Postal mRevenector DE 2011 - Security Policy
Security Policy
Postal mRevenector DE 2011
Version 1.6
Hardware P/N: 580036020300/01
Firmware Version:
Bootloader: 90.0036.0201.00/2011485001
Software-Loader: 90.0036.0206.00/2011485001
FRANKIT-Application: 90.0036.0204.00/2012095001
Francotyp-Postalia GmbH
Development Department
Hasbi Kabacaoglu / Dirk Rosenau
Prenzlauer Promenade 28
D-13089 Berlin
Germany
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Contents
1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification .............................................................................................4
3 Cryptographic Ports, Interfaces & Excluded Components...............................................................5
4 Rules of Operation .....................................................................................................................6
5 Roles, Services, Authentication & Identification ............................................................................8
6 Physical Security......................................................................................................................12
7 Cryptographic Functions...........................................................................................................13
8 Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters ...................................................................14
9 Self-Tests................................................................................................................................17
10 Mitigating Other Attacks........................................................................................................19
Figures
Figure: 1 Postal mRevenector DE 2011...............................................................................................3
Tables
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Levels ...................................................................................................4
Table 2: Cryptographic Ports & Types ................................................................................................5
Table 3: Services and Roles.............................................................................................................10
Table 4: Cryptographic Functions.....................................................................................................13
Table 5: Critical Security Parameters................................................................................................15
Table 6: FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests...........................................................................17
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Francotyp-Postalia (FP) is one of the leading global suppliers of mail
center solutions. A major component of the business of FP is the
development, manufacture and support of postal franking machines
(postage meters). These postal franking machines incorporate a
postal security device (PSD) that performs all postage meter
cryptographic and postal security functions and which protects both
Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and Postal Relevant Data Items
(PRDIs) from unauthorized access. The Postal mRevenector DE
2011 is FP’s latest generation of PSD.
This document forms a Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the cryptographic module of the device
under the terms of the NIST FIPS 140-2 validation. This Security Policy specifies the security rules under
which this device operates.
1.2 Implementation
The Postal mRevenector DE 2011 is a multiple-chip embedded cryptographic module, based around a
cryptographic integrated circuit, together with a small number of support components. The components,
mounted on a PCB, are covered by hard opaque potting material. The module has a proprietary electrical
connector forming the interface to the module.
Figure: 1 Postal mRevenector DE 2011
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 FIPS Security Level Compliance
The cryptographic module is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 as shown in the table below:
Section Security Requirement Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
3 Roles, Services and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 3
5 Physical Security 3 + EFP/EFT
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 3
8 Electromagnetic Interference/ Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/IMC)
3
9 Self-Tests 3
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 3
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
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3 Cryptographic Ports, Interfaces & Excluded Components
3.1 Physical Interface
The cryptographic module uses a 36 pin card edge connector. The usage of these physical ports for FIPS
140-2 logical interfaces is detailed in the table below:
Type Pin
Data Input A4, A5, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15
Data Output A4, A5, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15
Control Input A4, A5, A8, A9, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15
Status Output A2, A3, A4, A5, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, A15
Power A1, A6, A7, A16, A17, A18, B1, B7, B8, B9, B10, B11, B16, B17, B18
Not Used B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B12, B13, B14, B15
Table 2: Cryptographic Ports & Types
3.2 Cryptographic boundary
The cryptographic boundary is defined to be the outer edge both the epoxy covered printed circuit board
and the exposed battery. The battery is excluded from the requirements of FIPS 140-2. It is connected to
the circuitry of the module in such a way that it cannot be used to compromise the security of the
module.
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4 Rules of Operation
4.1 FIPS 140-2 Related Security Rules
The Postal mRevenector DE 2011 shall:
1. Support only an Approved mode of operation.
2. Not allow unauthenticated operators to have any access to the module’s cryptographic services.
3. Inhibit data output during self-tests and error states.
4. Logically disconnect data output from the processes performing zeroization and key generation.
5. Enforce identity-based authentication for roles that access Approved algorithms and CSPs.
6. Not retain the authentication of an operator following power-off or reboot.
7. Support the following roles: Default User, User, Cryptographic Officer.
8. Not permit the output of plaintext cryptographic keys or other CSPs.
9. Not support a bypass mode or maintenance mode.
10. Perform the self-test as described in section 9 of this document.
11. Support the following logically distinct interfaces:
 Data input interface
 Data output interface
 Control input interface
 Status output interface
 Power interface.
