSA Signature
Generation
ECDSA Signature
Verification
Partition LMS
Private Key
Private Key for a User partition 416 to 512 -
192/256
Asymmetric -
CSP
LMS Key
Pair
Generation
LMS Signature
Generation
Partition LMS
Public Key
Public Key for a User partition 384/448 -
192/256
Asymmetric -
PSP
LMS Key
Pair
Generation
KTS-AES LMS Signature
Generation
LMS Signature
Verification
Partition ML-
DSA Private
Key
Private Key for a User partition 2560/4032/4896
bytes -
128/192/256
Asymmetric -
CSP
ML-DSA
Key
Generation
ML-DSA PureSigGen
Partition ML-
DSA Public
Key
Public Key for a User partition 1312/1952/2592
bytes -
128/192/256
Asymmetric -
PSP
ML-DSA
Key
Generation
ML-DSA PureSigVer
Partition ML-
KEM Private
Key
Private Key used for key derivation and
decapsulation
1632/2400/3168
bytes -
128/192/256
Asymmetric -
CSP
KEM
KeyGen
KEM
Encaps
KEM
Decaps
KEM Decaps
Partition ML-
KEM Public
Key
Public Key used for key derivation and
encapsulation
800/1184/1568
bytes -
128/192/256
Asymmetric -
PSP
KEM
KeyGen
KEM Encaps
KEM Decaps
Partition RSA
Private Key
Private Key for a User partition 2048-4096 - 112-
150
Asymmetric -
CSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
KTS-AES RSA Signature
Generation
Partition RSA
Public Key
Public Key for a User partition 2048-4096 - 112-
150
Asymmetric -
PSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
KTS-AES RSA Signature
Generation
Page 70 of 89
Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
RSA Signature
Verification
Partition
Symmetric Key
Symmetric Key for a User partition 128-256 - 128-
256
Symmetric -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
KEM
Encaps
KTS-AES
KEM
Decaps
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Authenticated
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Hash Message
Authentication
Cryptographic Message
Authentication
KTS-AES
Key-Based KDF
RDEK Remote (PED session) Data Encryption Key.
Protects RPED tunnel across command
interface to Remote PED.
384 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
KAS-ECC Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
RMAC Remote (PED session) Message
Authentication Code Key. Authenticates
RPED tunnel across command interface to
Remote PED.
256 - 256 Authentication
- CSP
KAS-ECC Hash Message
Authentication
ROOT Root Certificate. Used in verifying other
certificates.
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
PSP
RSA Signature
Verification
RPV Remote PED Vector. A randomly generated
secret, shared with a Remote PED to
establish a secure communication channel.
256 - 256 Generic
Secret - CSP
Generate
Random
Data
KAS-ECC
RSA Shared
secret
Shared secret established by KAS2 key
agreement
4096/6144/8192 -
112/128/150
Shared secret
- CSP
KAS-RSA Two-Step KDF
Random
Challenge
Used with PED Key and MFA authentication.
A one-time random number generated by the
cryptographic module and sent to the calling
application for each login. It is XORed with
the input Challenge Secret to compute the
one-time response that is returned to the
cryptographic module
192 - 192 Nonce - PSP Generate
Random
Data
SADK Secure Audit Domain Key. Derived for a
cloning domain based upon KCV that is used
to wrap/unwrap the SALK when it is exported
/ imported from / to the module.
256 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
Two-Step
KDF
KTS-AES
SALK Secure Audit Logging Key. Authenticates log
messages.
256 - 256 Authentication
- CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
KTS-AES Hash Message
Authentication
Page 71 of 89
Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
SGSK Secondary Global Storage Key. Protects
ephemeral module parameters.
256 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SMK Security (Officer) Master Key. Protects
private objects owned by the SO.
256 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
SRV Secure Recovery Vector. A split of the MTK
that is written to one or more PED Keys using
the M of N secret splitting scheme and used
to recover the MTK after a tamper event has
been cleared.
256 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
TUK Token (or Module) Unwrapping Key. Used in
the cloning protocol.
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
CSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
KAS-RSA
TVK Token (or Module) Variable Key. Protects
cached User authentication data when auto-
activation is enabled.
256 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
TWC Token (or Module) Wrapping Certificate.
Used as part of the cloning protocol
4096 - 150 Asymmetric -
PSP
RSA Key
Pair
Generation
KAS-RSA
U2K U2 Key. Generic secret key loaded at
manufacturing and used as shared secret to
derive product specific keys
192 - 192 Generic
Secret - CSP
Two-Step KDF
USK User Storage Key. Protects private objects
owned by the User.
