VMware's BC-FJA
(Bouncy Castle FIPS Java
API)
Software Versions: 1.0.2.1/1.0.2.2/1.0.2.3
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 1
Document Version: 0.2
VMware, Inc.
3401 Hillview Ave
Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA
Tel: 877-486-9273
Email: info@vmware.com
http://www.vmware.com
Security Policy, Version 0.2 VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API)
February 28, 2024 Page 2 of 31
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Purpose.........................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Reference .....................................................................................................................................................4
2 VMware’s BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module ..............................................................................5
2.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................5
2.1.1 VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API)......................................................................................5
2.2 Module Specification....................................................................................................................................5
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary ............................................................................................................6
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary..............................................................................................................7
2.2.3 Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................8
2.2.4 Module Configuration..............................................................................................................................8
2.3 Roles, Authentication and Services ..............................................................................................................9
2.3.1 Assumption of Roles ................................................................................................................................9
2.3.2 Services ....................................................................................................................................................9
2.4 Physical Security.........................................................................................................................................12
2.5 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................................12
2.5.1 Use of External RNG...............................................................................................................................15
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management ...............................................................................................................15
2.6.1 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................................20
2.6.2 Public Keys .............................................................................................................................................22
2.7 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................22
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy .............................................................................................................24
3 Secure Operation ........................................................................................................................................25
3.1 Basic Enforcement......................................................................................................................................25
3.2 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager ..............................................................................25
3.3 Basic Guidance ...........................................................................................................................................25
3.4 Enforcement and Guidance for GCM IVs....................................................................................................26
3.5 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF......................................................................26
3.6 Rules for setting the N and the S String in cSHAKE.....................................................................................26
3.7 Guidance for the use of DRBGs and Configuring the JVM's Entropy Source ..............................................27
4 References and Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................28
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Hardware Block Diagram .........................................................................................................6
Figure 2 – Module’s Logical Cryptographic Boundary ...........................................................................7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section ........................................................................................5
Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces.......................................................................................................7
Table 3 – Available Java Permissions ..........................................................................................................8
Table 4 – Roles Description..........................................................................................................................9
Table 5 – Services ........................................................................................................................................9
Table 6 – CSP Access Rights within Services............................................................................................11
Table 7 – Tested Configuration...................................................................................................................12
Table 8 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions ..........................................................15
Table 9 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation ..........................................18
Table 10 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions...............................................................19
Table 11 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only.................................19
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).........................................................................................20
Table 13 – Public Keys ...............................................................................................................................22
Table 14 – Power Up Self-tests ..................................................................................................................22
Table 15 – Conditional Self-tests ................................................................................................................24
Table 16 – References................................................................................................................................28
Table 17 – Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................29
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle
FIPS Java API) Module from VMware, Inc. This Security Policy describes how the VMware's BC-FJA
(Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is
available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security (CCCS), a branch of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Cryptographic Module
Validation Program (CMVP) website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The
VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module is also referred to in this document as “BC-FJA
Module”, or “the module”.
1.2 Reference
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the composite module in the technical terms
of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
• The VMware website (http://www.vmware.com) contains information on the full line of products
from VMware.
• The CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-
Program/Validated-Modules/Search) contains options to get contact information for individuals to
answer technical or sales-related questions for the module.
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2 VMWARE’S BC-FJA (BOUNCY CASTLE FIPS JAVA API) MODULE
2.1 Introduction
VMware, Inc., a global leader in virtualization, cloud infrastructure, and business mobility, delivers
customer-proven solutions that accelerate Information Technology (IT) by reducing complexity and
enabling more flexible, agile service delivery. With VMware solutions, organizations are creating
exceptional experiences by mobilizing everything, responding faster to opportunities with modern data and
apps hosted across hybrid clouds, and safeguarding customer trust with a defense-in-depth approach to
cybersecurity. VMware enables enterprises to adopt an IT model that addresses their unique business
challenges. VMware’s approach accelerates the transition to solutional-computing while preserving existing
investments and improving security and control.
2.1.1 VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API)
The VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) is a software cryptographic module based on the
Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. FIPS Java API (BC-FJA) Module (SW Versions 1.0.2.1/1.0.2.2/1.0.2.3).
The module is a software library that provides cryptographic functions to various VMware applications via
a well-defined Java-language application program interface (API). The module only performs
communications with the calling application (the process that invokes the module services).
Note: VMware’s BC-FJA 1.0.2.2 & VMware’s BC-FJA 1.0.2.3 offers identical functionality and API to
VMware’s BC-FJA 1.0.2.1, however an internal modification means that it is not susceptible to JVM class
loader issues that started showing up following updates to Java 11 in October 2020. User experiencing
class loader issues on startup with VMware’s BC-FJA 1.0.2.1 are advised to use VMware’s BC-FJA 1.0.2.2
or VMware’s BC-FJA 1.0.2.3.
The VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) is validated at the FIPS 140-2 Section levels shown
in Table 1:
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A1
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC2 1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
2.2 Module Specification
The VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) is a software cryptographic module with a multiple-
1
N/A – Not Applicable
2
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
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chip standalone embodiment. The overall security level of the module is 1. The software versions of the
module are 1.0.2.1, using the 1.0.2.1 SW version of the Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-FJA (Bouncy
Castle FIPS Java API) Module,1.0.2.2, using the 1.0.2.2 SW version of the Legion of the Bouncy Castle
Inc. BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module and 1.0.2.3, using the 1.0.2.3 SW version of Legion
of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module.