12. Implement all software using a high-level language, except the limited use of low-level languages
to enhance performance.
13. Protect critical security parameters from unauthorized disclosure, modification and substitution.
14. Provide means to ensure that a key entered into or stored within the device is associated with
the correct entities to which the key is assigned.
15. Support a FIPS approved deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) as specified in NIST 800-90
section 10.2.1
16. Perform the self tests listed in section 9 during power-on and on-demand when the
corresponding service is used.
17. Store an error indication whenever an error state is entered. As a result the error indication can
be read by the Get Device Status Service.
18. Not perform any cryptographic functions while in an error state.
19. Not support multiple concurrent operators.
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4.2 Postal Related Security Rules
The Postal mRevenector DE 2011 shall:
20. Protect the postal registers against unauthorized substitution or modification.
21. Never zeroize the postal registers.
22. Comply with the specifications given in the “FRANKIT-New Generation Digital Franking”
specification from the Deutsche Post AG (DPAG).
23. Provide mechanisms to disable the Accounting Service when it has no connection with its
partnering infrastructure on a regular basis.
24. Provide services for protecting postal related data inside its hosting system against unauthorized
substitution or modification.
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5 Roles, Services, Authentication & Identification
5.1 Roles
The Postal mRevenector DE 2011 supports three distinct roles:
 Default User
 User
 Cryptographic Officer
Any services which do not read, update, modify or generate critical security parameters (CSPs) do not
require authentication.
5.2 Default User Role
By default the device enters the Default user role, which is an unauthenticated role, for services that do
not require authentication. The Host System typically acts on behalf of the Default operator and can
request unauthenticated services.
5.3 User Role
The User is authenticated using an identity based authentication method. This method is based on a
three way handshake protocol using secret pass phrases and user identifications (UIDs) known to both
parties.
The Host System typically acts on behalf of the User to request authenticated services.
5.4 Cryptographic Officer Role
The Cryptographic Officer is authenticated using an identity based authentication method based on an
RSA signature verification process, which utilizes a 2048-bit RSA public key over the CO’s identifier. This
method uses two pairs of asymmetric keys and two distinguished names. The public parts and
distinguished names are each known to the other party. In this way, the PSD and the infrastructure are
able to identify and authenticate themselves to the other by verifying the exchanged distinguished name
and signature. In addition the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is used to establish secret keys that
may be used for further key encryption and authentication of data exchange.
The Cryptographic Officer role shall provide those services necessary to initialize, authorize and validate
the Postal mRevenector DE 2011. This role provides any services which enter, modify or generate critical
security parameters.
A Francotyp-Postalia Infrastructure server typically acts on behalf of a Cryptographic Officer.
5.5 Services and Roles
The following services are offered by the cryptographic module:
Service
Approved
Security
Functions Used
Associated CSPs Roles Note
Echo None None Default User Echoes back data payload.
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Service
Approved
Security
Functions Used
Associated CSPs Roles Note
Get Device Status None None Default User
Reboot Device None None Default User
Service to cause the device to
reboot.
Scrap None None Default User Zeroizes all plaintext CSPs.
Select Programmed
Firmware
None None Default User Configures the bootloader.
Selftest All listed in chapter 6 None Default User
Setup Parameter None None Default User Enters postal configuration data.
Logoff None None CO, User Leaves the CO or User role.
Local Login
AES-CBC,
HMAC-SHA256,
DRBG
Passphrase
Required to enter
the User role
Required to enter the User role.
Remote Login
KAS, DSA Key
Generation
RSA 2048 Sign &
Verify with SHA-
256,
DRBG
PSD Transport Key Pair,
PSD Keys Pair,
PKM Public Key
Remote Session
Encryption Key
Remote Session
Authentication Key
Required to enter
the CO role Required to enter the CO role.
Postal Initialization
RSA 2048 Sign/Verify
using SHA-256,
3TDES CBC,
HMAC-SHA1,
DRBG
PSD Key Pair
Remote Session
Encryption Key
Remote Session
Authentication Key
CO
Initialize the device according to
the DPAG FRANKIT
requirements.
Postal Authorization
HMAC-SHA1, Remote Session
Authentication Key CO
Authorize the device according
to the DPAG FRANKIT
requirements.
Postage Value
Download
RSA 1024 Decryption,
3TDES CBC,
HMAC-SHA1
DPAG Private Key
Remote Session
Encryption Key
Remote Session
Authentication Key
Indicia Key (mSecret)
CO
Finance service, managing
postal funds.