256 - 256 Symmetric -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
User Password User provided 8-255 character string. 64-2040 - - Password -
CSP
KTS-RSA
Table 20: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
CITS-DAC ICD_O RAM:Plaintext Reboot CITS-DAK:Paired With
HOK:Signed by
CITS-DAK Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot CITS-DAC:Paired With
CKEV RAM:Plaintext Auto KCV:Derived From
RSA Shared secret:Derived From
Challenge Response TPED_I
RPED_I
RAM:Plaintext Auto Challenge Secret:Derived From
Random Challenge:Derived From
Challenge Secret TPED_O
RPED_O
Flash:Encrypted HSM
SO
CO
Page 72 of 89
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG Seed RAM:Plaintext Reboot Entropy:Extracted from
DRBG output RAM:Plaintext Reboot DRBG_C:Derived From
DRBG_V:Derived From
DRBG_C RAM:Plaintext Reboot DRBG Seed :Derived From
DRBG_V RAM:Plaintext Reboot DRBG Seed :Derived From
EC Peer public key ICD_I RAM:Plaintext Auto
EC Private key RAM:Plaintext Auto EC Public key:Paired With
EC Public key ICD_O RAM:Plaintext Auto EC Public key:Paired With
EC Shared secret RAM:Plaintext Auto EC Private key:Established from
EC Peer public key:Established from
Entropy RAM:Plaintext Reboot
FSC ICD_I RAM:Plaintext Reboot ROOT:Signed by
GSK MFR_I Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
TUK:Encrypts
HOK:Encrypts
U2K:Encrypts
CITS-DAK:Encrypts
HOC MFR_I
ICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
HOK Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot
KCV TPED_I
TPED_O
RPED_O
RPED_I
Flash:Encrypted HSM
SO
KEK NVRAM:Plaintext Decom SMK:Encrypts
USK:Encrypts
PEK:Encrypts
LSC ICD_I RAM:Plaintext Reboot ROOT:Signed by
MIC MFR_I
ICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot ROOT:Signed by
MTK MFR_I NVRAM:Plaintext Tamper
Decom
Partition Symmetric Key:Encrypts
Partition DSA Public Key:Encrypts
Partition ECDSA Public Key:Encrypts
Partition ECDSA Private Key:Encrypts
Partition LMS Public Key:Encrypts
Partition LMS Private Key:Encrypts
Partition RSA Public Key:Encrypts
Partition RSA Private Key:Encrypts
PEC ICD_O RAM:Plaintext Reboot User Password:Encrypts
PEK:Paired With
HOK:Signed by
Page 73 of 89
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
PED Key Authentication Data TPED_I
TPED_O
RPED_O
RPED_I
RAM:Plaintext
Flash:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
PEK RAM:Plaintext Reboot User Password:Decrypts
PEC:Paired With
PSK RAM:Plaintext Reboot
Auto
User Password:Derived From
USK:Encrypts
SMK:Encrypts
Partition DSA Public Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition ECDSA Private Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition ECDSA Public Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition LMS Private Key Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition LMS Public Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition ML-DSA Private Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition ML-DSA Public Key:Paired With
Partition ML-DSA Public Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition ML-DSA Private Key:Paired With
Partition ML-KEM Private Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition ML-KEM Public Key:Paired With
Page 74 of 89
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Partition ML-KEM Public Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition ML-KEM Private Key:Paired With
Partition RSA Private Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition RSA Public Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Partition Symmetric Key WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Encrypted
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
RDEK RAM:Plaintext Reboot
Auto
Challenge Secret:Encrypts
PED Key Authentication Data:Encrypts
RPV:Derived From
EC Shared secret:Derived From
RMAC RAM:Plaintext Reboot
Auto
RPV:Derived From
EC Shared secret:Derived From
ROOT MFR_I
ICD_O
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot
RPV TPED_O Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot
RSA Shared secret RAM:Plaintext Auto TUK:Established from
TWC:Established from
Random Challenge ICD_O RAM:Plaintext Auto
SADK Flash:Plaintext Reboot U2K:Derived From
KCV:Derived From
SALK:Encrypts
SALK WICD_I
WICD_O
Flash:Plaintext Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
SGSK Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
Challenge Secret:Encrypts
Page 75 of 89
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SMK Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot
HSM
SO
SRV TPED_I
TPED_O
RPED_O
RPED_I
Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot MTK:Derived From
TUK Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot TWC:Paired With
TVK NVRAM:Plaintext Decom
HSM
SO
CO
PED Key Authentication Data:Encrypts
TWC ICD_O RAM:Plaintext Reboot TUK:Paired With
HOK:Signed by
U2K MFR_I Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot
Auto
GSK:Encrypts
SGSK:Encrypts
KCV:Encrypts
Partition Symmetric Key:Encrypts
Partition DSA Public Key:Encrypts
Partition ECDSA Public Key:Encrypts
Partition ECDSA Private Key:Encrypts
Partition LMS Public Key:Encrypts
Partition LMS Private Key:Encrypts
Partition RSA Public Key:Encrypts
Partition RSA Private Key:Encrypts
USK Flash:Encrypted
RAM:Plaintext
Reboot
HSM
SO
CO
GSK:Encrypts
SGSK:Encrypts
KCV:Encrypts
Partition Symmetric Key:Encrypts
Partition DSA Public Key:Encrypts
Partition ECDSA Public Key:Encrypts
Partition ECDSA Private Key:Encrypts
Partition LMS Public Key:Encrypts
Partition LMS Private Key:Encrypts
Partition RSA Public Key:Encrypts