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary
As a software module, there are no physical protection mechanisms implemented. Therefore, the module
must rely on the physical characteristics of the host system. The BC-FJA Module runs on a General-
Purpose Computer (GPC) and the physical boundary of the cryptographic module is defined by the hard
enclosure around the host system on which it runs. The module supports the physical interfaces of the
GPC. See Figure 1 below for a block diagram of the typical GPC and the ports or interfaces across the
physical cryptographic boundary marked with red dotted line.
Abbreviations introduced in Figure 1 are: Basic I/O System (BIOS), Integrated Device Electronics (IDE),
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), Peripheral
Component Interconnect (PCI), Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) and Universal Serial
Bus (USB). Input or output ports are designated by arrows with single heads, while I/O ports are indicated
by bidirectional arrows.
Figure 1 – Hardware Block Diagram
For FIPS 140-2 purposes, the BC-FJA Module is defined as a “multi-chip standalone module”, therefore,
the module’s physical ports or interfaces are defined as those for the hardware of the GPC. These physical
ports are separated into the logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as shown in Table 2.
The BC-FJA Module is a software module only, and, therefore, control of the physical ports is outside of
the module’s scope. The module does provide a set of logical interfaces which are mapped to the following
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FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. When
the module performs self-tests, is in an error state, is generating keys, or performing zeroization, the module
prevents all output on the logical data output interface as only the thread performing the operation has
access to the data. The module is single-threaded, and in an error state, the module does not return any
output data, only an error value.
Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
Interface Module Equivalent
Data Input API input parameters – plaintext and/or ciphertext data.
Data Output API output parameters and return values – plaintext and/or ciphertext data.
Control Input API method calls – method calls, or input parameters, that specify
commands and/or control data used to control the operation of the module.
Status Output API output parameters and return/error codes that provide status
information used to indicate the state of the module.
Power Startup/Shutdown of a process containing the module.
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The executable for VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module is a Java Archive (JAR) file
which is: bc-fips-1.0.2.1.jar for version 1.0.2.1, bc-fips-1.0.2.2.jar for version 1.0.2.2 and bc-fips-1.0.2.3.jar
for version 1.0.2.3. This module is the only software component within the Logical Cryptographic Boundary
and the only software component that carries out cryptographic functions covered by FIPS 140-2. Figure 2
shows the logical relationship of the cryptographic module to the other software and hardware components
of the computer. The BC classes are executed on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) using the classes of the
Java Runtime Environment (JRE). The JVM is the interface to the computer’s Operating System (OS) that
is the interface to the various physical components of the computer.
Figure 2 – Module’s Logical Cryptographic Boundary
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2.2.3 Modes of Operation
There will be two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be in FIPS-approved
mode when the appropriate transition method is called. To verify that the module is in the Approved Mode
of operation, the user can call a FIPS-approved mode status method
(CryptoServicesRegistrar.isInApprovedOnlyMode()). If the module is configured to allow approved and non-
approved mode operation, a call to CryptoServicesRegistrar.setApprovedMode(true) will switch the current
thread of user control into approved mode.
In FIPS-approved mode, the module will not provide non-approved algorithms, therefore, exceptions will
be called if the user tries to access non-approved algorithms in the Approved Mode.
2.2.4 Module Configuration
In default operation, the module will start with both approved and non-approved mode enabled.
If the module detects that the system property org.bouncycastle.fips.approved_only is set to true, the
module will start in approved mode and non-approved mode functionality will not be available.
If the underlying JVM is running with a Java Security Manager installed the module will be running in
approved mode with secret and private key export disabled.
Use of the module with a Java Security manager requires the setting of some basic permissions to allow
the module HMAC-SHA-256 software integrity test to take place as well as to allow the module itself to
examine secret and private keys. The basic permissions required for the module to operate correctly with
a Java Security manager are indicated by a Y in the Req column of Table 3.
Table 3 – Available Java Permissions
Permission Settings Req Usage
RuntimePermission “getProtectionDomain” Y Allows checksum to be carried out
on jar.
RuntimePermission “accessDeclaredMembers” Y Allows use of reflection API within
the provider.
PropertyPermission “java.runtime.name”, “read” N Only if configuration properties are
used.
SecurityPermission “putProviderProperty.BCFIPS” N Only if provider installed during
execution.
CryptoServicesPermission “unapprovedModeEnabled” N Only if unapproved mode
algorithms required.
CryptoServicesPermission “changeToApprovedModeEnabled” N Only if threads allowed to change
modes.
CryptoServicesPermission “exportSecretKey” N To allow export of secret keys only.
CryptoServicesPermission “exportPrivateKey” N To allow export of private keys only.
CryptoServicesPermission “exportKeys” Y Required to be applied for the
module itself. Optional for any other
codebase.
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsNullDigestEnabled” N Only required for TLS digest
calculations.
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Permission Settings Req Usage
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsPKCS15KeyWrapEnabled” N Only required if TLS is used with
RSA encryption.
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsAlgorithmsEnabled” N Enables both NullDigest and
PKCS15KeyWrap.
CryptoServicesPermission “defaultRandomConfig” N Allows setting of default
SecureRandom.
CryptoServicesPermission “threadLocalConfig” N Required to set a thread local
property in the
CryptoServicesRegistrar
CryptoServicesPermission “globalConfig” N Required to set a global property in
the CryptoServicesRegistrar.
2.3 Roles, Authentication and Services
2.3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). The cryptographic
module implicitly maps the two roles to the services. A user is considered the owner of the thread that
instantiates the module and, therefore, only one concurrent user is allowed.
Table 4 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The module does not support a maintenance role
and/or bypass capability. The module does not support authentication.
Table 4 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type
CO Cryptographic Officer – Powers on and off
the module.
N/A – Authentication not required for
Level 1
User User – The user of the complete API. N/A – Authentication not required for
Level 1
2.3.2 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 5 below, and Table 6 describes all usage of
CSPs by the service.
Table 5 lists the services. The second column provides a description of each service and availability to the
Cryptographic Officer and User, in columns 3 and 4, respectively.
Table 5 – Services
Service Description CO U
Initialize Module and Run
Self-Tests on Demand
The JRE will call the static constructor for self-tests on module
initialization.
X
Show Status A user can call FipsStatus.IsReady() at any time to determine if the
module is ready.
CryptoServicesRegistrar.IsInApprovedOnlyMode() can be called to
determine the FIPS mode of operation.
X
Zeroize / Power-off The module uses the JVM garbage collector on thread termination. X
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Service Description CO U
Data Encryption Used to encrypt data. X
Data Decryption Used to decrypt data. X
MAC Calculation Used to calculate data integrity codes with CMAC. X
Signature Authentication Used to generate signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA). X
Signature Verification Used to verify digital signatures. X
DRBG (SP800-90A) output Used for random number, IV and key generation. X
Message Hashing Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 message digest,
SHAKE output.
X
Keyed Message Hashing Used to calculate data integrity codes with HMAC. X
TLS Key Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a master secret in TLS from a pre-master secret and
additional input.
X
SP 800-108 KDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SSH Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
X9.63 Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SP 800-56C Concatenation
Derivation Function (KDM)
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
IKEv2 Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SRTP Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to
be used for a secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
PBKDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to generate a key using an
encoding of a password and an additional function such as a
message hash.
X
Key Agreement Schemes Used to calculate key agreement values (SP 800-56Arev3, Diffie-
Hellman).
X
Key Wrapping Used to encrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
Key Unwrapping Used to decrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
NDRNG Callback Gathers entropy in a passive manner from a user-provided function X
Utility Miscellaneous utility functions, does not access CSPs X
Note: The module services are the same in the approved and non-approved modes of operation. The only
difference is the function(s) used (approved/allowed or non-approved/non-allowed).
Services in the module are accessed via the public APIs of the Jar file. The ability of a thread to invoke non-
approved services depends on whether it has been registered with the module as approved mode only. In
approved only mode no non-approved services are accessible. In the presence of a Java SecurityManager
approved mode services specific to a context, such as DSA and ECDSA for use in TLS, require specific
permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the Cryptographic Officer or User.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
Table 6 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of
access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
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• R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module
uses the CSP.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites an
existing CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 6 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
AES
Encryption
Key
AES
Decryption
Key
AES
Authentication
Key
AES
Wrapping
Key
DH
Agreement
Key
DRBG
(CTR
AES)
DRBG
(CTR
Triple-DES)
DRBG
(Hash)
DRBG
(HMAC)
DSA
Signing
Key
EC
Agreement
Key
EC
Signing
Key
HMAC
Authentication
Key
IKEv2
DF
Secret
PBKDF
Secret
RSA
Signing
Key
RSA
Key
Transport
Key
SP
800-56A
Concat.
DF
Secret
SP
800-108
KDF
Secret
SRTP
DF
Secret
SSH
DF
Secret
TLS
KDF
Secret
Triple-DES
Authentication
Key
Triple-DES
Encryption
Key
Triple-DES
Decryption
Key
Triple-DES
Wrapping
Key
X9.63
KDF
Secret
Initialize Module and Run
Self-Tests on Demand
Show Status
Zeroize / Power-off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Data Encryption R R
Data Decryption R R
MAC Calculation R R R
Signature Generation R R R
Signature Verification R R R
DRBG (SP800-90A) output G G G G G G
R
G
R
G
R
G
R
G G G G G G G G G G
Message Hashing
Keyed Message Hashing R
TLS Key Derivation
Function
R
SP 800-108 KBKDF R
SSH Derivation Function R
X9.63 Derivation Function G G G R
SP 800-56C Concatenation
Derivation Function (KDM)
G G G R
IKEv2 Derivation Function R
SRTP Derivation Function R
PBKDF G
R
R
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2.4 Physical Security
The VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) is a software module, which FIPS defines as a
multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. As such, it does not include physical security mechanisms.
Thus, the FIPS 140-2 requirements for physical security are not applicable.
2.5 Operational Environment
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The module runs on a GPC running one of the operating systems specified in the approved operational
environment list. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads in a logically separated
manner. The Module’s user is considered the owner of the calling application that instantiates the Module
within the process space of the Java Virtual Machine.
The module optionally uses the Java Security Manager and starts in FIPS-approved mode by default when
used with the Java Security Manager. When the module is not used within the context of the Java Security
Manager, it will start by default in the non-FIPS-approved mode.
The cryptographic module was tested on the following operational environment on the general-purpose
computer (GPC) platforms detailed in Table 7 below:
Table 7 – Tested Configuration
# GPC Platforms
Operational
Environment (on ESXi
7.0)
Java SE Runtime
Environment
Processor
Family
Software
version(s)
1 Dell PowerEdge
R740 with Intel
Photon OS 2.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
Service
AES
Encryption
Key
AES
Decryption
Key
AES
Authentication
Key
AES
Wrapping
Key
DH
Agreement
Key
DRBG
(CTR
AES)
DRBG
(CTR
Triple-DES)
DRBG
(Hash)
DRBG
(HMAC)
DSA
Signing
Key
EC
Agreement
Key
EC
Signing
Key
HMAC
Authentication
Key
IKEv2
DF
Secret
PBKDF
Secret
RSA
Signing
Key
RSA
Key
Transport
Key
SP
800-56A
Concat.
DF
Secret
SP
800-108
KDF
Secret
SRTP
DF
Secret
SSH
DF
Secret
TLS
KDF
Secret
Triple-DES
Authentication
Key
Triple-DES
Encryption
Key
Triple-DES
Decryption
Key
Triple-DES
Wrapping
Key
X9.63
KDF
Secret
Key Agreement Schemes G G G G R R G R G G G G
Key Wrapping/Transport
(RSA, AES, Triple-DES)
R R R R
Key Unwrapping (RSA,
AES, Triple-DES)
R R R R
NDRNG Callback G G G G
Utility
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Xeon Gold
Processor
(1.8.0), single-
user mode
2 Photon OS 2.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
3 Photon OS 3.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8
(1.8.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
4 Photon OS 3.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
5 Ubuntu OS 16.04 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8
(1.8.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
6 Ubuntu OS 16.04 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
7 Ubuntu 18.04 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8
(1.8.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
8 Ubuntu 18.04 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
9 Windows Server 2019 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
10 Windows Server 2016 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8
(1.8.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
11 Windows Server 2016 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
12 CentOS 8 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
13 SUSE Linux Enterprise
Server 15
Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6126
Series
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
# GPC Platforms
Operational
Environment
Java SE Runtime
Environment
Processor
Family
Software
version(s)
14 Dell Latitude E7470
with Intel Core i5
Ubuntu 18.04 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
Core i5
Processor
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
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(1.11.0), single-
user mode
15 Windows 10 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Core i5
Processor
1.0.2.1,
1.0.2.2,
1.0.2.3
# GPC Platforms Operational
Environment
(on ESXi 8.0)
Java SE Runtime
Environment
Processor
Family
Software
version(s)
16 Dell PowerEdge
R650 with Intel
Xeon Gold
Photon OS 3.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v8
(1.8.0), single-user
mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6330
Series
1.0.2.3
17 Dell PowerEdge
R650 with Intel
Xeon Gold
Photon OS 4.0 Java SE Runtime
Environment v11
(1.11.0), single-
user mode
Intel Xeon
Gold 6330
Series
1.0.2.3
As per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5, the cryptographic module will remain compliant with
FIPS 140-2 validation when operating on Intel Xeon Gold 6126, 6230R or 6330 Processor running ESXi
7.0 & 8.0 with,
• Ubuntu 16.04/ 18.04/ 20.04/ 22.04 with JDK 8 or 11
• Photon 4.0/ 5.0 with JDK 8 or 11
• CentOS 7/8 with JDK 8 or 11
• RHEL 7/8/9 with JDK 8 or 11
• Windows Server 2022 with JDK 8 or 11
Or, any general-purpose computer (GPC) provided that:
1) No source code has been modified.
2) The GPC uses the specified single-user platform, or another compatible single-user platform such
as one of the Java SE Runtime Environments listed on any of the following:
HP-UX
Linux CentOS
Linux Debian
Linux Oracle RHC
Linux Oracle UEK
Linux SUSE
Linux Ubuntu
Mac OS X
Microsoft Windows
Microsoft Windows Server
Microsoft Windows XP
RedHat Enterprise Linux
VMware ESXi
VMware Photon OS
BLUX
Further, VMware, Inc. affirms that the VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module runs in its
configured, Approved mode of operation on the following binary compatible platforms executing VMware
ESXi 6.0, ESXi 6.5, ESXi 6.7, ESXi 7.0 or ESXi 8.0 and Java SE Runtime Environment 7, 8, or 11 with any
of the above listed OS:
• Dell PowerEdge R740 with Intel Xeon Gold 6230R Processor
• Dell PowerEdge R650 with Intel Xeon Gold 6330 Processor
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• Dell PowerEdge R340, R540, R650, R740, R750, R840 with Intel Xeon Processor
• Dell PowerEdge T150, T350, T440 with Intel Xeon Processor
• Dell PowerEdge FC640 with Intel Xeon Processor
• HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen9 with Intel Xeon Processor
• HPE ProLiant DL38P Gen8 with AMD Opteron Processor
• Cisco UCS – B22 M Series Blade Servers with Intel Processor
• Cisco UCS – C24 M3 Series Rackmount with Intel Xeon Processor
• A general-purpose computer platform with an Intel Core i/Intel Xeon/AMD Opteron Processor
executing VMware ESXi and any OS (including Apple OS (OS X, macOS, iOS, iPad), Android
OS, and others) with single user mode.
• A general-purpose computer platform with Intel Core i/Intel Xeon/AMD Opteron Processor
executing any OS (including Apple OS (OS X, macOS, iOS), Android OS, and others) in single
user mode with JDK 7, 8, or 11.
• A cloud computing environment composed of a general-purpose computing platform executing
VMware ESXi or ithers, a VMware cloud solution that is executing VMware ESXi or others.
For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby stated that the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct
operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific
operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require a FIPS 140-2
validated Cryptographic Library. The Module is a software-only embodiment; the cryptographic boundary
is the Java Archive (JAR) file, bc-fips-1.0.2.1.jar for version 1.0.2.1, bc-fips-1.0.2.2.jar for version 1.0.2.2
and bc-fips-1.0.2.3.jar for version 1.0.2.3.
2.5.1 Use of External RNG
The module makes use of the JVM's configured SecureRandom entropy source to provide entropy when
required. The module will request entropy as appropriate to the security strength and seeding configuration
for the DRBG that is using it and for the default DRBG will request a minimum of 256 bits of entropy. In
approved mode the minimum amount of entropy that can be requested by a DRBG is 112 bits. The module
will wait until the SecureRandom.generateSeed() returns the requested amount of entropy, blocking if
necessary.
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in Table 8 to Table 10 below.
Table 8 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB8, CFB128, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
A2054
C2205
A2841
CCM [SP 800-38C]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
A2054
C2205
A2841
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Algorithm Description Cert #
CMAC [SP 800-38B]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: AES with 128, 192, 256 bits and Triple-DES with 2-
key3,4, 3-key
A2054
C2205
A2841
GCM/GMAC5 [SP 800-38D]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
A2054
C2205
A2841
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: Hash DRBG, HMAC DRBG, AES-CTR DRBG, Triple-
DES-CTR DRBG.
Security Strengths: 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits
A2054
C2205
A2841
DSA6 [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: PQG Generation, PQG Verification, Key Pair
Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 1024, 2048, 3072 bits (1024 only for SigVer)
A2054
C2205
A2841
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Signature Generation Component, Public Key
Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification, Public
Key Validation
Curves/Key sizes: P-192*, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163*, K-
233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-163*, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
* Curves only used for Signature Verification and Public Key
Validation
A2054
C2205
A2841
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
A2054
C2205
A2841
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific7
[SP 800-135]
Functions: TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, SSH KDF, X9.63 KDF,
IKEv2 KDF, SRTP KDF.
A2054
C2205
A2841
3
2^20 block limit is enforced by module.
4
In approved mode of operation, the use of 2-key Triple-DES to generate MACs for anything other than
verification purposes is non-compliant.
5
GCM encryption with an internally generated IV, see section 3.4 concerning external IVs. IV generation is
compliant with IG A.5.
6
DSA signature generation with SHA-1 is only for use with protocols.
7
These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
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Algorithm Description Cert #
KBKDF, using
Pseudorandom
Functions8
[SP 800-108]
Modes: Counter Mode, Feedback Mode, Double-Pipeline Iteration
Mode
Functions: CMAC-based KBKDF with AES, 3-key Triple-DES or
HMAC-based KBKDF with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
A2054
C2205
A2841
KDF, Password-
Based
[SP 800-132]
Options: PBKDF with Option 1a
Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
A2054
A2841
Key Wrapping
Using Block
Ciphers9
[SP 800-38F]
Modes: AES KW, KWP
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits (provides between 128 and 256 bits
of strength)
A2054
C2205
A2841
[SP 800-38F]
Mode: Triple-DES TKW
Key size: 3-key (provides 112 bits of strength)
A2054
C2205
A2841
RSA [FIPS 186-4, FIPS 186-2, ANSI X9.31-1998 and PKCS #1 v2.1
(PSS and PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Key Pair Generation (2048 and 3072 bits) Signature
Generation, Signature Verification, Component Test
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits (1024, 1536, 4096 only for SigVer)
SP 800-56B Section 7.1.2 RSA Decryption Primitive
A2054
C2205
A2841
SHS [FIPS 180-4],
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification, non-Digital Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-512/256
A2054
C2205
A2841
SHA-3, SHAKE [FIPS 202]
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128,
SHAKE256
A2054
C2205
A2841
8
Note: CAVP testing is not provided for use of the PRFs SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. These must not
be used in approved mode.
9
Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.
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Algorithm Description Cert #
Triple-DES (Triple-
DES)
[SP 800-67]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB, TCBC, TCFB64, TCFB8, TOFB, CTR
Key sizes: 2-key (Decryption only)10, 3-key11
A2054
C2205
A2841
Table 9 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description IG Ref.
AES-CBC
Ciphertext Stealing
(CS)
[Addendum to SP 800-38A, Oct 2010]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC-CS1, CBC-CS2, CBC-CS3
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
Vendor
Affirmed IG
A.12
CKG using output
from DRBG12
[SP 800-133]
Section 6.1 (Asymmetric from DRBG)
Section 7.1 (Symmetric from DRBG)
Using A2054, C2205, A2841 (DRBG)
Vendor
Affirmed IG
D.12
cSHAKE128,
cSHAKE256
[SP 800-185]
Section 3, cSHAKE
Using A2054, C2205, A2841 (SHA3, SHAKE)
Vendor
Affirmed IG
A.15
KAS-SSC13 [SP 800-56A-rev3]
Section 5.6.2.3.1 (Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) Full
Public Key Validation Routine)
Section 5.6.2.3.2 (Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Full Public Key Validation Routine)
Section 5.7 (DLC Primitive)
Section 5.8 (Key Derivation Functions for Key
Agreement Schemes)
Section 5.9 (Key Confirmation)
Section 6 (Key Agreement)
Parameter sets/Key sizes:
ECC: Approved P, B, K Curves per Appendix D
FFC: Safe primes per Appendix D
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.1
rev 3
10
2^20 block limit is enforced by the module, 2-key encryption is disabled.
11
3-key Triple-DES encryption must not be used for more than 2^20 blocks for any given key.
12
The resulting key or a generated seed is an unmodified output from a DRBG.
13
Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
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Algorithm Description IG Ref.
KDF, Password-
Based
[SP 800-132]
Options: PBKDF with Option 1a
Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Using A2054, C2205, A2841 (HMAC)
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.6
Key Wrapping
Using RSA14
SP 800-56B, Section 7.2.3]
RSA-KEMS-KWS with, and without, key confirmation.
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.4
Key Transport
Using RSA15
[SP 800-56B, Section 7.2.2]
RSA-OAEP with, and without, key confirmation.
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.4
RSA [SP 800-131 rev2]
Section 3
Key sizes: 4096 up to 16384 bits
Using mechanism tested in A2054, C2205, A2841
Vendor
Affirmed IG
A.14
Table 10 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
NDRNG [IG 7.15]
Non-deterministic random number generator.
Non‐SP 800‐56B
compliant RSA Key
Transport
[IG D.9] RSA May be used by a calling application as part of a key encapsulation
scheme.
Key sizes: 4096 up to 16384 bits.
MD5 within TLS [IG D.2]
Table 11 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for use in non-FIPS mode only
AES (non-compliant14)
ARC4 (RC4)
Blowfish
Camellia
CAST5
DES
Diffie-Hellman KAS (non-compliant15)
KAS18 using SHA-512/224 or SHA-512/256
KBKDF using SHA-512/224 or SHA-
512/256 (non-compliant)
MD5
OpenSSL PBKDF (non-compliant)
PKCS#12 PBKDF (non-compliant)
PKCS#5 Scheme 1 PBKDF (non-compliant)
PRNG X9.31
14
Support for additional modes of operation.
15
Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
18
Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
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DSA (non-compliant16)
DSTU4145
ECDSA (non-compliant17)
EdDSA
ElGamal
GOST28147
GOST3410-1994
GOST3410-2001
GOST3411
HMAC-GOST3411
HMAC-MD5
HMAC-RIPEMD128
HMAC-RIPEMD160
HMAC-RIPEMD256
HMAC-RIPEMD320
HMAC-TIGER
HMAC-WHIRLPOOL
IDEA
RC2
RIPEMD128
RIPEMD160
RIPEMD256
RIPEMD320
RSA (non-compliant19)
RSA KTS (non-compliant20)
SCrypt
SEED
Serpent
SipHash
SHACAL-2
TIGER
Triple-DES (non-compliant21)
Twofish
WHIRLPOOL
XDH
2.6.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section in Table 12. All usage of these CSPs by the
Module (including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in section 2.3.2.
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
16
Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
17
Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
19
Support for additional digests and signature formats, PKCS#1 1.5 key wrapping, support for additional
key sizes.
20
Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
21
Support for additional modes of operation.
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CSP Description / Usage
AES Encryption Key
[FIPS-197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-
38A] AES (128/192/256) encrypt key22
AES Decryption Key
[FIPS-197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-
38A] AES (128/192/256) decrypt key
AES Authentication Key [FIPS-197] AES (128/192/256) CMAC/GMAC key
AES Wrapping Key [SP 800-38F] AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key
DH Agreement key [SP 800-56A-rev3] Diffie-Hellman (160 - 512 bits) private key agreement key
DRBG(CTR AES)
V (128 bits) and AES key (128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG(CTR Triple-DES)
V (64 bits) and Triple-DES key (192), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG(Hash)
V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on
security strength)
DRBG(HMAC)
V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy
input (length dependent on security strength)
DSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key
EC Agreement Key
[SP 800-56A-rev3] EC (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409 and B-571) private key agreement key
EC Signing Key
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, B-233, B-283, B-409 and B-571) signature generation key.
HMAC Authentication
Key
[FIPS 198-1] Keyed-Hash key (SHA-1, SHA-2). Key size determined by
security strength required (>= 112 bits)
IKEv2 Derivation
Function Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified IKEv2
PRF.
PBKDF Secret Value
[SP 800-132] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the
specified PRF.
RSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] RSA (2048 up to 16384 bits) signature generation key
RSA Key Transport Key [SP 800-56B] RSA (2048 up to 16384 bits) key transport (decryption) key
SP 800-56C
Concatenation
Derivation Function
Secret Value
[SP 800-56C] Secret value used in construction of key for underlying PRF.
SP 800-108 KDF Secret
Value
[SP 800-108] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified PRF.
SRTP Derivation
Function Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SRTP
PRF.
22
The AES-GCM key and IV is generated randomly per IG A.5, and the Initialization Vector (IV) is a minimum
of 96 bits. In the event module power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that
any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
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CSP Description / Usage
SSH Derivation Function
Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SSH
PRF.
TLS KDF Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the
specified TLS PRF.
Triple-DES
Authentication Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192) CMAC key
Triple-DES Encryption
Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (192) encryption key
Triple-DES Decryption
Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192) decryption key
Triple-DES Wrapping
Key
[SP 800-38F] Triple-DES (192 bits) key wrapping/unwrapping key, (128
unwrapping only).
X9.63 KDF Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the
specified X9.63 PRF.
2.6.2 Public Keys
Table 13 – Public Keys
CSP Description / Usage
DH Agreement Key
[SP 800-56A-rev3] Diffie-Hellman (2048 and 3072) public key agreement
key
DSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key
EC Agreement Key
[SP 800-56A-rev3] EC (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-
409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409 and B-571) public key agreement key
EC Verification Key
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409 and B-571) signature verification key
RSA Key Transport Key [SP 800-56B] RSA (2048-16384) key transport (encryption) key.
RSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] RSA (1024-16384) signature verification key
2.7 Self-Tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly, and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling
the module.
On power-up or reset, the module performs the self-tests that are described in Table 14 below. All KATs
must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs
fails, the module enters the Self-Test Failure error state. The module will output a detailed error message
when FipsStatus.isReady() is called. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module and
calling FipsStatus.isReady() again to confirm successful completion of the KATs.
Table 14 – Power Up Self-tests
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Test Target Description
Software Integrity HMAC-SHA256
AES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
CCM KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
AES-CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: AES with 128 bits
FFC KAS23 KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: FB
DRBG KATs: HASH_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Curves/Key sizes: P-256
GCM/GMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-256, SHA-512, SHA3-256
ECC KAS24 KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: EC
SP 800-108
KBKDF
KATs: Per IG 9.4 – Output Verification
Modes: Counter, Feedback, Double Pipeline
PRFs: AES-CMAC, Triple-DES-CMAC, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256
RSA KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHS KATs: Output Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
Triple-DES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Mode: TECB
Key sizes: 3-Key
Triple-DES-CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 3-Key
Extendable-Output
functions (XOF)
KATs: Output Verification
XOFs: SHAKE256
Key Wrapping
Using RSA
KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Key
TransportUsing
RSA
KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
23
Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1rev3 due to vendor affirmation to SP 800-
56Arev3.
24
Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1rev3 due to vendor affirmation to SP 800-
56Arev3.
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Table 15 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the
NDRNG.
DH DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DH key pair generation.
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
DSA DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key pair generation.
ECDH/ECCDH EC DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DH key pair generation.
ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every EC key pair generation.
RSA RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
DRBG Health
Checks
Performed conditionally on DRBG, per SP 800-90A Section 11.3.
SP 800-56A
Assurances25
Performed conditionally per SP 800-56A Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and/or 5.6.3. Required
per IG 9.6.
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module implements basic protections to mitigate against timing-based attacks against its internal
implementations. There are two countermeasures used.
The first is Constant Time Comparisons, which protect the digest and integrity algorithms by strictly avoiding
“fast fail” comparison of MACs, signatures, and digests so the time taken to compare a MAC, signature, or
digest is constant regardless of whether the comparison passes or fails.
The second is made up of Numeric Blinding and decryption/signing verification which both protect the RSA
algorithm.
Numeric Blinding prevents timing attacks against RSA decryption and signing by providing a random input
into the operation which is subsequently eliminated when the result is produced. The random input makes
it impossible for a third party observing the private key operation to attempt a timing attack on the operation
as they do not have knowledge of the random input and consequently the time taken for the operation tells
them nothing about the private value of the RSA key.
Decryption/signing verification is carried out by calculating a primitive encryption or signature verification
operation after a corresponding decryption or signing operation before the result of the decryption or signing
operation is returned. The purpose of this is to protect against Lenstra's CRT attack by verifying the
correctness the private key calculations involved. Lenstra's CRT attack takes advantage of undetected
errors in the use of RSA private keys with CRT values and, if exploitable, can be used to discover the
private value of the RSA key.
25
Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1rev3 due to vendor affirmation to SP 800-
56Arev3.
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3 SECURE OPERATION
The VMware's BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Module meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-
2. The sections below describe how to install, use, and keep the module in FIPS-Approved mode of
operation.
3.1 Basic Enforcement
The module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1
module.
1. The module shall provide two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The module does not provide authentication.
3. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power up self-tests by
cycling power or resetting the module.
4. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
7. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module does not support concurrent operators.
9. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
10. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs from the module’s physical boundary.
11. The module does not output intermediate key values.
3.2 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager
In the presence of a Java SecurityManager approved mode services specific to a context, such as DSA
and ECDSA for use in TLS, require specific policy permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration
by the Cryptographic Officer or User. The SecurityManager can also be used to restrict the ability of
particular code bases to examine CSPs. See section 2.2.4 Module Configuration for further advice on this.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
3.3 Basic Guidance
The jar file representing the module needs to be installed in a JVM's class path in a manner appropriate to
its use in applications running on the JVM.
Functionality in the module is provided in two ways. At the lowest level there are distinct classes that provide
access to the FIPS approved and non-FIPS approved services provided by the module. A more abstract
level of access can also be gained through the use of strings providing operation names passed into the
module's Java cryptography provider through the APIs described in the Java Cryptography Architecture
(JCA) and the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE).
When the module is being used in FIPS approved-only mode, classes providing implementations of
algorithms which are not FIPS approved, or allowed, are explicitly disabled.
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3.4 Enforcement and Guidance for GCM IVs
IVs for GCM can be generated randomly, where an IV is not generated randomly the module supports the
importing of GCM IVs.
In approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated randomly, the module enforces the use of an approved
DRBG in line with Section 8.2.2 of SP 800-38D.
In approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated using the FipsNonceGenerator a counter is used as the
basis for the nonce. Rollover of the counter in the FipsNonceGenerator will result in an IllegalStateException
indicating the FipsNonceGenerator is exhausted and, as per IG A.5, where used for TLS, rollover will
terminate any TLS session in process using the current key and the exception can only be recovered from
by using a new handshake and creating a new FipsNonceGenerator.