Postage Value
Refund
RSA 1024 Decryption,
3TDES CBC,
HMAC-SHA1
DPAG Private Key
Remote Session
Encryption Key
Remote Session
Authentication Key
CO
Finance service, managing
postal funds.
Re-Initialization HMAC-SHA1
Remote Session
Authentication Key CO Updates postal configuration
data
Reenter FP Mac
Secret
3TDES CBC,
HMAC-SHA1
Remote Session
Encryption Key
Remote Session
Authentication Key
FP Mac Secret
CO
Enters FP Mac Secret used to
authenticate proprietary data
Rekey DPAG Keys
RSA 1024 Encryption/
Decryption,
3TDES CBC,
HMAC-SHA1
DRBG
DPAG Key Pair
Remote Session
Encryption Key
Remote Session
Authentication Key
CO
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Service
Approved
Security
Functions Used
Associated CSPs Roles Note
Rekey PSD keys
TDES CBC, RSA 2048
Sign/Verify using
SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA1,
DRBG
PSD Key Pair,
Remote Session
Encryption Key
Remote Session
Authentication Key
CO
Renew PKM key
RSA 2048 Verify
using SHA-256, PKM public key CO
Loads signed PKM certificate
Secure Echo HMAC-SHA1 Remote Session
Authentication Key
CO
Echoes back data payload within
a secure session.
Secure Get Status HMAC-SHA1
Remote Session
Authentication Key CO
Provides status within a secure
session.
Secure Set Time HMAC-SHA1
Remote Session
Authentication Key CO
Synchronizes the RTC within a
secure session.
Accounting SHA1 with secret
suffix method
mSecret User Debits the postal funds and
returns indicia content.
Postal Module
Registration
AES-CBC,
HMAC-SHA256
None User
Enters postal configuration data
and registers the module in the
country and initializes the
module for postal usage.
Program FLASH
with Firmware
RSA- PKCS#1 V1.5
verification using
2048 and SHA-256
Working Encryption keys
Working Authentication
keys
User
Receives firmware from an
external source and programs it
into the cryptographic module’s
FLASH memory.
Sign PMD Data
AES-CBC,
HMAC-SHA256,
RSA 2048 Sign using
SHA-256
Local Session Encryption
Key,
Local Session
Authentication Key,
Private PMD Key
User
Sign postal related items and
communication data.
Verify Mac None FP Mac Secret User Authenticates a data payload.
Table 3: Services and Roles
5.6 Authentication Strength
5.6.1 Cryptographic Officer Role
The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur shall be less than one
in 1,000,000. This is achieved through use of a 2048 bit RSA key to authenticate the role, which has been
determined to have an effective strength of 112-bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed
is therefore 1/(2112
), which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Should multiple attempts be made to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be
less than one in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur. This is
achieved by inserting a delay of 1 second after any failed attempt resulting in a maximum of 60 attempts
per minute. The probability is therefore 60/(2112
), which is less than 1/100,000.
5.6.2 User role
The passphrase contains at least 6 randomly chosen characters for the User resulting in a total of more
than 626
combinations (alphanumeric input). The probability that a random attempt will succeed is
therefore 1/(626
), which is less than 1/1,000,000.
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Should multiple attempts be made to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be
less than one in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur. This is
achieved by inserting a delay of 1 second after any failed attempt resulting in a maximum of 60 attempts
per minute. The probability is therefore 60/(626
), which is less than 1/100,000.
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6 Physical Security
All the components of the device, except the battery and the card edge connector, are covered with a
hard, tamper-evident potting material, which is opaque within the visible spectrum. Because of the
potting material it is not possible to physically access any internal components without seriously
damaging the module or causing zeroization.
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7 Cryptographic Functions
The module has one mode of operation, the FIPS mode of operation. It implements the following FIPS
approved and allowed algorithms:
Security Function Usage Certificate
SHA-1, SHA-256 Hashing NIST Certificate #1346
DRBG On key generation NIST Certificate #61
AES 128 (EBC & CBC) On data encryption and authentication NIST Certificate #1493
HMAC-SHA1,
HMAC-SHA-256
On message authentication NIST Certificate #878
Key Agreement Scheme(KAS) SP800-56A On key establishment, key establishment method
provides 112 bits of security strength.