Partition RSA Private Key:Encrypts
User Password PIN_I RAM:Encrypted Reboot
Auto
Table 21: SSP Table 2
Page 76 of 89
9.5 Transitions
The module implements the following security methods that are forecasted to transition to non-approved
over the lifetime of the validation:
Algorithm Uses
SHA-1 The module does not use SHA-1 directly to support a claim of security
SHA2-224 For hashing
In RSA signature generation
In ECDSA signature generation
SHA3-224 For hashing
In RSA signature generation
In ECDSA signature generation
HMAC-SHA-1 For MAC Generation
As the PRF in PBKDF
HMAC-SHA2-224 For MAC Generation
As the PRF in PBKDF
As the PRF in KBKDF
HMAC-SHA3-224 For MAC Generation
As the PRF in PBKDF
As the PRF in KBKDF
Page 77 of 89
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
Bootloader
integrity
SHA-1 EDC SW/FW
Integrity
Log message, Module halt on
failure, Boot on success
Bootloader verifies its
own image
Firmware
integrity
SHA2-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Log message, Module halt on
failure, Boot on success
Bootloader verifies
firmware image
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
On power-on/reset, the integrity of the bootloader image and firmware image is verified. Once verified,
the firmware tests the operation of the random number generator and the cryptographic algorithms.
Page 78 of 89
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs the following conditional self-tests. The module contains two implementations of some cryptographic algorithms. The
module performs self-tests of both implementations.
In the table below,
• (FW) indicates that the self-test exercises the implementation of the algorithm in the Firmware cryptographic library.
• (HW) indicates that the self-test exercises the implementation of the algorithm in the Hybrid cryptographic library, which makes use of
hardware cryptographic accelerators.
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
(FW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-CBC
(HW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-CFB128
(FW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-CFB128
(HW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-CFB8
(FW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-CFB8
(HW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-CTR
(FW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-CTR
(HW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-ECB
(FW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-ECB
(HW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-GCM
(HW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-KW (HW) 128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-KWP
(HW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-OFB
(FW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
AES-OFB
(HW)
128, 192 & 256-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
Page 79 of 89
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details Conditions
AES-XTS
(HW)
256, 512-bit KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, Decrypt On boot
APT Adaptive proportion test FDT CAST Function Fail / Error
Logged / Module
Halt
- On generation
CMAC (FW) 128 KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
CMAC (HW) 128 KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
DRBG (HW) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log message Instantiate,
Generate, Reseed
On boot
DSA SigVer
(FW)
L=1024, SHA 1; L=2048, SHA2-224 KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
DSA SigVer
(HW)
L=1024, SHA 1; L=2048, SHA2-224 KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
ECDSA Key
pairs
- PCT PCT Function Fail Sign and verify On key pair
generation
ECDSA
SigGen
Curve: P-256 Hash: SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log message Sign On boot
ECDSA
SigGen (HW)
Curve: P-256 Hash: SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log message Sign On boot
ECDSA
SigVer (FW)
Curve: P-256 Hash: SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
ECDSA
SigVer (HW)
Curve: P-256 Hash: SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
Firmware Load
Test
RSA 4096-bit, SHA2-384 SigVer SW/FW
Load
Function Fail / Error
Logged
Verify On firmware load
GMAC (HW) 128-bits KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
HMAC-SHA-1
(FW)
256-bit key KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
HMAC-SHA-1
(HW)
256-bit key KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
HMAC-SHA-2
(FW)
256 & 1048 bit keys, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
HMAC-SHA-2
(HW)
256 & 1048 bit keys, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
HMAC-SHA-3
(FW)
256 & 1048 bit keys, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
HMAC-SHA-3
(HW)
256 & 1048 bit keys, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
KAS-ECC-
SSC (FW)
P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 KAT CAST Log message Compute On boot
KAS-ECC-
SSC (HW)
P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 KAT CAST Log message Compute On boot
Page 80 of 89
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details Conditions
KAS-IFC-SSC
(FW)
2048-bit modulo KAT CAST Log message Compute On boot
KAS-IFC-SSC
(HW)
2048-bit modulo KAT CAST Log message Compute On boot
KBKDF (FW) CMAC-AES KAT CAST Log message Derive On boot
KBKDF (HW) CMAC-AES KAT CAST Log message Derive On boot
KDA TwoStep
(FW)
CMAC-AES, Counter mode KAT CAST Log message Derive On boot
KDA TwoStep
(HW)
CMAC-AES, Counter mode KAT CAST Log message Derive On boot
