



Security Policy: Motorola Solutions Astro Subscriber uMACE –FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2

Cryptographic module used in Motorola Solutions Astro APX-S 7000 and APX-S 7500 radios.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Scope

This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which the Motorola Solutions Astro Subscriber uMACE – FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2, herein identified as the Astro Subscriber uMACE, must operate. The module adheres to the FIPS 140-2 requirements. The rules include those derived from the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and those imposed additionally by Motorola Solutions, Inc. These rules, in total, define the interrelationship between the:

1. Module Operators,
2. Module Services, and
3. Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).

1.2 Definitions

ALGID	Algorithm Identifier
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CKR	Common Key Reference
CO	Cryptographic Officer or Crypto-Officer
CODEC	Coder/Decode
CPS	Customer Programming Software
CPLD	Complex Programmable Logic Device
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB	Electronic Code Book
EID	Encrypted Integrated Data
IV	Initialization Vector
KEK	Key Encryption Key
KID	Key Identifier
KLK	Key Loss Key
KMM	Key Management Message
KPK	Key Protection Key
KVL	Key Variable Loader
LFSR	Linear Feedback Shift Register
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MACE	Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine
NDRNG	Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OFB	Output Feedback
OMAP	Open Multimedia Applications Platform
OTAR	Over The Air Rekeying
TEK	Traffic Encryption Key
uMACE	microSD Compatible Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine

1.3 Overview

The Astro Subscriber uMACE provides secure key management, Over-the-Air-Rekeying (OTAR), and voice and data encryption for the following Motorola Solutions mobile and portable two-way radios:

- APX-S 7000 (portable)
- APX-S 7500 (mobile)

1.4 Astro Subscriber uMACE Implementation

The Astro Subscriber uMACE is implemented as a single-chip cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-2.

1.5 Astro Subscriber uMACE Hardware / Firmware Version Numbers

Family of Motorola μ Mace	FIPS Validated Cryptographic Module Hardware Version Number	FIPS Validated Cryptographic Module Firmware Version Number
AT58Z04	AT8358Z04	R01.06.57

The Astro Subscriber uMACE supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms which may be installed separately from uMACE firmware using the Program Update service. While the installation of AES may be done separately, for the purposes of this validation the module includes this firmware.

Approved Algorithm	Certificate Number	Part Number	Algorithm Firmware Version Numbers
AES-256 (ECB, CBC, OFB, GCM)	3415	AT8358Z04 (AT58Z04 Family)	R01.00.02
AES-256 (CFB)	3414	AT8358Z04 (AT58Z04 Family)	R01.00.03

Note: Either AES Firmware Version R01.00.02 or both R01.00.02 and R01.00.03 must be loaded for the Astro Subscriber uMACE to be in FIPS Approved mode.

1.6 Astro Subscriber uMACE Cryptographic Boundary




Figure 1: uMACE IC Die

The Astro Subscriber uMACE Cryptographic Boundary is drawn around the uMACE IC Die as shown below. The uMACE has an SSI port (used for Data, Control, Status, and OTAR Key data), a KVL port (used for Key Data, Control, and Status), and Power Connections.




Figure 2: Cryptographic Boundary

1.7 Ports and Interfaces

The Astro Subscriber uMACE provides the following physical ports and logical interfaces:

Table 1: Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Qty	Logical Interface Definition	Description
Serial Synchronous Interface (SSI)	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Data Input- Data Output- Control Input- Status Output	The main physical port provided by the module. It provides access to the majority of the supported interfaces.
Key Variable Loader (KVL)	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Data Input- Control Input- Status Output	This interface provides the input and output to a Key Variable Loader (KVL).
Self-test Indicator Interface	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Status Output	This interface provides status output to indicate all power-up self-tests completed successfully.
Power	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Power Input	This interface powers all circuitry.

2. FIPS 140-2 Security Levels

The Astro Subscriber uMACE can be configured to operate at FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 2. The table below shows the FIPS 140-2 Level of security met for each of the eleven areas specified within the FIPS 140-2 security requirements.

