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Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................... 9
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................10
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................10
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................10
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................10
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................10
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................11
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................11
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................12
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................12
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................12
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................12
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................13
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................13
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................13
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................13
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................14
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................15
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................15
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................16
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................17
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................18
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................18
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................18
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9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................18
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................18
9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................19
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................19
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................19
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................20
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................21
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................22
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................24
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................24
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................24
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................24
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................25
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).... 7
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................. 7
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ................... 8
Table 5: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 6: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 9
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms........................................................................ 9
Table 8: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................10
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................11
Table 10: Roles.........................................................................................................................12
Table 11: Approved Services ....................................................................................................13
Table 12: Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................13
Table 13: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................18
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................18
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................18
Table 16: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................19
Table 17: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................19
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................19
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................21
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................21
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................22
Table 22: Error States...............................................................................................................22
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram............................................................................................................. 7
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Samsung Kernel
Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and
describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1 module.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Samsung Kernel Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module” or SKC) is a
software module running on a multi-chip standalone general-purpose computing platform. The
module provides cryptographic services to Kernel through an application program interface (API).
The binary image that contains the SKC for the appropriate platform is boot.img.
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The module is defined as a multi-chip standalone software module. Figure 1 below illustrates a
logical cryptographic boundary and physical boundary of the module. The module’s cryptographic
boundary contains .rodata, .text and .init.text sections of the object files: fips140_integrity.o,
fips140_post.o, fips140_test.o, fips140_out.o, fips140_3_services.o, api.o, cipher.o,
algapi.o, scatterwalk.o, skcipher.o, ahash.o, shash.o, hmac.o, sha1_generic.o,
sha256_generic.o, sha512_generic.o, ecb.o, cbc.o, aes_generic.o, aes.o, sha256.o, sha1.o,
aes-ce-core.o, aes-ce-glue.o, aes-ce.o, aes-glue-ce.o, sha256-core.o, sha256-glue.o, sha2-
ce-core.o, sha2-ce-glue.o, sha1-ce-core.o, sha1-ce-glue.o.
The object files are generated from the sources through the kernel build process.
The module is intended only for single-process execution.
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The module’s Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) is defined as the
physical perimeter of the tested platform enclosure around which everything runs.
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Figure 1: Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File Name Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
boot.img 2.5 HMAC-SHA2-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware Platform Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
Linux Kernel 6.6 Samsung Galaxy S25 Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Elite Yes 2.5
Linux Kernel 6.6 Samsung Galaxy S25 Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Elite No 2.5
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Internal
Kernel
calling
code
API invocation
Samsung Kernel
Cryptographic Module
fips140_integrity.o
fips140_post.o
fips140_test.o
fips140_out.o
…
sha2-ce-glue.o
(.rodata, .text, .init.text)
Cryptographic
boundary
TOEPP Physical
perimeter
Kernel
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Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware Platform
Linux Kernel 6.6 Samsung Electronics Exynos 1580 running on Galaxy Tab S10 FE 5G
Linux Kernel 6.6 Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Elite running on Galaxy Z Fold7
Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of
the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the
validation certificate.
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no components excluded from the security requirements.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved Mode Automatically entered whenever an
approved service is requested
Approved Equivalent to the indicator of the
requested service
Non-Approved
Mode
Automatically entered whenever a non-
approved service is requested
Non-
Approved
Equivalent to the indicator of the
requested service
Table 5: Modes List and Description
When the module starts up, the Self-tests are executed automatically and the module enters the
operational state if the self-tests pass. In case of failure of the self-test the Module gets
unrecoverable error state and OE panic is initiated. The only way to recover the state is the
module restart.