KTS-IFC (FW) 4096-bit, SHA2-512 KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, decrypt On boot
KTS-IFC (HW) 4096-bit, SHA2-512 KAT CAST Log message Encrypt, decrypt On boot
LMS Key pairs - PCT PCT Function Fail Sign and verify On key pair
generation
LMS KeyGen
(FW)
LMS_SHA256_M24_H5, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5 KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
LMS KeyGen
(HW)
LMS_SHA256_M24_H5, LMS_SHA256_M32_H5 KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
LMS SigGen
(FW)
LMS: SHA256_M24_H5 & SHA256_M32_H5,
LMOTS: SHA256_N24_W2 & SHA256_N32_W1
KAT CAST Log message Sign On boot
LMS SigGen
(HW)
LMS: SHA256_M24_H5 & SHA256_M32_H5,
LMOTS: SHA256_N24_W2 & SHA256_N32_W1
KAT CAST Log message Sign On boot
LMS SigVer
(FW)
All supported parameter sets KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
LMS SigVer
(HW)
All supported parameter sets KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
ML-DSA Key
pairs
- PCT PCT Function Fail Sign and Verify On key pair
generation
ML-DSA
KeyGen (FW)
ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87 KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
ML-DSA
KeyGen (HW)
ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87 KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
ML-DSA
SigGen (FW)
ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87, All
Rejection outcomes`
KAT CAST Log message Sign On boot
ML-DSA
SigGen (HW)
ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87, All
Rejection outcomes
KAT CAST Log message Sign On boot
ML-DSA
SigVer (FW)
ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87 KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
ML-DSA
SigVer (HW)
ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87 KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
ML-KEM
Decap (FW)
ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 KAT CAST Log message Decapsulate On boot
Page 81 of 89
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details Conditions
ML-KEM
Decap (HW)
ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 KAT CAST Log message Decapsulate On boot
ML-KEM
Encap (FW)
ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 KAT CAST Log message Encapsulate On boot
ML-KEM
Encap (HW)
ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 KAT CAST Log message Encapsulate On boot
ML-KEM Key
pairs
- PCT PCT Function Fail Encapsulate and
decapsulate
On key pair
generation
ML-KEM
KeyGen (FW)
ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
ML-KEM
KeyGen (HW)
ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 KAT CAST Log message Generate On boot
PBKDF (FW) SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
KAT CAST Log message Derive On boot
PBKDF (HW) SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
KAT CAST Log message Derive On boot
RCT Repetition count test FDT CAST Function Fail / Error
Logged / Module
Halt
- On generation
RSA SigGen
(FW)
2048-bit, SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log message Sign On boot
RSA SigGen
(HW)
2048-bit, SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log message Sign On boot
RSA SigVer
(FW)
4096-bit, SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
RSA SigVer
(HW)
4096-bit, SHA2-256 KAT CAST Log message Verify On boot
RSA key pairs - PCT PCT Function Fail Sign and Verify On key pair
generation
SHA-1 (FW) - KAT CAST Log message Hash On boot
SHA-1 (HW) - KAT CAST Log message Hash On boot
SHA-2 (FW) SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-348, SHA2-512 KAT CAST Log message Hash On boot
SHA-2 (HW) SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-348, SHA2-512 KAT CAST Log message Hash On boot
SHA-3 (FW) SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-348, SHA3-512 KAT CAST Log message Hash On boot
SHA-3 (HW) SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-348, SHA3-512 KAT CAST Log message Hash On boot
TDES-CBC
(FW)
- KAT CAST Log message Decrypt On boot
TDES-CBC
(HW)
- KAT CAST Log message Decrypt On boot
XTS duplicate
key
Verifying that the two keys are different CT Critical
Function
Function Fail / Error
Logged
- On encrypt and
decrypt operations
Page 82 of 89
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests
Page 83 of 89
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Bootloader integrity EDC SW/FW Integrity - -
Firmware integrity KAT SW/FW Integrity - -
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CBC (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-CBC (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-CFB128 (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-CFB128 (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-CFB8 (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-CFB8 (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-CTR (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-CTR (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-ECB (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-ECB (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-GCM (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-KW (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-KWP (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-OFB (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-OFB (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
AES-XTS (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
APT FDT CAST - -
CMAC (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
CMAC (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
DRBG (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
