Ó 2025 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. All rights reserved.
Samsung TCG Opal SSC
Cryptographic Sub-Chip
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.2
Last update: 2025-01-28
Prepared for:
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
1-1, Samsungjeonja-ro
Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-do
Korea, 18448
www.samsung.com
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
4516 Seton Center Pkwy Suite 250
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1. GENERAL .................................................................................................... 5
1.1 OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................5
1.2 SECURITY LEVELS ..........................................................................................................5
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION .................................................... 6
2.1 DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................6
2.2 TESTED AND VENDOR AFFIRMED MODULE VERSION AND IDENTIFICATION...................................7
2.3 EXCLUDED COMPONENTS ................................................................................................7
2.4 MODES OF OPERATION....................................................................................................7
2.5 ALGORITHMS ................................................................................................................8
2.6 SECURITY FUNCTION IMPLEMENTATIONS............................................................................10
2.7 ALGORITHM SPECIFIC INFORMATION.................................................................................10
2.8 RNG AND ENTROPY .....................................................................................................10
2.9 KEY GENERATION.........................................................................................................10
2.10 KEY ESTABLISHMENT ....................................................................................................10
2.11 INDUSTRY PROTOCOLS ..................................................................................................11
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACES....................................................... 12
3.1 PORTS AND INTERFACES ................................................................................................12
4. ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION ................................................... 13
4.1 AUTHENTICATION METHODS...........................................................................................13
4.2 ROLES.......................................................................................................................13
4.3 APPROVED SERVICES ....................................................................................................14
4.4 NON-APPROVED SERVICES.............................................................................................18
4.5 EXTERNAL SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE LOADED ..................................................................18
5. SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE SECURITY ............................................................... 19
5.1 INTEGRITY TECHNIQUES ................................................................................................19
5.2 INITIATE ON DEMAND....................................................................................................19
6. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .................................................................... 20
6.1 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TYPE AND REQUIREMENTS ......................................................20
7. PHYSICAL SECURITY .................................................................................. 21
7.1 MECHANISMS AND ACTIONS REQUIRED.............................................................................21
8. NON-INVASIVE SECURITY ........................................................................... 22
9. SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETER MANAGEMENT ........................................ 23
9.1 STORAGE AREAS .........................................................................................................23
9.2 SSP INPUT-OUTPUT METHODS .......................................................................................23
9.3 SSP ZEROISATION METHODS .........................................................................................23
9.4 SSPS ........................................................................................................................23
10. SELF-TESTS ............................................................................................... 27
10.1 PRE-OPERATIONAL SELF-TESTS.......................................................................................27
10.2 CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS .............................................................................................27
10.3 PERIODIC SELF-TESTS...................................................................................................28
10.4 ERROR STATES............................................................................................................28
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11. LIFE-CYCLE ASSURANCE............................................................................. 29
11.1 INSTALLATION, INITIALIZATION AND STARTUP PROCEDURES ...................................................29
11.2 ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE............................................................................................29
11.3 NON-ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE ....................................................................................29
12. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ................................................................ 30
13. ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ 31
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TABLE 1: SECURITY LEVELS ............................................................................................................5
TABLE 2: HARDWARE OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS ...............................................................................7
TABLE 3: MODES LIST AND DESCRIPTION...........................................................................................7
TABLE 4: APPROVED ALGORITHMS ...................................................................................................8
TABLE 5: NON-APPROVED, NOT ALLOWED ALGORITHMS.......................................................................9
TABLE 6: ENTROPY .....................................................................................................................10
TABLE 7: KEY GENERATION...........................................................................................................10
TABLE 8: KEY ESTABLISHMENT ......................................................................................................11
TABLE 9: PORTS AND INTERFACES ..................................................................................................12
TABLE 10: AUTHENTICATION METHODS...........................................................................................13
TABLE 11: ROLES.......................................................................................................................13
TABLE 12: APPROVED SERVICES ....................................................................................................18
TABLE 13: NON-APPROVED SERVICES.............................................................................................18
TABLE 14: MECHANISMS AND ACTIONS REQUIRED.............................................................................21
TABLE 15: STORAGE AREAS .........................................................................................................23
TABLE 16: SSP INPUT-OUTPUT .....................................................................................................23
TABLE 17: SSP ZEROISATION METHODS .........................................................................................23
TABLE 18: SSP INFORMATION FIRST...............................................................................................25
TABLE 19: SSP INFORMATION SECOND ...........................................................................................26
TABLE 20: PRE-OPERATIONAL SELF-TESTS.......................................................................................27
TABLE 21: CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS .............................................................................................28
TABLE 22: ERROR STATES ............................................................................................................28
FIGURE 1: BLOCK DIAGRAM ............................................................................................................6
FIGURE 2 TESTED CONFIGURATION...................................................................................................7
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1.General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy of the Samsung TCG Opal SSC
Cryptographic Sub-Chip cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”). This Security
Policy contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this
module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 2 module. This Non-Proprietary Security
Policy may be reproduced and distributed, but only whole, intact, and must include this notice.
Other documentation is proprietary to their authors.
Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the security levels of the
module with respect to each of those individual areas.
1.2 Security Levels
ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6
[Subsection Num.
Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security
Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 2
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 2
8 Non-invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter
Management
2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle Assurance 2
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 2
Table 1: Security Levels
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2.Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use: The Samsung TCG Opal SSC Cryptographic Sub-Chip (referred to as “the
module” in the rest of this document) is a hardware cryptographic module which provides FIPS 140-
3 certified security functionality to Samsung’s TCG Opal SEDs.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Module Characteristics: The sub-chip hardware is contained within the Samsung S4LV006A01
SSD controller found within a Samsung TCG Opal SEDs.
Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary of the module consists of following
components:
- S-Core,
- A dedicated OTP on the SoC for the S-Core
- A set of fuses on the SoC which are dedicated to the S-Core
- Sub-Chip’s main firmware and bootloader.
Figure 1: Block Diagram
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Figure 2 Tested Configuration.
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Hardware Version(s): S01
Software Version(s): The module does not contain a software component.
Firmware Version(s): SS0100
Model and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processor
S4LV006A01 S01 SS0100 ARM SC000
Table 2: Hardware Operating Environments
Note: S4LV006A01 refers to the SoC on which the sub-chip cryptographic module runs on.
2.3 Excluded Components
The vendor does not claim any excluded components within the module’s boundary.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
Mode
Automatically entered whenever
an approved service is requested
FIPS Equivalent to the indicator of
the requested service
Non-approved
Mode
Automatically entered whenever
a non-approved service is
requested
nonFIPS Equivalent to the indicator of
the requested service
Table 3: Modes List and Description
Mode change instructions and status indicators:
After passing all pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests executed on start-
up, the module automatically transitions to the approved mode.
The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on
the services requested by the operator. The status indicator of the mode of operation is equivalent
to the indicator of the service that was requested. For each service the module provides a response
message that includes the service indicator for the requested service. Output “1” suggests that the
service is approved and the output “0” suggests that the service is non-approved.
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2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Cert1 Algorithm and Standard Mode/Method
Key Size/
Strength Use/Function
A4252 AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] ECB 256 bits / 256 bits Encryption
A4252 AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38D] GCM (internal IV)
Section 8.2.2 of SP 800-
38D
256 bits / 256 bits Authenticated
Encryption/Decryption
A4252 ECDSA key generation
[FIPS 186-4]
Appendix B.4.2 Testing
Candidates
P-384 / 192 bits key generation
A4252 ECDSA signature
verification [FIPS 186-4]
Using SHA2-384 P-384 / 192 bits signature verification
A4252 HMAC [FIPS 198-1] SHA2-256 112-512 bits / 112-
256 bits
Message Authentication
Code
A4252 KAS-ECC-SSC
[SP 800-56Arev3]
staticUnified P-384 / 192 bits Shared secret
computation
A4252 KDA [SP 800-56Crev2] One step no counter 256 bits / 256 bits Key derivation
A4252 KDF [SP 800-108] Counter using HMAC-
SHA2-256
256 bits Key derivation
A4252 SHS [FIPS 180-4] SHA2-256,
SHA2-384
N/A Hashing
A4135 AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] ECB 256 bits / 256 bits Encryption
A4135 CTR_DRBG [SP 800-90A] AES-256 with derivation
function
256 bits / 256 bits Random number
generation
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor Affirmed Algorithms:
The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG), as a vendor affirmed algorithm
compliant to SP 800-133r2, Section 4 and Section 5.2. See section 2.9 for details.
Non-approved, Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any non-approved algorithms that could be used in an approved
mode of operation.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
The module does not implement any non-approved algorithms that could be used in an approved
mode of operation.
Non-Approved, Not-Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
AES-XTS Used for Decrypt Firmware to decrypt FW provided by H-Core
Used for Verify Decrypt Firmware together with ECDSA signature
verification to decrypt and verify signature of FW provided by H-Core
RSA Encrypt Used for Get Dump Key to encrypt the AES-XTS dump key
1 The CAVP certs also list ECB decryption and ECDSA signature generation algorithm which is not used by the module.
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ECDSA verification with AES XTS
decryption
Used for Verify Decrypt Firmware together with AES-XTS decryption
to verify a signature of and encrypted FW provided by H-Core
Table 5: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
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2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms/CAVP Cert
ECDH Key
agreement
KAS SP 800-56Arev3.
KAS-ECC per IG
D.F Scenario 2
path (2)
P-384 curve providing 192 bits of
security strength
KAS-ECC-SSC / A4252
KDA / A4252
AES GCM KTS SP 800-38D and
SP 800-38F. KTS
(key wrapping
and
unwrapping) per
IG D.G
256-bit key providing 256 bits of
security strength
AES GCM / A4252
Table 5A: Security Function Implementation
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The ECDSA algorithm as implemented by the module conforms to FIPS 186-4, which has been
superseded by FIPS 186-5 on February 3, 2024. For the current module context, FIPS 186-4 can still
be used in the approved mode. See IG C.K for details.
2.8 RNG and Entropy
Entropy Information:
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample Size Entropy Per Sample Conditioning
Component
Samsung TRNG
(Cert. E81)
Physical See Table 2 1 Bit 0.5 Bits None
Table 6: Entropy
RNG Information:
The module implements SP 800-90ARev1 CTR_DRBG that with AES-256 as the block cipher and has
a derivation function. The CTR_DRBG is provided with a 256-bit nonce and 512-bits of entropy input
from the entropy source, which provides 256-bit of entropy.
2.9 Key Generation
Name Type Properties
ECDSA key pair
generation
CKG EC Curve: P-384; Security strength: 192 bits
Method: FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.4.2 Testing Candidates
Compliant to SP 800-133r2, Section 5.2
Symmetric key
generation
CKG Symmetric key generated using SP 800-90ARev1 DRBG
Compliant to SP 800-133r2, Section 4
Table 7: Key Generation
2.10 Key Establishment
Name Type Properties
ECDH Key
agreement
KAS-ECC-SSC
with SP 800-
56Crev2
Curves: P-384; Security strength: 192 bits
KDF: One Step KDF with no counter
Compliant with SP 800-56Ar3 and IG D.F Scenario 2 (2)
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AES Key Transport GCM AES GCM using 256 bit Key
Compliant with IG D.G and SP 800-38F
Table 8: Key Establishment
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not implement any industry protocols.
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3.Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical Interface Data That Passes
Mailbox/DMA Data Input Input Parameters
DMA Data Output Output parameters
Mailbox Control Input Command Input
Mailbox Status Output Status information
Power Port Power Input N/A
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
This module does not have a Control Output interface.
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4.Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Per
Attempt
Strength
Per Minute
Key-
Based
KDF
Operator keys that are necessary to access
authenticated commands, are access controlled
using 256-bit Credential Protection Key (CPK)
which is derived from SP 800-108 KDF using
Authority ID, Password and KDK_CPK i.e. key
derivation key for CPK. Only the operator with
valid Authority ID and Password (minimum of 8
bytes) can lead to derivation of valid CPK which
will allow the operator to access the
authenticated commands. The module does not
support concurrent operators and it does not
maintain any authentication results across
power cycle.
The module
waits for
750ms after a
failed attempt.
Probability of
success: 1/264
Probability of
success:
80/264
Table 10: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
Name Type Authentication Methods
SysID CO Key-Based KDF
AdminSP.SID CO Key-Based KDF
AdminSP.Admin1 CO Key-Based KDF
LockingSP.Admin1~4 CO Key-Based KDF
LockingSP.User1~9 User Key-Based KDF
Table 11: Roles
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4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
Role SSP Access
Show Status Provide the
module
versioning
information
and current
status of the
module
1 None Module
versioning
information
None N/A None
Create
Namespace
Create
Namespace
1 None Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
ECDH Key
Agreement,
CTR_DRBG,
SHA,
HMAC
SysID EWGZ: [CK,
PK, SK];
EWZ: [KEK,
KPK];
E: [SMK,
KMK, REK]
Delete
Namespace
Delete
Namespace
1 Namespace
Selection
Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
SysID EWGZ:
[MEK];
EWZ: [KEK,
KPK];
E: [SMK,
KMK, REK]
Format NVM Cryptograph
ically erase
a specific
Namespace'
s MEK
1 None Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
SysID EWGZ:
[MEK];
EWZ: [KEK,
KPK];
E: [SMK,
KMK, REK]
Permanent
Write
Protection
Enable
NVMe write
protection
1 None Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
HMAC
SysID EWZ: [KPK,
KEK];
E: [SMK,
KMK, REK]
Sanitize Erase all
MEKs and
generate
new MEK to
support
NVMe
Sanitize
1 None Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
SysID EWGZ:
[MEK];
EWZ: [KEK,
KPK];
E: [SMK,
KMK, REK]
Crypto
Erase
Erase all
MEKs and
generate
new MEK to
support
NVMe
CryptoErase
1 None Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
SysID EWGZ:
[MEK];
EWZ: [KEK,
KPK];
E: [SMK,
KMK, REK]
Activate Make
AdminSP to
transition to
the
Manufacture
d2 state
1 PIN Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC,
ECDH Key
Agreement,
KBKDF,
SHA
AdminSP.SI
D
EWGZ:
[KPK, MEK,
CPK,
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK];
EWZ: [PIN];
WGZ: [SK,
PK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
Role SSP Access
Reactivate Support TCG
SUM
method that
change to
"Single User
Mode" from
TCG Opal
feature set
spec.
1 PIN Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC,
ECDH Key
Agreement,
KBKDF, SHA
AdminSP.SI
D
AdminSP.Ad
min1
EWGZ:
[KPK, MEK,
CPK,
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK];
EWZ: [PIN];
WGZ: [SK,
PK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
Assign Support TCG
CNL method
to couple
LockingObje
ct from
NSGlobal
Range
1 Target
Namespace,
Target
Locking
Object
Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
ECDH Key
Agreement,
CTR_DRBG,
SHA, HMAC
LockingSP.A
dmin1~4
LockingSP.U
ser1~9
EWGZ:
[MEK, CK,
PK, SK];
EGZ: [KEK,
KPK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
Deassign Support TCG
CNL method
to decouple
LockingObje
ct from
NSGlobal
Range
1 Target
Namespace,
Target
Locking
Object
Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
ECDH Key
Agreement,
CTR_DRBG,
SHA, HMAC
LockingSP.A
dmin1~4
LockingSP.U
ser1~9
EWGZ:
[MEK, CK,
PK, SK];
EGZ: [KEK,
KPK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
Erase Support TCG
SUM
method to
crypto
erase.
EraseGlobal
crypto erase
MEK which
assign to
Global
Range
1 Target
Namespace
Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC,
ECDH Key
Agreement,
KBKDF, SHA
LockingSP.A
dmin1~4
LockingSP.U
ser1~9
EWGZ:
[MEK, CPK,
KDK_CPK,
KDK_CPK,
PK, SK];
EWZ: [KPK];
EZ: [PIN];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
Genkey Support TCG
method to
crypto
erase.
GenkeyNon
Global
crypto erase
MEK which
assign to
Global
Range
1 Target
Namespace
Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC
LockingSP.A
dmin1~4
LockingSP.U
ser1~9
EWGZ:
[MEK];
EWZ: [KEK,
KPK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
Grant Support TCG
method that
grants a
User’s
authority to
another
authority
1 Target
Authority
Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
ECDH Key
Agreement,
CTR_DRBG,
SHA, HMAC
LockingSP.A
dmin1~4
LockingSP.U
ser1~9
EWGZ: [CK,
PK, SK];
EWZ: [KEK,
KPK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
Random Provides
random
number
1 None DRBG
Output
CTR_DRBG N/A DRBG
Output
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2 Manufactured or Factory state refers to TCG Opal SSC’s policy state, not a FIPS 140-3 module state.
3* “authenticate” and “deauthenticate” services are not functions used to comply with FIPS authentication
requirements but instead used as part of the TCG Opal SSC specification’s commands.
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
Role SSP Access
from the
module
Revert Support TCG
method to
make a TCG
state to
Manufacture
d2
inactivate
state with
password
1 PIN Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC,
KBKDF, SHA
AdminSP.SI
D
AdminSP.Ad
min1
EWGZ:
[KEK, KPK,
MEK, CPK,
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK];
WGZ: [SK,
PK];
EZ: [PIN];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
RevertWithP
SID
Support TCG
method to
make a TCG
state to
Manufacture
d2
inactivate
state with
PSID
1 PIN Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
HMAC,
KBKDF, SHA
SysID EWGZ:
[KEK, KPK,
MEK, CPK,
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK];
WGZ: [SK,
PK];
EZ: [PIN];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
RevertSP Clear state
of TCG
Service
Provider(SP)
i.e. it causes
the SP to
revert to its
factory2
state.
1 PIN,
Target SP
Success/Fail
ure
AES-GCM,
CTR_DRBG,
KBKDF, SHA
LockingSP.A
dmin1~4
EWGZ:
[KPK, MEK,
CPK,
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK];
WGZ: [SK,
PK];
EWZ: [PIN,
KEK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
SetC_PIN Set PIN 1 PIN,
New PIN
Success/
Failure
CTR_DRBG,
AES-GCM,
ECDH Key
Agreement,
KBKDF,
SHA, HMAC
All roles EWGZ:
[KPK, MEK,
CPK,
KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK];
WGZ: [SK,
PK];
EWZ: [PIN,
KEK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
SetRange Set Range
for using
TCG
1 Target
Range
Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
HMAC
LockingSP.A
dmin1~4
LockingSP.U
ser1~9
EWZ: [KPK,
KEK, MEK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
Authenticat
e3*
Load the
KPK for
authority
and decrypt
1 Authority
Index,
PIN
Success/
Failure
CTR_DRBG,
AES-GCM,
ECDH Key
Agreement,
All roles EWGZ:
[KPK, MEK,
CPK,
KDK_CPK,
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4 These services are only indicated for use within the firmware update process. If any of these services are called
during operation of the module outside of a firmware update process, the module will fail to verify the firmware
during boot, resulting in halting during boot and becoming unavailable for use. Also note that use of any firmware
version other than the one specific in Table 2 is not part of validated module.
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
Role SSP Access
related
encryption
keys.
KBKDF,
SHA, HMAC
KDK_KPK];
WGZ: [SK,
PK];
EWZ: [PIN,
KEK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
Deauthentic
ate3*
Zeroise the
KPK for
authority
and zeroise
related
encryption
keys.
1 None Success/
Failure
N/A All roles Z: [KPK]
TperReset Reset the
lock state
information
1 None Success/
Failure
AES-GCM,
HMAC
SysID EWZ: [KPK,
KEK, MEK];
E: [REK,
SMK, KMK]
VerifyFW Verify
Firmware
1 None Success/
Failure
ECDSA,
SHA-384
SysID EWZ: [FW
Verification
Key]
Prevent FW
Rollback4
Update the
Anti-
Rollback
index
1 None Success/
Failure
None SysID None
Revoke FW
verification
key4
Revoke the
ECDSA FW
verification
key of
Firmware
integrity by
updating
the key
index
pointer
stored in
OTP
1 None Success/
Failure
None SysID None
SHA Digest Provide to
generate
the SHA
digest
1 Input Data Hash SHA-256 N/A None
Revoke Root
Encryption
Key
Revoke REK
and
Generate
new REK
1 None Success/
Failure
CTR_DRBG SysID WZ: [REK]
OTP
Zeroisation
Zeroises
root key in
OTP
None None Success/
Failure
None SysID Z: [Root
Key]
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Table 12: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Input Output Indicator Algorithm
Accessed
Role
Decrypt
Firmware
Decrypt FW
provided by H-
Core
Firmware
location
Decrypted
firmware
0 AES-XTS in S-
Core
N/A
(Unauthenticat
ed)
Verify Decrypt
Firmware
Verify and
Decrypt
Firmware5
provided by H-
Core
Firmware
location
Decrypted
firmware if
verification is
successful else
error.
0 ECDSA, SHA-
384, AES-XTS
N/A
(Unauthenticat
ed)
Get Dump Key Module
generates AES
XTS dump key
using DRBG
and then
exports it after
encrypting
with RSA
N/A Dump key with
RSA
0 CTR_DRBG,
RSA encrypt
N/A
(Unauthenticat
ed)
Clear Dump
Key
Removes
dump key
stored in the
module
N/A Success/
error
0 None N/A
(Unauthenticat
ed)
Dump
Encryption
Encrypts the
dump data
provided by H-
Core using
dump key
Dump data
location
Encrypted
dump data
0 AES-XTS in S-
Core
N/A
(Unauthenticat
ed)
Table 13: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software and Firmware Loaded
The module loads its firmware component from outside of the sub-chip boundary during
module start up. The module uses firmware load test described in Section 5.1 to ensure the
firmware’s validity.
5 Note: the firmware does not pertain to the module.
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
Role SSP Access
On demand
self-test
Module
reset by
setting the
SFR
SW_RST12
None None Module
reset
None All roles Z: All SSPs
in volatile
memory
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5.Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module’s firmware component (i.e., main firmware and bootloader) is in executable form
and is verified with ECDSA signature verification using P-384 ECDSA curve and SHA-384 by
the ROM code. The corresponding firmware verification key (i.e., ECDSA public key) used for
verification is stored in the ROM and its key index is stored in the OTP memory within the sub-
chip. During the module startup time the firmware component is loaded from outside of the
module’s sub-chip boundary. The firmware provides the “key index” of the public key stored
in the OTP. The module reads this key index and its corresponding public key, which is then
used to perform signature verification, i.e., the firmware load test required per IG 2.3.B. Only
when the signature verification is successful the firmware component is loaded, and the
module proceeds to boot. If the signature verification fails, the module enters Power on Error
state. The module does not provide any data output until the firmware load test is successful.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The integrity tests can be invoked on demand by module reset.
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6.Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
The module has a non-modifiable operational environment; therefore, this section is not
applicable.
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7.Physical Security
The module is hosted in a single chip that forms the physical perimeter of the module. The
SoC is enclosed within production grade components. At the time of manufacturing, the
module is embedded into its host SoC (shown in Figure 2), preventing visibility into the
module’s internal circuitry. In addition, the layer process which embeds the module into the
SoC prevents tampering of the module’s physical components without leaving tamper
evidence.
The module is intended to be deployed within a storage device which itself is made from
production grade, commercially available components. The storage device’s enclosure
surrounds the module’s SoC.
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance
Tamper evident coating N/A N/A
Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required
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8.Non-Invasive Security
This module does not implement a non-invasive security technique.
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9.Sensitive Security Parameter Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type
Registers The module has internal registers that
may store SSPs for use by the module.
Dynamic
S-Core Dedicated OTP (OTP) Stores Root Keys Static
S-Core ROM (SROM) Stores Firmware Verification Key Static
S-Core RAM (SRAM) S-Core exclusive RAM Dynamic
Table 15: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format Type Distribution Type Entry Type
Mailbox H-Core Module Plaintext N/A per IG 2.3.B as transfer is only
between the sub-chip module and
the components residing on the
same SoC
Electronic
DMA NAND Module Encrypted Automated Electronic
Table 16: SSP Input-Output
9.3 SSP Zeroisation Methods
All data output via data output interface is inhibited until completion of zeroization.
Zeroisation
Method Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Module reset Loss of volatile SSP data stores
upon power down.
N/A Powering off the module
Mailbox
Zeroisation
Writing zeroes over the SSP that is
used within a service.
N/A Performed automatically by the
module as part of each service
that receives an SSP as input
OTP Zeroisation Zeroising Root key stored in OTP. N/A Call to OTP Zeroisation service
Table 17: SSP Zeroisation Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name
Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Catego
ry
Generated
By
Establish
ed By Used By
DRBG
Internal State
Internal
state of
DRBG
N/A CSP CTR_DRBG N/A CTR_DRBG
DRBG Seed Derived
from
entropy
input per SP
800-
90ARev1
256 bits/
256 bits
CSP CTR_DRBG N/A CTR_DRBG
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Name
Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Catego
ry
Generated
By
Establish
ed By Used By
Entropy Input Output from
Entropy
source
512 bits/
256 bits
CSP ENT (P) N/A CTR_DRBG
Password Operator
provided
password
64-256-
bits / 64
bits - 256
bits
CSP N/A N/A All authenticated
services listed in Table
12
CPK Credential
Protection
Key
256-bit /
256-bits
CSP Derived
using SP
800-108
KBKDF
Encrypted
Import and
export
(AES GCM)
to NAND
All authenticated
services listed in Table
12
CK Common
Key i.e.,
ECDH
shared
secret
P-384 /
192 bits
CSP SP 800-
56Arev3
Shared
secret
computation
N/A Grant
KDK_KPK Key
Derivation
Key for the
KPK
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP CTR_DRBG Encrypted
Import and
export
(AES GCM)
to NAND
All authenticated
services listed in Table
12
KDK_CPK Key
Derivation
Key for the
CPK
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP CTR_DRBG Encrypted
Import and
export
(AES GCM)
to NAND
All authenticated
services listed in Table
12
KPK Key
Protection
Key
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP KBKDF N/A All authenticated
services listed in Table
12
SK ECDSA
private Key
P-384 /
192 bits
CSP FIPS 186-4
EC key
generation
Encrypted
Import and
export
(AES GCM)
to NAND
Grant
PK ECDSA
Public Key
P-384 /
192 bits
PSP FIPS 186-4
EC key
generation
Encrypted
Import and
export
(AES GCM)
to NAND
Grant
GRK Grant Key
(AES GCM
Key)
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP N/A SP 800-
56ARev3
ECDH key
agreement
Grant
KEK Key
Encryption
Key
(AES GCM
Key)
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP CTR_DRBG Encrypted
Import and
export
(AES GCM)
to NAND
CreateNamespace,
DeleteNamespace,
FormatNVM,
PermanentWriteProtect
ion,
Sanitze,
CryptoErase,
Assign,
Deassign,
Genkey,
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Name
Descriptio
n
Size -
Strength
Type -
Catego
ry
Generated
By
Establish
ed By Used By
Grant,
Revert,
RevertWithPSID,
RevertSP,
Authenticate
MEK Media
Encryption
Key
(AES GCM
Key)
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP CTR_DRBG Encrypted
Import and
export
(AES GCM)
to NAND
DeleteNamespace,
FormatNVM,
Sanitize,
CryptoErase,
Activate,
Reactivate,
Assign,
Deassign,
Erase,
Genkey,
Revert,
RevertWithPSID,
RevertSP,
SetRange,
Authenticate,
TperReset
REK Root
Encryption
Key
(AES GCM
Key)
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP Derived
from Root
key using
KBKDF
N/A All authenticated
services listed in Table
12
Root Key Stored in
the OTP
during
manufacturi
ng
(key
derivation
key)
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP N/A, loaded
at
manufacturi
ng
N/A All authenticated
services listed in Table
12
SMK Service
metadata
Mac Key
(HMAC key)
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP Derived
from Root
key using
KBKDF
N/A Module Startup
KMK Secret Key
metadata
Mac Key
(HMAC key)
256-bits /
256-bits
CSP Derived
from Root
key using
KBKDF
N/A All authenticated
services listed in Table
12
Table 18: SSP Information First
Name
Input -
Output Storage Storge Duration Zeroisation Type Related SSPs
DRBG
Internal
State
N/A HW registers Until Module reset Module reset DRBG seed, entropy input,
MEK, KEK, SK, KDK_CPK,
KDK_KPK
DRBG
Seed
N/A HW registers DRBG internal state,
entropy input, MEK, KEK,
SK, KDK_CPK, KDK_KPK
Entropy
Input
N/A HW registers Until Module reset Module reset DRBG seed, DRBG internal
state
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Name
Input -
Output Storage Storge Duration Zeroisation Type Related SSPs
Password Mailbox SRAM For the duration of
the service
Overwrite CPK, KPK
CPK DMA SRAM Mailbox Zeroisation KDK_CPK, Password
CK N/A SRAM Overwrite GRK
KDK_KPK DMA SRAM Mailbox Zeroisation KPK, Password
KDK_CPK SRAM CPK, Password
KPK N/A SRAM KDK_KPK, Password
SK DMA SRAM GRK
PK SRAM GRK
GRK N/A SRAM SK, PK, CK
KEK DMA SRAM For the duration of
the service
Mailbox Zeroisation MEK SK, PK, CK, GRK
MEK DMA SRAM KEK
REK N/A SRAM Root Key, KMK, SMK
Root Key N/A OTP Until OTP
zeroisation
OTP zeroisation REK
SMK DMA SRAM Until Module reset Mailbox Zeroisation REK
KMK DMA SRAM REK
Table 19: SSP Information Second
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10. Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm Implementa
tion
Test
Properties
Test Method Test Type Indicator Details
ECDSA Firmware P-384 with
SHA2-384
Signature
Verification
Firmware
Integrity
Module is
operational
Verifies Main
FW and
Bootloader
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
Implementatio
n
Test
Propertie
s
Test
Method
Test
Typ
e Indic. Details Conditions
ECDSA Firmware P-384 with
SHA2-384
KAT CAS
T
Module is
operationa
l
Before
firmware
integrity
check
Module
Startup
AES-GCM6 AES-256 KAT CAS
T
Encrypt/
Decrypt
SHA2-256 N/A KAT CAS
T
Hashing
SHA2-384 N/A KAT CAS
T
Hashing
HMAC SHA2-256 KAT CAS
T
Message
authenticatio
n
CTR_DRBG Hardware AES-256 KAT CAS
T
Random
number
generation7
KBKDF Firmware HMAC
SHA2-256
KAT CAS
T
Key
Derivation
ECDH SSC P-384 KAT CAS
T
Shared
secret
computation
One step KDF
(KDA)
SHA-256 KAT CAS
T
Key
Derivation
ENT (P) Hardware SP 800-
90B
Startup
Tests
1024
samples
RCT
&
APT
Entropy
source is
operationa
l
Entropy
source start-
up test
Boot Up
SP 800-
90B
Continuousl
y
RCT
&
APT
Entropy
source
Continuousl
y
6 Even though the module implements AES ECB mode, it is not available as a standalone service and therefore does not
include any self-test. ECB encryption is only used internally by module’s AES GCM and DRBG algorithm which have their own
self-test.
7 Including instantiate, generate, and reseed function per section 11.3 of SP 800-90A DRBG.
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Algorithm
Implementatio
n
Test
Propertie
s
Test
Method
Test
Typ
e Indic. Details Conditions
Continuou
s Tests
continuous
test
ECDSA Firmware SHA2-256 PCT CAS
T
Key
generatio
n
successful
Per SP 800-
56ARev3
section
5.6.2.1.4 b
Key
Generation
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Tests
The module does not implement any periodic self-tests.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Power ON
Error State
The module is not
operational. All
data output is
inhibited.
pre-operational test
or CAST failure
Power cycle or Internal
Reset Signal
the module is not
started, and no
services are
available.
Operational
Error state
The module does
not provide any
crypto operation.
All data output is
inhibited. Only
status output is
allowed.
PCT or runtime
health test failure
Power cycle or Internal
Reset Signal
FIPS_FAIL message
in Show Status
Service
Table 22: Error States
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11. Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization and Startup Procedures
The vendor uses trusted delivery courier to dispatch the SoC that hosts the module. The Crypto
officer should verify the package and the received SoC to verify that there is no tamper evidence
present.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The Crypto officer shall power up the module and call the “Show Status” service to verify the
following output is provided. This confirms that the SoC is running a FIPS validated module that has
booted successfully passing the pre-operational self-tests.
- Tested Configuration: S4LV006A01
- Hardware Version: S01
- Firmware Version: SS0100
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The module generates GCM IV internally in compliance with scenario 2 of IG C.H. The IV length is 96
bits, and the IV value is obtained from the SP 800-90ARev1 approved DRBG implemented by the
module.
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12. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not provide additional mitigations against other types of attacks.
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13. Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CK Common Key
CPK Credential Protection Key
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DTRNG Deterministic True Random Number Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ENT NIST SP 800-90B Compliant Entropy Source
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GRK Grant Key
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KDK_CPK Key Derivation Key for CPK
KDK_KPK Key Derivation Key for KPK
KMK Secret Key metadata Mac Key
KPK Key Protection Key
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OTP One Time Programmable
PK Public Key
PKE Public Key Encryption
PSP Public Security Parameter
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SED Self-Encrypting Device
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SID Security ID
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SK Secret key
SoC System on Chip
SSC Security Subsystem Class
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TCG Trusted Computing Group
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext stealing