



# Seagate Secure® TCG Opal SSC Self-Encrypting Drive FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy

Security Level 2

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## Table of Contents

1	Introduction .....	3
1.1	Scope .....	3
1.2	Security Levels .....	3
1.3	References .....	3
1.4	Acronyms .....	3
2	Cryptographic Module Description .....	5
2.1	Overview .....	5
2.2	Logical to Physical Port Mapping .....	5
2.3	Hardware and Firmware Versions .....	5
2.4	FIPS Approved Algorithms .....	5
2.5	Self-Tests .....	6
2.6	FIPS 140 Approved Modes of Operation .....	6
2.6.1	ATA Enhanced Security Mode .....	6
2.6.2	TCG Opal Security Mode .....	6
2.7	User Data Cryptographic Erase Methods .....	7
2.8	Revert and Revert SP Methods .....	7
3	Identification and Authentication (I&A) Policy .....	8
3.1	Operator Roles .....	8
3.1.1	Crypto Officer Roles .....	8
3.1.2	User Roles .....	8
3.1.3	Unauthenticated Role .....	8
3.2	Authentication .....	8
3.2.1	Authentication Type .....	8
3.2.2	Authentication in ATA Enhanced Security Mode .....	9
3.2.3	Authentication in TCG Opal Security Mode .....	9
3.2.4	Authentication Mechanism, Data and Strength .....	9
3.2.5	Personalizing Authentication Data .....	9
4	Access Control Policy .....	10
4.1	FIPS Services .....	10
4.2	Non-FIPS Mode Services .....	14
4.3	Cryptographic Keys and CSPs .....	14
5	Physical Security .....	16
5.1	Mechanisms .....	16
5.2	Operator Requirements .....	17
6	Operational Environment .....	19
7	Security Rules .....	20
7.1	Secure Initialization .....	20
7.2	Ongoing Policy Restrictions .....	20
8	Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy .....	20

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Scope

This security policy applies to the FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module (CM) embedded in **Seagate Secure® TCG Opal SSC Self-Encrypting Drive** products.

This document meets the requirements of the FIPS 140-2 standard (Appendix C) and Implementation Guidance (section 14.1). It does not provide interface details needed to develop a compliant application.

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## 1.2 Security Levels

Requirement Area	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services and Authentication	2
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
Electromagnetic Interface / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI / EMC)	3
Self – Tests	2
Design Assurance	2
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

## 1.3 References

1. FIPS PUB 140-2
2. Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2
3. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
4. TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal, Specification Version 2.00
5. TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Specification Version 2.00
6. TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification, Specification Version 1.0
7. TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Single User Mode, Specification Version 1.0
8. ATA-8 ACS
9. Serial ATA Rev 2.6 (SATA)

## 1.4 Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197)
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining, an operational mode of AES
CM	Cryptographic Module
CO	Crypto-officer
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
MEK	Media Encryption Key
FIPS 140	FIPS 140-2
HDA	Head and Disk Assembly
HDD	Hard Disk Drive
IV	Initialization Vector for encryption operation
LBA	Logical Block Address
KAT	Known Answer Test
MBR	Master Boot Record
MSID	Manufactured SID, public drive-unique value that is used as default PIN, TCG term
POR	Power-on Reset (power cycle)
POST	Power on Self-Test
PSID	Physical SID, public drive-unique value
RNG	Random Number Generator

SED	Self-Encrypting Drive, Seagate HDD products that provide HW data encryption.
SID	Security ID, PIN for Drive Owner CO role, TCG term
SoC	System-on-a-Chip
SP	Security Provider or Security Partition (TCG), also Security Policy (FIPS 140)
SUDR	Single User Data Range

## 2 Cryptographic Module Description

### 2.1 Overview

The Seagate Secure TCG Opal SSC Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) FIPS 140 Module is embedded in Seagate SEDs. The cryptographic module (CM) provides a wide range of cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption, instantaneous user data disposal with cryptographic erase, independently controlled and protected user data LBA ranges, and authenticated FW download. The services are provided through an industry-standard TCG Opal SSC interface.