The Security Function Implementations Table lists all Approved security functions of the module,
including specific key size(s) employed for approved services, and implemented modes of
operation. The module is in the Approved mode of operation when the module utilizes the services
that use the security functions listed in the Approved Services Table. The Approved mode of
operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-
Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in the Non-Approved Services
Table.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6893 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB A6893 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
HMAC-SHA-1 A6893 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
224
A6893 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A6893 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A6893 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A6893 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
SHA-1 A6893 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A6893 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6893 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6893 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6893 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 180-4
Table 6: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
ESSIV-CBC-AES Authenticated encryption/decryption
CMAC Message authentication
AES-CTR Symmetric Encryption and Decryption
AES-XTS Symmetric Encryption and Decryption with ciphertext stealing
AES-CBC-CTS Symmetric Encryption and Decryption with ciphertext stealing
AES-XCTR Symmetric Encryption and Decryption with ciphertext stealing
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES encryption BC-UnAuth AES encryption AES-CBC: (A6893)
AES-ECB: (A6893)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES decryption BC-UnAuth AES decryption AES-CBC: (A6893)
AES-ECB: (A6893)
Hash generation SHA Hash generation SHA-1: (A6893)
SHA2-224: (A6893)
SHA2-256: (A6893)
SHA2-384: (A6893)
SHA2-512: (A6893)
HMAC generation MAC HMAC generation HMAC-SHA-1:
(A6893)
HMAC-SHA2-224:
(A6893)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A6893)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A6893)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A6893)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
N/A for this module.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
N/A for this module.
N/A for this module.
2.9 Key Generation
N/A for this module.
2.10 Key Establishment
N/A for this module.
2.11 Industry Protocols
N/A for this module.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input API input parameters
N/A Data Output API output parameters
N/A Control Input API function calls, API control input parameters
N/A Control Output N/A
N/A Status Output API return code, log messages
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. The module supports Crypto
Officer (CO) role. The cryptographic module does not provide any authentication methods. The
module does not allow concurrent operators. The Crypto Officer is implicitly assumed based on
the service requested. The module does not implement a bypass capability. The module does not
implement a self-initiated cryptographic output capability. The module does not support
Software/Firmware loading. The module provides the following services to the Crypto Officer.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module.
No authentication is required at security level 1 and the assumption of the role is implicit by the
service being performed.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO None
Table 10: Roles
The Crypto Officer role is implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module services.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Symmetric
encryption
Encrypt a
plaintext
get_service_status()
returns 1
Key,
ciphertext,
initialization
vector
Ciphertext AES
encryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key:
W,E
Symmetric
decryption
Decrypt a
ciphertext
get_service_status()
returns 1
Key,
ciphertext,
initialization
vector
Plain text AES
decryption
Crypto
Officer
- AES
Key:
W,E
Message
digest
generation
Generate
message digest
get_service_status()
returns 1
Message Message
digest
Hash
generation
Crypto
Officer
MAC
generation
Generate
message
authentication
code
get_service_status()
returns 1
Message,
key
MAC HMAC
generation
Crypto
Officer
- HMAC
Key:
W,E
Show
status
Show Module's
status
N/A None Status
information
None Crypto
Officer
Show
version
Show Module's
versioning
information of
the module
N/A None Module
name and
version
None Crypto
Officer
Zeroization Zeroize all
SSPs
N/A None None None Crypto
Officer
Self-tests Perform
cryptographic
algorithm self-
test and integrity
test
The successful
completion of a service
is an implicit indicator for
the use of an approved
service
N/A Status
information
AES
encryption
AES
decryption
Hash
Crypto
Officer
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
generation
HMAC
generation
Table 11: Approved Services
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
Symmetric encryption Encrypt a plaintext ESSIV-CBC-
AES
AES-CTR
Crypto
Officer
Symmetric decryption Decrypt a ciphertext ESSIV-CBC-
AES
AES-CTR
Crypto
Officer
MAC generation Generate message authentication
code
CMAC Crypto
Officer
Symmetric encryption with ciphertext
stealing
Encrypt ciphertext with ciphertext
stealing
AES-XTS
AES-CBC-CTS
AES-XCTR
Crypto
Officer
Symmetric decryption with ciphertext
stealing
Decrypt ciphertext with ciphertext
stealing
AES-XTS
AES-CBC-CTS
AES-XCTR
Crypto
Officer
Table 12: Non-Approved Services
<Text>
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not support Software/Firmware loading.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure the software security,
the module is protected by HMAC-SHA2-256 (HMAC Certs. #A6893) algorithm. The software
integrity test key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary in the factory and used for
software integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. At Module’s initialization, the integrity
of the runtime executable is verified using a HMAC-SHA2-256 which is compared to a MAC value
computed at build time. If at load time the MAC does not match the stored, known MAC value,
the module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited.
