Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2021-2023 © Nokia 1.5
July 31, 2024 This document may be freely distributed whole and intact including this complete copyright notice Page 1 of 77
Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) R23.3
Nokia 1830 Photonic Service Interconnect – Modular
(PSI-M) R23.3
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 2
Document Version: 1.5 Last saved July 31, 2024 14:21
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2021-2023 © Nokia 1.5
July 31, 2024 This document may be freely distributed whole and intact including this complete copyright notice Page 2 of 77
Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................................7
2 Cryptographic module specification...................................................................................................8
2.1 Tested Platforms.......................................................................................................................8
2.1.1 PSS-32 ..................................................................................................................................8
2.1.2 PSS-16II................................................................................................................................8
2.1.3 PSS-8 ....................................................................................................................................9
2.1.4 PSS-24x ................................................................................................................................9
2.1.5 PSI-M....................................................................................................................................9
2.2 Algorithms..............................................................................................................................10
2.3 Module Description................................................................................................................17
2.4 Block Diagram .......................................................................................................................19
2.5 FIPS Configuration and Cryptographic Boundary.................................................................20
2.5.1 PSS-32/16II/8/24x ..............................................................................................................20
2.5.2 PSI-M..................................................................................................................................20
3 Cryptographic module interfaces......................................................................................................22
3.1 PSS-32 Interfaces ...................................................................................................................22
3.1.1 PSS-32 User Panel..............................................................................................................22
3.2 PSS-16II Interfaces.................................................................................................................23
3.2.1 PSS-16II User Panel ...........................................................................................................23
3.3 PSS-8 Interfaces .....................................................................................................................24
3.3.1 PSS-8 Shelf Panel...............................................................................................................24
3.4 PSS-24x Interfaces .................................................................................................................25
3.4.1 MFC24X.............................................................................................................................26
3.5 PSI-M Interfaces.....................................................................................................................26
3.5.1 PSI-M Chassis ....................................................................................................................27
3.6 Equipment Controller 32EC2 for PSS-32, PSS16II...............................................................27
3.7 Equipment Controller 8EC2 for PSS-8 ..................................................................................28
3.8 Equipment Controller CEC2 for PSS-24x .............................................................................28
3.9 11QPEN4................................................................................................................................29
3.10 S13X100E ..............................................................................................................................30
3.11 8P20........................................................................................................................................30
3.12 2UC400E................................................................................................................................31
3.13 MEC2 .....................................................................................................................................31
3.14 DFC12E..................................................................................................................................31
3.15 Filler Card (PSS-32/16II/8/24x PSI-M) .................................................................................32
4 Roles, services, and authentication...................................................................................................33
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4.1 Roles.......................................................................................................................................33
4.2 Services ..................................................................................................................................33
4.3 Authentication ........................................................................................................................38
5 Software/Firmware security .............................................................................................................40
5.1 Securing RPMs.......................................................................................................................40
5.2 Securing Files.........................................................................................................................40
6 Operational environment ..................................................................................................................41
6.1 Operating System and Hardware Platforms ...........................................................................41
6.2 FIPS Approved Mode Indicator .............................................................................................41
7 Physical security...............................................................................................................................42
7.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................42
7.2 Physical boundary ..................................................................................................................42
7.3 Physical Security Mechanisms...............................................................................................42
7.4 Tamper-evident labels ............................................................................................................42
8 Non-invasive security.......................................................................................................................43
9 Sensitive security parameter management........................................................................................44
10 Self-tests ...........................................................................................................................................51
11 Life-cycle assurance .........................................................................................................................53
11.1 Delivery & Operation.............................................................................................................53
11.2 Crypto Officer (Admin) Commisioning Guidance ................................................................53
11.3 Tamper-Evident Seal Inspection ............................................................................................53
11.4 Decommissioning the module................................................................................................53
12 Mitigation of other attacks................................................................................................................53
13 Acronyms..........................................................................................................................................53
14 References.........................................................................................................................................54
15 Guidance – Physical Installation – Installing Tamper-evident labels ..............................................55
15.1 Procedure 1: Install tamper-evident-labels.............................................................................55
15.2 Procedure 1.1: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-8 ................................56
15.3 Procedure 1.2: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-16II............................58
15.4 Procedure 1.3: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-32 ..............................61
15.5 Procedure 1.4: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ETSI variant.......64
15.6 Procedure 1.4: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ANSI variant......65
15.7 Procedure 1.5: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSI-M................................67
16 Guidance – System Configuration Procedures.................................................................................69
16.1 Provisioning the 1830 PSS and 1830 PSI-M .........................................................................69
16.1.1 Procedure: Provision for FIPS 140-3 Approved Mode of Operation.................................69
16.2 Periodically Check Log Files .................................................................................................75
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16.3 On-demand Self-test...............................................................................................................75
16.4 De-Provisioning the 1830 PSS and 1830 PSI-M....................................................................76
16.4.1 Procedure: Zeroization of All SSPs....................................................................................76
16.5 Additional Guidance...............................................................................................................77
List of Tables
Table 1 - Security Levels............................................................................................................................7
Table 2 – PSS-32 Cryptographic Module Test Configuration ...................................................................8
Table 3 - PSS-16II Cryptographic Module Test Configuration .................................................................8
Table 4 - PSS-8 Cryptographic Module Test Configuration......................................................................9
Table 5 - PSS-24x Cryptographic Module Test Configuration..................................................................9
Table 6 - PSI-M Cryptographic Module Test Configuration .....................................................................9
Table 7 - Approved Algorithms (Nokia SNMP-Engine)..........................................................................10
Table 8 - Approved Algorithms (Nokia openSSL)...................................................................................13
Table 9 – Approved Algorithms (Nokia Jitter Entropy (JENT))..............................................................14
Table 10 - Approved Algorithms (11QPEN4)..........................................................................................14
Table 11 - Approved Algorithms (S13X100E, 2UC400E) ......................................................................15
Table 12 - Approved Algorithms (DFC12E, MEC2)...............................................................................15
Table 13 - PSS-32 Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................22
Table 14 - PSS-32 User Panel - Ports and Interfaces ...............................................................................23
Table 15 - PSS-16II Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................23
Table 16 - PSS-16II User Panel - Ports and Interfaces.............................................................................24
Table 17 - PSS-8 Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................24
Table 18 - PSS-8 Shelf Panel - Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................25
Table 19 - PSS-24x Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................................25
Table 20 - MFC24x - Ports and Interfaces ...............................................................................................26
Table 21 – PSI-M Ports and Interfaces.....................................................................................................26
Table 22 – PSI-M Chassis - Ports and Interfaces .....................................................................................27
Table 23 - 32EC2 - Ports and Interfaces...................................................................................................28
Table 24 - 8EC2 - Ports and Interfaces.....................................................................................................28
Table 25 - CEC2 - Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................29
Table 26 - 11QPEN4 - Ports and Interfaces .............................................................................................29
Table 27 - S13X100E - Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................30
Table 28 – 8P20 - Ports and Interfaces.....................................................................................................31
Table 29 – 2UC400E - Ports and Interfaces.............................................................................................31
Table 30 – MEC2 - Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................31
Table 31 - DFC12E - Ports and Interfaces................................................................................................32
Table 32 - Filler Card - Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................32
Table 33 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output .........................................................................33
Table 34 - Approved Services ..................................................................................................................36
Table 35 - Roles and Authentication ........................................................................................................38
Table 36 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms ...............................................................................39
Table 37 - SSPs.........................................................................................................................................50
Table 38 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification .............................................51
Table 39 - Self-tests..................................................................................................................................51
Table 40 - Acronyms ................................................................................................................................54
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - PSS-32 Shelf............................................................................................................................17
Figure 2 - PSS-16II Shelf .........................................................................................................................17
Figure 3 - PSS-8 Shelf..............................................................................................................................18
Figure 4 - PSS-24x Shelf..........................................................................................................................18
Figure 5 - PSI-M Shelf .............................................................................................................................18
Figure 6 - 1830 PSS, 1830 PSI-M Block Diagram...................................................................................19
Figure 7 - Network Configuration of 1830 PSS-32/16II/8/24x................................................................20
Figure 8 - Network Configuration of 1830 PSI-M ...................................................................................21
Figure 9 - PSS32 User Panel - front view ................................................................................................22
Figure 10 - PSS-16II User Panel - Ports and Interfaces ...........................................................................23
Figure 11 - PSS-8 Shelf Panel – Ports and Interfaces ..............................................................................24
Figure 12 - PSS-24x MFC24X - Ports and Interfaces..............................................................................26
Figure 13 – PSI-M Chassis (Front and Back) - Ports and Interfaces........................................................27
Figure 14 - 32EC2 - Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................27
Figure 15 - 8EC2 - Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................28
Figure 16 - CEC2 - Ports and Interfaces...................................................................................................28
Figure 17 - 11QPEN4 - Ports and Interfaces............................................................................................29
Figure 18 - S13X100E - Ports and Interfaces...........................................................................................30
Figure 19 – 8P20 - Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................30
Figure 20 – 2UC400E - Ports and Interfaces............................................................................................31
Figure 21 – DFC12E - Ports and Interfaces .............................................................................................32
Figure 22 – PSS32-16II/8 Filler Card - Ports and Interfaces....................................................................32
Figure 23 - Tamper-evident label: intact ..................................................................................................42
Figure 24 - Tamper-evident label: broken................................................................................................43
Figure 25 - PSS-8 shelf – rear...................................................................................................................56
Figure 26 - PSS-8 shelf – top....................................................................................................................56
Figure 27 - PSS-8 shelf – left / right.........................................................................................................57
Figure 28 - PSS-8 shelf – front.................................................................................................................57
Figure 29 – PSS-16II shelf – overview front............................................................................................58
Figure 30 - PSS-16II shelf – overview rear..............................................................................................58
Figure 31 – PSS-16II shelf - rear..............................................................................................................59
Figure 32 - PSS-16II shelf - left ...............................................................................................................59
Figure 33 - PSS-16II shelf - right .............................................................................................................60
Figure 34 - PSS-16II shelf - front.............................................................................................................60
Figure 35 - PSS-32 shelf – rear.................................................................................................................61
Figure 36 – PSS-32 shelf – bottom (1).....................................................................................................62
Figure 37 - PSS-32 shelf – bottom (2)......................................................................................................62
Figure 38 - PSS-32 shelf – front...............................................................................................................63
Figure 39 - PSS-24x ETSI rack ................................................................................................................64
Figure 40 - PSS-24x ANSI shelf – front, left and right............................................................................65
Figure 41 - PSS24x ANSI shelf – rear......................................................................................................66
Figure 42 - PSI-M shelf – front ................................................................................................................67
Figure 43 - PSI-M shelf – front left..........................................................................................................67
Figure 44 - PSI-M shelf – top...................................................................................................................67
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Figure 45 - PSI-M shelf – rear..................................................................................................................68
Figure 46 - PSI-M shelf – rear, bottom ....................................................................................................68
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1 General
This document describes the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Nokia 1830
Photonic Service Switch (PSS) R23.3 (internal release R14.2) and Nokia 1830 Photonic Service
Interconnect – Modular (PSI-M) R23.3 (internal release R6.2). These are referenced in the document as
PSS and PSI-M.
This security policy provides the details for configuring and running these products in a FIPS-140-3
mode of operation and describes how the module meets the level 2 requirements of FIPS 140-3. Please
see the references section for a full list of FIPS 140-3 requirements.
The security level of the individual areas is shown in the table below.
ISO/IEC 24759 Section
6.[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment 2
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Table 1 - Security Levels
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2 Cryptographic module specification
For the purposes of FIPS 140-3, the 1830 is designated as a multi-chip standalone hardware
cryptographic module.
2.1 Tested Platforms
The following platforms were tested for running the module in a FIPS approved mode. They all share
the same CPU, the Marvell MV78460, which does not contain a Processor Algorithm Accelerator
(PAA).
Use of circuit packs not tested under this validation will invalidate the FIPS certification.
2.1.1 PSS-32
Model Hardware Firmware
Version
Distinguishing
Features
1830 PSS-
32
Chassis - WOM4V10GRA /
8DG59319AB
n/a Card Holder
32EC2 - 8DG63979AA 1830PSS ECN
R23.3
Equipment Controller
Card
11QPEN4 - 8DG60996AA 10G Interface Card
8P20 - 3KC49240AA 10G Interface Card
S13X100E - 8DG63988AA 100G Interface Card
Filler Card - 8DG59418AA n/a Empty Slot Blank
Security Label Kit - 8DG-6509-
AAAA
n/a Tamper Labels
Table 2 – PSS-32 Cryptographic Module Test Configuration
2.1.2 PSS-16II
Model Hardware Firmware
Version
Distinguishing
Features
1830 PSS
16II
Chassis - WOMR300BRA /
3KC48960AC
n/a Card Holder
32EC2 - 8DG63979AA 1830PSS ECN
R23.3
Equipment Controller
Card
11QPEN4 - 8DG60996AA 10G Interface Card
8P20 - 3KC49240AA 10G Interface Card
S13X100E - 8DG63988AA 100G Interface Card
Filler Card - 8DG59418AA n/a Empty Slot Blank
Security Label Kit - 8DG-6509-
AAAA
n/a Tamper Labels
Table 3 - PSS-16II Cryptographic Module Test Configuration
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2.1.3 PSS-8
Model Hardware Firmware
Version
Distinguishing
Features
1830 PSS-
8
Chassis - WOMPU00CRA /
3KC48901AA
n/a Card Holder
8EC2 - 3KC48820AA 1830PSS ECN
R23.3
Equipment Controller
Card
11QPEN4 - 8DG60996AA 10G Interface Card
8P20 - 3KC49240AA 10G Interface Card
S13X100E - 8DG63988AA 100G Interface Card
Filler Card - 8DG59418AA n/a Empty Slot Blank
Security Label Kit - 8DG-6509-
AAAA
n/a Tamper Labels
Table 4 - PSS-8 Cryptographic Module Test Configuration
2.1.4 PSS-24x
Model Hardware Firmware
Version
Distinguishing
Features
1830 PSS-24x Chassis - WOMP410CRB /
3KC50378AA
n/a Card Holder
CEC2 - 3KC50335AA 1830PSS ECN
R23.3
Equipment
Controller Card
MFC24X - 3KC50330AA Multi-Function
Card
2UC400E - 3KC60522AA 100G Interface
Card
Filler Card – 3KC59819AC n/a Empty Slot
Blank
Security Label Kit - 8DG-6509-AAAA n/a Tamper Labels
Table 5 - PSS-24x Cryptographic Module Test Configuration
2.1.5 PSI-M
Model Hardware Firmware Version Distinguishing
Features
1830 PSI-M Chassis - 3KC81791AA n/a Card Holder
MEC2 - 3KC81775AA 1830PSI-M ECN R23.3 Equipment
Controller Card
DFC12E - 3KC82081AA 100G Interface
Card
Filler Card – 3KC81780AA n/a Empty Slot
Blank
Security Label Kit - 8DG-6509-AAAA n/a Tamper Labels
Table 6 - PSI-M Cryptographic Module Test Configuration
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2.2 Algorithms
Nokia PSS-32/16II/8/24x PSI-M SNMP-Engine
CAVP Cert. Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description /
Key Size / Key
Strength
Use / Function
A2502 AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CFB128 Key Length: 256
bits
Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
A2502 HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
SHA-1, SHA2-
256
Key Length: 160
bits, 256 bits
Keyed Hash
A2502 CVL
[SP 800-135 Rev
1]
SNMP KDF
Note: The
SNMP protocols
have not been
reviewed or
tested by the
CAVP and
CMVP
- Key Derivation
A2502 KTS
[SP 800-38F
Rev 1]
SP 800-38A,
FIPS 198-1,
and SP 800-38F.