DSA SigVer (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
DSA SigVer (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ECDSA Key pairs PCT PCT - -
ECDSA SigGen KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ECDSA SigGen
(HW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ECDSA SigVer
(FW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ECDSA SigVer
(HW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
Firmware Load Test SigVer SW/FW Load - -
GMAC (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
HMAC-SHA-1 (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
HMAC-SHA-1 (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
HMAC-SHA-2 (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
HMAC-SHA-2 (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
HMAC-SHA-3 (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
HMAC-SHA-3 (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KAS-ECC-SSC
(FW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KAS-ECC-SSC
(HW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KAS-IFC-SSC (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KAS-IFC-SSC (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KBKDF (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KBKDF (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KDA TwoStep (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KDA TwoStep (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KTS-IFC (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
KTS-IFC (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
LMS Key pairs PCT PCT - -
Page 84 of 89
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
LMS KeyGen (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
LMS KeyGen (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
LMS SigGen (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
LMS SigGen (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
LMS SigVer (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
LMS SigVer (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-DSA Key pairs PCT PCT - -
ML-DSA KeyGen
(FW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-DSA KeyGen
(HW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-DSA SigGen
(FW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-DSA SigGen
(HW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-DSA SigVer
(FW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-DSA SigVer
(HW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-KEM Decap
(FW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-KEM Decap
(HW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-KEM Encap
(FW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-KEM Encap
(HW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-KEM Key pairs PCT PCT - -
ML-KEM KeyGen
(FW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
ML-KEM KeyGen
(HW)
KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
PBKDF (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
PBKDF (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
RCT FDT CAST - -
RSA SigGen (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
RSA SigGen (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
RSA SigVer (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
RSA SigVer (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
RSA key pairs PCT PCT - -
SHA-1 (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
SHA-1 (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
SHA-2 (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
SHA-2 (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
SHA-3 (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
SHA-3 (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
TDES-CBC (FW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
TDES-CBC (HW) KAT CAST CAST Timer Automatic
XTS duplicate key CT Critical Function - -
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information
The table above lists the self-tests performed on a periodic basis.
The timing of the periodic tests is controlled by a configurable parameter stored in Flash, with a minimum
value of 1 hour and a default setting of 24 hours. When the timer expires, the ICD command interface is
shut down and all command processing stops while the listed self-tests run on all cryptographic libraries.
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The CAST test result is written to the driver log for the T7 module. On failure, the module will halt
operation and stop processing commands until the next power cycle. On success, the module will re-
enable its ICD command interface and resume normal operation.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Fatal
Error
Error of severity that
requires the module to halt
operation
Failed
integrity test
Failed CAST
Power
cycle
Red LED on device, Fatal Error status on
display, Fatal Error message logged and
sent to host, module operation halted
Service
Error
Error on a function call that
does not impact ability to
operate securely
Failed PCT Automatic Error status returned in command
response
Table 26: Error States
On the failure of a Pre-Operational Self Test or CAST, the module will log the failure, send the failure
message to the host, and halt all operations. The only recovery from a Pre-Operational Self Test or
CAST error is a power cycle.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
There are several ways in which an operator can initiate the Self-Test sequence on the module. One
method is to simply perform a Power On reset sequence to run the POST tests.
