FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
ST-012
TrellisWare Technologies, Inc.
TW-900/950 TSM Shadow and TW-870/875
TSM Ghost FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary
Security Policy
Document
Revision:
1.0
H.W.
Version:
ASY0750164
Rev.C
ASY0750090
Rev.C
ASY0750203
Rev.B
ASY0750220
Rev.B
S.W.
Version:
N/A
F.W.
Version:
6.1.6-fips-b2
Copyright © 2021 TrellisWare Technologies, Inc.
May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
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Copyright © 2021 TrellisWare Technologies, Inc.
May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
ST-012
October 20, 2021
Revision History
Document Revision Date Description
1.0 10/20/2021 Initial release
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FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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October 20, 2021
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 Module Identification.................................................................................................... 4
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY........................................................................................ 4
2.1 Module Block Diagrams ............................................................................................... 8
2.2 Excluded Components................................................................................................10
3 ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................11
4 SECURITY LEVEL SPECIFICATION.................................................................................13
5 PHYSICAL PORTS AND LOGICAL INTERFACES ...........................................................14
6 SECURITY RULES ............................................................................................................16
7 CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS, PUBLIC KEYS, AND PRIVATE KEYS................18
7.1 List of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and Public Keys.......................................18
7.2 Key Generation...........................................................................................................19
7.3 Key Storage................................................................................................................19
7.4 Zeroization..................................................................................................................19
7.5 Initializing Modules Received from the Factory ...........................................................20
7.6 Reinitializing Modules After Zeroization ......................................................................21
8 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY........................................................22
9 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY............................................................................................23
10 ALGORITHMS ...................................................................................................................26
10.1 APPROVED ALGORITHMS .......................................................................................26
10.2 ALLOWED ALGORITHMS..........................................................................................26
10.3 NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS ..............................................................................27
11 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES .....................................................................................28
12 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ........................................................................................29
13 EMI/EMC............................................................................................................................29
14 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ...................................................................29
Page 4 of 29
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FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
ST-012
October 20, 2021
1 INTRODUCTION
The TrellisWare Technologies, Inc TW-900/950 TSM Shadow and TW-870/875 TSM Ghost
Cryptographic Modules, F.W. Version 6.1.6-fips-b2, are multi-chip standalone cryptographic
modules designed to convert Plaintext Data to/from Ciphertext data using AES256-CTR mode.
The modules also authenticate Crypto Officer access using a RSA2048/SHA256 Certificate.
The modules support distinct operator roles: Crypto Officer (CO) and User. Additionally, the
module supports an unauthenticated Human Operator role. These are discussed further below.
1.1 Module Identification
The modules described in this document are identified by a Product ordering numbering. The
product label on the module case is applied in the factory and identifies the module by
Assembly number. The following table provides a mapping of the Product number to Assembly
number.
Table 1: Mapping of Product Numbers to Assembly Numbers
Product
Ordering
Number
Product
Description
HW
Assembly
Number
HW
Revision
FW
Version
TW-950
TSM Shadow Radio. Handheld
Cryptographic module, with Keypad/LCD
ASY0750164 C
6.1.6-
fips-b2
TW-900
TSM Shadow Radio. Handheld
Cryptographic module, no Keypad/LCD
ASY0750090 C
6.1.6-
fips-b2
TW-875
TSM Ghost Radio. Embeddable
Cryptographic module, internal battery
ASY0750203 B
6.1.6-
fips-b2
TW-870
TSM Ghost Radio. Embeddable
Cryptographic module, no internal battery
ASY0750220 B
6.1.6-
fips-b2
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY
For the TW-900/950 TSM Shadow and TW-870/875 TSM Ghost, the physical cryptographic
boundary is defined as the module case.
 Figure 2-1 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-950 TSM Shadow.
 Figure 2-2 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-900 TSM Shadow.
 Figure 2-3 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-875 TSM Ghost.
 Figure 2-4 below shows the physical cryptographic boundary of the TW-870 TSM Ghost.
The cryptographic boundary does not require any caps or covers on connectors.
 The Red and Blue arrows in the figures show the locations of the Tamper Evidence, further
discussed in Section 7.5 below.
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ST-012
October 20, 2021
Figure 2-1: TW-950 TSM Shadow Module
Size: 4.54" (H) x 2.76"
(W) x 0.90" (D)
Top
Bottom
Right
Left
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ST-012
October 20, 2021
Figure 2-2: TW-900 TSM Shadow Module
Size: 4.54" (H) x 2.76"
(W) x 0.90" (D)
Top
Bottom
Right
Left
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October 20, 2021
Figure 2-3: TW-875 TSM Ghost Module
Size: 4.06" (H) x 2.50" (W) x 1.46" (D)
Top
Bottom
Page 8 of 29
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October 20, 2021
Figure 2-4: TW-870 TSM Ghost Module
2.1 Module Block Diagrams
The figures below show a simplified block diagram depicting major hardware components of the
cryptographic modules, component interconnections, Plaintext data paths, Ciphertext data paths,
Non-security Human Operator features and Crypto Officer control paths.
 Figure 2-5 below is the Block Diagram for the TW-900/950 TSM Shadow modules.
o Note that the Keypad/LCD interface is available on the TW-950 Only.
 Figure 2-6 below is the Block Diagram for the TW-870/875 TSM Ghost modules.
o Note that the RF Antenna connector type on the TW-875 is a TNC jack, while the TW-
870 is a SMA jack.
o Also, the LCD interface and internal battery are present on the TW-875 only. The LCD
interface provides non-security status only.
All modules run the same Firmware. They differ only in case size and variations in connectors
and controls mounted on the case.
Size: 4.06" (H) x 2.25" (W) x 0.62" (D)
Top
Bottom
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October 20, 2021
Figure 2-5: TW-900/950 TSM Shadow Module Block Diagram
Ciphertext
CPU
RAM
Civilian GPS
Audio Codec
SD Video
Digitizer
Right Side
Top Cap
Keypad/
LCD
(TW-950
Only)
Ethernet PHY
RF
Ant
Crypto Boundary
FPGA
(AES-CTR
Crypto)
RF
XCVR
Bottom
Cap
(Power)
Ciphertext
Data In/Out
Display (Status Out)
Keypad (User Control In)
Knob: On/Off, Voice Channel
Plaintext Data In/Out, CO Control In, Status Out
GPS RF
GPS
Ant
Power
Input
LED
HD Video Data In
Ethernet
TSM RF
(Ciphertext
Data In/Out)
Knob
Left Side
Buttons
USB-Ethernet
Conn
CO Web
Apps
(HTTPS)
Flash Memory
AES Key
RSA Cert
FW Image
I/O
Micro
Controller
Control
RF
Micro
Controller
Control
Control
Audio/
Data
SMA
TNC
Front
Panel
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October 20, 2021
Figure 2-6: TW-870/875 TSM Ghost Module Block Diagram
2.2 Excluded Components
There are two (2) additional microcontrollers within the Cryptographic Boundary which have no
security functions.
 The I/O Micro Controller is used to service the Human Operator controls on the module
case.
 The RF Micro Controller is used to control the RF Transceiver settings (e.g. Frequency,
Bandwidth, Power Control, Tx/Rx switching).
These controllers have no access to Plaintext, Ciphertext and CSP storage or data paths and
thus cannot compromise the module's security.
Ciphertext
CPU
RAM
Civilian GPS
Audio Codec
Top
Cap
LCD
(TW-875
Only)
RF
Ant
Crypto Boundary
FPGA
(AES-CTR
Crypto)
RF
XCVR
Ciphertext
Data In/Out
Control
Aux (User Control In)
On/Off (User Control In)
Headphone
GPS RF
GPS
Audio/
Data
Power
Input
LED
TSM RF
(Ciphertext
Data In/Out)
Btn
Bottom
Cap
Btn
TW-870
is SMA,
TW-875 is
TNC
PWR
Conn
Plaintext Data In/Out, CO Control In, Status Out
USB-Ethernet
CO Web
Apps
(HTTPS)
Flash Memory
AES Key
RSA Cert
FW Image
I/O
Micro
Controller
Control
On/Off Control
RF
Micro
Controller
Control
Control
Internal
Battery
(TW-875 only)
SMA
Page 11 of 29
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FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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October 20, 2021
3 ACRONYMS
The following table specifies acronyms related to the cryptographic module that are referenced
in this document.
Table 2: Specification of Acronyms and their Descriptions
Term Definition Description
AES Advanced Encryption
Standard
See FIPS 197. Developed by Vincent Rijmen and
Joan Daemen, who submitted a proposal to NIST
during the AES selection process circa 2001
ANSI American National
Standards Institute
Private nonprofit organization that oversees the
development of voluntary consensus standard
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation Program
Provides validation testing of Approved
cryptographic algorithms and their individual
components. Cryptographic algorithm validation is a
prerequisite of cryptographic module validation
CMVP Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
A joint American and Canadian security
accreditation program for cryptographic modules
CO Crypto/Cryptographic
Officer
An individual assigned to configure a FIPS 140-2
Approved Cryptographic Module
CRC Cyclic-Redundancy
Check
Typically, 3 to 64 bits. Error detection, but no
correction. Not suitable as a signature hash
CSP Critical Security
Parameters
For example, Keys and Certificates
CT Ciphertext Encrypted data
CTR Counter In this context, a type of AES cipher using a counter
as the key. Counter is typically initialized using a
shared key.
ECB Electronic Code Book In the AES context, a cipher operation is done on
each block of 16-bytes
EMC Electro-Magnetic
Compatibility
Device design features to ensure co-existence with
other electronic devices
EMI Electro-Magnetic
Interference
Device design features to ensure proper operation
in the presence of interfering signals from other
electronic devices or nature
FIPS Federal Information
Processing Standards
Publication
A set of publications issued by NIST
FW Firmware Software used in embedded systems
GPS Global Positioning
System
A satellite-based radio-navigation system operated
by the US Air Force. It provides geolocation and
time information
GUI Graphical User Interface Allows users to interact with electronic devices
through graphical icons
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Term Definition Description
HTTPS Secure Hypertext
Transfer Protocol
HTTP is a text-based messaging method that is
used to access Web pages. Security is added using
TLS, usernames and passwords.
HW Hardware Electronics circuit boards, components and modules
IP Internet Protocol As used herein. May also mean 'Intellectual
Property' in other documents
KAT Known Answer Test Part of power-on self-tests of CSPs
LCD Liquid Crystal Display Flat-screen display technology
LED Light Emitting Diode As used herein, an indicator lamp. May be single-
color or multi-colored
N No If not part of a word
N/A Not Available or Not
Applicable
Can be interpreted as Don't Care
NIST National Institute of
Standards and
Technology
US Government agency which (among other things)
defines requirements for and certifies compliance of
Cryptographic Modules
OTAC Over-the-Air Clearing Wirelessly disable a key (but not destroyed)
OTAR Over-the-Air Rekeying Wirelessly change a key
OTAZ Over-the-Air Zeroing Wirelessly zero a key (must be reloaded)
PC Personal Computer Windows, Mac, Chrome or Linux
PLI Position/Location
Information
Small packets of formatted data typically added to
data streams
PT Plaintext Non-encrypted machine or human readable data
PTT Push-To-Talk Button used to start sending voice over a Radio link
R Read If not used as part of a word
RF Radio Frequency Synonym for wireless communications
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Public key crypto algorithm named after its inventors
RW Read and Write If not used as part of a word
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm See FIPS PUB 180-2
SMA Sub-Miniature version A Radio Connector developed in the 1960s
SSL Secure Socket Layer Older version of TLS, but term is still used even
when TLS is actually being used
SW Software Can be applicable to embedded, desktop or
mainframe computers
TBD To Be Determined Indicates details will be added later
TN Technical Note Supplemental technical documents
TNC Threaded Neill–
Concelman
Radio Connector invented in the late 1950s, named
after its inventors
TLS Transport Layer Security Provides communications security over a computer
network
v or V Version If not used as part of a word
W Write If not used as part of a word
Y Yes If not used as part of a word
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4 SECURITY LEVEL SPECIFICATION
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS
140-2, as shown in the table below.
Table 3: Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks None
Overall Level 2
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5 PHYSICAL PORTS AND LOGICAL INTERFACES
The interfaces for the cryptographic boundary include physical and logical interfaces. The physical
interfaces provided by each module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces:
Data Input (DI), Data Output (DO), Control Input (CI), and Status Output (SO). The mapping of
FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces to module physical interfaces is provided in the following tables.
The physical ports are identified in the module photos above - Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2, Figure
2-3, Figure 2-4. The ports are also shown in the block diagrams above - Figure 2-5 and Figure
2-6.
FIPS 140-2
Logical
Interfaces
Physical Ports
Data Input
RF Antenna Connector, GPS Antenna Connector, Audio/Data Connector,
Right-Side Connector Interface
Data Output RF Antenna Connector, Audio/Data Connector, Right-Side Connector Interface
Control Input
RF Antenna Connector, Audio/Data Connector, Right-Side Connector Interface,
Knob, Left-Side Volume Buttons, Left-Side Push-to-Talk Button, LCD, Keypad,
Pushbuttons
Status Output
RF Antenna Connector, Audio/Data Connector, Right-Side Connector Interface,
LCD, Status Indicator LED, Pushbuttons
Power Power Connector, Internal Battery
The table below and notes that follow provide more details about each port, including:
 A description of each port
 The operator roles supported by each port
 Which ports transfer plaintext or ciphertext
 Which ports support CSP input
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Table 4: Logical Interface/Physical Interface Mapping
Physical
Port
Description
Human
Operator
Control
Crypto
Officer
Control
Input
User
Plaintext
Data
I/O
User
Ciphertext
Data
I/O
Status
Out
Power
CSP
I/O
RF Antenna
Connector
Note 1
SMA (TW-870) or TNC
(TW-875/900/950) RF
connector
CI
Note 1a
DI,
DO
SO
GPS
Antenna
Connector
Civilian GPS antenna
SMA connector
DI
Audio/Data
Connector
Note 2
12-pin audio, data in/out
connector
CI
Note 3
CI DI,
DO
SO
DI
Only
Right-Side
Connector
Interface Note
2, 4
Multi-pin connector for
dongle accessories
CI
DI,
DO
SO
DI
Only
Knob Note 4
16-position multi-
function Power/ Channel
Select
CI
Left-Side
Volume
Buttons Note 4
Volume up/down push
buttons
CI
LCD Note 5
LCD display SO
Keypad Note 6 Standard touchtone-
style numeric keypad
CI
Status
Indicator
LED
Multi-color LED provides
network status, signal
strength and hop count
SO
Pushbuttons
Note 7
Buttons for On/Off,
battery and RF status
CI CI SO
Power
Connector
Battery/power adapter CI
Internal
Battery Note 8
Internal rechargeable
battery
CI
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Notes:
1. All data I/O on the RF Antenna is Ciphertext.
a. The Crypto Officer can perform over-the-air Zeroization, but not rekeying.
2. All data I/O on the Audio/Data connector and Side connector is Plaintext.
3. The Audio/Data connector has a Push-to-Talk (PTT) input pin for Audio transmit.
4. These ports are present on TW-900/950 TSM Shadow modules only.
5. The LCD is present on TW-950 TSM Shadow and TW-875 TSM Ghost modules only.
6. The Keypad is present on TW-950 TSM Shadow modules only.
7. Buttons are only used for non-security actions - On/Off, Volume and to report Non-security
status (Link Quality and Battery).
a. Security failure status is perpetual and requires no Human Operator actions.
 No additional security status results from use of the buttons.
b. TW-900/950 TSM Shadow: Volume buttons are located on the left-side of the module.
 Press each button individually to change the Audio volume.
 Press the two Volume buttons at the same time to view Link Quality on the Status
LED for 5 seconds.
o The LED emits colors ranging from blue (best), green, yellow, to red (worse).
c. TW-870/875 TSM Ghost: On/Off and Aux buttons are located on the bottom cap.
 Press the On/Off for 3 seconds to turn the module on/off.
 Press the On/Off button for <1 second to view Battery status for 5 seconds.
o The LED emits colors ranging from blue (best), green, yellow, to red (worse).
 Press the Aux button for <1 second to view the Link Quality for 5 seconds.
o The LED emits colors ranging from blue (best), green, yellow, to red (worse).
8. The internal battery is present on TW-875 TSM Ghost modules only.
6 SECURITY RULES
This section specifies the security rules under which the cryptographic module shall operate:
1. The cryptographic module shall provide distinct operator roles:
 User
 Crypto Officer
 Unauthenticated Human Operator
2. The cryptographic module shall provide role-based authentication.
3. The cryptographic module shall clear previous authentications on power cycle or closure of
Web Browser GUI window.
4. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to
any cryptographic services.
5. The cryptographic module shall perform Power-up self-tests:
 Integrity tests -
o FW Environment Integrity test, CRC-32.
o File system FW Integrity test, SHA-256.
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o FPGA FW Integrity test, SHA-256.
 Security self-tests -
o AES-256 CTR Encrypt and Decrypt Known Answer Tests (KAT).
o RSA 2048 Verify KAT (includes SHA-256 KAT).
 Critical Functions tests - none.
6. Power-up self-tests do not require any operator action.
 During the power-on sequence, the Status LED will cycle through the following color
sequence - White, Red, Yellow, Light Blue, Blue, followed by self-test results.
 Self-test Pass/Fail indications shall be as follows:
o Success of all self-tests will be indicated by Green for ~10 seconds on the Status LED.
o Failure of Security self-tests will be indicated by a Red/Blue pattern on the Status
LED, repeating twice per second.
o On failure of FW Environment CRC-32 test, the Green color on the Status LED will not
be displayed. Instead, the module will display a solid White color on the Status LED.
o For all failures, the operator can attempt to power-cycle the module.
 If the module returns to this state, the module must be RMA'd and sent back to
TrellisWare Technologies, Inc.
7. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power-up self-test
by cycling power.
8. When loading new Firmware, the cryptographic module shall perform a Firmware load test
on the new Firmware.
 The Firmware load test uses RSA 2048 with SHA-256 Digital Signature Verification.
 Failure of the Firmware load test will be indicated by a status message on the
TrellisWare TSM Software Update Tool screen and the Status LED will blink
Red/Green, repeating twice per second.
9. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
10. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
11. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
12. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
13. The module does not support Cryptographic bypass.
14. The module does not support cryptographic key generation.
15. The module supports electronically-distributed manual key entry using supplied applications
that only function when the module is in Authenticated CO mode. This is covered below in
Section 7.6.
16. The module does not output plaintext Keys or CSPs.
17. The following TrellisWare MMC web app command and related steps shall not be used in
FIPS-approved operation - 'Certificate Update -> Generate Certificate'.
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 If the TrellisWare MMC command is accidentally performed by the CO, the module will
still be in FIPS-approved operation, as the generated certificate will not be used as a
CSP without also performing the following disallowed manual steps.
 The CO shall not add 'generate.p12' to Firefox or other browser used to access the
module's web apps, as the module will no longer be in FIPS-approved operation.
o Note: Adding a certificate to a browser requires several manual steps and could
not happen by accident.
18. When using the Crypto Officer role, the module shall be on a LAN with sufficient security
controls to ensure that no other devices are analyzing or storing network traffic. It is
recommended that the LAN have only one PC with Trellisware tools and one or more radios to
be configured.
7 CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS, PUBLIC KEYS, AND PRIVATE KEYS
This section shows all Critical Security Parameters (CSPs), Public Keys, and Private Keys. The
process of key generation, storage, and zeroization is also described.
7.1 List of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and Public Keys
The modules contain the following CSPs:
Table 5: List of CSPs and Public Keys
Algorithm Name Type Description
AES-256
CTR
Encryption/
Decryption
Network
Key
Private
Key
 AES-256 CTR mode encryption and decryption of network traffic.
 This key authenticates the User of the module.
 The Crypto Officer may store up to 8 Network Keys on a crypto
module, but only one key is used at a time.
 Generation: N/A
 Storage: Plaintext in eMMC (Flash), File System, RAM, and FPGA
 Zeroization: Actively overwritten via “FIPS Zeroize (OTAC)”
RSA-2048
with SHA-
256
CO Public
Key
Certificate
Public
Key
 CO Certificate contains an RSA 2048 bit key used to authenticate
Crypto Officer role.
 Generation: N/A
 Storage: Plaintext in eMMC (Flash), File System, RAM
 Zeroization: N/A
RSA-2048
with SHA-
256
TWT CA
Public Key
Certificate
Public
Key
 TrellisWare Technologies, Inc. CA Certificate contains an RSA
2048 bit key used to authenticate the Crypto Officer’s certificate
(certificate chain verification).
 Generation: N/A
 Storage: Plaintext in eMMC (Flash), File System, RAM
 Zeroization: N/A
RSA-2048
with SHA-
256
FW Load
Public Key Public
Key
 RSA 2048 bit public key used to authenticate Firmware Load.
 Generation: N/A
 Storage: Plaintext in eMMC (Flash), File System, RAM
 Zeroization: N/A
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7.2 Key Generation
The modules do not generate Keys. To generate Network Keys and CO Certificates for the
modules, a supplied Windows PC Application must be used - TrellisWare TSM Management
Tool. This tool is outside the boundary and out-of-scope of this validation.
 The required tool is issued to the Crypto Officer(s) only by TrellisWare Technologies, Inc. via
the TrellisWare support website (login account required).
 The tool will install and run on any Windows 7 or 10 PC.
TrellisWare Tech Note TN-0091– TSM Management Tool (v.1.0.3.16) is the User Guide for the
tool and is available to existing customers via the TrellisWare support website or to prospective
customers by contacting TrellisWare customer service.
7.3 Key Storage
The TrellisWare TSM Management Tool is also used to download and store Keys in the
modules' Flash memory. Keys are stored within the module as Plaintext in eMMC (Flash), File
System, RAM, and FPGA.
The CO Public Key Certificate shown in Table 5 above is used by the tool and module to verify
that the transferred key has a valid signature. If the signature is not valid, the module will not
store the new key.
The download occurs from the PC to any Plaintext I/O port listed in Table 4 above. The PC must
be connected to one Plaintext I/O port on the module. Note that all Plaintext I/O ports on the
module are wired connections only. The required cables are not included with each module and
must be purchased separately.
 Here is a list of the currently available cables that can be used with the TrellisWare TSM
Management Tool:
o P/N TW-1650
o P/N TW-1665
o P/N TW-1670
o P/N TW-1212
o P/N TW-1230
o P/N TW-1250
o P/N TW-1255
When using the TrellisWare TSM Management Tool, the module shall be on a LAN with
sufficient security controls to ensure that no other devices are analyzing or recording network
traffic. It is recommended that the LAN have only one PC with Trellisware tools and one or more
radios to be configured.
7.4 Zeroization
Zeroization is done by using the supplied TTV-C Web Application, available to Crypto
Officer(s) only. This tool is outside the boundary and out-of-scope of this validation. The
required tool is issued to the Crypto Officer(s) only by TrellisWare Technologies, Inc.
Page 20 of 29
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The application shows a list of all modules connected on the RF Wireless network. Any module
listed can be Zeroized by selecting 'Perform Clean', this will invoke the FIPS Zeroize (OTAC)
service. To re-initialize the module, follow the steps in 'Reinitializing Modules After
Zeroization' below.
7.5 Initializing Modules Received from the Factory
To operate in a FIPS-Approved mode, the following actions are required by a Crypto Officer
when modules are received from the Factory:
 Apply anti-tamper sealant, TrellisWare P/N 800AAA0036 to all access fasteners.
 Load the FIPS-Approved firmware, a non-default CO Certificate and non-default Network
Key(s).
7.5.1 Applying anti-tamper sealant
Obtain TrellisWare P/N 800AAA0036, 'Adhesive, Tamper-Poof Sealant, White'. Since one tube
is sufficient for many radios, it is not included with every module. The goal is to cover the tool
mating surfaces ('wells') on all access screws and a portion of the connector retaining nuts,
such that it will be obvious if tampering has occurred.
 Refer to Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2, Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4 above for required locations
and examples of the proper technique for applying the sealant.
o In the figures, the Red arrows indicate access screws that require sealant, and the
Blue arrows indicate connector retaining nuts that require sealant.
o The table below summarizes the number of locations requiring sealant for access
screws and connector retaining nuts per module type.
 Clean the application areas of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying.
 A magnifying glass or microscope is useful for controlling the application of the sealant.
o Drying time is 20 seconds.
 Excess sealant may be removed with a wipe and/or Q-tip soaked with Isopropyl Alcohol.
o Try to wipe each application within ~20 seconds for best results.
 Note: When using solvents, extinguish all ignition sources.
o Excess dried sealant may also be carefully scraped off as desired for aesthetics.
 Thicker sealant coverage of the fasteners is also acceptable if preferred, up to 1/8"
thickness.
o However, a thicker application may become chipped and appear to be tampered
when in fact no tampering has occurred.
 Standard shelf life of the sealant is 12 months from date of manufacture when stored in a
refrigerator.
o Shelf life is reduced to 9 months when stored at 60-80°C (16-27°C).
o The tube of sealant must be stored tip down.
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October 20, 2021
Table 6: Required Locations for Tamper Evidence per Module Type
Module
Quantity of
Access Screw
Sealant Locations
Quantity of
Retaining Nut
Sealant Locations
TW-950 TSM Shadow 19 2
TW-900 TSM Shadow 19 2
TW-875 TSM Ghost 8 3
TW-870 TSM Ghost 14 3
7.5.2 Load FIPS-Approved firmware, non-default CO Certificate and non-default
Network Key(s)
The modules do not ship with the FIPS-Approved firmware. Also, the modules ship from the
factory with a default CO Certificate and Network Key. To operate in a FIPS-approved state,
follow the steps in 'Reinitializing Modules After Zeroization' below.
7.6 Reinitializing Modules After Zeroization
The Crypto Officer must use the following procedure to re-initialize a module in the FIPS Approved
mode of operation:
 Setup
o The Crypto Officer shall be physically present and in control of the module.
o The Crypto Officer shall inspect the module as per Section 12 in this policy to ensure
the Physical Security Mechanisms are not tampered.
o For all steps in this section, the Crypto Officer shall connect directly to the
Audio/Data Connector physical port available on all module types.
 On the TW-900/950 TSM Shadow modules, the Right-Side Connector
physical port may also be used.
 Remote access is a strict violation of this Security Policy.
 Cycle power using the Channel knob on the TW-900/950 TSM Shadow or Power button on
the TW-870/875 TSM Ghost.
 Verify the FIPS validated firmware 6.1.6-fips-b2 is installed on the module.
o Use the “Firmware Upgrade” service. The TrellisWare TSM Software Update Tool
provides Crypto Officer access to the service.
o The Crypto Officer shall authenticate into the module using the default CO
Certificate.
o Note that the module is not shipped from the factory with the FIPS validated firmware
6.1.6-fips-b2.
 Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this
validation and requires a separate FIPS 140‐2 validation.
o If firmware 6.1.6-fips-b2 is not installed, the CO shall install the firmware using the
tool.
 The Crypto Officer shall replace the default certificate.
o Manually load a new CO Certificate on the module via electronic distribution manual
key entry.
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 Use the Security Configuration service "Certificate Update" API. The
TrellisWare TSM Software Update Tool provides Crypto Officer access to
the API.
 The Crypto Officer shall replace the default Network Key.
o Manually load a new Network Key onto the module via electronic distribution manual
key entry.
 Use the Security Configuration service “TWW Configuration” API. The
required API is called from the TrellisWare TSM Management Tool, a
Windows PC application supplied with the module.
 The Crypto Officer shall authenticate into the module using the CO Public
Key.
 Power-cycle the module. The module will enter FIPS Approved mode of operation following
successful power up initialization.
o For FIPS Approved mode of operation, the Crypto Officer shall ensure the Module
LED is enabled by un-checking the 'Light Discipline' checkbox in the TrellisWare
MMC utility application. This tool is outside the boundary and out-of-scope of this
validation. The required tool is issued to the Crypto Officer(s) only by TrellisWare
Technologies, Inc. via the TrellisWare support website (login account required).
 Note: The module is shipped from the Factory with the LED enabled.
 Re-installing the FIPS Approved firmware enables the LED by default.
8 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY
The module supports distinct operator roles: Crypto Officer (CO) and User. Additionally, the
module supports an unauthenticated Human Operator role. These roles and the required
identification and authentication are described below.
Table 7: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication (FIPS 140-2 Table C1)
Role Description Authentication
Type
Authentication
Data
Crypto Officer (CO) This role accesses the module via Web
Browser for initialization and configuration of
the module. This role also has access to all
other services offered by the module.
Role-based CO Public Key
Certificate
User This role allows the module to perform FIPS-
approved Cryptographic data encryption/
decryption using Approved algorithms.
Role-based Network Key
Human Operator
(Non-security)
An unauthenticated operator can control
switches, dials, and other unauthenticated
services on the module.
None None
The strength of each implemented authentication mechanism is described below.
Table 8: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms (FIPS 140-2 Table C2)
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Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
CO Public Key
Certificate
 The RSA certificate contains a 2048-bit key signed with a SHA-256 hash
function. An RSA 2048-bit key provides an equivalent security strength of 112-
bits. Thus, the probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1 ÷ 2112, which
is less than the required 1/1,000,000 (~1/220).
 Each HTTPS attempt was observed to be 5024 bytes (40192 bits). At the
module's maximum 100 mbps rate, the maximum number of HTTPS attempts
per second is 100e6 ÷ 40192 bits, or 2488 per second, ignoring packet overhead.
Multiply x 60 = 149280 attempts per minute. Rounding up to the nearest power
of 2, assume 218 attempts per minute is possible via a script or automated attack.
The probability of a success with multiple attempts is 1 ÷ 2(112-18) => 1/294, which
is ~5.5 times better than the required 1/100,000 (~1/217).
Network Key  An AES key provides an equivalent security strength of 256-bits. The probability
that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is 1/2256,
which is less than the required 1/1,000,000 (~1/220).
 AES-256 output blocks are 128-bits in length. The Ciphertext output port is
capable of 16M bps maximum, or 16M ÷ 128 blocks/sec = 125K blocks/sec that
an attacker could analyze. Rounding up to a power of 2 = 131K (217) blocks per
second. Thus, the probability of a success is 1 ÷ 2(256-17) => 1/2239, which ~14
times better than the required 1/100,000 (~1/217).
9 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
The following table describes the services provided, along with which roles can access each
service.
Table 9: Services Authorized for Roles (FIPS 140-2 Table C3)
Crypto
Officer
User
Human
Operator
Service Description
X Crypto Officer Authentication Uses the CO Public Key Certificate to allow the CO to access
the unit for Security and Non-security configuration.
X Non-Security Configuration Configure non-security settings and Wideband RF settings.
X Security Configuration Enter and select the FIPS-140 CSP's - CO Public Key
Certificate and AES-256 CTR Network Key via electronic
distribution manual key. Prior to a certificate update, the
module is automatically zeroized.
X Packet Forwarding Provides packet transfer between the RF Ciphertext port and
Plaintext Ethernet ports. Packets are encrypted and decrypted
using the AES-256 Network Key.
X Packet Creation Provides Ciphertext packet creation from internal Plaintext
sources (GPS, Audio, Video). Packets are encrypted using the
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Crypto
Officer
User
Human
Operator Service Description
AES-256 Network Key. Encrypted packets are transmitted via
RF.
X Network Monitoring & Remote
Control
Monitor network and individual radios. Remote control of radio
non-security settings and stream control.
X Firmware Upgrade Upgrade firmware release.
Note: If non-FIPS validated firmware is loaded, the module is no
longer a FIPS validated module.
X
Note
1
Power-on Module Self-Tests Performs module’s power-up self-tests. If failing, enters Error
state.
X
Note
2
Module Status LED Provides Security and Non-Security Status LED indications.
X Module Status API Provides CO Non-security Status API service for PC, Android
and Web apps.
X FIPS Zeroize (OTAC) Remotely zeroize all CSPs in the module. Once zeroized, the
module must be reinitialized as described above.
X
Note
2
Manual Non-Security Configuration Selection of voice channel, volume and other non-security
configuration parameters using the manual controls on the unit.
Note 1. See Section 6, Security Rules for more details about Power-on Module Self-Tests.
Note 2. See Table 14 below for more details.
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The table below defines the relationship between access to CSPs or Public Keys and the different
module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
 R = Read: Role has privilege to read the CSP or Public Key.
 W = Write: Role has the privilege to write the CSP or Public Key.
 Z = Zeroize: Role has the privilege to zeroize the CSP or Public Key.
Table 10: Access Rights within Services (FIPS 140-2 Table C4)
Service
Network
Key
CO
Public
Key
Certificate
TWT
CA
Public
Key
Certificate
FW
Load
Public
Key
Crypto Officer Authentication R R
Non-Security Configuration Note 1 R R
Security Configuration RW RW R
Packet Forwarding R
Packet Creation R
Network Monitoring & Remote Control R R
Firmware Upgrade RW RW R
Power-on Module Self-Tests N/A N/A
Module Status LED N/A N/A
Module Status API R R
FIPS Zeroize (OTAC) Z N/A
Manual Non-Security Configuration Note 2
N/A N/A
Note 1. Non-security configuration that is done via PC, Android and Web applications requires
CO Authentication, as only a CO shall have access to these tools. This includes RF Settings,
Voice Settings, Video Streaming setup, IP Settings and Position-Location-Info (PLI) Settings.
Note 2. Manual configuration from the module's knobs and buttons does not require
Authentication. A Human Operator is permitted to do manual configuration.
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10 ALGORITHMS
10.1 APPROVED ALGORITHMS
The following table is a list of approved algorithms along with their corresponding CAVP
certificates, standards, modes/methods, key lengths, curves, or moduli, and how they are used.
Table 11: FIPS Approved Algorithms Used in the Module
CAVP
Cert. #
FIPS Approved
Algorithm
Standard Mode/
Method
Key
Len
Use
C1431 AES
FIPS 197 and
SP 800-38A
ECB1,
CTR
256-bits
RF Over-the-Air
Encryption/Decryption
C1430 RSA
FIPS 186-4 and
PKCS 1.5
RSA
Signature
Verification
2048-bits
For CO authentication and
firmware load
C1430 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-256
For CO authentication,
firmware load and integrity
tests at power-on
Note 1. AES-CTR mode uses ECB mode Encryption for both AES-CTR Encryption and
Decryption. Thus, it is typical to obtain approval for ECB Encryption together with AES-CTR.
10.2 ALLOWED ALGORITHMS
The following table is a list of allowed algorithms, caveats and how they are used.
Table 12: FIPS Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module
FIPS Allowed Algorithm Caveat Use
AES (“non-compliant”) No security
claimed1
Used internally and separate from AES
Cert # C1431. As per FIPS 140-2 IG 1.23,
this is used to “obfuscate” data using
proprietary implementations. All
obfuscated data is treated as plaintext.
HTTPS using SSL v2, SSL
v3, and SSL v3.1/TLS 1.2
using any ciphersuites
No security
claimed1
As per FIPS 140-2 IG 1.23, this is used to
support a secure channel between
applications/web browser to the module;
however, the module’s purpose is to
provide end-to-end secure
communications over an insecure
communications channel. Module does not
rely on the security of HTTPS for this.
 Certificate Update service
 Firmware Upgrade service
 RF Network Configuration service
 Module Status API service
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Note 1. CSPs cannot be read back from the module. Thus, these additional algorithms are not
considered part of the FIPS Cryptographic functionality. For FIPS, all internally stored CSPs are
considered plaintext.
10.3 NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS
The following table is a list of non-approved algorithms and how they are used.
Table 13: FIPS Non-Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module
FIPS Non-Allowed Algorithm
There are no Non-Allowed Algorithms used in the Module
Page 28 of 29
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11 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES
Within the Cryptographic boundary, the module provides only a FIPS Approved mode of
operation. The module will enter FIPS Approved mode following successful power up
initialization.
Switches, buttons and status LEDs exist on the outside surface of the module’s enclosure and
can only be used for unauthenticated non-security services.
 These services are available to the Human Operator role.
 The available non-security services are summarized in the table below.
 Not all services are available on every module type, as shown in the table.
Table 14: List of Unauthenticated Services
Non-Security Service Access
Method
Module
State
Human
Operator
Service
Attach/Remove Power Module Connector Off Manual Non-
Security Config
Attach Side Accessories Note 1
(TW-900/950 TSM Shadow only)
Module Connector Off Manual Non-
Security Config
Attach 12-pin Conn Cable Module Connector Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
Power On/Off
(TW-900/950 TSM Shadow only)
Module Knob Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
Power On/Off
(TW-870/875 TSM Ghost only)
Module Button Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
Change Voice Channel
(TW-900/950 TSM Shadow only)
Module Knob Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
Change Voice Volume
(TW-900/950 TSM Shadow only)
Module Buttons Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
Voice Transmit (PTT) Module 12-pin Conn Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
View RF Status
(TW-950 TSM Shadow only)
Module LCD Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
View RF Status Module LED Operating Module Status LED
View GPS Status
(TW-875 TSM Ghost, TW-950 TSM
Shadow only)
Module LCD Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
View Battery Status
(TW-875 TSM Ghost, TW-950 TSM
Shadow only)
Module LCD Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
View Battery Status
(TW-870/875 TSM Ghost only)
Module LED Operating Module Status LED
View Non-Security Settings
(TW-950 TSM Shadow only)
Module LCD Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
Change Non-Security on-the-fly
User Settings
(TW-950 TSM Shadow only)
Module LCD and
Keypad
Operating Manual Non-
Security Config
View LED Status Indicator Module LED Operating Module Status LED
Note 1. Side accessories do not access CSP's or Ciphertext data and use of the side
accessories cannot lead to a compromise of the module.
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12 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY
The module is of production quality. Tamper evident coating is applied to all screws on each
access panel by the Crypto Officer upon delivery. This makes it impossible to remove or move
aside the access panel without resulting in damage to the tamper evident coating. If tampering is
demonstrated, the local Crypto Officer is instructed to perform the zeroize operation prior to
discarding the module or returning it to the manufacturer.
Tamper is evident by the presence of any ‘dry joints’ or gaps between the adhesive and the
protected components, or other inconsistencies in the applications. Inspect screw heads and
connector nuts daily for chipped adhesive material. If any damage is present, remove the device
from service.
Table 15: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms (FIPS 140-2 Table C5)
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended
Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper Evident Coating Daily Inspect all screws and connector nuts. See
figures in Section 2 above. A magnifying
glass or camera can be used as an aid for
inspection.
13 EMI/EMC
The modules have been tested for RF Emissions and Electromagnetic Immunity per the
requirements and procedures in MIL-STD 461F.
14 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY
The following table specifies a security policy for mitigation of other attacks, including the
security mechanisms implemented to mitigate the attacks.
Table 16 - Mitigation of Other Attacks (FIPS 140-2 Table C6)
Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations
The module does not mitigate
other attacks
N/A N/A