KTS (key
wrapping and
unwrapping)
per IG D.G.
Key Length: 256
bits
Key Strength:
256 bits
Key
establishment
methodology
provides 256 bits
of encryption
strength)
A2502 SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA-1, SHA-
256
- Message Digest
Table 7 - Approved Algorithms (Nokia SNMP-Engine)
The use of truncated HMAC-SHA-1-96 in SNMP protocol is compliant with IG.C.D
Nokia openSSL
CAVP Cert. Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description /
Key Size / Key
Strength
Use / Function
A3369 AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CBC, CTR Key length: 128,
256 bits
Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
A3369 AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
ECB Key Length:
128 bits
Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
Self-Test only
A3369 AES
[SP 800-38D]
GCM Key length: 128,
256 bits
Symmetric
Encryption and
Decryption
Vendor Affirmed CKG
[SP 800-133
Rev 2]
- - Symmetric key
generation
Symmetric keys
and generated
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CAVP Cert. Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description /
Key Size / Key
Strength
Use / Function
Section 5.1: Key
Pairs for Digital
Signature
Schemes
Section 6.1: The
Direct
Generation of
Symmetric Keys
seeds are
produced using
unmodified
output from the
Approved
DRBG.
A3369 CTR_DRBG
[SP800-90A]
AES-256
Derivation
Function Enabled
No Prediction
Resistance
256 bits Random
Number
Generation
A3369 ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4]
Key Pair
Generation (PKG)
Curve: P-256,
P-384, P-521
Asymmetric
Key Generation
A3369 ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4]
Public Key
Validation (PKV)
Curve: P-256,
P-384, P-521
Asymmetric
Public Key
Verification
A3369 ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4]
Signature
Generation
Curve: P-256,
P-384, P-521
Digital
Signature
Verification
A3369 ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4]
Signature
Verification
Curve: P-256,
P-384, P-521
Digital
Signature
Verification
A3369 HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512
Key Length:
256 bits or
greater
Keyed Hash
A3369 KAS-SSC
[SP800-56A
Rev 3]
KAS-ECC-SSC:
Scheme:
“Ephemeral
Unified” with
curve P-256, P-
384, P-521
KAS-FFC-SSC:
Scheme:
“dhEphem” and
domain parameter
generation
methods
“ffdhe2048,
MODP-4096,
MODP-8192”
Domain
Parameter
Generation
Methods:
ffdhe2048,
MODP-4096,
MODP-8192
Shared Secret
Computation
ffdhe2048 self-
test only
A3369 KAS
[SP800-56A
Rev 3]
KAS (ECC):
P-256, P-384
and P-521
KAS (KAS-SSC
Cert. #A3369,
CVL
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CAVP Cert. Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description /
Key Size / Key
Strength
Use / Function
with SSH and
TLS v1.2
KDF (SP800-
135rev1)
KAS (FFC):
ffdhe2048,
MODP-4096,
and MODP-
8192
with SSH
KDF (SP800-
135rev1)
Cert. #A3369)
As per IG D.F
Scenario 2 path
(2), the CAVP
testing is
performed
in which case it
is split into (i)
testing the
computation of
the shared
secret, (ii)
testing the key
derivation
function used in
deriving the
keying material
as per SP800-
135 Rev 1
A3369 KTS
[SP 800-38F
Rev 1]
SP 800-38A, FIPS
198-1,
and SP 800-38F.
KTS (key
wrapping and
unwrapping)
per IG D.G.
Key Length:
128, 256 bits
Key Strength:
128, 256 bits
Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
encryption
strength.
A3369 KTS
[SP 800-38F
Rev 1]
Key wrapping per
IG D.G.
Key Length:
128, 256 bits
Key Strength:
128, 256 bits
Key Transport
(SSH, TLS)
Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
encryption
strength.
A3369 CVL
[SP 800-135
Rev 1]
SSH KDF, TLS
KDF
Note: The SSH,
TLS protocols
have not been
reviewed or tested
by the CAVP and
CMVP
Cipher: AES-
128, AES-256
Hash
Algorithm:
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
TLS Version:
v1.2
Key Derivation
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CAVP Cert. Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description /
Key Size / Key
Strength
Use / Function
Hash
Algorithm:
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384
A3369 RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
- Modulus: 2048,
3072, 4096
Asymmetric
Key Generation
A3369 RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
Signature
Generation
(PKCS#1 v1.5)
Modulus: 2048,
3072, 4096
Digital
Signature
Generation
A3369 RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
Signature
Verification
(PKCS#1 v1.5)
Modulus: 1024,
2048, 3072,
4096
Digital
Signature
Verification
A3369 RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
Signature
Verification
(PKCS PSS)
Modulus: 4096 Digital
Signature
Verification
Self-test only
A3369 Safe Primes Key
Generation
[SP 800-133
Rev 1]
KeyGen for DH Safe Prime
Groups:
ffdhe2048,
MODP-4096,
MODP-8192
Key Generation
ffdhe2048 Self-
test only
A3369 Safe Primes Key
Verification
[SP 800-133
Rev 1]
KeyVer for DH Safe Prime
Groups: MODP-
4096, MODP-
8192
Key Verification
A3369 SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-
512
N/A Message Digest
Table 8 - Approved Algorithms (Nokia openSSL)
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Nokia Jitter Entropy (JENT)
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s)
/Key Strength(s)
Use / Function
A3310 SHS
[FIPS 202]
SHA3-256 256 Message Digest
Entropy
Cert
Algorithm
and Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s)
/Key Strength(s)
Use / Function
E26 Entropy
[SP800-90B]
N/A
(Algorithms
covered by
A3310)
N/A Random Number
Generation
Table 9 – Approved Algorithms (Nokia Jitter Entropy (JENT))
Rijndael AES256 CTR/GCM (Nokia Crypto-OTU2 Engine 11QPEN4)
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key
Size(s) /Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
A2537 AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CTR Key length: 256 bits Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
ECB
Encryption
only
Key length: 256 bits Symmetric Encryption
A2539 AES
[SP 800-38D]
GCM Key length: 256 bits Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
ECB
Encryption
only
Key length: 256 bits Symmetric Encryption
A2538 AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-38A]
CBC Key length: 256 bits Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
SHA2-256 256 bits Keyed Hash
SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA2-256 256 bits Message Digest
Table 10 - Approved Algorithms (11QPEN4)
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CRYPOTN (Nokia 100G using Microsemi, S13X100E, 2UC400E)
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key
Size(s) /Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
AES 3844
(S13X100E
and
2UC400E)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-
38A]
CTR Key length: 256
bits
Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-
38A]
ECB
Encryption
only
Key length: 256
bits
Symmetric Encryption
AES
[SP 800-
38D]
GMAC Key length: 256
bits
Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
A2415
(S13X100E),
A2416
(2UC400E)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-
38A]
CBC Key length: 256
bits
Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
SHA2-256 256 bits Keyed Hash
SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA2-256 256 bits Message Digest
Table 11 - Approved Algorithms (S13X100E, 2UC400E)
CRYPOTN IP (Nokia 100G using Microsemi IP, DFC12E, MEC2)
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key
Size(s) /Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
A2599
(DCF12E)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-
38A]
CTR Key length: 256
bits
Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-
38A]
ECB
Encryption
only
Key length: 256
bits
Symmetric Encryption
AES
[SP 800-
38D]
GMAC Key length: 256
bits
Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
A2591
(MEC2)
AES
[FIPS 197]
[SP 800-
38A]
CBC Key length: 256
bits
Symmetric Encryption and
Decryption
HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
SHA2-256 256 bits Keyed Hash
SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA2-256 256 bits Message Digest
Table 12 - Approved Algorithms (DFC12E, MEC2)
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CRYPOTN (Nokia 100G using Microsemi) uses HMAC-SHA256 (and the underlying SHA-256) for
the authentication of the pack serial number, which is used to distinguish the two ends of the encryption
section (certificate C1545).
CRYPOTN (Nokia 100G using Microsemi) uses AES-256-CTR combined with AES-GMAC to form a
proprietary authenticated encryption function (GMAC+CTR). The authentication key is derived from
the encryption key in exactly the same way that AES-GCM does and also all calculations are done in a
GCM like manner. The only difference is that the length of the authentication and cipher text fields are
transposed.
For CRYPOTN, the IV generation follows the rules of [FIPS 140-3 IG] section C.H (case 4):
The probability that the proprietary GMAC+CTR authenticated encryption function ever will be
invoked with the same IV and the same key on two (or more) distinct sets of input data shall be no
greater than 2-32
for 1830 PSS S13X100E and 2UC400E.
The following rules ensure that the construction of the IV, the keys and the Fixed Field used satisfy the
above requirement.
i.) By implementation, the Fixed Field for AtoZ direction is always different than the ZtoA
direction.
ii.) By implementation, the IV is composed of a Fixed Field and a running counter (Invocation
Field) that starts at zero
iii.) By implementation, authentication stops and new keys are required from the key
management system if:
a. The modules power is lost and then restored (which would cause the IV to be reset)
b. Running counter reaches its maximum
iv.) Therefore, since IV are only reused with different keys, as long as the probability of new
keys being different than any previous used keys exceeds 2-32
, then the concatenation of the
keys with the IV will also exceed 2-32
.
v.) By Policy, the key management system (external to the module) always generates random
256-bit keys and the probability of the key manager ever generating the same key again shall
be no greater than 2-32
during the system lifetime across all keys generated.
vi.) By Policy, the key management system uses one newly generated key on one circuit per one
key session time period. The key is used for both the AtoZ and the ZtoA directions of that
circuit for that key session time period.
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2.3 Module Description
The 1830 PSS is a scalable, next-generation Dense Wave Division Multiplexer (DWDM) platform that
supports data center aggregation for Ethernet, Fiber Channel (FC) and other protocols. Multiprotocol
services can then be dynamically and flexibly transported over metro and long-haul spans, using
Tunable and Reconfigurable Optical Add-Drop Multiplexers (T-ROADMs) for optical wavelengths.
The 1830 PSS enables transparent L2 Ethernet or FC and L3 IP services over the optical link.
The Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelves provide increased network
flexibility and operational automation through zero-touch,
transparent photonic networking. Photonic networks use
simplified and accelerated operations to transform
wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) into true
transport networking with advanced flexibility,
performance, automation, and integration. Several Optical
Add-Drop multiplexing (OADM) configurations are
supported by components that provide optical filter routing,
optical amplification, and support for interworking with
optical signals originating on non-1830 PSS hardware.
The Nokia 1830 PSS-32s are closely related shelves that
compose the Nokia 1830 PSS-32 multi-service multi-reach
solution. They are scalable optical transport platforms that
implement a converged platform solution for multi-service
DWDM metro-area, long-haul, and Optical Transport
Network (OTN) switching, and leading-edge flexibility with
next generation optical and OTN capabilities.
The Nokia 1830 PSS-32 Central Office Shelf provides a 32-slot
primarily DWDM platform.
The Nokia 1830 PSS-8 and PSS-16II are the
new generation in the 1830 portfolio; it is
future-oriented product to provide high
capacity, high flexibility and high scalability.
Integrated together with existing network
management systems and engineering tools,
both shelves provide operational automation
through zero-touch, transparent photonic
networking. These two new products are based
on the platform that converges Lambda
switching, OTN switching and packet
switching in metro aggregation and core layers
for service grooming and aggregation.
Figure 1 - PSS-32 Shelf
Figure 2 - PSS-16II Shelf
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Figure 3 - PSS-8 Shelf
The 1830 PSS-24x is designed to address multilayer, multiservice,
optical network scale and efficiency by delivering an industry
leading level of optical transport network (OTN) and Ethernet
switching. Capable of supporting up to 48 Tbps of OTN/Ethernet
switching capacity in a single rack, terabit capable card slots and
low system power utilization, the 1830 PSS-24x takes
OTN/Ethernet grooming and protection to the next level of scale
required to support efficient 100G, 200G, 400G, 500G and beyond
wavelength transport.
The 1830 Photonic Services Interconnect – Modular (PSI-M)
provides flexible, modular, and scalable optical networking solutions for data center interconnect (DCI)
applications.
