### Motorola Solutions, Inc. Astro Subscriber Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) - Security Level 2 ### FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### Document Version: R01.01.00 Date: March 03, 2026 Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Page 1 of 41 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## Table of Contents | 1 General ....................................................................................................................................................... 5 | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 5 | | 1.2 Security Levels ..................................................................................................................................... 5 | | 2 Cryptographic Module Specification .......................................................................................................... 5 | | 2.1 Description .......................................................................................................................................... 5 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ...................................................... 7 | | 2.3 Excluded Components ........................................................................................................................ 8 | | 2.4 Modes of Operation ............................................................................................................................ 8 | | 2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................................... 9 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations .................................................................................................. 11 | | 14 | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ......................................................................................................... | | AES GCM IV Generation ...................................................................................................................... 14 | | Legacy Use ........................................................................................................................................... 14 | | Key Agreement Scheme ...................................................................................................................... 14 | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................................... 15 | | 2.9 Key Generation ................................................................................................................................. 15 | | 2.10 Key Establishment ........................................................................................................................... 15 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ............................................................................................................ 15 | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces .......................................................................................................................... 15 | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ......................................................................................................... 16 4.1 Authentication Methods ................................................................................................................... | | 16 4.2 Roles .................................................................................................................................................. 16 | | 4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................................. 17 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services ..................................................................................................................... 25 | | 5 Software/Firmware Security .................................................................................................................... 25 | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded ................................................................................................ 25 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques ......................................................................................................................... 25 5.2 Initiate on Demand ........................................................................................................................... 26 | | 6 Operational Environment ........................................................................................................................ 26 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements .......................................................................... 26 | | 7 Physical Security ....................................................................................................................................... 26 | | 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required ................................................................................................... 26 26 | | 8 Non-Invasive | | Security............................................................................................................................... | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Page 2 of 41 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ........................................................................................... 27 9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................................... 27 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ............................................................................................................... 27 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods .................................................................................................................. 28 9.4 SSPs ................................................................................................................................................... 28 10 Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................................ 34 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests .............................................................................................................. 34 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................... 35 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ........................................................................................................ 37 10.4 Error States ..................................................................................................................................... 39 11 Life-Cycle Assurance .............................................................................................................................. 39 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ........................................................................ 39 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................................. 40 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance .......................................................................................................... 40 11.4 Design and Rules ............................................................................................................................. 40 Rules of Operation .............................................................................................................................. 40 11.5 Maintenance Requirements ........................................................................................................... 41 11.6 End of Life ....................................................................................................................................... 41 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................................... 41 Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Page 3 of 41 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels ................................................................................................................................. 5 Table 2: Tested Module Identification Table 3 - - Hardware ...................................................................................... 7 Approved Mode Drop-in Algorithms ............................................................................................. 7 Table 4: Modes List and Description ............................................................................................................. 8 Table 5: Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................... 10 Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ......................................................................................................... 11 Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms ............................................................................................. 11 Table 8: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed .................................................... 11 Table 9: Security Function Implementations .............................................................................................. 14 Table 10: Entropy Certificates ..................................................................................................................... 15 Table 11: Entropy Sources .......................................................................................................................... 15 Table 12: Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................................... 16 Table 13: Authentication Methods ............................................................................................................. 16 Table 14: Roles ............................................................................................................................................ 17 Table 15: Approved Services ....................................................................................................................... 25 Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required ............................................................................................. 26 Table 17: Storage Areas .............................................................................................................................. 27 Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods ......................................................................................................... 28 Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods ............................................................................................................ 28 Table 20: SSP Table 1 .................................................................................................................................. 31 Table 21: SSP Table 2 .................................................................................................................................. 34 Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .......................................................................................................... 34 Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests .................................................................................................................. 37 Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ........................................................................................ 37 Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information ................................................................................................ 39 Table 26: Error States .................................................................................................................................. 39 ### List of Figures Figure 1 - MACE IC (Top) .............................................................................................................................. 6 Figure 2 - MACE IC (Interfaces) .................................................................................................................... 6 Figure 3 - Cryptographic Boundary for the MACE ........................................................................................ 7 Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Page 4 of 41 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## 1 General ### 1.1 Overview This document defines the Security Policy for the Astro Subscriber Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) - Security Level 2, hereafter denoted the MACE. The MACE is implemented as a single-chip cryptographic module to meet FIPS 140-3 Level 2 physical security requirements as defined by FIPS 1403 and embedded in the Motorola Solutions subscribers. The MACE provides secure key management, Over-the-Air-Rekeying (OTAR), and voice and data encryption for multiple Motorola Solutions subscribers. Visit the Motorola Solutions website to verify your subscriber has this cryptographic module by viewing the subscriber specifications sheet. ### 1.2 Security Levels The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the MACE are as follows from Table 1: | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 2 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 2 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 2 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 3 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 3 | | 6 | Operational environment | N/A | | 7 | Physical security | 2 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 2 | | 10 | Self-tests | 3 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 3 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 2 | Table 1: Security Levels ## 2 Cryptographic Module Specification The MACE cryptographic module is a single chip hardware cryptographic module. The MACE is used in multiple Motorola Solutions, Inc. subscriber two-way radios. The MACE cryptographic module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated overall Security Level 2. ### 2.1 Description ###### Purpose and Use: The MACE cryptographic module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated overall Security Level 2. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 5 of 41 ####### Module Type : Hardware Module Embodiment : Single Chip ####### Cryptographic Boundary: The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The Module is a single-chip embedded embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is shown in Figure 3. Figure 1 - MACE IC (Top) Figure 2 - MACE IC (Interfaces) The MACE IC has an SSI port, a KVL port when connected to the Motorola Key Variable Loader (KVL), Self-Test Indicator Interface, and Power Connections. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Page 6 of 41 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Figure 3 - Cryptographic Boundary for the MACE ### 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ####### Tested Module Identification - Hardware: The MACE cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment: Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Hardware | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------| | 5185912T05 | 5185912 | R01.15.02 with [AES256 R01.00.00 or AES256 R01.00.01] | 5185912 Family | N/A | | 5185912Y03 | 5185912 | R01.15.02 with [AES256 R01.00.00 or AES256 R01.00.01] | 5185912 Family | N/A | | 5185912Y05 | 5185912 | R01.15.02 with [AES256 R01.00.00 or AES256 R01.00.01] | 5185912 Family | N/A | The MACE cryptographic module supports the following approved algorithms which may be installed separately from the MACE base firmware using the program update service. While the installation of AES may be done separately, for the purposes of this validation the MACE includes this firmware. Table 3 - Approved Mode Drop-in Algorithms | Algorithm* | Algorithm FW Version | Base FW Version | Cert. # | |--------------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------| | AES256 | R01.00.00 | R01.15.02 | A2261 | | AES256 | R01.00.01 | R01.15.02 | A2262 | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 7 of 41 ### 2.3 Excluded Components The module does not exclude any components from the cryptographic boundary. ### 2.4 Modes of Operation ####### Modes List and Description: Table 4: Modes List and Description | Mode Name | Description | Types of Services | Status Indicator | |-------------|----------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | Approved | Operating in approved mode | Approved | FIPS Status: 0x02 as a result of Module Info Service | The MACE is originally non-compliant and must be configured to operate in an approved mode of operation. The MACE must be installed, initialized, and configured, including a required change of the factory-default password, in order to be in an approved mode. Documented below are the additional configuration settings that are required for the MACE to be used in an Approved Mode of operation at overall Security Level 2. The approved mode is indicated by using the 'Module Status ' service. The result from this service will return: ``` FIPS Status: 0x02 ``` This indicates that the module is operating in Level 2 Approved Mode. When the module is in the approved operating mode, t he 'Module Info ' service can be used to verify the firmware version matches an approved version listed on NIST's website: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules ####### Mode Change Instructions and Status: The module can be configured to operate in a FIPS 140-3 Approved mode of operation at overall Security Level 2. To configure the module to operate in FIPS Approved mode, the operator must log in as the Configuration Crypto Officer (CCO) using the default password and: 1. Upon first access, the CCO will use the default passwords, provided by Motorola Solutions in a separate communication, to change the password based on the rules defined in Section 4.1. 2. Disable Motorola Data Comunication Over the Air Rekeying (MDC OTAR) 3. Disable OTAR Generate Key-Loss-Key (KLK) 4. Disable KVL - FIPS Level 3 Approved Mode 5. Disable Infinite UKEK Retention 6. Activate the Periodic self-test timer interval 7. Then the Operational Crypto Officer (OCO) will need to change their password, as defined in Section 4.1 Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 8 of 41 Additionally, the MACE supports 'drop - in algorithms' via the program update service. Drop -in algorithms may be added or removed from the MACE independent of the base FW. In order to remain in the Approved mode, only Approved and Allowed algorithms are loaded into the MACE during initialization; in particular AES-256 (Certs. #A2261 and #A2262). The loading and unloading of any firmware within the validated cryptographic module invalidates the Module's validation and zeroizes all SSPs except those entered at manufacturing. The Module is then in a non-compliant state. ### 2.5 Algorithms ####### Approved Algorithms: The Module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic algorithms listed the table below. | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CBC, AES-CFB8, AES-ECB, AES-OFB | A2261, A2262, A2260 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-GCM | A2262 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2 Key Length - 256 Tag Length - 128 IV Length - IV Length: 96 Payload Length - Payload Length: 256-512 Increment 128 AAD Length - AAD Length: 256-512 Increment 128 | SP 800-38D | | AES-KW | A2263 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Cipher - Cipher Key Length - 256 Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-256 Increment 64 | SP 800-38F | | AES-KW | A2264 | Direction - Decrypt Cipher - Cipher Key Length - 256 Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-256 Increment 64 | SP 800-38F | | Counter DRBG | A6380 | Prediction Resistance - No Supports Reseed - No Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes Additional Input - Additional Input: 0 Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 256-1024 Increment 128 Nonce - Nonce: 128-512 Increment 128 Personalization String Length - Personalization | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 9 of 41 Table 5: Approved Algorithms | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | | | String Length: 0 Returned Bits - 128 | | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A655 | Curve - P-384 Secret Generation Mode - Extra Bits | FIPS 186-4 | | HMAC-SHA2-384 | HMAC 1796 | Key sizes < block size - Yes Key sizes > block size - No Key size = block size - No | FIPS 198-1 | | KAS-ECC Sp800- 56Ar3 | A2266 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-384 Function - Key Pair Generation, Partial Validation iutId - A1B2C3D4E5 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - Initiator, Responder KDF Methods - oneStepKdf - Auxiliary Function Methods - Auxiliary Function Name - SHA2-384 Fixed Info Pattern - algorithmId||l||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo Fixed Info Encoding - Concatenation Key Length - 384 | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 2) | RSA 396 | Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048 Hash Pair - Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5) | A5253 | Hash Pair - Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 Modulo - 2048 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5 Fixed Public Exponent - 010001 Public Exponent Mode - fixed | FIPS 186-5 | | SHA2-256 | SHS 817 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 Supports Bit-Oriented Messages - No Supports Empty Message - Yes | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-384 | SHS 2399 | Message Length - Message Length: 8-102400 Increment 8 Supports Bit-Oriented Messages - No Supports Empty Message - No | FIPS 180-4 | ####### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: The Module implements the Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 10 of 41 Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |-----------|-----------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------------------| | CKG1 | Key Type:Asymmetric and Symmetric | N/A | SP800-133rev2 Sections 4, Example 1 and IG D.H | | CKG - IDK | Key Type:Symmetric | N/A | SP800-133rev2 Sections 6.3 #2 and IG D.H | ###### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: The Module implements the Non-Approved, but Allowed cryptographic algorithms listed. Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------| | KTS2 | key unwrapping only:Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits strength | AES CBC or OFB Cert. #A2261 or #A2262 | IG D.G | | KTS3 | key unwrapping only:Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits strength | AES CFB8 Cert. #A2260 | IG D.G | ###### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: The Module implements the Non-Approved, Allowed cryptographic Algorithms with No Security Claimed. | Name | Caveat | Use and Function | |---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | AES MAC | No security claimed - AES MAC is used as part of OTAR but is considered obfuscation | [IG 2.4.A] P25 AES OTAR. AES MAC is applied directly to the plaintext OTAR key components and then KTS encryption is performed on the OTAR key components and decrypted within the module using AES KW Cert. #A2264 | Table 8: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed ####### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms, Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation. N/A for this module. ### 2.6 Security Function Implementations The following table shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements: Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 11 of 41 | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |--------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------| | A2260 Decryption | BC- UnAuthDecrypt | Block Cipher | | AES-CFB8: (A2260) AES-OFB: (A2260) | | A2260 Encryption | BC- UnAuthEncrypt | Block Cipher | | AES-CFB8: (A2260) AES-OFB: (A2260) | | A2261 Decryption | BC- UnAuthDecrypt | Block Cipher | | AES-CBC: (A2261) AES-ECB: (A2261) AES-OFB: (A2261) | | A2261 Encryption | BC- UnAuthEncrypt | Block Cipher | | AES-CBC: (A2261) AES-ECB: (A2261) AES-OFB: (A2261) | | A2262 Authenticated Decryption | BC-AuthDecrypt | Authenticated Decrypt, Message Authentication | | AES-GCM: (A2262) | | A2262 Authenticated Encryption | BC-AuthEncrypt | Authenticated Encrypt, Message Authentication | | AES-GCM: (A2262) | | A2262 Decryption | BC- UnAuthDecrypt | Block Cipher | | AES-CBC: (A2262) AES-ECB: (A2262) AES-OFB: (A2262) | | A2262 Encryption | BC- UnAuthEncrypt | Block Cipher | | AES-CBC: (A2262) AES-ECB: (A2262) AES-OFB: (A2262) | | A2263 Decryption | BC-AuthDecrypt | Authenticated Decrypt for storing SSPs | | AES-KW: (A2263) | | A2263 Encryption | BC-AuthEncrypt | Authenticated Encrypt for storing SSPs | | AES-KW: (A2263) | | Entropy | ENT-ESV | Entropy Source | | | | HMAC | MAC | Message Authentication | | HMAC-SHA2- 384: (HMAC 1796) | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 12 of 41 | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms SHA2-384: | |---------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | IDKGen | CKG | Symmetric Key Generation | | (SHS 2399) Counter DRBG: (A6380) CKG - IDK: () SHA2-256: (SHS 817) | | KAS | KAS-Full | ECC Ephemeral Unified , (Initiator, Responder), KPG, Partial, oneStepKdf (SP800-56Cr1) IG D.F Scenario 2 path 2 | Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 192 bits strength Publication:[IG D.F] | KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3: (A2266) SHA2-384: (SHS 2399) | | KeyGen1 | CKG | Symmetric Key Generation | | AES-CFB8: (A2260) AES-KW: (A2264) Counter DRBG: (A6380) CKG1: () Key Type: Asymmetric and | | KeyGen2 | AsymKeyPair- KeyGen | Asymmetric Key Pair Generation | | Symmetric ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A655) CKG1: () Key Type: Asymmetric and Symmetric | | KTS1 | KTS-Unwrap | Key Transport - Unwrapping | Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits strength Publication:[IG D.G] | AES-KW: (A2264) | | KTS2 | KTS-Unwrap | Key Transport - Unwrapping | Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits | AES-CBC: (A2261, A2262) AES-OFB: | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 13 of 41 | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | | | | strength Publication:[IG D.G] | (A2261, A2262) | | KTS3 | KTS-Unwrap | Key Transport - Unwrapping | Caveat: Key establishment methodology provides 256 bits strength Publication:[IG D.G] | AES-CFB8: (A2260) | | OTAR AES MAC | MAC | AES MAC is used as part of OTAR but is considered obfuscation | Note:No security claimed | AES MAC: () | | RNG | DRBG | AES-256 CTR Deterministic RBG | | Counter DRBG: (A6380) | | SHS2399 | SHA | Secure Hash Standard Message Digest Generation | | SHA2-384: (SHS 2399) | | SHS817 | SHA | Secure Hash Standard Message Digest Generation | | SHA2-256: (SHS 817) | | SigVer1 | DigSig-SigVer | Digital Signature Verification | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5253) | | SigVer2 (Legacy) | DigSig-SigVer | Digital Signature Verification | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-2): (RSA 396) | Table 9: Security Function Implementations ### 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information #### AES GCM IV Generation The MACE, per IG C.H Scenario 2, generates GCM IVs randomly as specified in SP800-38D section 8.2.2 using approved DRBG (Cert #A6380) and the IV length is 96 bits. #### Legacy Use RSA SigVer [FIPS 186-2] is approved for legacy use only: verifying signatures that were performed starting September 1 st , 2020, and onwards is a not a FIPS 140-3 compliant use of this algorithm/service and cannot claim security. Verifying signatures generated before September 1 st , 2020, is the approved legacy use of RSA SigVer [FIPS 186-2]. #### Key Agreement Scheme KAS-ECC [56Ar3] Scheme: Ephemeral Unified - Per [IG] D.F Scenario 2 path (2), compliant key agreement scheme where testing is performed end-to-end for the shared secret computation and a KDF compliant with onestep KDF without key confirmation. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 14 of 41 ### 2.8 RBG and Entropy Table 10: Entropy Certificates | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|------------------------| | E132 | Motorola Solutions Inc | The Module uses the following entropy sources: Table 11: Entropy Sources | Name | Type | Operational Environment | Sample Size | Entropy per Sample | Conditioning Component | |-------------------------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------| | Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) Entropy Source | Physical | Atmel 5185912 | 1 bit | 0.138262 | N/A | ### 2.9 Key Generation For Key Generation methods, see Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations above. ### 2.10 Key Establishment For Key Establishment methods, see Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations above. ## 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces The Module's ports and associated FIPS defined logical interfa ce categories are listed below. | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Serial Synchronous Interface (SSI) | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | The main physical port provided by the MACE. It provides access to the majority of the supported interfaces. | | Self-test Indicator | Status Output | This interface provides status output to indicate all power- up self-tests complete successfully. | | Power | Power | This interface powers all circuitries. | | Key Loading Port (KYLD) | Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output | This interface provides the input and output to the Key Variable Loader (KVL) | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 15 of 41 Table 12: Ports and Interfaces Note: The module does not support Control Output. ## 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ### 4.1 Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | AM1 | Identity-based. Configuration Crypto- Officer (CCO) Password: a 10-digit hexadecimal password is authenticated to gain access to CCO services. It should be noted that after authenticating, this password may be changed at any time through the EBI Port. | SHA2-256 (SHS 817) | The probability of a successful random attempt is 1 in {16^10} which is 1 in 1,099,511,627,776. | After the CCO password has been incorrectly entered 15 consecutive times, the Module will erase all CSPs, reset all passwords back to their default and must be reinitialized. The strength per minute is 15 in 1,099,511,627,776 | | AM2 | Identity-based. Operational Crypto- Officer (OCO) Password: a 10-digit hexadecimal password is authenticated to gain access to OCO services. It should be noted that after authenticating, this password may be changed at any time through the EBI Port. | SHA2-256 (SHS 817) | The probability of a successful random attempt is 1 in {16^10} which is 1 in 1,099,511,627,776. | After the OCO password has been incorrectly entered 15 consecutive times, the Module will erase all CSPs, reset the all passwords back to their default and must be reinitialized. The strength per minute is 15 in 1,099,511,627,776 | Table 13: Authentication Methods ### 4.2 Roles The Module supports two distinct operator roles, the Configuration Cryptographic Officer (CCO) and the Operational Crypto Officer (OCO). In addition, the Module supports services which do not require authentication (UA). The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 16 of 41 The Module does not support concurrent operators. | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |------------------------------|----------|-----------------|--------------------------| | Configuration Crypto Officer | Identity | CCO | AM1 | | Operational Crypto Officer | Identity | OCO | AM2 | Table 14: Roles ### 4.3 Approved Services All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below: The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as: - G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP. - R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output). - W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input). - E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. - Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP | Name | Description | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Change Active Keyset | Modify the currently active keyset used for selecting keys for encryption/decry ption services. | Approv ed mode | Keyset Index | Changed the active keyset as requested. Success/fail ure status. | None | Operational Crypto Officer | | Change CCO Password (AM1) | Modify the current password used to identify and authenticate the CCO role using AM1. | Approv ed mode indicato r and service status output | Password | Updated the CCO password. Success/fail ure status. | A2260 Decryption SHS817 KTS3 | Configuration Crypto Officer - CCO PWD (AM1): Z - KEK: Z - PEK: E - PWD Hash: W,Z - TEK: Z | | Change OCO Password (AM2) | Modify the current password used to identify and authenticate the OCO role using AM2. | Approv ed mode | Password | Updated the OCO password. Success/fail ure status. | A2260 Encryption A2260 Decryption KeyGen1 SHS817 | Operational Crypto Officer - KEK: Z - KPK: G,E,Z - OCO PWD (AM2): Z - PEK: E - PWD Hash: W,Z | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 17 of 41 | Name | Description | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------|------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - TEK: Z - UKKPK: E | | Clear Error Log | Clears the history of error events | Approv ed mode | Command In | Success/Fail ure status. | None | Configuration Crypto Officer Operational Crypto Officer | | Decrypt | Decrypt digital voice or data using AM2. | Approv ed mode | Ciphertext | Plaintext. Success/fail ure status. | A2260 Decryption A2261 Decryption A2262 Decryption A2262 Authentica ted Decryption KTS2 | Operational Crypto Officer - KPK: E - TEK: E | | Encrypt | Encrypt digital voice or data using AM2. | Approv ed mode | Plaintext | Ciphertext. Success/fail ure status. | A2260 Encryption A2261 Encryption A2262 Authentica ted Encryption A2262 Encryption KTS2 | Operational Crypto Officer - DRBG- EI/Seed: E - DRBG-State: E - KPK: E - TEK: E | | Extract Error Log | Provide the history of error events. | Approv ed mode | Command In | Error logs out. Success/Fail ure status. | None | Configuration Crypto Officer Operational Crypto Officer | | Generate Entropy | Generate Entropy for use inside the MACE | Approv ed mode | Power On | DRBG Seed | Entropy RNG | Unauthentica ted - DRBG- EI/Seed: G - DRBG- nonce: G | | Generate Keypair | Generate Asymmetric keys | Approv ed mode | Command in | Key stored inside Module, | A2263 Encryption | Operational Crypto Officer | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 18 of 41 | Name | Description | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | within the module using AM2. | | | Success/Fail status. | KeyGen2 KAS | - BKK: E - DH-Priv: G - DH-Pub: G - DRBG-State: G,E - PKPK: E | | Generate Signature | Generate HMAC- SHA2-384 signature | Approv ed mode | Command In | Signature, Success/fail ure status. | A2260 Encryption A2260 Decryption SHS2399 HMAC | Operational Crypto Officer - KPK: E - TEK: E | | Import Keys Over KYLD Interface | Imports keys into the MACE in plaintext using AM2. | Approv ed mode | Ciphertext | Key Stored inside the Module. Success/fail ure status. | A2260 Encryption A2260 Decryption | Operational Crypto Officer - KEK: W,Z - KPK: E - TEK: W,Z | | Key/Keyset Check | Obtain status information about a specific key | Approv ed mode | Command In | Status information for key returned. Success/Fail ure Status | None | Operational Crypto Officer | | MACE Status | Provide module version, firmware version, FIPS status | Approv ed mode | Command In | Module HW version, Firmware version, and FIPS status | None | Unauthentica ted | | Module Configurati on | Set configuration parameters used to specify module behavior using AM1 or AM2 | Approv ed mode | Configurati on parameter s | Updated module configuratio n. Success/fail ure status. | KeyGen1 | Configuration Crypto Officer - CCO PWD (AM1): Z - KEK: Z - KPK: G,Z - PWD Hash: Z - TEK: Z - UKKPK: E Operational Crypto Officer - KEK: Z - KPK: G,Z | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 19 of 41 | Name | Description | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - OCO PWD (AM2): Z - PWD Hash: Z - TEK: Z - UKKPK: E | | On Demand Self Tests | Perform on demand self- testing of algorithms within the MACE. | Approv ed Mode | Command In | Success/Fail ure status | A2260 Decryption A2260 Encryption A2261 Decryption A2261 Encryption A2262 Authentica ted Decryption A2262 Authentica ted Encryption A2262 Decryption A2262 Encryption A2263 Decryption A2263 Encryption HMAC KAS KeyGen1 KeyGen2 KTS1 KTS2 KTS3 SHS2399 SHS817 SigVer1 SigVer2 (Legacy) | Operational Crypto Officer | | Perform Key Agreement Process | Perform a key agreement process to create | Approv ed mode | Command In | Generate Keys stored in the Module. | A2261 Encryption A2261 Decryption | Operational Crypto Officer - BKK: E | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 20 of 41 | Name | Description | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | an ECDH Shared Secret using AM2. | | | Success/fail ure status | A2262 Encryption A2262 Decryption KeyGen2 RNG KAS | - DH-CLI-Pub: W,E - DH-Priv: E - DH-SS: G,E - DRBG-State: G,E - PKPK: E | | Privileged APCO OTAR | Import, modify and query the keys using AM2. | Approv ed mode | Ciphertext | Store Keys internal to the Module. Success/Fail ure Indication. | KTS1 KTS2 OTAR AES MAC | Operational Crypto Officer - DH-SS: - KEK: W,E - KPK: E - TEK: W,E | | Program Update | Update the MACE firmware. Firmware upgrades are authenticated using a digital signature. The Program Update Public Signature Key is used to validate the signature of the firmware image being loaded before it is allowed to be executed. | Approv ed mode | Firmware image | The MACE is upgraded to new firmware. | A2261 Decryption A2262 Decryption SigVer1 SigVer2 (Legacy) | Configuration Crypto Officer - BKK: Z - CCO PWD (AM1): Z - DH-CLI-Pub: Z - DH-Priv: Z - DH-Pub: Z - DH-SS: Z - DRBG- EI/Seed: Z - DRBG- nonce: Z - DRBG-State: Z - FW-LD-Pub: E,Z - IDK: E,Z - IDK Block: E,Z - KEK: Z - KPK: Z - PEK: Z - PKPK: Z - PWD Hash: Z - TEK: Z - UKKPK: Z Operational Crypto | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 21 of 41 | Name | Description | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Officer - BKK: Z - DH-CLI-Pub: Z - DH-Priv: Z - DH-Pub: Z - DH-SS: Z - DRBG- EI/Seed: Z - DRBG- nonce: Z - DRBG-State: Z - FW-LD-Pub: E,Z - IDK: E,Z - IDK Block: E,Z - KEK: Z - KPK: Z - OCO PWD (AM2): Z - PEK: Z - PKPK: Z - PWD Hash: Z - TEK: Z | | Reset | Reset/power cycle the MACE. | Approv ed mode | Command In | Reset the MACE. | RNG KAS | - UKKPK: Z Unauthentica ted - DH-CLI-Pub: Z - DH-SS: Z - DRBG- EI/Seed: Z - DRBG- nonce: Z - DRBG-State: | | Self-Tests | Perform module self-tests comprised of cryptographic algorithm tests, firmware integrity test, and critical | Approv ed mode indicato r and service | Power on/Comma nd In | Success/Res et. | A2260 Decryption A2260 Encryption A2261 Decryption A2261 | Z Unauthentica ted - FW-LD-Pub: E | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 22 of 41 | Name | Description | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security | SSP Access | |-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | functions test. Initiated by module reset or transition from power off state to power on state using UA. | status output | | | Functions Encryption A2262 Authentica ted Decryption A2262 Authentica ted Encryption A2262 Decryption A2262 Encryption A2263 Decryption A2263 Encryption Entropy KAS KeyGen1 KTS1 KTS2 SHS2399 SHS817 SigVer1 SigVer2 (Legacy) | | | Symmetric Key Generatio n | Generate symmetric [135] keys within the Module using AM2. | Approv ed mode | Command in | Key Stored inside Module. Success/fail ure status | A2261 Encryption A2261 Decryption A2262 Encryption A2262 Decryption KeyGen1 IDKGen RNG | Operational Crypto Officer - BKK: E - DRBG-State: G,E - IDK: G,Z - IDK Block: E,Z - IDK ROM: E,Z - KPK: G,Z | | Validate CCO Password (AM1) | Validate the current password used to identify and authenticate the CCO role using AM1. | Approv ed mode | Password | Successful authenticati on will allow access to the services | A2260 Decryption SHS817 KTS3 | - PKPK: G,Z Unauthentica ted - CCO PWD (AM1): Z - KEK: Z - PEK: E | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 23 of 41 | Name | Description | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | allowed for CO role. | | - PWD Hash: W,Z - TEK: Z | | Validate OCO Password (AM2) | Validate the current password used to identify and authenticate the OCO role using AM2. | Approv ed mode | Password | Successful authenticati on will allow access to the services allowed for User role | A2260 Encryption A2260 Decryption SHS817 KTS3 | Unauthentica ted - KEK: Z - KPK: G,E,Z - OCO PWD (AM2): Z - PEK: E - PWD Hash: W,Z - TEK: Z - UKKPK: E | | Zeroize all keys and passwords | Zeroize the KPK and all keys and CSPs in the key database and causes a new KPK to be generated. Resets the passwords to the factory default. | Approv ed mode | Command In | Keys marked for deletion. Success/fail ure status | KeyGen1 | Configuration Crypto Officer - CCO PWD (AM1): Z - DH-Priv: Z - DRBG-State: G,E - KEK: Z - KPK: G,Z - PKPK: Z - PWD Hash: Z - TEK: Z - UKKPK: E Operational Crypto Officer - DH-Priv: Z - DRBG-State: G,E - KEK: Z - KPK: G,Z - OCO PWD (AM2): Z - PKPK: Z - PWD Hash: Z - TEK: Z - UKKPK: E | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 24 of 41 Table 15: Approved Services | Name | Description | Indicat or | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------|----------------------------------|----------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Zeroize Keys | Mark key for deletion using AM2. | Approv ed mode | Command In | Key is marked for deletion. Success/fail ure status. | KeyGen1 | Operational Crypto Officer - DRBG-State: G,E - KEK: Z - KPK: G,Z - TEK: Z - UKKPK: E | ### 4.4 Non-Approved Services There are no Non-Approved services available while the module is in the approved mode. N/A for this module. ### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded This module supports loading of external firmware via the Program Update service. Execution of the successfully loaded firmware is only effective after the next reset of the security module. Any firmware loaded into the module other than that listed in Section 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification, is outside the scope of this Security Policy and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The module validates the integrity of the externally loaded firmware via procedures described in Section 5.1 Integrity Techniques. ## 5 Software/Firmware Security ### 5.1 Integrity Techniques The MACE has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The MACE is composed of the following firmware components: - Component 1: Executable - binary - Component 2: Drop in Algorithms - binary The firmware components are protected with the FW-LD-Pub key described in Section 9.4 SSPs. The FWLD-Pub key is loaded into the module at manufacturing. The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Module. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 25 of 41 ### 5.2 Initiate on Demand The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Module. ## 6 Operational Environment ### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ####### Type of Operational Environment : Limited The MACE has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions with a Physical Security at Level 2. Therefore, per the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual Section 7.5 Partial validations and non-applicable areas, this section in not applicable. ## 7 Physical Security The MACE is a production grade, single-chip cryptographic module with standard passivation over the modules circuitry as defined by FIPS 140-3 and is designed to meet Level 2 physical security requirements. The information below is applicable to cryptographic module hardware kit numbers 5185912Y03, 5185912Y05, and 5185912T05, which have identical physical security characteristics. ### 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required The MACE is covered with a hard-opaque epoxy coating that provides evidence of attempts to tamper with the MACE. The security provided from the hardness of the MACE's epoxy encapsulate is claimed at the temperature range of -40 to 85 degrees Celsius. No assurance of the epoxy hardness is claimed for this physical security mechanism outside of this range. The MACE does not contain any doors, removable covers, or ventilation holes or slits. No maintenance access interface is available. No special procedures are required to maintain physical security of the MACE while delivering to operators. | Mechanism | Inspection Frequency | Inspection Guidance | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Covered with a hard-opaque epoxy coating that provides evidence of attempts to tamper with the MACE. | Periodically | Look for signs of tampering. Remove from service if tampering found. | Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required ## 8 Non-Invasive Security The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 26 of 41 ## 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ### 9.1 Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | Flash Memory (S2) | Stored in the flash in plaintext, associated by memory location (pointer). | Static | | Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3) | Stored in the flash in encrypted, associated by memory location (pointer). | Static | | System Memory (S1) | Stored encrypted in volatile memory (RAM). | Dynamic | Table 17: Storage Areas ### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------| | Input encrypted on the IDK (A2261, A2262 AES-CBC) (I1) | Application Software (outside) | Flash Memory (S2) | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS2 | | Input encrypted on the PEK using AES KTS (A2260 AES- CFB8) (I3). | Application Software (outside) | Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3) | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS3 | | Input encrypted on the TEK (A2261, A2262 AES-OFB) (I5) | Application Software (outside) | Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3) | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS2 | | Input encrypted using ECDH Key Agreement Process (I6). | Application Software (outside) | Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3) | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KAS | | Input encrypted using SP800-38F AES key transport by the KEK (A2264) (I4) | OTAR (outside) | Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3) | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | KTS1 | | Input in plaintext through the KVL (I2) | Application Software (outside) | Flash Memory (S2) | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 27 of 41 Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|---------------------------------| | Output in plaintext public key (O1) | Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3) | Application Software (outside) | Plaintext | N/A | Electronic | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A655) | ### 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Z1 | Zeroized by the "Program Update" service.* | SSPs zeroized upon loading of new firmware. | Yes | | Z10 | Zeroized by the "CCO Validate Password" service. | CO password zeroized after too many failed login attempts | Yes | | Z11 | Zeroized by the "CCO Change Password" service. | Old User password zeroized as new CO password set | Yes | | Z2 | Zeroized by module power cycle or hard reset.* | SSPs in volatile memory zeroized. | Yes | | Z3 | Zeroized by the "Zeroize Keys" service. | TEK/KEKs zeroized upon request | Yes | | Z4 | Zeroized by the "Zeroize all Keys and Password" service. | Old CO password zeroized as new CO password set | Yes | | Z5 | Zeroized by the "OCO Validate Password" service. | CO password zeroized after too many failed login attempts | Yes | | Z6 | Zeroized by the "OCO Change Password" service. | Old User password zeroized as new CO password set | Yes | | Z7 | Zeroized by the "Module Configuration" service. | User password zeroized after too many failed login attempts | Yes | | Z8 | Zeroized by the "Privileged APCO OTAR" service. | TEK/KEKs zeroized upon request | Yes | | Z9 | Zeroized by the "KVL Import Key" service. | TEK/KEKs zeroized upon request | Yes | Note: For zeroization methods with an asterisk, once zeroization is complete the Module will reboot, indicating successful zeroization. The output status of all other methods of success of zeroization are implicit and any attempt to use previous keys/CSPs will trigger an error. ### 9.4 SSPs All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3 Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 28 of 41 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------------------------| | BKK | A 256-bit AES OFB (A2260) key used to encrypt/decrypt the PKPK | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | Pre-loaded | | A2260 Decryption | | CCO PWD (AM1) | 8-32 ASCII characters CO password. | N/A - N/A | Authentication - CSP | | | A2260 Encryption A2260 Decryption | | DH-CLI- Pub | The Elliptic Curve (EC) Diffie-Hellman (DH) public key for the other party, used for establishing a shared secret over an insecure channel. | 384 - 192 | Asymmetric Public Key - PSP | | | KAS | | DH-Priv | The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (DH) private key used for establishing a shared secret over an insecure channel. | 384 - 192 | Asymmetric Private Key - CSP | KeyGen2 | | RNG KAS | | DH-Pub | The Elliptic Curve (EC) Diffie-Hellman (DH) public key, used for establishing a shared secret over an insecure channel. | 384 - 192 | Asymmetric Public Key - PSP | KeyGen2 | | KAS | | DH-SS | The Elliptic Diffie- Hellman (DH) Shared Secret (SS) is established as a part of DH key agreement scheme. | 192 - 192 | Symmetric Key - CSP | | KAS | KAS | | DRBG- EI/Seed | Internally generated by the HWRNG | 2770 - N/A | N/A - CSP | Entropy | | RNG | | DRBG- nonce | Internally generated by the HWRNG | 128 - N/A | N/A - CSP | Entropy | | RNG | | DRBG- State | CTR_DRBG (A6380) internal state: V (128 bits) and Key (AES 256) | 256 - 256 | N/A - CSP | RNG | | KeyGen1 KeyGen2 | | FW-LD- Pub | 2048-bit RSA key used to validate the signature of the firmware image | 2048 - 112 | Asymmetric Public Key - PSP | Pre-loaded | | SigVer1 SigVer2 (Legacy) | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 29 of 41 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------------------------| | | during FW integrity and FW Loading before it is allowed to be executed. | | | | | | | IDK | A 256-bit AES CBC (A2261 or A2262)) key used to decrypt downloaded firmware images. | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | IDKGen | | A2261 Decryption A2262 Decryption | | IDK Block | A 256-bit AES CBC key (A2261 or A2262) used in the re-construction of IDK per SP800-133r2 (Section 6.3 #2) via XOR using IDK ROM | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | Pre-loaded | | IDKGen | | IDK ROM | A 256-bit AES CBC key (A2261 or A2262) used in the re-construction of IDK per SP800-133r2 (Section 6.3 #2) via XOR using IDK Block | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | Pre-loaded | | IDKGen | | KEK | 256-bit AES-KW (A2264) keys used for encryption of keys in key transport operation | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | | | KAS KTS1 | | KPK | 256 bit AES CFB-8 (A2260) key used to encrypt all TEKs and KEKs stored in the flash. | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | KeyGen1 | | A2260 Encryption A2260 Decryption | | OCO PWD (AM2) | 8-32 ASCII characters User password. | N/A - N/A | Authentication - CSP | | | A2260 Encryption A2260 Decryption | | PEK | 256-bit AES-CFB8 (A2260) key used for decrypting passwords during password validation | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | Pre-loaded | | A2260 Encryption A2260 Decryption | | PKPK | 256-bit AES KW (A2263) used to store encrypted, the | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | KeyGen1 | | A2263 Encryption | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 30 of 41 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------------------------| | | ECDH generated private key | | | | | A2263 Decryption | | PWD Hash | 256-bit password hash stored in the non-volatile memory. | 256 - 128 | Authentication - CSP | SHS2399 | | | | TEK | 256-bit AES ( A2261 or A2262)) keys used for enabling secure communication with target devices. | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | | | KTS2 | | UKKPK | 256 bit AES CFB8 (A2260) Key used for encrypting the KPK in flash. | 256 - 256 | Symmetric Key - CSP | Pre-loaded | | A2260 Encryption A2260 Decryption | Table 20: SSP Table 1 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------| | BKK | Input encrypted on the IDK (A2261, A2262 AES-CBC) (I1) | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | PKPK:Encrypts PKPK:Decrypts | | CCO PWD (AM1) | Input encrypted on the PEK using AES KTS (A2260 AES- CFB8) (I3). | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 | PEK:Encrypted with PWD Hash:Hashed with | | DH-CLI- Pub | Input encrypted using ECDH Key Agreement Process (I6). | System Memory (S1):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | DH-Priv:Paired With DH-SS:Used to establish | | DH-Priv | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | PKPK:Encrypted with DH-SS:Used to establish DH-CLI-Pub:Paired With | | DH-Pub | Output in plaintext public key (O1) | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 31 of 41 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| | DH-SS | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | DH-Priv:Generated by DH-CLI- Pub:Generated by | | DRBG- EI/Seed | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z2 | | | DRBG- nonce | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z2 | | | DRBG- State | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z2 | DRBG- EI/Seed:Derived From DRBG- nonce:Derived From | | FW-LD- Pub | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | | | IDK | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | IDK ROM:Derived From IDK Block:Derived From | | IDK Block | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | IDK ROM:Used With IDK:Generates | | IDK ROM | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | IDK Block:Used With IDK:Generates | | KEK | Input in plaintext through the KVL (I2) Input encrypted using SP800-38F AES key transport by the KEK (A2264) (I4) | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Z10 Z11 | KPK:Encrypted with | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 32 of 41 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KPK | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Z10 | DRBG- State:Derived From UKKPK:Encrypted with KEK:Encrypts TEK:Encrypts | | OCO PWD (AM2) | Input encrypted on the PEK using AES KTS (A2260 AES- CFB8) (I3). | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z11 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 | PEK:Encrypted with PWD Hash:Hashed with | | PEK | Input encrypted on the IDK (A2261, A2262 AES-CBC) (I1) | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | IDK:Encrypted with CCO PWD (AM1):Encrypts CCO PWD (AM1):Decrypts OCO PWD (AM2):Encrypts OCO PWD | | PKPK | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | (AM2):Decrypts BKK:Encrypted with DH-Priv:Encrypts DRBG- State:Derived From | | PWD Hash | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z1 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 | CCO PWD (AM1):Hash of OCO PWD (AM2):Hash of | | TEK | Input in plaintext through the KVL (I2) Input encrypted on the TEK (A2261, A2262 AES-OFB) (I5) | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory - Encrypted (S3):Encrypted | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 | KPK:Encrypted with | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 33 of 41 Table 21: SSP Table 2 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |--------|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------| | | | | | Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 Z10 Z11 | | | UKKPK | | System Memory (S1):Encrypted Flash Memory (S2):Plaintext | When module is reset | Z1 Z2 | KPK:Encrypts | ## 10 Self-Tests ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests The MACE performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation. Per FIPS 140-3 these are categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests. Pre-operational self - tests are available on demand by power cycling the MACE. In addition, preoperational self - tests are periodically performed by the MACE as configured by the operator during the module configuration as shown in Section 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures. The MACE will not accept any commands when a periodic self-test is required; the commands still in the I/O buffer will be processed by the MACE after periodic self-test ends and will execute when the I/O buffer is emptied. The MACE logs the most recent self-test errors to the internal flash; the operator (CO) can extract the error logs using Extract Error Log service. The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |---------------------|------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Firmware integrity | SHA2-256 (Cert. #817), RSA-2048 (Cert. #396, #A5253) | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | Success or ES2 on failure | A digital signature is generated over the Boot Block, Base firmware (Cert. #A5253), and all Drop-in algorithms (Cert. #396) when it is built using SHA2-256 (Cert. #817), and is stored with the code upon download into the MACE. When the MACE is powered up, the digital signature is verified. If the digital signature matches then the test passes otherwise it fails. | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 34 of 41 ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below: | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |---------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------| | AES-CFB8 (A2260) Decryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | AES-CFB8 256 Decryption | Bootup | | AES-CFB8 (A2260) Encryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | AES-CFB8 256 Encryption | Bootup | | AES-ECB (A2261) Decryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | AES-ECB 256 Decryption | Bootup | | AES-ECB (A2261) Encryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | AES-ECB 256 Encryption | Bootup | | AES-ECB (A2262) Decryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | AES-ECB 256 Decryption | Bootup | | AES-ECB (A2262) Encryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | AES-ECB 256 Encryption | Bootup | | AES-GCM 256 Authentication Decryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | AES-GCM 256 Authenticated Decryption | Bootup | | AES-GCM 256 Authentication Encryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | AES-GCM 256 Authenticated Encryption | Bootup | | AES-KW (A2263) Decryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | Message Decryption | Bootup | | AES-KW (A2263) Encryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | Message Encryption | Bootup | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 35 of 41 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------| | AES-KW (A2264) Decryption | AES-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | Message Decryption | Bootup | | Counter DRBG (A6380) | AES-256 CTR | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | AES-256 CTR_DRBG instantiation, generate, and reseed KATs performed before the first random data generation. | Bootup | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A655) | ECDSA KeyGen | PCT | PCT | Success or ES3 on failure | ECDSA P-384 Pair-wise Consistency Test | Bootup | | Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | Adaptive Proportion Test | Fault Detection | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | Designed to detect a large loss of entropy that might occur as a result of some physical failure or environmental change affecting the noise source | Bootup | | Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT) | Repetition Count Test | Fault Detection | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | Designed to quickly detect catastrophic failures that cause the noise source to become \"stuck\" on a single output value for a long period of time. | Bootup | | Firmware Load | 2048-bit RSA Signature Verification/SHA2- 256 RSA (Cert. #A5253) | KAT | SW/FW Load | Success or ES2 on failure | A digital signature is generated over the code when it is built using | loading a new firmware image | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 36 of 41 Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |--------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------| | | | | | | SHA-256 and RSA-2048. The digital signature is verified upon download into the MACE. | | | HMAC-SHA2- 384 (HMAC 1796) | HMAC-SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | HMAC-SHA2- 384 | Bootup | | KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 (A2266) | KAS-ECC SP800- 56Ar3 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | Per IG D.F, separately tested KAS Shared Secret generation with P-384 and SP800-56Cr2 one-step KDA. | Bootup | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5253) | RSA-2048 SigVer | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | 2048-bit RSA PKCSv1.5 Signature Verification, performed before Pre- Operational FW integrity tests. Inclusive for 186-2 (Cert. #396) | Bootup | | SHA2-256 (SHS 817) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | SHA2-256 | Bootup | | SHA2-384 (SHS 2399) | SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | Success or ES1 on failure | SHA2-384 | Bootup | ### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------| | Firmware integrity | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On Demand | Manually | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 37 of 41 | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------------|---------------------------| | AES-CFB8 (A2260) Decryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-CFB8 (A2260) Encryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-ECB (A2261) Decryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-ECB (A2261) Encryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-ECB (A2262) Decryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-ECB (A2262) Encryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-GCM 256 Authentication Decryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-GCM 256 Authentication Encryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-KW (A2263) Decryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-KW (A2263) Encryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | AES-KW (A2264) Decryption | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | Counter DRBG (A6380) | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A655) | PCT | PCT | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT) | Fault Detection | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT) | Fault Detection | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | Firmware Load | KAT | SW/FW Load | | | | HMAC-SHA2-384 (HMAC 1796) | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 (A2266) | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5253) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-256 (SHS 817) | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 38 of 41 Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------------|---------------------------| | SHA2-384 (SHS 2399) | KAT | CAST | On Demand/Periodically | Manually/programmatically | Conditional self - tests are periodically performed by the MACE every X hours, where X is configured by the operator during module configuration (1 minute to 712,800 minutes). The MACE will not accept any commands when a periodic self-test is required; the commands still in the I/O buffer will be processed by the MACE end the periodic self-test executed when the I/O buffer is emptied. ### 10.4 Error States Table 26: Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------| | ES1 | The MACE fails a KAT. | The MACE enters the critical error state. In this state, the MACE stores the status into the internal flash memory and then halts all further operation by entering an infinite loop. | Reboot/Power cycle the module | Device will not respond to authentication requests. | | ES2 | The MACE fails a firmware loading during program upgrade and/or firmware integrity pre-operational self-test. | The MACE enters the firmware signature validation failure state. In this state, the MACE halts all further operations by entering the flash programming mode. | Reboot/Power cycle the module or re- flashing a new image. | Device will not respond to authentication requests. | | ES3 | The MACE fails an ECDSA PCT. | The MACE enters a temporary error state. The generated key is not discarded. | The error state is automatically cleared and the module resumes normal operation. | The MACE will return an error code (0x01) to the operator. | ## 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ###### Installation and Initialization: The MACE is originally a non-compliant module and must be initialized to be in approved mode. There is no non-approved mode. During initialization the operator shall configure the MACE from the instructions below: Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 39 of 41 1. Upon first access, the CO will use the default password provided by Motorola in a separate communication. Upon first access, the operator will use the default passwords for the specified product found on https://support.motorolasolutions.com/. 2. The CO will then change the default password based on the requirements in Table 10 - Roles and Authentication. 3. The CO will then configure the MACE using the Module configuration service as specified in the Section 2.3.1. 4. Finally, the operator will set the periodic self-tests timer as part of the Module configuration in every X minutes, where X is a minimum value = 1 minute and maximum value = 712,800 minutes (495 days). Note: the default minimum = 0* but must be changed to a minimum of 1. *periodic self-tests will not perform if minimum = 0 ###### Delivery: The MACE is embedded in multiple Motorola Solutions, Inc. radios (aka, subscribers). Motorola uses commercially available courier systems such as UPS, FedEx, and DHL with a tracking number and requires a signature at the end by an authorized client. ### 11.2 Administrator Guidance Use radio specific user guide available on the www.motorolasolutions.com website for secure operations. ### 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance Use radio specific user guide available on the www.motorolasolutions.com website for secure operations. ### 11.4 Design and Rules Rules of Operation 1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: Configuration Cryptographic Officer and the Operational Crypto Officer. 2. The Module provides identity-based authentication. 3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle. 4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role. 5. The MACE allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting the MACE. 6. All self-tests do not require any operator action. 7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. 8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 40 of 41 9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service. 10. The MACE does not support concurrent operators by enforcing the following restrictions: - a. The CCO is automatically logged out if the OCO Authenticates. - b. The CCO cannot authenticate if the OCO is already logged on. 11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role. 12. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method. 13. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data. 14. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs. 15. The Module does store some CSPs in plaintext. 16. The Module does not output intermediate key values. 17. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces. ### 11.5 Maintenance Requirements Not Applicable ### 11.6 End of Life After the end-oflife, the operator should zeroize all SSPs using the 'Zeroize all keys and password' service listed in the Section 4.3 followed by shredding the MACE chip. ## 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks. Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version R01.01.00 Page 41 of 41 Motorola Solutions Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).