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5.2 Initiate on Demand
Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed
at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the software
integrity test on-demand.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1
specifications. The module runs within a commercially available kernel of the general-purpose
operating system. The module is executing on the hardware specified in the Tested Operational
Environments Table.
The operating is restricted to a single operator. Only a single instance of the module is allowed in
the Operational environment. The operating environment is non-configurable for the operator. The
operational environment provides the capability to separate the module during operation from
other functions in the operational environment. Those functions do not obtain information from the
module related to the CSPs and do not modify CSPs, PSPs, or the execution flow of the module
other than via the interfaces provided by the module itself.
The module does not spawn any processes.
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7 Physical Security
The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The module does not implement non-invasive attack mitigation techniques to protect the module’s
unprotected SSPs from non-invasive attacks referenced in Annex F of FIPS 140-3.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM (Volatile
memory)
Temporary storage within TOEPP for SSPs used by the module as part of
service execution
Dynamic
Table 13: Storage Areas
The module does not provide persistent storage for keys or SSPs. The module uses pointers to
plaintext keys/SSPs that are passed in by the calling application. The module does not store any
SSP beyond the lifetime of an API call.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
SSPs API input Calling application (TOEPP) Module Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 14: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Zeroization
API call
Zeroization command calling
context destructor to zeroize all
SSPs stored in its context
struct
SSPs are actively overwritten
with zeroes and thus not
recoverable
Using
crypto_free_<transformation
type>()
Power down Power down the tested
platform to zeroize all SSPs
SSPs stored in the tested
platform's volatile memory
will be zeroized after power
is lost
Power down the tested
platform
Table 15: SSP Zeroization Methods
The zeroization mechanism for all of the CSPs is to replace 0s in the memory which originally
store the CSPs. Zeroization of the sensitive data within the module and is performed automatically
in the frame of release of early allocated crypto handler, by calling function
crypto_free_<transformation type>() e.g. crypto_free_skcipher() for symmetric cyphers or
crypto_free_shash() for hashes. In addition, powering down the tested platform also has all SSPs
zeroized.
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
AES
Key
Keys used for AES
encryption /
decryption
128, 192, 256
bits - 128 to 256
bits
Symmetric
AES key - CSP
AES
encryption
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Name Description Size - Strength Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
AES
decryption
HMAC
Key
Keyed Hash at least 112 bits
- at least 112
bits
MAC key -
CSP
HMAC
generation
Table 16: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related
SSPs
AES Key SSPs API
input
RAM (Volatile
memory):Plaintext
For the lifetime of the
API call
Zeroization API
call
Power down
HMAC
Key
SSPs API
input
RAM (Volatile
memory):Plaintext
Table 17: SSP Table 2
The table summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the
cryptographic services implemented in the module.
9.5 Transitions
- SHA-1
The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing. This implementation will be non-
Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031. User should move to SHA2, which is available in
this module.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
Software
Integrity
Test
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A6893)
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
When the test passes,
do_integrity_check() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1 and device
gets into error state
This test is
performed after the
CASTs for SHA2-256
and HMAC-SHA2-
256
Table 18: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs Pre-operational Self-tests automatically when the module is loaded into
memory (i.e. at power on). The Pre-operational Self-tests contain pre-operational software
integrity test to ensure that the module is not corrupted. The integrity test is performed on the
runtime image of the module using HMAC-SHA2-256. Prior to software integrity test, a CAST for
HMAC-SHA2-256 is performed. If the CAST on the HMAC-SHA-256 is successful, the HMAC
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value of the runtime image is recalculated and compared with the stored HMAC value pre-
computed at compilation time (for details, see Integrity Techniques section). While the module is
performing the Pre-operational Self-tests no other functions are available and all output is
inhibited. Once Pre-operational Self-tests are completed successfully, the module enters
operational mode and cryptographic services are available.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-ECB
Encrypt KAT
(A6893)
Key lengths:
128, 192, 256
bits
KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
Encrypt During the module
start-up or using
fips140_kat()
AES-ECB