The Nokia PSI-M is a high capacity, modular, optical networking platform, optimized for data center
interconnect applications over metro, regional, and long haul distances. As the software industry has
transitioned to data center based applications, it has created a tremendous need for optical networks and
bandwidth to interconnect data centers, as well as to connect local data caching sites to their respective
metro point of presence locations. The 1830 PSI-M modular architecture allow carriers to configure
only the interfaces and capacities needed for each application – the ultimate pay as you go modularity.
The PSI-M provides easy to use, cost efficient, small sized optical transport for 100GE, 400GE, and
OTU4 client services. With its modular architecture, additional capacity and client interfaces can be
added, as needed.
Figure 5 - PSI-M Shelf
Figure 4 - PSS-24x Shelf
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The FIPS approved configurations of 1830 PSS and 1830 PSI-M consist of physically secured single
shelf entities equipped with equipment controller cards and encryption cards.
The cryptographic module is based on the encryption cards 11QPEN4, S13X100E, 2UC400E installed
on a single shelf version of an 1830 PSS with an equipment controller (32EC2E, 8EC2E or CEC2) as
shown in 2.1.
2.4 Block Diagram
Figure 6 - 1830 PSS, 1830 PSI-M Block Diagram
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2.5 FIPS Configuration and Cryptographic Boundary
2.5.1 PSS-32/16II/8/24x
FIPS Configurations of 1830 PSS must meet stringent Physical, Logical and Operational requirements
that are more restrictive than typical telecom or data center deployments. While the generalized use of
1830 PSS may normally include many different multi-shelf configurations with many different circuit
pack types, the FIPS approved configurations of 1830 PSS consist of physically secured single shelf
entities equipped with equipment controller cards and 11QPEN4, S13X100E, 2UC400E cards.
The cryptographic module is based on the encryption card 11QPEN4 and/or S13X100E or 2UC400E
installed on a single shelf version of an 1830 PSS with an Equipment Controller (32EC2E, 8EC2E or
CEC2).
The cryptographic modules are intended to be deployed at both ends of a transmit/receive pair of
external optical fibers between two data centers to provide encryption of 10GE, 8G/10GFC and ODU2
client traffic (for 11QPEN4) and 10x 10GE/ODU2, 2x 40GE or 100GE/ODU4 (for S13X100E) and 4x
ODU4 (for 2UC400E) while in flight between data centers.
AES-256
Device
Key
Repository
S13X100E
11QPEN4
2UC400E
1830 PSS
32EC2
8EC2
CEC2
cryptographic boundary
AES-256
Device
Key
Repository
S13X100E
11QPEN4
2UC400E
1830 PSS
32EC2
8EC2
CEC2
cryptographic boundary
Encrypted ODU-2 (x4 per 11QPEN4)
and/or
Encrypted ODU-4 (x1 per S13X100E, x4 per 2UC400E)
Optical Fiber
Data Service Interface
(10GE/10GFC/OTU2)
(100GE/40GE/10GE
Data Service Interface
(10GE/10GFC/OTU2)
(100GE/40GE/10GE
External KM
External NM
KM-NE
interfaces
KM-NE
interfaces
NM-NE
interfaces
NM-NE
interfaces
Figure 7 - Network Configuration of 1830 PSS-32/16II/8/24x
2.5.2 PSI-M
FIPS Configurations of 1830 PSI-M must meet stringent Physical, Logical and Operational
requirements that are more restrictive than typical telecom or data center deployments. The FIPS
approved configurations of 1830 PSI-M consist of physically secured single shelf entities equipped with
equipment controller cards and DFC12E cards.
The cryptographic module is based on the encryption card DFC12E installed on an 1830 PSI-M with an
Equipment Controller (MEC2).
The cryptographic modules are intended to be deployed at both ends of a transmit/receive pair of
external optical fibers between two data centers to provide encryption of 12x ODU4 (for DFC12E)
while in flight between data centers.
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AES-256
Device
Key
Repository
DFC12E
1830 PSI-M
MEC2
cryptographic boundary
AES-256
Device
Key
Repository
DFC12E
1830 PSI-M
MEC2
cryptographic boundary
Encrypted ODU-4 (x12 per DFC12E)
Optical Fiber
Data Service Interface
(100GE)
Data Service Interface
(100GE)
External KM
External NM
KM-NE
interfaces
KM-NE
interfaces
NM-NE
interfaces
NM-NE
interfaces
Figure 8 - Network Configuration of 1830 PSI-M
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3 Cryptographic module interfaces
The module uses logical interfaces: Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, Status Output.
The logical interface Control Output is not used by the module. The module does not output any
command or control data used to control another module.
3.1 PSS-32 Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
PSS-32 User Panel (1)
OAMP (1) OAMP interface Control Input – Status Output
Craft (USB) (1) Craft Terminal Control Input – Status Output
Craft (DB-9) (1) Craft Terminal Control Input – Status Output
Equipment Controller 32EC2 (2)
CIT (2) OAMP interface (local) Control Input – Status Output
11QPEN4 Encryption Card (up to 16)
LEDs (9) Card, Transmission status Status output
L (4) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
VA (4) Transmission Data Output
S13X100E Encryption Card (up to 15)
LEDs (2) Card, Transmission status Status output
L (1) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
Filler Card (up to 16)
n.a. n.a. No Interfaces
Table 13 - PSS-32 Ports and Interfaces
3.1.1 PSS-32 User Panel
Figure 9 - PSS32 User Panel - front view
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
STATUS (1) NE status LED Status Output
HOUSEKEEPING (1) Housekeeping n.a. (shelf internal)
ALARM (1) Rack Alarm n.a. (shelf internal)
CR/PROMPT (1) Critical Condition LED Status Output
MJ/PROMPT (1) Major Condition LED Status Output
MN/DEFRD (1) Minor Condition LED Status Output
WARNING (1) Warning Condition LED Status Output
ATTENDED (1) NE attended status LED Status Output
ABNORMAL (1) NE attended status LED Status Output
OAMP (1) (incl. LED) OAMP (GbE) Control Input – Status Output
VOIP (1) (incl. LED) Voice over IP Data Input – Data Output
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
E1, E2 (2) (incl. LED) Inter-Shelf LAN n.a. (shelf internal)
CRAFT (1) Type B USB interface
Craft: Craft Port (USB signal)
Control Input – Status Output
ACO (1) Alarm cut off button Control Input
LAMP TEST (1) Lamp test button Control Input
CRAFT (Sub-D) (1) (D-Sub DE-9) Debug Serial
In/Out
Control Input – Status Output
RACK, LAMP (1) Rack alarm, Rack Lamp n.a. (shelf internal)
Table 14 - PSS-32 User Panel - Ports and Interfaces
3.2 PSS-16II Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
PSS-16II User Panel (1)
OAMP (1) OAMP interface Control Input – Status Output
Craft (USB) (1) Craft Terminal Control Input – Status Output
Craft (DB-9) (1) Craft Terminal Control Input – Status Output
Equipment Controller 32EC2 (2)
CIT (2) OAMP interface (local) Control Input – Status Output
11QPEN4 Encryption Card (up to 16)
LEDs (9) Card, Transmission status Status output
L (4) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
VA (4) Transmission Data Output
S13X100E Encryption Card (up to 15)
LEDs (2) Card, Transmission status Status output
L (1) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
Filler Card (up to 16)
n.a. n.a. No Interfaces
Table 15 - PSS-16II Ports and Interfaces
3.2.1 PSS-16II User Panel
Figure 10 - PSS-16II User Panel - Ports and Interfaces
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
LEDs Alarm Status (4) (#1) NE alarm status Status Output
LED ATT (1) (#2) NE attended status Status Output
LED STAT (1) (#3) NE status Status Output
Shelf-ID Rotary H, L (2) (#4,5) Shelf-ID configuration Control Input
CRAFT (#6) Type B USB interface
Craft: Craft Port (USB signal)
Control Input – Status Output
HK1, HK2 (#7) Housekeeping n.a. (shelf internal)
RACK, LAMP (#8) Rack alarm, Rack Lamp n.a. (shelf internal)
OAMP (#9) (incl. LED) OAMP (GbE) Control Input – Status Output
VOIP (#9) (incl. LED) Voice over IP Data Input – Data Output
E1, E2 (#10) (incl. LED) Inter-Shelf LAN n.a. (shelf internal)
BITS out TOD out (#11) Clock and timing Data Output
BITS in TOD in (#11) Clock and timing Data Input
BITS out TOD out (#12) Clock and timing Data Output
BITS in TOD in (#12) Clock and timing Data Input
INV (#13) 1-wire connection to SFD44 n.a. (shelf internal)
ACO (#14) Alarm cut off button Control Input
LAMP TEST (#15) Lamp test button Control Input
Table 16 - PSS-16II User Panel - Ports and Interfaces
3.3 PSS-8 Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
PSS-8 Shelf Panel (1)
OAMP (1) OAMP interface Control Input – Status Output
Equipment Controller 8EC2 (2)
Craft (1) Craft Terminal Control Input – Status Output
CIT (2) OAMP interface (local) Control Input – Status Output
11QPEN4 Encryption Card (up to 8)
LEDs (9) Card, Transmission status Status output
L (4) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
VA (4) Transmission Data Output
S13X100E Encryption Card (up to 8)
LEDs (2) Card, Transmission status Status output
L (1) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
Filler Card (up to 7)
n.a. n.a. No Interfaces
Table 17 - PSS-8 Ports and Interfaces
3.3.1 PSS-8 Shelf Panel
Figure 11 - PSS-8 Shelf Panel – Ports and Interfaces
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
BITS out TOD out (#1) Clock and timing Data Output
BITS in TOD in (#2) Clock and timing Data Input
OAMP (1) (#3) OAMP interface Control Input – Status Output
Table 18 - PSS-8 Shelf Panel - Ports and Interfaces
3.4 PSS-24x Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
MFC24X (1)
STAT (1) NE status LED Status Output
Shelf ID MSB, LSB (2) Shelf ID Rotary Dials Control Input
Equipment Controller CEC2 (2)
STAT (1) Card Status LED Status Output
EPS (1) EPS LED Status Output
(1)
Alarm cut off button Control Input
C, M, m, W (4) Alarm Condition LED Status Output
AT (1) Attended LED Status Output
AB (1) Abnormal LED Status Output
(1) Type B USB interface
Craft: Craft Port (USB signal)
Control Input – Status Output
DLAN (1) Debug LAN Control Input – Status Output
DSER (1) Debug Serial In/Out Control Input – Status Output
DNR (1) Do Not Remove LED Status Output
CIT (1) OAMP Management (local) Control Input – Status Output
OAMP (1) OAMP Management Control Input – Status Output
E1 (1) OAMP Management Control Input – Status Output
R Reset Button Control Input
2UC400E Encryption Card (up to 24)
STAT Card status LED Status Output
1, 2 LED (2) Transmission status LED Status output
1, 2 (2) Line Interface Data Input – Data Output
Filler Card (up to 23)
n.a. n.a. No Interfaces
Table 19 - PSS-24x Ports and Interfaces
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3.4.1 MFC24X
Figure 12 - PSS-24x MFC24X - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
STAT (1) NE status LED Status Output
Shelf ID MSB, LSB (2) Shelf ID Rotary Dials Control Input
HK IN, HK OUT (2) Housekeeping n.a. (shelf internal)
RA OUT, RL IN, RL OUT (3) Rack alarm, Rack Lamp n.a. (shelf internal)
SENSOR IN (1) Interface to sensor card n.a. (shelf internal)
Table 20 - MFC24x - Ports and Interfaces
3.5 PSI-M Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
PSI-M Chassis (1)
OAMP (1) OAMP interface Control Input – Status Output
USB (1) Type B USB interface
Craft: Craft Port (USB signal)
Control Input – Status Output
CON (1) Serial Debug Control Input – Status Output
CIT (1) OAMP interface (local) Control Input – Status Output
E1 Inter-Shelf LAN Not used
E2 Inter-Shelf LAN Not used
UID/RESET Shelf Reset Control Input
Equipment Controller MEC2 (up to 2)
n.a. n.a.
DFC12E Encryption Card (up to 16)
STAT LED (1) Card status LED Status output
L1, L2 LED (2) Transmission status LED Status output
C01..C12 LED (12) Transmission status LED Status output
L1, L2 (2) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
C01..C12 (12) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
Filler Card (up to3)
n.a. n.a. No Interfaces
Table 21 – PSI-M Ports and Interfaces
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3.5.1 PSI-M Chassis
Chassis Front Chassis Back
Figure 13 – PSI-M Chassis (Front and Back) - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
Status (1) NE alarm status Status Output
OAMP (incl. LED) (1) OAMP (GbE) Control Input – Status Output
CON (1) Serial Debug
CIT (1) OAMP interface (local) Control Input – Status Output
USB (1) Type B USB interface
Craft: Craft Port (USB signal)
Control Input – Status Output
E1, E2 (incl. LED) (2) Inter-Shelf LAN n.a. (shelf internal)
UID/RESET (1) Shelf Reset Control Input
Table 22 – PSI-M Chassis - Ports and Interfaces
3.6 Equipment Controller 32EC2 for PSS-32, PSS16II
Figure 14 - 32EC2 - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
LED (#1) LED status Status Output
LED (#2) LED EPS Status Output
USB (#3) USB Control Input – Status Output
CIT (#4) OAMP Management
(local)
Control Input – Status Output
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
AUX (#5) Port disabled and cannot be used in FIPS
configuration
ES1, ES2
(#6,7)
Inter-Shelf LAN Port enabled, but shall not be used in FIPS
configuration
Table 23 - 32EC2 - Ports and Interfaces
The physical access to the AUX, ES1, ES2 is prevented by a faceplate which is secured by tamper
labels if the module is in approved mode of operation. The AUX channel is disabled in the approved
mode of operation and cannot be used. For ES1/ES2, non-usage of ES1/2 is by policy. The ES1/2 are
unused in FIPS configurations and instead, the ports are used in non-FIPS multi-shelf configurations.
They are, however, only used if the connected shelf is accepted to be a part of the NE. This requires
provisioning actions that are prohibited by policy. CSPs are not accessible through ES1/2 and code
cannot be loaded using ES1/2.