Table 2: Astro Subscriber uMACE Security Levels

FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section	Validated Level at overall Security Level 2
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	3
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
EMI / EMC	3
Self-Tests	2
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

3. FIPS 140-2 Approved Operational Modes

The Astro Subscriber uMACE can be configured to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation and a Non-FIPS Approved mode of operation. Documented below are the configuration settings that are required for the module to be used in a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode of operation at overall Security Level 2.

At any given time, the FIPS Status service can be used to determine whether the module is operating at overall Security Level 2 or in a non-FIPS Approved mode. Status is indicated by the FIPS STATUS RESPONSE message: Non-FIPS Compliance Mode or Level 2 FIPS Approved Mode.

3.1 Configuration Settings for operation at FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 2

Documented below are the actions and configuration settings required to enable FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 2.

1. Disable Motorola Data Communication Over The Air Rekeying (MDC OTAR). The Download Configuration Parameters service is used to configure this parameter in the module.
2. Disable Key Loss Key (KLK) generation. The Download Configuration Parameters service is used to configure this parameter in the module.
3. Enable Red Keyfill. When Red Keyfill is enabled, the module will allow keys to be entered in plaintext form;. The Download Configuration Parameters service is used to configure this parameter in the module.
4. Only Approved and Allowed algorithms installed. The module supports the following Approved algorithms:
 - AES-256 (Cert. #3415) –Used for encryption and decryption in the following Approved modes: OFB, ECB, and CBC.
 - AES-256 (Cert. #3414) –Used for encryption and decryption in the following Approved modes: 8-bit CFB.
 - AES-256 GCM (Cert. #3415) – Used for symmetric encryption / decryption of Encrypted Integrated Data (EID)
 - SHA-256 (Cert. #2822) – used for password hashing for internal password storage and digital signature verification during firmware integrity test and firmware load test
 - SHA-384 (Cert #2821)
 - HMAC/SHA-384 (Cert #2174)
 - RSA-2048 (Cert. #1747) – used for digital signature verification during firmware integrity test and firmware load test
 - ECDSA P-384 (Cert #684) - used for digital signature verification during firmware integrity test
 - SP800-90A CTR DRBG (Cert. #820) – used for IV and KPK generation
5. The module supports the following Allowed algorithm:

- AES MAC (Cert. #3415) – Used to provide authentication within APCO OTAR. AES MAC as used within APCO OTAR has been vendor affirmed and is approved when used for Project 25 APCO OTAR.
 - Maximal length 64-bit LFSR.
 - Non-deterministic Hardware Random Number Generator
6. Zeroize default security parameters: The Program Update service should be used to ensure all default CSP's are zeroized. The Program Update service is invoked in the factory at programming time and can be invoked in the field either by a FLASHPort Upgrade through CPS or a FLASHPort Upgrade with a KVL and PCMCIA card.
 7. Infinite UKEK Retention is disabled. The Download Configuration Parameters service is used to configure this parameter in the module.

3.2 Non Approved Mode of Operation

A non-FIPS Approved mode of operation is transitioned to when any of the following is true:

1. MDC OTAR is enabled.
2. KLK generation is enabled.
3. Infinite UKEK Retention feature is enabled. All keys are zeroized including the KEKs when the Infinite UKEK Retention feature transitions from enable to disable and also from disable to enable.

The module maintains FIPS mode status and will provide this upon operator request.

4. Crypto Officer and User Guidance

4.1 Administration of the Astro Subscriber uMACE in a secure manner (CO)

The Astro Subscriber uMACE requires no special administration for secure use after it is set up for use in a FIPS Approved manner. To do this, set the module's parameters to the settings listed in section 3 of this document via the Download Configuration Parameters service.

Note that all keys will be zeroized after the Program Update service has completed.