The CM is a multiple-chip embedded physical embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is the entire physical drive. The physical interface to the CM is the SATA connector and jumper block pins. The logical interface is the industry-standard ATA (7), TCG SWG (5), and Opal SSC (4) protocols, carried on the SATA transport interface (9). The primary function of the module is to provide data encryption, access control and cryptographic erase of the data stored on the hard drive media. The human operator of the drive product interfaces with the CM through a “host” application on a host system.

### 2.2 Logical to Physical Port Mapping

FIPS 140-2 Interface	Module Ports
Data Input	SATA Connector
Data Output	SATA Connector
Control Input	SATA Connector
Status Output	SATA Connector
Power Input	Power Connector

### 2.3 Hardware and Firmware Versions

The SED Drives, FIPS 140 Module has been validated in the following configurations:

HW version	FW versions
9WU142 (500GB)	0001SDM7, 0002SDM7, 0001SED7, 0002SED7, 0001LIM7
9WU14C (320GB)	0001SDM7, 0002SDM7, 0001SED7, 0002SED7, 0001LIM7
9WU141 (250GB)	0001SDM7, 0002SDM7, 0001SED7, 0002SED7, 0001LIM7
1DJ142 (500GB)	0001SDM7, 1002SED7, 1003SED7, 0001LIM7
1DJ14C (320GB)	0001SDM7, 1002SED7, 1003SED7, 0001LIM7
1DJ141 (250GB)	0001SDM7, 1002SED7, 1003SED7, 0001LIM7
1RS152 (500GB)	0001SDM7, 0001YXM7, 0002LIM7
1RS15C (320GB)	0001SDM7, 0001YXM7, 0002LIM7
1RS15D (250GB)	0001SDM7, 0001YXM7, 0002LIM7

The configurations vary by storage capacity and customer-unique FW differences which do not involve FIPS services.

### 2.4 FIPS Approved Algorithms

Algorithm	Certificate Number
ASIC AES	#1845
Firmware AES	#1343
RSA	#650
SHA	#1225
800-90 DRBG	#62

FIPS Non-Approved but Allowed Algorithm: - Non-deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG)

## 2.5 Self-Tests

Function Tested	Self-Test Type	Implementation	Failure Behavior
ASIC AES	Power-On	Encrypt and Decrypt KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Fail State
Firmware AES	Power-On	Encrypt and Decrypt KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Fail State
RSA	Power-On	Verify KAT performed.	Enters FIPS Self Test Fail State
SHA-256	Power-On	Digest KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Fail State
800-90 DRBG	Power-On	DRBG KAT performed	Enters FIPS Self Test Fail State
Firmware Integrity Check	Power-On	16-bit CRC and ECC	Enters FW Integrity Error State
Firmware Load Check	Conditional: When new firmware is downloaded	RSA PKCS#1 signature verification of new firmware image is done before it can be loaded.	Firmware download is aborted.
800-90 DRBG	Conditional: When a random number is generated	Newly generated random number is compared to the previously generated random number. Test fails if they are equal.	Enters FIPS Self Test Fail State.

A continuous test is performed on the Non-deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG) that compares newly generated random number to the previously generated random number. Test fails if they are equal.

## 2.6 FIPS 140 Approved Modes of Operation

Before the operator performs the Secure Initialization steps detailed in Section 7.1, the drive will operate in a non-FIPS Approved mode (uninitialized state).

From this mode, the operator may choose to initialize the CM to operate in either “ATA Enhanced Security Mode” or “TCG Opal Security Mode”. After setting up (configuring) the CM per the Security Rules detailed in Section 7.1, the CM will remain in FIPS Approved mode of operation until either a critical failure has been detected; or any ‘Exit FIPS Mode’ services is invoked; or the “Show Status” service does not return the expected status (refer to Section 4.1).

An operator can switch the CM between these FIPS Approved modes of operation. To do so, he must first, transition to the uninitialized state (via ‘Exit FIPS Mode’ service) which will zeroize the keys and CSPs. He must then reinitialize the CM per the Security Rules detailed in Section 7.1 to return to a FIPS Approved mode of operation

The module’s FIPS modes of operation are enforced through configuration and policy. Violating these ongoing policy restrictions (detailed in Section 7.2) would mean that one is no longer using the drive in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.

### 2.6.1 ATA Enhanced Security Mode

This mode provides services through industry-standard ATA commands, and TCG Opal commands addressed to the TCG Admin SP. Some of the services are based on the ATA Security Feature set but with vendor-unique extensions (e.g. encryption of user data on media). Other services are based on the TCG Opal commands. To operate in ATA Enhanced Security Mode, the ATA User must do a Set PIN from the uninitialized state. This mode corresponds to having a deactivated TCG Opal Locking SP.

ATA Enhanced Security Mode implements the Master and User roles as defined in ATA. The ATA security lock / unlock states correspond to operator authentication for the Read / Write data services (which use an internal AES 256-bit key for encryption and decryption of data written to and read from the drive media respectively). In addition, a “Drive Owner” CO role is provided, which can enable or disable access to the FW download service for FW upgrade. Additionally, a cryptographic erase service is provided to the Master and User roles through the ATA Security Erase Unit commands. The FW download service (ATA Download Microcode command) provides a FIPS Approved FW load test by verifying the code’s embedded 2048-bit RSA signature.

### 2.6.2 TCG Opal Security Mode

This mode provides services through industry-standard ATA commands, TCG Opal commands addressed to the TCG Admin SP, and TCG Opal commands addressed to the TCG Locking SP. It provides all of the

services of the ATA Enhanced Security Mode as well as additional features through TCG Opal commands. Some ATA Security commands are disabled in this mode and their functionality is provided through the TCG Opal commands. To operate in TCG Opal Security Mode, the Drive Owner must invoke the Activate method on the Locking SP from the uninitialized state.

One of the fundamental differences in this Mode is the capability to have multiple Users with independent access control to read/write/erase independent data areas (LBA ranges). Note that by default there is a single “Global Range” that encompasses the whole user data area.

In addition to the Drive Owner and User(s) roles, this mode implements a CO role (Admins) to administer the additional features. These features include:

- Enable/disable additional Users
- Create and configure multiple LBA Ranges
- Assign access control of Users to LBA Ranges
- Lock/unlock LBA Ranges
- Erase LBA Ranges using Cryptographic Erase
- MBR Shadowing

#### 2.6.2.1 Single User Data Ranges (SUDRs)

While invoking the Activate method to enter TCG Opal Security Mode, the Drive Owner may elect to classify one or more user data ranges as “Single User Data Ranges” (SUDRs). Such SUDRs conform to the Single User feature set as defined in the Opal SSC feature set [7] and are managed solely by the associated User role. Details of the differences between SUDRs and normal data ranges can be found in Section 4.1, Table 2.1.

Note that once in TCG Opal Security Mode, the only way to change the classification of a user data range without invoking the “Exit FIPS Mode” service is by using the Reactivate method.

## 2.7 User Data Cryptographic Erase Methods

Since all user data is encrypted / decrypted by the CM for storage / retrieval on the drive media, the data can be erased using a cryptographic method. The data is effectively erased by changing the encryption key (MEK). Thus, the FIPS 140 key management capability of “zeroization” of the key erases all the user data. This capability is available through both FIPS modes. Of course the user data can also be erased by overwriting, but this can be a long operation on high capacity drives.

Other FIPS services can be used to erase all the other private keys and CSPs (see Section 2.8).

## 2.8 Revert and Revert SP Methods

In either ATA Enhanced Security Mode or TCG Opal Security Mode, the TCG Revert and Revert SP methods may be invoked by an appropriately authenticated Role to transition the CM into the uninitialized state (non-Approved) mode. This corresponds to the “Exit FIPS Mode” service and is akin to a “restore to factory defaults” operation. This operation also provides a means to zeroize keys and CSPs. Subsequently, the CM has to be reinitialized before it can return to a FIPS Approved mode of operation (i.e. ATA Enhanced Security Mode or TCG Opal Security Mode). These Revert and Revert SP methods may be invoked by the Drive Owner, Admin SP Admins, Locking SP Admins or an unauthenticated role using the public PSID value.