3.7 Equipment Controller 8EC2 for PSS-8
Figure 15 - 8EC2 - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
LED (#1) LED status Status Output
LED (#8) LED EPS Status Output
CRAFT (#3) Craft Terminal Control Input – Status Output
CIT (#2) OAMP Management
(local)
Control Input – Status Output
ES1, ES2
(#4,5)
Inter-Shelf LAN Port enabled, but shall not be used in FIPS
configuration
USB (#6) USB Control Input – Status Output
RST (#7) Reset button Control Input
Table 24 - 8EC2 - Ports and Interfaces
The physical access to the ES1, ES2 is prevented by a faceplate which is secured by tamper labels if the
module is in approved mode of operation. For ES1/ES2, non-usage of ES1/2 is by policy. The ES1/2 are
unused in FIPS configurations and instead, the ports are used in non-FIPS multi-shelf configurations.
They are, however, only used if the connected shelf is accepted to be a part of the NE. This requires
provisioning actions that are prohibited by policy. CSPs are not accessible through ES1/2 and code
cannot be loaded using ES1/2.
3.8 Equipment Controller CEC2 for PSS-24x
Figure 16 - CEC2 - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
STAT (1) Card Status LED Status Output
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Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
EPS (1) EPS LED Status Output
(1)
Alarm cut off button Control Input
C (1) Critical Condition LED Status Output
M (1) Major Condition LED Status Output
m (1) Minor Condition LED Status Output
W (1) Warning Condition LED Status Output
AT (1) Attended LED Status Output
AB (1) Abnormal LED Status Output
(1) Type B USB interface
Craft: Craft Port (USB signal)
Control Input – Status Output
DLAN (1) Debug LAN Control Input – Status Output
DSER (1) Debug Serial In/Out Control Input – Status Output
DNR (1) Do Not Remove LED Status Output
ES1, ES2 (2) Inter-Shelf LAN Port enabled, but shall not be used in FIPS
configuration
CIT (1) OAMP Management (local) Control Input – Status Output
OAMP (1) OAMP Management Control Input – Status Output
E1 (1) OAMP Management Control Input – Status Output
AUX Port enabled, but shall not be used in FIPS
configuration
R Reset Button Control Input
Table 25 - CEC2 - Ports and Interfaces
3.9 11QPEN4
The 11QPEN4 has four pluggable client interfaces (C1, C2, C3, and C4), four pluggable line interfaces
(L1, L2, L3 and L4) and four VOA sockets (VA1, VA2, VA3 and VA4) and a status LED as shown in
Figure 10. The client and line interfaces are equipped with XFP transceivers. Each transceiver provides
an optical fiber interface for receive and an optical fiber interface for transmit. Each line-client pair
(L1-C1, L2-C2, L3-C3, L4-C4) provides an encrypted line port and the associated unencrypted client
port. In the transmit direction, unencrypted data in the form of Fibre Channel, Ethernet or OTU2 signals
enter a client port and are encrypted and then transmitted out the associated line port. In the receive
direction, encrypted data is received on the Line Port and then decrypted and sent out the associated
client port. The VOA sockets provide a means to optically attenuate the Line port signals- (They do not
access or modify the content of the line port signals).
Figure 17 - 11QPEN4 - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
LED (#1) LED status Status Output
L1, L2, L3, L4 (4) (#2) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
VA1, VA2, VA3, VA4 (4) (#3) Transmission Data Output
C1, C2, C3, C4 (4) (#4) Transmission Data Input – Data Output
LEDs (12) (#2,3,4) Transmission Status Output
Table 26 - 11QPEN4 - Ports and Interfaces
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3.10 S13X100E
The S13X100E has
• thirteen pluggable client interfaces
o C1 … C10: SFP+ transceivers
o C21: CFP4 transceiver
o C31, C32: QSFP transceivers
• one fixed line interface
• a status LEDs for the card
• fourteen status LEDs (one for each interface)
Each pluggable client interface transceiver and the fixed line side transceiver provides an optical fiber
interface for receive and an optical fiber interface for transmit. In the transmit direction, unencrypted
data in the form of Ethernet, OTU2 or OTU4 signals enters the client ports, are multiplexed into one
ODU4 signal and then encrypted and transmitted out the line port. In the receive direction, encrypted
data is received on the Line Port and then decrypted and de-multiplexed and sent out the client ports.
Figure 18 - S13X100E - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
LED STAT LED status Status Output
L1 (1) Line Interface Data Input – Data Output
C1..C10 Client XFP interfaces Data Input – Data Output
C31..32 Client QSFP interfaces Data Input – Data Output
C21 Client CFP4 interfaces Data Input – Data Output
Table 27 - S13X100E - Ports and Interfaces
3.11 8P20
The 8P20 has
• eight client or line interfaces
• a status LEDs for the card
• eight status LEDs (one for each interface)
8P20 is a single-slot, half-height card supported in 1830 PSS-8/PSS-16II/PSS-32 shelves. It
has six SFP and two SFP+ ports. It supports 8 sub-10G any-rate client ports in client/line
configurations as a client tributary card in PSS-8/PSS-16II shelves, and it supports 6 sub-10G anyrate
client ports with two line OTU2 SFP+ ports in the standalone muxponder configuration.
Figure 19 – 8P20 - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
STAT Card status LED Status Output
C1, C2, C3, C4,
VA1/C5, VA2/C6,
L1/C7, L1/C8 LED (8)
Transmission status LED Status output
C1, C2, C3, C4,
VA1/C5, VA2/C6,
Client/Line Interface Data Input – Data Output
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L1/C7, L1/C8 (8)
Table 28 – 8P20 - Ports and Interfaces
3.12 2UC400E
The 2UC400E has
• two fixed line interfaces (1, 2)
• a status LEDs for the card
• two status LEDs (one for each interface)
The fixed line side transceivers provide an optical fiber interface for receive and an optical fiber
interface for transmit. This card is used in a switching system, where the client-side signals are received
from a backplane interface by the card. In the backplane-to-line direction, unencrypted data in the form
of 100GE signals enters the client ports, is multiplexed into one ODU4 signal and then encrypted and
transmitted out the line port. In the line-to-backplane direction, encrypted data is received on the Line
Port and then decrypted and de-multiplexed and sent out the client ports.
Figure 20 – 2UC400E - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
STAT Card status LED Status Output
1, 2 LED (2) Transmission status LED Status output
1, 2 (2) Line Interface Data Input – Data Output
Table 29 – 2UC400E - Ports and Interfaces
3.13 MEC2
The MEC2 has no interfaces. All needed interfaces (e.g. for OAMP) are accessible at the PSI-M
Chassis.
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
n.a. n.a. No interfaces
Table 30 – MEC2 - Ports and Interfaces
3.14 DFC12E
The DFC12E has
• twelve pluggable client interfaces
o C01 … C12: QSFP transceivers (QSFP28 100GBase-SR4/LR4,CWDM4)
• two fixed line interfaces (L1, L2)
• a status LEDs for the card
• thirteen status LEDs (one for each interface)
Each pluggable client interface transceiver and the fixed line side transceivers provide an optical fiber
interface for receive and an optical fiber interface for transmit. In the client-to-line direction,
unencrypted data in the form of 100GE signals enters the client ports, is multiplexed into one ODU4
signal and then encrypted and transmitted out the line port. In the line-to-client direction, encrypted data
is received on the Line Port and then decrypted and de-multiplexed and sent out the client ports.
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Figure 21 – DFC12E - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
LED STAT Card status LED Status Output
L1, L2 LED (2) Transmission status LED Status output
C01..C12 LED (12) Transmission status LED Status output
L1, L2 (1) Line Interface Data Input – Data Output
C1..C12 Client QSFP interfaces Data Input – Data Output
Table 31 - DFC12E - Ports and Interfaces
3.15 Filler Card (PSS-32/16II/8/24x PSI-M)
The Filler Card has no transmission functionality. Its main purpose is to guarantee the proper airflow for
the cooling of the NE.
Figure 22 – PSS32-16II/8 Filler Card - Ports and Interfaces
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over port/interface
n.a. n.a. No interfaces
Table 32 - Filler Card - Ports and Interfaces
Note: there are different physical filler cards for PSS-32/16II/8, for PSS-24x and for PSI-M, but the
properties of those cards are the same and are reflected in the table above.
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4 Roles, services, and authentication
4.1 Roles
The module supports identity-based authentication and the module supports two roles:
• Crypto Officer Role which is referred to as ‘Admin’
• User Role which is referred to as ‘Crypto’
The Admin accesses the module via the SNMP and/or the Command Line Interface (CLI) and/or
WebUI. This role provides all services that are necessary for initial installation of the module and
management of the module. These services are all Approved services.
The Crypto accesses the module via the SNMP and/or the Command Line Interface (CLI). This role
provides all services that are necessary for the provisioning and supervision of the transmission
encryption function of the module for S13X100E, 11QPEN4 and 2UC400E. Those transmission
encryption functions cannot be provisioned by other roles. These services are all Approved services.
Role Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Admin Role CO SNMPv3 Authentication, CLI/WebUI Password
Crypto Role User SNMPv3 Authentication, CLI Password
Table 33 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output
4.2 Services
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
And/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Admin related Services
User Account
Management
Manage user accounts,
password complexity and user
privileges via CLI, WebUI
interface
N/A User Password (all accounts) Admin W Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
Change User
Password
Change the User password for
same account via CLI, Web
UI interface
N/A User Password Admin W Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
SNMP
Configuration
and Management
Manage SNMPv3
configurations via CLI,
WebUI interface
AES-CFB128
Keyed Hash
Message
Authentication
SNMPv3 Key
Derivation
KTS
Secure Hash
SNMPv3 Passphrase
SNMPv3 Authentication Key
SNMPv3 Privacy Key
Admin E, W Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
Key and
Certificate
Management
Manage Keys and Certificates
(including Trust Anchors) via
CLI, WebUI interface
RSA/ECDSA Key
Pair Generation
KTS
Secure Hash
TLS Public Key
TLS Private Key
SSH Private Key
SSH Public Key
SNMP Certificate Fingerprint
CA Public Key
SSH User Public Key
SFTP SSH User Private Key
SFTP Server Public Host Key
Admin G, E, R,
W
Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
Commission the
Module
Commission the module by
following the Security Policy
guidelines via CLI interface
N/A None Admin N/A Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
And/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Perform Self-
tests
Perform on-demand Power-up
Self Tests by power cycling
the cryptographic module
A3369, A2502,
A3310, A2537,
A2538, A2539,
A2415, A2416, AES
3844
None Admin All
ephemeral
keys/CSP
s – Z
N/A
Show Status Allows operator to view
status of the parameters
associated with FIPS-
Approved mode via SNMPv3
and CLI interfaces
N/A None Admin N/A N/A
Alarms
Monitoring
Allows operator to view
active alarms via SNMPv3
interfaces
N/A None Admin N/A N/A
Events
Monitoring
Allows the user to view all
logged events associated with
their permissions via
SNMPv3 interfaces
N/A None Admin N/A N/A
11QPEN4
Provision
Equipment
Allows the user to provision
and configure the 11QPEN4
cards via SNMPv3 interface
N/A None Admin N/A N/A
11QPEN4
Provision Facility
Allows the user to provision
and configure the facility
information associated with
11QPEN4 cards via SNMPv3
interface
N/A None Admin N/A N/A
S13X100E
Provision
Equipment
Allows the user to provision
and configure the S13X100E
cards via SNMPv3 interface
N/A None Admin N/A N/A
S13X100E
Provision Facility
Allows the user to provision
and configure the facility
information associated with
S13X100E cards via
SNMPv3 interface
N/A None Admin N/A N/A
Zeroize Keys Zeroize keys and CSPs over
SNMPv3 and CLI interfaces
N/A SNMPv3 Passphrase
SNMPv3 Authentication Key
SNMPv3 Privacy Key
11QPEN4 Session Encryption
Key
11QPEN4 Session KAT Key
S13X100E Session Encryption
Key
S13X100E Session KAT Key
Admin Z Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
Session initiation Initiate session with another
module using AES keys.