The operator may also initiate the Request HSM Self-Test service by issuing the corresponding command
across the ICD command interface.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
11.1.1 Installation
Standard practice for high-value assets such as HSMs is installation in a secured environment.
Installation in a secured environment is part of a defense-in-depth approach to minimize direct access to
the HSM.
Securing the environment of the HSM typically will include a combination of both:
• securing its location using physical defenses; and
• procedures for monitoring and managing authorized access to the HSM.
The exact measures put in place will vary and should be commensurate with the potential consequences
or costs associated with the complete compromise of the HSM and cryptographic keys (or data objects) it
protects.
Common components of a physical security solution often include:
• dedicated areas (e.g. locked cage or cabinet) for the HSM as part of a general IT environment;
• monitored and audited physical access controls on IT environments hosting the HSM;
• hardened locks, doors and walls to increase the effort required to force access to the HSM;
• out-of-hours alarm systems on areas containing the HSM;
• 24hr/365day on-site or remote guard service that will respond to alarms; and
• video monitoring of areas containing the HSM to allow detection of activity in proximity to the
HSM.
Refer to the Installation Guide in the Luna HSM documentation for steps to verify the integrity of the
received product prior to installation and to install the product in your environment.
11.1.2 Initialization
Prior to use, the Luna T7 must be initialized per the instruction below. The operator assigned to the
HSM’s SO role may initialize the Luna T7 using the LunaCM application provided with the Luna client.
The default install location of lunacm on a Linux host is "/usr/safenet/lunaclient/bin" and on a Windows
host is "C:\Program Files\SafeNet\LunaClient".
Alternatively, the SO may initialize the Luna T7 using LunaSH. This requires SSH on the host device.
Using SSH, log into the appliance as the appliance administrator. From a command prompt, enter the
following:
ssh admin@<ip>
To initialize the module (via either LunaCM or LunaSH), invoke the "HSM Initialize" service by entering
hsm init -label <label> -password <password> -domain <domain> [ -
initwithped || -initwithpwd ]
<label> sets HSM’s label. <password> sets the HSM’s SO password. <domain> sets the HSM’s
domain (for use with cloning)
Next, configure the module to enforce FIPS requirements. If using LunaCM enter:
hsm changeHSMPolicy –policy 12 –value 0
If using LunaSH enter:
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hsm changePolicy –policy 12 –value 0
Finally, verify that the FIPS policy has been set. If using LunaCM enter:
hsm showInfo
If using LunaSH enter:
hsm show
In the information provided by the command, look for:
*** The HSM is in FIPS 140-3 approved operation mode. ***
If the Luna T7 does not report the above, it has not been properly configured, and will be
operating in a manner that is compliant with this security policy.
Refer to the Luna HSM documentation more information on LunaCM or LunaSH.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Administrator guidance is provided in the following documents
• Configuration Guide
• Luna HSM Administration Guide
These documents, stored on digital media, are provided to customers with the product and are also
available on the Customer Support Portal at https://support.thalestct.com.
11.2.1 PED Key management
Any PED Key, once data has been written to it, is an Identification and Authentication device and must be
safeguarded accordingly by the administrative or operations staff responsible for the operation of the
module within the customer’s environment.
For specific guidance refer to the PED Key Management section of the Luna HSM Administration Guide.
This guidance includes:
• Determining how many PED keys are needed
• Keeping a log of the operators in possession of PED keys
• Proper labelling of PED keys and HSM servers
• How to update PED keys
• Using M-of-N
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
In addition to the documentation provided for administrator guidance, other documentation, also provided
with the product and available on the Customer Support Portal at https://support.thalestct.com include the
following:
• Installation Guide
• LunaCM Command Reference Guide
• LunaSH Command Reference Guide
• SDK Reference Guide
• Utilities Reference Guide
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11.6 End of Life
At the End of Life for the module, it is recommended that the HSM Factory Reset service be employed by
use of the LunaCM ‘hsm factoryreset’ command. This will delete all HSM identities (including the SO), all
users, keys, and data objects and sets all HSM settings and policies to factory default values.
It is further recommended that the Decommission input to the Luna T7 be asserted to zeroize nonvolatile
memory.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
Timing attacks against the module are mitigated through the use of a hardware accelerator for modular
exponentiation operations. The use of these hardware acceleration functions ensures that all RSA
signature operations complete in very nearly the same time, therefore making the analysis of timing
differences irrelevant. The RSA blinding configuration option may be selected to mitigate this type of
attack.