## 3 Identification and Authentication (I&A) Policy

### 3.1 Operator Roles

Note: The following identifies the CO and User roles with a *general* description of the purposes. For further details of the services performed by each role in each FIPS mode, see section 4.1.

#### 3.1.1 Crypto Officer Roles

##### 3.1.1.1 Drive Owner

This CO role corresponds to the SID (Secure ID) Authority on the Admin SP as defined in Opal SSC [4]. This role is used to transition the CM to TCG Opal Security Mode or to download a new FW image. Note: only a FIPS validated firmware version can be loaded to the module. Otherwise, the module is not operating in FIPS mode.

##### 3.1.1.2 Admins (1-4) in Locking SP (TCG Opal Security Mode Only)

This CO role for TCG Opal Security Mode corresponds to the same named Authority on the Locking SP as defined in Opal SSC [4]. For non-Single User Data Ranges, this role is used to enable/disable Users, create and delete data regions (LBA Ranges), set Data Range attributes, lock/unlock Data Ranges and erase Data Ranges (by zeroizing the MEK with the Cryptographic Erase service).

##### 3.1.1.3 Admins (1-4) in Admin SP (TCG Opal Security Mode Only)

This CO role for TCG Opal Security Mode corresponds to the same named Authority on the Admin SP as defined in Opal SSC [4]. This role is disabled by default and can be enabled using SID. Once enabled, this role can invoke the “Exit FIPS Mode” service in TCG Opal Security Mode.

#### 3.1.2 User Roles

##### 3.1.2.1 User (1) – ATA Enhanced Security Mode, Users (1-16) – TCG Opal Security Mode

This role can unlock (and also lock) the drive so that an operator can read and write data to the drive. This role can also call the Cryptographic Erase service.

When operating in TCG Opal Security Mode, there can be up to 16 separate Users (User IDs) and the role corresponds to the same named TCG Authority on the Locking SP. The Locking SP Admin role enables Users and assigns them read/write/erase access to non-Single User Data Ranges.

##### 3.1.2.2 Master (ATA Enhanced Security Mode Only)

This role corresponds to the same named role as defined in ATA [8]. This role only provides a backup authentication to the ATA User and does not have access to administration services beyond those of the ATA User role.

##### 3.1.3 Unauthenticated Role

This role can perform the Show Status service.

If the operator has physical access to the drive, this role can also reset the module with a power cycle (which results in POSTs) as well as configure the jumper block to control the interface speed between the host and drive (a non-security relevant service). This role can also use the public PSID value to invoke the “Exit FIPS Mode” service.

### 3.2 Authentication

#### 3.2.1 Authentication Type

Operator authentication is role-based. For example, the Drive Owner role has its own unique ID and PIN.

For some services the authentication is performed in a separate associated service; e.g. the Read Unlock service is the authentication for subsequent User Data Read service. If the User Data Read service is attempted without prior authentication then the command will fail.

For authentication using the TCG interface, the operator and PIN can be provided in the StartSession method itself. Alternatively, an operator may use the Authenticate method to authenticate to a role after a Session has been started. Authentications will persist until the session is closed.



### 3.2.2 Authentication in ATA Enhanced Security Mode

In ATA Enhanced Security Mode, Master and User operator authentication is provided through a PIN provided in the ATA Security command [8]. In the event of authentication failure, the ATA command will abort, and subsequent read/write services will abort. A password attempt counter is implemented as specified in ATA, which when reached, blocks Master/User service authentication (with command abort), until the module is reset (Unblock PIN service).

Depending on a parameter of the Set PIN service for the User password, the User services may or may not be fully extended to the Master role. If the Master Password Capability is set to “High”, then either role can access the same services. Otherwise the Master role only has access to the erase service.

Drive Owner authentication for the Set PIN and Enable/Disable FW Download services is provided through the TCG StartSession or Authenticate to Admin SP.

### 3.2.3 Authentication in TCG Opal Security Mode

Operator authentication is provided via the TCG StartSession or Authenticate methods. The host application can have only a single session open at a time. During a session the application can invoke services for which the authenticated operator has access control. Note that a security rule of the CM is that the host must not authenticate to more than one operator (TCG authority) in a session.

For some services the host application will authenticate to the “Anybody” authority which does not have a private credential. Therefore these operations are effectively unauthenticated services.

### 3.2.4 Authentication Mechanism, Data and Strength

Operator authentication with PINs is implemented by hashing the operator input value and comparing it to the stored hash of the assigned PIN. The PINs have a retry attribute (“TryLimit”) that controls the number of unsuccessful attempts before the authentication is blocked until a module reset. The PINs have a maximum length of 32 bytes.

Per the policy security rules, the minimum PIN length is 4 bytes (Rule 4 in Section 7.1). This gives a probability of  $1/2^{32}$  of guessing the PIN in a single random attempt. This easily meets the FIPS 140 authentication strength requirements of less than  $1/1,000,000$ .

Each authentication attempt takes 15ms on average to complete. This means that approximately  $\{(60*1000)/15\}$  attempts can be made in one minute. Thus the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed in one minute is about  $4000/2^{32}$ . This is significantly lower than the FIPS requirement of  $1/100,000$ .

### 3.2.5 Personalizing Authentication Data

The initial value for SID is a manufactured value (mSID). This is a device-unique, 32-byte, public value. The Security Rules (Section 7) for the CM requires that the PIN values must be “personalized” to private values using the “Set PIN” service. Note that for ATA Enhanced Security Mode, setting the User PIN also sets the Drive Owner PIN to the same value; the Drive Owner PIN can be set to a different value with the TCG Set Method.

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## 4 Access Control Policy

### 4.1 FIPS Services

The following tables represent the FIPS 140 services for each FIPS Approved Mode in terms of the Approved Security Functions and operator access control. Note the following:

- Use of the services described below is only compliant if the module is in the noted Approved mode.
- Underlying security functions used by higher level algorithms are not represented (e.g. hashing as part of asymmetric key)
- Operator authentication is not represented in this table.
- Some security functions listed are used solely to protect / encrypt keys and CSPs.
- Service input and output details are defined by the TCG and ATA standards.
- Unauthenticated services (e.g. Show Status) do not provide access to private keys or CSPs.
- Some services have indirect access control provided through enable / disable or lock / unlock services used by an authenticated operator; e.g. User data read / write.
- If the Operator value contains “optional” then the access is dependent on the module setup (see 3.2.2).

<b>Table 1.1 - FIPS 140 Authenticated Services – ATA Enhanced Security Mode</b>				
Service Name	Description	Operator Access Control	Security Function	Command(s)/Event(s)
Set PIN	Change operator authentication data. Note: Setting the User PIN also sets the Drive Owner PIN.	Master*, User*, Drive Owner	Hashing	ATA SECURITY SET PASSWORD, TCG Set Method
Lock / Unlock FW Download	Enable / Disable FW Download Service	Drive Owner*	None	TCG Set Method
Firmware Download	Load complete firmware image. If the self-test of the code load passes then the device will run with the new code.	None**	Asymmetric Key	ATA DOWNLOAD MICROCODE
Unlock User Data	Enable user data read/write and Set PIN services.	User (optional. Master)	Symmetric Key (to unwrap MEK)	ATA SECURITY UNLOCK
User Data Read / Write	Encryption / decryption of user data.	None*	Symmetric Key	ATA Read / Write Commands
Cryptographic Erase	Erase user data through cryptographic means: by zeroizing the encryption key and the User PIN. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state.	Master, User	RNG	ATA SECURITY ERASE PREPARE + ATA SECURITY ERASE UNIT
Exit FIPS Mode	Exit ATA Enhanced Security Mode. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state.	User* (optional. Master*)	RNG, Hashing, Symmetric Key	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ATA SECURITY DISABLE PASSWORD</li> <li>ATA SECURITY ERASE PREPARE + SECURITY ERASE UNIT</li> </ul>

<b>Table 1.2 - FIPS 140 Unauthenticated Services – ATA Enhanced Security Mode</b>				
Service Name	Description	Operator Access Control	Security Function	Command(s)/Event(s)
Unblock PIN	Reset Master and User password attempt counter.	None	None	POR
Show Status	Reports if CM satisfies rule# 3 of Secure Initialization (Section 7.1).	None	None	ATA IDENTIFY DEVICE Word 128 Bit 1 = 1 (Security Enabled)
Reset Module	Runs POSTs and zeroizes key & CSP RAM storage.	None	None	POR
Disable Services	Disables ATA Security commands until POR	None*	None	ATA SECURITY FREEZE LOCK
Exit FIPS Mode	Exit ATA Enhanced Security Mode. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state.	None (using PSID)	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TCG AdminSP.RevertSP()</li> </ul>
FIPS 140 Compliance Descriptor	Reports FIPS 140 Revision, Overall Security Level, Hardware and Firmware versions, and Module name	None	None	ATA TRUSTED RECEIVE Protocol 0

\*Security has to be Unlocked

\*\*FW Download Port has to be Unlocked

<b>Table 2.1 - FIPS 140 Authenticated Services – TCG Opal Security Mode</b>				
Service Name	Description	Operator Access Control	Security Function	Command(s)/Event(s)
Set PIN	Change operator authentication data. Note: Locking SP Admins can set PINs for any non-SUDR User or Locking SP Admin.	Locking SP Admin1-4, User1-16 (unless previously disabled by “Disable User Set PIN”), Drive Owner	Hashing	TCG Set Method
Disable User Set PIN	Disable a non-SUDR User’s ability to change its own PIN.	Locking SP Admin 1-4	None	TCG Set Method
Enable / Disable Single User Data Range (SUDR)	Enable / Disable Single User Data Range (SUDR) classification for a data range	Locking SP Admin1-4	None	TCG Reactivate Method
Lock / Unlock FW Download	Enable / Disable FW Download Service	Drive Owner	None	TCG Set Method
Firmware Download	Load complete firmware image. If the self-test of the code load passes then the device will run with the new code.	None**	Asymmetric Key	ATA DOWNLOAD MICROCODE
Enable / Disable Admin SP Admin(s)	Enable / Disable an Admin SP Admin.	Drive Owner	None	TCG Set Method
Enable / Disable Locking SP Admin(s), non-SUDR User(s)	Enable / Disable a Locking SP Admin or non-SUDR User Authority.	Locking SP Admin1-4	None	TCG Set Method
Set Range Attributes for non-SUDR	Set the location, size, locking and User access rights of the non-SUDR.	Locking SP Admin1-4	None	TCG Set Method
Set Range Geometry for SUDR	Set the location and size, of the SUDR.	User1-16 (if User Ownership), Locking SP Admin1-4 (if Admin Ownership),	None	TCG Set Method
Lock / Unlock User Data Range for Read and/or Write	Block or allow read (decrypt) / write (encrypt) of user data in a range.	User1-16, Locking SP Admin1-4 (for non-SUDRs)	None	TCG Set Method, ATA SECURITY UNLOCK
User Data Read / Write	Encryption / decryption of user data to/from a LBA range. Access control to this service is provided through Lock / Unlock User Data Range.	None*	Symmetric Key	ATA Read / Write Commands
Cryptographic Erase of non-SUDR	Erase user data in a non-Single User Data Range by cryptographic means: changing the encryption key.	User1-16, Locking SP Admin1-4	RNG, Symmetric Key	TCG GenKey Method
Cryptographic Erase of SUDR	Erase user data in a Single User Data Range by cryptographic means: changing the encryption key.	Locking SP Admin1-4	RNG, Symmetric Key	TCG Erase Method
		User1-16		TCG GenKey Method, TCG Erase Method
Exit FIPS Mode	Exit TCG Opal Security Mode. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state.	Drive Owner	RNG, Hashing, Symmetric Key	TCG LockingSPObj.Revert(), TCG AdminSPObj.Revert()
		Admin SP Admin1-4		TCG AdminSPObj.Revert()
		Locking SP Admin1-4		TCG LockingSP.RevertSP()

\*Data Range has to be Unlocked      \*\*FW Download Port has to be Unlocked

<b>Table 2.2 - FIPS 140 Unauthenticated Services – TCG Opal Security Mode</b>				
Service Name	Description	Operator Access Control	Security Function	Command(s)/Event(s)
Unblock PIN	Resets password attempt counters.	None	None	POR
Show Status	Reports if CM satisfies rule# 3 of Secure Initialization (Section 7.1)	None	None	TCG Level 0 Discovery. Drive Security Life Cycle State = 0x80 (Use State) <b>AND</b> TCG Get Method on SecurityOperatingMode in Admin SP = 0x02
Reset Module	Runs POSTs and zeroizes keys & CSPs in RAM	None	None	POR
FIPS 140 Compliance Descriptor	Reports FIPS 140 Revision, Overall Security Level, Hardware and Firmware versions, and Module name	None	None	ATA TRUSTED RECEIVE Protocol 0
DRBG Generate Bytes	Returns a SP800-90 DRBG Random Number of 32 bytes	None	None	TCG Random()
Exit FIPS Mode	Exit TCG Opal Security Mode. Note: CM will enter uninitialized state.	None (using PSID)	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AdminSP.RevertSP()</li> <li>• AdminSPObj.Revert()</li> </ul>

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## 4.2 Non-FIPS Mode Services

In the uninitialized state, the module supports the following services:

1. Services required to transition the CM to FIPS-Approved modes of operation.
2. Services related to firmware update.
3. Services related to unauthenticated encryption/decryption of user data.
4. Services related to cryptographic erase of user data.
5. Module reset.
6. Services related to status reporting.

All cryptographic algorithms used in FIPS-Approved operating modes are also available in this security uninitialized state.

## 4.3 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs

The following table defines the keys / CSPs and the operators / services which use them. Note the following:

- The use of PIN CSPs for authentication is implied by the operator access control.
- The Set PIN service is represented in this table even though generally it is only used at module setup.
- All non-volatile storage of keys and CSPs is in the system area of the drive media to which there is no logical or physical access from outside of the module.
- The module uses SP 800-90 DRBG and adopts Hash\_DRBG mechanism.
- Non-critical security parameters are not represented in this table.
- Read access of private values is internal only to the CM and are thus not represented in this table.
- There is no security-relevant audit feature.

<b>Table 3 - Key Management</b>						
Name	Mode (ATA / TCG / Both)	Description	Type (Pub / Priv, key / CSP (e.g. PIN)), size	Operator Role	Services Used In	Access (W, X)**
SID (Security Identifier), aka Drive Owner PIN	Both	Auth. Data	Private, PIN, 32 bytes	Drive Owner	Set PIN	W
Master, User Passwords	ATA	Auth. Data	Private, PIN, 32 bytes	None (subject to unlocked)	Set PIN	W
				Master, User	Unlock User Data	X
				Master, User	Cryptographic Erase	X
				Master, User	Exit FIPS Mode	X
Master, User MEK	ATA	MEK mixed with PINs	Private, AES Key, 256 bits	Master, User	Unlock User Data	X
Locking SP Admin1-4 Passwords	TCG	Locking SP Admins Auth. Data	Private, PIN, 32 bytes	Locking SP Admins	Set PIN	W
Admin SP Admin1-4 Passwords	TCG	Admin SP Admins Auth. Data	Private, PIN, 32 bytes	Admin SP Admins	Set PIN	W
User1-16 Passwords	TCG	Users Auth. Data	Private, PIN, 32 bytes	Locking SP Admins, Users	Set PIN	W
LBA Range MEKs	TCG	MEK mixed with MEKEK	Private, AES Key, 256 bits	Locking SP Admins, Users	Unlock User Data	X
Entropy Input String	Both	Input to a DRBG mechanism of a string of bits that contains entropy*	Private, 520 bytes	None	Services which use the RNG (e.g; cryptographic erase)	X
Seed	Both	String of bits that is used as input to a DRBG mechanism*	Private, Hash seed, 544 bytes	None	Services which use the RNG (e.g. cryptographic erase)	X
Internal State	Both	Collection of stored information about DRBG instantiation*	Private, V and C	None	Services which uses the RNG (e.g. cryptographic erase)	X
ORG0-0 - ORG0-3	Both	Firmware Load Test Signature Verify Key	Public, RSA Key, 2048 bits	Drive Owner (enable FW download)	FW Download	X
MEKEK	TCG	Media Encryption Key Encryption Key	Private, AES Key, 256 bits	Locking SP Admins, Users	Unlock User Data	X

\* Source: Section 4 Terms and Definitions of NIST Special Publication 800-90


\*\* W - Write access is allowed, X - Execute access is allowed

## 5 Physical Security

### 5.1 Mechanisms

The CM has the following physical security:

- Production-grade components with standard passivation
- Opaque, tamper-evident, security label on the exposed (back) side of the PCBA applied by Seagate manufacturing prevents electronic design visibility and protects physical access to the electronics by board removal
- Tamper-evident security labels applied by Seagate manufacturing prevent HDA cover removal for access or visibility to the media
- Exterior of the drive is opaque
- The tamper-evident labels cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without tamper-evidence
- The tamper-evident labels cannot be easily replicated with a low attack time



- Security labels on side of drive to provide tamper-evidence of HDA cover removal,





## 5.2 Operator Requirements

The operator is required to inspect the CM periodically for one or more of the following tamper evidence:

- Checkerboard pattern on security label or substrate





- Security label over screws at indicated locations is missing or penetrated,




- Text (including size, font, orientation) on security label does not match original,
- Security label cutouts do not match original.

- Scrapes, scratches or discoloration on the side rail (red circles) or PCB edge (blue circle). Note that the tamper evidence can be more easily seen if the operator pushes down on the PCB.



- PCB looks deformed and does not sit evenly. Red border (bottom) illustrates a tampered drive as compared to the un-tampered drive in the green border (top).



Upon discovery of tamper evidence, the module should be removed from service.

## 6 Operational Environment

The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM operates in a “non-modifiable operational environment”. That is, while the module is in operation the operational environment cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted. FW can be upgraded (replaced) with a signed FW download operation. If the code download is successfully authenticated then the module will begin operating with the new code image.

## 7 Security Rules

### 7.1 Secure Initialization

The CM does not change mode across module resets. However, certain operations can result in exiting the FIPS Approved mode. In some of these exit scenarios (e.g. POST failure), the drive cannot be restored to FIPS mode and does not provide any FIPS services.

The following are the security rules for initialization and operation of the CM in a FIPS 140 Approved manner. Reference the appropriate sections of this document for details.

1. COs: At receipt of the product examine the shipping packaging and the product packaging to ensure it has not been accessed during shipping by the trusted courier.
2. COs and Users (either mode): At installation and periodically examine the physical security mechanisms for tamper evidence.
3. Transition the CM to one of the Security Modes by doing one of the following:
  - ATA Enhanced Security Mode: User Set PIN.
  - TCG Opal Security Mode: Drive Owner executes Activate method on Locking SP
4. COs and Users: At installation, set all operator PINs applicable for the FIPS mode to private values of at least 4 bytes length:
  - ATA Enhanced Security Mode: Master and User. Drive Owner (optional).
  - TCG Opal Security Mode: Drive Owner, Admins and Users
5. COs (Locking SP Admins) for TCG Opal Security Mode: Set ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled to “True” on at least one data range and it must not be modified.
6. Drive Owner: At installation, disable the “Makers” authority
7. At installation, the value of LockOnReset for FW Download must be set to “Power Cycle” and it must not be modified.
8. After secure initialization is complete, do a power-on reset to clear authentications established during initialization.

At the end of these steps, the CM will be in a FIPS Approved Mode of operation.

### 7.2 Ongoing Policy Restrictions

1. Prior to assuming a new role, close the current Session and start a new Session, or do a power-on reset, so that the previous authentication is cleared.

## 8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The CM does not make claims to mitigate against other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2.