Decrypt KAT
(A6893)
Key lengths:
128, 192, 256
bits
KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
Decrypt During the module
start-up or using
fips140_kat()
AES-CBC
Encrypt KAT
(A6893)
Key lengths:
128, 192, 256
bits
KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
Encrypt During the module
start-up or using
fips140_kat()
AES-CBC
Decrypt KAT
(A6893)
Key lengths:
128, 192, 256
bits
KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
Decrypt During the module
start-up or using
fips140_kat()
SHA1 KAT
(A6893)
N/A KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
Hash
generation
During module
start-up or on-
demand using
fips140_kat()
SHA2-224
KAT (A6893)
N/A KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
Hash
generation
During module
start-up or on-
demand using
fips140_kat()
SHA2-256
KAT (A6893)
N/A KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
Hash
generation
During module
start-up or on-
demand using
fips140_kat()
SHA2-384
KAT (A6893)
N/A KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
Hash
generation
During module
start-up or on-
demand using
fips140_kat()
SHA2-512
KAT (A6893)
N/A KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
Hash
generation
During module
start-up or on-
demand using
fips140_kat()
HMAC-SHA1
KAT (A6893)
Key length:
160 bits
KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
HMAC
generation
During module
start-up or on-
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
demand using
fips140_kat()
HMAC-
SHA2-224
KAT (A6893)
Key length:
160 bits
KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
HMAC
generation
During module
start-up or on-
demand using
fips140_kat()
HMAC-
SHA2-256
KAT (A6893)
Key length:
160 bits
KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
HMAC
generation
During module
start-up or on-
demand using
fips140_kat()
HMAC-
SHA2-384
KAT (A6893)
Key length:
160 bits
KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
HMAC
generation
During module
start-up or on-
demand using
fips140_kat()
HMAC-
SHA2-512
KAT (A6893)
Key length:
160 bits
KAT CAST When the test passes,
fips140_kat() returns 0,
otherwise it returns -1
and device gets into
error state
HMAC
generation
During module
start-up or on-
demand using
fips140_kat()
Table 19: Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests at module initialization to ensure that
the algorithms work as expected, before any security function or process is invoked via module
interface, as detailed below.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Software Integrity
Test
KAT SW/FW Integrity On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
Table 20: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-ECB Encrypt
KAT (A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
AES-ECB Decrypt
KAT (A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
AES-CBC Encrypt
KAT (A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
AES-CBC Decrypt
KAT (A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
SHA1 KAT (A6893) KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
SHA2-224 KAT
(A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
SHA2-256 KAT
(A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
SHA2-384 KAT
(A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
SHA2-512 KAT
(A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
HMAC-SHA1 KAT
(A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
HMAC-SHA2-224
KAT (A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
HMAC-SHA2-256
KAT (A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
HMAC-SHA2-384
KAT (A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
HMAC-SHA2-512
KAT (A6893)
KAT CAST On demand Reload the module
or use fips140_kat()
API call
Table 21: Conditional Periodic Information
The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator (via calling fips140_post()
service), by power-cycling, or rebooting the tested platform. The pre-operational software integrity
test and the full suite of self-tests listed in the Conditional Self-Tests Table are executed. The
same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests. If any of the
tests fail, the module will enter error state.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error The module's
only error state
Any failure in context of the execution
of the implemented self-tests during
module start-up or the self-test service
Reload the
module
The OE`s OS log contains
message 'FIPS : POST -
one or more self-tests
failed'.
Table 22: Error States
The module has a variable (skc_fips_enabled) indicating the status of the Self-test. It contains
0 if the Self-test was failed and it contains 1 if the Self-test was successful.
The kernel logs contains message:
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FIPS : POST - integrity test failed
in case of integrity test is failed, or
FIPS : <alg name>, test failed, err=<test number>
in case of CAST is failed.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
This cryptographic module is built-in along with the Linux Kernel. The module is initialized during
the Kernel boot-up before any cryptographic functionality is available. The Kernel is responsible
for the initialization and loading processes of the module. The module is designed with module
init entry point which ensures that the Pre-operational self-tests and CASTs are initiated
automatically when the module is loaded.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
N/A
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
N/A
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks.