© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ
SUSE LLC
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
4516 Seton Center Pkwy, Suite 250
Austin, TX 78759 Document version: 1.2
www.atsec.com Last update: 2026-09-06
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 2 of 57
Table of Contents
1 General.......................................................................................................................................................................7
1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................................7
1.2 Security Levels....................................................................................................................................................7
1.3 Additional Information......................................................................................................................................8
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................................................9
2.1 Description .........................................................................................................................................................9
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ................................................................10
2.3 Excluded Components .....................................................................................................................................11
2.4 Modes of Operation..........................................................................................................................................12
2.5 Algorithms........................................................................................................................................................12
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................................................16
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ......................................................................................................................18
2.7.1 AES XTS ....................................................................................................................................................18
2.7.2 AES GCM IV .............................................................................................................................................19
2.7.3 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurances .................................................................................................................19
2.8 RBG and Entropy .............................................................................................................................................19
2.9 Key Generation ................................................................................................................................................20
2.10 Key Establishment..........................................................................................................................................20
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................................................20
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces...........................................................................................................................21
3.1 Ports and Interfaces..........................................................................................................................................21
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................................................................22
4.1 Authentication Methods..................................................................................................................................22
4.2 Roles..................................................................................................................................................................22
4.3 Approved Services............................................................................................................................................22
4.4 Non-Approved Services ...................................................................................................................................27
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded...............................................................................................................27
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................................................29
5.1 Integrity Techniques........................................................................................................................................29
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 3 of 57
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................................................29
6 Operational Environment .......................................................................................................................................30
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements .......................................................................................30
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions..........................................................................................................30
7 Physical Security .....................................................................................................................................................31
8 Non-Invasive Security.............................................................................................................................................33
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..........................................................................................................34
9.1 Storage Areas....................................................................................................................................................34
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods .............................................................................................................................34
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods.................................................................................................................................34
9.4 SSPs...................................................................................................................................................................35
9.5 Transitions........................................................................................................................................................38
10 Self-Tests................................................................................................................................................................39
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................39
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................................................39
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ......................................................................................................................45
10.4 Error States .....................................................................................................................................................48
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests....................................................................................................................49
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................................................................50
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures......................................................................................50
11.2 Administrator Guidance ................................................................................................................................50
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance........................................................................................................................51
11.4 Design and Rules............................................................................................................................................51
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................................................51
11.6 End of Life ......................................................................................................................................................51
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks..................................................................................................................................52
Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................53
Appendix B. References .............................................................................................................................................55
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 4 of 57
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 5 of 57
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) .............................10
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ............................................................10
Table 4: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware.......................................................................11
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ..........................................11
Table 6: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................................................12
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - ................................................................................................................................14
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - [EVM]....................................................................................................................15
Table 9: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms......................................................................................................................15
Table 10: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms.................................................................................................16
Table 11: Security Function Implementations..........................................................................................................18
Table 12: Entropy Certificates ...................................................................................................................................19
Table 13: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................................................19
Table 14: Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................................................21
Table 15: Roles............................................................................................................................................................22
Table 16: Approved Services......................................................................................................................................27
Table 17: Non-Approved Services .............................................................................................................................27
Table 18: Storage Areas ..............................................................................................................................................34
Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods .......................................................................................................................34
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods...........................................................................................................................35
Table 21: SSP Table 1 .................................................................................................................................................37
Table 22: SSP Table 2 .................................................................................................................................................38
Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests.........................................................................................................................39
Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................45
Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information......................................................................................................45
Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information .............................................................................................................48
Table 27: Error States .................................................................................................................................................48
List of Figures
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 6 of 57
Figure 1: Block Diagram.............................................................................................................................................10
Figure 2: IBM Mainframe Computer.........................................................................................................................31
Figure 3: IBM® Telum™ Processor Unit Chip .........................................................................................................32
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 7 of 57
1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for software version 1.2 and 1.3 and hardware
version IBM z/16 of the SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules
under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in
FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1
module.
This Non-Proprietary Security Policy may be reproduced and distributed, but only whole and intact and
including this notice. Other documentation is proprietary to their authors.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 8 of 57
1.3 Additional Information
In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for
consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security
Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy
was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also
supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and
resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 9 of 57
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a software-
hybrid module that provides general purpose cryptographic algorithms to applications running in the user space
of the underlying operating system through a C language application program interface (API).
The module is composed of a software library and a Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions
(CPACF). The software library provides the API and a subset of the cryptographic algorithms. The CPACF is a
hardware device that is part of the IBM® Telum™ processor. It provides additional cryptographic algorithms
implemented in hardware. In addition, the module uses a bound OpenSSL module, which provides additional
algorithms. The Libica module is tested with versions 1.2 and 1.3 which bound to “SUSE Linux Enterprise
OpenSSL 1 Cryptographic Module” with certificate 5238 and “SUSE Linux Enterprise OpenSSL 3 Cryptographic
Module” with certificate 5096, respectively.
Module Type: Software-hybrid
Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand
Cryptographic Boundary:
The blue dashed line in the block diagram below shows the cryptographic boundary of the module and its
interfaces with the operational environment. The cryptographic boundary of the module is composed of the
Libica shared library, the .hmac check file for this shared library, and the CPACF hardware implementation
provided by the IBM® Telum™ processor that is installed in the TOEPP where the module is executing.
The TOEPP of the module of the module is the IBM Mainframe on which the IBM® Telum™ processor is
installed.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 10 of 57
Figure 1: Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File Name Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
libica-
openssl1_1.so.4.3.1,
.libica-
openssl1_1.so.4.3.1.hmac
1.2 N/A HMAC-SHA-256
libica.so.4.3.1,
.libica.so.4.3.1.hmac
1.3 N/A HMAC-SHA-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating System Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15
SP6
IBM z16
A01
IBM®
Telum(TM)
Yes N/A 1.2
1.3
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 11 of 57
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
Model and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
IBM® Telum(TM) IBM z16 N/A IBM® Telum(TM) CPACF
Table 4: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating System Hardware Platform
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15SP6 IBM LinuxONE III Model LT1 on z15
SUSE Linux Enterprise Base Container Image 15SP6 IBM LinuxONE III Model LT1 on z15
SUSE Linux Enterprise Base Container Image 15SP6 IBM LinuxONE III Model LT1 QEMU VM on z15
SUSE Linux Enterprise Base Container Image 15SP6 IBM z16 A01 on IBM® Telum(TM)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15SP6 IBM LinuxONE III Model LT1 QEMU VM on z15
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15SP7 IBM LinuxONE III Model LT1 on z15
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15SP7 IBM z16 A01 on IBM® Telum(TM)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Base Container Image 15SP7 IBM LinuxONE III Model LT1 on z15
SUSE Linux Enterprise Base Container Image 15SP7 IBM z16 A01 on IBM® Telum(TM)
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
The module is considered to maintain compliance with the FIPS 140-3 validation for SUSE products when
operating on any general-purpose platform/processor that supports the SUSE Linux Enterprise Server operating
system per the vendor affirmation from SUSE based on the allowance FIPS 140-3 management manual
[FIPS140-3_MM] section 7.9.1 bullet 1 a i).
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated
keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no components excluded from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 12 of 57
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
Automatically entered
whenever an approved service is
requested
Approved Equivalent to the indicator of the requested
service (the API for the requested service
returns value 0)
Non-
approved
mode
Automatically entered
whenever a non-approved
service is requested
Non-
Approved
Equivalent to the indicator of the requested
service (the API for the requested service
returns non zero value)
Table 6: Modes List and Description
After passing all pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests executed on start-up, the
module automatically transitions to the approved mode. No operator intervention is required to reach this
point. The module operates in the approved mode of operation by default and can only transition into the non-
approved mode by calling one of the non-approved services listed in the Non-Approved Services table of the
Security Policy.
In the operational state, the module accepts service requests from calling applications through its logical
interfaces. At any point in the operational state, a calling application can end its process, causing the module to
end its operation.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on the services
requested by the operator. The status indicator of the mode of operation is equivalent to the indicator of the
service that was requested.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6712 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A6712 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8 A6712 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 13 of 57
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CMAC A6712 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-CTR A6712 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A6712 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6659, A6711,
A6712
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A6659, A6711,
A6712
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-OFB A6712 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
A6712 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38E
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6712 Component - Yes FIPS 186-5
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A6712 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 14 of 57
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
SHA2-384 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/224 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA3-224 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-256 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A6712 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHAKE-128 A6712 Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHAKE-256 A6712 Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
Table 7: Approved Algorithms -
[EVM]
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
Counter DRBG A5397,
A5659
Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No, Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A5883,
A6103
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 15 of 57
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA2-256 A5883,
A6103
Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5)
A5883 Key Generation Mode -
probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5)
A6103 Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
SHA2-256 A5883,
A6103
Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - [EVM]
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
Asymmetric Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG)
Key
type:Asymmetric
Provided by:[EVM]
N/A SP 800-133 Rev. 2, section
4, example 1
Table 9: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
AES GCM with external IV
(Libica)
Authenticated symmetric encryption
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 16 of 57
Name Use and Function
RSA (Libica) Signature generation, signature verification, encryption, and decryption
primitives
DRBG (Libica) Random Number Generation service
ECDSA (Libica) Signature verification component
Table 10: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
The table above lists all non-approved cryptographic algorithms of the module employed by the non-approved
services of the Non-Approved Services table in Section 4.4 Non-Approved Services.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Symmetric
encryption
BC-UnAuth Encrypt a message
with AES
AES-CBC: (A6712)
AES-CFB128:
(A6712)
AES-CFB8:
(A6712)
AES-CTR: (A6712)
AES-ECB: (A6712)
AES-OFB: (A6712)
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A6712)
Symmetric
decryption
BC-UnAuth Decrypt a message
with AES
AES-CBC: (A6712)
AES-CFB128:
(A6712)
AES-CFB8:
(A6712)
AES-CTR: (A6712)
AES-ECB: (A6712)
AES-OFB: (A6712)
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A6712)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 17 of 57
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Authenticated
encryption
BC-Auth Encrypt and
authenticate a
message with AES
AES-GCM: (A6659,
A6711, A6712)
Authenticated
decryption
BC-Auth Decrypt and
authenticate a
message with AES
AES-GCM: (A6659,
A6711, A6712)
Message
authentication
with AES
MAC Authenticate a
message with AES
AES-GMAC:
(A6659, A6711,
A6712)
AES-CMAC:
(A6712)
Digital signature
generation
component with
ECDSA
DigSig-SigGen Generate a
signature using
ECDSA
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6712)
Shared secret
computation with
ECDH
KAS-SSC Compute a shared
secret using ECDH
Compliance:FIPS
140-3 IG D.F,
Scenario 2(1)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6712)
Message digest SHA
XOF
Compute the digest
of a message using
SHA or XOF
functions
SHA-1: (A6712)
SHA2-224: (A6712)
SHA2-256: (A6712)
SHA2-384: (A6712)
SHA2-512: (A6712)
SHA2-512/224:
(A6712)
SHA2-512/256:
(A6712)
SHA3-224: (A6712)
SHA3-256: (A6712)
SHA3-384: (A6712)
SHA3-512: (A6712)
SHAKE-128:
(A6712)
SHAKE-256:
(A6712)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 18 of 57
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Random number
generation
DRBG [EVM]Generate
random numbers
Use:Internal
Provided by:Bound
OpenSSL module
Counter DRBG:
(A5397, A5659)
Key pair generation
with ECDSA
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
[EVM]Generate a
key pair using
ECDSA
Mode:FIPS 186-5,
Section A.2.2 -
Rejection Sampling
Provided by:Bound
OpenSSL module
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5883, A6103)
Key pair generation
with RSA
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
[EVM]Generate a
key pair using RSA
Mode:FIPS 186-5,
Section A.1.6 -
Probable Primes
Based on Auxiliary
Probable
Provided by:Bound
OpenSSL module
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A5883, A6103)
Message
authentication
with HMAC
MAC [EVM]Authenticate
a message using
HMAC
Provided by:Bound
OpenSSL module
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A5883, A6103)
SHA2-256: (A5883,
A6103)
Table 11: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
2.7.1 AES XTS
The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, as
specified in SP 800-38E. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2²⁰ AES
blocks, that is 16MB of data.
To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check that ensures, before performing any
cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical. As the module does
not generate symmetric keys, the check is performed when keys are input the service APIs.
Key_1 and Key_2 shall be generated and/or established independently according to the rules for component
symmetric keys from NIST SP 800-133rev2, Sec. 6.3.
The XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. It shall not be
used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 19 of 57
2.7.2 AES GCM IV
The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with section 8.2.2 of SP 800-38D and IG C.H scenario 2 of the
FIPS 140-3 IG, in which the GCM IV is generated internally at its entirety randomly. The DRBG provided by
the OpenSSL bound module, compliant with SP 800-90A Rev. 1, is used for generating the IV of 96 bits. The
DRBG is fully seeded with entropy provided by the non-physical entropy source that is not within the
cryptographic boundary of the module but within its physical perimeter.
2.7.3 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurances
To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56A Rev. 3, the operator must use the module
in the context of the TLS or SSH protocols. Additionally, the module’s approved key pair generation service (see
Approved Services table in Section 4.3 Approved Services) must be used to generate ephemeral EC Diffie-
Hellman key pairs. As part of this service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of
the generated public key. Alternatively key pairs may be obtained from another FIPS-validated module.
The module’s shared secret computation service will internally perform the full public key validation of the
peer public key, complying with Section 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56A Rev. 3.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E177 SUSE LLC
E209 SUSE LLC
Table 12: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
SUSE OpenSSL CPU
Time Jitter RNG
Entropy Source
Non-
Physical
SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server 15 SP6 on IBM®
TelumTM
256
bits
256 bits AES-256-CTR-DRBG
(A5397); SHA3-256
(A5411)
SUSE OpenSSL1 CPU
Time Jitter RNG
Entropy Source
Non-
Physical
SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server 15 SP6 on IBM®
TelumTM
256
bits
256 bits AES-256-CTR-DRBG
(A5555); SHA3-256
(A5411)
Table 13: Entropy Sources
The Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) is provided by the bound OpenSSL module [EVM]. The
DRBG is based on SP 800-90A Rev. 1 for the creation of RSA and ECDSA keys in OpenSSL, and for the random
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 20 of 57
generation of the IV used in AES GCM and the k value used in ECDSA signature generation component. The
use of the DRBG provided by the bound OpenSSL module is only internal to the Libica module. Notice that the
Libica module implements a separate DRBG for providing a random generation number service, but this
algorithm implementation, as well as the service, are considered non-approved.
The DRBG is initialized during initialization of the bounded OpenSSL module; this module loads the DRBG by
default using the CTR_DRBG mechanism with AES-256, with derivation function, and without prediction
resistance.
The bound OpenSSL module uses an SP 800-90B compliant entropy source specified in the Table above. This
entropy source is located within the physical perimeter, but outside of the cryptographic boundary of the
module as well as the EVM. The module obtains 384 bits to seed the DRBG, and 256 bits to reseed it, sufficient
to provide a DRBG with 256 bits of security strength.
2.9 Key Generation
For generating RSA, ECDSA keys, the bound OpenSSL module implements asymmetric key generation services
compliant with FIPS 186-5. A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is directly
obtained from the SP 800-90A Rev. 1 OpenSSL’s DRBG.
The public and private keys used in EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation are generated internally by
the bound OpenSSL module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with FIPS 186-5 and SP 800-
56A Rev. 3.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module implements shared secret computation method as listed in the Security Function Implementations
table in Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not implement any industry protocols.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 21 of 57
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input API input parameters for data.
N/A Data Output API output parameters for data.
N/A Control
Input
API function calls, API input parameters for control input,
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled control file, ICAPATH environment variable.
N/A Status
Output
API return codes, API output parameters for status output.
N/A Power N/A
Table 14: Ports and Interfaces
The logical interfaces are the APIs through which the applications request services. These logical interfaces are
logically separated from each other by the API design. The module does not implement a control output
interface.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 22 of 57
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The module does not support authentication methods.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role Crypto Officer None
Table 15: Roles
The module does not support multiple concurrent operators.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Symmetric
encryption
Perform
AES
encryption
ica_aes_* return 0 Plaintex
t, AES
key, IV
Cipherte
xt
Symmetric
encryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES key:
W,E
Symmetric
decryption
Perform
AES
decryption
ica_aes_* return 0 Cipherte
xt, AES
key, IV
Plaintex
t
Symmetric
decryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES key:
W,E
Authenticated
encryption
Perform
authentica
ted AES
encryption
ica_aes_gcm_kma_*
return 0
Plaintex
t, AES
key, IV
Cipherte
xt, MAC
tag
Authentica
ted
encryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES key:
W,E
Authenticated
decryption
Perform
authentica
ted AES
decryption
ica_aes_gcm_kma_*
return 0
Cipherte
xt, MAC
tag, AES
key, IV
Plaintex
t or Fail
Authentica
ted
decryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES key:
W,E
Digital
signature
Generate
ECDSA
signature
ica_ecdsa_sign returns 0 Hashed
message,
ECDSA
Signatur
e
Digital
signature
generation
Crypto
Officer
- ECDSA
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 23 of 57
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
generation
component
private
key
component
with
ECDSA
Random
number
generation
private
key: W,E
Shared secret
computation
EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
computati
on
ica_ecdh_derive_secret
returns 0
ECDH
private
key,
ECDH
public
key
from
peer
ECDH
shared
secret
Shared
secret
computatio
n with
ECDH
Crypto
Officer
- EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: W,E
- EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
W,E
- EC
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret: G,R
Message digest Compute
SHA or
XOF
hashes
ica_sha* return 0 Message Message
digest
Message
digest
Crypto
Officer
Message
authentication
code (MAC)
with AES
Compute
AES-based
CMAC or
GMAC
ica_aes_gcm_kma_*
return 0
Message,
AES key
MAC tag Message
authenticat
ion with
AES
Crypto
Officer
- AES key:
W,E
[EVM]Asymm
etric key
generation
Generate
RSA or
ECDSA
key pairs
relying on
the bound
ica_ec_key_generate or
ica_rsa_key_generate_mo
d_expo returns 0
RSA
modulus
length
or EC
curve
RSA or
ECDSA
key pair
Key pair
generation
with
ECDSA
Key pair
Crypto
Officer
-
[EVM]Bou
nd-
module-
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 24 of 57
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
OpenSSL
module
generation
with RSA
generated
EC public
key: G,R
-
[EVM]Bou
nd-
module-
generated
EC private
key: G,R
-
[EVM]Bou
nd-
module-
generated
RSA public
key: G,R
-
[EVM]Bou
nd-
module-
generated
RSA
private
key: G,R
Module
installation
and
configuration
Install and
configure
module
Implicit (always
approved)
None Success
or Fail
None Crypto
Officer
Show status Show
module
status
Implicit (always
approved)
None Module
status
None Crypto
Officer
Show module
name and
version
Show
module
name and
version
Implicit (always
approved)
None Module
name
and
version
None Crypto
Officer
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 25 of 57
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Self-tests Perform
self-tests
Implicit (always
approved)
None Pass or
Fail
Random
number
generation
Authentica
ted
encryption
Authentica
ted
decryption
Message
authenticat
ion with
AES
Message
authenticat
ion with
HMAC
Symmetric
encryption
Symmetric
decryption
Digital
signature
generation
component
with
ECDSA
Shared
secret
computatio
n with
ECDH
Message
digest
Crypto
Officer
Zeroization Zeroize
CSPs
Implicit (always
approved)
Context
containi
ng SSPs
None None Crypto
Officer
- AES key:
Z
- ECDSA
private
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 26 of 57
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
key: Z
- EC
Diffie-
Hellman
private
key: Z
- EC
Diffie-
Hellman
public key:
Z
- EC
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret: Z
-
[EVM]Bou
nd-
module-
generated
EC public
key: Z
-
[EVM]Bou
nd-
module-
generated
EC private
key: Z
-
[EVM]Bou
nd-
module-
generated
RSA public
key: Z
-
[EVM]Bou
nd-
module-
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 27 of 57
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
generated
RSA
private
key: Z
Table 16: Approved Services
The module provides services to operators that assume the available role. All services are described in detail in
the API documentation (manual pages). The convention below applies when specifying the access permissions
(types) that the service has for each SSP.
• Generate (G): The module generates or derives the SSP.
• Read (R): The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
• Write (W): The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• Execute (E): The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Zeroize (Z): The module zeroizes the SSP.
• N/A: The module does not access any SSP or key during its operation.
The indicator that a service is approved is the return value of the API(s) that are used to invoke the service. A
return value of “0” indicates that the service is approved. Any other return value (e.g., EPERM, EACCESS, or
EINVAL) indicates that the invoked service is non-approved.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
AES GCM with
external IV
Perform authenticated encryption with an
externally provided IV
AES GCM with external
IV (Libica)
CO
RSA Sign/verify and encrypt/decrypt primitives RSA (Libica) CO
DRBG Random Number Generation service DRBG (Libica) CO
ECDSA Signature verification component ECDSA (Libica) CO
Table 17: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not load external software or firmware.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 28 of 57
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 29 of 57
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated at run time with
the HMAC value stored in the .hmac file that was computed at build time for each software component of the
module. If the HMAC values do not match, the test fails and the module enters the error state. The module uses
the HMAC-SHA2-256 algorithm provided by the OpenSSL bound module. The MAC key is hardcoded in the
module.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests.
The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand which includes the pre-operational
tests (i.e., integrity test) and cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). This service can be invoked by using
the ica_fips_powerup_tests() API function call. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are
not available, and no data output or input is possible.
In order to verify whether the self-tests have succeeded and the module is in the Operational state, the calling
application may invoke the ica_fips_status().
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 30 of 57
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
How Requirements are Satisfied:
Any SSPs contained within the module are protected by the process isolation and memory separation
mechanisms, and only the module has control over these SSPs.
If properly installed, the operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that
ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control
over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented.
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
The module shall be installed as stated in Section 11 Life-Cycle Assurance.
Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace, userspace live patching, as well as other
tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the
operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a
non-validated operational environment.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 31 of 57
7 Physical Security
The Libica module inherits the physical characteristics of the host running it; the module has no physical
security characteristics of its own. Figure 2 illustrates the IBM System z16 mainframe computer that represents
the testing platform, that includes the hardware component of the cryptographic module.
Figure 2: IBM Mainframe Computer
The Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions (CPACF) is part of the CoProcessor Unit (CoP)
integrated in the IBM® Telum™ processor, and offers full implementation of several algorithms; this module
uses the processor algorithm implementations (PAI) for AES, SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3, SHAKE, ECDSA signature
generation and verification, and ECDH shared secret computation. The module is a multi-chip standalone with
a physical security level of 1. This security level is satisfied by the device (CoP) being included within the
cryptographic boundary of the module and the device being made of production grade components that include
standard passivation techniques. The module does not implement a maintenance access interface.
With regards to the CPACF physical design, each microprocessor (core) on the 8-core chip (see Figure 3) has its
own dedicated CoP, which implements the crypto instructions and provides the hardware compression
function. The compression unit is integrated with the CPACF, benefiting from combining (sharing) the use of
buffers and interfaces.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 32 of 57
Figure 3: IBM® Telum™ Processor Unit Chip
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 33 of 57
8 Non-Invasive Security
This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanisms, and therefore this section is not
applicable.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 34 of 57
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Temporary storage for SSPs used by the module as part of service execution. SSPs are
stored until they are zeroized by the operator (using a zeroization call or removing
power from the module) or zeroized automatically
Dynamic
Table 18: Storage Areas
The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in
plaintext form.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
API input
parameters
Operator calling
application
(TOEPP)
Cryptographic
module
Plaintext Manual Electronic
API output
parameters
Cryptographic
module
Operator calling
application
(TOEPP)
Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Zeroized by
calling
application
Calling application zeroizes
the SSPs contained within
the cipher handle
By calling the appropriate zeroization
functions
By calling the
cipher related
zeroization API
Automatic The module zeorizes
internal values used to store
SSPs and calls OpenSSL
Memory occupied by SSPs is overwritten
with zeroes, which renders the SSP
values irretrievable. The successful
N/A
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 35 of 57
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
APIs to zeroize OpenSSL
SSP structures
completion of the running service
indicates that zeroization has completed
Module Reset De-allocates the volatile
memory used to store SSPs
Volatile memory used by the module is
overwritten within nanoseconds when
power is removed
By unloading
and reloading
the module
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods
For those SSPs that are either imported or exported, it is the responsibility of the calling application to zeroize
them once they are no longer utilized.
Internal values to store SSPs are zeroized automatically before returning the control to the calling application.
Zeroization is performed by overwriting the memory with zeroes.
For services implemented in the bound OpenSSL module, the Libica module calls internally the appropriate
zeroization functions provided by the bound module (e.g. OPENSSL_cleanse) before returning to the calling
application. The zeroization functions overwrite the memory occupied by SSPs with “zeros” and deallocate the
memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system call.
The completion of a zeroization routine will indicate that a zeroization procedure succeeded. Also, module
reset can zeroize all SSPs for both the module and the OpenSSL bound module.
All data output is inhibited during zeroization.
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
AES key AES key
input to the
module
128, 192,
256 bits -
128, 192,
256 bits
Symmetric
key - CSP
Symmetric
encryption
Symmetric
decryption
Authenticated
encryption
Authenticated
decryption
Message
authentication
with AES
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 36 of 57
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
ECDSA private
key
ECDSA
private key
input to the
module
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
Private key
- CSP
Digital
signature
generation
component
with ECDSA
EC Diffie-
Hellman
private key
EC Diffie-
Hellman
private key
input to the
module
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
Private key
- CSP
Shared secret
computation
with ECDH
EC Diffie-
Hellman public
key
EC Diffie-
Hellman
public key
input to the
module
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
Public key
- PSP
Shared secret
computation
with ECDH
EC Diffie-
Hellman shared
secret
EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared secret
established
by the
module
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
Shared secret
computation
with ECDH
[EVM]Bound-
module-
generated EC
public key
EC public
key
generated by
the bound
OpenSSL
module
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
Public key
- PSP
Key pair
generation
with
ECDSA
[EVM]Bound-
module-
generated EC
private key
EC private
key
generated by
the bound
OpenSSL
module
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128,
192, 256
bits
Private key
- CSP
Key pair
generation
with
ECDSA
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 37 of 57
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
[EVM]Bound-
module-
generated RSA
public key
RSA public
key
generated by
the bound
OpenSSL
module
2048,
3072,
4096 bits
- 112,
128, 149
bits
Public key
- PSP
Key pair
generation
with RSA
[EVM]Bound-
module-
generated RSA
private key
RSA private
key
generated by
the bound
OpenSSL
module
2048,
3072,
4096 bits
- 112,
128, 149
bits
Private key
- CSP
Key pair
generation
with RSA
Table 21: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES key API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation
until cipher
handle is freed
Zeroized by
calling
application
Module Reset
ECDSA private
key
API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation
until cipher
handle is freed
Zeroized by
calling
application
Module Reset
EC Diffie-
Hellman private
key
API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation
until cipher
handle is freed
Zeroized by
calling
application
Module Reset
EC Diffie-Hellman
public key:Paired
With
EC Diffie-
Hellman public
key
API input
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation
until cipher
handle is freed
Zeroized by
calling
application
Module Reset
EC Diffie-Hellman
private key:Paired
With
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 38 of 57
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
EC Diffie-
Hellman shared
secret
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation
until cipher
handle is freed
Zeroized by
calling
application
Module Reset
EC Diffie-Hellman
private
key:Established By
EC Diffie-Hellman
public
key:Established By
[EVM]Bound-
module-generated
EC public key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation
until cipher
handle is freed
Zeroized by
calling
application
Automatic
Module Reset
[EVM]Bound-
module-generated
EC private
key:Paired With
[EVM]Bound-
module-generated
EC private key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation
until cipher
handle is freed
Zeroized by
calling
application
Automatic
Module Reset
[EVM]Bound-
module-generated
EC public key:Paired
With
[EVM]Bound-
module-generated
RSA public key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation
until cipher
handle is freed
Zeroized by
calling
application
Automatic
Module Reset
[EVM]Bound-
module-generated
RSA private
key:Paired With
[EVM]Bound-
module-generated
RSA private key
API output
parameters
RAM:Plaintext From service
invocation
until cipher
handle is freed
Zeroized by
calling
application
Automatic
Module Reset
[EVM]Bound-
module-generated
RSA public
key:Paired With
Table 22: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes,
starting January 1, 2031.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 39 of 57
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test Method Test Type Indicator Details
HMAC-SHA2-
256
SHA2-
256
MAC Tag
Verification
SW/FW
Integrity
Module becomes
operational
[EVM]
Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs the integrity test of the software component using HMAC-SHA2-256. The integrity test
uses the HMAC algorithm implemented in the bound OpenSSL module, which tests this algorithm as part of
the CASTs when loaded into memory and before Libica performs the pre-operational tests.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-ECB
(A6712) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-ECB
(A6712) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-CBC
(A6712) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-CBC
(A6712) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 40 of 57
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-OFB
(A6712) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-OFB
(A6712) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-CTR
(A6712) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-CTR
(A6712) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-GCM
(A6659) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-GCM
(A6711) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-GCM
(A6712) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-GCM
(A6659) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 41 of 57
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-GCM
(A6711) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-GCM
(A6712) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
(A6712) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
(A6712) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-CMAC
(A6712) -
Encryption
128-bit key,
encrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-CMAC
(A6712) -
Decryption
128-bit key,
decrypt
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message
authentication
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(A6712)
P-256 curve KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Shared secret
computation
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6712)
P-256 with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Digital signature
generation
component
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 42 of 57
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
SHA-1
(A6712)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SHA2-224
(A6712)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SHA2-256
(A5883)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
[EVM]Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
(performed by
bound
OpenSSL
module)
SHA2-256
(A6103)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
[EVM]Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
(performed by
bound
OpenSSL
module)
SHA2-256
(A6712)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SHA2-384
(A6712)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SHA2-512
(A6712)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 43 of 57
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
before the
integrity test
SHA3-224
(A6712)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SHA3-256
(A6712)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SHA3-384
(A6712)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SHA3-512
(A6712)
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
Message digest Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
Counter
DRBG
(A5397)
AES with 256-
bit key,
with/without
DF,
with/without
PR
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
[EVM]Instantiate;
Generate; Reseed
(compliant to SP 800-
90A Rev. 1 Section
11.3)
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
Counter
DRBG
(A5659)
AES with 256-
bit key,
with/without
DF,
with/without
PR
KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
[EVM]Instantiate;
Generate; Reseed
(compliant to SP 800-
90A Rev. 1 Section
11.3)
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5883)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
[EVM]Message
authentication code
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 44 of 57
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A6103)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module
becomes
operational
[EVM]Message
authentication code
Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5883)
SHA2-256 PCT PCT Key pair
generation
is successful
[EVM]Signature
generation and
verification
Key pair
generation
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6103)
SHA2-256 PCT PCT Key pair
generation
is successful
[EVM]Signature
generation and
verification
Key pair
generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5883)
PKCS#1 v1.5
with SHA2-256
PCT PCT Key pair
generation
is successful
[EVM]Signature
generation and
verification
Key pair
generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6103)
PKCS#1 v1.5
with SHA2-256
PCT PCT Key pair
generation
is successful
[EVM]Signature
generation and
verification
Key pair
generation
AES-CFB128
(A6712) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-CFB128
(A6712) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-CFB8
(A6712) -
Encryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, encrypt
KAT CAST module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
before the
integrity test
AES-CFB8
(A6712) -
Decryption
128, 192, 256-
bit key, decrypt
KAT CAST module
becomes
operational
Symmetric operation Test runs at
power-on
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 45 of 57
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
before the
integrity test
Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests
Data output through the data output interface is inhibited during the conditional self-tests. The module does
not return control to the calling application until the tests are completed. If any of these tests fails, the module
transitions to the error state (Section 10.4 Error States).
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256 MAC Tag
Verification
SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually
Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-ECB (A6712) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-ECB (A6712) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A6712)
- Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CBC (A6712)
- Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-OFB (A6712)
- Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-OFB (A6712)
- Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CTR (A6712)
- Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 46 of 57
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CTR (A6712)
- Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A6659)
- Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A6711)
- Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A6712)
- Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A6659)
- Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A6711)
- Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-GCM (A6712)
- Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
(A6712) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
(A6712) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CMAC
(A6712) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CMAC
(A6712) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A6712)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 47 of 57
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6712)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA-1 (A6712) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-224 (A6712) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A5883) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A6103) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256 (A6712) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-384 (A6712) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-512 (A6712) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA3-224 (A6712) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA3-256 (A6712) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA3-384 (A6712) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA3-512 (A6712) KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Counter DRBG
(A5397)
KAT CAST On Deman Manually
Counter DRBG
(A5659)
KAT CAST On Deman Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A5883)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A6103)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5883)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 48 of 57
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6103)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A5883)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6103)
PCT PCT On Demand Manually
AES-CFB128
(A6712) -
Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CFB128
(A6712) -
Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CFB8 (A6712)
- Encryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
AES-CFB8 (A6712)
- Decryption
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error Error state entered due
to self-test failure or
failure of the [EVM]
Failure of any CAST
Failure of any
integrity test
Bound OpenSSL
module transitions
to error state
Unload and
reload the
module
All cryptographic operations are
inhibited. Module does not load
or stops functioning.
Table 27: Error States
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 49 of 57
When the module fails any pre-operational self-test or conditional test, or when the bound OpenSSL module
transitions to any error state, the module will return an error code to indicate the error and will enter the Error
state. Any further cryptographic operation is inhibited. The calling application can obtain the module state by
calling the ica_fips_status() API function.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
On-Demand self-tests can be invoked by calling the ica_fips_powerup_tests() API function, which causes the
module to run the pre-operational tests again. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are
not available, and no data output or input is possible.
To verify whether the self-tests have succeeded, and the module is in the Operational state, the calling
application may invoke the ica_fips_status() API function.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 50 of 57
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
Before the packages specified in Section 11.2 are installed, the SUSE Linux Enterprise SP6 system must operate
in the FIPS validated configuration. This can be achieved by:
• Adding the fips=1 option to the kernel command line during the system installation. During the
software selection stage, do not install any third-party software.
• Switching the system into the FIPS validated configuration after the installation. Execute the fips-
mode-setup --enable command. Restart the system.
In both cases, the Crypto Officer must verify the system operates in the FIPS validated configuration by
executing the fips-mode-setup --check command, which should output “FIPS mode is enabled.”
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The module is distributed as part of the following RPM packages:
Version 1.2
libica4-openssl1_1-4.3.1-150600.4.25.1.s390x.rpm
Version 1.3
libica4-4.3.1-150600.4.25.1.s390x.rpm
After the installation of these RPM packages, the Crypto Officer must execute the “Show module name and
version” service by checking the outputs of the APIs described below.
For software version, the Crypto officer must check the output of the ica_get_build_version() API. The output
of this API must read:
Version 1.2
build: FIPS-SUSE-openssl1_1-4.3.1-150600.4.25.1
Version 1.3
build: FIPS-SUSE--4.3.1-150600.4.25.1
For hardware version, the Crypto officer must check the output of the ica_get_hw_info() API. The output of
this API must read:
• vendor_id: IBM/S390
• machine_type: 3931
This identifier corresponds to the IBM z16 A01 hardware with IBM® Telum™ processor.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 51 of 57
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
There is no administrator guidance.
11.4 Design and Rules
Not applicable.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
Not applicable.
11.6 End of Life
As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of unloading the
module. This will zeroize all SSPs in volatile memory. Then, if desired, the packages specified in Section11.2
can be uninstalled from the SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6 system.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 52 of 57
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not implement any mitigation mechanism.
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 53 of 57
Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CFB Cipher Feedback
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPACF Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
CVL Component Validation List
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EVP Envelope
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois Counter Mode
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 54 of 57
GMAC Galois Counter Mode Message Authentication Code
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PAI Processor Algorithm Implementation
PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test
PSP Public Security Parameter
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSC Shared Secret Computation
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
XOF Extendable Output Function
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 55 of 57
Appendix B. References
FIPS 140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf
FIPS 140-3 IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
18 April 2025
https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
August 2015
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4
FIPS 186-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
February 2023
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
May 2023
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.197-upd1
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.198-1
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
August 2015
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 56 of 57
SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38A
SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
May 2005
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38B
SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38A
SP 800-38E Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices
January 2010
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38E
SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
April 2018
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3
SP 800-90A Rev. 1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
Bit Generators
June 2015
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1
SP 800-90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation
January 2018
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90B
SUSE Linux Enterprise Libica Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 SUSE LLC/atsec information security corporation.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 57 of 57
SP 800-133 Rev. 2 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
June 2020
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-133r2