AES
Encryption/Decrypti
on
Keyed Hash
Message
Authentication
Secure Hash
11QPEN4 Session Encryption
Key
11QPEN4 Session KAT Key
S13X100E Session Encryption
and Authentication Key
S13X100E Session
Communication Authentication
Key
S13X100E Session KAT Key
2UC400E
Session Encryption Key
2UC400E Session
Communication Authentication
Key
2UC400E Session KAT Key
Admin E Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
Zeroize all SSPs Zeroize all SSPs over CLI
interface using Return-to
Factory command
N/A All SSPs Admin Z LED status indicator
Show version Show the version of the
module
N/A None Admin N/A N/A
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
And/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Establish TLS
session
Establish TLS session AES-CBC, AES-
GCM
Encryption/Decrypti
on
Keyed Hash
Message
Authentication
RSA Digital
Signature Generation
RSA Digital
Signature
Verification
TLS 1.2 Key
Derivation
RSA Key
Generation
KAS-ECC-SSC
Shared Secret
Computation
KTS
Secure Hash
Random Number
Generation
CA Public Key
TLS Public Key
TLS Private Key
ECDH Private Key Component
ECDH Public Key Component
ECDH Peer Public Key
Component
TLS Pre-Master Secret
TLS Master Secret
TLS Session Key
TLS Authentication Key
SNMPv3 Certificate Fingerprint
Database Encryption Key
AES GCM IV
DRBG Seed
Entropy Input String
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Admin G, R, W,
E
Log entry
TLS session
completes
Establish SSH
session
Establish SSH session AES-CTR, AES-
GCM
Encryption/Decrypti
on
Keyed Hash
Message
Authentication
ECDSA Digital
Signature Generation
ECDSA Digital
Signature
Verification
RSA Digital
Signature Generation
RSA Digital
Signature
Verification
SSHv2 Key
Derivation
RSA/ECDSA Key
Generation
KAS-FCC-SSC
Shared Secret
Computation
KAS-ECC-SSC
Shared Secret
Computation
KeyGen for DH
KeyVer for DH
KTS
Secure Hash
Random Number
Generation
DH Public Key Component
DH Private Key Component
ECDH Public Key Component
ECDH Private Key Component
SSH Private Key
SSH Public Key
SSH Shared Secret
SSH Session Key
SSH Authentication Key
SSH User Public Key
SFTP SSH User Private Key
SFTP Server Public Host Key
Database Encryption Key
AES GCM IV
DRBG Seed
Entropy Input String
DRBG V
DRBG Key
Admin G, R, W,
E
Log entry
SSH session
completes
Establish
SNMPv3
session
Perform actions over
SNMPv3
AES CFB128
Encryption/Decrypti
on
Keyed Hash
Message
Authentication
KTS
SNMPv3 KDF
Secure Hash
SNMPv3 Authentication Key
SNMPv3 Privacy Key
SNMP Certificate Fingerprint
Admin W, E Log entry
SNMPv3
session completes
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
And/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Upgrade
Application
Firmware
Load FIPS validated
application firmware
RSA Digital
Signature
Verification
Firmware Load Authentication
Key
Admin E Log entry
Show version
confirmation
Crypto related Services
Change Crypto
Password
Change the Crypto password
for same account
N/A Crypto Password Crypto W N/A
Perform Self-
tests
Perform on-demand Power-up
Self Tests by power cycling
the cryptographic module
A3369, A2502,
A3310, A2537,
A2538, A2539,
A2415, A2416, AES
3844
None Crypto All
ephemeral
keys/CSP
s – Z
N/A
Alarms
Monitoring
Allows users to view active
alarms via SNMPv3
interfaces
N/A None Crypto N/A N/A
Events
Monitoring
Allows the user to view all
logged events associated with
their permissions via
SNMPv3 interfaces
N/A None Crypto N/A N/A
11QPEN4 Line
Port WKAT
Provisioning
Allows the crypto user to
provision and configure the
WKAT via SNMPv3 interface
KTS 11QPEN4 Session KAT key
(WKAT Authentication String)
Crypto W Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
11QPEN4 Line
Port Encryption
Key Provisioning
Allows the crypto user to
provision and switch the
Encryption Key via SNMPv3
interface
KTS 11QPEN4
Session Encryption Key
Crypto W Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
11QPEN4 Line
Port Encryption
State
Provisioning
Allows the user to provision
and configure the facility
information associated with
11QPEN4 cards via SNMPv3
N/A None Crypto N/A N/A
S13X100E Line
Port WKAT
Provisioning
Allows the crypto user to
provision and configure the
WKAT via SNMPv3 interface
KTS S13X100E Session KAT key
(WKAT Authentication String)
Crypto W Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
S13X100E Line
Port Encryption
Key Provisioning
Allows the crypto user to
provision and switch the
Encryption Key via SNMPv3
interface
KTS S13X100E
Session Encryption and
Authentication Key
Crypto W Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
S13X100E Line
Port Encryption
State
Provisioning
Allows the user to provision
and configure the facility
information associated with
S13X100E cards via
SNMPv3
N/A None Crypto N/A N/A
2UC400E Line
Port WKAT
Provisioning
Allows the crypto user to
provision and configure the
WKAT via SNMPv3 interface
KTS 2UC400E Session KAT key
(WKAT Authentication String)
Crypto W Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
2UC400E Line
Port Encryption
Key Provisioning
Allows the crypto user to
provision and switch the
Encryption Key via SNMPv3
interface
KTS 2UC400E Session Communication
Authentication Key
Crypto W Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
2UC400E Line
Port Encryption
State
Provisioning
Allows the user to provision
and configure the facility
information associated with
2UC400E cards via SNMPv3
N/A None Crypto N/A Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
Zeroize Keys Zeroize keys and CSPs over
SNMPv3 interfaces
N/A SNMPv3 Passphrase
SNMPv3 Authentication Key
SNMPv3 Privacy Key
11QPEN4 Session Encryption
Key
11QPEN4 Session KAT Key
S13X100E Session Encryption
Key
S13X100E Session KAT Key
Crypto Z Log entry,
Command execution
returns success
indicator
Table 34 - Approved Services
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Access rights:
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
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4.3 Authentication
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
Admin SNMPv3 Authentication 160 bit
CLI/WebUI Authentication 160 bit
Crypto SNMPv3 Authentication 160 bit
CLI/WebUI Authentication 160 bit
Table 35 - Roles and Authentication
The cryptographic module only provides access to a user that assumes a role (Administrator or Crypto)
and has a specific identity (username and a password). Users are required to follow password
restrictions listed in the following table.
Authentication
Mechanism
Keyword / Password
Rules
Strength of Mechanism
SNMPv3 username and
keyword for 1830 SMS
and NMS
The username should not be
longer than 21 characters.
The username is a human
readable string and no more
than 21 characters in length,
there are no additional
SNMPv3 standards for user
restrictions.
The keyword can be from 27 to
32 characters, using upper- and
lower-case letters and numeric
digits 0–9.
The keyword must be
generated by a key generator
(to guarantee the required
randomness).
The SNMP v3 Crypto user is created by the user
manually at system turn-up. The keyword can be
entered from 27 to 32 characters, upper and lower
letter case and numeric. There are 26 lower case
plus 26 upper case plus 10 digits for a total of 62
characters: with a minimum keyword length of 27,
the minimum combinations that are possible are
2,481E+48 or 62^27.
The fastest network connection supported by the
module is 100 Mbps. Hence at most (100×10^6 ×
60 = 6 × 10^9) = 6,000,000,000 bits of data can be
transmitted in one minute.
Therefore, the probability that a random attempt
will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in
one minute is
1 : 62^27 possible keywords / ((6 ×10^9 bits per
minute) / 64 bits per keyword)), which is
1: 2,481E+48 possible keywords / 93,750,000
keywords per minute), which is
1: 2,646E+40, which is a smaller probability than
1:100,000 as required by FIPS 140-3.
CLI username and
password
Usernames are strings of 5
to 12 case-sensitive
alphanumeric characters
where the first character is
an alphabetic character.
The following special
characters are also valid:
• % (percent
• + (plus sign)
• # (pound sign)
• _ (underscore)
Minimum password length is
12 characters.
There are 26 lower case plus
26 upper case plus 10 digits
plus 14 special characters for a
total of 76 characters. A
password is a case- sensitive
string of 12 to 32 alphanumeric
characters having at least one
of the following:
• at least one lowercase
alphabetic character
• at least one uppercase
alphabetic character
• at least one numeric
character
• at least one special
character
The following special
characters are valid:
% (percent)
+ (plus sign)
# (pound sign)
_ (underscore)
(26 lower case + 26 upper case + 10 digits + 14
special characters) = 76 characters X a minimum
password length of 12.
7612 = 37,133,262,473,195,501,387,776
After a failed login attempt, the system delays the
next login prompt. With this delay, a maximum of
31 attempts can occur in one minute. Therefore,
the probability that a random attempt will succeed
or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is 1:
37,133,262,473,195,501,387,776 possible
passwords / 31 passwords per minute) =
1:1,197,847,176,554,693,593,154 which is a
smaller probability than 1 in 100,000 as required
by FIPS 140-3.
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! (exclamation mark)
@ (at sign)
$ (dollar sign)
” (double quotation
mark)
& (ampersand)
' (apostrophe)
( (left parenthesis)
) (right parenthesis)
(asterisk)
. (period)
The first character of the
password can be any
alphabetic, numeric, or a valid
special character.
The New Password cannot be
the same as or the reverse of
the associated username and
the password must not have
three consecutive identical
characters.
Table 36 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
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5 Software/Firmware security
A Nokia-Generic is the means to store software and firmware for a PSS-8/16II/32/24x or PSI-M system.
The Nokia-Generic consists of a number of RPMs and each RPM contains a number of files.
5.1 Securing RPMs
Each RPM is protected in integrity and authentication (proof of origin) using a digital signature based
on:
• SHA-512 [FIPS 180-4] for the hash function
• RSA-PSS [FIPS 186-4] with 4096-bits asymmetrical key for the signature calculation using a
512-bit salt (random value)
An RPM is checked when it is brought onto the module.
5.2 Securing Files
Each file is protected in integrity using an integrity check based on
• SHA-256 for the hash function
All files are checked a start-up of the module.
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6 Operational environment
The operational environment is non-modifiable.
6.1 Operating System and Hardware Platforms
For the used Operating Systems and Hardware Platforms, please refer to chapter 2 “Cryptographic
module specification”.
6.2 FIPS Approved Mode Indicator
The module shall be provisioned as described in chapter 16.1 and physically secured as described in
chapter 15.
The Admin can unambiguously determine that the module is in approved mode if the tamper-evident
labels remain intact.
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7 Physical security
7.1 Overview
To operate in FIPS Approved mode the tamper-evident labels shall be installed as shown in chapter 15
“Guidance – Physical Installation – Installing Tamper-evident labels”.
7.2 Physical boundary
The cryptographic boundary of the 1830 PSS shelves is
• PSS-8: Shelf and Shelf Cover and Shelf Panel
• PSS-16II, PSS-32: Shelf and Shelf Cover and User Panel
• PSS-24x (ETSI version): Rack (shelf is inside the rack)
• PSS-24x (ANSI variant): Shelf and Shelf Cover
• PSI-M: Shelf
7.3 Physical Security Mechanisms
After the tamper seals have been applied to the module, the shelf cannot be accessed without indicating
signs of tampering.
The multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security mechanisms:
• Production-grade components and production-grade opaque enclosure with tamper-evident
labels.
• Tamper-evident labels: refer to chapter 15 “Guidance – Physical Installation – Installing
Tamper-evident labels” for detailed instructions on tamper-evident label placement.
• Provision the cryptographic module to operate in a FIPS compliant mode: refer to chapter 6.1
“Operating System and Hardware Platforms
• For the used Operating Systems and Hardware Platforms, please refer to chapter 2
“Cryptographic module specification”.
• ” for detailed instructions.
• all unpopulated slots are equipped with filler cards
7.4 Tamper-evident labels
Tamper-evident labels shall be installed (by the Crypto Officer (CO)) for the module to operate in a
FIPS-approved mode of operation.
The following graphics illustrate a tamper-evident label.
Figure 23 - Tamper-evident label: intact, illustrates a tamper-evident label with no evidence of
tampering.
Figure 23 - Tamper-evident label: intact
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2021-2023 © Nokia 1.5
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Figure 24 - Tamper-evident label: broken, illustrates a tamper-evident label that shows signs of
tampering. Note the VOID markings on the solid red label. If any portion of the VOID marking is
visible, the equipment is showing signs of potential tampering.
Figure 24 - Tamper-evident label: broken
Scan labels
The tamper-evident labels each have a unique serial number and a linear barcode. The linear barcodes
can be scanned while still on the sheet.
Broken tamper-evident labels
If a tamper-evident label is broken, then the respective module must be considered compromised and
must not be used anymore.
8 Non-invasive security
The module claims no non-invasive security techniques.