NIST Certificate #16
RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 Verification
using 2048 and SHA-256
On signature verification NIST Certificate #732
RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 Signing
using 2048 and SHA-256
On signature generation NIST Certificate #785
RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 Encryption/Decryption*
using 1024 and SHA-1
On key decryption, key establishment method
provides 80 bits of security strength.
N/A
3TDES (ECB & CBC) On data encryption and decryption NIST Certificate #1122
DSA On key generation for KAS NIST Certificate #522
Non-Approved RNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
(NDRNG), used for seeding the DRBG.
N/A
* The Approved Signature Generation and Verification functions of this RSA implementation were issued NIST Certificate #731.
Table 4: Cryptographic Functions
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8 Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters
The following section lists the critical and public security parameters that are retained by the device.
Critical Security Parameters
The table below lists the critical security parameters:
Name Algorithm Storage Generation Establishment Destruction Purpose
DRBG State CTR_DRBG
using AES
128
Encrypted Seeded by
internal
NDRNG
N/A N/A Internal state of the
Deterministic Random
Bit Generator.
Data
Encryption
Master Keys
AES CBC
128 bits
Plaintext Internal DRBG N/A Scrap service
or tamper
event
Serve to encrypt and
decrypt critical
security parameters.
Data
Authentication
Master Keys
(128 bit key)
HMAC-
SHA256
Plaintext Internal DRBG N/A Scrap service
or tamper
event
Serve to authenticate
critical security
parameters.
Working
Encryption
Keys
AES CBC
128 bits
Plaintext Internal DRBG N/A Scrap service,
tamper event
or power cycle
Serve to encrypt and
decrypt other
internally used data.
Working
Authentication
Keys
(128 bit key)
HMAC-
SHA256
Plaintext Internal DRBG N/A Scrap service,
tamper event
or power cycle
Serve to authenticate
other internally used
data.
Data
Encryption
Keys
AES CBC
128 bits
Encrypted Internal DRBG N/A N/A Serve to encrypt and
decrypt other
internally stored
critical security
parameters.
Data
Authentication-
Keys
(128 bit key)
HMAC-
SHA256
Encrypted Internal DRBG N/A N/A Serve to authenticate
other internally stored
critical security
parameters.
Transport
Signing
(private) Key
RSA PKCS#1
V1.5 -2048
Encrypted Internal DRBG N/A N/A Serves to properly
identify device after
shipping and to
establish initial secure
session.
PMD Signing
(private) Key
RSA PKCS#1
V1.5 -2048
Encrypted Internal DRBG N/A N/A Used to support
hosting device during
its authentication
services.
PSD Signing
(private) Key
RSA PKCS#1
V1.5 -2048
Encrypted Internal DRBG N/A N/A Serves to setup
regular secure
sessions.
DPAG
Decryption Key
RSA PKCS#1
V1.5 -1024
Encrypted Internal DRBG N/A N/A Serves to decrypt the
mSecret.
mSecret
(128 bit)
SHA1 Encrypted N/A Encrypted Entry N/A Serves to
authenticate indicia.
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Name Algorithm Storage Generation Establishment Destruction Purpose
Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman
KAS SP800-
56A -2048
Not
persistently
stored
Internal DRBG N/A Zeroized after
use
Serves to derive
session keys for the
Cryptographic Officer.
Remote
Session
Authentication
Key
(160 bit key,
112 bits of
strength)
HMAC -SHA1 Not
persistently
stored
N/A Key Agreement/
Derivation
Zeroized after
use
Serves to
authenticate data
during a remote
secure session (CO
role)
Remote
Session
Encryption Key
(192 bit key,
112 bits of
strength)
3TDES-CBC Not
persistently
stored
N/A Key Agreement/
Derivation
Zeroized after
use
Serves to encrypt and
decrypt data during a
remote secure session
(CO role).
FP Mac Secret N/A Encrypted N/A Encrypted Entry N/A Used to authenticate
proprietary data
Passphrase N/A Encrypted N/A N/A N/A Used for User Identity
based authentication
Table 5: Critical Security Parameters
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Public Security Parameters.