4.2 Assumptions regarding User Behavior (CO)

The Astro Subscriber uMACE has been designed in such a way that no special assumptions regarding User Behavior have been made that is relevant to the secure operation of the unit.

4.3 Approved Security Functions, Ports, and Interfaces available to Users

Astro Subscriber uMACE services available to the Astro Subscriber uMACE User are listed in section 8.2.

No Physical Ports or Logical Interfaces are directly available to the Astro Subscriber uMACE User, only indirectly through the Subscriber Radio in which the Astro Subscriber uMACE is installed.

4.4 User Responsibilities necessary for Secure Operation

If the module's power is lost, the keys used for the AES GCM algorithm shall be redistributed to the module.

5. Security Rules

The Astro Subscriber uMACE enforces the following security rules. These rules are separated into those imposed by FIPS 140-2 and those imposed by Motorola.

5.1 FIPS 140-2 Imposed Security Rules

1. The Astro Subscriber uMACE inhibits all data output via the data output interface whenever an error state exists and during self-tests.
2. The Astro Subscriber uMACE logically disconnects the output data path from the circuitry and processes when performing key generation, manual key entry, or key zeroization.
3. Authentication data (e.g. PINs) are entered in encrypted form. Authentication data is not output during entry.
4. At FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 2, secret cryptographic keys are entered in plaintext form over a physically separate port.
5. The Astro Subscriber uMACE enforces Identity-Based authentication.
6. The Astro Subscriber uMACE supports a User role and a Crypto-Officer role. Authenticated operators are authorized to assume either supported role.
7. The Astro Subscriber uMACE re-authenticates an operator when it is powered-up after being powered-off.
8. The Astro Subscriber uMACE prevents brute-force attacks on its password by using a 10-digit password that reduces the probability of a successful random attempt to one in 10^{10} or 10,000,000,000. It would require 100,000 attempts in one minute to lower the random attempt success rate to less than 1 in 100,000. A limit of 15 failed authentication attempts is imposed; 15 consecutive failed authentication attempts causes all TEKs and KEKs to be invalidated (key status is marked invalid) and the password to be reset to the factory default.
9. The Astro Subscriber uMACE uses RSA-2048 to prevent brute-force attacks on the digital signature used to verify firmware integrity during a Program Update. The probability of a successful random attempt is one in 2^{112} . As the Program Update service requires more than one minute to complete the random attempt success rate during a one minute period cannot be lowered to less than 1 in 100,000.
10. Authentication data is not output during entry.
11. The Astro Subscriber uMACE provides the following services requiring a role:
 - Program Update
 - Transfer Key Variable
 - Privileged APCO OTAR
 - Change Active Keypad
 - Change Password
 - Encrypt Digital
 - Decrypt Digital
 - Zeroize Selected Keys
 - Key/Keypad Check

12. The Astro Subscriber uMACE provides the following services not requiring a role:
 - FIPS Status
 - Initiate Self Tests
 - Validate Password
 - Zeroize All Keys
 - Zeroize All Keys and Password
 - Non-Privileged APCO OTAR
 - Reset
 - Shutdown
 - Extract Error Log
 - Clear Error Log
 - Download Configuration Parameters
13. The Astro Subscriber uMACE implements all firmware using a high-level language, except the limited use of low-level languages to enhance performance.
14. The Astro Subscriber uMACE protects secret keys and private keys from unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution.
15. The Astro Subscriber uMACE provides a means to ensure that a key entered into or stored within the Astro Subscriber uMACE is associated with the correct entities to which the key is assigned. Each key in the Astro Subscriber uMACE is entered and stored with the following information:
 - Key Identifier – 16 bit identifier
 - Algorithm Identifier – 8 bit identifier
 - Key Type – Traffic Encryption Key or Key Encryption Key
 - Physical ID, Common Key Reference (CKR) number, and Keyset number – Identifiers indicating storage locations.

Along with the encrypted key data, this information is stored in a key record that includes a CRC over all of the fields to detect data corruption. When used or deleted the keys are referenced by CKR/Key ID/AlgID, Key ID/AlgID, Physical ID, or CKR/Keyset.
16. The Astro Subscriber uMACE denies access to plaintext secret and private keys contained within the Astro Subscriber MACE.
17. The Astro Subscriber uMACE provides the capability to zeroize all plaintext cryptographic keys and other unprotected critical security parameters within the Astro Subscriber uMACE.
18. The Astro Subscriber uMACE provides the following non-FIPS Approved Random Number Generators to provide random numbers used as Initialization Vectors (IV) and the seeds for the Approved RNG.
 - Maximal length 64-bit LFSR.
 - Non-deterministic Hardware Random Number Generator
19. The Astro Subscriber uMACE conforms to FCC 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B requirements.
20. The Astro Subscriber uMACE performs the following self-tests:

Table 3: Power On Self-Tests

Self-Test	Description	Result of Self-Test Failure
<p>AES Encrypt & Decrypt KATs for each of the following modes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OFB - CBC - ECB - CFB (8-bit) - GCM <p>SHA-384 KAT</p> <p>HMAC-SHA-384 KAT</p>	<p>Each algorithm is tested by using a known key, known data, and if required a known IV. The data is then encrypted and compared with known encrypted data; the test passes if the final data matches the known data, otherwise it fails. The encrypted data is then decrypted and compared with the original plaintext; the test passes if the decrypted data matches the original plaintext, otherwise it fails.</p>	<p>The module enters an error state if any Cryptographic Algorithm Test fails. The error state may be exited by powering the module off then on.</p>
<p>DRBG KAT</p>	<p>The DRBG is initialized with a known answer seed and V generated by the hardware RNG. The DRBG is run and a random bit block is generated. The DRBG is then reseeded and another random bit block is generated. The two random bit blocks are compared. The test passes if the generated data does not match.</p>	<p>The module enters an error state if the DRBG KAT fails. The error state may be exited by powering the module off then on.</p>
<p>Firmware Integrity Test - includes the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SHA-256 KAT - RSA 2048 Verify KAT - ECDSA P-384 KAT 	<p>A digital signature is generated over the code when it is built using SHA-256, RSA-2048, and ECDSA P-384 and is stored with the code upon download into the module. When the module is powered up the digital signature is verified. If the digital signature matches the test passes, otherwise it fails.</p>	<p>The module enters an error state if the Firmware Integrity Test fails. As soon as an error indicator is output via the status interface, the module transitions from the error state to a state that only allows new firmware to be loaded.</p>

Powering the module off then on or resetting the module using the Reset service will initiate the power-up and on-demand self-tests.

Table 4: Conditional Self-Tests

Self-Test	Description	Result of Self-Test Failure
Firmware Load Test	A digital signature is generated over the code when it is built using SHA-256 and RSA-2048. Upon download into the module, the digital signature is verified. If the digital signature matches the test passes, otherwise it fails.	The module enters an error state if the Firmware Load Test fails. This error state may be exited by powering the module off then on which will start the download and validation process over.
Continuous Random Number Generator Tests: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DRBG - NDRNG - LFSR 	For each RNG, an initial value is generated and stored upon power up. This value is not used for anything other than to initialize comparison data. A successive call to any one of the RNGs generates a new set of data, which is compared to the comparison data. If a match is detected, this test fails; otherwise the new data is stored as the comparison data and returned to the caller.	The module enters an error state if the Continuous Random Number Generator Test fails. This error state may be exited by powering the module off then on.

21. The Astro Subscriber uMACE outputs a status indicator via the Self-test Indicator interface to indicate all self-tests passed. A status indicator is not output via the Self-test Indicator interface whenever an error state is entered due to a failed self-test.
22. The Astro Subscriber uMACE does not perform any cryptographic functions while in an error state.

5.2 Motorola Imposed Security Rules

1. The Astro Subscriber uMACE does not support multiple concurrent operators.
2. All cryptographic module services are suspended during key loading.
3. After a sufficient number (15) of consecutive unsuccessful user login attempts, the module will zeroize all keys from the Key Database.
4. The module does not support the output of plaintext or encrypted keys.

6. Identification and Authentication Policy

The Astro Subscriber uMACE supports two distinct operator roles (User and Crypto-Officer). The Astro Subscriber uMACE uses a 10-digit password to authenticate the User and an RSA-2048 digital signature to authenticate the Crypto-Officer. The role of the operator is specified by selecting which physical port will be used to authenticate and access module services.

The authentication data for the Program Update service is the digital signature of the downloaded firmware.

Table 5: Authorized Roles

Role	Authentication Type	Authentication Data Required
User	Identity-Based	User ID and 10-digit Password
Crypto-Officer	Identity-Based	RSA-2048 digital signature for Program Update service

7. Physical Security Policy

The Astro Subscriber uMACE is a production grade, single-chip cryptographic module as defined by FIPS 140-2 and is designed to meet Level 3 physical security requirements. The information below is applicable to Cryptographic Module hardware kit number AT8358Z04 which is part of the AT58Z04 family and has identical physical security characteristics.

The Astro Subscriber uMACE is covered with a hard opaque metallic coating that provides evidence of attempts to tamper with the module. Tampering with the module will cause it to enter a lockup state in which no crypto services will be available. The Astro Subscriber uMACE does not contain any doors, removable covers, or ventilation holes or slits. No maintenance access interface is available. No special procedures are required to maintain physical security of the module while delivering to operators.

8. Access Control Policy

8.1 Astro Subscriber MACE Supported Roles

The Astro Subscriber uMACE supports two (2) roles. These roles are defined to be the:

- User role and,
- Cryptographic Officer (Crypto-Officer or CO) role.

8.2 Astro Subscriber uMACE Services

Table 6: Services Allocated to Authorized Roles

Role		Service	Description
User	CO		
	X	Program Update	Update the module firmware. Firmware upgrades are authenticated using a digital signature. The Program Update Public Signature Key (a 2048 bit public RSA key) is used to validate the signature of the firmware image being loaded before it is allowed to be executed. All keys and CSPs are zeroized during a Program Update. To maintain validation, only validated firmware should be loaded. Loading non-validated firmware will invalidate the modules validation.
X		Transfer Key Variable	Transfer key variables to the MACE Key Database via a Key Variable Loader (KVL). If the Red Keyfill configuration parameter is enabled then keys will be transferred from the KVL in plaintext. If Red Keyfill is disabled, all keys transferred from the KVL will be encrypted. The Red Keyfill configuration parameter can be changed using the Download Configuration Parameters service. Any modification of the Red Keyfill parameter will zeroize all keys; therefore the operator shall reinitialize the module in accordance with the instructions provided in Section 3.1 of this document.
X		Privileged APCO OTAR	Modify and query the Key Database via APCO OTAR Key Management Messages. This service has access to non-Approved algorithms if those algorithms are installed and selected. Only Approved algorithms should be installed to remain in an Approved mode of operation.
X		Change Active Keyset	The active keyset is used to store a group of keys for current use while inactive keysets are used to store keys for future use. This service modifies the currently active keyset used for selecting keys for encryption / decryption services.

Role		Service	Description
User	CO		
X		Change Password	Modify the current password used to identify and authenticate the User role. Fifteen consecutive failed attempts causes the KPK to be zeroized, a new KPK to be generated, all TEKs and KEKs to be invalidated (key status is marked invalid), and the password to be reset to the factory default.
X		Encrypt Digital	Encrypt digital voice or data. This service has access to non-Approved algorithms if those algorithms are installed and selected. Only Approved algorithms should be installed to remain in an Approved mode of operation.
X		Decrypt Digital	Decrypt digital voice or data. This service has access to non-Approved algorithms if those algorithms are installed and selected. Only Approved algorithms should be installed to remain in an Approved mode of operation.
X		Zeroize Selected Keys	Zeroize selected key variables from the Key Database by Physical ID (PID) or Common Key Reference (CKR).
X		Key/Keyset Check	Obtain status information about a specific key/keyset

The following services are available without assuming an authorized role.

Table 7: Unauthenticated Services

Service	Description
FIPS Status	Provides current FIPS status about whether the module is operating at overall Security Level 2, or in a non-Approved mode of operation.
Initiate Self Tests	Performs module self-tests comprised of cryptographic algorithm tests, firmware integrity test, and critical functions test. Initiated by module reset or transition from power off state to power on state.
Validate Password	Validate the current password used to identify and authenticate the User role. Fifteen consecutive failed attempts causes the KPK to be zeroized, a new KPK to be generated, all TEKs and KEKs to be invalidated (key status is marked invalid), and the password to be reset to the factory default.
Zeroize All Keys	Zeroize all keys from the Key Database. (Module can be reinitialized using a Key Variable Loader.)
Zeroize All Keys and Password	Zeroize the KPK and all keys and CSPs in the key database and causes a new KPK to be generated. Resets the password to the factory default. Allows user to gain controlled access to the module if the password is forgotten. (Module can be reinitialized using a Key Variable Loader.)
Non-Privileged APCO OTAR	Hello and Capabilities Key Management Messages may be performed without a role

Service	Description
Reset (Crypto Module)	Soft reset of module to remove module from error states or a transition from power off to power on state.
Shutdown (Crypto Module)	Prepares module for removal of power.
Extract Error Log	Status Request. Provides detailed history of error events.
Clear Error Log	Clears history of error events.
Download Configuration Parameters	Download configuration parameters used to specify module behavior. Examples include enable/disable APCO OTAR, SingleKey, or MultiKey mode, etc. If the Tamper configuration parameter changed the module will zeroize the KPK and all keys and CSPs in the key database and will generate and store a new KPK.

8.3 Key Management

CSPs: The following table provides a list and description of all CSPs managed by the module.

Table 8: CSP Definition

CSP Identifier	Description
SP800-90 CTR DRBG V	A 128-bit seed value used within the SP800-90A CTR DRBG. The V is not stored but temporarily exists in volatile memory and is zeroized by power cycling the module. The seed is not entered into or output from the module.
SP800-90 CTR DRBG Key	Key used to seed the SP800-90A CTR DRBG during initialization. The seed key is not stored but temporarily exists in volatile memory and is zeroized by power cycling the module. The seed key is not entered into or output from the module.
Black Keyloading Key (BKK)	A 256 bit AES key used for decrypting keys entered into the module via a KVL when the Red Keyfill configuration parameter is disabled. Stored in plaintext in non-volatile memory and zeroized through the Program Update service. The BKK is entered using the Program Update service and is not output from the module.
Image Decryption Key (IDK)	A 256-bit AES key used to decrypt downloaded images. Stored in plaintext in non-volatile memory and zeroized through the Program Update service. The IDK is entered using the Program Update service and is not output from the module.
Key Encryption Keys (KEKs)	256 bit AES key used for encryption of other keys in OTAR. Stored encrypted on KPK in non-volatile memory. Entered through the KVL or APCO OTAR. KEK's are not output from the module.
Key Protection Key (KPK)	256 bit AES key used to encrypt TEKs and KEKs stored in non-volatile memory. The KPK is not entered into or output from the module.

CSP Identifier	Description
Password	The 10-digit password is entered encrypted on the PEK. After decryption the plaintext password is not stored but temporarily exists in volatile memory. The SHA-256 hash of the decrypted password is compared with the hash value stored in non-volatile memory during password validation. The password is not output from the module.
Password Encryption Key (PEK)	256 bit AES key used for decrypting password during password validation. Stored in plaintext in non-volatile memory and zeroized through the Program Update service. The PEK is entered using the Program Update service and is not output from the module.
Traffic Encryption Keys (TEKs)	256 bit AES key used for voice and data encryption. Stored encrypted on KPK in non-volatile memory. Entered through the KVL or APCO OTAR. TEK's are not output from the module.

Public Keys: The following table lists and describes all Public Keys managed by the module.

Table 9: Public Key Definition

Public Key Name	Description
Programmed Signature Key	2048 bit RSA key used to validate the signature of the firmware image being before it is allowed to be executed and is also used for authentication of the Crypto-Officer role. Loaded during manufacturing. The Programmed Signature Key is not output from the module.

8.4 CSP Access Types

Table 10: CSP Access Types

Access Type	Description
c - Check CSP	Checks status and key identifier information of key.
d - Decrypt CSP	Decrypts TEK or KEK retrieved from non-volatile memory using the KPK. Decrypts TEKs or KEKs entered via the KVL when the Red Keyfill configuration parameter is disabled using the Black Keyloading Key. Decrypts entered password with PEK during password validation.
e - Encrypt CSP	Encrypts TEK or KEK with KPK prior to storage in non-volatile memory.
g - Generate CSP	Generates KPK, SP800-90 CTR DRBG V, or SP800-90 CTR DRBG Key.
i - Invalidate CSP	Marks encrypted TEKs or KEKs stored in non-volatile memory as invalid. TEKs or KEKs marked invalid can then be over-written when new TEKs or KEKs are stored.

Access Type	Description
s - Store CSP	Stores KPK in volatile and non-volatile memory. Stores encrypted TEKs or KEKs in non-volatile memory, over-writing any previously invalidated TEK or KEK in that location. Stores plaintext BKK, PEK, or IDK in non-volatile memory.
u - Use CSP	Uses CSP internally for encryption / decryption services.
z - Zeroize CSP	Zeroize key.

Table 11: CSP versus CSP Access

Service	CSP										Role		
	SP800-90 CTR DRBG V	SP800-90 CTR DRBG Key	BKK (Black Key/loading Key)	IDK (Image Decryption Key)	KEK (Key Encryption Key)	KPK (Key Protection Key)	Password	PEK (Password Encryption Key)	TEK (Traffic Encryption Key)	User	Crypto-Officer	No Role Required	
Program Update			z, s	u, z, s	z	z		z, s	z		√		
Transfer Key Variable			u		i, e, z, s	u			i, e, z, s	√			
Privileged APCO OTAR			u		d, u, i, e, z, s	u			d, u, i, e, z, s	√			
Change Active Keyset										√			
Change Password					i	z, g, s	d, u, z	u	i	√			
Encrypt Digital									d, u	√			
Decrypt Digital									d, u	√			
Zeroize Selected Keys					i				i	√			
Key/Keyset Check					c				c	√			
FIPS Status					c				c	√	√	√	
Initiate Self Tests										√	√	√	
Validate Password					i	z, g, s	d, u, z	u	i	√	√	√	
Zeroize All Keys					i				i	√	√	√	
Zeroize All Keys and Password					i	z, g, s			i	√	√	√	
Non-Privileged APCO OTAR (not for key entry)										√	√	√	
Reset		g, u, z					g, s			√	√	√	
Shutdown										√	√	√	
Extract Error Log										√	√	√	
Clear Error Log										√	√	√	

Service	CSP									Role		
	SP800-90 CTR DRBG V	SP800-90 CTR DRBG Key	BKK (Black Keyloading Key)	IDK (Image Decryption Key)	KEK (Key Encryption Key)	KPK (Key Protection Key)	Password	PEK (Password Encryption Key)	TEK (Traffic Encryption Key)	User	Crypto-Officer	No Role Required
Download Configuration Parameters					i	z, g, s			i	✓	✓	✓

9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The Astro Subscriber uMACE is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside of those required by FIPS 140-2, including but not limited to power consumption, timing, fault induction, or TEMPEST attacks.