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2021-2023 © Nokia 1.5
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9 Sensitive security parameter management
List of SSPs:
Key/
SSP
Name/
Type
Streng
th
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generati
on
Import
/Export
Establish
ment
Storage Zeroisat
ion
Use &
related
keys
SNMPv3
Passphrase
Minimu
m: 27
charact
ers,
32
chars:
190 bits
N/A N/A Input in
encrypted
form via
CLI or
WebUI
Never
exits the
module
AD/EE
KTS
Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle
Derivation
of
SNMPv3
privacy and
authenticati
on keys
SNMPv3
Privacy
Key
256-
bits
AES CFB128
Encryption/
Decryption
A2502
N/A Never
exits the
module
Derived
internally
using SNMP
KDF
Local database
cleartext
Zeroized
when
SNMPv3
passphras
e is
updated
with a
new one
Encrypting
SNMPv3
packets
SNMPv3
Authenticat
ion Key
160-
256 bits
Keyed-Hash
Message
Authentication
A2502
N/A Never
exits the
module
Derived
internally
using SNMP
KDF
Local database
cleartext
Zeroized
when
SNMPv3
passphras
e is
updated
with a
new one
Authenticat
ing
SNMPv3
packets
11QPEN4
Session
Encryption
Key
(AES-256
key)
256-
bits
AES-CTR, AES-
GCM
A2537,
A2539
Imported
across
encrypted
SNMPv3
link from
KM
Imported
Encrypted,
no Export
AD/EE
KTS
Stored in write
only device
registers in
FPGA
Zeroized
on
module
reset and
key
switches
to new
keys
Used to
encrypt
traffic data
S13X100E
Session
Encryption
and
Authenticat
ion Key
(AES-256
key)
256-
bits
AES-CTR, AES-
GMAC
AES 3844
Imported
across
encrypted
SNMPv3
link from
KM
Imported
Encrypted,
no Export
AD/EE
KTS
Stored in write
only device
registers in
FPGA
Zeroized
on
module
reset and
key
switches
to new
keys
Used to
encrypt
traffic data
2UC400E
Session
Encryption
Key
(AES-256
key)
256-
bits
AES-CTR, AES-
GMAC
AES 3844
Imported
across
encrypted
SNMPv3
link from
KM
Imported
Encrypted,
no Export
AD/EE
KTS
Stored in write
only device
registers in
FPGA
Zeroized
on
module
reset and
key
switches
to new
keys
Used to
encrypt
traffic data
11QPEN4
Session
KAT Key
(WKAT
Authenticat
ion String)
(Hexadecim
al-Alpha-
Numeric-
String)
N/A AES-ECB
A2537,
A2539
Imported
across
encrypted
SNMPv3
link from
KM
Exits the
module in
plaintext
over
secured
SNMPv3
link
AD/EE
KTS
Stored within
module in plain
text in EC flash
memory and in
ASIC
Zeroized
when new
string is
entered or
when
service is
deleted
Used to
authenticat
e traffic
data
connection
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
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Key/
SSP
Name/
Type
Streng
th
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generati
on
Import
/Export
Establish
ment
Storage Zeroisat
ion
Use &
related
keys
S13X100E
Session
KAT Key
(WKAT
Authenticat
ion String)
(Hexadecim
al-Alpha-
Numeric-
String)
N/A AES-ECB
AES 3844
Imported
across
encrypted
SNMPv3
link from
KM
Exits the
module in
plaintext
over
secured
SNMPv3
link
AD/EE
KTS
Stored within
module in plain
text in EC flash
memory and in
ASIC
Zeroized
when new
string is
entered or
when
service is
deleted
Used to
authenticat
e traffic
data
connection
2UC400E
Session
KAT Key
(WKAT
Authenticat
ion String)
(Hexadecim
al-Alpha-
Numeric-
String)
N/A AES-ECB
AES 3844
Imported
across
encrypted
SNMPv3
link from
KM
Exits the
module in
plaintext
over
secured
SNMPv3
link
AD/EE
KTS
Stored within
module in plain
text in EC flash
memory and in
ASIC
Zeroized
when new
string is
entered or
when
service is
deleted
Used to
authenticat
e traffic
data
connection
S13X100E
Session
Communica
tion
Authenticat
ion Key
(AES-256
key)
256-
bits
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A2415
S13X100E
Session
Encryption
and
Authentica
tion Key is
used
No Import,
no Export
N/A Stored AES-256
encrypted in
module RAM
Zeroized
on
module
reset and
key
switches
to new
keys
Used to
authenticat
e (with
HMAC-
SHA256)
information
exchanged
between
modules
2UC400E
Session
Communica
tion
Authenticat
ion Key
(AES-256
key)
256-
bits
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A24156
2UC400E
Session
Encryption
Key is
used
No Import,
no Export
N/A Stored AES-256
encrypted in
module RAM
Zeroized
on
module
reset and
key
switches
to new
keys
Used to
authenticat
e (with
HMAC-
SHA256)
information
exchanged
between
modules
User
Password
Minimu
m: 12
charact
ers
32
chars=
199
N/A Entered in
module via
CLI or
Web UI
Entered
Encrypted,
no Export
N/A Local database
plaintext
Zeroized
when
password
is updated
with a
new one
Return-
to-
Factory
Comman
d
Authenticat
ion of
Users
AES GCM
IV
96-bit AES-GCM
A3369
Generated
internally
Never
exits the
module
N/A Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle
IV for AES
GCM
DH Private
Key
Component
112-
200 bits
DH Shared
Secret
Computation
A3369
Generated
internally
via
Approved
DRBG
Never
exits the
module
N/A Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Generation
of SSH
shared
secrets
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2021-2023 © Nokia 1.5
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Key/
SSP
Name/
Type
Streng
th
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generati
on
Import
/Export
Establish
ment
Storage Zeroisat
ion
Use &
related
keys
DH Public
Key
Component
112-
200 bits
DH Shared
Secret
Computation
A3369
[for the
module]
Generated
internally
via
Approved
DRBG
[for the
module]
Exits the
module in
plaintext
form
[for a peer]
Input in
plaintext
form,
never exits
the module
N/A Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Generation
of SSH
shared
secrets
ECDH
Private Key
Component
128-
256 bits
ECDH Shared
Secret
Computation
A3369
Generated
internally
via
Approved
DRBG
Never
exits the
module
N/A Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Generation
of SSH and
TLS shared
secrets
ECDH
Public Key
Component
128-
256 bits
ECDH Shared
Secret
Computation
A3369
[for the
module]
Generated
internally
via
Approved
DRBG
[for the
module]
Exits the
module in
plaintext
form
[for a peer]
Input in
plaintext
form,
never exits
the module
N/A Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Generation
of SSH and
TLS shared
secrets
SSH User
Public Key
112-
150 bits
(RSA)
128-
256 bits
(ECDS
A)
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
RSA Signature
Verification
A3369
N/A Imported
in Base64
encoded
(PEM) file
format via
WebUI or
CLI
AD/EE
KTS
Local database
AES-128
encrypted
Zeroized
when key
is updated
with a
new one
Return-
to-
Factory
command
Public key
authenticati
on
(authorized
key)
SFTP SSH
User
Private Key
112-
150 bits
(RSA)
128-
256 bits
(ECDS
A)
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
A3369
N/A Imported
in Base64
encoded
(PEM) file
format via
WebUI or
CLI
AD/EE
KTS
Local database
AES-128
encrypted
Return-
to-
Factory
command
Public key
authenticati
on to SFTP
server
(Identity
key)
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Key/
SSP
Name/
Type
Streng
th
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generati
on
Import
/Export
Establish
ment
Storage Zeroisat
ion
Use &
related
keys
SFTP
Server
Public Host
Key
112-
150 bits
(RSA)
128-
256 bits
(ECDS
A)
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
RSA Signature
Verification
A3369
N/A [for the
module]
Imported
in Base64
encoded
(PEM) file
format via
WebUI or
CLI
[for a peer]
Input in
plaintext
form as
part of
SSH
session
negotiation
Never
exits the
module
AD/EE
KTS
Local database
cleartext
Return-
to-
Factory
command
Authenticat
ion of
SFTP
server
(known
host key)
SSH
Private Key
112-
150 bits
(RSA)
128-
256 bits
(ECDS
A)
ECDSA/RSA
Key Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
A3369
Generated
internally
via
Approved
DRBG
Never
exits the
module
N/A Local database
AES-128
encrypted
Return-
to-
Factory
command
Authenticat
ion during
SSH
session
negotiation
SSH Public
key
112-
150 bits
(RSA)
128-
256 bits
(ECDS
A)
ECDSA/RSA
Key Generation
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
RSA Signature
Verification
A3369
[for the
module]
Generated
internally
via
Approved
DRBG
[for the
module]
Exits the
module in
plaintext
form
during
SSH
session
negotiation
Exported
from
module via
CLI or
WebUI
(for install
on client
for host
key
authenticat
ion)
[for a peer]
Input in
plaintext
form as
part of
SSH
session
negotiation
Never
exits the
module
N/A Local database
AES-128
encrypted
Return-
to-
Factory
command
Authenticat
ion during
SSH
session
negotiation
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
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Key/
SSP
Name/
Type
Streng
th
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generati
on
Import
/Export
Establish
ment
Storage Zeroisat
ion
Use &
related
keys
SSH Shared
Secret
112-
200 bits
(FFC)
128-
256 bits
(ECC)
KAS-FFC-SSC,
KAS-ECC-SSC
Shared Secret
Computation
A3369
N/A Never
exits the
module
KAS-FFC-
SSC
KAS-ECC-
SSC
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n
Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Derivation
of the SSH
Session
Key and
SSH
Authenticat
ion Key
SSH
Session
Key
128-
256 bits
AES-CTR
AES-GCM
Encryption/Decr
yption
A3369
N/A Never
exits the
module
SSH KDF
used to
derive
keying
material
Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Encryption
and
decryption
of SSH
session
packets
SSH
Authenticat
ion Key
256-
512 bits
Keyed-Hash
Message
Authentication
A3369
N/A Never
exits the
module
SSH KDF
used to
derive
keying
material
Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Authenticat
ion of SSH
session
packets
CA Public
Key
112-
150 bits
RSA Signature
Verification
A3369
Generated
externally
Imported
in Base64
encoded
(PEM) file
format via
WebUI or
CLI
AD/EE
KTS
Local database
AES-128
encrypted
Zeroized
when
certificate
is updated
with a
new one
Return-
to-
Factory
command
Verificatio
n of CA
signatures
TLS Private
Key
112-
150 bits
RSA Key
Generation/RSA
Signature
Generation
A3369
Generated
internally
via
Approved
DRBG
Never
exits the
module
Local database
AES-128
encrypted
Return-
to-
Factory
command
TLS
authenticati
on
TLS Public
Key
112-
150 bits
RSA Key
Generation/RSA
Signature
Verification
A3369
[for the
module]
Generated
internally
via
Approved
DRBG
[for the
module]
Exits the
module in
plaintext
form
[for a peer]
Input in
plaintext
form as
part of
TLS
session
negotiation
Never
exits the
module
[for the module]
Local database
AES-128
encrypted
[for a peer]
Plaintext in
volatile memory
Return-
to-
Factory
command
TLS
authenticati
on
1024-bit
RSA public
keys are
used for
signature
verification
only
TLS Pre-
Master
Secret
128-
256 bits
KAS-ECC-SSC
Shared Secret
Computation
A3369
N/A Never
exits the
module
Derived
internally
via KAS-
ECC-SSC
Shared
Secret
Computatio
n
Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
upon
completio
n of TLS
Master
Secret
computati
on
Derivation
of the TLS
Master
Secret
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Key/
SSP
Name/
Type
Streng
th
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generati
on
Import
/Export
Establish
ment
Storage Zeroisat
ion
Use &
related
keys
TLS Master
Secret
128-
256 bits
KAS-ECC-SSC
Shared Secret
Computation
A3369
N/A Never
exits the
module
Derived
internally
using the
TLS Pre-
Master
Secret via
TLS KDF
Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Derivation
of the TLS
Session
Key and
TLS
Authenticat
ion Key
TLS
Session
Key
128,
256
AES-CBC. AES-
GCM
Encryption/
Decryption
A3369
N/A Never
exits the
module
Derived
internally
using the
TLS Master
Secret via
TLS KDF
Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Encryption
and
decryption
of TLS
session
packets
TLS
Authenticat
ion Key
256-
384 bits
Keyed-Hash
Message
Authentication
A3369
N/A Never
exits the
module
Derived
internally
using the
TLS Master
Secret via
TLS KDF
Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle;
session
terminatio
n
Authenticat
ion of TLS
session
packets
DRBG
Seed
384 bits Random number
generation
A3369
Entropy
from ESV
(Cert
#26)
approved
platform
noise
source.
Never
exits the
module
N/A Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle
Random
seed data
drawn from
Nokia Jitter
Entropy(JE
NT)
and used to
seed an
implementa
tion of the
NIST
SP 800-
90Ar1 CTR
(AES)
DRBG.
DRBG Key
256-bit
AES key
256 bits Random number
generation
A3369
Internal
state
generated
using
CTR_DRB
G from
[SP800-
90Ar1].
Never
exits the
module
N/A Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle
32 bytes
AES key
stored in
the RAM.
Used in an
implementa
tion of the
NIST SP
800-90Ar1
CTR
(AES)
DRBG.
DRBG V 128 bits Random number
generation
A3369
Internal
state
generated
using
CTR_DRB
G from
[SP800-
90Ar1].
Never
exits the
module
N/A Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle
Part of the
secret state
of the
approved
DRBG.
The value
is
generated
using the
methods
described
in [SP800-
90Ar1].
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Key/
SSP
Name/
Type
Streng
th
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generati
on
Import
/Export
Establish
ment
Storage Zeroisat
ion
Use &
related
keys
Entropy
Input String
256 bits Entropy Source
for Random
number
generation
E26
Generated
internally
Never
exits the
module
N/A Plaintext in
volatile memory
Reboot;
power-
cycle
Random
number
generation
Firmware
Load
Authenticat
ion Key
N/A RSA Digital
Signature
Verification
A3369
N/A N/A N/A Hardcoded/emb
edded in the
application
firmware image
N/A Self-Test
SNMP
Certificate
Fingerprint
256-
512 bits
Secure Hash
A3369
N/A Imported
in hex
format
over CLI
or WebUI
AD/EE
KTS
Local database
cleartext,
certificate
fingerprint only
Zeroized
when
certificate
fingerprin
t is
updated
with a
new one
Return-
to-
Factory
command
SNMPv3
user
authenticati
on for
SNMP over
TLS
Database
Encryption
Key
128-bit AES-CBC
A3369
N/A N/A N/A Hardcoded/emb
edded in the
application
firmware image
Return-
to-
Factory
Comman
d
Encryption
of SSPs in
local
database
Table 37 - SSPs
Note: all SSPs are zeroized via the Return-to-Factory CLI command.
Note: The AES-GCM IV is used in the TLS and SSH protocol. For TLS, the AES-GCM IV is internally
generated deterministically in compliance with TLSv1.2 GCM cipher suites as specified in RFC 5288
and Section 8.2.1 of NIST SP 800-38D. Per RFC 5246, when the nonce explicit part of the IV exhausts
the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the module will trigger a handshake to
establish a new encryption key. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and supports acceptable GCM
ciphersuites from Section 3.3.1 of SP 800- 52 Rev 2. For SSH, the AES GCM IV is constructed in
compliance with the SSHv2 specification (RFCs 4252, 4253 and 5647) and only for use within the
SSHv2 protocol.
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RBG entropy sources:
Entropy sources Minimum number of bits of entropy Details
8EC2 256 JENT is used as entropy source
32EC2 256 JENT is used as entropy source
CEC2 256 JENT is used as entropy source
MEC2 256 JENT is used as entropy source
Table 38 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
10 Self-tests
The 1830 PSS-32/PSS-16II/PSS-8/24x and PSI-M perform known answer tests and critical functions
tests at power up.
Test Description
AES Encrypt KAT Encrypt Known answer test for AES-256 CFB-128.
AES Decrypt KAT Decrypt Known answer test for AES-256 CFB-128.
AES Encrypt FPGA KAT (11QPEN4 cards) Encrypt Known answer test for AES-256 CTR.
AES Decrypt FPGA KAT (11QPEN4 cards) Decrypt Known answer test for AES-256 CTR.
AES Encrypt ASIC KAT (S13X100E cards) Encrypt Known answer test for AES-256 GMAC.
AES Decrypt ASIC KAT (S13X100E cards) Decrypt Known answer test for AES-256 GMAC.
SHA KAT Known answer test for SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT Known answer test for HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA256 KAT Known answer test for HMAC-SHA256
OpenSSL self-test (Nokia openSSL) Details see below
Table 39 - Self-tests
Pre-Operational Self-Tests
• OpenSSL Integrity Test – using HMAC-SHA2-256
• Application Firmware Integrity Test – using error detection code (SHA2-256)
Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (performed at power-up)
• OpenSSL library
o AES encrypt KAT (ECB mode)
o AES decrypt KAT (ECB mode)
o AES GCM encrypt KAT
o AES GCM decrypt KAT
o CTR-based DRBG KAT
o HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
o ECDSA signature generation KAT OR ECDSA signature verification KAT
o RSA signature generation KAT
o RSA signature verification KAT
o SNMPv3 KDF KAT
o SSHv2 KDF KAT
o TLS 1.2 KDF KAT
o FFC DH shared secret KAT (2048)
o ECDH shared secret KAT (P-256)
• Entropy Source library
o SHA3-256 (entropy conditioning component)
HMAC KATs with SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512 utilize (and thus test) the full functionality of the
SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512 algorithms; therefore, no independent KATs for SHA-1, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, and SHA2-512 implementations are required.
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Conditional Self-Tests
• Firmware Load Test using RSA 4096 digital signature verification with SHA2-512
• Entropy RCT/APT
• ECDSA PCT
• RSA PCT
• DH/ECDH Key Assurances
Critical Functions Tests
• DRBG Health Checks (performed at power-up)
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11 Life-cycle assurance
11.1 Delivery & Operation
Nokia delivers the module both physically and electronically.
The hardware is delivered physically via a trusted carrier. The box is sealed by PVC adhesive tape with
identification labels. A tamper free tape is also applied. The box is then belted if required.
The software and guidance documentation are retrieved electronically from a web site.
Hardware and software items associated with the module are itemized by a unique Nokia Part Number
(APN). In addition, each 1830 PSS or 1830 PSI-M shelf can be ordered as a kit with the minimum
required equipment for approved operation. The kit is also specified by a unique APN.
Final versions of 1830 PSS customer documentation are posted on the Nokia Support portal, a Nokia
Extranet site for internal users and external customers with entitlement. If a customer document is re-
issued, the re-issue is then posted on Nokia Support portal and the previous issue of the document
removed.
11.2 Crypto Officer (Admin) Commisioning Guidance
The approved mode of operation has to be prepared by the Crypto Officer (Admin) by following the
instructions in chapter 15 and chapter 16.
If the module starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests (described in chapter 10)
and is operating in the approved mode of operation.
11.3 Tamper-Evident Seal Inspection
The Crypto Officer is responsible for inspecting the tamper-evident labels on the shelves at least every 3
months.
11.4 Decommissioning the module
When a zeroization of all SSPs is needed, because the module shall be decommissioned or taken out of
the secured mode of operation, then the Return-to-Factory procedure can be used.
Please note, that this erases also all Firmware and thus leads to a need to send the equipment back to the
factory before the next use. For details, refer to chapter 16.4.
12 Mitigation of other attacks
The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3
requirements.
13 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AGD Assurance Guidance Documents
ALC Assurance Life Cycle
ANSSI Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
CC Common Criteria
CIT Craft Interface Terminal
CLI Command Line Interface
COE Central Office Equipment
CPE Customer Premises Equipment
CT Commercial Temperature
DWDM Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing
EC Equipment Controller
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FC Fibre Channel
GE Gigabit Ethernet
KAT Known Answer Test
KM Key Manager
NE Network Element
NM Network Manager
NOC Network Operations Center
OAMP Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisoning
OTU Optical Transport Unit
PP Protection Profile
PSS Photonic Service Switch
QPEN Quad Pluggable ENcryption
RBAC Role Based Access Control
RFS Remote File Server
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SNMP Simple Network Manager Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
T-ROADM Tunable-Reconfigurable Optical Add/Drop Mulitplexer
TSF TOE Security Functions
UID User Identifier
VOA Variable Optical Attenuator
VOIP Voice over Internet Protocol
WKAT Well Known Answer Test
XFP eXtended Form-factor Pluggable
Table 40 - Acronyms
14 References
FIPS
[FIPS 140-3] FIPS PUB 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
[FIPS 140-3 DTR] Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-3, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules
[FIPS 140-3 IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
NIST
[NIST800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques - NIST Special Publication 800-38A
[NIST800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC - NIST Special Publication 800-38D
[NIST800-38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping - NIST Special Publication 800-38F
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15 Guidance – Physical Installation – Installing Tamper-evident labels
15.1 Procedure 1: Install tamper-evident-labels
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830
PSS-8/16-II/32. The tamper seals are provided in the Security Label Kit (8DG-6509-AAAA), which is
a component of Shelf FIPS Kit: (3KC-13453-AAAA)
Steps
1. When applying tamper-evident labels, ensure that the surface temperature to be sealed is be a
minimum of +10°F and a maximum of +167°F.
2. Ensure that the surface to be sealed is dry. Moisture of any kind can cause a problem.
Wipe the area with a clean paper towel.
3. Ensure that the surface to be sealed is clean. Wipe the area with a clean cloth or paper towel to
remove any dust or other loose particles.
4. If there are possible chemical contaminants (oil, lubricants, release agents, etc), clean the surface
with 100% iso-propyl alcohol. Wipe the alcohol dry with clean dry cloth or paper towel.
• Note: Avoid using rubbing alcohol; it can leave an oily coating that will interfere with
adhesion of the label.
5. Installed tamper-evident labels shall be cured for 24 hours.
6. Proceed to the appropriate procedure to install the tamper-evident labels:
• PSS-8
• PSS-16II
• PSS-32
• PSS-24x
• PSI-M
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15.2 Procedure 1.1: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-8
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-8.
Steps
1. Place labels 1-4 horizontally over the 4 mounting screws that affix the rear cover to the shelf.
Figure 25 - PSS-8 shelf – rear
2. Place labels 5 and 6 over the over the top cover to wrap the faceplate latches.
Figure 26 - PSS-8 shelf – top
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3. Place label 7 and 8 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover adaptor to the
shelf.
4. Place labels 9 and 10 over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to the shelf.
Figure 28 - PSS-8 shelf – front
5. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-8 shelf is now sealed.
6. Log the installation of the tamper evident labels used to be referenced at the time of label
inspection.
7 8
Left Right
Figure 27 - PSS-8 shelf – left / right
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15.3 Procedure 1.2: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-16II
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-16II.
Overview
Figure 29 – PSS-16II shelf – overview front
Figure 30 - PSS-16II shelf – overview rear
Steps
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1. Place labels 1-5 vertically over the 5 mounting screws that affix the rear cover to the shelf.
Figure 31 – PSS-16II shelf - rear
2. Place labels 6 to 7 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the left bracket to the shelf.
7
6
Figure 32 - PSS-16II shelf - left
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3. Place labels 8 and 9 horizontally over the 2 mounting screws that affix the right bracket to the
shelf.
Figure 33 - PSS-16II shelf - right
4. Place labels 10 and 11 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to the
shelf. Place labels 12 and 13 vertically over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to
the fan tray.
Figure 34 - PSS-16II shelf - front
5. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-16II shelf is now sealed.
9
8
10 11
12 13
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15.4 Procedure 1.3: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-32
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-32.
Steps
1. Place labels 1–4 horizontally over the 4 mounting screws that affix the rear cover to the shelf.
Figure 35 - PSS-32 shelf – rear
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2. Wrap labels 5 around one of the 2 mounting screws that affix the bottom shelf cover mounting
bracket to the shelf.
3. Wrap label 6 around one of the 2 mounting screws that affix the bottom shelf cover mounting
bracket to the shelf.
Figure 37 - PSS-32 shelf – bottom (2)
Figure 36 – PSS-32 shelf – bottom (1)
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4. Place label 7 over one of the two screws that affix the top air exhaust to the shelf. Place labels 8
and 9 over the 2 mounting screws that affix the front cover to the shelf.
5. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-32 shelf is now sealed.
6. Log the installation of the tamper evident labels used to be referenced at the time of label
inspection.
7
8
9
Figure 38 - PSS-32 shelf – front
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15.5 Procedure 1.4: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ETSI variant
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ETSI
variant.
Steps
1. Place label 1 over the front door opener and label 2 over the rear door opener.
2. Place label 3 and 4 over the screws on the left side and place labels 5 and 6 over the screws on
the right side.
1 2
3
4
5
6
Figure 39 - PSS-24x ETSI rack
3. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ETSI rack is now sealed.
Note: Top and bottom of the PSS-24x rack does not need to be secured as this is implicitly achieved by
the steps in this procedure.
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15.6 Procedure 1.4: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ANSI variant
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ANSI
variant.
Steps
1. Place label 1 and 2 over the screws on the front cover of the PSS-24x ANSI shelf.
2. Place label 3 and 4 on the left side of the PSS-24x ANSI shelf. Attach the tamper-evident labels
over the cover brackets and the central rack-post.
3. Place label 5 and 6 on the right side of the PSS-24x ANSI shelf. Attach the tamper-evident
labels over the cover brackets and the central rack-post.
1 2
3
4
3
4
5
6
5
6
3
4
Figure 40 - PSS-24x ANSI shelf – front, left and right
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4. Place label 7 over the border of the TPSC96, as shown in figure below.
5. Place label 8 over the screw on the back wall of the shelf, as shown in figure below.
6. Place label 9, 10 over the thumb screw that secures the TIC.
7. Place label 11 over the thumb screw that secures the MFC24X.
8. Place label 12, 13, 14 over the border between FAN housing and shelf.
9. Place label 15, 16, 17, 18 over the thumb screw that secures the PSF96.
10
11
15..18
9
8
7
PSS-24x Rear View
MFC
TIC
TPSC
PSF
FAN
14
13
12
Figure 41 - PSS24x ANSI shelf – rear
10. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSS-24x ANSI shelf is now sealed.
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15.7 Procedure 1.5: Install the tamper-evident labels on Nokia 1830 PSI-M
Purpose
Use this procedure to provision to install the tamper-evident labels on a Nokia 1830 PSI-M.
Steps
1. Place labels 1-4 horizontally over the 4 blades and onto the top cover making sure to not cover
any air holes or labels.
Figure 42 - PSI-M shelf – front
2. Place label 5 and 6 vertically over the mounting thumb screw for the chassis to mount into the
rack.
Figure 43 - PSI-M shelf – front left
3. Place label 7 over the top cover horizontally to cover the chassis and the top cover. Making sure
to cover the screw head on the chassis.
Figure 44 - PSI-M shelf – top
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4. Place Label 8 on the chassis and over the fan grill as shown. Place Labels 9 and 10 over the fan
handle. Make sure the fan handle is in the down position and put the make sure it is on the
bottom surface of the chassis once on the handles as shown.
Figure 45 - PSI-M shelf – rear
Label coming onto the bottom surface of the shelf
Figure 46 - PSI-M shelf – rear, bottom
5. The cryptographic boundary of the Nokia 1830 PSI-M shelf is now sealed.
6. Log the installation of the tamper evident labels used to be referenced at the time of label
inspection.
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16 Guidance – System Configuration Procedures
16.1 Provisioning the 1830 PSS and 1830 PSI-M
16.1.1 Procedure: Provision for FIPS 140-3 Approved Mode of Operation
16.1.1.1 Overview
16.1.1.2 Purpose
This procedure describes how to put the module into the FIPS-Approved mode.
16.1.1.3 Preconditions
16.1.1.4 Communication environment
Important! Until the NE is secured by performing the steps described up to and including chapter 16.1.1.15,
it must not be connected to a LAN in order to avoid vulnerabilities.
For a FIPS compliant configuration, the NE must run an ECN software load.
When the NE is operational, the NE, along with the whole communication network, must be under
restricted access. Internet access must be disabled, and access within the customer DCN must be
restricted to selected systems, for example the NMS and computers of administrators.
The Gateway NE (GNE) does have a rudimentary firewall, but the PSS network should also be
protected from network attacks, such as Denial of Service attacks or rogue packets. This protection
is typically implemented at the DCN router that connects to the GNE. Additionally, IPSec tunneling
between the DCN router and the management system(s) is recommended.
16.1.1.5 10.2.2 NE status
The NE is properly installed and running: The NE is physically assembled, and the software is
installed. The NE has booted and can be accessed via CIT.
16.1.1.6 Environment security
Any equipment used to access the NE must be secured through the current state of the art security
measures. This applies to computers that the 1830 PSS WebUI user interface or WS-NOC run on,
but also, to the use of input devices for such computers.
Note: A cordless mouse or keyboard cannot be considered secure.
The OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) community, among others, can provide the
best practices in regard to this topic.
16.1.1.7 Communication with the NE
All communication from/to the Management System(s) can be secured using an IPSec tunnel. This
is an additional security measure that is not required for most communication channels. The
communication channels where this is mandatory, are explicitly shown in the respective chapters.
Irrespective of the use of IPSec tunnel, secure protocols (SSH, SNMPv3, HTTPS, etc.) should be
used to connect to the NE.
The IPSec tunnel is set up between the management system(s) and a DCN router placed next to
the NE. From the DCN router to the NE, there is no IPSec tunnel possible, so this physical
connection must be physically secured.
Note: A FIPS compliant configuration allows secure communication protocols at the OAMP
interface only.
16.1.1.8 General steps
16.1.1.9 Before you begin
Refer to the 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) Release 22.12 Command Line Interface Guide [PSS-CLIG] for
more detailed information regarding the CLI commands used in this chapter.
16.1.1.10 Preparation
When the NE is connected to a DCN while the default user account passwords were not yet
changed or ZTP enabled, and keys not set, the NE might be compromised.
Required steps:
1. Disconnect the NE from DCN, if the NE was connected to the DCN before.
If the security was already compromised (e.g., illegitimate user accounts were created), the
system shall be reset to an initial status wiping out all configuration data. After this, restart the
system turn-up procedure. The following command resets the system:
config admin factory-reset
2. From the serial console of the active EC cryptographic module, access CLI as the default administrator
'admin’. Set the NE TID.”