In approved mode, importing a GCM IV for encryption that originates from outside the module is non-
conformant.
Per IG A.5, section 2.6.1 of this security policy also states that in the event module power is lost and restored
the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are
re-distributed.
3.5 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF
In line with the requirements for SP 800-132, keys generated using the approved PBKDF must only be
used for storage applications. Any other use of the approved PBKDF is non-conformant.
In approved mode the module enforces that any password used must encode to at least 14 bytes (112 bits)
and that the salt is at least 16 bytes (128 bits) long. The iteration count associated with the PBKDF should
be as large as practical.
As the module is a general-purpose software module, it is not possible to anticipate all the levels of use for
the PBKDF, however a user of the module should also note that a password should at least contain enough
entropy to be unguessable and also contain enough entropy to reflect the security strength required for the
key being generated. In the event a password encoding is simply based on ASCII a 14-byte password is
unlikely to contain sufficient entropy for most purposes. Users are referred to Appendix A, “Security
Considerations” of SP 800-132 for further information on password, salt, and iteration count selection.
For users interested in introducing memory hardness as a layer on top of the PBKDF the scrypt
augmentation to PBDKF based on HMAC SHA-256 (as described in RFC 7914) is also available.
3.6 Rules for setting the N and the S String in cSHAKE
The cSHAKE algorithm offers to input string for customizing the output of the cSHAKE function, the
Function-Name input (N) and the Customization String (S).
The Function-Name input (N) is reserved for values specified by NIST and should only be set to the
appropriate NIST specified value. Any other use of N is non-conformant.
The Customization String (S) is available to allow users to customize the cSHAKE function as they wish.
The length of S is limited to the available size of a byte array in the JVM running the module.
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3.7 Guidance for the use of DRBGs and Configuring the JVM's Entropy Source
A user can instantiate the default Approved DRBG for the module explicitly by using
SecureRandom.getInstance("DEFAULT", "BCFIPS"), or by using a BouncyCastleFipsProvider object
instead of the provider name as appropriate. This will seed the Approved DRBG from the live entropy source
of the JVM, for example /dev/random on the tested Linux operational environments, with a number of bits
of entropy appropriate to the security level of the default Approved DRBG configured for the module.
An additional option is available using the Approved Hash_DRBG and the process outlined in SP-800 90A,
Section 8.6.5. This can be turned on by following the instructions in Section 2.3 of the User Guide. The two
DRBGs are instantiated in a chain as a "Source DRBG" to seed the "Target DRBG" in accordance with
Section 7 of Draft NIST SP 800-90C, where the Target DRBG is the default Approved DRBG used by the
module.
The initial seed and the subsequent reseeds for the DRBG chain come from the live entropy source
configured for the JVM. The DRBG chain will reseed automatically by pausing for 20 requests (which will
usually equate to 5120 bytes). An entropy gathering thread reseeds the DRBG chain when it has gathered
sufficient entropy (currently 256 bits) from the live entropy source. Once reseeded, the request counter is
reset and the reseed process begins again.
The “Source DRBG” in the chain is internal to the module and inaccessible to the user to ensure it is only
used for generating seeds for the default Approved DRBG of the module.
The user shall ensure that the Approved entropy source is configured per Section 2.5.1 of this Security
Policy and will block, or fail, if it is unable to provide the amount of entropy requested.
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4 REFERENCES AND ACRONYMS
The standards in Table 16 are referred to in this Security Policy. Table 17 provides definitions for the
acronyms used in this document.
Table 16 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
ANSI X9.31
X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for
the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), September 9, 1998
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-3 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
IG
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
PKCS#1 v2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard
PKCS#5 Password-Based Cryptography Standard
PKCS#12
Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard Recommendation for the
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-38A
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of
Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode
SP 800-38B
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication
SP 800-38C
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
SP 800-38D
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC
SP 800-38F
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping
SP 800-56A
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
SP 800-56B
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
SP 800-56C Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion
SP 800-67
Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher
SP 800-89 Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
SP 800-90A
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators
SP 800-108 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
SP 800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
SP 800-133 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application –Specific Key Derivation Functions
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Table 17 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
BC Bouncy Castle
BC-FJA Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CDH Computational Diffie-Hellman
CFB Cipher Feedback Mode
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Crypto Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CS Ciphertext Stealing
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter-mode
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRAM Dynamic Random-Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Authority
DSTU4145 Ukrainian DSTU-4145-2002 Elliptic Curve Scheme
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Authority
EdDSA Edwards Curve DSA using Ed25519, Ed448
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
GOST Gosudarstvennyi Standard Soyuza SSR/Government Standard of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
GPC General Purpose Computer
HMAC key-Hashed Message Authentication Code
IG See References
JAR Java Archive
JCA Java Cryptography Architecture
JCE Java Cryptography Extension
JDK Java Development Kit
JRE Java Runtime Environment
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Acronym Definition
JVM Java Virtual Machine
IV Initialization Vector
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KW Key Wrap
KWP Key Wrap with Padding
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A Not Applicable
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OCB Offset Codebook Mode
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PQG Diffie-Hellman Parameters P, Q and G
RC Rivest Cipher, Ron’s Code
RIPEMD RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TCBC TDEA Cipher-Block Chaining
TCFB TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TECB TDEA Electronic Codebook
TOFB TDEA Output Feedback
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
XDH Edwards Curve Diffie-Hellman using X25519, X448
XOF Extendable-Output Function
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