The following public keys are stored in the device:
Name of certificate
or public key
Algorithm Storage Generation Purpose
FPRootCA
(certificate & public key)
2048 bit RSA
key
Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate FDC and PKM keys
FDC
(certificate & public key)
2048 bit RSA
key
Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate TransportKey
PKM
(certificate & public key)
2048 bit RSA
key
Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate Cryptographic Officer
TransportKey
(certificate & public key)
2048 bit RSA
key
Plaintext Internal
DRBG
Serves to initially authenticate Postal
mRevenector DE 2011
PSDKey
(certificate & public key)
2048 bit RSA
key
Plaintext Internal
DRBG
Serves to authenticate Postal mRevenector DE
2011
DPAGKey
(certificate & public key)
1024 bit RSA
key
Plaintext Internal
DRBG
Serves to encrypt the mSecret on the Postage
Point
RootCABC
(certificate & public key)
2048 bit RSA
key
Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate FDCBC and PMD keys
FDCBC
(certificate & public key)
2048 bit RSA
key
Plaintext N/A Serves to authenticate PMDKey
PMDKey
(certificate & public key)
2048 bit RSA
key
Plaintext Internal
DRBG
Used to support hosting device during its
authentication services.
Firmware Verification
Key
2048 bit RSA
key
Plaintext N/A Used to verify firmware from Francotyp-
Postalia.
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9 Self-Tests
9.1 Power on self tests
The following self tests are performed when the Postal mRevenector DE 2011 starts:
Firmware Integrity Test
The mRevenector checks the SHA 256 hash of the Postal mRevenector DE 2011 firmware of the
cryptographic module and verifies this against a known signature generated with PKCS#1 V1.5
(Signature Scheme).
Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
The following table lists the cryptographic algorithm tests for approved and allowed security functions that are performed as part of
the power-on self tests. For corresponding NIST certificates see * The Approved Signature Generation and Verification functions of
this RSA implementation were issued NIST Certificate #731.
Table 4.
Security Function Type of self-test
RSA 1024 bit Decryption Decrypt KAT
DRBG Known answer test (KAT)
AES 128 – ECB & CBC Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
HMAC-SHA1 & HMAC-SHA256 KAT (includes SHA KAT)
Key Agreement Scheme KAT
RSA 2048 bit Sign/Verify using SHA-256 KAT
RSA 2048 bit Verify using SHA-256 KAT
TDES (ECB & CBC) KAT
Table 6: FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
Register consistency test
This test checks the consistency of the redundantly stored postal registers.
9.2 Conditional Tests
The following conditional tests are performed:
Security Function Performed
CTR-DRBG and NDRNG On usage:
see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Continuous RNG test 1”.
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement On key establishment:
see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Pair-wise consistency test 2”.
RSA 2048 bit using SHA-256 On key generation:
see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Pair-wise consistency test 2”.
RSA 1024 bit On key generation:
see FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 “Pair-wise consistency test 2”. Runs an
Encrypt-Decrypt Test.
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Security Function Performed
Firmware Loading Test On loading of programmed firmware:
Performs RSA 2048 SHA 256 signature verification
Continuous DRBG Test
The cryptographic module uses a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on a block cipher
algorithm as specified in the recommendation NIST SP 800-90. The implemented CTR DRBG uses AES-
128 as its cryptographic function. The entropy input is at least 128 Bits. The DRBG uses a hardware-
based random number generator as the entropy source. Consecutive outputs of the DRBG are compared
to ensure that they differ.
The module has a non-approved hardware implemented NDRNG. Consecutive outputs of the NDRNG are
compared to ensure that they differ.
9.3 Error States
In the event of an error being detected, the Postal mRevenector DE 2011 enters an error state and stores
the reason (error identifier) persistently. The error state information can be retrieved via the Get Device
Status service.
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10 Mitigating Other Attacks
The device includes environmental failure protection means for the battery voltage. If an attack is
detected then the contents of the cryptographic IC’s battery powered key storage are automatically
zeroized, leaving the module inoperable.
The device is designed in such a way that temperature changes outside the normal operating ranges will
not compromise the security of the device.
The device includes failure protection means for the frequency of the internal Real Time Clock (RTC). If
an attack is detected then the contents of the cryptographic IC’s battery powered key storage are
automatically zeroized, leaving the module inoperable.
The device includes failure protection means for the main input voltage, the internal core voltage, and
the main clock frequency. If one of these conditions is outside a defined range the device is held in the
reset condition.
The cryptographic module’s processor incorporates a layer of metal shielding as one of its layers, used to
detect attempts at intrusion at a die level. In the event of an intrusion attempt being detected, the
contents of its battery powered key storage are automatically zeroized leaving the module inoperable.
The failure protection for the battery voltage and the RTC frequency and the tamper detection for the
module’s processor are present using power from the battery even when the device is switched off.