3. From the serial console of the active EC, login to CLI as default administrator ‘admin’.
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Execute the following CLI command to set the OAMP IP address.
config interface usrpnl oamp ip <ipaddress/mask>
16.1.1.11 Configuration access: CIT
Required steps must be executed using a locally connected Craft Interface Terminal (CIT) in order
to avoid interference from DCN before the NE is secured.
16.1.1.12 NE keys
NE keys and certificates must be generated.
Required steps:
1. Generate an SSH key.
crypto key generate all
2. Generate an SSL key (note: SSL means really TLS).
crypto sslkey generate keytype rsa keylen 2048
3. Get and install a signed TLS X.509v3 certificate. Refer to chapter 16.1.1.13
for more detailed information.
Note: When the NE is security hardened it can be connected to the LAN.
Note: Please refer to the User Provisioning Guide for more information.
16.1.1.13 Signed SSL/TLS X.509v3 certificate
In section 16.1.1.12, an SSL/TLS key was generated.
Create a signed X.509v3 certificate for the NE based on this SSL/TLS key.
Required steps:
Create a signed X.509v3 certificate and load it onto the NE.
Use the following commands:
1. Generate a CSR (Certificate Signing Request):
config sslcsr generate
2. Provision Subject Alternative Names (SAN) if SAN authentication/server authentication is
required on the peer.
config sslcsr san {add | delete} {<ip-address> |<domain>}
3. Upload the CSR to a file server:
config software server transfer < ip address of server:
example 135.104.252.100>
config software server transfer protocol sftp
config software server transfer userid < user-id-for-
server>
config software server transfer root <example path:
/home/sw1/ SAN8CSR.csr>
config software server transfer detail
config software server transfer load sslnecsr
4. Create the certificate by signing the CSR by an external CA (Certificate Authority).
5. Download the signed certificate to the NE:
config software server transfer protocol sftp
config software server transfer userid < user-id-for-
server>
config software server transfer root <example path:
/home/sw1/ SAN8certificate.pem>
config software server transfer load sslomscsr
6. Install downloaded certificate:
config sslcert yes
Be sure to install the NE root certificate on any clients connecting to the WebUI
Note: Please refer to the User Provisioning Guide for more information.
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16.1.1.14 Secure mode
In order to enforce secure (encrypted) protocols, the NE must be set to secure mode.
Required step:
1. Set NE to secure mode via CLI:
config admin ui mode encrypted
16.1.1.15 User and account administration for NE management
16.1.1.16 TL1, CLI, WebUI, NETCONF/gRPC
System security settings
The following settings are required to help enforce better security.
config admin session maxfailedlogins 5
config admin authentication local password minlength 12
config admin session timeout 15
config admin maxsession 1
config admin minwaitlogin 15
Default local accounts
At the time of NE deployment, there are two default accounts: admin and service.
admin: The admin account is used to initially configure the NE. This includes creation of additional
accounts to manage the NE.
service: The service account is used by Nokia service personnel to install the NE and perform
maintenance activities.
Required steps:
1. Change the default admin password.
config admin users edit admin passwd
2. Create a non-default account with administrative privileges to be used instead of the default
admin account. For example, to create a user named “adminjoe” with administrative privileges,
use the following command:
config admin users add adminjoe administrator
Note: Should you lose the new password, or disable the users, no maintenance access to the
system will be available in case of emergency.
It is recommended to always create new users with Administrative privilege for periodic work,
and to disable the default user permanently.
Recommended steps:
1. Disable the default admin account.
config admin users edit admin status disabled
2. Disable the default service account.
config admin users edit service status disabled
16.1.1.17 SNMP
The following steps must be executed regardless if the NE is to be managed using SNMP or not.
Accounts for SNMP are maintained by the NE.
Internal accounts
Important! The SNMP user accounts v3IntComDefUser is used for internal purposes. It must not be changed or
removed.
Default accounts
At the time of NE deployment, there are two default accounts: v3DefaultUser and v3DftAdvUser.
Required steps:
1. Disable default accounts:
config admin snmpusers edit v3DftAdvUser status disabled
config admin snmpusers edit v3DefaultUser status disabled
Other predefined accounts
If the NE was connected to a DCN before it was secured, other accounts might have been created.
If other accounts than the default accounts are present, then those accounts must be deleted
unless there is a clear and acceptable reason for them to be there.
Required step:
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1. Check for additional accounts and delete all non-default accounts (unless they are legitimate).
User-defined accounts
Required steps:
1. Create SNMP accounts as needed for accessing management systems.
2. Configure security options and passwords in alignment with accessing management systems.
WS-NOC related accounts
WS-NOC connection is not required. If WS-NOC is used, one SNMP user account is needed for the WS-NOC to
manage the NE. The WS-NOC account is an SNMPv3 user.
Required steps:
1. Create an SNMPv3 user with the following commands:
config admin snmpusers add newnfmuser120 admin aes256sha256
config admin snmpusers edit newnfmuser120 privpasswd
16.1.1.18 Open Agent
The Open Agent provides the NETCONF/gRPC interface and is disabled by default. If the Open
Agent is enabled, disable it.
Required step:
1. If it was enabled, use the following command to disable Open Agent:
config general openagent disabled
16.1.1.19 ZTP (Zero Touch Provisioning)
By default, ZTP is enabled. Disable ZTP mode.
Required step:
1. Disable ZTP via an Admin CLI account:
config admin ztp disable
16.1.1.20 FIPS squelching
Enable fips-squelching mode.
Required step:
1. In CLI, enter:
config general fips-squelching enable
16.1.1.21 Maintenance accounts
Accounts for maintenance are maintained by the NE. Those accounts are to be distinguished from
TL1/CLI/WebUI, SNMP, or GMPLS CP accounts.
Default accounts
At the time of NE deployment, there are two default accounts: maint1 and maint2. The default
status is that they are disabled.
Required steps:
1. Disable remote access to maint1 if it is enabled.
config admin system maint1 disable
2. Change the default passwords.
Use an Admin CLI account to change the passwords of maint1 and maint2:
config admin system maint1 <password>
config admin system maint2 <password>
Note: Passwords must available when required for action by service personnel and kept in a
safe area.
Recommended step:
1. Disable remote access to maint2 if it is enabled.
maint2 has less access rights than maint1 and could be used for remote access while remote
access for maint1is disabled. Still, the disabling of remote access to maint2 is recommended.
To disable the remote access to maint2, use an Admin CLI account to execute:
config admin system maint2 disable
16.1.1.22 Disable local serial console
The local serial console can be used for local maintenance actions. For the login the maint1 user
will be used. It is required that it is either managed by the autostate feature [see 16.1.1.28] or permanently
disabled. To disable it, execute the following command:
config admin system maint1 localdisable
Note: If all management protocols at the OAMP interface and remote maintenance logins
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have failed or are disabled, then no maintenance access is possible anymore - neither remote
nor local.
If the local serial console is enabled, it will be notified by the standing condition MAINT-ALLOWEDLOCAL.
The default severity is NR (not reported). It appears in the condition list and logs only. If the
severity shall be increased to MJ (major), CR (critical) or WR (warning), then it is automatically
present in the alarm list because the FIPS status of the NE is violated in case it is open.
16.1.1.23 Remote access is now safe
16.1.1.24 Precondition
The required steps described in the preceding sections of the security hardening guidelines were
executed. This means that the NE is now hardened to a degree that it is safe to connect to a
general network.
16.1.1.25 Allow remote access to the NE
The next steps can be done using any management access type that has a secure connection.
Configuration access via remote access is now safe, and you may connect to a LAN now.
Note: The DCN is secured, using IP ACL throughout the DCN (see DCN Guide for concepts
and instructions).
16.1.1.26 Physical security
16.1.1.27 Introduction
The NE must be in a secure network; see chapter 16.1.1.4. In addition, the communication channel
in and out of the NE must be restricted.
16.1.1.28 Customer LAN ports, Embedded Communication Channel (ECC)
Recommended steps:
1. Assign IP Address to OAMP port of TOE:
config interface mfc shelf/slot/oamp <ip address for the
TOE>
config cn routes default add <ip address for DHCP server>
16.1.1.29 Services
16.1.1.30 Introduction
The following services should only be enabled if they are used. If they are not used, they should be
disabled.
The following services are covered by this document: NTP, SNMP Traps.
16.1.1.31 NTP with authentication
To authenticate the NTP server(s), a key must be provisioned per NTP server used.
Required steps:
1. Establish an authentication key on each NTP server.
2. Provision each NE receiving time from that server with the authentication key.
Note: The length of the NTP Key must be at least 12 characters and the NTP Key hash type
must be SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1), not MD5 (Message-digest algorithm).
16.1.1.32 SWNE
For a FIPS compliant configuration, SWNE functionality must be disabled.
NEs can be in a server or in a client role.
Required step:
Disable the SWNE functionality:
1. Execute the following command:
config general ftpserver disable
Note: In case of a software update, SWNE functionality must be enabled temporarily.
16.1.1.33 Installation from USB stick
For a FIPS-compliant configuration, use of USB ports is prohibited. The USB ports are therefore
sealed and shall not be used.
16.1.1.34 Bluetooth access
The NE can be accessed via bluetooth using a bluetooth dongle. For a FIPS-compliant
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2021-2023 © Nokia 1.5
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configuration, access via bluetooth must be disabled.
Required step:
1. Execute the following command to disable it:
config interface BT state down
16.1.1.35 SFTP client
1. Provision key-based authentication which supports mutual authentication for SFTP file
transfers.
The following file transfers support this:
• SW download
config software server <ip address of server>
• Software dynamic download
config software dynamic refreshserver
• Data backup & restore
config database server ip <ip address of server: example
135.104.252.100>
config database server protocol sftp
config database server userid <user-id-for-server>
config database path <example path: /home/sw1/ajayoka/DB>
• Log file transfer
config transferlog server ip <ip address of server: example
192.168.219.170 >
config transferlog server protocol SFTP
config transferlog server userid crypto
prompted for <password>
config transferlog server port 22
config transferlog path /home/crypto
• Syslog file transfer
config admin transfersyslog server
• System Trust anchor installation file transfer
config keystore system trustanchor
Note: The parameters are always the same, but the commands differ. The configuration must
be done for all used services.
2. Provision the server and the user credentials on the server.[use server documentation]
3. Once the provisioning is complete, mutual authentication is available for SFTP.
Required steps:
1. Enable SFTP only if needed.
2. The recommended password length for the password used for the SFTP server login as a client
is 12 characters. Alternatively, use key based authentication.
16.1.1.36 SNMP traps
Required step:
1. Set the SNMP trap destination(s) for 1830 SMS.
config snmpserver trapdest add <snmp-server-name> <ip
address of server> 1500 3 v3 0 smsuser256
16.1.1.37 TLS
1. Use TLS 1.2:
config admin security tls tls-system version max 1.2
config admin security tls tls-system version min 1.2
config admin security commit
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2021-2023 © Nokia 1.5
July 31, 2024 This document may be freely distributed whole and intact including this complete copyright notice Page 75 of 77
16.2 Periodically Check Log Files
The NE stores information in various log files. This log files should be periodically checked.
Recommended step:
1. Check log files periodically for anomalies.
Show logs all
16.3 On-demand Self-test
A FIPS self-test can be initiated by power cycling the system. (This action will impact service until system fully
boots up.)
After starting, verify the status of the self-test.
FIPSSFMISMATCH or AESFIPSFAILURE conditions must not appear.
show condition
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2021-2023 © Nokia 1.5
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16.4 De-Provisioning the 1830 PSS and 1830 PSI-M
16.4.1 Procedure: Zeroization of All SSPs
16.4.1.1 Overview
16.4.1.2 Purpose
This procedure describes how to zeroize all SSPs to comply with the Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3 (Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules), detailing the U.S and Canadian governments' requirements for cryptographic modules.
16.4.1.3 Initiate SSP Zeroization
All SSPs are zeroized when the module executes the command to return it to factory. Administrator privilege is
needed to execute this command.
Required steps:
1. initiate Return-to-Factory:
config admin return-to-factory
16.4.1.4 Finish SSP Zeroization
Zeroizing all SSPs in the module takes some time, so the operator must wait for the internal steps to complete.
The Zeroization process is considered completed once all controllers show their LED in Solid Red.
Required steps:
1. Wait for all controller card LEDs to show solid red.
Nokia 1830 PSS/PSI-M R23.3 FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Security Policy Copyright 2021-2023 © Nokia 1.5
July 31, 2024 This document may be freely distributed whole and intact including this complete copyright notice Page 77 of 77
16.5 Additional Guidance
In additional to direct guidance provided in this security policy, additional detailed guidance is available
to registered customers from Nokia documentation web site at documentation.nokia.com.
[PSS-32 ITUG] 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS-32) Release 22.12 Installation and System Turn-Up Guide
Issue Date: 2022/12/22 | Issue: 1 | Document: 3KC-71311-PBAA-TJZZA
[PSS-16II ITUG] 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS-16II) Release 22.12 Installation and System Turn-Up Guide
Issue Date: 2022/12/22 | Issue: 1 | Document: 3KC-71311-PBAA-SMZZA
[PSS-8 ITUG] 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS-8) Release 22.12 Installation and System Turn-Up Guide
Issue Date: 2022/12/22 | Issue: 1 | Document: 3KC-71311-PBAA-SLZZA
[PSS-24x ITUG] 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS-24x) Release 22.12 Installation and System Turn-Up Guide
Issue Date: 2022/12/22 | Issue: 1 | Document: 3KC-71311-PBAA-SJZZA
[PSI-M ITUG] 1830 Photonic Service Interconnect-M (PSI-M) Release 22.12 Installation and System Turn-Up Guide
Issue Date: 2022/12/22 | Issue: 1 | Document: 3KC-82427-AAAA
[PSS CLIG] 1830 Photonic Service Switch (PSS) Release 22.12 Command Line Interface Guide
Issue Date: 2022/12/22 | Issue: 1 | Document: 3KC-71311-PBAA-THZZA
Note: the ITUG and CLIG documents of Release 22.12 are valid for Release 23.3 as well.