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Ruckus Wireless LLC
RUCKUS R770-US Access Point, R770-WW Access Point, R670-US Access Point,
R670-WW Access Point, T670-US Access Point, T670-WW Access Point and T670sn-
US Access Point
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................11
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................16
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................17
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................18
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................18
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................19
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................19
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................19
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................20
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................20
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................21
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................21
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................39
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................40
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status..............................................................................................40
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ........................................................................40
4.8 Additional Information......................................................................................................40
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................40
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................40
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................40
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................41
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................41
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................41
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................41
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals..............................................................................................41
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................46
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................46
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................46
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................46
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................46
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................47
9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................71
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................71
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................71
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................72
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................76
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................78
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................80
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................80
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................80
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................81
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................81
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................81
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 4: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus OpenSSL Crypto Implementation ...............................10
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus Kernel Crypto Implementation ....................................10
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 Hardware AES Engine for Ruckus R670-
US/WW, T670-US/WW, T670sn ...............................................................................................10
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 Hardware AES Engine for Ruckus T770-
US/WW.....................................................................................................................................10
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus Access Point TPM ......................................................11
Table 9: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................11
Table 10: Security Function Implementations............................................................................16
Table 11: Entropy Certificates...................................................................................................17
Table 12: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................18
Table 13: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................19
Table 14: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................21
Table 15: Roles.........................................................................................................................21
Table 16: Approved Services ....................................................................................................39
Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................41
Table 18: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................46
Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................46
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................47
Table 21: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................57
Table 22: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................71
Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................71
Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................76
Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................76
Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................78
Table 27: Error States...............................................................................................................80
List of Figures
Figure 1: RUCKUS R670-US Access Point, R670-WW Access Point ........................................ 6
Figure 2: RUCKUS R770-US Access Point, R770-WW Access Point ........................................ 6
Figure 3: RUCKUS T670-US Access Point, T670-WW Access Point......................................... 7
Figure 4: RUCKUS T670sn Access Point................................................................................... 7
Figure 5: R670-US/WW Top .....................................................................................................42
Figure 6: R670-US/WW Bottom ................................................................................................42
Figure 7: R770-US/WW Top .....................................................................................................43
Figure 8: R770-US/WW Bottom ................................................................................................43
Figure 9: T670-US/WW Top......................................................................................................44
Figure 10: T670-US/WW Bottom...............................................................................................44
Figure 11: T670sn Top..............................................................................................................45
Figure 12: T670sn Bottom.........................................................................................................45
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1 General
1.1 Overview
RUCKUS WiFi 7 access point portfolio comprises of indoor and outdoor APs that brings higher
capacity, efficiency, and performance to enterprises, distributed offices, and small businesses.
Ruckus WiFi 7 portfolio offers dual-band, dual-concurrent APs that support up to eight spatial
streams and tri-band, tri-concurrent APs that support up to eight spatial streams—eventually
twelve spatial streams on future models. Equipped with OFDMA and MU-MIMO capabilities, the
APs efficiently manage up to 1024 client connections with increased capacity, improved
coverage and performance in ultra-high dense environments.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
This is Ruckus Wireless LLC. non-proprietary security policy for RUCKUS R670-US Access
Point, R670-WW Access Point, R770-US Access Point, R770-WW Access Point, T670-US
Access Point, T670-WW Access Point and T670sn-US Access Point (hereinafter referred to as
Module), version 7.1.1.3. The following details how this module meets the security requirements
of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 2 hardware cryptographic
module. The module is operated in a limited operational environment.
The Module provides the connection point between wireless client hosts and the wired network.
Once authenticated as authenticated nodes on the wired infrastructure, the Module provides the
encryption service on the wireless network between themselves and the wireless client via the
802.11i secure service. Then, the Module tunnels the wireless client data via IPsec/IKEv2 to the
RUCKUS Data Plane. The Module also communicates directly with the wireless controller for
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management purposes. The management traffic between the Module and RUCKUS Wireless
Controller is protected by SSHv2 secure tunnel.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire chassis unit’s physical perimeter
encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and
shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. The US and WW Access Point
versions share the same exterior appearance. Where they differ is in the allowed frequencies
and power levels allowed in the regulatory domain they are configured to operate in.
Figure 1: RUCKUS R670-US Access Point, R670-WW Access Point
Figure 2: RUCKUS R770-US Access Point, R770-WW Access Point
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Figure 3: RUCKUS T670-US Access Point, T670-WW Access Point
Figure 4: RUCKUS T670sn Access Point
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
R670-US Access Point 9F1-R670-US00 7.1.1.3 QCA IPQ5332
R670-WW Access Point 9F1-R670-WW00 7.1.1.3 QCA IPQ5332
R770-US Access Point 9F1-R770-US00 7.1.1.3 QCA IPQ9570
R770-WW Access Point 9F1-R770-WW00 7.1.1.3 QCA IPQ9570
T670-US Access Point 9F1-T670-US01 7.1.1.3 QCA IPQ5332
T670-WW Access Point 9F1-T670-WW00 7.1.1.3 QCA IPQ5332
T670sn-US Access Point 9F1-T670-US51 7.1.1.3 QCA IPQ5332
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
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N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved Mode
of Operation
The module is always in the approved
mode of operation after initial
operations are performed.
Approved Approved mode
indicator: "FIPS mode
is enabled."
Table 3: Modes List and Description
After the Module is configured in the Approved mode of operation as outlined in Section 11 of
this document, it will be ready to operate in the Approved mode. The Module does not claim the
implementation of a degraded mode operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Ruckus OpenSSL Crypto Implementation
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6768 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A6768 Key Length - 128 SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A6768 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6768 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A6768 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6768 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6768 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1 A6768 Key Length - Key Length: 160 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6768 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A6768 Key Length - Key Length: 512 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6768 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6768 Domain Parameter Generation Methods -
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, MODP-2048, MODP-
3072, MODP-6144, MODP-8192
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF IKEv2
(CVL)
A6768 Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-
Hellman Shared Secret Length: 2048-8192
Increment 8
Derived Keying Material Length - Derived
Keying Material Length: 1056-3072 Increment 8
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SNMP
(CVL)
A6768 Password Length - Password Length: 64, 128 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SP800-108 A6768 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 256
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL) A6768 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6768 Modulo - 3072 FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6768 Modulo - 3072 FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6768 Modulo - 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A6768 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-6144,
MODP-8192
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A6768 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA2-256 A6768 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6768 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6768 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A6768 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
TLS v1.3 KDF
(CVL)
A6768 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
KDF Running Modes - DHE
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus OpenSSL Crypto Implementation
Ruckus Kernel Crypto Implementation
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6769 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192
SP 800-38A
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6769 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A6769 Key Length - Key Length: 384 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A6769 Key Length - Key Length: 512 FIPS 198-1
SHA2-256 A6769 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6769 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6769 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 5: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus Kernel Crypto Implementation
Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 Hardware AES Engine for Ruckus R670-US/WW, T670-US/WW, T670sn
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CCM A3235 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-GCM A3235 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 Hardware AES Engine for Ruckus R670-US/WW,
T670-US/WW, T670sn
Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 Hardware AES Engine for Ruckus T770-US/WW
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CCM A3239 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38C
AES-GCM A3239 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 Hardware AES Engine for Ruckus T770-US/WW
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Ruckus Access Point TPM
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A8586 Modulo - 3072
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - Ruckus Access Point TPM
As the Module can only be operated in the Approved mode of operation, and any algorithms not
listed in the tables above will be rejected by the module while in the approved mode, the options
defined in SP 800-140B for the following categories are missing from this document.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A The cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for
asymmetric keys as per section 4 example 1
in SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) and FIPS
140-3 IG D.H. A seed (i.e., the random value)
used in asymmetric key generation is a direct
output from SP800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG
(A6768)
Table 9: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-ECC
Key Agreement
used for SSHv2
service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
IG : IG D.F
Scenario 2, Path
2, Split Key
Confirmation :
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6768)
Curves: P-256,
P-384, P-521
KDF SSH:
(A6768)
Counter DRBG:
(A6768)
CKG: ()
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
No Key
Derivation : IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-ECC
Key Agreement
used for
TLSv1.2 service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128
bits of security
strength IG : IG
D.F Scenario 2,
Path 2, Split Key
Confirmation :
No Key
Derivation : IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6768)
Curve: P-256
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A6768)
Counter DRBG:
(A6768)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-ECC
Key Agreement
used for
TLSv1.3 service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128
bits of security
strength IG : IG
D.F Scenario 2,
Path 2, Split Key
Confirmation :
No Key
Derivation : IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6768)
Curve: P-256
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A6768)
Counter DRBG:
(A6768)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-ECC
Key Agreement
used for IKEv2
service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 192
bits of security
strength IG : IG
D.F Scenario 2,
Path 2, Split Key
Confirmation :
No Key
Derivation : IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6768)
Curve: P-384
KDF IKEv2:
(A6768)
Counter DRBG:
(A6768)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-FFC
Key Agreement
used for IKEv2
service
Caveat: Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 112
and 200 bits of
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6768)
Domain
Parameter
Generation:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
security strength
IG : IG D.F Path
2, Scenario 2,
Split Key
Confirmation :
No Key
Derivation : IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
MODP-2048,
MODP-3072,
MODP6144,
MODP8192
Safe Primes Key
Generation:
(A6768)
KDF IKEv2:
(A6768)
Counter DRBG:
(A6768)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KTS (SSHv2
with AES and
HMAC)
KTS-Unwrap KTS via SSHv2
service by using
AES and HMAC
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG
D.G:Approved
"Combination"
method
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
security strength
AES-CTR:
(A6768)
Key Length:
128, 256
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6768)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6768)
SHA2-256:
(A6768)
SHA2-512:
(A6768)
KTS (SSHv2
with AES-GCM)
KTS-Unwrap KTS via SSHv2
service by using
AES-GCM
Standard:SP
800-38F
IG
D.G:Approved
"Authenticated"
method
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
security strength
AES-GCM:
(A6768)
Key Length:
128, 256
RSA KeyGen
(TLSv1.2 and
TLSv1.3)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
RSA KeyGen for
TLSv1.2 and
TLSv1.3
services
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6768)
Modulus: 3072
Counter DRBG:
(A6768)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
DigSig-SigGen RSA SigGen for
SSHv2,
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2
services
(A6768)
Modulus: 3072
ECDSA SigGen
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2)
DigSig-SigGen ECDSA SigGen
for SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
services
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6768)
Curve: P-384
ECDSA SigGen
(TLSv1.2 and
TLSv1.3)
DigSig-SigGen ECDSA SigGen
for TLSv1.2 and
TLSv1.3
services
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6768)
Curves: P-256,
P-384
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer for
SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2
services
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6768)
Modulus: 3072
ECDSA SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2)
DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer
for SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
services
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6768)
Curve: P-384
ECDSA SigVer
(TLSv1.2 and
TLSv1.3)
DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigGen
for TLSv1.2 and
TLSv1.3
services
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6768)
Curve: P-256, P-
384
SSHv2 Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
SSHv2 session
protection.
AES-CTR:
(A6768)
Key Length:
128, 256
AES-GCM:
(A6768)
Key Length:
128, 256
SSHv2 Session
Authentication
MAC SSHv2 Session
Authentication
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6768)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6768)
SHA2-256:
(A6768)
SHA2-512:
(A6768)
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF SSHv2 session
keying materials,
used to derive
SSHv2 session
keys
KDF SSH:
(A6768)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
TLSv1.2
Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth TLSv1.2 session
protection.
AES-GCM:
(A6768)
Key Length:
128, 256
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF TLSv1.2 session
keying materials,
used to derive
TLS session
keys
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A6768)
TLSv1.3
Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth TLSv1.3 session
protection
AES-GCM:
(A6768)
Key Length:
128, 256
TLSv1.3 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF TLSv1.3 session
keying materials,
used to derive
TLS session
keys
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A6768)
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
IPsec/IKEv2
session
protection
AES-CBC:
(A6768, A6769)
Key Length:
128, 192, 256
AES-GCM:
(A6768)
Key Length:
128, 256
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Authentication
MAC IPsec/IKEv2
session
authentication
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6769)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A6769)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6769)
SHA2-256:
(A6769)
SHA2-384:
(A6769)
SHA2-512:
(A6769)
IPsec/IKEv2
Keying Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF IPsec/IKEv2
session keying
materials, used
to derive
IPsec/IKEv2
session keys
KDF IKEv2:
(A6768)
SNMPv3
Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-UnAuth SNMPv3
session
protection
AES-CFB128:
(A6768)
Key Length: 128
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SNMPv3
Session
Authentication
MAC Message
Authentication
for SNMPv3
service
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A6768)
SHA-1: (A6768)
SNMPv3 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF SNMPv3
session keying
materials, used
to derive
SNMPv3
session keys
KDF SNMP:
(A6768)
802.11i Session
Encrypt/ Decrypt
BC-Auth 802.11i Session
Protection
AES-CCM:
(A3235, A3239)
Key Length: 128
AES-GCM:
(A3235, A3239)
Key Length:
128, 256
802.11i Keying
Materials
Development
KBKDF 802.11i session
keying materials,
used to derive
802.11i session
keys
KDF SP800-
108: (A6768)
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A6768)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6768)
SHA-1: (A6768)
SHA2-256:
(A6768)
Firmware Load
Test
DigSig-SigVer Digital signature
verification for
firmware load
test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6768)
Modulus: 4096
SHA2-384:
(A6768)
DRBG Function DRBG Used for DRBG
generation
Counter DRBG:
(A6768)
Generate
Attestation
Signature
DigSig-SigGen Used during
initialization of
the module to
attest to the
Controller
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A8586)
Modulus: 3072
Table 10: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
• For SSHv2, the Module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation
Guidance C.H scenario #1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H.
• For TLSv1.2, the Module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation
Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The Module is compatible with
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TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52
Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2
handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the
module aborts the session if the key values are identical. The operations of one of the
two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely
within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of
the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or
server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption
key. In case the Module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the
AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
• For TLSv1.3, the Module offers the AES-GCM implementation and uses the context of
Scenario #1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The protocol that provides this compliance is
TLSv1.3, defined in RFC8446 of August 2018, using the ciphersuites that explicitly
select AES-GCM as the encryption/decryption cipher (Appendix B.4 of RFC8446). The
Module supports acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from Section 3.3.1 of SP800-
52rev2. The Module implements, within its boundary, an IV generation unit for TLSv1.3
that keeps control of the 64-bit counter value within the AES-GCM IV. If the exhaustion
condition is observed, the Module will return an error indication to the calling application,
who will then need to either trigger a re-key of the session (i.e., a new key for AES-
GCM), or terminate the connection.
• The Module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED
from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. Two keys established by IKEv2
for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the
parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. When the IV exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or
server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption
key. In case the Module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the
AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
• For 802.11i, the Module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation
Guidance C.H scenario #3 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H.
• In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as per section 5 in SP800-133rev2. The resulting
generated seed used in the asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from
SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E270 CommScope
Table 11: Entropy Certificates
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Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Ruckus CPU
Jitter Entropy
Source
Non-
Physical
QCA IPQ5332,
QCA IPQ9570
256 Full
entropy
A6935 (SHA3-
256)
Table 12: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant with
SP 800- 133r2. When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP 800-90Ar1
approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2. The following methods are
implemented:
• Direct generation of symmetric keys: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 6.1.
• Safe primes key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 5.2, which
maps to SP 800-56Arev3. The method described in Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3
(“Testing Candidates”) is used.
• RSA key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 5.1, which maps to
FIPS 186-5. The method described in Appendix A.1.3 of FIPS 186-5 (“Probable Primes”)
is used.
• ECDH key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section 5.1, which maps to
FIPS 186-5. The method described in Appendix A.2.2 of FIPS 186-5 (“Testing
Candidates”) is used. Note that this generation method is also used to only generate
ECDH key pairs.
Additionally, the module implements the following key derivation methods:
• SSHv2 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF (RFC 7627), TLSv1.3 KDF, IKEv2 KDF and SNMPv3 KDF:
compliant with SP 800-135r1. These implementations shall only be used to generate
secret keys in the context of the SSHv2, TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3, IKEv2 and SNMPv3
protocols, respectively.
• KDF SP800-108: compliant with section 4.1 “KDF in Counter Mode” of SP 800-108rev1.
This implementation shall only be used in context of the 802.11i protocol.
Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized
after processing the service
2.10 Key Establishment
The Module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of
operation:
KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation:
• The Module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS
140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared
secret computation provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.
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• The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 3526 (IKE).
• Note that the module only implements domain parameter generation, key pair generation
and verification, and shared secret computation:
o IKE (RFC 3526):
▪ MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
▪ MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
▪ MODP-6144 (ID = 17)
▪ MODP-8192 (ID = 18)
KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation:
• The Module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS
140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared
secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The Module supports SSHv2, TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3, IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and 802.11i industrial
protocols. No parts of SSHv2, TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3, IPSec/IKEv2, SNMPv3, and 802.11i protocols,
other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Please refer to SSPs Table for
more information.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Ethernet Port
and RF
Interface
Data Input Data input into the module for all the services defined in
Approved Services Table, including SSHv2, TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, IPsec/IKEv2and SNMPv3 service data.
Ethernet Port
and RF
Interface
Data Output Data output from the module for all the services defined in
Approved Services Table, including SSHv2, TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, IPsec/IKEv2and SNMPv3 service data.
Ethernet Port
and RESET
Control
Input
Control Data input into the module for all the services
defined in Approved Services Table, including SSHv2,
TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3, IPsec/IKEv2and SNMPv3 service data.
Ethernet Port
and LED
Status
Output
Status Information output from the module.
N/A Control
Output
N/A
Power Power Provide the Power Supply to the module.
Table 13: Ports and Interfaces
The Module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in
Table 2. The Module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided by
the Module (data input, data output, control input, control output and status output) as above.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per Minute
Password The minimum length is
fifteen (15) characters
(94 possible
characters).
Password
Based
The probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed or a
false
acceptance
will occur is
1/(94^15)
which is less
than
1/1,000,000.
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within one
minute is 10/(94^15),
which is less than
1/100,000.
RSA-
Based
Certificate
The modules support
RSA public-key based
authentication
mechanism using a
minimum of RSA 3072
bits, which provides 128
bits of security strength.
The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed is 1/(2^128)
which is less than
1/1,000,000. For
multiple attacks during a
one-minute period, as
the module at its highest
can support at most
17,000 new sessions
per second to
authenticate in a one-
minute period, the
probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is 17,000
* 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128),
which is less than
1/100,000.
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6768)
The probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed is
1/(2^128).
Please refer to
Description
section in this
table for more
details
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is
17,000 * 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128).
Please refer to
Description section in
this table for more
details
ECDSA-
Based
Certificate
The modules support
ECDSA public-key
based authentication
ECDSA
SigVer
The probability
that a random
attempt will
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each Attempt
Strength per Minute
mechanism using a
minimum of curve P-
256, which provides 128
bits of security strength.
The probability that a
random attempt will
succeed is 1/(2^128)
which is less than
1/1,000,000. For
multiple attacks during a
one-minute period, as
the module at its highest
can support at most
17,000 new sessions
per second to
authenticate in a one-
minute period, the
probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is 17,000
* 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128),
which is less than
1/100,000.
(FIPS186-5)
(A6768)
succeed is
1/(2^128)
which is less
than
1/1,000,000.
Please refer to
Description
section in this
table for more
details
module within a one
minute period is
17,000 * 60 =
1,020,000/(2^128).
Please refer to
Description section in
this table for more
details
Table 14: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO Password
RSA-Based Certificate
ECDSA-Based Certificate
User (Wireless Client) Role User Password
Table 15: Roles
The Module supports Crypto Officer (CO) role and User role (Wireless Client).
4.3 Approved Services
The following tables detail the types of approved services available to each role in approved
mode of operation, the types of access for each role and the Keys or SSPs they affect.
• Generate G
• Read Access R
• Write Access W
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• Execute Access E
• Zeroize Z
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Show
Status
Provide
Module's
current
status
(return
codes
and/or
syslog
messages)
N/A Command
s used to
show
Module's
Status
Module's
Operationa
l Status
None Crypto
Officer
Show
Version
Provide
Module's
name and
version
information
N/A Command
s `get
boarddata`
and `get
fips-
version`
Module's
ID and
versioning
information
None Crypto
Officer
Perform
Self-Tests
Perform
Self-Tests
(Pre-
operational
self-test
and
Conditiona
l Self-
Tests)
N/A Command
to trigger
Self-Test
Status of
the self-
tests
results
None Crypto
Officer
Unauthentic
ated
Perform
Zeroization
Perform
Zeroization
Syslog
message
Command
to zeroize
the module
Status of
the SSPs
zeroization
None Crypto
Officer
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: Z
- DRBG
Seed: Z
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value: Z
- DRBG
Key: Z
- Crypto
Officer
Password: Z
- Firmware
Load Test
Key: Z
- SSHv2
ECDH
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Private Key:
Z
- SSHv2
ECDH
Public Key:
Z
- SSHv2
Peer ECDH
Public Key:
Z
- SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
- SSHv2
RSA Private
Key: Z
- SSHv2
RSA Public
Key: Z
- SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public Key:
Z
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Private Key:
Z
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Public Key:
Z
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key: Z
- SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
- SSHv2
Session
Authenticati
on Key: Z
- TLSv1.2
ECDH
Private Key:
Z
- TLSv1.2
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ECDH
Public Key:
Z
- TLSv1.2
Peer ECDH
Public Key:
Z
- TLSv1.2
ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.2
RSA Private
Key: Z
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.2
RSA Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.2
RSA Private
Key: Z
- TLSv1.2
RSA Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.2
RSA Peer
Public Key:
Z
- TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Private Key:
Z
- TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Public Key:
Z
- TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.2
Master
Secret: Z
- TLSv1.2
Session
Encryption
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Private Key:
Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Public Key:
Z
- TLSv1.3
Peer ECDH
Public Key:
Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.3
RSA Private
Key: Z
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
RSA Private
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Key: Z
- TLSv1.3
RSA Peer
Public Key:
Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private Key:
Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public Key:
Z
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key: Z
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- TLSv1.3
Master
Secret: Z
- TLSv1.3
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Private
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Peer DH
Public Key:
Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Shared
Secret: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Private Key:
Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Public Key:
Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Peer ECDH
Public Key:
Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Private
Key: Z
-
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Peer
Public Key:
Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Private Key:
Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Public Key:
Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Pre-shared
Secret: Z
-
SKEYSEED:
Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Authenticati
on Key: Z
- SNMPv3
Shared
Secret: Z
- SNMPv3
Encryption
Key: Z
- SNMPv3
Authenticati
on Key: Z
- 802.11i
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Pre-Shared
Secret: Z
- 802.11i
Pairwise
Master Key
(PMK): Z
- 802.11i
Pairwise
Transient
Key (PTK):
Z
- 802.11i
Temporal
Key (TK): Z
- 802.11i
Group
Master Key
(GMK): Z
- 802.11i
Group
Temporal
Key (GTK):
Z
Configure
Network
Sets
configurati
on of the
systems
None Command
s to
configure
the
network
Status of
the
completion
of network
configurati
on status
None Crypto
Officer
Crypto
Officer
Authentica
tion
CO Role
Authentica
tion
N/A CO
Authentica
tion
Request
Status of
the CO
authenticat
ion
None Crypto
Officer
- Crypto
Officer
Password:
W
- SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public Key:
W,E
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key: W,E
User
(Wireless
Client)
Authentica
tion
User
(Wireless
Client)
Role
N/A User
(Wireless
Client)
Authentica
Status of
the User
(Wireless
Client)
None User
(Wireless
Client)
- User
(Wireless
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authentica
tion
tion
Request
Authenticat
ion
Client)
Password:
W
Initializatio
n
Attestation
The
module will
generate a
signature
to attest to
the
Controller
during
initializatio
n
The
module is
successfu
lly
connecte
d to the
controller
Command
s to
connect to
the
controller
Outcome
of the
attestation
attempt
Generate
Attestation
Signature
Crypto
Officer
- Factory
Device
Certificate:
E
Configure
SSHv2
Function
Configure
SSHv2
Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
SSHv2
configurat
ion
success
status
message
Command
s to
configure
SSHv2
Status of
the
completion
of the
SSHv2
configurati
on
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
Crypto
Officer
- SSHv2
RSA Private
Key: W
- SSHv2
RSA Public
Key: W
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Private Key:
W
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Public Key:
W
Configure
TLSv1.2
Function
Configure
TLSv1.2
Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
TLSv1.2
configurat
ion
success
status
message
Command
s to
configure
TLSv1.2
Status of
the
completion
of TLSv1.2
configurati
on
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
DRBG
Function
Crypto
Officer
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.2
RSA Private
Key: G,W
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.2
RSA Public
Key: G,W
- TLSv1.2
RSA Private
Key: W
- TLSv1.2
RSA Public
Key: W
- TLSv1.2
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ECDSA
Private Key:
W
- TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Public Key:
W
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,Z
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Configure
TLSv1.3
Function
Configure
TLSv1.3
Function.
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
TLSv1.3
configurat
ion
success
status
message.
API
commands
to configur
TLSv1.3
Status of
the
completion
of TLSv1.3
configurati
on.
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
DRBG
Function
Crypto
Officer
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.3
RSA Private
Key: G,W
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Key: G,W
- TLSv1.3
RSA Private
Key: W
- TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Key: W
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private Key:
W
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public Key:
W
- DRBG
Entropy
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Configure
IPsec/IKEv
2 Function
Configure
IPsec/IKEv
2 Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
IPsec/IKE
v2
configurat
ion
success
status
message
Command
s to
configure
IPsec/IKEv
2
Status of
the
completion
of
IPsec/IKEv
2
configurati
on
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
Crypto
Officer
-
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Private
Key: W
-
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Public
Key: W
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Private Key:
W
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Public Key:
W
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Pre-shared
Secret: W
Configure
SNMPv3
Function
Configure
SNMPv3
Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
SNMPv3
configurat
ion
success
status
message
Command
s to
configure
SNMPv3
Status of
the
completion
of
SNMPv3
configurati
on
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
SNMPv3
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
Crypto
Officer
- SNMPv3
Shared
Secret: W
- SNMPv3
Encryption
Key: G,W
- SNMPv3
Authenticati
on Key: G,W
Page 32 of 81
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Configure
802.11i
Function
Configure
802.11i
Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
802.11i
configurat
ion
success
status
message
API
commands
to
configure
802.11i
API
commands
to
configure
802.11i
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
Crypto
Officer
- 802.11i
Pre-Shared
Secret: W
- 802.11i
Pairwise
Master Key
(PMK): G
- 802.11i
Pairwise
Transient
Key (PTK):
G
- 802.11i
Temporal
Key (TK): G
- 802.11i
Group
Master Key
(GMK): G
- 802.11i
Group
Temporal
Key (GTK):
G
Run
SSHv2
Function
Execute
SSHv2
Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
successfu
l SSHv2
log
message
Initiate
SSHv2
tunnel
establishm
ent
Status of
SSHv2
tunnel
establishm
ent
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
RSA
SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3,
and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigGen
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3,
and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
Crypto
Officer
- SSHv2
ECDH
Private Key:
G,W,E
- SSHv2
ECDH
Public Key:
G,R,W
- SSHv2
Peer ECDH
Public Key:
W,E
- SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- SSHv2
RSA Private
Key: W,E
- SSHv2
Page 33 of 81
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
SSHv2
Session
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
SSHv2
Session
Authenticati
on
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
DRBG
Function
RSA Public
Key: R,W
- SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public Key:
R,W,E
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Private Key:
W,E
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Public Key:
R,W
- SSHv2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key: R,W,E
- SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- SSHv2
Session
Authenticati
on Key:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Run
TLSv1.2
Function
Execute
TLSv1.2
function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
successfu
Initiate
TLSv1.2
tunnel
establishm
ent
request
Status of
TLSv1.2
tunnel
establishm
ent
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
RSA
SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3,
and
Crypto
Officer
- TLSv1.2
ECDH
Private Key:
G,W,E
- TLSv1.2
ECDH
Page 34 of 81
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
l TLSv1.2
log
message
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3,
and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigVer
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.2
Session
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
DRBG
Function
Public Key:
G,R,W
- TLSv1.2
Peer ECDH
Public Key:
W,E
- TLSv1.2
ECDH
Shared
Secret: G,E
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.2
RSA Private
Key: G,W,E
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.2
RSA Public
Key: G,R,W
- TLSv1.2
RSA Private
Key: W,E
- TLSv1.2
RSA Public
Key: R,W
- TLSv1.2
RSA Peer
Public Key:
R,W,E
- TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Private Key:
W,E
- TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Public Key:
R,W
- TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key: R,W,E
- TLSv1.2
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLSv1.2
Session
Encryption
Page 35 of 81
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Run
TLSv1.3
Function
Execute
TLSv1.3
Function.
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
successfu
l TLSv1.3
log
message.
API
command
to execute
TLSv1.3
service.
Status of
TLSv1.3
establishm
ent.
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
RSA
SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3,
and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3,
and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigVer
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
Session
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
TLSv1.3
Keying
Materials
Crypto
Officer
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Private Key:
G,W,E
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Public Key:
G,R,W
- TLSv1.3
Peer ECDH
Public Key:
W,E
- TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.3
RSA Private
Key: G,W,E
- Locally
generated
TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Key: G,R,W
- TLSv1.3
RSA Private
Key: W,E
- TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Page 36 of 81
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Developme
nt
DRBG
Function
Key: R,W
- TLSv1.3
RSA Peer
Public Key:
R,W,E
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private Key:
W,E
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public Key:
R,W
- TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key: R,W,E
- TLSv1.3
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLSv1.3
Session
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Run
IPsec/IKEv
2 Function
Execute
IPsec/IKEv
2 Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
succesful
IPsec/IKE
Initiate
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel
establishm
ent
request
Status of
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel
establishm
ent
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
RSA
SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3,
and
Crypto
Officer
-
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Private
Key: G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Public
Key: G,R,W
Page 37 of 81
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
v2 log
message
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigGen
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3,
and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
ECDSA
SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2
)
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Authenticati
on
IPsec/IKEv2
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
DRBG
Function
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Peer DH
Public Key:
W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Private Key:
G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Public Key:
G,R,W
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Peer ECDH
Public Key:
W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Private
Key: W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Public
Key: R,W
-
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Peer
Public Key:
R,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Private Key:
W,E
Page 38 of 81
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Public Key:
R,W
-
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key: R,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Pre-shared
Secret:
G,W,E
-
SKEYSEED:
G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
-
IPsec/IKEv2
Authenticati
on Key:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Run
SNMPv3
Function
Execute
SNMPv3
Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
Initiate
SNMPv3
tunnel
establishm
ent
request
Status of
SNMPv3
tunnel
establishm
ent
SNMPv3
Session
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
SNMPv3
Session
Authenticati
Crypto
Officer
- SNMPv3
Shared
Secret: W,E
- SNMPv3
Encryption
Page 39 of 81
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
successfu
l SNMPv3
log
message
on
SNMPv3
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
Key: G,W,E
- SNMPv3
Authenticati
on Key:
G,W,E
Run
802.11i
Function
Execute
802.11i
Function
Status
Mode
indicator
"FIPS
mode is
enabled."
and
successfu
l 802.11i
log
message
Initiate
802.11i
tunnel
establishm
ent
request
Status of
802.11i
tunnel
establishm
ent
802.11i
Session
Encrypt/
Decrypt
802.11i
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
User
(Wireless
Client)
- 802.11i
Pre-Shared
Secret:
G,R,W
- 802.11i
Pairwise
Master Key
(PMK):
G,R,W,E
- 802.11i
Pairwise
Transient
Key (PTK):
G,R,W,E
- 802.11i
Temporal
Key (TK):
G,R,W,E
- 802.11i
Group
Master Key
(GMK):
G,R,W,E
- 802.11i
Group
Temporal
Key (GTK):
G,R,W
Firmware
Load Test
Execute
the
Firmware
Load Test
Successf
ul
Firmware
Loading
status
message
Command
s to load
new
firmware
image
Outcome
of the
Firmware
Load Test
Firmware
Load Test
Crypto
Officer
- Firmware
Load Test
Key: R,E
Table 16: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Page 40 of 81
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N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The Module supports the firmware load test by using RSA 4096 SigVer with SHA2-384 (Cert.
#A6768) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test
Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In
order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading
the firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed.
The Module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the
verification fails. Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module
certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
N/A for this module.
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
The Module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator
request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to
executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two
independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a
single error.
4.8 Additional Information
The Module supports unauthenticated service. The unauthenticated operator can trigger the
self-test service by power-cycling the module.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, all
firmware components within the physical boundary are protected by RSA 4096 SigVer with
SHA2-384 (Cert. #A6768) signature calculated at build time. At initialization, the signature is
recalculated and compared to the hardcoded build-time generated signature value. If at load
time the signature does not match, the module exits with an error. If failure occurs during self-
test, all crypto functionality is disabled.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed
at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the integrity
test on-demand.
Page 41 of 81
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper labels Recommended 30
days
Visible inspection of platform for residual
evidence of tampering
Strong Enclosure Recommended 30
days
Visible inspection of platform for evidence of
tampering, removal or access
Production Grade
Components
Recommended 30
days
Visible inspection of components for evidence
of tampering, removal or access
Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required
Appling Tamper Evidence Labels
Step 1: Turn off and unplug the module.
Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, oil or any other material other than the surface
coating from manufacture before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning
pads are recommended for this purpose.
Step 3: Apply a label to cover the Module as shown in the figures below.
The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive
backing. Any attempt to open the module will damage the tamper evident labels or the material
of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial
numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers
to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also
be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices.
Any deviation of the TELs placement by unauthorized operators such as tearing,
misconfiguration, removal, change, replacement or any other change in the TELs from its
original configuration as depicted below shall mean the Module is no longer in Approved mode
of operation. The Crypto Officer (CO) checks the integrity of the label by following the guidance
listed above, any unused TELs must be securely stored, accounted for, and maintained by the
Crypto Officer (CO) in a protected location.
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals
Page 42 of 81
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1. RUCKUS R670-US Access Point and R670-WW Access Point
Number: Four (4)
Placement:
Figure 5: R670-US/WW Top Figure 6: R670-US/WW Bottom
Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper
evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Any unused TELs must be securely
stored, accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.
TEL 1
TEL 4
TEL 2
TEL 3
Page 43 of 81
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2. RUCKUS R770-US Access Point and R770-WW Access Point
Number: Four (4)
Placement:
Figure 7: R770-US/WW Top Figure 8: R770-US/WW Bottom
Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper
evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Any unused TELs must be securely
stored, accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.
TEL 1
TEL 4
TEL 2
TEL 3
Page 44 of 81
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3. RUCKUS T670-US Access Point and T670-WW Access Point
Number: Four (4)
Placement:
Figure 9: T670-US/WW Top Figure 10: T670-US/WW Bottom
Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper
evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Any unused TELs must be securely
stored, accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.
TEL 1
TEL 3
TEL 2
TEL 4
TEL 1
TEL 2
TEL 3
TEL 4
Page 45 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
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4. RUCKUS T670sn Access Point
Number: Four (4)
Placement:
Figure 11: T670sn Top Figure 12: T670sn Bottom
Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper
evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Any unused TELs must be securely
stored, accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.
TEL 3
TEL 2
TEL 2
TEL 3
TEL 1
TEL 4
TEL 1
TEL 4
Page 46 of 81
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8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A for this module.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
DRAM Volatile Memory Dynamic
Flash Non-Volatile Memory Static
Table 18: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Peer Public
Key Input
External
(Outside of
the
Module's
Boundary)
Module Plaintext Automated Electronic
Module
Public Key
Output
Module External
(Outside of
the
Module's
Boundary)
Plaintext Automated Electronic
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypted
by AES and
HMAC
External
(Outside of
the
Module's
Boundary)
Module Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
(SSHv2
with AES
and
HMAC)
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypted
by GCM
External
(Outside of
the
Module's
Boundary)
Module Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
(SSHv2
with AES-
GCM)
Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Page 47 of 81
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Zeroization
Method
CO issues
zeroization service
via Controller
The zeroization method will
erase all SSPs stored in the
DRAM or in the Flash of the
module.
`zeroize-all csp` or
Zeroization method
via Controller
Session
Termination
Zeroization upon
session termination
Session termination will
automatically zeroize all
session based temporary SSPs
Terminate session
Reboot Zeroization upon
rebooting the
module
Reboot to zeroize all temporary
SSPs stored in volatile memory
Reboot
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
DRBG
Entropy
Input
Used to
seed the
DRBG
384 bits -
at least
256 bits
Entropy
Input - CSP
DRBG
Function
DRBG
Seed
Used in
DRBG
Generation
256 bits -
256 bits
DRBG
Seed - CSP
DRBG
Function
DRBG
Internal
State V
value
Used in
DRBG
Generation
256 bits -
256 bits
DRBG
Internal
State V
value -
CSP
DRBG
Function
DRBG Key Used in
DRBG
Generation
256 bits -
256 bits
DRBG Key
- CSP
DRBG
Function
Crypto
Officer
Password
Crypto
Officer
authenticati
on
8-30
Character
s - 8-30
Character
s
Authenticati
on Data -
CSP
User
(Wireless
Client)
Password
Used to
Authenticat
e the User
(Wireless
Client) Role
8-30
Character
s - 8-30
Character
s
Authenticati
on Data -
CSP
Factory
Device
Certificate
Used for
initialization
attestation
with
Controller
for first
time,
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Certificate -
CSP
Generate
Attestation
Signature
Page 48 of 81
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
imported at
the factory
Firmware
Load Test
Key
Used for
Firmware
Load Test
4096 bits
- 152 bits
Public Key
- CSP
Firmware
Load Test
SSHv2
ECDH
Private Key
Used to
derive the
SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curves:
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128
to 256
bits
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-
ECC
(SSHv2)
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2
ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curves:
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128
to 256
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2
Peer ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
SSHv2 DH
Shared
Secret
Curves:
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128
to 256
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Used to
derive
SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Keys,
SSHv2
Session
Authenticati
on Keys
Curves:
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 - 128
to 256
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-ECC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Development
SSHv2
RSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
SSHv2
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
SSHv2
RSA Public
Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
SSHv2
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
Page 49 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
SSHv2
RSA Peer
Public Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the SSHv2
service
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
SSHv2
ECDSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
SSHv2
authenticati
on
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
SigGen
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2)
SSHv2
ECDSA
Public Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
SSHv2
authenticati
on
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
SSHv2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the SSHv2
service
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
ECDSA
SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2)
SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Key
Used for
SSHv2
Session
protection
128 to
256 bits -
128 to
256 bits
Session
Key - CSP
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
SSHv2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
SSHv2
Session
Authenticati
on Key
Used for
SSHv2
Session
integrity
protection
At least
160 bits -
At least
160 bits
Session
Key - CSP
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
SSHv2
Session
Authenticatio
n
TLSv1.2
ECDH
Private Key
Used to
Derive
TLSv1.2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
256 - 128
bits
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-
ECC
(TLSv1.2
)
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
TLSv1.2
ECDH
Public Key
Used to
Derive
TLSv1.2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
256 - 128
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
Page 50 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
TLSv1.2
Peer ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
TLSv1.2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
256 - 128
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
TLSv1.2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Used to
Derive
TLSv1.2
Master
Secret and
Session
Encryption
Key
Curve: P-
256 - 128
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Development
Locally
generated
TLSv1.2
RSA
Private Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the WISPr
captive
portal over
TLSv1.2
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
Locally
generated
TLSv1.2
RSA Public
Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the WISPr
captive
portal over
TLSv1.2
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
RSA
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.2
RSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.2
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
TLSv1.2
RSA Public
Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.2
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
TLSv1.2
RSA Peer
Public Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
Page 51 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
the
TLSv1.2
service
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.2
authenticati
on
Curves:
P-256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
SigGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Public Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.2
authenticati
on
Curves P-
256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the
TLSv1.2
service
Curves:
P-256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
ECDSA
SigVer
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.2
Master
Secret
Used to
derive the
TLSv1.2
Session
Encryption
Key
At least
112 bits -
At least
112 bits
Master
Secret -
CSP
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Development
TLSv1.2
Session
Encryption
Key
Used to
protect the
TLSv1.2
session
128 or
256 bits -
128 or
256 bits
Session
Key - CSP
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
TLSv1.2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Private Key
Used to
Derive
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
256 - 128
bits
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-
ECC
(TLSv1.3
)
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Public Key
Used to
Derive
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
256 - 128
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
Page 52 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
TLSv1.3
Peer ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curve: P-
256 - 128
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Used to
Derive
TLSv1.3
Session
Encryption
Key and
TLS
Session
Authenticati
on Key
Curve: P-
256 - 128
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
Keying
Materials
Development
Locally
generated
TLSv1.3
RSA
Private Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the WISPr
captive
portal over
TLSv1.3
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
Locally
generated
TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the WISPr
captive
portal over
TLSv1.3
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
RSA
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
RSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.3
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
SigGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
RSA Public
Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.3
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
Page 53 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
TLSv1.3
RSA Peer
Public Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the
TLSv1.3
service
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
ECDSA
SigVer
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.3
authenticati
on
Curves P-
256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
SigGen
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
TLSv1.3
authenticati
on
Curves P-
256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Peer Public
Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the
TLSv1.3
service
Curves P-
256, P-
384 - 128
or 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
ECDSA
SigVer
(TLSv1.2
and
TLSv1.3)
TLSv1.3
Master
Secret
Used to
derive the
TLSv1.2
Session
Encryption
Key
384 bits -
384 bits
Master
Secret -
CSP
TLSv1.3
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
TLSv1.3
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
TLSv1.3
Session
Encryption
Key
Used to
protect the
TLSv1.3
session
128 or
256 bits -
128 or
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
TLSv1.3
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
TLSv1.3
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Private Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret
MODP-
2048,
MODP-
3072,
MODP61
44,
MODP81
92 - 112
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-
FFC
(IKEv2)
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
Page 54 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
to 200
bits
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH Public
Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret
MODP-
2048,
MODP-
3072,
MODP61
44,
MODP81
92 - 112
to 200
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 Peer DH
Public Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret
MODP-
2048,
MODP-
3072,
MODP61
44,
MODP81
92 - 112
to 200
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 DH
Shared
Secret
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Encryption
Keys,
IPsec/IKEv
2
Authenticati
on Keys
MODP-
2048,
MODP-
3072,
MODP61
44,
MODP81
92 - 112
to 200
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-FFC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2
Keying
Materials
Development
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Private Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Shared
Secrets
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-
ECC
(IKEv2)
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Shared
Secrets
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 Peer
ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
Page 55 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Shared
Secrets
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDH
Shared
Secret
Used to
derive
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Encryption
Keys,
IPsec/IKEv
2
Authenticati
on Keys
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-ECC
(IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv2
Keying
Materials
Development
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
and used
by the
module to
sign data
for
IPsec/IKEv
2
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA
Public Key
Imported by
the
controller
used for
IPsec/IKEv
2
authenticati
on
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
IPsec/IKEv
2 RSA Peer
Public Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the
IPsec/IKEv
2 service
Modulus
3072 bits
- 128 bits
Public Key
- PSP
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.3, and
IPsec/IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Private Key
Imported by
the
controller
and used
by the
module to
sign data
for
IPsec/IKEv
2
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
SigGen
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2)
Page 56 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Public Key
Imported by
the
controller
and used
by
IPsec/IKEv
2 peer to
authenticat
e the
module
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
IPsec/IKEv
2 ECDSA
Peer Public
Key
Used for
peer
authenticati
on during
the
IPsec/IKEv
2 service
Curve: P-
384 - 192
bits
Public Key
- PSP
ECDSA
SigVer
(SSHv2 and
IPsec/IKEv2)
IPsec/IKEv
2 Pre-
shared
Secret
Used for
IPsec/IKEv
2 mutual
authenticati
on
16-32
bytes
character
s - 16-32
bytes
character
s
shared
secret -
CSP
SKEYSEE
D
Keying
material
used to
derive the
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Encryption
Key and
IPsec/IKEv
2
Authenticati
on Key
160 bits -
160 bits
Keying
Material -
CSP
IPsec/IKEv
2 Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Authenticatio
n
IPsec/IKEv
2 Session
Encryption
Key
Used to
secure
IPsec/IKEv
2 session
confidentiali
ty
128 to
256 bits -
128 to
256 bits
Session
Key - CSP
IPsec/IKEv
2 Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
IPsec/IKEv
2
Authenticati
on Key
Used to
secure
IPsec/IKEv
2 session
integrity
at least
160 bits -
at least
160 bits
Session
Key - CSP
IPsec/IKEv
2 Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Authenticatio
n
Page 57 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
SNMPv3
Shared
Secret
Used for
SNMPv3
user
authenticati
on
8-32
character
s - N/A
Authenticati
on Secret -
CSP
SNMPv3
Encryption
Key
Used to
protect
SNMPv3
traffic
confidentiali
ty
128 bits -
128 bits
Encryption
Key - CSP
SNMPv3
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
SNMPv3
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
SNMPv3
Authenticati
on Key
Used to
secure
SNMPv3
traffic
integrity
At least
112 bits -
At least
112 bits
Authenticati
on Key -
CSP
SNMPv3
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
SNMPv3
Session
Authenticatio
n
802.11i
Pre-Shared
Secret
Used to
authenticat
e the User
(Wireless
Client)
8-32
character
s - N/A
Authenticati
on Secret -
CSP
802.11i
Pairwise
Master Key
(PMK)
Used to
derive the
802.11i
Temporal
Key
256 bits -
256 bits
Keying
Material -
CSP
802.11i
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
802.11i
Keying
Materials
Development
802.11i
Pairwise
Transient
Key (PTK)
Used to
derive the
802.11i
Temporal
Key
384 bits -
384 bits
Keying
Material -
CSP
802.11i
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
802.11i
Keying
Materials
Development
802.11i
Temporal
Key (TK)
Used to
protect the
802.11i
session
traffic
128 bits -
128 bits
Encryption
Key - CSP
802.11i
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
802.11i
Session
Encrypt/
Decrypt
802.11i
Group
Master Key
(GMK)
Used to
derive
802.11i
Group
Transient
Key
256 bits -
256 bits
Keying
Material -
CSP
DRBG
Function
802.11i
Keying
Materials
Development
802.11i
Group
Temporal
Key (GTK)
Used to
protect the
802.11i
group traffic
128 or
256 bits -
128 or
256 bits
Encryption
Key - CSP
802.11i
Keying
Materials
Developm
ent
802.11i
Session
Encrypt/
Decrypt
Table 21: SSP Table 1
Page 58 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
DRBG
Entropy Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
Until
Reboot
Zeroization
Method
Reboot
DRBG Seed:Used
With
DRBG Internal
State V value:Used
With
DRBG Key:Used
With
DRBG Seed DRAM:Plaintex
t
Until
Reboot
Zeroization
Method
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Internal
State V value:Used
With
DRBG Key:Used
With
DRBG
Internal State
V value
DRAM:Plaintex
t
Until
Reboot
Zeroization
Method
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Seed:Used
With
DRBG Key:Used
With
DRBG Key DRAM:Plaintex
t
Until
Reboot
Zeroization
Method
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Seed:Used
With
DRBG Internal
State V value:Used
With
Crypto
Officer
Password
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Encrypte
d
Zeroization
Method
User
(Wireless
Client)
Password
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
Page 59 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Factory
Device
Certificate
Flash:Encrypte
d
Zeroization
Method
Firmware
Load Test
Key
Flash:Plaintext N/A
SSHv2
ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 ECDH
Public Key:Paired
With
SSHv2 Peer ECDH
Public Key:Used
With
SSHv2
ECDH Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 ECDH
Private Key:Paired
With
SSHv2 Peer
ECDH Public
Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 ECDH
Private Key:Used
With
SSHv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 ECDH
Private
Key:Derived From
SSHv2 ECDH
Public Key:Derived
From
SSHv2 RSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
SSHv2 RSA Public
Key:Paired With
Page 60 of 81
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
d by
GCM
SSHv2 RSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
SSHv2 RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
SSHv2 RSA
Peer Public
Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2
ECDSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
SSHv2 ECDSA
Public Key:Paired
With
SSHv2
ECDSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
SSHv2 ECDSA
Private Key:Paired
With
Page 61 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
SSHv2
ECDSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2
Session
Encryption
Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 Session
Authentication
Key:Used With
SSHv2
Session
Authenticatio
n Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SSHv2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SSHv2 Session
Encryption
Key:Used With
TLSv1.2
ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.2 ECDH
Public Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.2 Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Used With
TLSv1.2
ECDH Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.2 ECDH
Private Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.2 Peer
ECDH Public
Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
while
TLSv1.2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.2 ECDH
Private Key:Used
With
TLSv1.2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
TLSv1.2 ECDH
Private
Key:Derived From
TLSv1.2 Peer
Page 62 of 81
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
n
Reboot
ECDH Public
Key:Derived From
Locally
generated
TLSv1.2 RSA
Private Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
Locally generated
TLSv1.2 RSA Peer
Public Key:Paired
With
Locally
generated
TLSv1.2 RSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
Locally generated
TLSv1.2 RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.2 RSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
TLSv1.2 RSA
Public Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.2 RSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
TLSv1.2 RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.2 RSA
Peer Public
Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
Page 63 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
TLSv1.2 ECDSA
Public Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.2
ECDSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
TLSv1.2 ECDSA
Private Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.2
ECDSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.2
Master
Secret
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.2 ECDH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
TLSv1.2
Session
Encryption
Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.2
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.2 Master
Secret:Derived
From
Page 64 of 81
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Public Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3 Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Used With
TLSv1.3
ECDH Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Private Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3 Peer
ECDH Public
Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Private Key:Used
With
TLSv1.3
ECDH
Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Private
Key:Derived From
TLSv1.3 Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Derived From
Locally
generated
TLSv1.3 RSA
Private Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
Locally generated
TLSv1.3 RSA Peer
Public Key:Paired
With
Locally
generated
TLSv1.3 RSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
Locally generated
TLSv1.3 RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3 RSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
TLSv1.3 RSA
Public Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3 RSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
TLSv1.3 RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
Page 65 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
TLSv1.3 RSA
Peer Public
Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
TLSv1.3 ECDSA
Public Key:Paired
With
TLSv1.3
ECDSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
TLSv1.3 ECDSA
Private Key:Paired
With
Page 66 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
d by
GCM
TLSv1.3
ECDSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3
Master
Secret
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 ECDH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
TLSv1.3
Session
Encryption
Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
TLSv1.3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
TLSv1.3 Master
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Private
Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Public Key:Paired
With
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer
DH Public
Key:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Private Key:Paired
With
IPsec/IKEv2
Peer DH
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
while
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Private Key:Used
With
IPsec/IKEv2
DH Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SKEYSEED:Used
With
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH
Public Key:Paired
With
IPsec/IKEv2 Peer
Page 67 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
n
Reboot
ECDH Public
Key:Used With
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH
Private Key:Paired
With
IPsec/IKEv2
Peer ECDH
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH
Private Key:Used
With
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDH
Shared
Secret
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SKEYSEED:Used
With
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Private
Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
IPsec/IKEv2 RSA
Public Key:Paired
With
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Public
Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
IPsec/IKEv2 RSA
Private Key:Paired
With
Page 68 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
d by
GCM
IPsec/IKEv2
RSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Private Key
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA Public
Key:Paired With
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA
Public Key
Module
Public
Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA Private
Key:Paired With
IPsec/IKEv2
ECDSA Peer
Public Key
Peer
Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2
Pre-shared
Secret
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
SKEYSEED:Derive
d to
Page 69 of 81
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
n
Reboot
SKEYSEED DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2 Pre-
shared
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2
Session
Encryption
Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2
Authenticatio
n Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
IPsec/IKEv
2 tunnel is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
IPsec/IKEv2 DH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
IPsec/IKEv2 ECDH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
SNMPv3
Shared
Secret
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
DRAM:Plaintex
t
Zeroization
Method
SNMPv3
Encryption
Key:Derive To
SNMPv3
Authentication
Key:Derive To
Page 70 of 81
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
d by
GCM
SNMPv3
Encryption
Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SNMPv3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SNMPv3 Shared
Secret:Derived
From
SNMPv3
Authenticatio
n Key
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
SNMPv3
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
SNMPv3 Shared
Secret:Derived
From
SNMPv3
Encryption
Key:Used With
802.11i Pre-
Shared
Secret
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by AES
and
HMAC
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypte
d by
GCM
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Method
802.11i
Pairwise
Master Key
(PMK)
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
802.11i
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
802.11i Pre-Shared
Secret:Derived
From
802.11i
Pairwise
Transient
Key (PTK)
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
802.11i
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
802.11i Pairwise
Master Key
(PMK):Derived
From
802.11i
Temporal
Key (TK)
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
802.11i
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
802.11i Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK):Derived
From
802.11i
Group Master
Key (GMK)
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
802.11i
Zeroization
Method
Session
Page 71 of 81
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
session is
active
Terminatio
n
Reboot
802.11i
Group
Temporal
Key (GTK)
DRAM:Plaintex
t
While
802.11i
session is
active
Zeroization
Method
Session
Terminatio
n
Reboot
802.11i Pairwise
Master Key
(PMK):Derived
From
802.11i Group
Master Key
(GMK):Derived
From
Table 22: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
SHA-1
The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification.
This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031
112-bit security keys
The module includes an implementation of DH using MODP-2048 for shared secret
computation. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2030.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test Method Test
Type
Indicator Details
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6768)
RSA 4096
SigVer with
SHA2-384
RSA signature
verification
SW/FW
Integrity
Module is in
normal state
RSA
SigVer
Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The Module performs the following self-tests, which include the Pre-Operational and Conditional
self-tests. Prior to the Module providing any data output via the data output interface, the
Module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-
operational self-tests, the Module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests
(CASTs). The self-test success or failure results are an output of the return value of the library
load API call, which is functioning as the self-test status indicator. If anyone of the self-tests
fails, the Module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the Module’s
status output interface. While the Module is in the error state, all data through the data output
interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by
reloading the Module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the Module
transitions to the operational state.
Page 72 of 81
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10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
AES-CBC encrypt KAT
(A6768)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Encrypt Power Up
AES-CBC decrypt KAT
(A6768)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Decrypt Power Up
AES-CBC encrypt KAT
(A6769)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Encrypt Power Up
AES-CBC decrypt KAT
(A6769)
128 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Decrypt Power Up
AES-CCM
authenticated encrypt
KAT (A3235)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
Power up
AES-CCM
authenticated decrypt
KAT (A3235)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
Power up
AES-CCM
authenticated encrypt
KAT (A3239)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
Power up
AES-CCM
authenticated decrypt
KAT (A3239)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
Power up
AES-GCM
authenticated encrypt
KAT (A6768)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
Power up
AES-GCM
authenticated decrypt
KAT (A6768)
256 bits KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
Power up
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Re
seed KAT (A6768)
AES-128 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Instantiate,
Generate,
and
Reseed
KATs
Power Up
Page 73 of 81
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5) KAT
(A6768)
P-256
curve
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA
SigGen
KAT
Power Up
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5) KAT
(A6768)
P-256
curve
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA
SigVer
KAT
Power Up
Entropy Source RCT
Start-up Health Tests
Repetitio
n Count
Test
(RCT)
RCT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
Entropy Source APT
Start-up Health Tests
Adaptive
Proportio
n Test
(APT)
APT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
Entropy Source RCT
Continuous Health
Tests
Repetitio
n Count
Test
(RCT)
RCT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performed
continuou
sly as
entropy
source is
active
Entropy Source APT
Continuous Health
Tests
Adaptive
Proportio
n Test
(APT)
APT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performed
continuou
sly as
entropy
source is
active
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
(A6768)
SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA-1
Power Up
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
(A6769)
SHA-1 KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA-1
Power up
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A6768)
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-256
Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A6769)
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-256
Power up
Page 74 of 81
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A6769)
SHA2-
384
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-384
Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A6768)
SHA2-
512
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-512
Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A6769)
SHA2-
512
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-512
Power up
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A6768)
P-256
Curve
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Primitive Z
KAT
Power Up
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A6768)
MODP-
2048
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
Primitive Z
KAT
Power Up
KDF IKEv2 KAT
(A6768)
N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
KDF SNMP KAT
(A6768)
N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
KDF SP800-108 KAT
(A6768)
N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
KDF SSH KAT (A6768) N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5) KAT (A8586)
RSA
3072 bit
modulus
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
RSA
SigGen
KAT
Power Up
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5) KAT (A6768)
2048 bit
modulus
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
RSA
SigGen
KAT
Power Up
Page 75 of 81
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5) KAT (A6768)
2048 bit
modulus
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
RSA
SigVer
KAT
Power Up
SHA2-384 KAT (A6768) Output
size: 384
bits
KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 KAT (A6768)
N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
TLS v1.3 KDF KAT
(A6768)
N/A KAT CAST Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power Up
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
5) PCT (A6768)
2048 bit
Modulus
PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
RSA Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A6768)
Curve P-
256 with
SHA2-
256
PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A6768)
MODP-
2048
PCT PCT Module
is in
N/A Performs
all
Page 76 of 81
RUCKUS Wireless LLC
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
normal
state
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
Firmware Load Test RSA
4096
SigVer
with
SHA2-
384
Signatur
e
Verificati
on
SW/F
W
Load
Module
is in
normal
state
RSA 4096
SigVer with
SHA2-384
When
firmware
has been
uploaded
to the
module
Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6768)
RSA signature
verification
SW/FW Integrity Recommend 60
Days
Reboot
Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC encrypt KAT
(A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CBC decrypt KAT
(A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CBC encrypt KAT
(A6769)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CBC decrypt KAT
(A6769)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CCM authenticated
encrypt KAT (A3235)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CCM authenticated
decrypt KAT (A3235)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CCM authenticated
encrypt KAT (A3239)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Page 77 of 81
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CCM authenticated
decrypt KAT (A3239)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM authenticated
encrypt KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM authenticated
decrypt KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Reseed
KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Entropy Source RCT Start-
up Health Tests
RCT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Entropy Source APT Start-
up Health Tests
APT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Entropy Source RCT
Continuous Health Tests
RCT CAST N/A N/A
Entropy Source APT
Continuous Health Tests
APT CAST N/A N/A
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A6768) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A6769) KAT CAST Recommended
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A6769)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A6769)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A6769)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A6768) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KDF SNMP KAT (A6768) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KDF SP800-108 KAT
(A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KDF SSH KAT (A6768) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Page 78 of 81
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A8586)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
SHA2-384 KAT (A6768) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
KAT (A6768)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
TLS v1.3 KDF KAT (A6768) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)
PCT (A6768)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A6768)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A6768)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Firmware Load Test Signature
Verification
SW/FW Load N/A N/A
Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Hard
Error
State
If self-test tests fail, the
module is put into the
hard error state and the
module automatically
reboots
Pre-Operational Firmware
Integrity Test
AES-CBC encrypt KAT
(A6768)
AES-CBC decrypt KAT
(A6768)
AES-CBC encrypt KAT
(A6769)
AES-CBC decrypt KAT
(A6769)
AES-CCM authenticated
encrypt KAT (A3235)
AES-CCM authenticated
decrypt KAT (A3235)
AES-CCM authenticated
encrypt KAT (A3239)
AES-CCM authenticated
decrypt KAT (A3239)
AES-GCM authenticated
encrypt KAT (A6768)
AES-GCM authenticated
Reboot the
module
System
Halt
Page 79 of 81
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
decrypt KAT (A6768)
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Reseed
KAT (A6768)
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A6768)
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)
KAT (A6768)
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A6768)
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A6769)
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A6768)
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A6769)
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A6769)
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A6768)
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A6769)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3
KAT (A6768)
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3
KAT (A6768)
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A6768)
KDF SNMP KAT (A6768)
KDF SP800-108 KAT (A6768)
KDF SSH KAT (A6768)
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) KAT
(A8586)
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) KAT
(A6768)
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) KAT
(A6768)
SHA2-384 KAT (A6768)
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT
(A6768)
TLS v1.3 KDF KAT (A6768)
Soft
Error
State
If any of the less severe
self-tests fail, the module
will be put into the soft
error state where the
failed self-tests are
retried until passed and
an error indicator
provided.
Entropy Source RCT Start-up
Health Tests
Entropy Source APT Start-up
Health Tests
Entropy Source RCT
Continuous Health Tests
Entropy Source APT
Continuous Health Tests
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)
PCT (A6768)
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3
The self-
test will be
retried.
Log
message
Page 80 of 81
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
PCT (A6768)
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3
PCT (A6768)
Firmware Load Test
Table 27: Error States
If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the Module reports the error and enters the Error
state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited.
The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the Module and perform the self-
tests, including the pre-operational integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The Module will
only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational integrity test
and the conditional CASTs.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The Module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and
powering the Module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure
may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The module meets all the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-3. The Crypto Officer must
configure and enforce the following initialization steps. Operating this module without
maintaining the following settings will put the module into a non-compliant state.
Physical Security: The Crypto Officer must first place the Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs) to
the module as show in section 7.
Module Initialization and Configuration for Approved Mode:
The module is not initialized upon receipt and must be configured to operate in Approved
Mode by explicitly enabling it. The module is intended to operate exclusively in Approved
Mode. Refer to the following configuration guidance to ensure proper setup.
Access to mode selection requires the command-line interface (CLI) and is limited to the
Cryptographic Officer. The module’s mode status is displayed after login.
When an Access Point (AP) joins a SmartZone controller, it automatically inherits the
controller's current mode. If an AP operating in Approved Mode joins a controller with
Approved Mode disabled, the AP’s Approved Mode is also disabled. Conversely, if a
controller in Approved Mode is joined by an AP with Approved Mode disabled, the
controller will enable Approved Mode on the AP. If both the AP and controller are
already operating in the same mode, the AP's mode remains unchanged.
Although not recommended, if needed to disable the Approved Mode, the CO must
disable the Approved mode via the controller. Once this is done, the AP will be
Page 81 of 81
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reconfigured and reset. From then on, the AP can be configured to use both Approved
and Non-Compliant algorithms.
To bring the module back to the Approved mode, the CO must enable the Approved
mode via the controller. Once this is done, the AP will be reconfigured and reset. From
then on, the AP can be configured to only use Approved algorithms.
Note: To maintain compliance, APs must only be connected to a SmartZone
controller operating in Approved Mode.
To connect the module to a SmartZone controller, execute the following command:
set scg <ip-address-of-controller>
The module will initiate a connection to the approved mode controller. To verify the
connection status, use the following command:
get scg
The module will connect to the SmartZone controller and adopt the configuration given
by the controller.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
No specific Administrator guidance.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
No specific Non-Administrator guidance.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A for this module.